1 CIVIL PROCEDURE 2014 | ATTY.

CUSTODIO TRICIA CRUZ JDCTR DLSU LAW

TRIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Yu v. Magpayo DOCTRINE: Where the answer of the defendant admitted the obligation stated in the complaint, although special defenses were pleaded, the plaintiff has every right to insist that it was for the defendant to come forward with evidence in support of his special defenses. FACTS: MFR was filed by plaintiff which was denied by the court and the case was dismissed for lack of prosecution (due to plaintiffs refusal to present evidence).

ISSUE: Order of trial RULING: Since the answer admitted defendants obligation as stated in the complaint, albeit special defenses were pleaded, plaintiff had every right to insist that it was for defendant to come forward with evidence in support of his special defenses. Sec. 2 of Rule129: (Judicial Admissions) admissions made by the parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings do not require proof and cannot be contradicted unless previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake.

The case originally started in the City Court of Davao where appellant Yu had filed suit to recover from defendant Mapayo the sum of P2800 representing the unpaid balance of the purchase price of a Gray Marine Engine sold by the plaintiff to the defendant, plus attorneys fees. The answer admitted the transaction and the balance due but contended that by reason of hidden defects of the article sold but contended that by reason of hidden defects of the article sold, the defendant had forced to spend P2800 for repairs and labor, wherefore plaintiff had agreed to waive the balance due on the price of the engine. Mapayo appealed to the CFI, filing an answer therein that was a virtual reproduction of his original defenses in the City Court. After several continuances, the case was called for hearing but the defendant and his counsel failed to appear and the court scheduled the case for hearing ex parte on the same day. Defendants counsel asked again for another postponement of the trial OTG that defendant and his witnesses were not able to come for lack of transportation, notwithstanding a stern warning by the Court that it would not entertain further motion for continuation of trial. Counsel for plaintiff vehemently objected to such motion and insisted in presenting his evidence which the Court granted in spite of another civil case and one miscellaneous case which were ready for hearing. Court ordered plaintiff to present his evidence. Plaintiffs counsel refused to comply with said order. Instead of calling his witnesses, he moved the Court to present them after the defendant had presented their evidence. CFI: The court asked said counsel twice whether he would present his evidence for the plaintiff, but said counsel refused to do so and stuck to his demand that he would introduce his witnesses only in rebuttal. This is dictation to the Court to disregard its lawful command and violation of the order of trial provided in the RoC.

**** Consolidation **** Active Wood v. CA DOCTRINE: The rules do not distinguish between cases filed before the same branch or judge and those that are pending in different branches or before different judges of the same court, in order that consolidation may be proper, as long as the cases involve the resolution of questions of law or facts in common with each other. FACTS: -

Two cases involved: one civil case (Branch 20) is pending before the court of respondent Judge Legaspi; one LRC case (Branch 14) is pending before Judge Villajuan, Jr. LRC case was initiated by the PR State Investment when it filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession over Active Woods two parcels of land. (AW was indebted to SI) Due to foreclosure, Active Wood filed the said civil case which by its order, declared as null and void the foreclosure and SI s certificate of sale. SI filed a petition for a writ of possession pending redemption of the lands by Active Wood. SI filed a motion with Branch 14 to reduce the amount of bond.

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CA set aside the order of Branch that had declared null and void the foreclosure and certificate of sale. Judge Villajuan of Branch 14 denied SI s motion for reduction. Active Wood filed a motion in LRC case pending in Judge Villajuans branch for the consolidation of said case with the civil case pending in Branch 20. It also filed a motion to dismiss and/or suspend the proceedings of the case until Branch 20 resolved the issue of validity of the mortgage raised. Judge Villajuan directed that said LRC case be consolidated in the civil case pending in respondent Judges branch provided he would not object. Resp Judge objected. CA denied the petition and ruled that the consolidation of cases is proper when they involve a common question of law or fact and that they are pending before the court. The public respondent would like to impress that consolidation is proper only when 2 or more cases are before the same judge/same branch and that consolidation is not allowed when the cases are pending before different courts/different branches of the same court. The consolidation of cases becomes mandatory because it involves the same parties and the same subject matter which is the same parcel of land. Such consolidation is desirable to avoid confusion and unnecessary costs and expenses with the multiplicity of suits. Thus the rules do not distinguish between cases filed before the same branch or judge and those that are pending in different branches, or before different judges of the same court, in order that consolidation may be proper, as long as the cases involve the resolution of questions of law or facts in common with each other. Superlines v. Victor (see page 97 Herrera)

**** Demurrer to Evidence **** Nepomuceno v. COMELEC DOCTRINE: The rule allows the defendant to move for dismissal of the case after the plaintiff has presented his evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, and provides for the effects of dismissal or non-dismissal, as the case may be, on the right of the defendant to present his cause. Otherwise stated, it authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part as he would ordinarily have to do if it shown by plaintiffs evidence that that latter is not entitled to the relief sought. The demurrer, therefore, is an aid or instrument for the expeditious termination of an action, similar to a motion to dismiss, which the court or tribunal may either grant or deny. FACTS: -

ISSUE: W/N consolidation of the 2 cases is proper? RULING: YES. Consolidation is proper when actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court. The rationale for consolidation is to have all cases, which are intimately related, acted upon by one branch of the court to avoid the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered that will not serve the orderly administration of justice. Time and again we have said that the rules of procedure must be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. It is true that a petition for a writ of possession is made ex-parte to facilitate proceedings, being founded on a presumed right of ownership. Be that as it may, when this presumed right of ownership is contested and made the basis of another action, then the proceedings for writ of possession would also become seemingly groundless. The entire case must be litigated and if need be as in the case at bar, must be consolidated with a related case so as to thresh out thoroughly all related issues.

Petitioners Cesar Nepomuceno, Leon Arcillas and Ruben Avenido were the official candidates of the Nacionalista Party in the 1980 local elections for the positions of mayor, vice-mayor and member of the Sangguniang Bayan, respectively, of Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Private respondent Oscar Laserna filed a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify petitioners on the ground of turncoatism. COMELEC issued a resolution granting said petition, thereby denying due course to petitioners' certificates of candidacy. Alleging denial of due process, petitioners assailed said resolution in a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a TRO. This was granted, thus, petitioners were allowed to be voted for in the elections of January 30, 1980. It appears that in said elections, petitioners won and were Proclaimed winners in their respective positions.

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The Court issued a resolution setting aside the challenged COMELEC resolution and remanding the cases to respondent COMELEC "for a full dress hearing in accordance with due process and to decide the cases as expeditiously as possible after giving the parties full opportunity to present all evidence relevant to the issue of alleged turncoatism." Petitioners filed MTD OTG that being a pre-election case, the same should be dismissed, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate quo warranto proceedings pursuant to Section 189 of the 1978 Election Code. COMELEC proceeded to hear PDC Case No. 65, with petitioners' manifestation 'That "They do not waive their right to question the jurisdiction of the COMELEC" having been placed on record. After respondent Oscar Laserna had terminated the presentation of his evidence, petitioners filed their respective Motions to Dismiss/Demurer to Evidence, which were reasonably opposed by respondent Laserna. Rejoinders and memoranda were filed by the parties, and on March 31, 1982, the COMELEC issued the following order denying the demurrer to evidence. It held: o The demurrers should be DENIED. The Commission would rather have the complete facts and evidence of the parties upon which to reach a decision than prematurely go into it now upon the facts and evidence of the petitioner only. The rationale behind such a procedure is to enable this Body to properly adjudicate the case on its merits and to ventilate the adversary issues on the basis of all the facts and evidence presented by the contending parties. The requirement of Section 1 of Rule 36 (rendition of judgments shall be in writing stating facts and the law on which it is based) would only apply if the demurrer is granted, for in this event, there would in fact be an adjudication on the merits of the case, leaving nothing more to be done, except perhaps to interpose an appeal. However, a denial of the demurrer is not a final judgment, but merely interlocutory in character as it does not finally dispose of the case, the defendant having yet the right to present his evidence, as provided for under Section 1 of Rule 35. The challenged order being merely an interlocutory order and not a final judgment or decision, no abuse of discretion was committed by respondent Comelec in its failure to state the facts and the law on which its order denying petitioners' demurrer to evidence is based.

****Judgment on the Pleadings**** Manufacturers v. Diversified DOCTRINE: FACTS: Manufacturers Bank & Trust Co. filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Manila for the recovery of a sum of money against Diversified Industries, Inc. and Alfonso Tan. o Defendants were granted a loan in the form of an agreement for credit in current account. o Said loan became due and pay able on February 26, 1965, but the defendants failed and refused to liquidate their obligations, leaving an outstanding balance. o By reason of the unjust refusal on the part of the defendants to satisfy their just and valid obligation upon maturity, the plaintiff was compelled to engage the services of counsel for a fee equivalent to 10% of the total sum due which the defendants have expressly agreed to pay in accordance with the terms of the agreement. In their answer, the defendants admitted the averments of paragraph 2 of the complaint but they professed to have no "sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations contained in paragraphs 3 and 4 and, therefore denied the same." Manufacturers Bank moved for judgment on the pleadings. It branded as contrived and inefficacious the defendants' profession of lack of

ISSUE: W/N COMELEC erred in denying petitioners motion to demurrer? RULING: NO. Petitioners are obviously misled by the title of Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, "Judgment on Demurer to Evidence." Said Rule allows the defendant to move for dismissal of the case after the plaintiff has presented his evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, and provides for the effects of the dismissal or non-dismissal, as the case may be, on the right of the defendant to present his cause. Otherwise stated, it authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part as the relief sought. The demurrer, therefore, is an aid or instrument for the expeditious termination of an action, similar to a motion to dismiss, which the court or tribunal may either grant or deny.

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knowledge of "the fact that the loan was due and payable on February 26, 1965 and that the same has been unliquidated as of the time that the complaint was filed," as well as the fact "of attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total sum due since the Agreement for Credit in Current Account which the defendants had expressly admitted clearly stated that the loan would automatically be due and payable on February 26, 1965 and that attorney's fees would be payable at the rate of 10% of amount due, and hence, it was not credible for them to claim to have no knowledge of the transactions in question, including the drawing they had made in virtue of the agreement. Also, by letter dated Oct. 18, 1966, written to petitioner by defendant, the latter had requested that they be allowed to pay the obligation by installments. The defendants, Diversified Industries and Tan, filed an opposition to the bank's motion for judgment on the pleadings. They alleged that neither the amounts drawn against the overdraft account nor the current balance due from them, were within the knowledge either of Alfonso Tan because he was a mere "guarantor" or even of Diversified Industries because its account officer had long since resigned, and moreover, they could not be expected to know the attorney's fees that Manufacturers Bank had undertaken to pay to its attorney. On the same date the defendants filed a motion for leave to amend their answer, and the amended answer itself. Court denied the defendants motion for leave to amend their answer and rendered judgment on the pleadings. It opined that the original answer failed to tender any issue, the defendants' asserted lack of knowledge or information regarding matters principally and necessarily within their knowledge could not be considered a specific denial. to pay their obligation by installments at the rate of P20,000.00 every six (6) months. These facts, considered conjointly with the admissions expressly made in the pleadings and those reasonably inferable therefrom, dictate a verdict in favor of the plaintiff bank. Where amendment is not a matter of right, a bare assertion of a desire to amend the pleading because certain matters had not been therein alleged, or the submission of an amended one, without more, is obviously not sufficient. The Rules elsewhere provide that judicial admissions "cannot be contradicted unless previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake." It is thus incumbent upon a party desiring to amend his pleading to furnish the Court with some adequate foundation for it to grant leave to amend the pleading. This was not done by the defendants. Their motion merely declared that they had failed to include certain allegations and defenses in their original answer, but gave no explanation for their failure to do so at the time they drew up that pleading or within a reasonable time thereafter, and why they had not essayed such amendment until after two (2) years and only after their receipt of plaintiff bank's motion for judgment on the pleadings which cited certain serious defects of their answer. More importantly, the denials in the amended answer are cut from the same bolt as those in the original answer. They are sham denials, consisting of an avowed lack of knowledge of facts which could not but be clearly known to the defendants or ought to be or could quite easily have been known by them. Their disclaimer of knowledge of the amount of their outstanding balance is implausible, but even if true, cannot be deemed a proper denial because concerning something they could very easily have learned or verified had they wished to. Amendment in the circumstances was clearly subject to said Court's discretion the exercise of which cannot be faulted; and the defendants' original answer in truth tendered no issue, or otherwise admitted the allegations of the complaint material and necessary to a valid decision.

ISSUE: W/N judgment on the pleadings was proper? RULING: YES. Points to consider: The motion to amend the answer was presented only after two (2) years had lapsed from the date of its filing, and only after the plaintiff had drawn attention to its patent and grave imperfections and moved for judgment on the pleadings. Defendants never challenged the authenticity of their letter to the bank dated October 18, 1966, advising that they had made, thru an Atty. Colayco, payment on their account and requesting that they be allowed

****Summary Judgments**** Vergara v. Suelto

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DOCTRINE: Summary judgment must not be confused with judgment on the pleadings. The essential question in determining whether a summary judgment is proper is not whether the answer does controvert the material allegations of the complaint but whether that controversion is bona fides and not whether the answer does tender valid issues as by setting forth specific denials and/or affirmative defenses but whether the issues thus tendered are genuine, or fictitious, sham, characterized by bad faith. FACTS: o Defendants' denial of their own personal circumstances, as these are stated in the complaint, is obviously sham. The accuracy of those stated circumstances is quite evident. They are in truth all residents of Davao City, doing business at Cabaguio Avenue, where the plaintiff's building is located, and in which they have rented space and where they have been maintaining their commercial establishments under one trade name or another. They could not but know that those circumstances had been correctly set down in the complaint, having been dealing with the plaintiff for years, and he being the owner of the building occupied by them. Their disavowal of the plaintiff's ownership of the building occupied by them, and also that the building is composed of three sections also cannot be genuine. They had each been occupying those 3 sections for years and been paying rentals therefore to the plaintiff. Also patently sham is their professed ignorance of the joint letter sent by them to the plaintiff under date of December 6, 1985, just referred to. It should be noted that they have not denied writing or sending the letter. Finally, their affirmative defense, in which they assert title in themselves over the land on which the plaintiff's building stands, is also sham, even an absurdity since neither the plaintiff nor the defendants are parties to this action. The judgment has moreover been appealed. And the defendants' connection with the case rests on nothing more substantial than their alleged membership in an association at whose relation the reversion suit had supposedly been instituted by the Republic, and which association would presumably have preferential rights to occupy or acquire the land once finally reverted to the public domain.

Vergara alleges that he is the owner of a commercial building and that the lessees thereof defaulted in the payment of rentals. Thus he instituted an action for unlawful detainer. Defendant-lessees answered denying having paid rents to Vergara. They also set an affirmative defense by claiming title over the land. Subsequently, Vergara filed a motion for summary judgment. The incidents were resolved by the respondent Judge in two separate orders promulgated on the same day.The first order denied the defendants' motion to dismiss while the second order denied Vergara's motion for summary judgment. The lower court ratiocinated that the material allegations of facts in the complaint constituting plaintiff's cause of action are specifically denied and in addition thereto, defendants have put up affirmative defenses in avoidance of plaintiff's claims. The rule gives the court limited authority to enter summary judgment. Upon a motion for summary judgment, the court's sole function is to determine whether there is an issue of fact to be tried. It does not vest the court with authority to try the issues on depositions, pleadings, letters or affidavits. If there is a controversy upon any question of fact, there should be a trial of the case upon its merits.

ISSUE: W/N summary judgment is proper and should be granted in this case? RULING: YES. The defendants answer appears on its face to tender issues. It purports to deal with each of the material allegations of the complaint, and either specifically denies, or professes lack of knowledge or information to form a belief as to them. It also sets up affirmative defenses. But the issues thus tendered are sham, not genuine. Points to consider:

Under the circumstances herein set forth at some length, the fitness and propriety of a summary judgment cannot be disputed. The failure of the respondent Judge to render such a judgment was due solely to his unfortunate unfamiliarity with the concept of a summary judgment. It is a failure which we have it in our power to remedy. No genuine issue having been tendered by the defendants, judgment should be directed as a matter of right in the plaintiff's favor. Judgment on the pleadings: Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that where an answer "fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegation of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading." The answer would fail to tender an issue, of course, if it does not comply with the requirements for a specific denial set out in Section 10 (or Section 8) of Rule 8; and it would admit the material allegations of

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the adverse party's pleadings not only where it expressly confesses the truthfulness thereof but also if it omits to deal with them at all. If an answer does in fact specifically deny the material averments of the complaint in the manner indicated by said Section 10 of Rule 8, and/or asserts affirmative defenses (allegations of new matter which, while admitting the material allegations of the complaint expressly or impliedly, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by the plaintiff) in accordance with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 6, a judgment on the pleadings would naturally not be proper. Summary Judgment: Even if the answer does tender issues and therefore a judgment on the pleadings is not proper, a summary judgment may still be rendered on the plaintiff's motion if he can show to the Court's satisfaction that "except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact," that is to say, the issues thus tendered are not genuine, are in other words sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in bad faith, patently unsubstantial. The determination may be made by the Court on the basis of the pleadings, and the depositions, admissions and affidavits that the movant may submit, as well as those which the defendant may present in his turn. The case began in the RTC of Las Pias, where a complaint for "Quieting of Title and Damages" was filed by the Heirs of Veronica V.Moreno Lacalle (represented by Jose Moreno Lacalle) against the Dimans. After joinder of the issues, the Dimans served on the Heirs on February 2, 1995, a REQUEST FOR ADMISSION. The REQUEST FOR ADMISSION was received by Jose Lacalle himself through registered mail and copy thereof, by the latter's lawyer (Atty. Cesar T. Ching). However, no response whatever was made to the request by Lacalle, his lawyer, or anyone else, despite the lapse of the period therefor fixed by Section 2 of Rule 26 (not less than ten days after service). The Dimans then submitted a "MOTION FOR SUMMARRY JUDGMENT". In that motion they drew attention to the Heirs' failure to file any Pre-Trial Brief, and the several instances when the Heirs failed to appear at scheduled hearings resulting in the dismissal of their complaint, which was however later reinstated. They argued that because the heirs had failed to respond to their REQUEST FOR ADMISSION, each of the matters of which an admission was requested, was deemed admitted pursuant to Section 2, Rule 26. On this basis, and on the basis of the joint affidavit of Clarissa Diman de los Reyes and Florina Diman Tan, the Dimans asserted that no genuine issue existed and prayed that "a summary judgment be entered dismissing the case for lack of merit." TC denied the Dimans' motion for summary judgment. The Court declared that a "perusal of the Complaint and the Answer will clearly show that material issue is raised in that both plaintiffs and defendants claimed ownership over the land in dispute, presenting their respective titles thereto and accused each other of possessing false title to the land." It stressed, citing jurisprudence that a summary judgment "is not proper where the defendant presented defenses tendering factual issues which call for the presentation of evidence." The Dimans filed a "Motion for Judgment on Demurrer to Evidence. They summarized the Heirs' evidence and emphasized anew said Heirs' implied admissions resulting from their failure to answer their (the Dimans') request therefor as a mode of discovery. On these premises, the Dimans contended that a judgment on demurrer should be rendered, there being no genuine issue between the parties notwithstanding the ostensible conflict of averments in their basic pleadings. Dimans commenced a special civil action of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition in the Court of Appeals. CA denied.

Diman v. Alumbres DOCTRINE: It is the law which determines when a summary judgment is proper. It declares that although the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues of fact -- e.g., there are denials of, or a conflict in, factual allegations -- if it is shown by admissions, depositions or affidavits, that those issues are sham, fictitious, or not genuine, or, in the language of the Rules, that "except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, the Court shall render a summary judgment for the plaintiff or the defendant as the case may be. **A Trial Court has no discretion to determine what the consequences of a party's refusal to allow or make discovery should be; it is the law which makes that determination; and it is grave abuse of discretion for the Court to refuse to recognize and observe the effects of that refusal as mandated by law. FACTS:

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ISSUE: W/N summary judgment is proper for this case? RULING: YES. The case at bar is a classic example of the eminent propriety of a summary judgment, or a judgment on demurrer to evidence. It is the law which determines when a summary judgment is proper. It declares that although the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues of fact -- e.g., there are denials of, or a conflict in, factual allegations -- if it is shown by admissions, depositions or affidavits, that those issues are sham, fictitious, or not genuine, or, in the language of the Rules, that "except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, the Court shall render a summary judgment for the plaintiff or the defendant as the case may be. Parenthetically, the existence or appearance of ostensible issues in the pleadings, on the one hand, and their sham or fictitious character, on the other, are what distinguish a proper case for a summary judgment from one for a judgment on the pleadings under Rule 19 of the 1964. For judgment on the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at all, but the absence of any because of the failure of the defending party's answer to raise an issue. Rule 19 expresses the principle as follows: "Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading **." In the case of a summary judgment, issues apparently exist -- i.e., facts are asserted in the complaint regarding which there is as yet no admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific denials or affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the answer -- but the issues thus arising from the pleadings are sham, fictitious, not genuine, as shown by admissions, depositions or admissions. In other words, as a noted authority remarks, a judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded while a summary judgment is a judgment on the facts as summarily proven by affidavits, depositions or admissions. Another distinction is that while the remedy of a judgment on the pleadings may be sought only by a claimant (one seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief, supra), a summary judgment may be applied for by either a claimant or a defending party. When the Heirs closed their evidence as party plaintiffs, and the Dimans moved to dismiss on ground of insufficiency of the Heirs' evidence, the Trial Judge was charged with the duty to assess the evidence to ascertain whether or not "upon the facts and the law the plaintiff(s) ** (have) shown no right to relief." In fine, the Heirs had proven nothing whatever to justify a judgment in their favor. They had not presented any copy whatever of the title they wished to be quieted. They had not adduced any proof worthy of the name to establish their precedessors' ownership of the land. Considering these circumstances, including the outlandish grounds of opposition advanced by the Heirs against the Dimans' motions for summary judgment and for demurrer to evidence, no less than the obviously mistaken grounds cited by the Trial Court for denying said motions, this Court has no hesitation in declaring that it was indeed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Trial Court to have refused to render a summary judgment or one on demurrer to evidence.

Natalia v. Vallez DOCTRINE: It is settled that a summary judgment under Rule 34 of the Rules of Court is proper only if there is no genuine issue as to the existence of any material fact. It is intended to expedite or promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits on record. FACTS: -

Said appeals originated from five (5) civil cases commenced by herein appellee Natalia Realty Corporation against the five (5) defendantappellants which were consolidated and assigned to RTC Antipolo. After filing their consolidated answer, defendants sought the dismissal of all the aforesaid complaints for ejectment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiff corporation moved for a summary judgment on the consolidated cases under Rule 34 of the Rules of Court. Plaintiff claimed that the only issue for resolution, if any, is strictly legal; and that "the pleadings manifestly show that there is no genuine issue or issues as to any material fact averred in the complaint and that defendants in their common answer to complaint have put up sham defenses and counterclaims all of which are mere pretended denials and flimsy defenses." RTC rendered a summary judgment upon finding that no valid issue was raised by defendants but only "conclusions that because they have been

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in actual possession for over 30 years of their respective farm lots they are entitled to be respected of such occupancy and as such the complaints should be dismissed. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff ordering the defendants to vacate the portions of land involved, to forthwith remove therefrom all improvements they may have constructed thereon, and to pay rentals. Defendants sought appellate review in the then Intermediate Appellate Court. CA affirmed RTCs ruling. DOCTRINE: The real test, therefore, of a motion for summary judgment is whether the pleadings, affidavits and exhibits in support of the motion are sufficient to overcome the opposing papers and to justify a finding as a matter of law that there is no defense to the action or that the claim is clearly meritorious. FACTS: -

ISSUE: W/N summary judgment was proper? RULING: YES. It is settled that a summary judgment under Rule 34 of the Rules of Court is proper only if there is no genuine issue as to the existence of any material fact. It is intended to expedite or promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits on record. In proceedings for summary judgment, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to prove the cause of action and to show that the defense is interposed solely for the purpose of delay. After plaintiffs burden has been discharged, defendant has the burden to show facts sufficient to entitle him to defend. The focal point of inquiry is whether or not there is a factual controversy in these consolidated cases. To resolve this query, the pleadings and documents on file and an analysis thereof are both indispensable and decisive. The rendition of the questioned summary judgment by the trial court is proper and valid. Tested against the statutory and jurisprudential rules above stated, the very allegations of the defendants prove that no valid issue has been tendered by them. They relied mainly on two points, the alleged invalidity of the title of the plaintiff and their supposed acquisition of the properties by adverse possession. Defendants' theses are obviously puerile but they are entitled to the benefit of clarification. Appellants' claim of acquisitive prescription is likewise baseless. Under Article 1126 of the Civil Code, prescription of ownership of lands registered under the Land Registration Act shall be governed by special laws. Grand Farms v. CA -

Petitioners filed a civil case in the RTC of Valenzuela for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings over their mortgaged properties, with damages, against respondent clerk of court, deputy sheriff and herein private respondent Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank. Soon after private respondent had filed its answer to the complaint, petitioners filed a request for admission by private respondent of the allegation that no formal notice of intention to foreclose the real estate mortgage was sent by private respondent to petitioners. Private respondent responded under oath to the request and countered that petitioners were "notified of the auction sale by the posting of notices and the publication of notice in the Metropolitan Newsweek, a newspaper of general circulation in the province where the subject properties are located and in the Philippines on February 13, 20 and 28, 1988." On the basis of the alleged implied admission by private respondent that no formal notice of foreclosure was sent to petitioners, the latter filed a motion for summary judgment contending that the foreclosure was violative of the provisions of the mortgage contract, specifically paragraph (k) thereof where they stipulated that personal delivery of the notice must be effected along with publication. The motion was opposed by private respondent which argued that petitioners' reliance on said paragraph (k) of the mortgage contract fails to consider paragraphs (b) and (d) of the same contract, which respectively provide that the mortgagee may foreclose the property any time after the breach of any of the conditions of the agreement. RTC issued an order, denying petitioners' motion for summary judgment. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by respondent-judge on the ground that genuine and substantial issues exist which require the presentation of evidence during the trial. Petitioners thereafter went on a petition for certiorari to respondent court attacking said orders of denial as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. As earlier adverted to, respondent court dismissed the petition, holding that no personal notice was required to foreclose

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since private respondent was constituted by petitioners as their attorneyin-fact to sell the mortgaged property. ISSUE: W/N RTC in erred in denying petitioners Motion for Summary Judgment? RULING: YES. Petitioners' action in the court below for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of the foreclosure proceedings and damages was found ripe for summary judgment. Private respondent tacitly admitted in its answer to petitioners' request for admission that it did not send any formal notice of foreclosure to petitioners. And as is evident from the records, there has been no denial by private respondent that no personal notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure was ever sent to petitioners prior thereto. This omission, by itself, rendered the foreclosure defective and irregular for being contrary to the express provisions of the mortgage contract. The inclusion of the aforequoted paragraph (k) in the mortgage contract nonetheless rendered personal notice to the latter indispensable. While publication of the foreclosure proceedings in the newspaper of general circulation was complied with, personal notice is still required, as in the case at bar, when the same was mutually agreed upon by the parties as additional condition of the mortgage contract. Failure to comply with this additional stipulation would render illusory Article 1306 of the NCC. The extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the property in question are fatally defective and are not binding on the deceased debtor-mortgagor or to his heirs. The Rules of Court authorize the rendition of a summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Although an issue may be raised formally by the pleadings but there is no genuine issue of fact, and all the facts are within the judicial knowledge of the court, summary judgment may be granted. The real test, therefore, of a motion for summary judgment is whether the pleadings, affidavits and exhibits in support of the motion are sufficient to overcome the opposing papers and to justify a finding as a matter of law that there is no defense to the action or that the claim is clearly meritorious. To still require a trial notwithstanding private respondent's admission of the lack of such requisite notice would be a superfluity and would work injustice to petitioners whose abstention of the relief to which they are plainly and patently entitled would be further delayed. That undesirable contingency is obviously one of the reasons why our procedural rules have provided for summary judgments.