Joint Personnel Recovery Joint Operational Guidelines-feb.11-Nato

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
Releasable to the Public

1

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
B-7010 SHAPE
Belgium
Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation
Norfolk, Virginia 23551-2490
United States of America

SH/FOR/RER/FSL/AN - 280090 3510 FRP-0010/TT-6908/Ser:

TO: See Distribution

SUBJ ECT: BI-SC JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY JOINT OPERATIONAL
GUIDELINES

DATE: 22 February 2011

REFERENCES: A. 3211 ISAF HQ/Dir ACE/Personnel Recovery (CRCC), ISAF Personnel
Recovery (PR) Manning and Training Shortcomings, dated J anuary 2009.
B. 1170.1/J BJ 7IS/016/09, ISAF Personnel Recovery (PR) Training
Shortcomings, dated 16 February 2009.
C. AAP-47 Allied J oint Doctrine Development, dated November 2007
3000 TC-5/TT-2593/SER: NR0015, J oint Operational Guideline (J OG) for
J oint Personnel Recovery (J PR), dated 4 March 2008.

1. A doctrinal gap concerning NATO J oint Personnel Recovery (J PR) could impact mission
accomplishment in ISAF and other current and future operations. In an effort to address
certain operational issues cited in References A and B, the Strategic Commands (SC), in
accordance with Reference C, issue this updated version as an immediate replacement to the
current J PR J oint Operational Guidelines (J OG) (Reference D).

2. Pending ratification and promulgation of J PR doctrine, the SCs recommend the enclosed
Bi-SC J PR J OG for immediate use by all NATO nations and operational headquarters. The
J OG combines the draft NATO PR doctrine (AJ P-3.3.9 SD8), TTPs (ATP-3.7.1 SD2) and
Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Extraction (SERE) training standards (Study 7196 SD5),
while taking into account national comments.

3. The points of contact for the Bi-SC J PR J OG are Maj Tim Wilcox at SACT, NCN 555-
3405, timothy.wilcox@act.nato.int and Col Antonio Nascimento at SHAPE, NCN 254-3707,
costa.nascimento@shape.nato.int.

FOR THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDERS, EUROPE AND TRANSFORMATION:

Manfred Lange R G Cooling
General, DEU AF Vice Admiral, GBR N
Chief of Staff Chief of Staff
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION
NU0087
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

2

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
ENCLOSURE:

1. Bi-SC J oint Personnel Recovery (J PR) J oint Operational Guidelines (J OG).

DISTRIBUTION:

External

Action:

Director General, International Military Staff
Director NATO Standardization Agency
COS J FC HQ Brunssum
COS ISAF HQ
COS J WC
COS J FTC
COS J ALLC
NATO Defense College Rome
NATO School Oberammergau

Information:

NATO and PfP CHOD & J PR POCs via
ACT NLR/PNLR
Non NATO ISAF TCNs CHOD & J PR
POCs via IMS OPS
NTG J SSG
COS J FC HQ Naples
COS J FC HQ Lisbon
COS NSHQ
NAEWFC

Internal

Action:

SHAPE:

FOR

SACT:

DPPI

Information:

SHAPE:

OPI
CPP
SPT
MCD

SACT:

(HQ SACT DIR 35-1) Lists I, II, III, V, VI, VII
ENCLOSURE 1 TO
SH/FOR/RER/FSL/AN-280090
3510 FRP-0010/TT-6908/Ser:
DATE:

Bi-SC JOINT OPERATIONAL
GUIDELINES
11/01

JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY
(JPR)

(Jan 2011)
NU0087
22 FEB 11

Bi-SC Joint Operational Guidelines (JOG)
11/01
Joint Personnel Recovery (JPR)
January 28, 2011
ii
NATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC
This page is intentionally left blank
Introduction
iii
Introduction
Introduction
The isolation, capture and/or exploitation of NATO personnel during operations could
have a signicant negative impact on operational security, morale of assigned forces
and public support. In addition, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) operations
rely on contract support and interaction with other non-NATO actors, for which NATO
may have a responsibility. The Alliance therefore requires a system to recover military
and civilian personnel that have become isolated.
Consequential requirements
NATO has therefore a requirement for a system with the following objectives:
a. Protecting the operational security and morale of NATO personnel by providing for
their recovery and reintegration, in case they become isolated.
b. Enhancing the Personnel Recovery (PR) capabilities of NATO by sharing, where
possible, the lessons learnt during PR exercises and missions.
and that provides:
a. Applicable documentation for the preparation and conduct of PR operations.
b. A suitable infrastructure plan (including commanders, staffs and recovery forces)
prepared for PR and the establishment of agreements with other organisations.
c. Appropriate PR training and equipment standards.
Aim
This JOG is intended to bridge the gap in NATO Personnel Recovery (PR) doctrine and
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) until new doctrine and TTPs can be written,
ratied and promulgated. It should be understood this JOG is not ratied doctrine, but
rather the presentation of best practice to provide a central frame of reference until
NATO PR doctrine and TTPs can be formally agreed, ratied and promulgated. When that
doctrine and TTPs are promulgated this JOG will be withdrawn.
iv
Guidance to the user
The document is set-up in such a way that, dependent on ones role, one can take the
respective volume out of the the JOG and use it as a standalone document. As all users
should have some knowledge on the fundamentals of PR, all should read the fundamen-
tal principles volume in conjunction with the respective Guide volume.
All the Guide volumes have a text part and an annex part to them. The text is intended
to provide the overview (the movie) of that aspect of PR. The annexes provide the
formats, templates and checklists. Therefore, whoever is already knowledgeable of ones
role, then the text part can also be discarded and the annexes can subsequently be used
as a standalone package.
Updating
This Joint Operational Guidelines (JOG) combines the draft NATO PR Doctrine (AJP-3.3.9
SD-8), TTPs (ATP-3.7.1 SD-2) and Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Extraction (SERE)
training standard (Study 7196 SD-5). Any comments and feedback on this JOG are
most welcome. Comments on the content of this JOG may also have relevance to the
development of the aforementioned documents, and should therefore also be forwarded
to their custodial POCs. As the PR concepts are work in progress, this JOG will be
updated annually in January. Proposals for improvements and commente are therefore
to be sent to the custodians using the addresses given below nlt. 18 November 2011.
Points of contact:
JOG
bisc.jpr-jog@personnel-recovery.net
PR Doctrine and TTPs
bj.holewijn.01@mindef.nl
SERE training standard (Volume III, Annex F
uschleimer@euroairgroup.org
CONTENTS
v
Contents
Introduction iii
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF PERSONNEL RECOVERY 1
1 Introduction 3
1.1 Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Jointness of Personnel Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3.1 Denitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3.2 Practical terms for use in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4 Operational environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 Scope of NATO PR 7
2.1 Elements of PR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Delineation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 The personnel recovery system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4 Methods of personnel recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.5 Risk considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3 PR guiding principles 11
3.1 Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4 FORCE COMPONENTS 13
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2 Personnel recovery organisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2.1 Embedded JPRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2.2 Delegated JPRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2.3 Sector oriented JPRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.3 C2 nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.3.1 JFC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.3.2 Component commands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
vi
CONTENTS
4.3.3 Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.3.4 JPRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.3.5 PRCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.3.6 PR POC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.3.7 Mission Coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.3.8 On-Scene Commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.3.9 Rescue Mission Commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.4 Military assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.5 Civil / diplomatic assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5 PR OPERATION 19
5.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.2 JPRC / PRCC tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.2.1 Set-up tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.2.2 PR CONOPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.3 Mission specic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.3.1 Risk analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.3.2 PR response options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.4 PR operation essential tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.4.1 Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.4.2 Locate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.4.3 Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.4.4 Recover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.4.5 Reintegrate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
I STAFF GUIDE 27
1 INTRODUCTION 29
1.1 The JPRC / PRCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.2 PR POC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.3 JFCs PR responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.4 Scale of operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.4.1 Manning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.4.2 Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.5 Guidance for units with non-CSAR trained and equipped personnel . . . . 33
1.5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.5.2 Recovery documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.5.3 ISOPREP form and management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
CONTENTS
vii
1.5.4 PR codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.5.5 Recovery equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.5.6 Basic, intermediate and advanced training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.5.7 PR POC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.5.8 Pre-deployment and in-theatre training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2 COMMAND AND CONTROL 37
2.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.2 Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.2.1 JFC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.2.2 Component / sector commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.3 JPRC / PRCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.3.1 Mission coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.3.2 OSC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.3.3 RMC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.3.4 Liaison authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.3.5 Mission abort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3 INTELLIGENCE 41
3.1 General intelligence principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2 Intelligence source . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.3 Advanced intelligence requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.4 Isolated personnel intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.5 Mission intelligence requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.6 Guidance for intel and ops support staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.6.2 Recovery documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.6.3 Electronic handling of ISOPREP and EPA documents . . . . . . . . 44
3.6.4 Recovery Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.6.5 Blood chit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4 RISK ANALYSIS AND MITIGATION 47
4.1 General risk analysis guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.2 Risk mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
viii
CONTENTS
5 PR OPERATION 49
5.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5.2 Pre-emptive mission planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
5.2.1 Preparatory work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
5.2.2 Specic missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.3 Pro-active planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.3.1 Planning process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.3.2 AO PR SOP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5.3.3 PR SPINS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.4 Daily operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.5 Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.6 Locate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.6.1 Search methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
5.7 Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.8 Recover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.8.1 Isolated or evading personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.8.2 Hostage release operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.9 Reintegrate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.10 Levels of training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.11 Theatre specic training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
A JPRC / PRCC set-up checklists 61
A.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
A.2 JPRC / PRCC set-up checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
A.3 JPRC / PRCC bullet list . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
B JPRC / PRCC activation message 67
C PR asset questionnaire 69
C.1 general . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
C.2 Operational capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
C.3 Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
C.4 Navigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
C.5 Recovery capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
C.6 Armament / self protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
C.7 Operational and logistical limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
C.8 Standard combat load . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
CONTENTS
ix
D Boards and matrices 73
D.1 Asset Board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
D.2 Asset matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
D.3 Launch / execute matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
D.4 Incident/mission board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
E PR report formats 77
E.1 PRIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
E.2 SARIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
E.3 PR 11-line report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
E.4 PR mission message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
F JPRC / PRCC chief checklist 81
G PR Annex to OPLAN template 83
G.1 Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
G.1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
G.1.2 Opposing forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
G.1.3 Own forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
G.1.4 Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
G.1.5 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
G.1.6 Denitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
G.2 Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
G.3 Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
G.3.1 Commanders intent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
G.3.2 Desired end state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
G.3.3 Concept of operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
G.3.4 Not covered areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
G.3.5 Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
G.3.6 Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
G.4 coordinating instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
G.5 PIERIE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
G.6 Command and control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
G.6.1 PR C
2
description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
G.6.2 Supporting / supported relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
G.6.3 Launch / Execute authority matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
G.6.4 Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
G.7 Administration and logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
x
CONTENTS
G.7.0.1 Pre deployment preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
G.7.0.2 Upon entry preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
G.7.0.3 In theatre continuation training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
G.7.1 Rules of Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
G.7.2 Service support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
H PR SOP template 91
H.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
H.1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
H.1.2 Reference publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
H.1.3 PR Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
H.1.3.1 4 PR methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
H.1.3.2 Relation to other mission types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
H.2 Theatre PR system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
H.2.1 Not covered areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
H.3 C2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
H.3.1 PR C2 description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
H.3.2 Supporting / supported relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
H.3.3 Launch / Execute authority matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
H.3.4 Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
H.3.5 specic tasks / duties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
H.3.6 Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
H.3.7 Communication conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
H.3.7.1 Use of ISOPREPs and EPAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
H.4 ORBAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
H.4.1 Dedicated assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
H.4.2 Designated assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
H.4.3 QRF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
H.4.4 Medical facilities for reintegration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
H.4.5 Other capable assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
H.5 Risk assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
H.6 PR staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
H.6.1 Proactive mission planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
H.7 PR critical tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
H.7.1 Locate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
H.7.2 Reintegration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
H.7.3 Normal mission execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
H.7.4 Recovery mission execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
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H.7.5 Reintegration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
H.8 Land procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
H.9 Air procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
H.9.1 Initial actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
H.9.2 Aircrew procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
H.9.3 Downed aircrew procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
H.9.4 Recovery phase procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
H.10Maritime procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
H.11Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
I PR codes message template 107
I.1 General information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
I.2 Rules of engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
I.3 Risk assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
I.4 Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
I.4.1 Brevity words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
I.4.2 Survivor radio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
I.4.3 PR codewords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
I.4.4 PR codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
I.4.5 Non-comms plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
J PR SPINS template 111
J.1 General information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
J.2 Rules of engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
J.3 Risk assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
J.4 Recovery mission execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
J.4.1 Special procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
J.5 Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
K Communications 113
K.1 COMPLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
K.1.1 Checklist for getting the necessary information from the opera-
tors/assets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
K.1.2 Checklist for checking the complan in annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
K.1.3 Detail the required liaisons plus the comms equipment . . . . . . . 114
K.1.4 Detail required C2 equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
K.2 Standard communication formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
K.3 SATCOM operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
K.4 Contact information table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
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L PR shift changeover checklists 117
L.1 Director changeover checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
L.2 PR controller checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
M Intelligence checklists 121
M.1 Pre-operations intel checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
M.2 Intel daily operations checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
M.3 Intel changeover brief checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
M.4 Intel PR incident checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
N Essential elements of information 125
O ELT notication checklist 129
P Recovery mission execution checklist 131
Q Course of action brief 135
Q.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Q.2 Suggested brieng format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
R Launch / execute back brief 137
R.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
R.2 Suggested brieng format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
R.3 PR mission launch criteria checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
S Intelligence and SERE debrief 141
S.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
S.2 SERE debrief of isolated person . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
S.3 Outline for survivor / evader interview / debrief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
S.3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
S.3.2 Personal information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
S.3.3 Overview of incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
S.3.4 Take a break . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
S.3.5 Detailed analysis of incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
S.4 Biographical information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
S.5 Military biographical information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
S.6 Pre-mission preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
S.7 Events leading up to isolation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
S.8 Incident details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
S.9 Survival & evasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
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S.10 Contacts with local populace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
S.11 Preparations for recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
S.12 Recovery phase - how were you recovered / rescued? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
S.13 Conventional assisted recovery (planned) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
S.14 Non-conventional assisted recovery (planned) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
S.15 Unplanned contacts - describe/explain any unplanned contact(s) . . . . . . 156
S.16 On-scene military forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
S.17 Unassisted recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
S.18 Any problems? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
T Continuity PR training task list 159
II HELICOPTER BORNE RECOVERY FORCE OPERATOR GUIDE161
1 GENERAL 163
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
1.2 Command and control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
1.3 PR SOP and SPINS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
1.4 Mission abort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
1.5 Liaison authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
1.6 Risk mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
2 PR OPERATION 165
2.1 Pre-emptive mission planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
2.1.1 Preparation and planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
2.2 Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
2.3 Locate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
2.4 Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
2.5 Recover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
2.5.1 Assets / PRTF composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
2.5.2 Mission planning and brieng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
2.6 Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
2.6.1 Enroute procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
2.6.2 Rendezvous point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
2.6.3 RV to IP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
2.6.4 Communication procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
2.6.5 Objective area procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
2.6.6 ISOPREP authentication procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
2.6.7 Egress routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
2.7 Reintegrate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
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CONTENTS
3 Formation ights and RESCORT patterns 175
3.1 RW RESCORT types of formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
3.1.1 Combat cruise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
3.1.2 Free cruise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
3.2 Enroute contingencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
3.2.1 Blind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
3.2.2 Altitude de-coniction procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
3.2.3 Inadvertent IMC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
3.3 RW RESCORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
3.4 FW RESCORT patterns and procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
3.5 RW RESCORT tactics and procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
3.6 RESCORT patterns in the objective area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
4 COMMUNICATIONS 183
4.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
4.2 Radio communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
4.3 Necessary amount of frequencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
4.4 Communications checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
4.4.1 Element/section lead initiates comm checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
4.4.2 Communications check continuation procedures . . . . . . . . . . . 184
4.4.3 PLS check procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
4.5 Brevity words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
5 TRAINING 187
5.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
5.2 Pre-emptive training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
5.2.1 PRTF and extraction force training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
5.2.2 Types of competencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
5.3 Pre-deployment training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
5.4 In-the AO training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
A Helo ops set-up checklist 189
B Capabilities & equipment 191
B.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
B.2 Recovery helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
B.3 Extraction force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
B.4 RESCORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
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C PR report formats 195
C.1 Personnel Recovery Incident Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
C.2 SARIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
C.3 PR 11-line report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
C.4 PR mission message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
D AMC responsibilities and checklist 199
D.1 AMC responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
D.2 AMC checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
E OSC checklist 201
F RMC responsibilities checklist 203
G RESCORT responsibilities checklist 205
H Recovery vehicle checklist 207
I Recovery vehicle to RESCORT brief 209
J 15-line pick-up brief 211
J.1 15-line pick-up brief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
J.2 Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
K Joint formation face-to-face brieng guide 215
L RMC task delegation sheet 217
L.1 Mission preparation: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
L.1.1 Aim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
L.1.2 Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
L.1.3 Crew tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
L.1.4 Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
L.1.5 Cells . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
L.1.6 Check before walk: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
M Suggested PRTF SOP format 221
M.1 Timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
M.2 Joblist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
M.3 Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
M.4 Brainstorm checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
M.5 Planning checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
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CONTENTS
M.5.1 Planning parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
M.5.2 Planning standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
M.6 Brieng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
M.7 Start-up and taxi standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
M.8 Enroute ying standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
M.9 Holding standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
M.10FARP standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
M.11Objective area standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
M.12Contingencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
M.13Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
N RMC mission brieng format 225
N.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
N.2 Mission elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
N.3 Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
N.4 Brieng format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
O Extraction force mission planning guide 231
O.1 Extraction force planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
O.2 Extraction force brieng guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
O.2.1 Time hack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
O.2.2 Team mission overview (given by team leader) . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
O.2.3 Marshaling area procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
O.2.4 Inltration plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
O.2.5 Exltration plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
P Communications 237
P.1 Brevity words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
P.2 COMCARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
Q Helo lead to RESCORT Brieng 241
R Tactical arming and refuelling 243
R.1 Tasks and responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
R.1.1 RMC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
R.1.2 FARP commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
R.1.3 Recommended personnel available on a FARP . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
R.2 FARP and FARP area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
R.2.1 Criteria for landing / refuelling points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
CONTENTS
xvii
R.2.2 Lighting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
R.2.3 Fire ghting equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
R.2.4 Medical crew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
R.2.5 Fuel trucks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
R.2.6 Communications device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
R.3 Refuelling procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
R.3.1 Radio controlled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
R.3.2 Procedural . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
R.4 Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
R.4.1 Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
R.4.2 Fire at the FARP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
R.4.3 Fuel spill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
R.5 Helicopter landing sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
R.6 Procedures for marshalling helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
R.7 Air refuelling brieng checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
S Training 251
III ISOLATED PERSONNEL GUIDE 253
1 INTRODUCTION 257
1.1 Aim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
1.2 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
1.3 Mission abort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
1.4 PIERIE vs MRIE and HRIE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
2 PREPARATION AND PLANNING 259
2.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
2.2 Preparatory work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
2.2.1 Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
2.2.2 Next of kin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
2.3 Levels of training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
2.4 Operational planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
2.4.1 Annex V, PR SOP(s) and SPINS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
2.4.2 ISOPREP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
2.4.3 EPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
2.4.4 Recovery methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
2.5 Tactical preparation and planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
2.5.1 Pre-deployment training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
2.5.2 Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
2.5.3 Mission preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
xviii
CONTENTS
3 SURVIVAL AND EVASION DURING ISOLATION 265
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
3.2 Report and immediate actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
3.2.1 Ground personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
3.2.2 Aircrew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
3.2.3 Radios / beacons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
3.2.4 General report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
3.2.5 Survival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
3.2.6 Evasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
3.3 Locate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
3.3.1 Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
3.3.2 Location if no radio available . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
3.3.3 Evasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
3.4 Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
3.4.1 Fire support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
3.4.2 Additional equipment/resupply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
3.4.3 SERE psychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
3.4.4 Support to family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
3.5 Extraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
3.5.1 Actions during extraction procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
3.5.2 Helicopter recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
3.5.3 Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
3.5.4 Extraction tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
4 Reintegration 273
5 Conduct after capture 275
6 Isolated personnel training 277
6.1.1 Levels of training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
6.2.1 Theatre specic training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
6.3 In-theatre training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
6.3.1 Prior to conducting operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
6.3.2 Refresher training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
CONTENTS
xix
A ISOPREP 279
A.0.3 ISOPREP form (electronic) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
A.0.4 Procedures for completion of ISOPREPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
A.0.5 Sending of ISOPREPs and EPAs to the PRCC . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
A.1 ISOPREP form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
B EPA 283
B.0.1 EPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
B.0.2 EPA form (electronic) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
B.0.3 Completion and handling EPAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
B.1 EPA form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
C Notication checklist 287
C.1 Aircrew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
C.2 Non-aircrew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
D Isolated personnel initial action checklist 289
E Report formats 291
E.1 PR 11-line report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
E.2 METHANE report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
F The NATO SERE training standard 293
F.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
F.2 Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
F.3 Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
F.4 SERE training levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
F.5 Student training objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
F.6 Instructor requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
F.6.1 SERE instructor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
F.6.2 Advanced SERE instructor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
F.7 Level A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
F.8 Level B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
F.9 Level C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
F.10 Pre-deployment training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
F.11 Continuation training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
Acronyms 303
xx
CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES
xxi
List of Figures
2.1 The PR system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 PR vs. complexity, difculty and risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1 Generic command and control structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.2 Sector oriented command and control structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.1 Generic decision cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.2 Execution matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.1 Standard MS-Outlook E-mail folder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.2 Standard document folder tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5.1 JPRC / PRCC activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5.2 Capabilities of recovery personnel vs. capabilities of recovery equipment . 53
A.1 Example of a generic JPRC / PRCC set-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
G.1 PR command and control structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
H.1 PR command and control structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
2.1 RMC decision cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
3.1 RW (RESCORT) formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
3.2 Rejoin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
3.3 Rear RESCORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
3.4 Racetrack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
3.5 Attached FW RESCORT patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
3.6 Attached FW RESCORT patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
4.1 Comms prior passing IP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
4.2 Comms after passing IP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
P.1 A COMCARD example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
xxii
LIST OF FIGURES
R.1 Generic FARP area layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
R.2 Standard FARP layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
A.1 ISOPREP page 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
A.2 ISOPREP page 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
B.1 EPA page 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
B.2 EPA page 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
F.1 The NATO SERE training concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
F.2 The NATO SERE structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
1
Volume
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
OF PERSONNEL RECOVERY
Introduction
3
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Purpose
0101. This volume provides fundamental principles for NATO Personnel Recovery (PR).
0102. It also provides guidance for determining personnel whose duties make them
vulnerable to isolation and exploitation, requiring different levels of training.
1.2 Applicability
0103. This document applies to both military and non-military participants involved
in NATO operations, NATO led operations and training. NATO personnel could become
isolated while conducting the full spectrum of NATO or NATO led operations or training.
Responsibility for the recovery of all personnel (military and civilian) participating in
such operations resides therefore with the appropriate commander.
1.3 Jointness of Personnel Recovery
0104. PR is a joint function. Joint functions need to be considered by the Joint Force
Commander (JFC) in determining the capabilities required for the command. Nations
have differing PR philosophies, policies, priorities and capabilities. In a multinational
force, differences should be reconciled and an overall combined joint force personnel re-
covery policy should be established to facilitate unity of effort and enhance PR measures.
0105. The JFC will most often desire functional or national service components to pro-
vide capabilities to conduct PR execution tasks for their own forces and for other isolated
personnel within their assigned operating areas. The JFC will need to balance functional
component area of operation PR responsibilities with the capabilities of a PR effort for
the operational area. Depending on the situation, the JFC may want to rely entirely on
component PR capability or multinational capability, or some combination of all or sev-
eral categories. Nations and components identify their capability and shortfalls to meet
the JFCs requirements and adjust assigned forces or capabilities where required.
0106. A NATO component experiencing an isolation event within its force or operational
area may be able to conduct the recovery mission without external support. Often this is
due to need for expediency and proximity of forces. However, components should weigh
risks associated and whether or not a joint effort would be a better option.
4
1.4 Operational environment
0107. If two or more components are involved, the Joint Personnel Recovery Cell (JPRC)
coordinates the augmentation of forces and recommend PR mission-specic supported
and supporting command relationships to the JFC or designated supported comman-
der for PR. Respective component commanders normally retain Operational Control
(OPCON) of their forces and the JFC or designated supported commander for PR will del-
egate Tactical Control (TACON) of participating forces to the supported commander.
0108. Nations should identify personnel that may be assigned to a mission, duty / job,
or task where they may be at greater risk of isolation or exploitation if captured. Nations
should ensure these personnel are trained and equipped to NATO standards.
1.3.1 Denitions
Personnel Recovery (PR): The sum of military, diplomatic and civil efforts to effect
the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel.
Isolated Personnel: Military or civilian personnel who are separated from their unit
or organisation in a situation that may require them to survive, evade, resist exploita-
tion, or escape while awaiting recovery.
Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Extraction (SERE): Denes the set of tactics,
techniques, and procedures that will give isolated personnel the tools to survive in any
environment and to evade capture where such a threat exists. Failing that, to resist
exploitation by captors and, if the situation permits, escape captivity to nally support
their own or assisted recovery and return with dignity.
Reintegration: The operational process of providing medical and psychological care
to personnel recovered from isolation and debrieng them for intelligence and lessons
learned purposes.
1.3.2 Practical terms for use in this document
Personnel. Although in principle all military and civil personnel in a NATO operation
are at risk of getting isolated, some are at a higher level of risk than others. Nations
are to provide them with the appropriate level of training prior entering the Joint Oper-
ations Area (JOA). The different levels of risk and training must be taken into account
every time the term personnel is used in this document
1
.
0109. Joint forces may conduct a wide variety of activities to include combat, humani-
tarian assistance, maintaining order and managing confrontation within the JOA. These
activities must be coordinated with other organizations - military operations may only
play a relatively minor part during some crises. Nevertheless, experience demonstrates
that a wide range of military activities will be required simultaneously, rather than
single focus operations.
1
Categories of civilian personnel are dened in NATO policy document: EAPC(SNLC)D(2006)0006-
REV1. (19 June 2006)
Introduction
5
Alliance forces will be required to deal with a complex and diverse range of risks, situa-
tions and demands to manage the crisis through military operations; and personnel may
encounter a wide range of potential situations when conducting operations. These situ-
ations could range from a permissive to a no permissive operational environment with
the expectation of engagement by adversary forces. The development of proper plans
will depend on the ability of the designated commander and principal staff ofcers to
observe and accurately assess conditions within the JOA. Regardless of the operational
environment, forces must be trained and ready to respond to recovery missions across
the operational spectrum. Commanders should be aware of the pertinent conditions
prior to execution of any mission. Additionally, isolated personnel may encounter differ-
ent levels of exploitation if captured and must be trained appropriately.
In any operational environment, intelligence adds substantially to the Allied effort, es-
pecially when dealing with isolated personnel. Recovery forces are dependent on qual-
ity intelligence for their own safety and that of the isolated personnel. The JPRC and
Personnel Recovery Coordination Cells (PRCCs) need to establish a positive working re-
lationship with the joint force commanders (JFCs) J-2, and identify PR intelligence re-
quirements early in the operation.
6
Scope of NATO PR
7
Chapter 2
Scope of NATO PR
2.1 Elements of PR
0201. PR involves a balance of activities between the three elements of the PR system
as depicted in gure 2.1; commanders and staffs, recovery forces and isolated personnel.
0202. Commanders and staffs trained to integrate and synchronise PR planning and
operations into all operational activities.
0203. A recovery force manned, trained and equipped to plan, exercise and execute PR
missions. The nature of the required recovery force varies in line with the demands of
the task.
0204. Isolated personnel.
Education and Training
CiviI MiIitary DipIomatic
PR options
SAR CR CSAR NAR
Recovery methods
IsoIated PersonneI
Recovery Forces
Commanders and Staffs
PR eIements
Legend
CR = Combat Recovery
CSAR = Combat Search and Rescue
NAR = Non-conventionaI Assisted Recovery
PR = PersonneI Recovery
Figure 2.1: The PR system
8
2.2 Delineation
2.2 Delineation
0205. The following delineation implements NATO policy to ensure a viable PR capabil-
ity in all environments. These options govern planning and preparation for PR, but do
not prescribe mission execution. The options are as follows:
a. Diplomatic. National governments are the lead for all diplomatic activities to
prepare for, support and possibly execute PR events.
b. Military. NATO nations and NATO are responsible for all NATO or NATO led military
activities conducted in preparation for and during PR missions.
c. Civil. (Non) Governmental Organisations ((N)GOs) and private citizens have often
played an important role in securing the release of captured and detained person-
nel.
2.3 The personnel recovery system
0206. NATO and / or NATO nations may exercise diplomatic, military, or civil options, or
a combination thereof, to recover isolated personnel. Within the NATO military option
the three essential elements of PR must work together through a credible communication
system and intelligence architecture. Each of the essential elements must be thoroughly
trained, properly organised and equipped to perform its own unique actions, seamlessly
interface with the other elements to accomplish the ve PR execution tasks, and gain
and maintain situational awareness (gure 2.1).
2.4 Methods of personnel recovery
0207. Any service or component may conduct PR. Some methods of PR are illustrated
in gure 2.1. For NATO the terms Combat Recovery (CR) and Combat Search And Rescue
(CSAR) refer to the status of the isolated personnel. Historically, these acronyms are also
used to refer to a specic type of mission
1
.
Search And Rescue (SAR) is the location and recovery of persons in distress in an
environment where hostile interference is not expected.
0208. Military SAR effort is directed principally toward, but is not restricted to, the res-
cue of military personnel. Subject to military requirements and operational practicabil-
ity, SAR assistance may also be provided to civil authorities. Additionally, some nations
have parallel civil SAR assets, which can respond to military SAR incidents. NATO na-
tions SAR services remain a national responsibility operated to meet International Civil
Aviation Organisation (ICAO), International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and NATO re-
quirements. There is no requirement for NATO to maintain a parallel SAR organisation.
0209. In many cases, military requirements for SAR exceed those of ICAO and IMO
which represent only the minimum acceptable civil standard; thus the facilities pro-
vided within Search and Rescue Regions (SRRs) are often well in excess of those shown
in the ICAO and IMO documents for the region. SAR facilities provided by nations, though
usually military and military-operated, may also be civil and civil-operated.
1
Detailed description of all these methods can be found in the Lexicon. There are a number of other
acronyms used by nations to describe specic recovery methods, e.g. Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and
Personnel (TRAP), Downed Aircraft Recovery Team (DART), Deployed Search And Rescue (DSAR)
Scope of NATO PR
9
0210. For deployed operations where no hostile interference is expected (e.g. peace
support operations, disaster relief or training exercises), NATOs capability to search for
and recover personnel may need to be provided by deployed assets. This capability may
be either provided by dedicated SAR or other in-theatre assets and is referred to as DSAR
by GBR forces.
Combat Recovery (CR) is the recovery of isolated personnel from a situation where
hostile interference may be expected. In combat recovery, either the recovery force, or
the isolated personnel, or both, have not been trained in CSAR Tactics, Techniques and
Procedures (TTPs)
Combat Search And Rescue (CSAR) is the application of specic tactics, techniques
and procedures by dedicated forces to recover isolated personnel, who themselves are
trained and appropriately equipped to receive this support, from a situation where hos-
tile interference may be expected.
Non-conventional Assisted Recovery. Recovery situations may need the assistance
of non-conventional forces or other types of assistance when conventional means are not
suitable. NATO nations may conduct recoveries using Special Operations Forces (SOF) or
other surrogate/indigenous forces trained to assist in moving isolated personnel through
a network that returns them to the safety of allied forces.
2.5 Risk considerations
NEO
UNIT RESCUE
CSAR
DIPLOMATIC / CIVIL
CR
I
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c
r
e
a
s
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o
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I
e
x
i
t
y
/
d
i
f
f
i
c
u
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y
/
r
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SAR
Increasing numbers of isoIated personneI
I
s
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C
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PR
Hostage rescue
SOF / NAR
Figure 2.2: PR vs. complexity, difculty and risk
10
2.5 Risk considerations
0211. The PR system as depicted in gure 2.1 may give the impression that diplomatic,
civil and military ways to recover personnel overlap, but that CR, CSAR, etc are clearly
delineated. This is however not true as illustrated by gure 2.2. This gure shows
that the different types of operations overlap. The colour shading from green via am-
ber to red indicates that there is a gradual shift from relatively easy / safe to complex
/ risky execution of that particular type of recovery operation. Where SAR typically fo-
cuses on people that are isolated, but not evading, CR may range from small to relatively
large numbers of personnel that may be isolated or evading. CSAR is typically applica-
ble for small numbers of personnel that may be isolated or evading. Non-conventional
Assisted Recovery (NAR) may be applicable to both small and relatively large numbers
of personnel excluding Hostage Release Operations (HRO). Non-combatant Evacuation
Operation (NEO) is not considered part of PR, although it might entail small to large
groups of isolated personnel. Recovery TTPs for the extraction of small numbers of non-
combatants will be similar, if not the same, as for CR operations
2
. A similar situation
goes for the rescue of entire units that have become isolated. Such a recovery operation
is also considered to be an operation in its own right.
0212. A clearly separated issue is when isolated personnel are captured and/or held
hostage. Due to the nature of HRO, they require sovereign military, diplomatic, civil or
legal decisions at the highest levels of a nations leadership and are therefore a nation-
to-nation responsibility. In certain circumstances, however, NATO may be involved in
HRO.
0213. The scope of this Joint Operational Guidelines (JOG) is depicted by the dotted
circle in gure 2.2.
2
The extraction of large numbers of non-combatants is an operation in its own right as described in
AJP-3.4.2
PR guiding principles
11
Chapter 3
PR guiding principles
3.1 Principles
0301. Ideally, a recovery by on-scene or nearby assets should be effected wherever
possible. All operations should include recovery procedures planning. Once personnel
become isolated, and immediate recovery is not possible by on-scene assets, the require-
ment will be passed through appropriate channels to the JPRC / PRCC. Depending on
the force posture, forces may be designated for specic PR missions and maintained at
a high degree of readiness or they may be double earmarked while conducting other
missions.Additionally, the JPRC and PRCCs have a responsibility to record all events to
provide data for lessons learned.
Early deployment
0302. From the onset of a mission or training, NATO personnel may become isolated.
For deployed operations, early deployment of a PR capability is an important element
of the JFCs operational capability. Therefore, assets that are capable of supporting PR
must be integrated into the deployed force when operations start.
Preparedness
0303. Before entering the JOA, NATO and participating forces should be trained, equipped
and prepared to conduct PR operations within their capabilities. JFCs will dene the
parameters required for recovery operations. JPRC directors should be engaged in the
Operational Planning Process (OPP) at the earliest possible time. (N)GOs involved in the
NATO JOA should be invited to attend the OPP. They hold invaluable information and
this starts the coordination required for PR.
Time
0304. Expediency is required to prevent exploitation by an adversary, meet urgent
medical needs and limit exposure to extreme environments. A timely response may also
be required to remain within the adversarys decision cycle. Similarly, there may be
preferred periods to execute a recovery (i.e. at night) or specic times when the isolated
personnel will be contactable or available for recovery. Therefore, potential PR assets
must remain exible and able to react rapidly when required.
12
3.1 Principles
Operational security
0305. In order to share knowledge and TTPs among NATO and Partnership for Peace na-
tions and other nations participating in NATO led operations, the security classication
of PR documents should be kept as low as possible.
Commanders personnel recovery responsibilities
0306. All operational level commanders have a PR responsibility toward their subordi-
nate personnel. A JPRC will be formed to coordinate all joint PR activities on behalf of
the JFC preferably at the JFC level. Alternatively, a Component Commander (CC) may be
designated by the JFC to command and control all PR activity throughout the JOA. Sub-
ordinate commanders are to establish a PRCC or designate a PR Point Of Contact (POC).
0307. NATO commanders and their planning staff must consider all available PR op-
tions to successfully plan for PR operations within their operational area. NATO comman-
ders and staffs should recommend the composition of, and inuence the preparation and
training for, all NATO dedicated and designated recovery assets necessary to accomplish
PR missions within their operational area. In many cases the NATO commanders and
their staffs cannot control the non-military options, but must aggressively liaise with
these groups and push for Liaison Ofcers (LNOs) from these groups.
FORCE COMPONENTS
13
Chapter 4
FORCE COMPONENTS
4.1 Introduction
0401. The JFC has overall responsibility for PR in the JOA. JFCs normally exercise com-
mand authority for PR either through a designated component commander whose PRCC
has been designated by the JFC to function also as the JPRC, or through a designated
JPRC embedded in the JFC staff (usually in the Joint Operation Centre (JOC)). The JPRC
is responsible to facilitate the planning and execution of PR operations by providing the
JFC the greatest latitude and exibility for coordinating and executing joint, component,
and unit PR responsibilities and activities. Staffs at all levels should make PR an inte-
gral part of planning, and identify and coordinate PR support requirements in advance.
It is the JPRCs responsibility to facilitate coordination both in the planning process and
during PR operations. PR operations may involve forces ranging from a single recovery
vehicle to a complex task force.
4.2 Personnel recovery organisation
0402. PR organisation and operations should ideally be built around forces either ded-
icated or designated for PR. When resources are constrained, assets may only be ded-
icated for a specic time period. Designated forces are capable of supporting PR, but
may or may not be tasked depending on the commanders priorities. In addition, other
naval, land or air force resources may be required to assist in detection, coordination,
location, authentication, protection, and recovery. These assets may be constituted into
a comprehensive force package called a Personnel Recovery Task Force (PRTF).
4.2.1 Embedded JPRC
0403. PR operations are similarly organised as the normal Command and Control (C
2
)
structure from the JFC down via the CCs to the operational units. This is depicted in
gure 4.1. The JPRC exercises coordinates with over the PRCCs along the same lines as
the normal C
2
is exercised.
4.2.2 Delegated JPRC
0404. The authority for the joint PR activities may be delegated when the JFC does not
have the means to effectively take on the joint responsibilities and if one of the compo-
nents already has the appropriate C
2
structure and means or if one of the components
14
4.2 Personnel recovery organisation
JFC
JPRC
MCC
PRCC
ACC
PRCC
LCC
PRCC
SOCC
PRCC
Units
PR POC
Units
PR POC
Units
PR POC
Units
PR POC
CIV LNO
DipIomatic LNO
Command
Coordination / Liaison
Figure 4.1: Generic command and control structure
has all necessary PR assets organically available. The component that is delegated the
joint PR authority should integrate the JPRC into its operations centre while retaining
a PRCC capability to conduct component PR missions. When a CCs PRCC is designated
the JPRC for the JFC, the JPRC has the authority and responsibility for coordinating PR
related matters for the JFC with all C
2
nodes, including other CCs PRCCs.
CC
PRCC
CC
PRCC
JFC
CC
PRCC
COM NPSO
JPRC
Units
PR POC
Units
PR POC
Units
PR POC
Sector A
PRCC
Sector B
PRCC
Sector C
PRCC
Units
PR POC
Figure 4.2: Sector oriented command and control structure
4.2.3 Sector oriented JPRC
0405. In some cases the land CC is effectively the overall commander of the operation
in the JOA and has the JOA subdivided in sectors. In such a case the C
2
structure may be
set-up as depicted in gure 4.2. Again, the JPRC resides over the other PRCCs where C
2
is concerned. This has been the case in recent NATO Operations such as KFOR and ISAF.
FORCE COMPONENTS
15
4.3 C2 nodes
4.3.1 JFC
0406. PR is a JFCs responsibility and may be conducted within an JOA. JFC exercises
OPCON over assigned PR forces; however, certain national PR forces may be made avail-
able under TACON only, due to national caveats. Integration of contributing nations
military forces which could be used to achieve the PR objective will be attained by estab-
lishing a JPRC in a designated operations centre. Other national forces may be allocated
for specic PR operations through the JPRC. The JPRC / PRCC should be staffed by spe-
cialists from contributing nations and the component commands. The JFC may direct
other components to support a given PR operation.
Coordination
0407. PR operations must be an integral part of any operational planning. Coordina-
tion should be both vertical and horizontal and should be conducted continuously during
all phases of a PR operation. Principle nodes where coordination takes place are within
the JPRC / PRCC, between the JPRC / PRCC and PRCCs, between the JFC and external
agencies, and through liaison ofcers.
JFCs PR responsibilities
0408. JFC has responsibility for PR operations and should:
Establish a PR organisation within the JOA.
Establish and maintain command procedures for PR.
Ensure that PR is an integral part of planning and training.
Identify PR requirements, to include intelligence, apportion and allocate assigned
PR forces.
identify shortfalls in PR capabilities. If necessary, request additional PR assets
from national forces not assigned.
Establish clear and direct lines of communication between the command and higher
NATO authorities.
Conduct a preliminary assessment of circumstances surrounding the incident and
make a recommendation concerning the individuals status.
Conduct recovery operations to undertake safe recoveries.
Dene mission abort criteria and procedures in the PR Concept of Operation (CONOPS)
and Special Instructions (SPINS).
Identify personnel at risk, to include level of risk.
Establish and coordinate clear reintegration procedures.
(1)Establish procedures to maintain records on PR organisations and activities to
provide data for lessons learned.
16
4.3 C2 nodes
4.3.2 Component commands
0409. Each CC has the responsibility, through its PRCC, to plan, coordinate, conduct
and control PR operations for his own component. The authority to prosecute component
PR missions should rest with CCs and is often delegated to the Operations Centre (OC)
director. If a CC is conducting a PR mission within his own capabilities for his component,
he should still notify the JPRC for deconiction and oversight. The CC should exercise
TACON over a PRTF tasked for a specic mission. JFC may direct CCs to make units /
troops available to be assigned to other components to support the PR effort.
4.3.3 Units
0410. Unit commanders are primarily responsible for recovering their own personnel
with their own assets, whenever possible. Units are also to plan, prepare and train
for an isolated personnel incident involving their personnel.Units are to appoint a PR
POC to coordinate with the PRCC and or JPRC on all PR related issues. This may range
from the preparation of Isolated Personnel Reports (ISOPREPs) via in-theatre isolated
personnel training, to providing information and support in case personnel of that unit
have become isolated.
4.3.4 JPRC
0411. The JPRC is the central node to coordinate PR C
2
on behalf of the JFC. It is to plan
and coordinate all PR activities throughout the JOA. It records data to support lessons
learned.
4.3.5 PRCC
0412. The role of the PRCC is to plan and coordinate all component PR operations, in-
cluding coordination with JPRC and other component PRCCs.
4.3.6 PR POC
0413. The role of the PR POC is to plan and coordinate all unit level PR operations and
support required training. The PR POC anticipates PR needs and coordination with other
unit PR POCs, component PRCCs and the JPRC. The PR POC is responsible for coordinating
all PR documentation (e.g. ISOPREP, Evasion Plan of Action (EPA), etc.).
4.3.7 Mission Coordinator
0414. The Mission Coordinator (MC) is also responsible for coordinating PR activities,
supporting the On Scene Commander (OSC) and the recovery force in conducting their
primary tasks and for guiding the mission. The MC is the coordinator and link for com-
munications and data exchange between the JPRC and the PR assets. In the event
the MC is operating from an airborne platform he is known as the Airborne Mission
Coordinator (AMC). Additional duties include:
Determines the OSC.
FORCE COMPONENTS
17
Establishing communications among the recovery force elements according to the
Communication Plan (COMPLAN).
Relaying threat warnings and other information affecting mission progress.
Requesting additional assets as required and ensuring recovery and support forces
arrive at designated locations to accomplish the PR mission.
Managing logistic support for all PR assets.
Coordinating appropriate air space control means and re support measures in the
Objective Area (OA), and advising PRTF participants and the JPRC / PRCC of mission
progress.
4.3.8 On-Scene Commander
0415. The OSC directs operations in the vicinity of the isolated personnel until arrival
of the recovery force. All assets participating in a PR operation should contact the OSC /
MC before entering the (restricted) zone of recovery operations. The OSC should contin-
uously monitor isolated personnel frequency in case immediate actions are required to
prevent isolated personnel capture. The OSC should be familiar with OSC responsibilities
and should carry the appropriate PR report format as described in the CONOPS.
4.3.9 Rescue Mission Commander
0416. The Rescue Mission Commander (RMC) will be appointed by the appropriate
level commander, through the JPRC / PRCC and is responsible for the planning and execu-
tion of the PR mission. The RMC is normally the asset with the best situation awareness
and capability to command the recovery mission. The RMC will normally have TACON of
assets tasked for the recovery mission. Once appointed, the RMC will lead the mission
planning process. This planning is an iterative process with the support of the JPRC /
PRCC, who are to be fully informed to obtain launch and execute approval. During the
execution phase he coordinates his elements activities through the MC. The RMC should
select ingress or egress routes and objective area tactics based on hostile threat, terrain
and the number and status of the isolated personnel being recovered. When in the OA,
the RMC will assume OSC duties.
4.4 Military assets
0417. PR assets may range from a lone individual to a complex taskforce consisting of
any combination of conventional / unconventional, manned / unmanned xed and / or
rotary wing air / space assets, ground elements, surface or subsurface naval assets. Key
is to use the assets that are most suitable for the mission at hand. When planning for a
particular mission, limiting factors and (national) caveats (e.g. only used in humanitar-
ian operations, aircraft only used to transport own personnel, cannot operated outside
of designated area) may preclude available assets from being used and must therefore
be carefully considered. Limiting factors may also reduce the availability of assets (e.g.
no night ying or Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) capability).
18
4.5 Civil / diplomatic assets
4.5 Civil / diplomatic assets
0418. It is important that the appropriate NATO commands maintain awareness of civil
and diplomatic efforts. While military commanders may have little or no control over
these efforts to recover isolated personnel, the affected NATO theatre command may be
able to offer guidance, and should be prepared to assist if necessary and feasible. While
these situations are difcult to predict or direct, deliberate planning and coordination
procedures may facilitate successful outcomes. In the case of civil assets a useful POC is
the Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) cell (J-9) in the Headquarters (HQ). In the case
of diplomatic assets the POC should be the local embassy, consulate or national liaison.
PR OPERATION
19
Chapter 5
PR OPERATION
5.1 General
0501. JPRC and PRCC PR operations should focus on managing the successful execution
of the ve PR tasks. Suitably qualied JPRC and PRCC staff members are essential to
ensure effective employment of the PR CONOPS and operations.
JPRC / PRCC decision making
RMC decision
making
AII Green
Mission Briefing
Execution
EvaIuation
Launch approvaI
Execute approvaI
YES /NO
AII Green
YES
NO Other
options
Figure 5.1: Generic decision cycle
0502. PR missions are conducted through a ow of events as depicted in gure 5.1.
First the JPRC and PRCC will conduct their decision making process whether a PR mission
may be conducted by the available PR assets. If all signs are green, meaning risks have
been mitigated to an acceptable level, the process continues. If this is not the case other
options have to be considered (SOF, diplomatic, civil, etc.). Otherwise, the appointed
RMC will start his decision making process (this is preferably done in parallel to the
JPRC and PRCC decision making process to save time). At the end of his decision making
process the RMC will backbrief the JPRC and PRCC and brief the recovery force. Following
execution, the mission will be evaluated and the outcome will be briefed to the JPRC and
PRCC.
20
5.2 JPRC / PRCC tasks
5.2 JPRC / PRCC tasks
5.2.1 Set-up tasks
0503. The JFC directed OPP is usually led by the J3 and J5 in the Joint Operations
Planning Group (JOPG). This OPP validates PR requirements, to include the establish-
ment of the PR planning cell. Ideally the PR planning cell chief becomes the JPRC di-
rector. PR planning begins as soon as possible to complete the PR annex to the Oper-
ation Plan (OPLAN) / Operations Order (OPORD), PR CONOPS, and Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs). The Legal Adviser (LEGAD), Political Adviser (POLAD), the LNOs and
red card holders are critical during this process. Direction should be issued as soon as
possible to the components to initiate parallel planning and to identify PR POCs. This
planning establishes the foundation for forming the JPRC and PRCCs.
0504. PR operations in theatre begin with setting up the JPRC and component PRCCs.
After initial set-up, the rst action is to make an inventory of the available assets and
to assess the climate, terrain and threat. A PR CONOPS is to be developed based on
this information. Special attention is to be given to the CONOPS development if the
full range of Naval, Land and Air recovery assets is not available, or are only available
under certain restrictions. The PR CONOPS will drive the development of the Air Tasking
Order (ATO), Airspace Control Order (ACO), COMPLAN, PR SPINS and the JOA PR training
plan as depicted in subordinate TTPs documents.
5.2.2 PR CONOPS
PR CONOPS campaign phasing
0505. The JPRC will develop the PR CONOPS for the JOA in accordance with the phases
as described in the OPLAN / OPORD, and may be included as the PR annex to the OPLAN /
OPORD. the PR CONOPS must address the architecture necessary to accomplish the ve
PR tasks. All CCs PRCCs will conduct PR planning for their own personnel, capabilities,
and requirements in support of JOA PR CONOPS. The PR CONOPS must be continually
reviewed to ensure coherence with the progress of the campaign plan. The PR CONOPS
should identify periods of high risk and plan for the use of PR capabilities accordingly.
The PR CONOPS should address linkages to diplomatic, host nation, and civil actors as
they may provide a more appropriate PR course of action. This is especially relevant
since PR missions may have strategic impact. PR CONOPS should be updated and rened
as a part of the Joint Coordination Order (JCO).
0506. ISOPREPs are documents that facilitate the identication of isolated personnel.
EPAs are documents that make evasion actions predictable to the recovery force. In order
to enhance the PR process, all personnel should complete an ISOPREP and/or EPA before
entering the JOA. The PR CONOPS should give clear guidance on the preparation and
management of ISOPREPs and EPAs.
Launch vs execute
0507. PR missions normally have two steps. The rst step is to preposition recovery
forces and their supporting assets. This is historically known as launch. This is ap-
plicable for ground, air and maritime led missions alike. The second step is the actual
approval to prosecute the PR mission and is historically called execute. Authority to
launch and execute resides with the JFC or the CC. This authority may be delegated to
PR OPERATION
21
an individual (e.g. the JOC chief or the JPRC director), but must be clearly delineated
in the PR CONOPS. However, in the interest of timeliness, launch authority is usually
passed to the JPRC or the PRCC. The JFC normally retains execute authority, but may
also choose to delegate it.
5.3 Mission specic
5.3.1 Risk analysis
0508. PR subject to high visibility and to costs/benets considerations. The risk anal-
ysis is conducted in the same manner as other military operations taking into consid-
eration that a typical PR mission is executed at the tactical level but may have an op-
erational or even a strategic impact. The means to conduct the PR mission will span
the whole PR spectrum. The JFC must weigh his course of action against the outcome
and assure that the desired outcome is benecial to the overall operation. PR operations
should therefore not:
a. Add unnecessary risk to the isolated personnel.
b. Add unnecessary risk to the personnel involved in the recovery mission.
c. Preclude execution of higher priority missions.
d. Divert critically needed forces from ongoing operations.
e. Allow the overall military situation to deteriorate.
f. Allow the unnoticed, gradual change to the missions goal, which sometimes is
referred to as Mission creep.
0509. The actual assessed level of risk should drive the type and amount of assets and
their capabilities to ensure economy of force.
0510. The psychological impact of the effort on remaining personnel should be weighed
against the risk to PR resources and the effect of diverting resources from the ongoing
operations. Commanders at all levels should evaluate these factors before ordering or
authorising a PR mission.
5.3.2 PR response options
Immediate. Recovery may be conducted by accompanying, on-scene assets that can be
quickly diverted to execute the recovery (e.g. buddy recovery) or by the individual
who self recovers. Given the nature of this kind of recovery, the JPRC / PRCC will
not be involved in the execution of the mission. The JPRC / PRCC are to be informed
afterwards for lessons learned purposes.
Alert. Response missions commence from a dedicated ground or airborne alert posture.
In order to decrease en-route time to the anticipated recovery area, PR forces may
be located on the ground at a forward location or in the case of aviation assets,
loitering in anticipation of an execution order. Additionally, these forces may be
embedded in missions to further reduce response time.
22
5.4 PR operation essential tasks
Deliberate. This recovery response requires knowledge of the location of the isolated
personnel. Commanders choose this method when an immediate response may not
be possible due to environmental, political, or threat considerations. Deliberately
planned missions give planners the exibility to utilise all necessary / available
assets to complete the recovery.
0511. PR operations comprise ve tasks: Report, Locate, Support, Recover, Reinte-
grate. These tasks can be completed sequentially, in parallel or simultaneously. A
generic ow of events that occur from receiving a distress call to the reintegration of
the recovered isolated personnel is depicted as the execution matrix in Figure 5.2
5.4.1 Report
Initial notication
0512. Initial notication can come from any source, but verication is of the utmost
importance. Rapid and accurate notication is essential for a successful recovery. Dur-
ing the initial reporting period of a PR event, it is likely that there may be numerous
and potentially conicting reports. Therefore, it is essential that each reported location
is logged with an associated time and source. Threat conditions permitting, isolated
personnel should attempt to establish contact with friendly forces i.a.w. notication pro-
cedures as outlined in the PR CONOPS.
Initial response
0513. Once an actual or potential isolating incident is observed, the JPRC will be noti-
ed immediately through the PR communications architecture. The initial JPRC / PRCC
that has been notied, should notify all nodes of the PR C
2
structure. A verbal report
should be sent immediately via voice communication means, and followed up with a for-
mal written or electronic report when able. The affected PRCC will attempt to recover
the isolated personnel utilising available (organic) PR capabilities, and notify the JPRC.
If the affected PRCC determines it is unable to accomplish the recovery with its own
resources, the JPRC will coordinate with other PRCCs to gain an initial assessment on
the capabilities within each component and feasibility of component courses of action.
As soon as practicable, the JPRC should establish and promulgate supporting and sup-
ported relationships, nominate a component PRCC to plan and execute the recovery and
allocate additional resources as necessary. Once the nominated component accepts the
mission, the PRCC will appoint a RMC for the tasked mission. The PRCC or JPRC will
notify responding units and brief pertinent aspects of the mission. The response time
and operations concept will depend on the enemy threat en-route or near the isolated
personnels location, environmental conditions, available assets, and other factors.
0514. Isolating events tend to generate a lot of press inquiries regarding the isolated
personnel and the next of kin. Press and Information Ofce (PIO) response to an isolat-
ing event should therefore be taken into consideration by all PR C
2
nodes and should be
carefully planned and executed.
PR OPERATION
23
5.4.2 Locate
0515. After notication, the priority is to locate the isolated personnel. Verication
of the location information is of utmost importance. Time, effort and lives can be lost
if this is not accomplished. A thorough threat assessment is essential to PR planning
and execution. To locate isolated personnel, use all available resources as required (e.g.
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) means or eyewitness reports). Some
of these capabilities are nationally controlled, and access should be coordinated well
prior to requesting support in an actual PR event.
0516. Even with precise coordinates that can pinpoint the isolated personnels location,
recovery forces still have to authenticate the isolated personnels identity prior to sup-
port and recovery operations. An effective authentication system is essential to prevent
the compromise of vital information and minimise risk to isolated personnel and the
recovery force. This holds true because PRTF assets are extremely vulnerable during the
execution phase and need exact and reliable authentication information. Accordingly,
isolated personnel and recovery forces should take extreme care not to compromise au-
thentication information.
0517. Some of the ways that PRTF forces authenticate isolated personnel in hostile
environments include PR code words, letters, numbers, and visual signals, as well as
ISOPREP data. The details of these will be included in the PR CONOPS and SPINS and
/ or detail promulgated to non-CSAR trained personnel (via JCO, Fragmentation Order
(FRAGO), etc.). It is important that the JPRC actively tracks the use and / or compromise
of authentication means in order to promulgate required changes.
5.4.3 Support
0518. Support is the planned effort necessary to ensure the physical and psychological
sustainment of isolated personnel and the morale of their next of kin and their unit.
Support measures begin before an individual becomes isolated. This includes home-
station arrangements, training and equipping personnel prior to entering a specic JOA,
and the establishment of the JOA PR architecture and theatre PR CONOPS.
0519. Support to the isolated personnel may include establishing two-way communi-
cations, providing morale building support, aerial resupply, or aerial escort to a cache.
Support may also encompass the suppression of enemy threats to the isolated personnel.
This may preclude capture for the isolated person and disrupt the adversarys response
to PR efforts. When necessary, extraction forces and/or equipment may be pre-positioned
to support the isolated personnel until the recovery phase.
0520. Besides support to the isolated personnel, support includes physical and psycho-
logical assistance to the isolated personnels family and unit. Support to the isolated
personnel next of kin is a national responsibility. However, this process may be initiated
by the JPRC through established channels.
5.4.4 Recover
0521. This task reects activities by commanders, staffs, recovery force, and isolated
personnel to physically recover the isolated personnel. This includes the planning,
launch and execution stages. As information of a potential isolating incident becomes
available, the PRCC should assess the situation quickly, determine mission feasibility,
and disseminate data to units that may participate in the recovery mission. Once mis-
sion execution appears feasible, units may be tasked to initiate/continue planning or
24
launch from alert. If they launch, the recovery force will include all the necessary sup-
porting forces required to execute a recovery operation.
5.4.5 Reintegrate
0522. The reintegration task begins when the recovery force relinquishes physical con-
trol of recovered isolated personnel to a designated team member or organisation in the
reintegration process. As part of reintegration, perishable essential intelligence and
SERE information is collected, while at the same time tending to the physical and psy-
chological welfare of recovered isolated personnel. The welfare portion of the reintegra-
tion process may be a long-term endeavour with no specic end date and is normally a
national responsibility. Ultimately, reintegration reects the combatant commanders
commitment to return isolated personnel to duty or their unit in the most expeditious
manner possible considering human life / welfare.
PR OPERATION
25
Is report
vaIidated?
Distress caII comes in
Is IsoIated
PersonneI
Iocated?
What is the
risk?
AcceptabIe UnacceptabIe
Is appropriate
PRTF avaiIabIe?
CapabIe of
neutraIizing /
reducing
threat?
Locate IsoIated
personneI
Is IsoIated
PersonneI
Iocated?
Continue to
monitor the
situation
Launch
PRTF
BuiId PRTF
Provide
information to
RMC
- Location
- ISOPREP
- EPA
- Suggeted route
Coordination with:
- InteII
- (other) component PRTFs
- MedicaI
Augment
PRTF?
Look for other
options
- SOF
- PoIiticaI
- DipIomatic
- CiviI
Execute mission
IP
recoverd?
Reintegrate RepIan mission
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
Y
IP's ID
confirmed?
N
Y
Y
Y
Y N
N
Figure 5.2: Execution matrix
26
27
Volume I
STAFF GUIDE
INTRODUCTION
29
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 The JPRC / PRCC
0101. This volume will detail the roles, responsibilities and activities of the Joint Per-
sonnel Recovery Cell (JPRC) and Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell (PRCC). Where
aspects are valid for both the JPRC and the PRCC it will be referred to in the text as
JPRC / PRCC. The role of the JPRC is to maintain oversight and coordinate Personnel
Recovery (PR) operations. It is the primary PR facility, suitably staffed by trained per-
sonnel drawn from each joint force component as required. The role of the PRCC is to
plan and coordinate all component or sector
1
PR operations. This responsibility may be
limited to that components means or Area of Operations (AO). Operations requiring
cross-component / -sector support should be coordinated through the JPRC.
1.2 PR POC
0102. Selected personnel are trained as PR Point Of Contact (POC) to assist their units
in the completion of Isolated Personnel Reports (ISOPREPs) and the compilation of Eva-
sion Plan of Actions (EPAs). Additionally they have a responsibility for organising the
issue of equipment for the AO of operations, and in achieving a level of practical experi-
ence in survival in extreme environments.
1.3 JFCs PR responsibilities
0103. PR is a Joint Force Commander (JFC)s responsibility and may be conducted
within a NATO Area Of Responsibility (AOR). PR operations must be an integral part
of any operational planning. JFC has responsibility for PR operations and will:
a. General.
(a) Understand the PR mission process and risk assessment.
(b) Understand the capabilities and concept of operations for PR assets.
(c) Know the overall JPRC / PRCC mission and responsibilities.
1
The AO may be subdivided into several sectors where the sector commander is responsible for all oper-
ations within that sector. In such cases and for the purpose of this document, the AO / theatre commander
is considered to be the JFC and the sector commanders the component commanders for the purpose of this
document.
30
1.3 JFCs PR responsibilities
(d) Understand the relationships between the JPRC, PRCCs and host nation PRCCs.
(e) Understand the PR assets tasking process.
(f) Be able to produce & transmit PR specic reports and returns.
(g) Understand the roles of Personnel Recovery Task Force (PRTF) elements:
Mission Coordinator (MC).
On Scene Commander (OSC).
Rescue Mission Commander (RMC).
Rescue Escort (RESCORT).
Rescue Combat Air Patrol (RESCAP).
Recovery vehicles.
Extraction Force (EF).
(h) Understand the NATO authentication system.
b. Preparation.
(a) Establish a PR organisation within the AO.
(b) Develop personnel augmentation requirement. (JPRC lead)
(c) Establish and maintain Command and Control (C
2
) procedures for PR.
(d) Establish clear and direct lines of communication between all PR nodes and
force elements (including Psychologal Operations (PSYOPS), Civil Military
Cooperation (CIMIC), diplomatic and Host Nation).
(e) Identify requirements, apportion and allocate assigned PR forces and identify
shortfalls in PR capabilities.
(f) Identify intelligence requirements for PR.
(g) Establish clear and direct lines of communication between the command and
higher NATO authorities.
(h) Establish liaison with appropriate outside authorities.
(i) Establish reporting requirements and monitor all PR incidents prosecuted by
PRCCs.
(j) Establish dedicated intelligence support requirements and coordinate with
the AO resources.
c. Planning.
(a) Ensure that PR is an integral part of planning and training.
(b) Develop a PR threat decision matrix tailored to the threat analysis.
(c) Develop a launch and execute authority matrix.
(d) Develop a PR Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) to support Operation Plans
(OPLANs) and Contingency Plans (CONPLANs). (JPRC lead)
(e) Ensure guidance is provided to components / sectors establishing appropriate
AO specic individual training for personnel at risk of isolation (as required).
(f) Provide PR inputs to the joint and/or component orders (Joint Coordination
Order (JCO), Fragmentation Orders (FRAGOs), Operational Tasks (OPTASKs),
Air Control Plans (ACPs), Airspace Control Orders (ACOs), Air Operations
Directive (AOD), Air Tasking Orders (ATOs) and Communication Plans (COMPLANs)).
(g) Develop, disseminate and update PR Special Instructions (SPINS). (JPRC lead)
(h) Develop, disseminate and update a theatre reintegration plan. (JPRC lead)
INTRODUCTION
31
d. Execution.
(a) If necessary, request additional PR assets from national forces not assigned.
(b) When individuals become isolated, conduct a preliminary assessment of the
circumstances surrounding the incident and make a recommendation con-
cerning the individuals status.
(c) If necessary, conduct PR operations to undertake safe recoveries.
(d) Coordinate training and exercises to provide a trained PR organisation,recovery
forces for recovery operations.
(e) Coordinate, de-conict and recommend priorities concurrent PR support oper-
ations by joint force components and other National PRCCs. (JPRC lead)
(f) Alert JPRC / other PRCCs of isolated personnels location.
(g) Maintain a database and le on each isolated personnel until recovery is com-
plete.
(h) Coordinate with the Joint Force Psychological Operations cell to inuence lo-
cal populace regarding PR efforts. (JPRC only)
(i) Coordinate deception plans to support PR operations.
(j) Provide PR-brief tailored to various organisational levels in ensure under-
stand or PR responsibilities.
(k) Be able to draft an Air Task Message (ATM), Daily Operations Task Air /
Helicopters (DOTAH) change, or FRAGO supporting PR requirements.
(l) Be able to obtain, manage and disseminate ISOPREP and EPA data.
(m) Make launch and execute recommendations to the designated authority.
(n) Disseminate documents to actors that do not normally receive the ATO, ac-
complan and SPINS.
(o) Assess and identify capabilities and shortfalls of PRCCs and units by using
dedicated JPRC personnel.
1.4 Scale of operations
0104. The organisation, manning equipment and activities of a JPRC / PRCC depends on
the type, scale, duration and circumstances of the operation. For small scale operations
of limited duration and / or operations are conducted only during daytime, a JPRC / PRCC
may consist of only one person. A large scale operation with 24 / 7 operations requires a
full manned and equipped JPRC / PRCC including, but not limited to the responsibilities
as below.
a. Develop supporting PR annex to the OPLAN / Operations Order (OPORD), CONPLANs
and SOPs.
b. Provide a trained joint staff element.
c. Provide PR inputs for the ACP, ACO, ATO and COMPLAN.
d. Develop and disseminate PR SPINS.
32
1.4 Scale of operations
1.4.1 Manning
0105. The JPRC / PRCC must have suitable and adequate manning at all times to be
able to properly handle all PR requests including PR training in plans, current ops and
other applicable staff sections. Upon start of the operations, personnel operating in a
JPRC / PRCC should be fully capable of fullling their respective tasks. Detail on the
set-up of a JPRC / PRCC can be found in Annex A.
Minimum manning levels
0106. The suggested minimum manning to form a JPRC / PRCC, to cover 24 hour op-
erations, is six personnel; three ofcers, two Non-Commissioned ofcers (NCOs) and a
Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Extraction (SERE) specialist. One ofcer and one
NCO to cover each twelve hour shift. The director and the SERE specialist should be
available during the day shift, since most planning and execution will occur during
the day. The JPRC / PRCC should work in close coordination with plans, operations, intel
and medical personnel. Dedicated plans/intell/medical representative should, as a mini-
mum, be assigned as dedicated liaison to the JPRC / PRCC. Whenever possible/applicable,
plans/intel/medical personnel should be even permanently assigned to the JPRC / PRCC.
Minimum manning qualications
0107. Minimum qualications are as follows:
a. Ofcers should be experienced in planning PR missions and, preferably, with JPRC
/ PRCC experience and at the NATO JPRC controllers course or the US PR-101 / -103
and -301 courses or a similar national PR course.
b. NCOs should be experienced in JPRC / PRCC operations and preferably qualied at
the NATO JPRC controllers course or the US PR-101 / -103 and -301 courses or a
similar national PR course.
c. Intelligence ofcer should be experienced in PR.
d. SERE specialist should be familiar with the AO requirements and assigned units
equipment and preferably qualied at the US PR-300 and -301 courses or a similar
national PR course.
1.4.2 Equipment
0108. The primary equipment of a JPRC / PRCC are robust and interoperable communi-
cation means to guarantee its coordination authority. Communications equipment can
range from a (mobile) telephone to highly secure encrypted communication means. The
equipment used should depend on the requirements of the operational ease of use, pro-
liferation desired and the need for security. Details on JPRC / PRCC equipment can be
found in annex A. As default, the following capabilities should be available:
a. Voice and data exchange between JPRC, PRCC, and PR forces. Depending on the
situation, secure communications may be required.
INTRODUCTION
33
b. Communication and Information System (CIS) connectivity / capability to inter-
face with the primary JFC and component C
2
systems (e.g. CRONOS, Integrated
Command and Control system (ICC), Air Command and Control System (ACCS),
Maritime Command, Control and Information System (MCCIS), Joint Automated
Deep Operations Coordination System (JADOCS), etc.)
c. Specic PR management tools (i.e mission manager on ICC / JADOCS), and collabo-
rative chat capability.
Location
0109. The JPRC / PRCC should be located within the operations area of the host head-
quarters (i.e. the Joint Operation Centre (JOC) or Air Operation Centre (AOC)). Com-
munication and means to maintain situational awareness are normally fused in these
locations, which facilitates coordination and time sensitive decision making.
1.5 Guidance for units with non-CSARtrained and equipped
personnel
1.5.1 Introduction
0110. The successful recovery of isolated personnel in the AO can only be achieved if
the personnel requiring recovery are sufciently trained and properly documented prior
to the start of their mission. The requirement is to follow similar principles but to
present pragmatic guidance that can be tailored to the art of the possible depending on
unit role and mission. The guidance should be incorporated in formation/unit planning
and execution procedures.
1.5.2 Recovery documentation
0111. The organisation of personal documentation is essential for the recovery of iso-
lated personnel. Collation and timely dispatch to a PRCC is a fundamental rst stage
in the organisation of recovery operations. This is achieved by structured and detailed
ISOPREP and EPA. The JFC is likely to mandate that all personnel at risk of isolation
complete an ISOPREP as it is a proven format. The information contained in an EPA is
essentially standard business for many units and covered by unit orders (actions on),
patrol traces, equipment lists and PR SPINS. Units are to ensure that this information
can be passed to the PRCC or directly to the JPRC without delay.
1.5.3 ISOPREP form and management
0112. Full guidance and a template of an ISOPREP can be found in Volume III Chapter
2.5 and Annex A. Management of personal documentation for non Combat Search And
Rescue (CSAR) equipped personnel should be directed by PRCCs as dened by the PR
SOP for the operation. For large formations/units the most pragmatic solution may be
to retain the data at unit / brigade level. It is vital those personnel are aware of the
content of their ISOPREP and that any other individual other than those in the Recovery
chain of command does not know the contents. Once complete the ISOPREP is classied
Condential.
34
1.5 Guidance for units with non-CSAR trained and equipped personnel
1.5.4 PR codes
0113. The PR information contained in SPINS is only relevant for CSAR recoveries and
dissemination to a wider audience is neither pragmatic nor desirable. However, PRCCs
should strip and disseminate any relevant information if appropriate. This should not
include SPINS authentication data (PR Word, Letter, Number, Colour) as wider distribu-
tion would compromise Operational Security (OPSEC) and be impractical. Therefore, the
JPRC will develop and disseminate theatre wide Combat Recovery (CR) codes that are
to be used in CR events. These codes include also Ground-To-Air Signalss (GTASs) and
Recovery Activation Signalss (RASs). Furthermore, PRCCs could direct formations/unit
to provide additional simple means to initially authenticate isolated personnel (e.g. the
units daily changing challenge and response password), taking the directions given in
the PR SOP into account.
1.5.5 Recovery equipment
0114. The JPRC should direct minimum levels of equipment to be carried by personnel
operating in the AO as dened by the PR SOP for the operation. This may simply be
standard unit scales with targeted units / individuals provided with additional equip-
ment. It is however vital that the detail is available to the PRCC on the occurrence of an
isolating event.
1.5.6 Basic, intermediate and advanced training
0115. Levels of PR training for formations / units deploying into AO are directed by the
JFC and direction should be promulgated during the operational planning process. na-
tions may, but should not, deviate from these requirements through the use of formal
National caveats. Basic training (SERE Level A) comprises theoretical training in sur-
vival, evasion, recovery and Conduct After Capture (CAC) policy. Intermediate training
(SERE Level B) includes practical exercises in some of the techniques used in recovery
and is usually associated with Medium Risk of Isolation and / or Exploitation (MRIE).
Advanced training (SERE level C) includes practical exercises in evasion, recovery and
CAC and is usually asicoated with High Risk of Isolation and / or Exploitation (HRIE).
As a minimum all personnel at risk of isolation should receive SERE Level A training
tailored to the AO and units should include this requirement in their pre-deployment
preparation. The degree of training each individual has received is to be recorded on
their ISOPREP.
1.5.7 PR POC
0116. Units should nominate selected personnel and provide training to enable them
to implement mandated policy (train the trainer). Formations liable to form a PRCC
should provide selected ops staff with specic training on the roles and functions of an
PRCC. These personnel will then be the principle POC for the JPRC.
1.5.8 Pre-deployment and in-theatre training
0117. Pre-deployment and in-theatre training requirements will be specied in the PR
SOP. Where additional pre-deployment or in-AO training in recovery or environmen-
tal survival is required by units, a request can be made for additional SERE training
INTRODUCTION
35
through national channels. Personnel assigned to man positions in the JPRC will receive
appropriate training as dened by the PR SOP for the operation.
36
1.5 Guidance for units with non-CSAR trained and equipped personnel
COMMAND AND CONTROL
37
Chapter 2
COMMAND AND CONTROL
2.1 General
0201. The JFC may exercise command authority for PR by himself or through a des-
ignated Component Commander (CC). CCs involved in the operation are to establish a
PRCC. The JFC normally exercises Operational Control (OPCON) over PR forces; however,
certain national PR forces will be made available under Tactical Control (TACON) only.
Other national forces may be allocated for specic PR operations through the JPRC. The
JFC or the designated CC will establish a JPRC within his components operations centre.
Other CCs involved in the operation should also establish PRCC within their operations
centres. The JPRC has primacy over PRCCs and the latter must keep the JPRC informed
of any PR operation. The JPRC must have access to the Concept of Operation (CONOPS),
valid for the particular AO, of every PR asset.
2.2 Coordination
0202. Coordination should be both vertical and horizontal and should be conducted
continuously during all phases of a PR operation. Principle nodes where coordination
takes place are within the JPRC / PRCC, between the JPRC / PRCC and PRCCs, between the
JFC and external agencies, and through liaison ofcers.
2.2.1 JFC
0203. JFC exercises OPCON over assigned PR forces. Integration of contributing nations
military forces which could be used to achieve the PR objective will be attained by estab-
lishing a JPRC in a designated operations centre. The JPRC / PRCC should be staffed by
specialists from contributing nations and the component commands. The JFC has both
execution and launch authority and may direct other components to support a given PR
operation
2.2.2 Component / sector commander
0204. Each CC has the responsibility, through its PRCC, to plan, coordinate, conduct
and control PR operations for his own component. The authority to launch component
PR missions rests with CCs and will normally be delegated to the Operations Centre (OC)
director. A CC designated by JFC will plan, coordinate and control joint PR for the AO
38
2.3 JPRC / PRCC
and will have the responsibility to launch those missions. The nominated CC may be
delegated OPCON over assigned PR forces. He will exercise TACON over a PRTF tasked for
a specic mission. JFC may direct CCs to make units / troops available to be assigned to
other components to support the PR effort. Forces not under JFC command and control
may also support PR missions.
2.3 JPRC / PRCC
0205. The JPRC is to maintain oversight and coordinate all joint PR operations. It is
the primary PR facility, suitably staffed by supervisory personnel and equally manned
by trained personnel drawn from each joint force component.
0206. The role of the PRCC is similar to the role of the JPRC but then only within the
components or sectors AOR (see AJP-3.3.9 for details regarding the different C
2
options).
2.3.1 Mission coordinator
0207. The MC is the link for radio communications and data exchange between the
JPRC / PRCC and the PR assets. The Airborne Mission Coordinators (AMCs) is also respon-
sible for coordinating PR activities thus supporting the OSC and the RMC in conducting
their primary jobs. Additional AMC duties include:
a. Designating OSC.
b. Establishing communications among the PRTF elements according to the COMPLAN.
c. Relaying threat warnings and any other information that may affect the mission
in progress.
d. Requesting additional assets as required and ensuring that recovery and support
forces arrive at designated locations to accomplish the PR mission.
e. Managing Air to Air Refuellings (AARs) for all PR assets. (AMC only)
f. Coordinating appropriate no-re zones in the objective area and advising PRTF
participants and the JPRC / PRCC of mission progress.
2.3.2 OSC
a. The OSC controls operations in the AO.
b. A checklist from staff for OSC needs to be developed. (see Annex E in Volume II.
c. Appropriate details in the SPINS (see annex J).
2.3.3 RMC
0208. The RMC will be appointed by the component / sector commander and will have
responsibility for the planning and execution of the PR mission. The RMC appointed
should be experienced in leading complex, multi-national, dissimlar type asset task for-
ces. He will have TACON of assets tasked for the recovery mission.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
39
2.3.4 Liaison authority
0209. All participating units are to be granted direct liaison authority with the JPRC /
PRCC.
2.3.5 Mission abort
0210. Mission abort criteria, including national caveats, and procedures must be clearly
dened and articulated in the PR SOP and SPINS.
40
2.3 JPRC / PRCC
INTELLIGENCE
41
Chapter 3
INTELLIGENCE
3.1 General intelligence principles
0301. Detailed intelligence information is the foundation for successful PR operations.
Special considerations are required to assess the probability of success before tasking
PR missions into hostile territory. Intelligence must be tied into a real-time network cou-
pled with analysis of opposing forces tactics and capabilities. During the planning and
execution of the PR mission, dedicated intelligence must be made available at all levels.
Experience has shown that, to guarantee real-time access to intelligence information for
PR missions, a rm liaison between the JFCs / CCs intelligence cell and the JPRC / PRCC
must be established.
0302. To support PR operations, relevant intelligence needs to be provided in a timely
manner to enable an accurate threat assessment:
a. To the isolated personnel (evasion requirement).
b. To the recovery force during ingress, egress and in the pick-up area.
3.2 Intelligence source
0303. Mission intelligence will be developed from:
a. Naval, Ground, Air, Electronic and Missile Order of Battle (ORBAT).
b. Image Intelligence (IMINT).
c. Signal Intelligence (SIGINT).
d. Human Intelligence (HUMINT).
e. Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT).
f. National and AO level Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) collec-
tion assets.
42
3.3 Advanced intelligence requirement
3.3 Advanced intelligence requirement
0304. Mission intelligence will also need to consider the following in advance of any PR
operations:
a. Political / religious environment.
b. Civilian population.
c. Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) assessment.
d. Terrain / weather.
e. Friendly ORBAT.
f. Ongoing operations
3.4 Isolated personnel intelligence
0305. Isolated personnel intelligence will be developed from:
a. ISOPREPs.
b. EPA including Designated Area of Recovery (DAR).
c. Mission Reports (MISREPs) and personnel debriefs.
3.5 Mission intelligence requirements
0306. Intelligence resources may be required for the initial detection and location of
the isolated personnel and subsequently to determine:
a. Method of recovery.
b. DARs.
c. Opposing Forces (OPFOR) counter-PR activity.
d. Reaction of local civilian population.
3.6 Guidance for intel and ops support staff
3.6.1 Introduction
The successful recovery of isolated personnel in the AO can only be achieved if the per-
sonnel requiring recovery are sufciently trained and properly documented prior to the
start of their mission. This guidance is designed as the template to be issued in the AO
as part of the PR SOP or within SPINS. Procedures and requirements regarding survival
equipment and other survival aids detailed in this PR SOP should be driven by a J2 as-
sessment and conrmed by operational planning staff. Guidance for units and personnel
not trained and equipped for CSAR recovery is given in Paragraph 1.5 on page 33.
INTELLIGENCE
43
3.6.2 Recovery documentation
The collation of ISOPREPs and EPAs and their timely dispatch to a PRCC is a typical
responsibility of the units intel staff and a fundamental rst stage in the organisation
of recovery operations.
Sending of ISOPREP and EPA to PRCC
To enable rapid ling and sorting of the many ISOPREPs and EPA held by units and the
JPRC / PRCC, it is important that all electronic documents arrive with the same format
of labelling.
a. E-Mails Containing EPA should have the following make-up of the subject line:
EPA, Callsign, Vehicle Type, Base Name, ATO Day (Air only) (e.g. EPA, ZIPPY 43,
GR7, Al Jaber, ATO-L).
b. EPA Documents naming convention: Callsign, Vehicle Type, Base Name, ATO Day
(Air only) (e.g. ZIPPY 43, GR7, Al Jaber, ATO-L).
c. E-Mail Containing ISOPREPs should have the following make-up of the subject line:
ISOPREP, Vehicle Type, Sqn, Base (e.g. ISOPREP, E3D, 8-23 Sqn, PSAB).
d. ISOPREP Documents naming convention: Surname, First name, Middle Initial (e.g.
Bigglesworth, John, W).
e. Figure 3.1 is a standard MS Outlook e-mail folder showing correct document titles
and format.

Figure 3.1: Standard MS-Outlook E-mail folder
Any amendments sent are to be indicated by the following conventions:
a. E-Mails Containing EPA should have the following make-up of the subject line:
EPA, Callsign, Vehicle Type, Base Name, ATO Day (Air only) AL (e.g. EPA, ZIPPY
43, GR7, Al Jaber, ATO-L AL2).
44
b. EPA Documents naming convention: Callsign, Vehicle Type, Base Name, ATO Day
(Air only) AL (e.g. ZIPPY 43, GR7, Al Jaber, ATO-L AL2).
3.6.3 Electronic handling of ISOPREP and EPA documents
ISOPREP and EPA protection on operation CIS network. Due to their sensitive
nature and mission critical status the folders that contain the ISOPREPs and EPAs on the
computer must be protected against un-necessary disclosure and accidental deletion.
This can only be achieved by the information manager setting the correct properties.
Within the mission CIS network the user cannot dene the properties. At the JPRC
level, access to the folders containing ISOPREPs and EPAs must be restricted to operators
and the system managers. At the unit and Deployed Operating Base (DOB) access to the
folders must be restricted to the unit intel staff and ops staff.
File layout examples. Careful layout of the ling system may alleviate problems in
nding and maintaining the database of ISOPREPs and EPAs. ISOPREPs should be led in
separate folders and stored under DOB / unit / formations as appropriate. EPAs should
be led in a similar fashion but each EPA should be led in a folder for the appropriate
ATO day. The previous days EPA folder should be kept to allow for missions that extend
over the ATO changeover period. An example layout is shown in gure 3.2.

Figure 3.2: Standard document folder tree
Mission CIS network and back-up drives. In addition to storing information on a
shared drive, the mission CIS network has the potential to create a back-up drive that
may be lodged on a separate server giving access to the database in the event of the
prime server being unserviceable.
Mission CIS network group. To enable smooth 24-hour a-day operation, avoiding
confusing repetition of documents and the potential to miss information, all ISOPREPs
and EPAs sent to the JPRC must be sent to a single address. This group address should
only be accessible by the JPRC controllers, and as e-mails are received and led they
INTELLIGENCE
45
should be deleted from the Outlook Inbox. To enable the ISOPREP and EPA information
to be circulated to other nations recovery forces, the JPRC controllers must be able to
export the information via oppy disc or CD-ROM Impex accounts.
3.6.4 Recovery Equipment
The SPINS will direct the minimum levels of equipment to be carried by aircraft operat-
ing in the AO of operations. Prior to deployment units are to contact the JPRC to establish
the correct scale of equipment. It is the responsibility of units to arrive in the AO fully
equipped and trained to conduct their operations.
3.6.5 Blood chit
0307. Blood chits / promissory notes give an undertaking by a national government
of a participating nation to provide anyone who helps the bearer of the note with a
reward of money, goods or services
1
. No specic value is attached and the bearer is
not to promise any specic reward. The bearer should give a copy of the number of
the promissory note to his helper with instruction to quote it to the respective national
authorities as a reference. To avoid the potential for fraudulent use, it is essential that
there is strict control and accounting of promissory notes. Each note is to be numbered
individually and a record kept of to whom the note was issued. The number on the note
is to be printed in indelible ink and is to be constructed by using the rst 3 letters of
the bearers name, the service number and a random element (e.g. SMI-8027038-TFG).
There should be no signatures or features that would identify the originating unit. The
promissory note should not be left with the individual giving the aid, as there is a risk
of punishment by the enemy if it is discovered that help was given.
1
There is no NATO blood chit programme, it is a strictly national programme. USA and GBR are known
to have such a programme in place, but all nations are encouraged to create such a programme for their
own personnel. Should a blood chit programme be in place in the operation, this paragraph should be taken
into account by the JPRC / PRCCs / PR POCs
46
RISK ANALYSIS AND MITIGATION
47
Chapter 4
RISK ANALYSIS AND
MITIGATION
4.1 General risk analysis guidelines
0401. PR operations are subject to cost / benet considerations and threat analysis
in the same manner as any other military operation. The benet gained from a PR
operation should equal or outweigh the cost associated with executing the operation. PR
operations should not:
a. Unduly risk isolating additional personnel.
b. Preclude execution of higher priority missions.
c. Divert critically needed forces from ongoing operations.
d. Allow the overall military situation to deteriorate.
0402. Commanders must balance the value of retrieving isolated personnel against
potential costs. The psychological impact of the effort on remaining personnel should be
weighed against the risk to PR resources and the effect of diverting resources from the
ongoing combat effort. Commanders at all levels should evaluate these factors before
ordering or authorising a PR effort based on the guidance given in the PR SOP. An
example of a generic decision matrix is given in AJP-3.3.9.
4.2 Risk mitigation
0403. Efforts should be made to prevent isolating events by mitigating the risk associ-
ated with all operations and activities. These risks can be mitigated through;
a. Proper route planning to avoid threat areas and utilise terrain cover wherever
possible.
b. Proper (task) force composition.
c. OPSEC measures.
48
4.2 Risk mitigation
PR OPERATION
49
Chapter 5
PR OPERATION
5.1 General
0501. JPRC / PRCC PR planning is based on the ve operational PR tasks: Report, Lo-
cate, Support, Recover, Reintegrate. Suitably-qualied JPRC / PRCC staff members are
essential to ensure effective employment of the AO PR SOP and effective conduct of JPRC
/ PRCC operations. Figure 5.1 graphically depicts the general ow of preparatory activ-
ities. The JPRC / PRCC starts working based on the (initial) guidance given by the JFC.
After making an inventory of all available assets and their capabilities / limitations and
taking into account environmental factors a PR SOP will be developed. This CONOPS is
the basis for the PR inputs to the COMPLAN, SPINS, ACO and the PR training plan.
- Disposition
- Numbers
- CapabiIities
- Limitations
- NationaI caveats
- Etc.
JFC Guidance JPRC / PRCC
AvaiIabIe assets
Environment
Annex V / PR SOP
- ROE
- ORBAT
- OPFOR
- CIimate
- Terrain
- popuIation
- Intent
- Mission Statement
- AJP-3.3.9
- ATP-...
- Etc.
Risk assessment
COMMS (Freq)
Requirements
PR SPINS
ACO
inputs
Training
requirements
Figure 5.1: JPRC / PRCC activities
50
5.2 Pre-emptive mission planning
0502. The rst action of a newly set up JPRC / PRCC is to make an inventory of the avail-
able assets and their capabilities, and assess the climate, terrain, threat and OPLAN.
Based on this information a PR SOP is to be developed. The PR SOP will subsequently
drive the ATO, ACO and COMPLAN inputs, the PR SPINS and the in the AO PR training
plan as depicted in gure 5.1. As the operation moves from one phase to another and /
or characteristics of the operation change over time, the PR SOP may need to be updated
/ modied accordingly. JPRC / PRCC staffs should regularly challenge the validity of the
current CONOPS. During prolonged operation that may evolve into a theatre PR SOP. In
that case, all references in this document to PR SOP are to be read as PR SOP.
5.2.1 Preparatory work
0503. The PR SOP for the AO should be developed by the JFC or by the CC responsible for
the JPRC. CCs may wish to develop a PR SOP with respect to their own personnel based
on the overall PR SOP. The factors to be considered are laid out in annex H.
a. Develop an inventory of all assets in the AO that are usable for PR missions with
reference to availability, capability, and interoperability, limitations, logistical and
combat support required. Annex C gives a template for this inventory.
b. Develop a list of medical facilities, including their capabilities and specialisations
and transload to Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC), which are available in the AO.
c. Conduct PR route planning (spider routes / spider points), taking into considera-
tion:
(a) Threat analysis.
(b) Environmental factors.
(c) Friendly ORBAT.
d. Fuel / time plan and refuel plan if applicable.
e. Develop the PR requirements to the communications plan (detailed in Annex K).
f. Produce a PR SOP for the area. A suggested format for a PR SOP is at Annex H.
g. Produce PR SPINS for the AO, including short term contact procedures for EPA, and
as a minimum two spare sets of PR SPINS tobe readily available if the active PR
SPINS have become compromised. A suggested format for a PR SPINS is at Annex J.
h. Disseminate standard ISOPREP and EPA formats. The format for both ISOPREPs and
EPAs can be found in Annexes A and B in Volume III. These formats should be used
for all training and operations to enhance interoperability; however, the minimum
EPA format is as follows:
(a) Personal data.
(b) Route information.
(c) Short-term evasion plan.
(d) Long-term evasion plan.
(e) Equipment carried.
PR OPERATION
51
i. Collate and disseminate threat information to sub-unit level to assist in the pro-
duction of viable individual EPAs.
j. Establish a system of storage and secure transmission of ISOPREP and EPA data.
5.2.2 Specic missions
0504. PR planning should be an aspect in the planning of all missions. Consideration
is to be given to the possibility of self recovery or preparing for an immediate recovery
rather than a deliberate one. Wherever possible and practical a PRTF should be pre
tasked and prepositioned in order to conduct an immediate recovery if needed.
5.3 Pro-active planning
0505. To successfully execute PR missions it is essential that PR planning is included in
the operational planning process and that an appropriate PR organisation is established
in the AO.
5.3.1 Planning process
0506. The JFC will have overall responsibility for PR within his AO and the joint OPORD
should state the requirement for, and include guidance on PR operations, i.a.w. Annex
H. Operational level PR planning will usually be led by J3/5 but may be delegated to
the JPRC director. It is essential that whichever organisation is tasked to provide a JPRC
participates in the operational planning process to:
a. Ensure that PR is an integral part of planning and training.
b. Establish an appropriate PR organisation within the AO.
c. Establish command procedures for PR.
d. Conduct a PR risk estimate, identify requirements and allocate or double-earmark
forces for PR, and identify shortfalls in PR capabilities, if necessary, requesting
additional PR assets from national forces not assigned.
e. Establish clear and direct lines of communication between all PR C
2
nodes and force
elements.
f. Establish a communications plan with the media during PR events.
Operational planning process
During the Operational Planning Process (OPP) it is essential for the JPRC director to
engage with joint staff to assist in the production of the PR annex to the Joint OPORD
as detailed at Annex H. It is vital that the authority of the JPRC is established and
Components are tasked to establish PR C
2
nodes and/or POCs. The JPRC director should
conduct a PR estimate in parallel with the OPP. The output of the PR estimate should be:
AO PR SOP, to be promulgated either by the JFC Headquarters (HQ) or as an annex to the
OPLAN; PR input to SPINS and component orders / plans. Key factors specic to the PR
Estimate are as follows:
52
a. Identify intent. The JFCs overall AO plan should state the requirement for, and
include guidance on, PR operations. However, it is important to ascertain the JFCs
and Air Component Commander (ACC)s intent, specically regarding risk. This is
often a signicant issue during the initial phases of an operation when prioritisa-
tion of assets and the desired order of arrival may preclude early deployment of PR
assets (n.b. for coalition operations this is likely to cause friction and provision of
PR capability may be essential prior to commencing operations). If it does, then the
planner should extract whatever he can. However, the planner should be prepared
to have to contribute to the AO plan.
b. Analyse the operational environment. Analysis of the operational environment is
essential to determining the requirements for PR forces. Areas to be considered
include:
(a) The local- and geopolitical situation.
(b) The physical environment, including terrain and weather and their likely im-
pacts on both isolated personnel and recovery forces.
(c) Likely target locations and threats at those targets.
(d) Rules of Engagement (ROE).
(e) The likely threat to recovery forces.
(f) Battlespace geometry including likely bed-down locations, distance and spa-
tial relationships to probable recovery areas, overight constraints in neigh-
bouring countries, International waters, Forward Operating Locations and
potential Forward Arming and Refuelling Points (FARPs).
c. Determine the likely number of isolation incidents. For ACC and Maritime Compo-
nent Command (MCC) aircrew, determining the likely number of isolation incidents
is fairly simply estimated by multiplying the number of Aircraft (AC) of a particu-
lar type in the AO by the number of personnel on board, by the number of sorties
per day, by the expected attrition rate. Summing the results for each AC type in
the AO will give the likely number of PR incidents. However, JPRC must consider
CR events across the JFC. To make a judgement the PR Planner must fully engage
with component planners during the OPP and understand not only the Scheme Of
Manoeuvre (SOM) but also CCs intended SOM. From this information it is usually
practical to estimate the likely and worst case number of simultaneous events by
Phase.
d. Determine the available PR capabilities. A recovery capability typically comprises
of a recovery vehicle and an EF that conducts the actual extraction of the isolated
personnel. An EF comprises specically trained personnel delivered by the re-
covery vehicle with primary responsibility for extracting isolated personnel. EF
personnel is normally highly trained, but they must not be confused with Special
Operations Forces (SOF). The extraction team is normally employed as a part of the
helicopter recovery force but might also be part of a non helicopter-borne PR mis-
sion. As not all recovery situations are equally complex, they do also not require
equally (highly) trained and equipped recovery forces. Figure 5.2 on page 53 shows
the range of PR capabilities provided by available EF based on their personnel capa-
bilities vs. the capabilities of their equipment. The team will be specically organ-
ised, trained, and equipped to conduct PR operations in high threat environments.
When the commander accepts the risk, forces lacking this specialised training may
also be employed as the EF. This will normally be limited to lower threat environ-
ments, or when urgent circumstances exist. The number of personnel depends on
the operational needs and member nations PR concept.
PR OPERATION
53
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
i
n
g
c
o
m
p
I
e
x
i
t
y
/
r
i
s
k
Not
speciaIised
Increasing capabiIities of equipment
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
i
n
g
c
a
p
a
b
i
I
i
t
i
e
s
o
f
p
e
r
s
o
n
n
e
I
SOF
speciaIised
unit
CSAR
NAR
CR
SOF
Unit
HR
Figure 5.2: Capabilities of recovery personnel vs. capabilities of recovery equipment
e. Determine the PR SOM. The preceding analysis should identify shortfalls in PR
capabilities, allowing the planner to estimate the number, types and locations for
recovery assets. Consideration will have to be given to dedicating assets speci-
cally for PR, or designating them (double-earmarking) whereby they are routinely
used for other tasks and re-tasked for PR missions, if available, when requested.
Risk and delays will usually be associated with double-earmarking and a dedicated
allocation of recovery assets for PR is preferable. However, given the usual short-
fall of Support Helicopter (SH) lift, designating assets is usually required. The PR
planner should identify particular periods of high risk and, if possible, dedicate
assets appropriately. This may need resolution and direction from the JFC . The
PR SOM should be promulgated in the AO PR SOP and form the basis for subsequent
mission planning.
Training
PR AO entry requirements should be included in Annex V of the Joint OPLAN / OPORD and
in the theatre PR SOP The requirements should also dene which personnel at what risk
of isolation and / or exploitation and the levels of individual training required. Once in
theatre, the JPRC should coordinate collective training events to establish and maintain
capability. This should include training for the PR C
2
chain, aircrew and EF.
Establish a personnel recovery organisation
0507. To establish a PR organisation, the PR planner will need to:
a. Ensure the JPRC / PRCC organisation is placed with the correct CCs.
54
b. Ensure appropriately qualied personnel staff the JPRC / PRCCs in accordance with
Paragraph 1.4.1. Manning of the PRCCs is a matter for the appropriate CCs, but,
ideally, would reect that of the JPRC. Additionally, the JPRC / PRCCs will need
access to the intelligence, legal and admin and logs staff, dedicated SERE specialists
and Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) on the designated recovery assets. Depending
upon the scale and complexity of the operation the JPRC may need to include other
component Liaison Ofcers (LNOs).
Establish and maintain command procedures for PR
0508. To establish and maintain command procedures for PR, the PR planner will need
to:
a. Determine the command relationship for PR forces. Dedicated PR forces would
normally be under the ACC OPCON and he would exercise TACON of other forces
assigned for specic PR missions. Designated (double-hatted) forces would usu-
ally remain OPCON to their CC but should be identied during the planning pro-
cess, ideally by phase. Supporting / supported relationships will be used to iden-
tify the Component responsible for planning and executing each mission with the
supported Component exercising TACON over recovery assets for the period of the
mission. Authority to Launch and Execute PR missions should be clearly identi-
ed and promulgated. The command relationships for Non-conventional Assisted
Recovery (NAR) missions will also need to be claried although the details of these
areas should not be promulgated to those without a need to know.
b. Ensure that the C
2
structure is publicised and understood. The C
2
structure will
normally be described in the PR SOP.
0509. Establish clear and direct lines of communication between all force elements.
Once it has been established what recovery assets will be operating from where, the In-
formation Exchange Requirement (IER) needs consideration. The minimum equipment
is listed in Paragraph 1.4.2.
Reintegration planning
0510. The PR planner should ensure supporting reintegration plans are developed, pro-
mulgated and implemented. This detail is often overlooked and rarely exercised so ad-
ditional staff effort and liaison will be required to educate other staff functions. Full de-
tails of medical, welfare, administrative, and de-brieng requirements must be included
in theatre PR SOP and the PR planner should ensure that support to PR is included in the
corresponding combat service support plans.
5.3.2 AO PR SOP
General
0511. The Annex V and the theatre PR SOP are the main outputs of the PR OPP and
provide AO specic direction and guidance. They should contain the majority of standing
PR information and enable content of PR SPINS to be minimised. There are no rm rules
for how PR information is split between SPINS and PR SOP; the JPRC Director will need to
decide the most appropriate means depending upon communications capability and the
expectations of the JFC, especially in a coalition environment. For guidance the template
format is given in Annex H.
PR OPERATION
55
Delineation of responsibility
0512. Particular attention is to be given to the delineation of the responsibility for
recovery in case of an isolation incident. The default responsibility for recovery lies
with the commander of the isolated personnel. However, in some cases (e.g. in the
case of downed aircrew) this may not be the best or most logical approach. In case
of downed aircrew, the aircrew may have come down in the AOR of a land component
(sub)commander. In such cases it may be more appropriate to transfer the primary
responsibility for recovery to the ground force commander as he may have the better
Situational Awareness (SA) and will most likely have recovery assets available in close
vicinity of the isolated personnel, thus facilitating a quick recovery. Clear details on
delineation of responsibilities must therefore be put into the CONOPS.
5.3.3 PR SPINS
0513. PR SPINS are issued in order to provide forces that are prone to capture or isola-
tion with instructions on actions to take to evade the enemy and the mandatory proce-
dures to be followed for subsequent recovery. Although SPINS are normally associated
with aviation operations they are equally applicable to all participants in an operation
who are at a high risk to become isolated. They are focused primarily for people trained
and equipped for CSAR recovery.
0514. In principle SPINS should be minimised and contain classied perishable and
time-sensitive information, with general standing guidance promulgated as part of the
theatre PR SOP. However, historically, all PR information has been included and the JPRC
should determine the most appropriate format taking into account the composition and
expectations of the JFC. The SPINS format is given in Annex J.
5.4 Daily operations
0515. During daily operations JPRC / PRCC staff are to run and hand-over their shifts
and are to maintain their documentation. A checklist for the JPRC / PRCC directors daily
activities is given in Annex F. A template for a shift hand-over brief is given in Annex
L. Besides updating the PR SOP and SPINS the JPRC / PRCC staff is also to maintain a
POC list as given in Annex K.
5.5 Report
0516. Initial notication can come from any source. Key in this phase is verication of
the notication received. Upon verication of the reliability of the notication the infor-
mation is to be spread to the JPRC, PRCC and unit or organisation the isolated personnel
belongs to. If the initial alert is triggered by an Emergency Location Transmitter (ELT),
the JPRC / PRCC may expect an ELT notication message through an Airborne Early
Warning (AEW) asset in accordance with Annex O.
5.6 Locate
0517. The aims of the location phase are to x, nd and, if possible, to authenticate
the isolated person. The requirement to know the location of isolated personnel may
56
5.6 Locate
be a pre-requisite to launch a recovery mission. Initial location and authentication is
normally achieved using covert electronic means and / or visual location methods:
a. The isolated personnel must make every effort to aid the location and authentica-
tion process. The correct implementation of the initial contact procedures outlined
in the PR SOP, SPINS or EPA is pivotal to a successful recovery.
b. If the initial electronic search fails or is not available to determine the position of
the isolated person, a more extensive search may be required. In a hostile area,
stand-off search techniques may have to be employed. A risk assessment needs to
be conducted before any asset is used to search in hostile environments.
0518. Planners should attempt to determine location information using the following
priority:
a. Global Positioning System (GPS) derived and reported coordinates (normally the
most accurate).
b. Isolated personnel reported position.
c. Friendly Forces visual observation.
5.6.1 Search methods
0519. Whether at sea or on land, obtaining accurate and timely location information of
the isolated persons position may present major challenges for PR forces, thus requiring
a search. Though the isolated persons position may be ascertained via radio or visual
search, other search modes may be more appropriate. If recovery is not imminent, the
isolated persons position should not be compromised. In addition, the search method
should be decided following consideration of the level of threat.
Electronic search
0520. If an electronic search is conducted, the following factors should be considered:
Altitude. Determine an initial electronic search altitude based on threat and terrain
(to maintain line of sight connectivity to Personal Locator System (PLS), beacons
and radio communications).
Electronic warfare. OPFOR jamming, deception, monitoring and Direction Finder (DF)
intrusion.
ADF. Caution should be used with Automatic Direction Finder (ADF) as OPFOR forces
may also employ DF techniques to locate isolated person. OPFOR DF and intelligence-
gathering methods should be understood by all PRTF participants and isolated per-
sonnel prior to utilising DF locating methods.
Airborne or surface radar. Airbourne or surface radar should attempt to provide the
isolated persons last known radar position to the JPRC / PRCC.
Satellite. Satellite systems such as Cosmicheskaya Systemya Poiska Avariynich Sudov
(COSPAS) / Search and Rescue Satellite (SARSAT) visibility and availability sched-
ules should be published in ATO SPINS.
PR OPERATION
57
Visual search
0521. Search units should consider searching along the isolated persons intended
route, areas offering concealment, and pre-briefed locations in accordance with the EPA.
They should avoid major lines of communications such as roads, railroads, large rivers
or open valleys. These areas are normally frequented by people and often pose the
greatest threat to PR forces and evaders.
5.7 Support
0522. Support is the planned effort necessary to ensure the physical and psychological
sustainment of isolated personnel. This may include establishing two-way communi-
cations, providing morale-building support, aerial resupply or aerial escort to a cache.
Support may also encompass the suppression of enemy threats to the isolated personnel
and deception missions to hide the recovery operation. This may preclude capture for
the isolated person and disrupt the adversarys response to PR efforts. When necessary,
ground forces, recovery specialists (e.g. Pararescuemen (PJs)) and/or equipment may be
pre-positioned to support the isolated personnel until the recovery phase.
0523. Besides support to the isolated personnel, this task includes physical and psy-
chological assistance to the isolated personnel?s family to include information manage-
ment (controlling release to media). Support measures begin before and after an indi-
vidual becomes isolated. This support is manifested in the AO PR SPINS, home-station
arrangements and training prior to entry in to a specic AO, AO PR regulations, and the
establishment of the AO PR architecture. All of these are component responsibilities that
frame the support mechanism.
5.8 Recover
5.8.1 Isolated or evading personnel
0524. The decision to launch a PR mission can only be made after careful risk analysis.
This analysis is implicit in the mission planning cycle and the results will determine
both the composition of the PR package and the conduct of the PR mission. The mission
planning process involves the following steps:
a. Collection of Essential Elements of Information (EEI) data as listed in Annex N.
b. Conduct threat and risk assessment.
c. Evaluate available PR assets and capabilities.
d. Decide go/no go mission.
e. Selection of extraction method.
f. Assignment of assets and supporting forces, including the designation of comman-
ders.
g. Coordination with other forces and operations.
h. exchange information with the assigned recovery force.
58
5.9 Reintegrate
i. Launch approval based on CONOPS and risk analysis assessment.
(a) PR package size and composition.
(b) Method of recovery.
(c) PR forces availability and capability.
(d) Environment.
(e) Timing.
(f) Command and Control Warfare (C2W) status.
(g) Compromise to, or cover from, another mission.
j. Mission brieng.
k. JPRC / PRCC execute approval process.
l. Send complete mission message.
5.8.2 Hostage release operations
0525. If isolated personnel is captured and taken hostage, a recovery should not be con-
ducted using normal PR procedures. Transfer of the responsibility for the Hostage Re-
lease Operations (HRO) to the Special Operations Component Commander (SOCC) should
to be considered. Cross component support to national SOF, preparing for, or conducting
an HRO may be required at any time.
5.9 Reintegrate
0526. On completion of the execution phase of the PR operation, the recovered per-
sonnel and recovery forces are debriefed at the earliest opportunity as part of the rein-
tegration process of the recovered personnel. Annex S gives a template for this debrief.
The JPRC / PRCC should collate the lessons identied and disseminate them to all appro-
priate force levels and implement them where appropriate in PR SOP, SPINS etc..
5.10 Levels of training
Knowledge level training. Have basic knowledge of JPRC / PRCC roles and responsi-
bilities and is capable of augmenting a JPRC / PRCC.
Comprehensive level training. Have advanced knowledge and experience in JPRC /
PRCC roles and responsibilities and is capable of acting as shift leader in a JPRC /
PRCC.
Application level training. Have in depth knowledge and experience in JPRC / PRCC
roles and responsibilities and is capable of acting as director in a JPRC / PRCC.
5.11 Theatre specic training
a. Validate the PR SOP (through exercises if possible).
b. Become accustomed to the area of operations.
PR OPERATION
59
c. Evaluate the capability of recovery assets to operate in a realistic environment.
d. Adapt procedures to the AO.
0527. Continuation training in order to maintain operational readiness must be con-
ducted by all elements of the PR organisation. Details on this type of training are given
in Annex T.
60
5.11 Theatre specic training
JPRC / PRCC set-up checklists
61
Annex A
A.1 Introduction
Preferably the JPRC / PRCC is integral part of the (joint) operations centre close to the
medical / MEDEVAC cell. A typical layout of a JPRC / PRCC looks like this:
M
a
p
s
Chief
ControIIer Assistant SERE speciaIist
Asset board Incident / mission board
P
r
i
n
t
e
r
S
e
c
u
r
e
F
a
x
White board
Figure A.1: Example of a generic JPRC / PRCC set-up
A.2 JPRC / PRCC set-up checklist
a. Make inventory of available documents. The following documents should be avail-
able as a minimum:
(a) AJP-3.3.9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Personnel Recovery
(b) ATP-3.7.1 NATO Personnel Recovery Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
(c) STANAG 7196 NATO SERE training standard
62
A.2 JPRC / PRCC set-up checklist
(d) BI-SC PR Joint Operational Guidelines (JOG)
(e) ATP-49 Helicopters in Land Operations
(f) STANAG 7007 Combat Search And Rescue Electronic Equipment (CSARES)
b. Make an inventory of available assets, characteristics and disposition as per Annex
C.
c. Review entry procedures to JPRC / PRCC;
d. Review location and procedures for using message system;
e. Brief supporting personnel (JPRC / PRCC staff, intel, planning cell, etc.) on their
duties;
f. coordinate with PRCCs to:
(a) Develop quick reference list of key personnel and phone numbers
(b) Establish procedures for obtaining current maintenance of recovery assets
(c) Establish procedures for after duty hours notication
g. Transmit a message to all units participating in the operation / exercise requesting
a list of life support equipment carried by their respective crews and the location
of authentication and EPA data
1
.
h. Establish a single point of contact with each of the recovery units participating in
the operation / exercise;
i. Check radio equipment:
(a) Conduct familiarisation training for JPRC / PRCC personnel
(b) Set-up secondary / mobility radios as required
(c) Develop and review frequency list and sweep
(d) Coordinate communication procedures with available facilities
j. Develop and display two wall charts:
(a) Assets board
(b) Incident / mission table
k. Draw and post the JPRC / PRCC planning map with:
(a) Universal Transversal Mercator (UTM) designator letters
(b) Low level routes
(c) Spider points
(d) Tactical / DARs / FARP areas
(e) Orbits, refuelling tracks
(f) Reference points (Search And Rescue Dot (SARDOT))
(g) Recovery resource locations (with type and numbers)
(h) Forward Line Own Troops (FLOT) and Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA)
when applicable
(i) Known OPFOR threats (received from intel)
1
This may be need to be re-accomplished once a month
63
(j) Transload locations
(k) Helicopter Contact Points (HCPs) / waypoints
(l) Fire support coordination line
(m) Field hospitals
(n) OPFOR / friendly forces
(o) Airspace Control Measures (ACM)
(p) Current as of Date / Time Group (DTG)
l. Analyse the FRAGO for active operations areas (this analysis will be a major factor
in determining if Forward Operating Location (FOL) activity is needed);
m. Separate the FRAGO package into general SPINS, PR SPINS, PR frag missions, and
general frag missions;
n. Set-up mission folders and miscellaneous worksheets;
o. Set-up two message folders (incoming and outgoing). Divide the folders into clas-
sied and unclassied sections, with log sheets;
p. Set-up a controller information le;
q. Start, set-up procedures for maintaining a 24hr events log;
r. Develop a work schedule;
s. Develop a schedule for a mobile training team;
t. As needed, review:
(a) Authentication / encryption / decryption procedures
(b) Plotting of UTM / georef coordinates
(c) Plotting of Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) radials and Distance Measuring
Equipment (DME) (SARDOT/Bullseye)
(d) ATO / SPINS format and procedures
u. Transmit JPRC/JPRC activation message
v. Start and mission log.
64
A.3 JPRC / PRCC bullet list
Task organisation
Director
Watch supervisor
Controller
Mobile PR training team
Logs & folders
Controller
Mission
Reference data
ATO
SPINS
ACO
CONOPS
COMPLAN
PR regulation
ROE list
Red card holders / Senior National Representatives (SNRs)
Phone book
Common information displays
Incident
Asset
Theatre authentication
Static callsigns
Phone numbers
POC list
Message templates
Map
Friendly/ OPFOR ORBAT
OPFOR Integrated Air Defence (IAD)
FLOT
Waypoints
Spider points
SARDOT(s)
DARs
Refuelling tracks
Transload locations
Comm checks with key players (voice and/or data)
65
PRCCs
AOC Chief of combat ops
AOC Intel
Battleeld Coordination Element (BCE) Ops/Intel
NSA SSA
Airborne C
2
Airbourne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS)
Airborne Command, Control and Communications (ABCCC)
Rivet Joint
Compass Call
JPRC / PRCC activation message
66
67
Annex B
UNCLAS
MSGID / GENADMIN / JPRC / PRCC
SUBJ / JPRC / PRCC ACTIVATION
RMK /
THE ????? (JPRC / PRCC) HAS BEEN ACTIVATED AT mmhhmmZ yy.
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR RECORDS:
PHONE NUMBER (UNSECURE)
FAX NUMBER (UNSECURE)
STU II / III (SECURE)
SECURE FAX
E-MAIL (UNCLASS)
E-MAIL (SECURE)
SATCOM FREQ: UPLINK: xxx.xxx, DOWNLINK: xxx.xxx, CALLSIGN:
UHF FREQ
VHF FREQ
HF FREQ
I. Contingency Theatre Automated Planning System (CTAPS) IDENTIFIER
COMPONENT PRCC WILL CONTACT THE JPRC / PRCC NLT 0800A DAILY RE-
PORTING THE STATUS OF THEIR RECOVERY FORCES AND UPDATES ON OUT-
STANDING MISSIONS.
PLEASE RESPOND VIA MESSAGE INDICATING RECEIPT AND PROVIDE INFOR-
MATION ON YOUR COMM EQUIPMENT / CAPABILITIES.
68
PR asset questionnaire
69
Annex C
C.1 general
a. Unit name.
b. Contact details.
c. Assets.
d. Location.
e. Type and number.
f. National Caveats.
g. Red Card holder.
C.2 Operational capabilities
a. Speed.
b. Range.
c. Instrument Flying Rules (IFR) capable.
d. Night Vision Device (NVD) capable.
e. Forward Looking InfraRed (FLIR) capable.
f. Air refuellable.
g. Amphibious platform.
70
C.3 Communications
C.3 Communications
TYPE AVAILABLE
YES/NO
FREQ RANGE
xxx.xxxyyy.yyy
INCREMENT
zz kHz
HF
VHF-AM
VHF-FM
UHF
SATCOM C
SATCOM M
IRIDIUM
GSM
PLS
Secure NA NA
C.4 Navigation
a. Inertia Navigation System (INS).
b. GPS.
c. TACAN.
d. VHF Omni-directional Range (VOR).
e. ADF.
f. Doppler / map display.
g. Ultra High Frequency (UHF)-DF.
h. PLS locator.
i. Blue force tracker
C.5 Recovery capabilities
a. Number of ambulatory passengers.
b. Number & type of litters.
c. Special rescue equipment.
Hoist.
Divers.
Search And Rescue (SAR) swimmer.
Horse collar.
Rescue basket.
Forest penetrator.
Fast roping capable.
Special Insertion and Extraction (SPIE) capable.
Rope ladder.
71
Extractor kit.
Emergency medical kit.
d. EF (numbers and composition).
e. etc.
C.6 Armament / self protection
a. Armament, type and position (e.g. 7.62 minigun, 2000 rnds, sidere).
b. Electronic Warfare (EW) suite: IRCM, CW jammer, MWS, etc.
c. Flares.
d. Chaff.
e. Ballistic self protection. item Laser range nder / pointer
C.7 Operational and logistical limitations
a. Night ying capability
b. Weather minima.
c. maximum operating altitude.
d. What is the alert status when Quick Reaction Force (QRF)?
e. Other (operational) minima.
f. Maximum number of sorties per day/week/month.
g. Maximum number of ying hours per day/week/month.
h. Who can extend crew duty time or shrink crew rest time?
i. Rotor turning refuel capable?
j. What side is the fuel port on?
k. NATO refuel nozzle capable?
l. How long does it take to refuel aircraft (rotors turning and cold refuel).
m. How much fuel does the aircraft take?
C.8 Standard combat load
a. Number of combat-loaded pax (estimate 250lbs/120kg per soldier).
b. Number of combat-loaded pax (estimate 200lbs/90kg per soldier).
c. Number of civilian pax (estimate 170lbs/80kg per person).
d. Max weight of cargo given ight distances of 30 min, 1 hr, 2 hr, 3 hr.
To be completed.
72
C.8 Standard combat load
Boards and matrices
73
Annex D
Boards and matrices
D.1 Asset Board
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number and type assets - list the number and type of assets possessed
location - location of the recovery assets
unit POC - 24 hr contact numbers
alert - conrm the alert times from the ATO or phone call
status - status of the recovery assets
remarks / tasked msn # - if tasked for a msn, list msn # and / or any pertinent
information, squawk etc..
74
D.2 Asset matrix
D.2 Asset matrix
All available assets may be put into a matrix as shown below for quick reference to
determine what asset(s) to use in a particular isolated personnel case, based on the
information available regarding the training and equipment level of the isolated per-
sonnel in question. If not all cells of the matrix can be lled with recovery assets, the
commander should be informed that operations under those conditions pose an elevated
risk and should therefore be avoided.
Level A Level B Level C NO SERE
TRG
High
risk
Medium
risk
Low
risk
No
risk
D.3 Launch / execute matrix
The authority to approve launch and / or execute is depicted in a table as below.
Launch / Own AOR Other AOR Other AOR
Execute Own Assets Own Assets Other assets
Launch ... ... ...
Execute ... ... ...
D.4 Incident/mission board
inc # / DTG - the number of the incident (from incident log), with the related DTG
msn # / DTG - the number of the mission (from ATO), with the related DTG
type of incident - shot down / lost / mech failure / etc.
name or call sign - of the individual(s) isolated
unit - that the individual(s) belongs in the AO
number of personnel / Persons On Board (POB) - total known number of isolated
personnel
Last Known Point (LKP) / DTG - last known position of the isolated personnel, with
the related DTG
threat - current threat around position of isolated personnel
time of last contact - DTG of last known contact with isolated individual(s)
status / remarks - all notes of importance such as etd / eta / waiting for other
details, etc.
Boards and matrices
75
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76
D.4 Incident/mission board
PR report formats
77
Annex E
PR report formats
E.1 PRIR
Obtain the following information and pass it to JPRC / PRCC as it becomes available
1
:
a. Time of report
b. Callsign (Whos reporting) M
c. Authentication
d. Time of incident
e. Exact location E
f. Type of vehicle
g. Way to identify vehicle (colour, ID)
h. Type (cause) of incident T
i. Hazards (re, mines, enemies) H
j. Access to the spot A
k. Number and status of isolated personnel N
l. Nationality
m. Emergency service required type of injuries E
n. Qualier / source.
o. Authentication of isolated personnel (Y / N and by what means).
p. Point of contact and means of communication.
1
This report is to replace the SARIR as still shown in paragraph E.2.
78
E.2 SARIR
E.2 SARIR
a. Date / Time Group of Report: Z
b. Callsign: Last Contact Frequency:
c. Aircraft type:
d. Nationality / Unit:
e. Persons on Board:
f. Location:
g. Location qualiers (circle as appropriate): Actual / last known / estimated position
land / water ejection / bailout altitude feet
h. Ejection / bailout winds at knots
i. DTG of Incident Z
j. Cause of loss (circle as appropriate):
k. Interceptors, Surface to Air Missile (SAM), Anti Aircraft Artillery (AAA), collision,
malfunction, other:
l. Isolated personnel condition: Mobile?
(a) Injured?
(b) Concealed?
(c) Survival equipment?
(d) Signaling devices?
(e) Intentions?
m. Last voice contact at DTG. freq / push with
(a) (Callsign)
n. Threat situation:
o. Friendly units on-scene:
p. Source of information:
q. Reported by:
r. RMC call sign:
E.3 PR 11-line report
The following checklist is used to communicate basic information about a PR situation.
As a minimum, the designated AMC uses this checklist to gather information and relay
it to the Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC), JPRC /PRCC, and the PRTF. All aircraft
should have this checklist available and use it as appropriate during a PR incident.
PR report formats
79
# Action Data
1 Callsign / Vehicle Type /
Mission Number / Parent
Command
2 Location .....
Source .....
Time* .....
3 Comm with Survivor (Yes /
No)
4 Authentication Used (yes/no
and by what means)
5 Injuries/Conditions
6 OSC / Bingo / Loadout /
POC (Who is reporting and
means of communication)
7 # Chutes Seen
8 Cause of incident
9 Hazards / Ground / Air
Threats / Access to the spot
10 WX in Survivor Area
11 Survivor Radio Frequency a) .....
b) .....
*CAUTION: Line 2 must include all three elements; location / source / time.
NOTE: For brevity, information should be given by reference to each checklist line
number (Example: Line 1: Flameout 01; Line 2: 30 45N, 046 00E / Wingman / 1000Z;
etc.). It is crucial that line #2 always includes all three elements: Location, Source, and
Time. The JPRC / PRCC uses this information to discern the most accurate location. All
players can then reference the location of the survivor by the associated time and source
to avoid confusion.
E.4 PR mission message
a. Unit/POC
b. Isolated personnel
(a) Callsign
(b) Location
(c) Number of isolated personnel
c. Routing
d. Threat assessment
(a) Ingress route
(b) Isolated personnel location (area description)
(c) Egress route
e. PRTF mission package
80
E.4 PR mission message
f. Additional support requirements
g. Launch location
h. Launch weather
i. Estimate Time En-route (ETE) to isolated personnel
j. Ingress weather
k. AAR / Helicopter Aerial Refuelling (HAR) track / FARP location
l. Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) isolated personnel location (DTG)
m. Weather at isolated personnel location
n. Estimate time on station
o. Isolated personnel transload/recovery base
p. Re-entry location friendly territory
(a) Re-entry time (DTG)
(b) Re-entry altitude (ft acsamsl / acsagl)
(c) Re-entry heading (degrees)
q. ETA transload/recovery base (DTG)
r. Recovery base weather
s. Estimated mission complete time (DTG)
t. Commander assessment
u. ROEs
v. Go / no go
JPRC / PRCC chief checklist
81
Annex F
JPRC / PRCC chief checklist
a. If JPRC / PRCC personnel shortages exist, request augmentation through J-1 and
J-3
b. Transmit JPRC / PRCC activation message
c. Assign staff duties (as required):
(a) Deputy chief
i. Update SPINS as required
ii. Coordinate with plans to be part of planning process.
(b) Watch supervisor(s)
(c) Controllers
(d) Dedicated intelligence support
(e) LNO support (coordination process)
(f) Communication support
(g) Administrative support
d. Develop a JPRC / PRCC CONOPS and distribute (update as required)
(a) Establish who has launch and execute authority for all recovery forces and
support assets
(b) Develop and coordinate a PR COMPLAN
(c) Establish reporting requirements for the PRCCs
(d) Request all PRCCs disseminate their SOPs
(e) coordinate AO wide ISOPREP and EPA plan with custodian for that plan.
e. Ensure CC-AIR HQ Izmir and CC-AIR HQ Ramstein receive copies of all:
(a) Theatre SPINS (daily, AO, monthly, quarterly......)
(b) Theatre ATO
(c) COMPLAN
(d) CONOPS
f. Brief the designated commanders staff on all isolated personnel.
g. Monitor all PR incidents prosecuted by PRCCs
82
h. Receive the watch supervisor recommendations on closed and suspended incidents
and missions, and take appropriate action
i. Review and release all message trafc in and out of the JPRC / PRCC
j. Ensure all debriengs of recovery crews, Prisoner Of Wars (POWs) and returnees,
logs, after action reports, and incident / mission folder forwarded to CC-AIR HQ
Izmir and CC-AIR HQ Ramstein as soon as possible. Do not destroy anything.
k. Complete after action report for PR missions and operations conducted.
l. Initiate AO PR and SERE training and brieng.
m. Checklist complete
PR Annex to OPLAN template
83
Annex G
NOTE. Normal text is considered to be applicable in all PR SPINS.
NOTE. Italicised text is text that may or may not be applicable in the operations / exer-
cise at hand, dependant on the situation. The text itself is either intended to be an
example of what should be put in that particular position or needs to be developed
based on the actual situation.
NOTE. This template is written as the Annex V to the JFCs OPLAN. For component and
sector commanders OPLANs, references to JFC, etc. may have to be adapted to the
respective commander issuing the Annex V.
NOTE. These notes are only for the purpose of this template. They may be removed
when developing the actual Annex V.
Reference publications
AJPs AJP-3.3.9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Personnel Recovery
...
ATPs ATP-3.7.1 Personnel Recovery Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
ATP-3.3.9.1 NATO Combat Search And Rescue
ATP-3.3.9.2 NATO Search And Rescue Manual
...
STANAGs STANAG 7007 Combat Search and Rescue Electronic Systems
STANAG 7196 NATO SERE Training standard
...
Other NATO publications Bi-SC PR JOG
AD 80-6
...
Memoranda Of Understanding ...
Other publications iamsar! manual
...
84
G.1 Situation
G.1 Situation
G.1.1 Introduction
Here the information that links PR to the (basic plan for the) overall operation should be
given.
G.1.2 Opposing forces
Here the information on the opposing forces that is relevant for the execution of PR oper-
ations should be inserted. This information should be based on and linked to the overall
assessment of the opposing forces
G.1.3 Own forces
Here the information on own forces that is relevant for the execution of PR operations
should be inserted. This information should be based on and linked to the overall assess-
ment of the own forces.
G.1.4 Environment
Here the information on the environment that is relevant for the execution of PR opera-
tions should be inserted. This information should be based on and linked to the overall
assessment of the environment.
G.1.5 Assumptions
Here all for PR relevant planning assumptions should be inserted.
G.1.6 Denitions
Here all relevant PR terms and denitions should be inserted.
G.2 Mission
To recover all <insert name of operation or exercise> and other eligible personnel that
have become isolated in the Joint Operations Area (JOA) within number of hours of
initial notication.
G.3 Execution
G.3.1 Commanders intent
The JFCs commanders intent will normally have PR as one of his highest priorities.
Therefore, reference to the commanders intent, threat / risk assessment, airspace control,
ROE, etc. should be given here (see also ATP-3.7.1, Vol I, Chapter 5).
85
G.3.2 Desired end state
The establishment of an integrated PR system that prepares all <insert name of opera-
tion or exercise> personnel and other eligible supporting personnel for SERE commensu-
rate with their designated risk of isolation and / or exploitation category. The command
structure must be capable of ensuring the effective planning and execution of PR mis-
sions throughout the JOA within an adequate time frame. This system is to ensure that
all isolated personnel are recovered and reintegrated.
G.3.3 Concept of operations
The JFC intends to establish a joint PR architecture with the capability to use military,
diplomatic and civil means to recover isolated personnel. The designated PR authority
is <insert name: JFC, Commander (COM) NATO Peace Support Operation (NPSO) or a
designated component commander as appropriate> and he will establish a JPRC which
will act as focal point for all PR activities within the JOA and will be responsible for
planning, coordination and control of all joint PR missions. Component and / or sector
PRCCs have the same responsibility in their AOR.
G.3.4 Not covered areas
Despite the PR capabilities as mentioned above, some areas in the AO are not covered
by PR assets. List the areas as mentioned. These may be high mountains, areas under
control of hostile elements, etc. (e.g. there may not be PR capabilities available that can
operate at night). Also describe how the commander intends to cater for this problem.
G.3.5 Forces
The Combined Joint Status Of Requirements (CJSOR) outlines dedicated and designated
PR forces. Political and / or geographic constraints, availability of dedicated PR assets,
and the need for a more timely response may dictate the use of other assets than those
dedicated for PR in the CJSOR. Component and/or sector commanders must be prepared
to use organic assets and tailor the PR task force to match the character of the PR mis-
sion.
In addition, commanders must be prepared to utilise diplomatic and civil (e.g. io!s (io!s),
(Non) Governmental Organisations ((N)GOs) and local entities) means to to effect the
recovery of their personnel.
Dedicated forces . Unit name, location and number and type of assets needs to be
inserted here.
Designated forces . Unit name, location and number and type of assets needs to be
inserted here.
PRCCs . Location, manning and training requirements for the PRCCs needs to be put
here.
.
.
.
86
G.4 coordinating instructions
G.3.6 Tasks
JPRC a. The JPRC is to develop and maintain a theatre PR SOP in accordance with
ATP-3.7.1 Vol ?? Annex H.
b. The JPRC is to provide a PR in-brief as part of in-processing programme.
c. Other tasks are as per ATP-3.7.1. A more extensive task-list may be inserted
here or as an appendix to Annex V if deemed appropriate.
PRCC a. The PRCC is to develop and maintain a PR SOP for their component / sector
based upon the theatre PR SOP in accordance with ATP-3.7.1 Vol ?? Annex H.
b. The PRCC is to provide a PR in-brief as part of in-processing programme.
c. Other tasks are as per ATP-3.7.1. A more extensive task-list may be inserted
here or as an appendix to Annex V if deemed appropriate.
ACC. only if the ACC is the designated PR authority. If that authority rests with the acjfc
or COM NPSO, the ACC responsibilities will be addressed in the item below.
Land Component Commander (LCC)
MCC
SOCC
Sector commanders]
a. ...
Staffs from all branches at all levels are to be prepared to support the JPRC / PRCC to
prepare plan and execute PR operations as per Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-
3.7.1 and PR SOP (theatre, component, sector).
Troop contributing nations a. Ensure personnel assigned to <insert name of oper-
ation or exercise> have the appropriate level of SERE training as dened by
pre-deployment requirements.
b. Ensure all forces are equipped with required survival equipment as dened
by pre-deployment requirements
c. Identify requirements for reintegration activities.
G.4 coordinating instructions
All personnel deployed in the JOA is to prepare an ISOPREP and an EPA. Units are to be
prepared to forward ISOPREP and EPA to the PRCC / JPRC if required.
G.5 PIERIE
All deployed personnel is to be considered to be Personnel Identied as at an Elevated
Risk of Isolation and / or Exploitation (PIERIE). Consequently, in accordance with NATO
policy, sending nations and headquarters are to categorise their personnel with respect
to their risk of isolation. This categorisation is typically done through the denition of
MRIE and HRIE. Preparation for a potential isolation event is conducted in three consec-
utive steps; pre-deployment preparation, upon entry preparation, and normal mission
preparation.
87
G.6 Command and control
G.6.1 PR C
2
description
Based on the overall C
2
structure as described in <insert reference to the main body or
annexes as applicable> the PR C
2
structure is depicted in the diagram below. Provide
description of where the JPRC, PRCCs and PR POCs are located. Roles and responsibilities
of the JPRC, PRCCs and PR POCs are described in ATP-3.7.1 Vol I Chapter 1.

INSERT PR C2 GRAPHIC
Figure G.1: PR command and control structure
G.6.2 Supporting / supported relationships
Typically, commanders are responsible for their own personnel and are therefore also
responsible for the recovery of their isolated personnel. This is easily implemented when
own personnel has become isolated in ones own AOR and the recovery can be effected
with own assets / capabilities. However, as soon as personnel has become isolated in
someone elses AOR and/ or a recovery cannot be effected by solely using own assets /
capabilities, coordination is required. In such cases supporting / supported relationships
have to be dened.
In <insert name of operation or exercise> supporting / supported relationships will be
dened by the JFC through the JPRC on a case by case basis.
G.6.3 Launch / Execute authority matrix
Reference AJP-3.3.9, PR missions normally have two steps. The rst step is to preposi-
tion recovery forces and their supporting assets. This is commonly known as launch.
This is applicable for ground, air and maritime lead missions alike. The second step is
the actual approval to prosecute the PR mission and is commonly called execute.
Although typically launch and execute authority resides with the JFC, in <insert name of
operation or exercise> the authority to issue launch and execute approval is delineated
as per the matrix below.
88
G.7 Administration and logistics
Launch / Own AOR Other AOR Other AOR
Execute Own Assets Own Assets Other assets
Launch ... ... ...
Execute ... ... ...
G.6.4 Reports
The JPRC will be notied of all PR operations. The PRCCs will submit an initial report
to the JPRC prior to any planned or deliberate PR missions. Mission folders will be
submitted to the JPRC as soon as possible for all other PR missions. The Personnel
Recovery Incident Report (PRIR) will be used to transmit the message.
Training
G.7.0.1 Pre deployment preparation
Education. Personnel that are to be deployed, and based on their risk of isolation, are
to be trained in accordance with STANAG-7196.
Training. In addition to the above, personnel is to be trained in the following:
Items to be listed here may refer to the environment (desert, jungle, arctic, etc.),
population, ROE, PR procedures and equipment to be used in theatre
...
Equipment. In addition to the equipment specied in ATP-3.7.1, Vol III, Chapter XXXX,
all personnel in <insert name of operation or exercise> has to carry the items listed
below at all times when they leave the base to enhance their chances of survival
and to facilitate their recovery if they have become isolated.
...
...
G.7.0.2 Upon entry preparation
Education. Upon entry in theatre, all personnel will undergo an initial in-theatre brief.
This brief will be given by personnel designated by the JPRC. Commanders will be
briefed additionally on their roles and responsibilities regarding PR.
Training. Upon entry in theatre, all personnel will undergo initial in-theatre training.
Items to be listed here may include acclimatisation, familiarisation with the envi-
ronment and all types of training that could not be conducted prior to deployment.
Equipment. Upon entry in theatre, personnel will be issued list items will / could not
have been issued prior to deployment.
...
...
89
G.7.0.3 In theatre continuation training
during their deployment in theatre, all personnel will undergo continuation training
related to their role regarding PR. Items to be listed here may include table top and live
exercises.
insert other coordinating instructions as required.
G.7.1 Rules of Engagement
ROEs are as per <insert the reference to the ROEs, in particular if there are specic ones
related to PR>
G.7.2 Service support
Service support is in accordance with Annex R (Logistics). Specic issues are:
a. Supply. FARP locations capable of servicing PR assets will be identied throughout
the JOA. FARP locations and status will be monitored by the JPRC to ensure avail-
ability during PR missions. The JPRC will also coordinate the use of AAR if required
for PR missions.
b. Medical. All dedicated PR assets will be capable of providing initial medical treat-
ment to recovered personnel. The JPRC will monitor the status and coordinate the
use of medical facilities in the JOA for PR missions.
medical facilities will designate a helicopter landing site and a method for trans-
porting patients to the facility from that landing site.
The JPRC will ensure a capability to provide Phase I reintegration and coordinate
for Phase II and -III reintegration as needed.
the JPRC needs to ensure medical arrangements for PR are not only mentioned in
this Annex V, but also in the annexes related to medical issues as the medical com-
munity may not necessarily be familiar with this Annex V.
90
PR SOP template
91
Annex H
PR SOP template
NOTE. Normal text is considered to be applicable in all PR SOP.
when developing the actual PR SOP.
NOTE. This is the default template for the theatre PR SOP. more detail may be required
depend upon the theatre and capabilities. Component and sector commands are
to use the same template but references to JFC and theatre are to be amended as
appropriate.
H.1 General
H.1.1 Introduction
This PR SOP is intended to tailor the generic relevant documents to the operation /
exercise at hand. It does no necessary repeat anything from those reference documents.
The reference documents must therefore be studied in reference to the content of this
PR SOP.
H.1.2 Reference publications
APs .
AJP-3.3.9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Personnel Recovery
ATP-3.7.1 Personnel Recovery Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
ATP-3.3.9.1 NATO Combat Search And Rescue
ATP-3.3.9.2 NATO Search And Rescue Manual
BI SC PR JOG
...
Orders .
92
H.2 Theatre PR system
OPLAN XXXXX
FRAGO XXXXX
...
Memoranda Of Understanding .
...
H.1.3 PR Characteristics
H.1.3.1 4 PR methods
As described in AJP-3.3.9, PR encompasses four methods; SAR, CR, CSAR and NAR.
The four methods will only be referred to if a particular piece of text refers to only
that particular method. Otherwise, the generic term PR will be used throughout
this SOP.
H.1.3.2 Relation to other mission types
Medical Evacuation. MEDEVAC is not a subset of PR. Details are described in
Annex H of this OPLAN. However, MEDEVAC assets may be used to support PR
missions
1
.
HRO. Example: Although some nations might consider HRO as a subset of PR, the
conduct of this specic mission is a primarily a national responsibility. If iso-
lated personnel have been captured and taken hostage, the JPRC may transfer
the supporting responsibility for the coordination of the HRO to the SOCC.
Quick Reaction Force. A QRF is typically not stood up for the execution of PR
missions. However, a QRF may be used to conduct / support PR missions.
Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations. In accordance with NATO policy and
doctrine, Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) is not considered to be a
subset of PR. However, PR capabilities and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
(TTPs) may be used to conduct NEO operations as applicable / appropriate.
Persons Designated with Special Status. The personnel listed in <insert ref-
erence to the main body or annexes as applicable> are considered Person(s)
with Designated Special Status (PDSS). However, that status does not nec-
essarily entitle them to the full range of PR support when applicable. In the
context of PR, only the personnel listed below are to be fully supported with
PR support in case of a isolation event.
...
H.2 Theatre PR system
Amplication of the overall concept of the PR system as stated in Annex V of the OPLAN
as is relevant for this PR SOP.
1
These items may be considered doctrinal in nature. It is therefore op for debate whether this should be
part of a typical PR SOP as a reminder / amplication or whether they should not be mentioned at all.
PR SOP template
93
H.2.1 Not covered areas
Despite the PR capabilities as mentioned above, some areas in the AO are not covered
by PR assets. List the areas as mentioned. These may be high mountains, areas under
control of hostile elements, etc. (e.g. there may not be PR capabilities available that can
operate at night).
H.3 C2
H.3.1 PR C2 description
Based on the overall C
2
structure as described in the OPLAN Annex V, the PR C
2
structure
is depicted in the diagram below. text is to be copied from the Annex V and expanded if
required

INSERT PR C2 GRAPHIC
Figure H.1: PR command and control structure
H.3.2 Supporting / supported relationships
text is to be copied from the Annex V and expanded if required
H.3.3 Launch / Execute authority matrix
text is to be copied from the Annex V and expanded if required
H.3.4 Reports
The JPRC will be notied of all PR operations. The PRIR will be used to transmit the
message. The PRCCs will submit an initial report to the JPRC prior to any planned or
deliberate PR missions. Lessons identied will be submitted to the JPRC as soon as
possible for all other PR missions. Mission folders will be archived upon the completion
of the recovery.
94
H.3 C2
H.3.5 specic tasks / duties
In addition to the tasks and duties as described in ATP-3.7.1 volume 1, Chapter 1, the
PR C
2
nodes have the following additional tasks and duties:
One may choose to list all or a selection of the task for the respective nodes. This section
may be moved to an appendix to the SOP for readability purposes (in particular if the list
becomes long).
JPRC .
Some of the tasks given in ATP-3.7.1 may be mentioned here for clarity pur-
poses.
Diplomatic. Special attention should be given to the way how the JPRC is to
liaise / coordinate with diplomatic sources with respect to PR. The JPRC may
be authorised to do this directly, or through normal Political Adviser (POLAD)
channels. In any case, the contact details of the POC is to be given here as well.
Civil. Special attention should be given to the way how the JPRC is to liaise /
coordinate with civil sources with respect to PR. The JPRC may be authorised
to do this directly, or through normal CIMIC channels. In any case, the contact
details of the POC is to be given here as well.
Host Nation. Special attention should be given to the way how the JPRC is to
liaise / coordinate with host nation sources with respect to PR. The JPRC may
be authorised to do this directly, or through normal liaison and / or CIMIC
ISOPREP / EPA management. Special attention is to be given to the way
ISOPREPs and EPAs are managed by the JPRC and what the responsibilities for
handling ISOPREP and EPA are for the JPRC.
...
PRCC .
poses.
Diplomatic. Special attention should be given to the way how the PRCC is to
liaise / coordinate with diplomatic sources with respect to PR. The PRCC may
be authorised to do this directly, or through normal POLAD channels. In any
case, the contact details of the POC is to be given here as well.
Civil. Special attention should be given to the way how the JPRC is to liaise /
coordinate with civil sources with respect to PR. The PRCC may be authorised
to do this directly, or through normal CIMIC channel. In any case, the contact
details of the POC is to be given here as wells.
Host Nation. Special attention should be given to the way how the PRCC is to
liaise / coordinate with host nation sources with respect to PR. The PRCC may
be authorised to do this directly, or through normal liaison and / or CIMIC
ISOPREPs and EPAs are managed by the PRCC and what the responsibilities for
handling ISOPREP and EPA are for the PRCC.
...
PR POC .
PR SOP template
95
poses.
Diplomatic. Special attention should be given to the way how the PR POC is to
liaise / coordinate with diplomatic sources with respect to PR. The JPRC may
be authorised to do this directly, or through normal POLAD channels. In any
case, the contact details of the POC is to be given here as well.
Civil. Special attention should be given to the way how the PR POC is to liaise /
coordinate with civil sources with respect to PR. The PR POC may be authorised
to do this directly, or through normal CIMIC channels. In any case, the contact
details of the POC is to be given here as well.
Host Nation. Special attention should be given to the way how the JPRC is
to liaise / coordinate with host nation sources with respect to PR. The PR POC
may be authorised to do this directly, or through normal liaison and / or CIMIC
ISOPREPs and EPAs are managed by the PR POC and what the responsibilities
for handling ISOPREP and EPA are for the PR POC.
...
Recovery forces .
Recovery forces are to inform the JPRC / PRCC on their status and will inform
the JPRC / PRCC about any change in in their status.
...
(A)MC .
...
OSC .
...
RMC .
...
Staff sections Staffs from all branches at all levels are to be prepared to support the
JPRC / PRCC to prepare plan and execute PR operations as per ATP-3.7.1 and PR SOP
(theatre, component, sector).
SNRs .
SNRs are to collect ISOPREPs for all personnel from their Nation prior to their
entering theatre. Particular attention is to be given to visiting personnel.
SNRs are to inform the JPRC about where the national ISOPREPs are stored
and who the POC for providing them is should the JPRC need them.
Host nation The host nation will provide SAR services throughout the host na-
tions Search and Rescue Region (SRR).
...
Chatroom The following are to check into the PR chatroom as set-up by the JPRC /PRCC:
JPRC
96
H.3 C2
PRCCs
PR POCs
Battle captain
Intel cell
Press and media ofcer
Dedicated and designated recovery forces
QRFs
...
...
H.3.6 Communications
List the available communication means that will or may be used for PR operations.
Within <Insert name of operation or exercise> several means of communication will be
used for PR purposes(see also ATP-3.7.1, Vol I, Annex K. Here the communications archi-
tecture for typical PR situations (e.g. delineate SAR from CR from CSAR) should be intro-
duced. A graphical depiction of the respective communications architectures (similar to
ATP-3.7.1, Vol II,gures 4.1 and 4.2) should be added to the PR SOP as appendices.
From JPRC - PRCC - PR POC. Communications between the JPRC, PRCC and PR POCs
will be conducted via telephone, e-mail and chat with radio communications as
back-up system. The primary means of communication during a PR event will be
chat. Telephone numbers, (e-mail) addresses, chat aliases and frequencies will be
provided in the PR POC list as appendix XXXX.
Airbourne recovery assets. Airbourne recovery assets will use frequencies and codes
as per the ACCs COMPLAN.
Land based recovery assets. Land based recovery assets will use frequencies and
codes as per the AO COMPLAN.
Sea based recovery assets. maritime based recovery assets will use frequencies and
codes as per the MCCs COMPLAN.
H.3.7 Communication conventions
The following conventions will be taken into account to ensure smooth communications
and prevent confusion as much as possible:
ISOPREPs / EPAs. Details on how ISOPREPs and EPAs are managed are to be inserted
here. As a minimum, information is to be given on the format (if that deviates
from the standard as given in Annex A to Vol III of ATP-3.7.1, who is to store
ISOPREPs and EPAs (taking into account national regulation, etc.), through what
means ISOPREPs and EPAs are to be distributed in this operation/exercise.
E-mail and network folder naming conventions. For the purpose of easy informa-
tion retrieval and automatic information archiving, e-mail subject information and
and format may de dened. The same goes for network folder naming.
PR chatroom naming conventions. A standardised way of the use of user-names in a
chat system confusion in this respect may lead to the failure of missions.
PR SOP template
97
Intranet homepage usage. Intranet will be used to store information such as orders,
but may also be used to store standard briefs (e.g. upon entry theatre PR brieng).
Transfer of information between different systems. In most operations there will
be an operation wide network. In addition to that there will also be several national
networks. In many cases it is not easy to transfer data from one network to another.
Details are to be worked out and presented here.
Mission numbering convention. To avoid confusion, a mission numbering system is
to be developed by the JPRC that is to be used by all PR entities.
Mission folder contents. Besides the mission-folder itself (as per ATP-3.7.1), special
attention is to be given to other pieces of information that may be inserted (e.g. chat
listings).
H.3.7.1 Use of ISOPREPs and EPAs
Certain items of the ISOPREPs and EPAs may be used in a particular way. E.g. One of the
four statements of the ISOPREP may be reserved for use by the OSC or EF, or the PR colour,
or word may be designated as the initial means to authenticate isolated personnel. Such
special uses are to be mentioned here wherever applicable.
H.4 ORBAT
Based on the CJSOR, the PR related ORBAT is as follows. This information may be pre-
sented in a table for readability purposes.
H.4.1 Dedicated assets
Dedicated assets are those assets of which the sole purpose is to satisfy the PR re-
quirements. If there are no dedicated assets, the term NONE should be inserted
here. If there are assets dedicated to PR they should be listed here. At this level the
location of the assets is to be inserted. As sub bullets, the following items should be
inserted (see also ATP-3.7.1, Vol I, Annex C):
Type and number.
Readiness (Alert status).
Operational range.
The assets AOR.
Capabilities (including day / night capabilities.
Limitations (including national caveats).
...
...
98
H.4 ORBAT
H.4.2 Designated assets
Designated assets are those multi-mission assets which are only momentarily as-
signed to fulll PR duties. If there are no designated assets, the termNONE should
be inserted here. If there are assets designated to PR they should be listed here. At
this level the location of the assets is to be inserted. As sub bullets, the following
items should be inserted (see also ATP-3.7.1, Vol I, Annex C):
Type and number.
Operational range.
The assets AOR.
...
...
H.4.3 QRF
If there are no QRF assets that can be made available for PR (through the appro-
priate channels), the term NONE should be inserted here. If there are QRF assets
available for PR they should be listed here. At this level the location of the assets
is to be inserted. As sub bullets, the following items should be inserted (see also
ATP-3.7.1, Vol I, Annex C):
Type and number.
Operational range.
The assets AOR.
...
H.4.4 Medical facilities for reintegration
The medical facilities designated for reintegration phase I and II are to be listed
here with their name and location.
...
H.4.5 Other capable assets
Under this item capabilities that are not, as a minimum, TACON to the Force, but
are available through prior coordination, should be listed here. Examples of other
capable assets that may be available are; host nation SAR capabilities, local police
capabilities, capabilities of (N)GOs, etc.. If there are no other assets, the termNONE
should be inserted here. If there are other assets to PR they should be listed here.
At this level the location of the assets is to be inserted. As sub bullets, the following
items should be inserted (see also ATP-3.7.1, Vol I, Annex C):
PR SOP template
99
Type and number.
Operational range.
The assets AOR.
...
...
H.5 Risk assessment
The JFC is to provide generic information regarding:
Go - no go criteria
Red card issues
Risk assessment formats
A PR related risk assessment should be given here. This should be based on the over-
all risk assessment and include PR specic issues regarding terrain (high mountains,
mineelds, etc.), population (friendly or hostile), day / night / weather implications (e.g.
adverse weather or very low light levels at night that may limit the use of NVD) and any
other risk / threat to successful execution of PR operations.
H.6 PR staff
In accordance with ATP-3.7.1, Chapter 1, the JPRC has been responsible for the develop-
ment of this theatre PR SOP for <insert name of operation or exercise> and is responsible
for keeping this PR SOP up to date. The PRCC are to use this PR SOP template to develop a
PR SOP tailored to their own AOR based on its specic characteristics and their available
capabilities. If a PRCC chooses to do so, they are to use this template and are responsible
for keeping it up to date.
H.6.1 Proactive mission planning
SPINS. For air and aviation PR purposes, PR SPINS have been developed. These PR
SPINS will be distributed as part of the overall SPINS (typically together with the
ATO.
Spider points. For air and aviation PR purposes, a list of spider points has been
developed.This item may only be applicable for the ACCs PR SOP. The list can be
found in the ACO.
100
H.7 PR critical tasks
H.7 PR critical tasks
The ve critical tasks of PR are; report, locate, support, recover and reintegrate. These
critical tasks are the foundation on which all PR operations are planned, coordinated
and executed.
Specic items on the ve tasks that are not mentioned in ATP-3.7.1 may need to be inserted
here (e.g. in this theatre the METHANE report will be used or reporting PR incidents).
H.7.1 Locate
Specic information has to be inserted here on the use of coordinates (e.g. UTM, MGRS,
LAT-LONG, decimal minutes).
H.7.2 Reintegration
Recovered isolated personnel will brought to one of the designated reintegration facili-
ties to undergo reintegration phase I treatment in accordance with the theatre reinte-
gration plan. As per NATO policy, reintegration is a national responsibility. However,
for lessons learned purposes it is critical that the SERE debrief, that is part of the rein-
tegration phase I, is to be reported to the JPRC within seven days of the recovery. The
JPRC will subsequently update PR procedures as appropriate or inform units through
the appropriate channels of lessons identied where applicable.
H.7.3 Normal mission execution
Prior to execute normal missions, all personnel is to ensure that their ISOPREP and EPA
is up to date and they are familiar with its content. Furthermore, personnel is to ensure
that the intended routing and timing is known to their home unit and / or the ops room
at the location of their departure. If there are areas that are not covered by PR capabilities
(see paragraph H.2.1 in this PR SOP), operators may be advised to avoid these areas or
to take special precautions. Dos and donts in this respect are to be given here Finally
personnel is to ensure they carry all the required equipment (see also ATP-3.7.1, Vol III,
Paragraph 2.5).
Personnel should give special attention to the following items:
Sanitation
Maps / evasion charts
Survival equipment (mention specic, deviating, requirements here)
ISOPREP and EPA
Survival radio procedures
PR codes
PR SOP template
101
H.7.4 Recovery mission execution
Upon becoming isolated, personnel is to act in accordance with ATP-3.7.1, Vol III. Con-
tinue with listing specic items pertaining to the operation / exercise at hand. Particular
attention is to be given to dos and donts with respect to (un)friendly population, mines,
other go / no-go areas, etc.. Specically distinguish between isolating events in friendly,
hostile and neutral/unknown territory.
Immediate actions. List appropriate actions based on ATP-3.7.1, Vol III.III
Contact procedures. List appropriate actions based on ATP-3.7.1, Vol III. particular
attention is to be given to the use of clicking the radio button as means of non-voice
communication and the use of PLS and associated codes.
Evasion. List appropriate actions based on ATP-3.7.1, Vol III.
H.7.5 Reintegration
Upon recovery, the isolated personnel will be brought to a designated medical facility to
undergo reintegration phase I treatment in accordance with the theatre reintegration
plan. The medical aspect of this reintegration treatment will be conducted by the per-
sonnels national medical staff or by medical staff that is designated in accordance with
applicable Memorandum Of Understandings (MOUs).
H.8 Land procedures
As appropriate, procedures that are specic to the maritime environment are to be listed
here in a similar fashion as with the air procedures.
H.9 Air procedures
H.9.1 Initial actions
Distress call. For aircrew, prior to ejection, transmit on the working frequency: "MAY-
DAY" (three times); callsign; and position. The Distress call will be made by the wing-
man if the emergency aircraft was unable to transmit or if transmission was not made
on the working frequency. If on a non-secure net, use bearing and range from the appli-
cable Bullseye for airborne position reporting.
Emergency Aircraft Ejection / Ditching Over Water: Transmit "MAYDAY, MAY-
DAY, MAYDAY" and your call sign on UHF Guard (243.0) or VHF (121,5).
a. Put the ejection seat emergency locator beacon to Automatic / ON. Once in the
water, allow the beacon to transmit for at least ve minutes and then attempt
periodic voice contact on UHF Guard (243.0) until you make contact.
b. When you make contact, pass GPS position (DO NOT use the SARDOT in this case)
and the medical condition of yourself and other crew-members as applicable.
102
H.9 Air procedures
H.9.2 Aircrew procedures
During a PR event, all aircraft involved will calculate time to be at refuelling (BINGO)
time in ZULUand be ready to respond to an RMC roll call with call sign, BINGOtime and
weapons load ("as fragged" or "as fragged minus X"). RMC qualied crews should state
"RMC-qualied" upon initial call-up with AMC to help the AMC assign tasks appropriately.
OSC procedures. Any aircraft (involved in the operation) can be designated as the
OSC, should be familiar with OSC responsibilities and should carry the PR 11-Line check-
list / report format (see paragraph J). Wingman shall assume OSC rst if threat / fuel /
mission permits. Eyewitness to downed aircraft. Mark your position and, if practical,
the survivors position. Report the shoot down to the appropriate PR C
2
assets. Use PRIR
checklist/report format. Assume OSC if threat/fuel/mission permits.
Airborne asset communications with survivor.
a. Use of PR Codes. If specic PR codes are to be used by specic players in the recovery
mission, details are to be mentioned here. E.g. One of the four statements of the
ISOPREP may be reserved for use by the OSC or EF, or the PR colour, or word may
be designated as the initial means to authenticate isolated personnel. Such special
uses are to be mentioned here wherever applicable.
b. OSC / RMC. To avoid unfriendly DF detection, every effort will be made to employ
data burst and limit voice communication with the survivor until the nal phase
of rescue with the EF.
c. Make every attempt to ask the survivor only yes / no questions and expect data
burst or <give number> PTT clicks = yes, <give number> PTT clicks = no. OSC / RMC
will conrm with the survivors that data burst transmissions are being received
by data-bursting "Message Received, Standby" after each data burst.
d. Pass survivor coordinates via a secure net. If secure net is unavailable, pass en-
crypted survivor location using position TO the SARDOT, or use the Search And
Rescue Numeric Encryption Grid (SARNEG).
e. SARNEG: Use the SARNEG as an alternate means to pass position when secure
communication is not possible.
f. For coordinates, pass NORTH / SOUTH rst, then EAST / WEST in degrees, min-
utes and tenths of minutes. Do not say "North" or "East" unless you are forced
out of your aircraft south of the equator or west of 0 Meridian. In this particular
case only, to avoid any confusion or ambiguity, state "South" after passing the rst
set of coordinates or "West" after second set. Preface all encoded information with
"SARNEG". Do not use any clear text with the encoding that could compromise the
grid or information being passed in the clear.
H.9.3 Downed aircrew procedures
Establishing timely contact with friendly forces and accurately passing initial contact
information is critical to your rescue. Immediate rescue procedures should be followed
for the rst <give number> hours. If forced to evade attempt to follow EPA procedures.
PR SOP template
103
Immediate Actions. List actions that deviate from the PR SOP. Specically distin-
guish between isolating events in friendly, hostile and neutral / unknown territory.
Report.
a. Upon parachute landing acquire GPS position and send canned data burst message
advising rescue forces of status (repeat once) IF APPLICABLE TO YOUR RADIO.
b. If your radio is not designed with data burst feature or if nothing is heard within
two minutes make voice call in the blind. Limit voice transmissions to short mes-
sages (not longer than 3 seconds) and transmit large amounts of information (lo-
cation, physical condition, etc.) with several shorter transmissions. When asked
yes/no questions, respond with data burst or use <give number> PTT clicks=yes
and <give number> PTT clicks=no.
c. Make initial radio call on primary PR A / B to friendly forces with:
MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY
Callsign (and crew position if needed).
Location TO SARDOT.
Physical condition (and that of other aircrew if applicable).
Threats in your immediate area.
d. If no initial radio contact is established, keep the radio on for the rst <give num-
ber> minutes and transmit on primary PR A/B. Attempt to contact every <give
number> minutes for the rst <give number> hours.
e. If no contact is made after <give number> hours, monitor primary PR A/B for <give
number> minutes every <give number> minutes for the rst <give number> hours.
If nothing is heard broadcast Call Sign and condition in the blind. To conserve
battery life, ensure that your survival radio is turned off all other times. If aircraft
are noticed ying overhead at any time or sonic booms are heard, turn radio on and
monitor the primary PR A/B frequencies in consideration of enemy DF capabilities.
f. Long Range Communications Plan. After <give number> hours, re-attempt contact
every hour at <give number> minutes past the hour and monitor for <give number>
minutes. To conserve battery life, ensure that your survival radio is turned off all
other times. If aircraft are noticed ying overhead at any time or sonic booms are
heard, turn radio on and monitor the primary PR A/B frequencies in consideration
of enemy DF capabilities.
g. Once contact is made, discontinue quarterly transmissions and follow all instruc-
tions given. If rescue forces direct you to switch to a different frequency, do so
and remain on that frequency until otherwise directed. It is critical once contact is
made, that the evader maintains radio discipline and good cover / concealment.
h. Avoid passing your position in the clear unless a rescue helicopter is in sight. If
in enemy territory the beacon should be used as a last resort only. Remember,
in order for friendly forces to interrogate and receive your location using PLS, the
PRC-112 (or the other systems) must in the on position.
i. Duress Code Word. If you are captured and forced to transmit over radio, convey
that message by attaching the DURESS WORD to your Call Sign.
104
H.9 Air procedures
j. Imminent Capture. State that capture is imminent by voice transmission. De-
scribe in as much detail any and all information pertaining to the capturing force.
This information will be used to prole the captors when formulating liberation/rescue
forces. Do not use the Duress Word unless forced to transmit deceptive informa-
tion. Once the Duress Word is used, all information will be suspect to rescue forces.
Signaling procedures.
a. Day signaling equipment: mirror and smoke. Flash all friendly A/C with mirror
only when signaled to do so. Respond to an exaggerated wing rock by ceasing
mirror ashes. Pop up smoke when you are requested to do so.
b. Night signaling equipment. Prepare your InfraRed (IR) strobe/rey. Do not acti-
vate (crack it) the chemlite unless signaled to do so. Pencil ares should be used a
last resort only as they will highlight your position.
Extended evasion. If an immediate recovery is impossible or unsuccessful, it may
take up to <give number> hrs to execute a pre-planned CSAR mission. In this case do not
move unless directed to or unless absolutely necessary. If you are unable to establish
contact with rescue forces within <give number> hours, execute your long-term EPA. For
communication to air/space platforms display <give character> as GTAS, approximately
fteen feet long using natural or man-made materials, visible from the air. The <give
part> of the vertical line of the <give character> will indicate direction of travel and/or
hole-up site. Give more details only when they deviate from standard procedures (e.g.
Once the GTAS has been constructed, use a signal mirror to attract attention of friendly
aircraft to the location during the day. At night use an infrared (IR) strobe or rey
anytime friendly aircraft are overhead. Do not use any hand held visual signaling devices
until any approaching forces have been positively identied as friendly. DO NOT hole
up near the GTAS and move far enough away to ensure security of the hole-up site while
maintaining line-of-sight with the GTAS.
Radio Authentication procedure. Detail the applicable procedures here.
a. Any time a downed aircrew recognises a friendly aircraft overhead, the survivor
should monitor primary PR A/B frequency and be prepare to authenticate.
b. Initially, RESCAP / RMC / OSC or helicopter rescue forces will use PR Word from the
date of the isolating event (or from the EPA for ground teams / isolated personnel)
to properly authenticate the survivor. PR Word authentication will use only ONE
letter at a time. The same rules apply to PR Number which is reserved for Rescue
Ground Teams. You should avoid asking the whole number and instead use one
digit at a time or use mathematic techniques (add, subtract, multiply) between two
digits of the number.
c. The PR letter will be coded in the rst message of the Personal Locator Beacon (PLB)
for databurst message or used as a near recognition signal for assisted recovery.
d. Extended evasion episodes will use ISOPREP information as a denitive or nal
survivor / team / isolated personnel authentication.
PR SOP template
105
H.9.4 Recovery phase procedures
Detail the applicable procedures here.
a. Be prepared to mark your position. DO NOT use any hand-held signaling devices
until directed by RMC/EF or until the approaching forces have been positively iden-
tied as friendly.
b. Prior to the rescue platform or personnel nal approach, secure all gear / equip-
ment (holster your weapon). All personnel will keep their Identication (ID) card
in their upper left breast pocket.
c. Be prepared to provide vectors to the recovery helicopter. Identify the signicant
geographic landmarks for use in vectoring rescue helicopters and making threat
calls. Once helicopter is in sight, make all calls in clears and vector helicopter.
d. Assume a non-threatening posture by kneeling and facing away from the recovery
vehicle / personnel with hands over your head (if physically possible). Maintain
position until directed otherwise.
e. Expect an additional authentication by rescue ground forces which will normally
be derived from the PR Colour / Letter. Follow all rescue force instructions.
f. DO NOT approach the rescue platform / personnel unless directed by recovery
forces. Remember you are considered potentially hostile until positively identied
by Rescue Team.
g. Failure to execute all instructions precisely may lead to mission abort.
h. Hoist Recovery. If no landing zone is available, the helicopter may lower a rescue
device to execute the pickup. PJs will accompany the rescue device and assist with
recovery. If no PJs are available, allow the device to contact the ground before you
touch it.
i. ...
H.10 Maritime procedures
As appropriate, procedures that are specic to the maritime environment are to be listed
here in a similar fashion as with the air procedures.
H.11 Appendices
a. POC list (format as per ATP-3.7.1, Vol I, Annex XXXX)
b. Templates and message formats that deviate from ATP-3.7.1
c. ...
106
H.11 Appendices
PR codes message template
107
Annex I
The PR codes message should include the following:
NOTE. Normal text is considered to be applicable in all PR codes messages.
when developing the actual PR codes message.
I.1 General information
This PR codes message are to be considered an addition to the PR SOP for the operation.
The ACC PRCC is primary responsible for conducting a rescue operations and overall
management with respect to these PR codes message. Isolated personnel are to act
according procedures as laid out in Volume III and the current PR SOP.
The following PR codes message is effective for operation from to .
I.2 Rules of engagement
In addition / deviation to the PR SOP, the following ROE are applicable:
...
I.3 Risk assessment
Insert the actual risk level in theatre / the applicable AOR
108
I.4 Communication
I.4 Communication
I.4.1 Brevity words
For use in unsecure radio nets, or as brevity codes an secure nets the following brevity
words are used as appropriate.
NO EVENT MX FROM TO CODE
1 RMC LAUNCH M RMC AMC ASHLEY
2 EF LAUNCH M EF AMC BARNEY
3 EF FEET DRY M EF AMC ...
4 RESCORT LAUNCH M RESCORT AMC ...
5 PRTF RV & READY M RMC AMC ...
6 RMC IN COMM WITH SURVIVOR M RMC AMC ...
7 EF / RESCORT AT IP M RESCORT ALL ...
8 EF AT SURVIVOR LOCATION M EF ALL ...
9 SURVIVOR X RECOVERED M EF ALL ...
10 ALL SURVIVORS RECOVERED M EF ...
11 EF RESCORT EGRESS M EF AMC ...
12 EF FEET WET M EF AMC ...
13 MAINTENANCE ABORT X RMC ALL ...
14 ABORT DUE TO THREAT X RMC AMC ...
15 WX ABORT X RMC AMC ...
16 BORDER X-ING APPROVED X AMC PRTF ...
17 REQUEST MORE CAS X RMC AMC ...
18 SURVIVOR NOT LOCATED X RMC AMC ...
NOTE: M - MANDATORY CALL. X - OPTIONAL CALL
I.4.2 Survivor radio
Ensure the correct PLS ID code is loaded in the PRC-112 series radio.
109
I.4.3 PR codewords
CODEWORD DEFINITION
HAMMER Cleared to execute mission
FOG Smoke
etc. Survivor injured
Mission abort
Mission delay
Team inserted
Planned Landing Zone (LZ)
Survivor recovered
Survivor uninjured
Survivor under duress or hostage
Crash site not located
Cleared to survivor lz
SOF extraction
Hostile contact
Red ashlight
PRTF aircraft down
Strobe / IR strobe
IR chemlights
West
North
East
South
Change route
Continue / push EF
Return to last spider point
On top
Mirror
Stop signal
Hold at stated position
Holding point prior to survivor
Etc.
I.4.4 PR codes
PR word: <give PR word> valid from to
PR colour: <give PR colour> valid from to
PR number: <give PR number> valid from to
PR letter: <give PR letter> valid from to
SARDOT: <give SARDOT> valid from to
SARNEG: <give SARNEG> valid from to
Bullseye: <give bullseye> valid from to
RAMROD: <give RAMROD> valid from to
110
I.4 Communication
I.4.5 Non-comms plan
Specic procedures are to be given here.
PR SPINS template
111
Annex J
PR SPINS template
The PR SPINS should include the following:
NOTE. Normal text is considered to be applicable in all PR SPINS.
when developing the actual PR SPINS.
J.1 General information
These PR SPINS are to be considered an addition to the PR SOP and PR codes message for
the operation.
The ACC PRCC is primary responsible for conducting a rescue operations and overall
management with respect to these PR SPINS. Isolated personnel are to act according
procedures as laid out in ??, Volume III and the current PR SOP.
The following SPINS are effective for operation from to .
J.2 Rules of engagement
In addition / deviation to the PR SOP, the following ROE are applicable:
...
J.3 Risk assessment
Insert the additional / different risks to aircrew, if any, in relation to the risk assessment
mentioned in the PR SOP. Particular guidance should be given with respect to evasion
and contacting local population.
112
J.4 Recovery mission execution
J.4 Recovery mission execution
J.4.1 Special procedures
Anything that is not mentionen in the PR SOP and the PR codes message should be men-
tined here.
J.5 Communication
Any additional brevity words, codewords and PR codes that are not mentioned in the PR
codes message is to be inserted here.
Communications
113
Annex K
Communications
K.1 COMPLAN
JFC or a designated CC will publish a COMPLAN capable of supporting PR operations. The
COMPLAN should cover:
a. PRTF frequencies including as a minimum:
(a) Isolated personnel to / from EF.
(b) EF to / from C
2
platform.
(c) C
2
platform to / from JPRC / PRCC.
(d) EF to / from JPRC / PRCC (ground communications).
(e) PRTF to JPRC / PRCC (if PRTF is ground forces unit)
b. JPRC / PRCC communication requirements.
c. Emergency / distress / PLB (which should comply with Standard NATO Agreement
(STANAG) 7007).
d. Satellite Communications (SATCOM) nets, if available.
e. Codewords / Authentication. This section should include SAR word / letter / number
/ colour of the day (or other designated period), SARNEG code and duress word.
f. Callsigns.
g. Messages (as per APP-11).
h. Emission Control (EMCON) plan.
i. Anti-jam nets.
j. Radio relay.
k. Identication Friend or Foe (IFF) (to include procedures for non-IFF aircraft).
K.1.1 Checklist for getting the necessary information from the opera-
tors/assets.
See Annex C in Volume I on page 69
114
K.2 Standard communication formats
K.1.2 Checklist for checking the complan in annex
T.b.d.
K.1.3 Detail the required liaisons plus the comms equipment
Liaison and associated equipment must ensure contact with JPRC, PRCC, PR POC as well
as (N)GOs, civil and diplomatic authorities. Contact with these actors must be provided
as a minimum through unsecure means. Secure means need to be available as appro-
priate.
K.1.4 Detail required C2 equipment
C
2
equipment is laid out in gure A.1. The computer equipment must be connected to
the C
2
system used in the operation. As a minimum it must be capable of sending and
receiving:
a. ACO, ATO, etc.
b. ISOPREP and EPA information
c. e-mail / chat messages throughout the C
2
system.
The computers must also be capable of running the PR mission related software in use
in the operation (e.g. ICC, Falconview, etc.).
K.2 Standard communication formats
Standard communication formats should be adopted to ensure accurate transmission of
vital information. Suggested formats from AAP-11 should be used, with the following
being the minimum required for PR operations:
a. Search And Rescue Incident Report (SARIR) (see Annex E.2).
b. Other formats may be developed by JFC J6 staff as required.
K.3 SATCOM operations
SATCOM is the primary secure means for monitoring rescue missions in real time.
The radio is programmed to monitor the following SATCOM Channel:
Primary Channel:
TARN Channel xxx
Uplink UHF
Downlink UHF
PR NET: Uplink UHF
Downlink UHF
Communications
115
Secondary Channels:
AC-1: Channel yyy
Uplink UHF
Downlink UHF
AC-10B: Channel zzz
Uplink UHF
Downlink UHF
K.4 Contact information table
In case of preparing or executing a PR mission a wide range of contacts might be nec-
essary. The table in paragraph K.4 is an initial set up and must be expanded with
contacts in the AO as the circumstances depict. It is advised to complete the table as
shown in paragraph K.4 as soon as possible after arrival in the AO and add contacts
were necessary.
Organisation Contact
person
Contact
number
E-mail Remarks
MILITARY
Launch Authority
Execute Authority
Legal advisor 1
Legal advisor x
Interpreter 1
Interpreter x
Reachback HQ 1
Reachback HQ x
JPRC
PRCC LCC
PRCC xCC
PRCC region 1
PRCC region x
PR POC unit 1
PR POC unit x
Liaison off unit 1
Liaison off unit x
Assets unit 1
Assets unit x
SNR Nation 1
SNR Nation x
Military police
Etc.
CIVIL
Local police region
1
Local police region
x
116
K.4 Contact information table
Local hospital re-
gion 1
Local hospital re-
gion x
Local emergency
(e.g. for ambulance)
Etc.
AUTHORITIES
Embassy 1
Embassy x
NGO 1
NGO x
Civ government 1
Civ government x
Etc.
PR shift changeover checklists
117
Annex L
L.1 Director changeover checklist
a. Brief the following items to the on-coming shift supervisor/controllers
(a) Location of:
i. JFC or designated execution approval authority / JFC or designated launch
approval authority
ii. JPRC / PRCC director
iii. JPRC / PRCC deputy director
iv. recovery assets (number and status)
(b) The current intelligence situation
(c) Incidents/missions in progress
i. Incidents being worked
A. Location of incident
B. Information required to go to mission
C. Open checklist items
ii. Missions assigned to recovery forces
A. PR mission commander
B. Tasked PR unit
C. Estimated Time of Departure (ETD) or Actual Time of Departure (ATD)
of PR forces
D. Outstanding items required to launch PR forces
(d) Incidents/missions closed during shift
(e) Communications equipment status (as applicable)
i. Phones
ii. STU-III
iii. Field phones
iv. Radios
v. Global Command and and Control System (GCCS)
vi. CTAPS
vii. Unsecure/secure fax
viii. COSPAS / SARSAT
(f) Messages received and sent during the shift
118
L.1 Director changeover checklist
i. Mission reports needed to be drafted and sent to higher HQ
ii. Mission reports sent to higher HQ
iii. Messages received during the shift
iv. Message trafc waiting pick-up
(g) Brief special instructions
i. Message for specic individuals
ii. New read items that change procedures
(h) Ensure the JPRC is clean and neat
(i) Ensure supplies are located at each console
(j) Log shift changeover brieng complete on JPRC / PRCC event log
(k) Checklist complete
119
L.2 PR controller checklist
a. Changeover brief
(a) Log on to the JPRC / PRCC event log
(b) Review events log since end of last shift
(c) Be prepared to brief the support resources on any preplanned or expected
recovery activity if Personnel Recovery Duty Ofcer (PRDO) is not available
(d) Inventory Communication Security (COMSEC)
(e) Re-key secure communications equipment (as required)
(f) Change / destroy COMSEC (as required)
b. Daily tasks (conducted continuously throughout shift)
(a) Conduct communications check radio / phone lines with all customers and
Higher HQ
(b) Review current ATO / SPINS
i. Post PR FRAGO (primary and support resources)
ii. Post call sign / radio freq
iii. Update asset board
(c) Obtain weather brieng
i. Update weather board
ii. Update mission folders
(d) Obtain intelligence brieng / get periodic updates
i. Update mission folders
ii. Update situation map
iii. Ensure threat information is current and posted
(e) Review JPRC / PRCC wall displays
i. Update assets board
ii. Incident mission board
iii. Conrm status of support resources
A. Alert status
B. Number and type
C. Callsigns
D. Location
(f) Review open incident(s) / mission folder(s)
i. Determine follow-up actions
ii. Conrm number and condition of known isolated personnel are current
and accurate
iii. Conrm Coordinates of isolated personnel LKP in folder, on plotting chart
and mission status board are correct PR POCs
iv. Check with PRDO for any information on contact with isolated personnel
and update incident board / mission folder as appropriate
(g) Update AMC on missions in progress and / or opened, as applicable.
(h) Analyse open / future missions to determine if primary recovery forces should
be moved to a forward operating location and / or placed in precautionary
orbits
120
L.2 PR controller checklist
(i) Coordinate with PRCC and PR POCs to monitor PR frequencies for isolated per-
sonnel transmissions
(j) When there are no further missions in the AO, place PR units on relaxed alert
and inform them when ight activity will resume
(k) Review mission folders
i. Obtain weather forecast for time of mission
ii. Obtain intel for ingress / egress routes for recovery site
iii. Brief primary and support recovery resources taking mission
(l) Review PR activity (open / closed incidents and missions) and prepare / trans-
mit required reports per AO SOP
c. Early morning activities
(a) Update all status boards
(b) Conrm support forces, weather, intel, SERE available for any planned mis-
sions
(c) Brief AMC on any morning missions
d. Midnight Zulu time:
(a) Close / open daily JPRC / PRCC event log
(b) Key radios (as applicable)
(c) Destroy classied waste
Intelligence checklists
121
Annex M
M.1 Pre-operations intel checklist
National checklists are to be used for pre-mission planning
122
M.2 Intel daily operations checklist
M.2 Intel daily operations checklist
a. Shift Changeover Brieng
(a) Review JPRC / PRCC event log
(b) Review JPRC / PRCC intelligence journal
(c) Read messages from previous shift
(d) Brief current threat and probable hostile courses of action in relation to iso-
lated personnel
i. Signicant political events
ii. Areas of major engagement
iii. Weather
iv. Local area situation
v. Threat condition
vi. Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) level / Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear (CBRNE)
vii. Indications of impending attack
b. Daily tasks
(a) Review current ATO, changes to SPINS and all missions currently in planning
stages
(b) Check with JPRC / PRCC director for additional information
i. Discuss potential threats to missions with PR planners
(c) Get Joint Intelligence Centre (JIC) or Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE)
daily situation brieng
(d) Get weather brieng to cover duration of PR missions
(e) Complete tasks unnished by previous shift (Request For Information (RFI) ,
plotting ORBAT, etc.)
(f) Develop new EEIs and pass as RFIs as necessary
(g) Review open incident / mission folders
i. Check for accuracy
ii. Compare folders with logs and displays; check for consistency
(h) Review threats for opened missions, update mission coordinator of changes
(i) Check incoming message trafc (telephonic, radio, chat, etc.) look for info that
may affect recovery forces or personnel
(j) Brief critical changes of information to JPRC / PRCC personnel
(k) Maintain situational awareness of available PR and intelligence assets
(l) Check comms with PR and intelligence units
(m) Prepare shift changeover brieng
123
M.3 Intel changeover brief checklist
a. Current as of time
b. Current status of each isolated person
(a) Missions
i. Completed
ii. Ongoing
iii. Planned
(b) Recent incidents
c. Local area threat situation and signicant events
(a) Threat level
(b) Alert status
(c) Etc.
d. Signicant political events (surrenders, treaties, declarations of war; policy changes,
etc.)
e. Brief any changes to:
(a) Orders of battle
(b) Tactics
(c) Readiness posture
(d) Areas of engagement
f. Other signicant military activity
g. CBRNE attacks or indications of impending attacks
h. Probable courses of enemy action
i. Results of debriengs
j. Signicant terrorist activity
k. Review the following administrative items. reference intelligence journal as ap-
propriate.
(a) Messages, both in and out of the JPRC / PRCC
(b) Comm problems
(c) Unnished tasks (RFIs, ob plots, etc.)
(d) Upcoming events (briengs, etc.)
(e) Signicant events
(f) Status of supplies
124
M.4 Intel PR incident checklist
M.4 Intel PR incident checklist
a. Upon notication of isolated personnel, plot location on the primary situation dis-
play chart with the DTG and source of the report.
b. Immediately notify JPRC / PRCC leadership by most secure means with:
(a) Time of incident #
(b) Location
(c) Call Sign
(d) Primary PR frequency
c. Coordinate incident report i.a.w. PR SOP
d. Assess threat situation in vicinity of isolated personnel and brief:
(a) Director / deputy watch supervisor
(b) PR mission coordinator
(c) AMC
(d) Other personnel as necessary
e. PR POC must provide the following information about isolated personnel
(a) EEIs
i. Type of vehicle (ground, air, maritime)
ii. RAS
iii. EPAs
iv. Route of movement
v. Altitude (for aircraft)
vi. DAR
f. Draft RFIs and issue to following personnel:
(a) Director / deputy watch supervisor
(b) PR mission coordinator
(c) PRTF units
(d) Additional recovery units
(e) Plot changes on chart
g. Assist controllers in determining:
(a) Ingress / egress routes
(b) Spider point routing
(c) Airspace around isolated personnel
i. No re
ii. Restricted Operation Zone (ROZ)
h. ID intelligence assets available to support recovery
i. Recommend actions to degrade / eliminate threat
j. Provide support to intelligence section of PRTF units (as required)
Essential elements of information
125
Annex N
a. Reliable isolated personnel location(with date / time of last contact).
b. Number and physical status of isolated personnel.
c. Suspected cause of incident.
d. Contact with isolated person.
e. Reception of emergency beacon.
f. Threat (to include):
(a) Air / ground / sea superiority.
(b) OPFOR order of battle.
(c) OPFOR equipment and serviceability.
(d) OPFOR C
2
.
(e) OPFOR night capability.
(f) OPFOR electronic warfare capability.
(g) OPFOR NBC capabilities.
g. Consider: Political / religious / cultural environment.
h. Friendly forces in area (and if they are attempting to search).
i. Weather, sea and astronomical conditions affecting survival and recovery.
j. General description of terrain in the immediate vicinity of the personnel. Identify
outstanding terrain features and potential landing zones.
k. Availability of isolated persons ISOPREP, EPA data and type of survival radio and
other equipment.
l. Availability of required recovery support forces / medical facilities.
m. Disposition of recovered personnel.
n. Reintegration location and procedures.
Additional information requirements:
a. Planning / briengs (who, where, when)
126
b. Go / no go decision (who, when)
c. Abort criteria
d. Tactical weather limitations
e. Crew rest
f. Delay plan
g. Success criteria
h. ROE
i. Transfer Of Authority (TOA) (when applicable)
j. COMPLAN
(a) Freq assignment (C
2
and weapon codes)
(b) Brevity words
(c) Code words
(d) EW procedures)
(e) Flight following
(f) IFF procedures
k. Survivability equipment (chaff, ares)
l. Intell update
m. Scheme of manoeuvre
(a) Starting point
(b) Forward Operating Base (FOB)
(c) Formation form
(d) Speeds
(e) Lighting procedures
(f) Routing
(g) Rendez vous points
(h) Landing plan
(i) LZ procedures
(j) Aircraft down (emergency handling)
(k) Extraction plan
n. ACO
(a) Spider-routes
(b) Altitude of ops
(c) CSAR procedures
o. Coordination through friendly units (Army)
p. FLOT
q. Coordination to go X-FLOT and return
127
r. Coordination with neighbour units
s. Fire support (where, who, freq, C/S)
t. Close Air Support (CAS) (where, who, freq, C/S, what is available)
u. Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) (where, who, freq, C/S)
v. FARP, AAR / HAR ((where, who, freq, C/S, what is available, including time plan)
w. Food (where)
x. Personal survival equipment
128
ELT notication checklist
129
Annex O
ELT notication checklist
Upon receiving the initial notication of an activated ELT the following actions are to be
taken:
a. Log time and position in ofcial log book.
b. Use all available assets to locate and determine authenticity.
c. Plot ELT position.
d. Is it a mission aircraft or not?
(a) If it is not a mission aircraft and outside of the AO: Call local Air Trafc
Control (ATC).
(b) If it is not a mission aircraft but is within the AO: Apply PR checklist.
(c) If it is a mission aircraft within the AO: Apply PR checklist.
(d) If it is a mission aircraft but is outside the AO: Call local PRCC.
(e) If it is a mission aircraft but is over international waters: Comply with SPINS
and either apply PR checklist or call local PRCC.
130
Recovery mission execution checklist
131
Annex P
Recovery mission execution
checklist
a. This checklist is for use in JPRC / PRCC as a back up in order to make sure it does
not miss essential points during execution.
b. All times in zulu (or the commonly used timezone in the operation)
c. Not all items may be applicable in all cases.
d. Items are not to be handled strictly sequential.
General
Case ofcer name
DTG case opening.
Report
Notify senior ops ofcer / J-3 ofcer.
Open a mission folder (JPRC / PRCC mission folder).
Validate incident
Validate alerting originator
Validate alerting message content
Complete PRIR brief with details given (populate as available, do not wait for 100%
information before moving on)
Update chat with with known details (use chat to maintain a log. start and main-
tain a log if chat is not DTG stamped. It is essential that all relevant details are
entered as it provides and audit trail)
Form multi-disciplinary team as appropriate.
J-1 representative. Name contact details
132
PIO representative. Name contact details
LEGAD representative. Name contact details
POLAD representative. Name contact details
Info ops representative. Name contact details
lno (as rquired). Name contact details
Other representative. Name contact details
Other representative. Name contact details
Transmit warning order to recovery assets as soon as possible with available in-
formation.
Notify all PRCCs and/or JPRC for awareness and parallel planning.
Notify isolated personnels unit / DOB.
Notify the isolated personnels SNR and Press and Information Ofce (PIO).
Collect AO level authentication information (ISOPREP, EPA, PLB code etc.)
Prepare to transmit authentication information to relevant forces and acknowl-
edge receipt.
Locate
Determine location of isolated personnel using all available means.
Log all location, source and time information.
Authenticate Isolated Personnel.
Track use of authentication data.
Support
Analyse need of support to isolated personnel
To survive
Suppress enemies
During reintegration
Analyse need of support to next of kin. (Be before CNN)
Recover
Recovery mission execution checklist
133
Mission planning
Pass isolated personnel location to intel and ask them for threat assessment.
OPFOR defences/response capability
NBC assessment
Terrain analysis
Mine threat
Request both a complete weather brief for incident location and a forecast for
the entire area of interest, between the recovery asset launch location and the
incident location, for the anticipated mission duration
Determine availability and evaluate nearby assets and capabilities as potential
OSC / RMC / recovery vehicle and assess potential for opportune recovery.
Notify PRCCs to assist cross boundary coordination process.
Prepare PRIR (contains all information on PR incident checklist) and transmit to all
relevant units (e.g. JPRC / PRCCs and recovery assets). Do not delay transmission
of the initial report to wait for completed information: transmit best available
information immediately. Update the SARIR with Search And Rescue Situation
Report (SARSIT) as more detailed information becomes available.
Receipt of PRIR by action addressees acknowledged.
Task appropriate PRTF assets.
Provide mission brief to PRTF
Analyse all mission briefs. (Include aircraft unit reps, communications rep and in-
telligence rep in this analysis, if applicable. Consider diversionary attacks.) Make
recommendation to the ofcer with launch and execute authority.
Execute order given.
For delayed mission TOT is: Z Include in ATO.
Name of execution authority
Planned ingress / egress routing:
Put airspace measures in place (Temporary Minimum Risk Route (TMRR), ROZ
around the isolated personnel, etc.).
Notify the isolated personnels SNR and PIO.
Execution
Monitor applicable communications to followmission progress. Update all relevant
forces with new information as it becomes available.
PRTF launched: Number / type callsigns
Recovery vehicles: /
Mission Commander: /
Other: /
134
Isolated personnel located. Position
Isolated personnel recovered
Condition
Taking isolated personnel to
Reintegration
ETA Z
Coordinate arrival of isolated personnel at nal destination / medical facility.
Coordinate isolated personnel debrieng (Operations (Ops), intel and SERE).
Isolated personnel arrives at transload location, if applicable.
Isolated personnel delivered to nal destination / medical facility.
PRTF recovered at home station.
Recovery vehicles
Mission commander
Other
Determine Phase 2 Reintegration requirement.
Mission completion
Provide updates as required to:
Change authentication data.
Change SARDOT.
Change SARNEG.
Other.
Notify applicable agencies of mission closure / suspense.
Contact isolated personnel unit/organisation and provide update.
Contact all unit operation centres which had aircraft participating in the mission
to recap take off / landing times and total sorties and hours own.
Complete recovery mission folder. Include all paperwork, including copies of all
checklist pages, logs, maps, etc.
Close out / suspend mission in PRCC event log and update recovery mission num-
ber in front of checklist binder. Suspended mission les must be passed to the
appropriate authority, to enable the le to be re-opened if circumstances change.
Recap mission with Chief of Operations (CHOPS)
Prepare recovery mission summary and any lessons learned for recovery units,
support agencies and higher headquarters.
DTG case closure
Archive PR mission information.
Course of action brief
135
Annex Q
Course of action brief
Q.1 General
The Course of Action (COA) brief is the staff s method to present possible plans to the
launch / execute authority. It is informal and interactive, designed to show how you
plan on utilising the assets available and how you plan to mitigate threat and risk. This
brieng is given early in the planning process. This brieng gives the launch / execute
authority an opportunity to supervise the planning and to issue more guidance. The
brieng should:
a. Describe how you plan to tactically employ the allocated assets
b. Describe how the isolated personnel will be recovered
c. Show the general sequence of events
d. Present unresolved issues
e. Ensure the initial plan meets the commanders intent. The overall goal of this brief
is not format, but content.
Q.2 Suggested brieng format
Slide 1: Mission overview (map view)
Slide 2: isolated personnel situation (from information report show on map)
Slide 3: Weather forecast (up through next 24-hrs)
Slide 4: Intelligence: Enemy situation (show on map)
Enemies offensive capabilities
Enemies defensive capabilities
Slide 5: Intelligence: Friendly situation (show on map)
PR-capable unit locations
PR-capable unit capabilities
Slides 6 9: Courses of action (possible examples)
136
Q.2 Suggested brieng format
LCC
Scheme of manoeuvre
Threat assessment and counter-tactics
Signicant concerns/performance considerations
ACC
Scheme of manoeuvre
MCC
Scheme of manoeuvre
SOCC
Scheme of manoeuvre
Slide 10: Command, control, & communications employment plan
Available support assets and locations
Support asset routing plan
Communication architecture
Slide 11: ROE
Identication/engagement authority
Caveats
Additional critical information (as required)
Slide 12: Initial risk assessment (stoplight: red, yellow, green)
requirements to mitigate risk
Launch / execute back brief
137
Annex R
R.1 General
This brief should convey the entire PRTF plan to the launch / execute authority, the
staff, and those concerned with the operation. The back brief is the end of the planning
process and should give a big picture view. The Courses of Action slides should be the
basis for the brief, but concentrating on the following:
a. Present scheme of manoeuvre in a logical ow
b. Discuss the support plan
c. Discuss areas where proper integration is critical
d. Present the C
2
plan and the ow of critical information
e. Describe de-coniction techniques
This brieng should cover enough information so the launch / execute authority can
answer any mission related questions at higher levels.
Note: Ensure you check the format of this brieng is appropriate for the mission/exercise.
Every launch / execute authority may want different and specic items briefed. What
follows is a suggested format.
R.2 Suggested brieng format
Slide 1: Mission overview
Slide 2: Commanders intent
Slide 3: isolated personnel situation (updated since COA brief)
Slide 4: Weather forecast (for operation)
Slide 5: Intelligence: Enemy situation
Enemies offensive capabilities
Enemies defensive capabilities
138
R.2 Suggested brieng format
Slide 6: Intelligence: Friendly situation
PRTF composition and locations
Support and augmentation requirements (FARP, AAR / HAR, RESCORT, RESCAP,
SEAD, ISR, Space, C
2
, medical, engineer, etc.)
Minimum force / go/ no-go criteria
Slides 7 10: PRTF mission
Mission statement
Sequence of events
Routing ingress / egress
Rendez-vous / orbit areas
AAR / HAR tracks
Objective area(s)
LZs objectives
Ingress
Recovery tactics (airspace de-coniction)
Weapon control status
Fire support plan/coordination
Egress
Slide 11: Command, control, & communications employment plan
Communication architecture (plan)
Required reports / critical information ow
Tanker management and control
Crypto
Emission control plan
Slide 12: ROE
Weapon control status
Identication/engagement authority
Caveats
Additional critical information (as required)
Slide 13: Risk assessment (stoplight: red, yellow, green)
Performance considerations
Requirements to mitigate risk
launch / execute recommendation
139
R.3 PR mission launch criteria checklist
This checklist may also be incorporated in slide 13 of the launch / execute back brief.
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R.3 PR mission launch criteria checklist
Intelligence and SERE debrief
141
Annex S
S.1 General
Intelligence and SERE debrief will be conducted after initial medical and psychological
care for the recovered isolated personnel. This includes questions that are to be utilised
by NPSO HQ JPRC / PRCC and NPSO HQ. J-2 when conducting an intelligence and SERE
debrief of recovered isolated NPSO personnel.
S.2 SERE debrief of isolated person
NPSO HQ JPRC / PRCC shall conduct a SERE debrief of the recovered isolated personnel
in order to gain any further information that could be of use to other personnel within
NPSO. If this information in any way affects the conduct of how an isolated personnel
shall act while being in distress it must be distributed within NPSO As Soon As Possible
(ASAP).
If NPSO conducts a recovery operation in general the isolated personnel will be taken to
the nearest medical facility. If necessary NPSO will take the recovered isolated person-
nel to the dedicated Role-2 medical facility for reintegration. If requested by NPSO HQ
JPRC / PRCC, NPSO can conduct intelligence and SERE debrieng of the recovered isolated
personnel at the dedicated role 2 medical facility for reintegration. After medical treat-
ment, intelligence and SERE debrief is nished the recovered isolated personnel will be
released to NPSO and ones SNR. After that, repatriation of a recovered isolated personnel
back in to duty becomes a national matter.
S.3 Outline for survivor / evader interview / debrief
S.3.1 Introduction
During the interview/debrief, only the interviewer should ask questions, interact with,
and otherwise establish and maintain a relationship with the subject. The other team
members, camera, note taker, etc., should maintain silence. They may write down ques-
tions that they would like the subject to answer, and pass themto the interviewer during
breaks. Usually, the other team members will nd that they will end up crossing off the
questions that they have written down, as an experienced interviewer will, in their own
way and time, get all the questions in. The interviewer will introduce the other team
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S.3 Outline for survivor / evader interview / debrief
members, providing the appropriate level of pre-arranged details, and explain the above
questioning procedures.
The interviewer should:
Express appreciation for his/her participation.
Explain how the information will be used.
Provide a general, but not rigid, structure of how the interview will proceed
Insure he/she is comfortable, provide something to drink, engage in enough casual
conversation to put the subject at ease and then proceed with the interview. Items
to have within reach of the subject should include:
Pitcher or bottle of water and glass.
Box of Kleenex.
Pad of paper and pen/pencil.
Provide maps, charts and imagery (when available) for the operational area as an
aid to the subject in explaining actions taken and identify specic locations.
Note: Try and arrange for breaks to come between topic areas on the interview out-
line, as this will facilitate picking up the dialogue again without losing continuity and
momentum. However, the interviewer should pay close attention to the subjects body
language, taking breaks when appropriate. Following each topic area, remember to
ask if he/she would like to take a few minutes to refresh/stretch/etc. Also ask if there
was something related to the topic that was not asked and they would like to men-
tion/discuss. Allow for the camera operator to change setting and angle, if necessary.
If there is ample debrief time available, and use of the debrief is anticipated for training
(or will be edited), request that the subject begin their response to each question by
pausing (explain how this will aid later in the editing process). Provide an example
such as: if the question was What type of aircraft were you on? You would begin with
the aircraft I was on was an MH-53. Explain that at the end of each of their responses,
that you too (the interviewer) will pause slightly, prior to asking the next question.
S.3.2 Personal information
Gather personal demographic data. See question set below and select appropriate de-
mographic data for each situation.
S.3.3 Overview of incident
If not conducted before, ask subject to give a general overview of their experience from
beginning to end. Let subject know you will go back after this overview and systemati-
cally walk through the entire experience in detail and by stages.
Listen carefully and take notes as you listen to his overview
Avoid getting bogged down in any specic area too long
Without abruptness, guide him/her along if necessary. Use comments like that is
very important and we will discuss that in detail when we are dealing with....
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S.3.4 Take a break
Take a break. As a team, review the general overview. Discuss modications (if any)
based on the overview. After the break, come back and ll in the holes in the story.
Compare the information with the established interview questions.
S.3.5 Detailed analysis of incident
Proceed through the interview as outlined below. Integrate any notes taken during the
subjects overview into the sections of the outline where they are appropriate. Allow
the time necessary for the subject to feel as if they have covered each area to their
satisfaction. Stick with the outline, but be exible enough to meet the subjects needs to
express information so as not to stie the conversational ow. Use the outline to expand
on subjects that are of interest.
NOTE: The following question set is a guide to help debrieng teams select appropri-
ate questions for a variety of situations. It is not expected that every returnee answer
all the following questions. The debrieng team should review this question set and cut,
paste, and add questions as appropriate to create a tailored debrieng guide for each
subject.
NOTE: If the subject was recovered via NAR methods, then the debrieng team MUST
include a representative from J-3-N. If J-3-N is not present, and the returnee indicates
that his recovery may have been through non-conventional means, do not ask any ques-
tions regarding non-conventional recovery until the J-3-N representative is present. De-
briengs containing information pertaining to NAR methods must initially be protected
at the TS/NF/OC/SAR level until evaluated by J-3-N.
S.4 Biographical information
a. What is your full name and any other names (AKAs) you are known by?
b. What is your rank (or civilian equivalent)?
c. What is your registration number (e.g. service number, social security number)?
d. What is your place and date of birth?
e. Did you have any applicable childhood experiences, hobbies, or activities that may
have prepared you for your isolation experience?
f. Do you have any civilian training, skills, licenses, and/or certications, that would
have assisted in preparing you for your survival/evasion experiences?
S.5 Military biographical information
a. What is your branch of service?
b. What was the date you entered the service? If commissioned, source of commis-
sion?
144
S.6 Pre-mission preparation
c. What is your job title and code?
d. What is your current unit and parent organization?
e. What were your previous assignments?
f. What is you unit address and phone number?
g. Where is your unit based?
h. What was your radio call sign? List all call signs associated with your mission.
i. What was the name of your operation?
j. What was your crew or squad position?
k. What training had you received up to this point in your military career?
l. Do you have any special survival or resistance training?
m. Have you had any other SERE training or experiences?
n. Do you have Joint Service Training Programme (JSTP) training?
o. Did you attend any special military training?
p. Did you have any previous military campaign or conict experience that helped
prepare you for your survival/evasion experience?
S.6 Pre-mission preparation
a. Did you prepare or have an EPA?
b. Was this a directed plan or did you author it yourself?
c. Describe in general terms your EPA. (Note: Variations to the EPA due to situational
circumstances will be discussed in evasion phase of this debrieng.)
d. What clothing did you have for this mission?
(a) Was it normal and appropriate for the circumstances?
e. What equipment did you have? Did you have any weapons? Did you use or attempt
to use them? Why or why not?
f. Did you have a map or an Evasion Chart (EVC)?
(a) If so, how many were there? Were they of your operational area?
(b) Did you have a compass?
i. If so, what type?
g. Did you have a Blood Chit?
h. Did you a have a pointee-talkee?
i. Did you have a Survival or Escape and Evasion kit?
(a) If so what did it contain?
145
(b) Was it issued or self-made?
(c) Did you attempt to pre-hide any survival/escape equipment in your clothing
or on your person? If so, what?
j. What other SERE equipment did you have?
k. What signaling equipment did you have?
l. Describe any pre-mission study (SERE guides, information requirements, web-sites,
maps, etc.) that you conducted.
(a) Was this study helpful?
m. Did you receive any theater-specic SERE guidance / intel briengs, including com-
munications, prior to your mission? If so, please describe.
n. Were you briefed on any unconventional recovery methods or pre-determined re-
covery areas, which might be in the area of your mission? If so, please describe.
o. Did you receive any in-theater briengs on what type of treatment or interroga-
tions to expect if you were captured?
p. What was your attitude toward having to evade or being captured by the enemy
prior to this mission?
(a) Was this attitude common among people in your group/crew?
q. Did you feel condent in your ability to survive and evade capture or survive cap-
tivity?
r. Had other members of your unit ever been shot-down, isolated, or captured?
S.7 Events leading up to isolation
a. What kind of mission were you on?
b. When did your mission start?
c. How long was the mission to last?
d. How long did the mission actually last?
e. Where was the mission to have taken place?
f. From what base did you initially stage?
g. At what point in the mission did the incident occur?
h. How many US/Allied personnel were involved in this incident? (present when the
incident occurred)
i. Were there any civilian personnel involved? If so, how many, who where they, what
role did they have?
j. Describe the circumstances leading up to the isolation from friendly forces of your-
self or your group.
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S.8 Incident details
S.8 Incident details
a. To the best of your knowledge, what was your location at the beginning of the
incident?
b. What time did the incident occur?
c. What was the date of the incident?
d. What were the weather conditions?
e. Did a border penetration actually take place?
f. If the incident began in the air:
(a) What type of aircraft were you on?
(b) What was your approximate airspeed?
(c) What was your altitude?
(d) What circumstances brought your aircraft down?
(e) Were there any visual or electronic warnings prior to the incident?
(f) What was your in-ight reaction to the emergency?
(g) What sort of damage did your aircraft sustain?
(h) Were there any injuries or fatalities associated with the incident?
(i) Did you bail out, ditch, or crash-land the aircraft?
g. Did you report the incident?
(a) To whom did you report the incident?
(b) How did you report the incident?
(c) If you reported the incident, what, if any, guidance were you given?
(d) Did you attempt, but fail, to report the incident? Why?
h. Were you aware of any friendly forces that witnessed, or may have witnessed, the
incident?
i. Are you aware of anyone else reporting the incident?
(a) How do you know it was reported?
S.9 Survival & evasion
a. Once isolated, were you aware of enemy forces?
b. If you bailed out/ejected, did you look around to assess your situation while hang-
ing in the parachute?
(a) What did you see?
(b) How did it help you?
(c) Were there any communications before hitting the ground?
(d) What type of radio did you use?
147
(e) What frequency(s)?
(f) Duration?
(g) What and with whom?
c. Were you injured/wounded before or during your evasion episode/situation?
(a) What were the specic injuries?
(b) When did you realize you were injured?
(c) What was your initial treatment of injuries?
(d) What materials did you use for treatment?
(e) Did your injuries limit your initial evasion actions?
(f) How? Explain.
d. Did the group/crew become separated after the incident?
(a) Was there a rally point position identied?
(b) Did you use the rally point/location to re-group?
e. Was the aircraft commander in charge on the ground?
(a) If not, who was in command? Why?
f. How did you communicate on the ground with the rest of the isolated crewmem-
bers? (e.g., radio, voice, hand signals, etc.)
g. Describe the weather at the time of isolation (hot, dry, wet, cold, winds, clouds,
etc)?
(a) Was it a factor in your decisions?
(b) How did it affect your ability to survive and evade (effects on physical health,
mental state, light or sound, cover, evidence or travel, etc.)?
(c) Did you think it affected enemy search teams?
h. Describe the terrain in the isolation area (vegetation, elevation, slope, soil, etc).
i. Were there any people in the immediate area of isolation? If yes explain:
(a) How many?
(b) Military or civilians?
(c) Were they armed?
(d) What type of weapons?
(e) Did they know you were in the vicinity/area?
(f) What were their actions?
(g) Were there any patterns to their activities?
(h) How did their presence affect your actions? (i.e. did you hide or move out?)
(i) Do you have any information on internal security forces or population control
measures?
j. If you had an EPA,
148
(a) Were you able to follow it?
(b) If not, what variations did you make?
(c) What caused you to make the deviations?
(d) How were supporting assets notied of the deviations?
k. Did you make any attempts at communication during isolation?
(a) How?
(b) If the communication was by radio:
i. What type of radio did you use?
ii. What were the frequencies used?
iii. What was the duration?
iv. Describe (in detail) the communication to the best of your ability.
(c) With whom?
(d) When?
(e) Were you successful?
(f) Any problems?
(g) Was this a pre-briefed procedure?
l. Did you evade alone or in a group?
(a) If in a group, were there any problems making decisions, communicating, etc?
(b) How were they resolved?
m. Did you know your approximate location when you started evading? Explain how.
n. Did you know your specic location?
(a) How did you determine this?
(b) Did you have maps/EVCs?
(c) How many EVCs?
(d) Did the EVCs cover the area of isolation/evasion and recovery?
(e) Did you have any problems with the EVCs?
(f) Did you use a compass/GPS?
(g) What type of compass/GPS?
(h) How and when did you use it?
o. What equipment/clothing did you have with you?
(a) Was any of it lost or damaged? Explain.
(b) Was the equipment protected against loss or damage?
(c) How did you cope with equipment problems?
(d) When you traveled, did you take everything with you?
(e) If you left items behind, how did you make your selection?
(f) What did you do with items left behind?
(g) Did training prepare you for making the choices you made?
(h) Do you think you made any mistakes in selecting the items? Why?
149
(i) Did you make your choices prior to your mission?
(j) What items would you add or delete?
(k) What were the items you carried?
(l) How did you carry them?
(m) In relation to your survival or escape and evasion kit:
i. Was this kit sufcient for your particular experience?
ii. If the kit was not sufcient, what was it lacking?
iii. What specic items did you have with you that were not part of your
issued kit, which assisted you in your survival/evasion?
p. What were your water sources while evading?
(a) How much water did you carry on the mission?
(b) Was there additional water on the aircraft? Did you take it with you?
(c) Approximately how much water were you able to obtain each day? Where,
and from what source?
(d) How did you carry and store the water?
(e) Did you purify the water? Did you lter the water? Why?
(f) How did you purify water?
(g) Did you have any ill effects from the water?
(h) Describe your evasion actions to procure water.
(i) Did you have to vary your travel plans to obtain water?
(j) Did you go without water to remain secure?
(k) Were there people around/near the water sources you used? Who and how
many?
(l) Was there a time of day that there were more/less people present at the water
source?
q. Did you consume any food while evading?
(a) What was its source? (i.e. survival kit, pocket, ruck sack).
(b) Describe any problems.
(c) Describe any natural foods you procured.
i. How did you know it was edible?
ii. How much did you eat?
iii. Did you use a taste test?
(d) If you ate any animal life, describe your procurement techniques and your
method of preparation for eating.
(e) Did you steal any food while evading? If so, describe your actions. (time of
day, observations/area layout, approach, items stolen and quantity, retreat,
preparation for consumption, and problems/suggestions)
r. When hiding, what type of sites did you select?
(a) Describe as many as you can.
(b) Did you use them as found or were modications required?
150
(c) Describe the modications.
(d) Did you have to make a shelter for protection? Explain?
(e) How long did you stay at the various sites?
(f) What precautions did you take for security?
(g) Describe your use of camouage in the site.
(h) Did you observe potential hide-sites that you did not use?
s. Did you camouage yourself throughout the episode?
(a) Describe how you camouaged yourself.
(b) What problems did you note?
(c) Describe how you maintained the camouage.
t. Did you travel or not? Why? If you traveled:
(a) What were your initial goals/intentions/objectives?
(b) Did you plan to go to a predetermined recovery site?
i. Were you able to follow that plan?
ii. Where was your planned recovery site?
iii. How far away was it?
iv. What was your direction of travel?
v. Describe your travel plans to get there.
vi. What was your rate of travel?
vii. How long did it take you to reach your objective?
viii. Was there any evidence that the enemy was conducting a search for you?
How was the search conducted: what type of troops, their weapons and
vehicles, tactics, use of NVD or other illumination devices, dogs, and level
of prociency (disciplined and organized, or an unorganized gaggle)?
ix. How long did you wait at the recovery location prior to contact?
x. When did you travel (day, night, dusk, dawn, etc.)?
A. Why?
B. What was the best?
C. Were there any particular problems?
xi. Did you have an alternate plan? Briey what?
xii. Did you select your own recovery site? Why?
(c) Did you travel a straight line or travel a planned erratic pattern using the
terrain/vegetation, etc?
(d) What obstacles were encountered? Describe obstacles in detail. How did they
effect your plans?
i. Natural. (mountains, valleys, broad open areas, rivers, vegetation, etc.).
ii. Man-made. (enemy presence, borders, border obstacles, electronic de-
vices, dogs, population controls, roads, power lines, pipe lines, etc.)
(e) Did you use a map and/or compass / GPS during this time?
(f) If you had evasion charts, describe how you used them.
i. Did you use the marginal information on navigation techniques?
ii. Was the evasion chart useful for other things, (i.e. medical, personal pro-
tection, shelter or clothing, camouage, plants, etc.)?
151
u. Did you have any specic problems with navigation or any survival problems as-
sociated with travel?
v. How could you have been better prepared to cope with combat survival?
(a) Briengs.
(b) Formal training.
(c) Clothing.
(d) Equipment.
S.10 Contacts with local populace
a. Describe your initial contact.
b. What do you believe led to your contact?
c. Do you believe you were under surveillance before contact?
(a) If so, how long did it last?
(b) How many people did you observe?
d. What actions were observed before contact with local populace?
e. What actions did you take to prepare yourself for contact?
f. How did the local people contact you/your group?
(a) How many were there?
(b) Were they armed?
i. If so, what kind of rearms? Provide make, model, and country of fabri-
cation if known.
(c) Did the local people come across as being friendly or hostile?
(d) How did they introduce themselves and whom did they say they represented?
(e) What language did they speak?
(f) Could they speak English?
(g) Did you use a pointee-talkee or blood chit to communicate?
g. Cultural aspects
(a) Were you at all familiar with the cultural characteristics of country/people?
(b) Would it have helped if you had been more familiar?
(c) Were there any specic events that occurred where your lack of knowledge of
their culture created an additional hardship on you? Describe.
(d) Were there any specic events that occurred where knowledge of their culture
may have helped? Explain
152
S.11 Preparations for recovery
S.11 Preparations for recovery
a. Describe your recovery location.
(a) Why did you select the site?
(b) Was it a site that was pre-briefed?
(c) Were there any problems nding a recovery site?
(d) How long did you wait there?
b. Communications with Recovery Forces
(a) When and where did you rst attempt to make contact with friendly forces?
(b) Were you able to pass your location, authentication, physical condition, and
enemy situation to friendly forces?
(c) How (visual signals, radio, etc.)?
i. Describe your signals in detail, (i.e. materials, conguration, size, loca-
tion, radio type, mirror, are, type, etc.)?
(d) Any problems with signals and/or communications?
(e) Were there any failed attempts to contact friendly forces?
(f) If HOOK-112 equipped, explain and describe the location and process used
during each data burst.
c. Authentication
(a) Did friendly forces authenticate you upon initial contact at your recovery lo-
cation?
(b) Was ISOPREP data used? If so;
i. What parts were used?
(c) Explain any problems with authentication.
(d) Were you authenticated more than once?
(e) Were you aware of when your identity was veried? How?
(f) Were you authenticated by means other than ISOPREP data? Explain.
(g) If you were not authenticated, describe the situation and reasons.
d. Enemy situation
(a) Did you observe enemy forces/civilians in the recovery area? Explain.
e. Physical Condition - What survival difculties were encountered while waiting for
recovery?
(a) Physical/Medical Condition.
(b) Environmental Conditions.
(c) Food/Water Availability.
153
S.12 Recovery phase - how were you recovered / rescued?
Note to interviewer: You will have to determine, based upon the returnees response,
which category of recovery applies to this situation, then refer to the proper line of
questioning.
a. Conventional assisted recovery (planned) - refer to paragraph S.13.
b. Non-conventional assisted recovery - refer to paragraph S.14
1
.
c. Unplanned contacts - refer to paragraph S.15.
d. Unassisted recovery - refer to paragraph S.16.
S.13 Conventional assisted recovery (planned)
a. Describe initial contact with the recovery force
(a) How was contact established?
i. Were there any problems?
(b) Did you use any signals, loads, link-up procedures not mentioned previously.
i. Where?
ii. How?
iii. When?
iv. Were you pre-briefed instructions? By whom?
v. Describe any problems with the signal/loads/radios.
b. Describe the recovery force.
(a) Who: US Military, Allied, other?
(b) What:
i. Aircraft (helicopter or xed wing aircraft).
A. What type?
B. Were there any problems with recovery devices or the landing?
ii. Advancing troops or armor / long range patrol / scouts.
A. Unit designator and type?
B. Initial contact precautions?
C. Any problems?
iii. Ship, sub, small watercraft.
A. Type/name of ship/unit?
B. Describe initial contact?
C. Any problems?
(c) Describe the authentication procedures used by the recovery force to verify
your identity.
(d) Describe your treatment once recovered?
i. Was medical treatment rendered, if required?
(e) Any suggestions regarding recovery operations?
1
If the returnee was recovered via NAR methods, then the debrieng team MUST include a represen-
tative from J-3-N. If J-3-N is not present, and the returnee indicates that his recovery may have been
through non-conventional means, do not ask any questions regarding non-conventional recovery until the
J-3-N representative is present. Debriengs containing information pertaining to NAR methods must ini-
tially be protected at the TS/NF/OC/SAR level until evaluated by J-3-N.
154
S.14 Non-conventional assisted recovery (planned)
S.14 Non-conventional assisted recovery (planned)
The sequence of events during NAR occurs in four phases. These are contact, move, hide
and support, and return or crossover. these four phases may be repeated several times
before successful return to friendly control takes place. The questions in the following
sections have been grouped by phases and will be repeated as many times as necessary
to cover all aspects of the NAR.
a. Describe in your own words the sequence of events from the time you were directed
or decided to seek assistance in return to friendly control until you were nally
returned.
(a) What guided you to the contact area?
b. How were you made aware of the contact area?
(a) Technical communications? When, where and from whom?
(b) Pre-briefed with a contact plan and location? When, where, and from whom?
c. What route did you use to get to the contact area?
(a) Describe in detail. Movement actions, hold-up/hide sites, contact with other
evaders, contact with indigenous personnel, actions/activities observed en-
route.
(b) How did you locate the signal site and/or contact point upon arrival?
(c) What where your actions at the signal site and/or contact point? Describe in
detail.
i. Security procedures at signal site and/or contact point.
ii. Describe all activities in the vicinity of the signal site and/or contact point.
d. Contact Phase
(a) Describe actions at the contact point.
i. Who made contact? (Describe the group who made contact).
A. Military or civilian? Numbers and names if known. General appear-
ance? Uniforms?
B. Nationality if known. How many English speaking?
C. Armed or unarmed? If armed, what type?
ii. Describe the assisters initial security measures during the contact phase.
(I.E., search, silence, segregate, safeguard, and speed to the rear.)
A. Did they communicate with you on other than ISOPREP data? What
subjects? How?
B. Was there an obvious chain of command? Describe the leader(s)?
iii. What was said? (What instructions were you given?) Was a re-contact
plan established?
iv. When was contact made? (Approximate time). How much time elapsed
between of the activation signal and initiation of contact?
v. Where did contact take place?
vi. Why did you make contact with that individual(s)?
vii. How was contact initiated?
155
(b) Did you see any people in the area before contact? What were their actions?
(c) Describe any signals, loads, link-up procedures not mentioned previously.
i. Where?
ii. How?
iii. When?
iv. Describe any problems with the signal/loads.
(d) How was your identity authenticated? When and where?
(e) Did all actions happen as planned?
(f) Explain any problem areas.
e. Movement phase.
(a) Describe the sequence of events immediately following contact.
(b) How much time passed between contact and initial movement?
(c) Describe any known security measures used in the movement phase to protect
the assisters and evader. Examples could include blindfolding the evader,
masks, limited contact, disguises, guards, lookouts, cutouts, dead drops, re-
authorization, etc.
(d) Travel times, distances, routes, and methods of travel.
(e) Stops, hiding places, safe houses, with approximate time spent at each. Pre-
cise locations if known.
(f) Times you were handed over to the control of other groups or individuals and
how it was done.
(g) Were you aware of any radio, cellular phone, or other external communica-
tions?
(h) Did the assister(s) provide you with emergency procedures and/or re-contact
instructions?
f. Hide and support phase
(a) Medical aide.
(b) Water.
(c) Food.
(d) Clothing and bedding.
(e) Shelter.
(f) Sanitation and hygiene.
(g) Mental and physical occupation.
(h) Security measures employed at the hide site.
(i) Brieng on evader actions at the hide site.
(j) Emergency procedures and re-contact instructions.
(k) Were re-authentication procedures used any time you were passed between
individuals/groups?
(l) Explain your evader/assister(s) interaction and relationship.
i. Attitude toward you? NATO? Why? Did you get the feeling that anyone
disliked or mistreated you?
ii. What conversation subjects did they appear to like?
156
S.15 Unplanned contacts - describe/explain any unplanned contact(s)
iii. Did anything irritate them? What?
iv. Did you make any mistakes that irritated, worried, or alienated your as-
sister(s)?
v. Did the assister(s) do anything to irritate, worry or alienate you? What?
vi. How did you cope with your problems?
vii. Did you feel threatened? If so, explain.
viii. Did you help your assister(s) in any way?
(m) Prior to your mission had you received enough training to deal with non-
conventional assisted recovery? What would you change or add?
g. Return or crossover
(a) How were you returned to friendly control or crossed over between elements
during your evasion?
(b) Travel times, distances, routes, and methods of travel.
(c) Stops, hiding places, safe houses, with approximate time spent at each. Pre-
cise locations if known.
(d) How many times were you handed over to the control of other groups or in-
dividuals and how was it done? Were you re-authenticated each time? What
procedures were used for re-authentication?
(e) Other evaders encountered and observed?
(f) Were you aware of any radio, cellular phone, or other external communica-
tions during this phase?
(g) How did the assister(s) get you to friendly forces?
(h) Could you have survived and evaded on your own?
(i) After the assister(s) delivered you to the control of a denitive recovery force
(under friendly control), did you discuss any details about the assistance you
had received to that point? What details did you discuss? With whom?
(j) Is there anything else you think may be important to tell us at this time?
S.15 Unplanned contacts - describe/explain any unplanned
contact(s)
a. Those contacts not resulting in assistance:
(a) Who? Personal description/perception?
(b) Where? Be as precise as possible.
(c) Time of contact?
(d) How did you break contact and what were your actions immediately after?
S.16 On-scene military forces
In case recovery was assisted by military forces that happened to be in your area.
a. On scene forces:
157
(a) Who were they?
(b) How many?
(c) What were they doing in the area?
(d) What contact procedures were used?
(e) How were you treated?
(f) How were you transported back (to your unit)?
b. Local Populace Assistance
(a) Describe initial contact.
i. How contact occurred; (i.e., accidental, selective, capture, etc.).
A. Where? Be as precise as possible.
B. Time of day?
(b) Describe your assisters:
i. Who were they? Provide detailed description of individual(s).
A. Name(s).
B. Features.
C. Age, height, weight.
ii. What was their motivation for providing assistance?
A. Opportunistic?
Sympathetic individual or group motivated by political goals, reli-
gious conviction, and/or hatred of a common enemy.
Reward motivation (i.e. greedy individuals, criminals, smugglers,
kidnappers, and mercenaries).
Independent resistance movement.
B. Accidental contact with evader in which aid was rendered. Describe
in detail.
C. Acts of mercy - sought by evader/isolated person?
D. Attitude - cautious, bold, meek, fearless, fearful, pro-NATO., anti-NATO,
but hates enemy worse?
E. Likelihood of helping other Americans.
F. Capability of helping other Americans?
G. Security measures to prevent detection?
H. Attitude toward you personally?
iii. What form of aid did you receive?
iv. Did you use your blood chit? How many times? If so, explain in detail.
Describe how the assister reacted to the blood chit.
v. Did you make any promises? If so, explain in detail. Did the assisters
demand or request anything?
vi. Howdid this group/individual help get you to friendly forces? Give details.
A. How long did it take?
B. Could you have survived without this help?
C. Could you have returned without help?
158
S.17 Unassisted recovery
S.17 Unassisted recovery
In the case the evader/isolated person reached friendly forces/neutral territory on his/her
own.
a. Describe in detail.
b. Where and how contact was made.
c. Precautions used.
S.18 Any problems?
a. Lessons Learned
b. Was anything classied, to your knowledge, compromised?
(a) What information/equipment was compromised?
(b) When was the information/equipment compromised?
(c) Where was the information/equipment compromised?
(d) Could the compromise have been prevented?
(e) How could future missions prevent the occurrence from repeating?
c. How well did your prior SERE training prepare you for this incident? Discuss
d. Was there any particular SERE course or Theater specic SERE/PR preparation pro-
vided which proved to be more helpful? Discuss
e. Do you feel that the time interval between training and the actual incident: ac-
ceptable, unacceptable, too long, etc.? Discuss
f. Had you done any outside readings in subject areas associated with SERE? If so,
what?
g. Had you done any research prior to the incident? If so, what type?
h. Had you adequately prepared yourself for such an incident? Discuss
i. Had you adequately prepared your family/loved-ones for such an eventuality? Dis-
cuss
j. Was there anything left undone or unsaid prior to this mission, which caused you
concern? Discuss
k. Did you adequately sanitize yourself and your equipment prior to the mission?
Discuss
l. With this experience behind you, what, if anything, will you do to better prepare
yourself for another such incident? Explain
Continuity PR training task list
159
Annex T
Continuity PR training task list
In theatre training of personnel is an essential part of PR SOP and includes Briengs,
Command Post Exercise (CPX) and Live Exercise (LIVEX). JPRC / PRCC is responsible
for distributing and keep updated PR-brief to be given personnel divided in levels in
order to make sure individuals and organisation levels understand their responsibility
in fullling the different PR task in order to affect the recovery of personnel in the AO:
The training could as a minimum include following.
a. All personnel - Common PR brief in order to understand own responsibility as
potential isolated person objective:
(a) Basic knowledge concerning PR
(b) Understand own responsibility in order to affect own recovery and minimise
the risk for others
(c) Inform about PR system/assets in place
b. HRIE personnel - Procedures brieng for Personnel who will have access to SPINS
and write ISOPREP and EPA
(a) Understand PR system
(b) Understand how to support own recovery
(c) Ability to use different methods for authentication
(d) Understand and have ability to act i.a.v. SPINS
c. Extraction forces - Procedures brieng and training including training with as-
signed Rotary Wing (RW).
(a) Understand PR system
(b) Ability to use different methods for authentication
(c) Understand and have ability extract personnel i.a.w. SPINS
d. C
2
and Staff Brieng and training including CPX.
(a) Staff responsibility in a PR operation.
(b) Make individual staff member understand their responsibility in order to af-
fect recovery of personnel within the AO.
The training should be validated through CPX and LIVEX in order to make sure that both
the human and the technical systems work the way they are supposed to.
160
161
Volume II
HELICOPTER BORNE
RECOVERY FORCE OPERATOR
GUIDE
GENERAL
163
Chapter 1
GENERAL
1.1 Introduction
0101. The purpose of Volume II is to standardise all Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
(TTPs) used in a Personnel Recovery Task Force (PRTF) from the recovery forces point of
view. It contains those planning elements relevant to the preparation and execution of
the Personnel Recovery (PR) mission. Since the recovery force operates in the same envi-
ronment as the isolated personnel, it is essential that they are familiar with all aspects
of this publication. Operators PR planning is conducted along the ve essential PR tasks.
1.2 Command and control
0102. The baseline for Command and Control (C
2
) is given in the Communication Plan
(COMPLAN) as part of the Air Tasking Order (ATO) and Special Instructions (SPINS).
1.3 PR SOP and SPINS
0103. Operations are conducted in accordance with the PR Concept of Operation (CONOPS)
produced by the Joint Personnel Recovery Cell (JPRC). Further details on execution of
air centric PR missions will be found in the PR SPINS.
1.4 Mission abort
0104. All levels of command can recommend mission abort. The authority to abort
rests with Joint Force Commander (JFC) / Component Commander (CC), On Scene Commander
(OSC) and Rescue Mission Commander (RMC).
1.5 Liaison authority
0105. All participating units are granted direct liaison authority with the JPRC / Per-
sonnel Recovery Coordination Cell (PRCC).
164
1.6 Risk mitigation
1.6 Risk mitigation
0106. Efforts should be made to mitigate the risk associated with the execution of
recovery operations. These risks can be mitigated through;
a. Proper route planning to avoid threat areas and utilise terrain cover wherever
possible.
b. Proper (task) force composition.
c. Operational Security (OPSEC) measures.
PR OPERATION
165
Chapter 2
PR OPERATION
0201. Pre-emptive planning is preparatory work, conducted before an incident occurs,
which facilitates the recovery of potential isolated personnel. Every PR unit will set up
its own operations room upon arrival in the Area of Operations (AO). In combined opera-
tions nations may only provide elements of a PRTF and a multi-national operations room
will be required. To facilitate proper C
2
with the JPRC / PRCC, a checklist of the minimum
requirements of a PR unit ops-room in given in Annex A. Every PR unit should provide
the JPRC / PRCC with the appropriate information regarding their assets (numbers, ca-
pabilities, disposition etc.) as requested. The units should also have prepared maps and
documentation in accordance with the SPINS for the operation. Finally the operators
should be as familiarised with the terrain, weather and general threat conditions in the
AO as possible.
0202. Once a PRTF is designated, an internal PRTF Standard Operating Procedure
(SOP) should be developed to facilitate planning and execution of a PR mission. A tem-
plate of such an SOP is given in Annex M on page 221.
2.1.1 Preparation and planning
0203. Successful PR operations depend on diligent preparation and planning by all
members of the recovery force: command and control, recovery forces, and the potential
isolated personnel. Potential isolated personnel should be familiar with the current
SPINS for their AO to increase their chance for being successfully recovered. The PR
SOP are a primary source of information from which isolated personnel can derive their
preparation and planning. They are developed and coordinated by the JPRC and issued
in order to provide potential isolated personnel and recovery forces with instructions
to successfully prosecute PR missions. The overall PR SOP is detailed in the SPINS and
will provide the isolated personnel with critical information regarding available types
of recovery forces and procedures. Although SPINS are normally issued in support of
aviation operations, they are equally applicable to all participants in a NATO operation
who have the potential to become isolated and are eligible to receive PR.
0204. Figure 2.1 depicts a generic overview of the RMCs planning process. Once tasked
by the JPRC / PRCC the RMC will start his planning. In this process he will determine
whether he has suitable assets and suitable conditions to execute the mission. If not, he
needs to immediately inform the JPRC / PRCC to coordinate how to mitigate the encoun-
tered problems. At the end of his planning process, the RMC will brief the JPRC / PRCC
166
2.2 Report
and receives launch approval. He will then brief the PRTF and execute the mission after
receiving the execute order from the execute authority.
2.2 Report
0205. Initial notication of a PR requirement is likely to come from the JPRC / PRCC
through a Search And Rescue Incident Report (SARIR). It is imperative that the SPINS
authentication data current at the time of the incident is frozen for all PR efforts as-
sociated with that incident (authentication data, codewords, Search And Rescue Dot
(SARDOT), Search And Rescue Numeric Encryption Grid (SARNEG), etc.). This informa-
tion must be annotated on the SARIR that will be distributed in turn to the PR units. Any
asset that becomes aware of isolated personnel must notify the JPRC / PRCC as soon as
possible.
2.3 Locate
0206. Time, effort and lives can be lost if the isolated personnels exact location is not
accurately veried in a reasonable amount of time. Therefore the critical task is to
locate or conrm the location of the isolated personnel. Normally the location of the
isolated personnel will be conducted by stand-off electronic means. Dependent on the
risk / threat in the area the search may be conducted by the PRTF itself if other means
that have more stand-off and / or covert ways to locate the isolated personnel are not
available.
a. Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver derived and reported coordinates (nor-
mally the most accurate).
b. Isolated personnel reported position.
c. Friendly forces visual observation.
2.4 Support
0207. A PRTF will typically not play a role in the support of isolated personnel. As soon
as the isolated personnel is/are located an OSC may be appointed to provide communi-
cation support to the isolated personnel. If the isolated personnel needs to be supplied
(e.g. food or survival equipment) this will typically be executed by transport aircraft not
part of the PRTF.
2.5 Recover
0208. The JPRC / PRCC will start the risk analysis while the search is ongoing, but
formal mission planning will only start after this phase is completed. This analysis is
implicit in the mission planning cycle and the results will determine both the composi-
tion of the PR package and the conduct of the PR mission. The JPRC / PRCC is however
likely to issue a warning order in the form of a partial (not complete) PRTF-message
document, which can be found in Annex E.4 on page 79.
PR OPERATION
167
JPRC / PRCC
RMC
PIanning
SuitabIe assets
SuitabIe conditions
AII Green
GO/
NO GO
NO
NO
YES /NO
Mission Briefing
Execution
EvaIuation
Launch approvaI
Execute approvaI
Figure 2.1: RMC decision cycle
0209. The PRTF may thus start its planning process simultaneously as depicted in g-
ure 2.1, based on the information available, but formal tasking will be part of the next
phase. Should the RMC conclude that the available assets or conditions are not suitable
for the mission he should inform the JPRC / PRCC through the PRTF-message immediately
to let them re-plan / re-assess the mission. As soon as the RMC has nished his planning
he should inform the JPRC / PRCC through a completed PRTF-message. Subsequently the
RMC may receive launch approval from the JPRC / PRCC if applicable. All exchange of
information between the JPRC / PRCC and the possible PRTF will be done through the
JPRC / PRCC-message document. When the mission is cleared for execution, most items
must be known and clear to both the JPRC and PRTF. The actual execution may only be
conducted after receiving the execute order from the execute authority. This should be
done not later then leaving the rendez-vous point.
0210. When PRTF recovery is not suitable because of threat, recovery vehicle limita-
tions etc, ground recovery can be taken into account. In this situations, extraction for-
ces may be tasked for ground recovery. Extraction force starts its planning process as
tasked by JPRC / PRCC. Extraction force mission planning guide (Annex O to volume II)
should be used during mission planning.
2.5.1 Assets / PRTF composition
0211. PR options may include single or multiple recovery aircraft, additional xed
and/or rotary wing air assets, conventional and/or unconventional ground elements,
surface or subsurface naval assets, or any combination thereof. If the PRTF is a com-
plex formation of dissimilar type aircraft and / or multi-national composition, the RMC
should be experienced in leading such formations.
168
2.5 Recover
Recovery vehicles The recovery vehicles will eventually pick up the isolated person-
nel. Recovery vehicles will be transport helicopters with the capacity to transport
the extraction forces and the isolated personnel to be rescued. The decision to
use one or more recovery vehicles is dependent on the tactical situation and the
number and physical condition of the isolated personnel. Multi-ship operations
may enhance combat effectiveness by providing mutual support and a back-up re-
covery capability. Depending on the threat, recovery vehicles should be equipped
with the appropriate passive and active defensive aids. A checklist for the recovery
vehicles is at Annex H.
Extraction forces The Extraction Force (EF) is the integral part of the recovery vehicle
team that will deplane the recovery vehicle in the Pick-Up Zone (PUZ) to identify
and a authenticate the isolated personnel, provide initial medical care and bring
the isolated personnel to the recovery vehicle. The EF may also be required to inl-
trate, exltrate and engage in combat to ensure the safety of the isolated personnel
and the whole PRTF.
RESCORT will neutralise any threat enroute and at the objective area. It may in-
clude xed and/or rotary wing attached and detached options. A checklist for Res-
cue Escort (RESCORT) crews is at Annex G. Tactics and procedures for use by the
RESCORT assets are included at Annex 3.
RESCAP will neutralise any enemy aircraft and will ensure a local air superiority. The
relative position of Rescue Combat Air Patrol (RESCAP) assets is determined by the
needs of the forces along the intended ingress/egress route or at the objective area.
The Airborne Mission Coordinator (AMC) should ensure de-coniction between the
RESCAP and other Task Force aircraft.
SEAD will neutralise any enemy ground to air radar systems on a certain pre-determined
route. This route should be carefully co-ordinated through the JPRC / PRCC.
Fire support / Suppression assets will be used as necessary to create a threat en-
vironment that enables recovery. The OSC/RMC will plan these strikes and then,
through the AMC, coordinate their execution. The OSC/RMC must decide how close
to the objective strikes may occur, based on weapon types and effects. If the loca-
tion of the isolated personnel is not known exactly, any suppressive strikes must
be executed with extreme caution to prevent hitting the isolated personnel by ac-
cident. If able, the isolated personnel should assist in directing strikes in his close
proximity.
Mission support Supporting assets such as tankers, jammers, Forward Arming and
Refuelling Point (FARP) etc. may be also added to a PRTF dependent on the circum-
stances under which a PR mission is to be conducted.
2.5.2 Mission planning and brieng
0212. The mission planning process for the PRTF is conducted in a number of steps.
The RMC should delegate several tasks to other members of the PRTF. A task delegation
sheet that contains all general planning points is given in Annex L. In some cases there
may not have been the opportunity to have the recovery vehicle and RESCORT crews plan
and brief together. In such cases the lead of the recovery vehicle(s) may need to brief
the RESCORT while airbourne joining up. Then the recovery vehicle lead may use the
brieng format as given in Annex Q. Risk mitigation considerations should be part of
planning to prevent unduly risk to the PRTF, the isolated personnel and others.
PR OPERATION
169
2.6 Execution
0213. As soon as the PRTF is set-up and briefed, execution should commence as follows.
2.6.1 Enroute procedures
0214. Enroute recovery and RESCORT formation procedures and patterns for both Ro-
tary Wing (RW) and Fixed Wing (FW) aircraft are described in Annex 3. Whenever nec-
essary, a FARP could be planned either before or after the recovery as described in Annex
R.
0215. Formation ight procedures can also be found in ATP-49 Vol II chapter 6.
2.6.2 Rendezvous point
0216. When the PRTF assets are not co-located, different elements or sections will ren-
dezvous at the Rendezvous Point (RV). Unless otherwise stated in the mission scenario
or situation dictates, take-off time should be adjusted to coordinate rendezvous time
with RESCORT aircraft and / or arrival at RV. Authentication of the isolated personnel
and the 15-line brief by the appropriate OSC or detached RESCORT has to be nished
before the PRTF leaves the RV unless special conditions exist. If execute authority has
not yet been granted by the PRCC, the PRTF should not proceed beyond the RV.
2.6.3 RV to IP
0217. The route from RV to Initial Point (IP) can be planned and executed using spider
points that are dened in the SPINS. When the RMC decides to perform a route change
during this phase, he can do this using other spider points.
0218. From RV to IP, a sweep can be executed by the detached RESCORT, so that the
recovery vehicles and attached RESCORT can be cleared to progress using the pre planned
spider points.
0219. Upon arrival at the Objective Area (OA), the RESCORT can assume all responsi-
bilities as OSC. When the recovery vehicles arrive at the IP, they should hold outside
the OA until cleared to proceed by the OSC. RMC will then order the recovery vehicles to
execute the pickup. If no RESCORT is available, the recovery vehicles will assume OSC
responsibilities on arrival at the OA.
2.6.4 Communication procedures
0220. Prior to execution, the RMC will ensure all required PRTF sections are on the
correct isolated personnel recovery frequency. As a minimum, RESCORT and recovery
vehicles will monitor the primary recovery frequency. The RMC will announce execute
on the primary frequency.
2.6.5 Objective area procedures
0221. The OA ow, de-coniction and communications procedures will be dictated by
the tactical situation, terrain and PRTF assets. The following examples provide a guide-
line for possible objective area procedures, but should not be regarded as the only solu-
tion. These procedures should be modied as required by the situation at the time. For
170
2.6 Execution
readability purposes, in this document the recovery vehicles are described as Rescue 11
and 12, the RESCORT as Gun 1 and 2.
0222. Dependent on the situation and the time required for the EF to locate, authen-
ticate and prepare the isolated personnel for the ight to safety, the recovery vehicles
may leave the Landing Zone (LZ) and move to a nearby holding area for safety reasons.
Once the EF is ready they will subsequently call the recovery vehicles to pick them up.
OA procedures without RESCORT
0223. If no RESCORT is available, the recovery vehicle lead will become the RMC. The
RMC should carry out the nal authentication of the isolated personnel and ask for an
appropriate signal when approaching the Pick-Up Point (PUP).
0224. Having located the isolated personnel, the recovery vehicles can determine a
suitable Landing Site (LS) or pickup procedure and will provide their own mutual sup-
port. Rescue 11 could conduct a low pass over the PUP, in order to conrm the location
of the isolated personnel and may attempt to draw Opposing Forces (OPFOR) re. Res-
cue 11 can then relay the location and relative position to Rescue 12. After conrming
the PUP and the isolated personnels location, Rescue 11 will proceed into an overhead
pattern. Rescue 12 can continue inbound and land at the site of the isolated personnel
and proceed with recovery. Alternatively, Rescue 11 may land immediately, followed by
Rescue 12.
0225. If Rescue 11 has not positively located the isolated personnel by the time Res-
cue 12 is at PUP, Rescue 12 may join Rescue 11 in the overhead pattern until a positive
location is acquired. Once a positive location has been acquired, Rescue 12 may proceed
to land in the PUP. Once on the ground, the EF may disembark Rescue 12 and move to
the isolated personnel. The EF may perform nal authentication of the isolated person-
nel and will move back to Rescue 12. Rescue 11 may remain in the overhead pattern
providing situational awareness, security and overwatch (ready to re).
0226. In the event the EF are not immediately enroute back to Rescue 12 with the
isolated personnel within a pre briefed time of wheels down on the PUP, Rescue 12 can
join Rescue 11 in the overhead Combat Air Patrol (CAP) until Rescue 12 is called back in
for pick up at the PUP. At that time Rescue 12 may land immediately and begin recovery
of the EF and isolated personnel.
0227. If deemed necessary, and if the situation allows, both recovery vehicles may land
at the PUP. Take off may be in the same order as landing. If both recovery vehicles have
to land in the PUP due to the situation, but the PUP allows only one helicopter to land,
Rescue 11 may land rst, drop off the EF and take off again. Rescue 12 may land and
stay in the PUP until it has picked up the EF again. Afterwards Rescue 11 may land
again and may pick up all remaining EF.
0228. If radio contact is lost, the EF on the ground may signal for extraction with
appropriate pre briefed signalling devices. When the EF are forced to use a different
PUP for extraction, the extraction point may be marked with smoke (preferred) or with
a panel marker for day operations and a swirling IR chemlight, Buzzsaw (preferred) or
InfraRed (IR) strobe.
0229. Before takeoff, a signal should be made (radio call, light signal etc.) to warn
the other assets that the aircraft is lifting. If necessary, a departure heading or sector
should also be passed for de-coniction. Once airborne, the recovery vehicles should
rejoin in formation for the egress.
OA procedures with RW RESCORT
PR OPERATION
171
0230. Upon reaching the IP, Rescue 11 and Rescue 12 should hold in order to allow the
RESCORT to push forward to the OA. GUN 1 should proceed into the OA to authenticate
of the isolated personnel and assume OSC responsibilities.
0231. Gun 1 can proceed across the PUP and attempt to positively locate the isolated
personnel by both visual or thermal means and determine if the objective is cold or hot.
0232. At IP inbound, Gun 2 can continue to provide RESCORT until the recovery vehicles
are in the OA.
0233. After the RESCORT has neutralised any OPFOR threat and determined the OA to
be cold, Gun 1 can clear Rescue 11 and 12 into the OA. The recovery procedures may
take place as outlined in the paragraph above.
0234. The RESCORT may take up positions to provide over watch and security or main-
tain a mobile patrol.
OA procedures with FW detached RESCORT
0235. Detached RESCORT may have Tactical Control (TACON) over the PRTF, if ap-
pointed as RMC.
0236. If the xed wing detached RESCORT lead is not trained to execute RMC duties,
the attached RESCORT or recovery vehicles lead may take the RMC role.
0237. After the xed wing detached RESCORT has determined the objective to be cold,
or after it has neutralised any OPFOR threat, the PRTF may be called in.
0238. The recovery procedures may take place again as outlined in paragraph 2.6.5.
OPFOR threat and reaction in the OA
a. Reactions should always be according to the Rules of Engagement (ROE). No re
areas, free re areas and coordination areas will be dened for every possible
scenario within a radius of 1000 meters. Specic sectors can be assigned to re-
covery, RESCORT or EF. Outside this radius of 1000 meters, the detached RESCORT
is responsible. The OSC can at any moment amend these procedures, considering
the specic condition or situation. Call For Fire (CFF) can be done by distance and
heading from a certain position, or by the use of laser pointers. Procedures will be
briefed by the RMC and EF. Asset armament limitations as well as the fragmenta-
tion envelope of specic weaponry must always be taken into account. Regardless
the RESCORT available, if Rescue 12, while in the PUP, receives OPFOR re that can
not be suppressed by the EF nor Rescue 11s or 12s door gunners, Rescue 11 and 12
will depart while the RMC organises suppression and neutralisation of the OPFOR
threat, based on calls from the recovery vehicles or the EF. Once the PUP is secure,
Rescue 12 will land for extraction of the EF and isolated personnel. If the OPFOR
threat can not be suppressed, the RESCORT will assist with a break in contact and
provide covering re for the EF and isolated personnel as they move to an alternate
PUP.
b. If artillery re begins to impact the PUP while EF are still in the OA, they must
immediately collapse back to Rescue 12 for extraction and departure.
c. If Rescue 12 goes down in the PUP, RESCORT will assist in suppression of the OPFOR.
Rescue 11 will provide covering re for Rescue 12 and friendly forces to egress
away from the OPFOR. Rescue 11 may land and extract Rescue 12s crew and all
friendly forces on the ground. Rescue 11 will then egress and return to base.
172
2.6 Execution
d. Asset armament limitations as well as the fragmentation envelope of specic weaponry
have always to be taken into account.
EF employment
a. Timing calls: EF will be given time calls as required (e.g. cross Forward Line Own
Troops (FLOT), etc.).
b. If chemlights are used to indicate a PUP, deploy one per side per aircraft to min-
imise the confusion of where each aircraft will land. If landing as a formation, the
lead aircraft will land as indicated and others will land as briefed.
c. The type and sequence of aerial insertion and extraction needed, will be coordi-
nated between the ight engineer/aerial gunner and the pilots. Use of hoist, rope
or rappel and the desired altitude will be briefed.
d. Signalling methods and No Radio (NORDO) procedures between EF members and
the recovery vehicles Commander will coordinated and briefed for each mission.
2.6.6 ISOPREP authentication procedures
0239. Normally isolated personnel in a hostile environment will not receive assistance
until their identity has been authenticated. To facilitate isolated personnel authentica-
tion, unit intelligence personnel will assist Personnel member in preparing an Isolated
Personnel Report (ISOPREP) form. This assistance will be completed thoroughly because
of the importance of a correct ISOPREP. A copy of deployed personnel ISOPREPs will be
controlled in accordance with the PR SOP.
0240. Personnel review their ISOPREP form prior to every mission. The JPRC / PRCC
must maintain a copy of any units ISOPREP le that does not have the capability to
transmit secure data within 30 minutes of an incident.
0241. Otherwise, ISOPREP information should be passed to JPRC / PRCC by the fastest
electronic secure means. ISOPREP information must be available to all players involved
in a PR mission within 30 minutes after initial notication of a PR incident.
Authentication procedures
0242. An effective authentication system is essential for protection of PR forces from
OPFOR entrapment and successful recovery of isolated personnel. To achieve this objec-
tive, authentication information must be used in a manner that maintains security and
durability over a long period of time.
Authentication procedures and techniques
0243. Immediate authentication of isolated personnel may be accomplished by an OSC
using the PR authentication code PR word / letter / number / colour, published in the
SPINS. The SPINS may give directions on who is to use which authentication method.
These directions are to be adhered to closely to prevent duplicate use of authentication
codes and thus become compromised. To maintain security, personnel should only carry
the PR authentication codes for their on station time, as written in the ATO. These codes
remain valid for the duration of evasion until recovered. Since recoveries may involve
PR OPERATION
173
multiple isolated personnel, it may be necessary to use the same PR authentication codes
many times. To increase durability, the OSC should avoid asking isolated personnel for
the complete PR word or number. Simple creative questions may allow same PR word
and number to be used many times.
0244. Usage of SARNEG will be described in detail in the PR SPINS.
2.6.7 Egress routing
0245. Egress via briefed egress route which is different from the ingress route. In case
of emergency, reverse routing can be used. All applicable enroute contingencies apply.
2.7 Reintegrate
0246. On completion of the Execution phase of the PR operation, the isolated person-
nel should be taken to a pre-assigned medical facility for reintegration. Plans should be
exible enough to allow for changing medical and operational requirements. It is im-
perative that recovery forces are debriefed at the earliest opportunity. The JPRC / PRCC
should be informed as soon as possible by the RMC about the outcome of the operation
with a PRTF report. The format of this report should be found in the SPINS. Lessons
identied / learned from the recovery forces should be forwarded to the JPRC and dis-
seminated to all appropriate force levels.
174
2.7 Reintegrate
Formation ights and RESCORT patterns
175
Chapter 3
Formation ights and RESCORT
patterns
3.1 RW RESCORT types of formations
0301. All distances and angles mentioned in this Annex are indicative. Actual details
are dependent on the situation and are to be briefed by the formation leader
1
.
3.1.1 Combat cruise
0302. The sections will y staggered left (approx. 45) with a separation of 200m within
the section. The separation between the sections is 300m. For Night Vision Goggles
(NVG) operations, it is mandatory that all helicopters within an element are visual with
each other. The lead of the second element has to maintain visual contact with the
wingman of the rst element. If visual contact can not be maintained between the
elements, separation between elements will be effected by a xed distance, which can
be checked by xed calls on prepared points (e.g. spider points). Speed changes have to
be reported to all helicopters within the section. This procedure can also be applied to
keep separation between recovery vehicles and attached RESCORT.
3.1.2 Free cruise
0303. The basic formation is staggered left with a separation of 200m within the sec-
tion. Helicopters within an section, as well as the sections themselves are free to ma-
noeuvre approx. 30
o
right and left of each other. The distance between the sections will
be 400m.
0304. For NVG operations, it is mandatory that all helicopters within an section are
visual with each other. The lead of the second element has to maintain visual contact
with the wingman of the rst element. If visual contact can not be maintained between
the elements, or if deemed necessary, separation between elements will be effected by a
xed distance and xed speed, which can be checked by xed calls on prepared points
(e.g. spider points). Speed changes have to be reported to all helicopters within the
section. This procedure can also be applied to keep separation between recovery vehicles
and attached RESCORT.
1
These formation procedures should be copied from ATP-49 Helicopters in Land Operations. Given the
currently ongoing revision of ATP-49 the current text will be kept for the time being. Upon release of a new
version of ATP-49 these procedures are to be replaced by a reference to ATP-49.
176
3.2 Enroute contingencies
(a) Combat cruise
(b) Free cruise

Figure 3.1: RW (RESCORT) formations
3.2.1 Blind
0305. When an a/c within an element or section calls blind
2
, all a/c of this element
or section will go Flashlight (landing lights for day and IR searchlight for night, both
straight down) and go Yardstick (Air to Air Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN)) when
equipped with a TACAN. After calling blind, the other aircraft will:
a. If it has the blind aircraft in sight, call visual and clock position from blind
aircraft with a distance.
b. If the second aircraft is also blind, and the lead has full situational awareness
(yardstick, terrain, funnelling or maintaining lateral separation via heading or
range/bearing from a common point), lead will call Continue and include a head-
ing.
c. If the lead has limited situational awareness or blind was unexpected, the lead will
call Execute Blind and execute altitude de-coniction blind procedures. If visual
is regained on another formation member, visual aircraft can be cleared to rejoin.
3.2.2 Altitude de-coniction procedures
0306. In case of a two ship, Lead (regardless of position) remains below a reference
altitude. Wingman climbs to at least 200 above that reference altitude. Lead can call
2
Brevity words used in this paragraph are the standard brevity words that can be found in APP-7.
177
barometric altitude if necessary. (Exception: during PUP operations if unable to remain
in the PUP the pick-up aircraft will remain 300 AGL and below. Supporting aircraft will
climb to 500 AGL.)

Figure 3.2: Rejoin

0307. If rejoin cannot be accomplished prior to next way point, aircraft will remain in
altitude blocks, proceed to the next way point and make left turns at 60 KIAS until visual
is regained. See gure 3.2. Use overt lighting as required to assist in reacquisition.
0308. These de-coniction procedures are local procedures only. Real world missions
may dictate different procedures based on tactical situation.
0309. Rejoins: Unless otherwise pre-briefed, perform all rejoins at 60 KIAS and if turn-
ing 20
o
angle of bank.
3.2.3 Inadvertent IMC
NOTE:
0310. If national procedures dont allow crews to apply the procedures underneath, it
is not possible to y a multinational formation. In this case a physical separation will
be applied between the different national formations.
0311. If a crew goes inadvertent Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) their rst
concern is a/c control and warning of the rest of the formation: 1 IMC - break For each
mission, an emergency recovery will be planned to an aireld, the operating base, or a
recovery spot. For the operating base or recovery spot, a GPS approach will be developed
in case of an Instrument Flying Rules (IFR) emergency recovery and if no other means
are available.
IMC in OPFOR territory
0312. When a ight encounters inadvertent IMC and a/c go IMC in OPFOR territory
where no climb out is possible, the following procedure will apply:
a. A/C climb to Minimum Safe Altitude (MSA) and initiate inadvertent IMC procedure.
b. The last a/c decreases speed by 30 Knots (KTS), a/c 3 -20 KTS, a/c 2 -10 KTS from
the cruise speed. A/C 1 maintains its cruise speed.
178
c. On command of rst a/c, all a/c reverse track via procedure turn and y an airspeed
of 80 KTS.
d. Procedure turn consists of ying a track for one minute with a 30
o
offset followed
by a standard rate turn to get back on reversed track.
e. When reaching Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) conditions a/c proceed to
last Spider Point (SP) and continue the mission.
f. The rest of the formation, which is still under VMC will come to a stop or reverse
and proceed as ordered by the RMC. Options are to continue, split in smaller pack-
ages, or return to a holding area near the last SP for formation join up.
IMC in friendly territory
0313. When an a/c encounters inadvertent IMC in friendly territory when a climb out
is possible, the following procedure will apply:
a. All a/c in inadvertent IMC will start a climb and squawk emergency.
b. The lead a/c will call out his heading and altitude he will climb to the base altitude.
This altitude depends on the MSA and freezing level.
c. The second a/c will climb to leads altitude plus 500 and turns 20
o
away from lead,
d. The third a/c will climb to leads altitude plus 1000 and turns 40
o
away from lead.
e. The fourth a/c will climb to leads altitude plus 1500 and turns to 60
o
away from
lead.
f. On command of rst a/c all a/c reverse track via procedure turn and y an airspeed
of 80 KTS.
g. Procedure turn consists of ying a track for one minute with a 30
o
offset followed
by a standard rate turn to get back on reversed track.
h. When reaching VMC conditions a/c proceed to last SP and continue the mission.
i. The rest of the formation, which is still under VMC will come to a stop or reverse
and proceed as ordered by the RMC. Options are to continue, split in smaller pack-
ages, or return to a holding area near the last SP for formation join up.
j. If a/c can not regain VMC, they will rejoin the operating base for an emergency
recovery.
Lost wingman
0314. Lost Wingman procedures must be taken into account during the mission plan-
ning. Factors determining a continuation or cancellation of the mission are among oth-
ers: the availability of a Hot Spare; mission priority; threat level; lost wingman before-
or after execute, etc.
179
3.3 RW RESCORT
0315. The task of the armed helicopters is to protect the recovery vehicles by provid-
ing repower or showing presence to suppress or intimidate the OPFOR, so the recovery
vehicles can have a safe passage to the AO. The RESCORT can be detached or attached
RESCORT. The detached RESCORT will y 1 to 5 minute in front of the recovery vehicles
and y the same speed and same altitude or higher as the recovery vehicles. It needs to
be considered that using forward detached RESCORT can alert possible OPFOR. In order
to prevent this, the detached RESCORT can take an alternative route in the direct prox-
imity of the recovery vehicless route. The position of the attached RESCORT will depend
on the number of used Attack Helicopters (AHs), threat situation, terrain, environmen-
tal conditions and size of the whole Task Force (TF). The preferred tactic for attached
RESCORT will be rear RESCORT. In this case the AHs will y behind the recovery vehi-
cles. See gure 3.3. When the recovery vehicles are being engaged, the AHs manoeuvre
towards the threat to suppress the OPFOR.

Figure 3.3: Rear RESCORT
3.4 FW RESCORT patterns and procedures
Detached FW RESCORT. The following patterns and procedures are only conceivable
with fast movers. Detached FW RESCORT patterns include:
a. Medium altitude parallel. The medium altitude parallel is own along
ingress and egress routes in front of the recovery vehicle(s). The primary
purpose of this pattern is to clear the recovery vehicle(s) ight path. The
RESCORT aircraft will most likely not maintain sight of the recovery vehicle(s).
The pattern can be own at different altitudes and airspeeds.
b. Racetrack. Racetrack is a large oval pattern own with the recovery vehi-
cle(s) within the pattern. The pattern is own along the recovery vehicle(s)
route with RESCORT aircraft maintaining sight of the recovery vehicles. The
pattern may be own at different altitudes and airspeeds. (see Fig. 3.4)
c. Box pattern. Box pattern is similar to racetrack but with extended cross-
wind legs. This pattern may be own at different altitudes and airspeeds.
Attached FW RESCORT patterns include:
180
3.5 RW RESCORT tactics and procedures

Figure 3.4: Racetrack
a. Low Altitude chain pattern. Low altitude chain pattern is used for close
cover of a singleton or formation of recovery helicopters (see Fig 3.5a). The
RESCORT assets y essentially an oval shaped pattern around (a) moving re-
covery vehicle(s). Such a pattern is normally own between 500 and 2000
AGL but is not easily own by aircraft manoeuvring at speeds above 350 KIAS.
b. Race track. The race track pattern for attached RESCORT is the same basic
oval pattern as own for detached RESCORT (see Fig 3.4). The pattern may be
own with either the objective area or recovery vehicles in the centre, or be
offset to aid in visual look-out. This pattern is useful regardless of RESCORT
airspeed.
c. S-weave. The weave pattern involves FW RESCORT ying an S pattern in
relation to the recovery vehicle(s) ight path (g 3.5b). This pattern may be
own at varying altitudes and airspeeds.
3.5 RW RESCORT tactics and procedures
0316. The task of the AH is to protect the recovery vehicles by providing repower or
showing presence to suppress or intimidate the OPFOR, so the recovery vehicles can have
a safe passage to the OA. The RW RESCORT can be detached or attached RESCORT.
Detached RW RESCORT. The detached RW RESCORT is to clear the ingress route and
monitor OPFOR avenues of approach into the OA. The detached RW RESCORT will
y 1 to 5 minute in front of the recovery vehicles and y the same speed and same
altitude or higher as the recovery vehicles. It needs to be considered that using
forward detached RW RESCORT can alert possible OPFOR. In order to prevent this,
the detached RESCORT can take an alternative route in the direct proximity of the
recovery vehicless route.
Attached RW RESCORT. The attached RW RESCORT is to provide close-in protection to
the recovery vehicles. The position of the attached RW RESCORT will depend on the
number of used AHs, threat situation, terrain, environmental conditions and size
of the whole PRTF. For Night Vision Device (NVD) operations, it is mandatory that
all helicopters within an element are visual with each other. The lead of the second
181

(a) Daisy chain

(b) S-weave
Figure 3.5: Attached FW RESCORT patterns
element has to maintain visual contact with the wingman of the rst element. If
visual contact can not be maintained between the elements, or if deemed necessary,
separation between elements will be effected by a xed distance and xed speed,
which can be checked by xed calls on prepared points (e.g. spider points). Speed
changes have to be reported to all helicopters within the section. This procedure
can also be applied to keep separation between recovery vehicles and attached RW
RESCORT.
0317. The preferred tactic for attached RESCORT will be rear RESCORT as ex-
plained above.
3.6 RESCORT patterns in the objective area
0318. As detailed in 3.3, at least one AH will keep rear RESCORT in order to provide
security for the recovery vehicles at all time. Also in the objective area, this AH will
stay in rear cover, hovering behind the recovery vehicles to provide constant cover. If
however, more AH are available as RESCORT, the following RESCORT patterns may be
used in the OA as hover cover
Wheel. Wheel is a circular pattern own with the objective area or recovery vehicles
normally at the centre. The wheel may be own at varying altitudes and airspeeds.
Figure 8. RW RESCORT gure 8 pattern is the same as the xed wing except that the
pattern may cover less area around the objective area or recovery vehicles. He-
licopters with forward ring ordnance may require higher altitudes during the
pattern.
182
3.6 RESCORT patterns in the objective area

(a) Wheel

(b) Figure-8
Figure 3.6: Attached FW RESCORT patterns
COMMUNICATIONS
183
Chapter 4
COMMUNICATIONS
4.1 General
0401. The JFC or a designated CC will publish a COMPLAN capable of supporting PR op-
erations. This COMPLAN will provide callsigns, frequencies, codewords, communication
formats etc. All deviations from this COMPLAN require coordination with the PRCC prior
start of the mission.
4.2 Radio communications
0402. Brevity communications will be used to the maximum extent possible. When-
ever appropriate, secure communications have to be applied all the time. When using
non secure communications, codewords and procedures will be used, such as Numerical
Encryption Grid (RAMROD), SARNEG, SARDOT, bulls eye, duress.
0403. The recovery force, as well as the survivor should authenticate as much as pos-
sible all new calls made to them, using word of day where possible.
0404. Diagrams of the communication structure both prior and after passing IP are
given in gures 4.1 on page 185 and 4.2 on page 185 respectively.
4.3 Necessary amount of frequencies
PUSH 1 (MHZ) 2 (MHZ) V (MHZ) PURPOSE CALLSIGN
X JPRC / PRCC OPS DESK ....
X X PR OPS DESK ....
X X X PRTF ....
X AMC-PR ....
X FARP ....
X X ISOL. PERS. ....
4.4 Communications checks
0405. Since communications are of vital importance in a PR operation, a possible way
to check the communications is described below:
TBD
184
4.5 Brevity words
4.4.1 Element/section lead initiates comm checks
0406. Obtain ATIS (if applicable) prior to the comm check. The ow for comm checks is:
UHF - VHF - PLS - HF - FM - Have Quick -Secure respond by position to inform the lead of
any communication or aircraft limitations not previously briefed after the comm check.
The EF commander needs to be included in the Comm Check.
0407. The lead then calls comm check complete For example:
Formation, check Uniform
2 - 3
Formation, check Victor
2 - 3
Formation, Comm check complete
4.4.2 Communications check continuation procedures
0408. Go through the complete communications check and do not trouble-shoot radios
until the lead calls comm check complete and directs trouble-shooting. Following the
communications check, push conform the Communications Card (COMCARD). A possible
COMCARD to use can be found in Annex P in paragraph P.2.
a. Call signs: The element/section will use the leads call sign for all communica-
tions concerning the ight. Intra-ight communications will use the individual
call signs, for example Brussels, which consists out of 1, 2 and 3 will proceed as
follows; Brussels, hook right 270 2 3
b. Push and Roll will be used for frequency changes and check-in. If ight lead pushes
the package on a certain frequency, aircraft will respond during rst check-in. If
ight lead rolls the package, an initial response from all aircraft is not required.
4.4.3 PLS check procedures
0409. Recovery vehicles need to check their Personal Locator System (PLS) prior to
departure.
4.5 Brevity words
Brevity words are short words to communicate procedures or information in a fast man-
ner. These brevity words can be used in planning or executing a PR mission. NATO
brevity words can be found in APP-7. An excerpt of most frequently used brevity words
can be found in Annex P.
COMMUNICATIONS
185
Legend
Different communication nets:
= PR 1
= PR 2
= SAR A / B
= AWACS C2 Iink JPRC /
PRCC
ISOP
AMC
(AWACS)
Recovery
vehicIes
RW RESCORT
FW RESCORT
OSC
RESCAP
Figure 4.1: Comms prior passing IP
Legend
Different communication nets:
= PR 1
= PR 2
= SAR A / B
= AWACS C2 Iink JPRC /
PRCC
ISOP
AMC
(AWACS)
Recovery
vehicIes
RW RESCORT
FW RESCORT
OSC
RESCAP
Extraction force
Figure 4.2: Comms after passing IP
186
4.5 Brevity words
TRAINING
187
Chapter 5
TRAINING
5.1 General
0501. Training is key to the effective execution of any mission. Appropriate basic PR
training should therefore be conducted at the peacetime home base of the unit. This
basic training is to be supplemented with AO specic training prior deployment and
upon arrival in the AO.
5.2 Pre-emptive training
0502. Units and operators should be trained for their respective missions in accor-
dance with relevant NATO procedures.
5.2.1 PRTF and extraction force training
PRTF training. PRTFs require appropriate training to ensure that they are familiar
with NATO PR TTPs and are familiar with NATO PR SOP / SOP / SPINS.
Extraction force training. The extraction team must be trained in the specic tasks
of PR as outlined in Annex S. It must be capable of providing security on the
ground, and have medical qualications appropriate to the potential nature of
medical conditions they may encounter. The team must train regularly as part
of full spectrum PR exercises.
5.2.2 Types of competencies
National participants, VMC conditions. This level of training allows the crew of a
PRTF to execute a PR missions under good weather, day-only conditions with only
national participants in the PR mission. Details are given in Annex S.
National participants, adverse conditions. This level of training allows the crew
of a PRTF to execute a PR missions under day and/or night adverse weather and
terrain conditions with only national participants in the PR mission. Details are
given in Annex S.
Multi-national participants, VMC conditions. This level of training allows the crew
of a PRTF to execute a PR missions under good weather, day-only conditions with
participants from different nations in the PR mission. Details are given in Annex
S.
188
5.3 Pre-deployment training
Multi-national participants, adverse conditions. This level of training allows the
crew of a PRTF to execute a PR missions under day and/or night adverse weather
and terrain conditions with participants from different nations in the PR mission.
Details are given in Annex S.
0503. Prior to deployment units should be fully prepared for their role in the upcoming
operation. Pre-deployment training should pay special attention to unfamiliar environ-
mental operating conditions (e.g. mountain ying).
5.4 In-the AO training
0504. This part of training includes terrain and weather familiarisation and familiari-
sation with the current SPINS and other units that could comprise a PRTF.
a. Validate the PR SOP.
c. Validate the calculated capabilities.
d. Adapt procedures to the AO. Continuation training in order to maintain opera-
tional readiness must be conducted by all elements of the PR organisation.
Helo ops set-up checklist
189
Annex A
Helo ops set-up checklist
a. Make inventory of available national assets and characteristics
b. Review location and back-up procedures for communications with JPRC / PRCC
c. Make inventory of available national assets and characteristics
d. Review location and back-up procedures for communications with JPRC / PRCC
e. Brief supporting personnel on their duties
f. Develop quick reference list of key personnel and phone numbers (i.e. JPRC / PRCC;
DetCos; Wing Ops Centre (WOC); Multinational Logistics Centre (MNLC), mainte-
nance chiefs etc.)
g. Establish procedures for after duty hour notication.
h. Collect all ISOPREP and Evasion Plan of Action (EPA) data
1
of the crews participat-
ing in the operation / exercise and centralize their storage.
i. Check radio equipment:
(a) Conduct familiarisation training for ops personnel
(b) Set-up secondary / mobility radios as required
(c) Develop and review frequency list and sweep
(d) Coordinate communication procedures with available facilities
j. Develop and display two wall charts:
(a) Assets board & maintenance status
(b) Incident / mission table
k. Draw and post the planning map with:
(a) Universal Transversal Mercator (UTM) designator letters
(b) Low level routes
(c) Spider points
(d) Tactical / Designated Area of Recoverys (DARs) / FARP areas
(e) Orbits / refueling tracks
(f) Reference points (SARDOT)
1
This may need to be re-accomplished one a month.
190
(g) Recovery resource locations (with type and numbers)
(h) FLOT and Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) when applicable
(i) Known OPFOR threats (received from intel)
(j) Transload locations
(k) HCP /waypoints
(l) Fire support coordination line
(m) Field hospitals
(n) OPFOR / friendly forces
(o) Airspace Control Measures (ACM)
(p) Current as of Date / Time Group (DTG)
l. Analyze the ATO for active operations areas (this analysis will be a major factor in
determining if follow-on activity is needed)
m. Separate the ATO package into general SPINS, PR SPINS and PR tasked missions
n. Set-up mission folders and miscellaneous worksheets
o. Set-up two message folders (incoming and outgoing). Divide the folders into clas-
sied and unclassied sections, with log sheets
p. Start, set-up procedures for maintaining a 24hr events log
q. Develop a work schedule
r. As needed, review:
(a) Authentication / encryption / decryption procedures
(b) Plotting of UTM / Geographical Reference (GEOREF) coordinates
(c) Plotting of TACAN radials and Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) (SARDOT/Bullseye)
(d) ATO / SPINS format and procedures
s. Start a mission log
Capabilities & equipment
191
Annex B
See also asset sheet in Annex ??
1
B.1 General
All PR platforms should have compatible communications. Recovery vehicles should be
capable of:
a. Deploying recovery personnel and equipment.
b. Communicating with isolated personnel and PRTF.
c. Locating and transporting recovered isolated personnel.
B.2 Recovery helicopters
The recovery helicopters and their crews should be capable of operating as part of a PRTF
in any given threat environment. In addition, an EF may be required in each recovery
vehicles to extract the isolated personnel. The recovery helicopter and crew should be
capable of:
a. Carrying personnel and related equipment capable of extracting isolated person-
nel.
b. Locating and authenticating the isolated personnel (e.g. operating a PLS, conform-
ing to Standard NATO Agreement (STANAG) 7007).
c. Executing a isolated personnel pick-up (potentially with a hoist) and transporting
a litter-borne patient. Self protection (e.g. operating with chaff and are equip-
ment, armour plating, component redundancy and self-defence weaponry).
d. Operating avionics, to include: precision navigation equipment, secure communi-
cations, Identication Friend or Foe (IFF) and a data-link system.
e. Operating in poor weather / low light level night conditions with equipment such
as: NVD and compatible lighting; IR devices and Terrain Avoidance System (TAS)
with Obstacle Warning Capability (OWC).
1
this information should be put into a table that links the type of equipment to the type or threat level
of the operation as depicted in Volume I Annex C on page 74.
192
B.3 Extraction force
In addition, it is highly desirable for recovery vehicles to have:
a. An Air to Air Refuelling (AAR) / Helicopter Aerial Refuelling (HAR) capability.
b. An Altitude Hover Hold System (AHHS) and a Hover InfraRed Suppression System
(HIRSS).
B.3 Extraction force
a. The EF must be trained and equipped to suit the mission, threat and environment
of the AO. The only essential equipment is self-protection and communication be-
tween the EF and the recovery vehicle. The skills and equipment presented here
represent samples not exhaustive lists of the possible skills and equipment
that MAY be required:
(a) Small unit (infantry) tactics and procedures.
(b) Insertion / extraction methods.
(c) Landing techniques such as:
(d) Fast-roping.
(e) Rappelling.
(f) Rope ladder.
(g) Hoist operations.
(h) Deploying into the water.
(i) Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Extraction (SERE).
(j) Rescue swimming.
(k) Authentication procedures.
(l) Intelligence Preparation of the Battleeld (IPB).
(m) Fire support request.
(n) Contact with the special or subsurface forces.
(o) Contact with isolated person.
(p) Interfacing with other special teams such as Army and Navy Special Forces
for quick integration.
(q) OSC procedures (EF leader is the OSC for ground operations).
(r) Combat engineer
(s) Mine clearing
(t) Combat medic
b. The EF equipment to perform this mission MAY could include (but is not limited
to):
(a) Light weight infantry rie.
(b) Pistol.
(c) Grenade launcher.
(d) Sub-machinegun (if required).
(e) Small calibre machine gun.
(f) Combat optical gun sight (both day and night).
193
(g) Combat optical gun sight reex.
(h) Binoculars.
(i) NVD.
(j) IR pointer.
(k) GPS receiver.
(l) Signalling devices.
(m) Communication systems.
B.4 RESCORT
Ideally, aircraft tasked for RESCORT role should:
a. Be equipped with multiple (redundant) and secure radios.
b. Be equipped with stand off sensors (IR / optical pods) to locate the isolated person-
nel and to track the recovery vehicles.
c. Be equipped with interoperable data-link.
d. Have A / A self defence capability.
e. Be able to carry A / G weapons, mixed load capable.
194
B.4 RESCORT
PR report formats
195
Annex C
PR report formats
C.1 Personnel Recovery Incident Report
1
Obtain the following information and pass it to JPRC / PRCC as it becomes available:
1 Time of report
2 Callsign. Whos reporting M
3 Authentication
4 Time of incident.
5 Exact location E
6 Type of vehicle
7 Way to identify vehicle (colour, ID)
8 Type (cause) of incident T
9 Hazards (re, mines, enemies) H
10 Access to the spot A
11 Number and status of isolated personnel N
12 Nationality
13 Emergency service required type of injuries E
14 Qualier / source.
15 Authentication of isolated personnel (Y / N and by what means).
16 Point of contact and means of communication.
1
This report is to replace the SARIR as still shown on the next page
196
C.2 SARIR
C.2 SARIR
1 DTG of report: Z
2 Callsign: Last contact frequency:
3 Aircraft type:
4 Nationality / unit:
5 Persons on board:
6 Location:
7 Location qualiers (circle as appropriate): Actual / last known / estimated position
land / water ejection / bailout altitude feet
8 Ejection / bailout winds at knots
9 DTG of incident Z
10 Cause of loss (circle as appropriate):
11 Interceptors, Surface to Air Missile (SAM), Anti Aircraft Artillery (AAA), collision,
malfunction, other:
12 Isolated personnel condition:
(a) Mobile?
(b) Injured?
(c) Concealed?
(d) Survival equipment?
(e) Signalling devices?
(f) Intentions?
13 Last voice contact at DTG.
(a) Freq / push with
(b) (Callsign)
14 Threat situation:
15 Friendly units on-scene:
16 Source of information:
17 Reported by:
18 RMC call sign:
PR report formats
197
C.3 PR 11-line report
As a minimum, the designated AMC uses this checklist to gather information and relay
it to the Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC), JPRC /PRCC, and the PRTF. All aircraft
should have this checklist available and use it as appropriate during a PR incident.
# Action Data
Command
2 Location .....
Source .....
Time* .....
No)
and by what means)
6 OSC / Bingo / Loadout / Point
Of Contact (POC) (Who is re-
porting and means of com-
munication)
7 # Chutes Seen
8 Cause of incident
b) .....
*CAUTION: Line 2 must include all three elements; location / source / time.
NOTE: For brevity, information should be given by reference to each checklist line
number (e.g.: Line 1: Sixpack 01; Line 2: 30 45N, 046 00E / Wingman / 1000Z; etc.). It is
crucial that line #2 always includes all three elements: Location, Source, and Time. The
JPRC / PRCC uses this information to discern the most accurate location. All players can
then reference the location of the survivor by the associated time and source to avoid
confusion.
C.4 PR mission message
a. Unit/POC
b. Isolated personnel
(a) Callsign
(b) Location
(c) Number of isolated personnel
198
C.4 PR mission message
c. Routing
d. Threat assessment
(a) Ingress route
(b) Isolated personnel location (area description)
(c) Egress route
e. PRTF mission package
f. Additional support requirements
g. Launch location
h. Launch weather
i. Estimate Time En-route (ETE) to isolated personnel
j. Ingress weather
k. AAR / HAR track / FARP location
l. Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) isolated personnel location (DTG)
m. Weather at isolated personnel location
n. Estimate time on station
o. Isolated personnel transload/recovery base
p. Re-entry location friendly territory
(a) Re-entry time (DTG)
(b) Re-entry altitude (ft amsl/agl)
(c) Re-entry heading (degrees)
q. ETA transload/recovery base (DTG)
r. Recovery base weather
s. Estimated mission complete time (DTG)
t. Commander assessment
u. ROEs
v. Go / no go
AMC responsibilities and checklist
199
Annex D
AMC responsibilities and
checklist
D.1 AMC responsibilities
a. Update JPRC / PRCC as frequent as possible.
b. Ensure isolated personnel is located and authenticated.
c. Coordinate rendezvous of the PRTF.
d. Request additional assets as required.
e. Coordinate PRTF communications connectivity.
f. Coordinate ow of PRTF assets to and from the objective area.
g. Coordinate asset re-fuelling including AAR / HAR, surface locations including mar-
itime, land vehicle refuel points and FARPs.
h. Monitor PR effort; provide coordination and assistance as required.
i. Update mission progress, threats and weather conditions to the PRTF and the JPRC.
j. Obtain launch approval.
k. Obtain execute approval.
l. Monitor PR code usage.
200
D.2 AMC checklist
D.2 AMC checklist
Notied by
Callsign
Accompanying A/C / vehicle callsign
Aircraft / vehicle type
Persons On Board (POB)
Location
Actual/last known/estimated
Time
Cause of crash (if known)
Bailout location (if applicable)
# of chutes seen (if applicable) seen by
Bailout altitude/winds (if applicable) ft. kts.
# of isolated personnel reported by
Crew position
Location
Condition
Last voice contact
Frequency
Situation (threat in area)
Authenticate survivor (and means used):
PR colour
PR word
PR letter
PR number
Pass authentication info to JPRC / PRCC.
OSC checklist
201
Annex E
OSC checklist
a. Authentication:
(a) Authenticate isolated personnel (SPINS authenticators, etc.).
(b) Conrm number of isolated personnel.
(c) Establish order of communications (multiple isolated personnel).
(d) Determine physical / psychological condition of isolated personnel.
(e) Determine / conrm OPFOR threat and local activity.
b. Location:
(a) Locate through electronic and / or visual means.
(b) Develop isolated personnel visual signal plan.
(c) Note PUP terrain description, elevation.
c. Threat suppression:
(a) Suppress immediate threats to the isolated person.
(b) Suppress threats that may affect recovery operations.
(c) Locate OPFOR positions.
(d) Pass all threat data to AMC.
d. Monitor PR code usage.
202
RMC responsibilities checklist
203
Annex F
RMC responsibilities checklist
a. Achieve OSC handover / approval.
b. Receive PRTF status brief from AMC.
c. Authentication:
(a) Authenticate isolated personnel (ISOPREP, etc.).
(b) Conrm number of isolated personnel.
(c) Establish order of communications (multiple isolated personnel).
(d) Determine physical / psychological condition of isolated personnel.
(e) Determine / conrm OPFOR threat and local activity.
d. Location:
(a) Locate through electronic and / or visual means.
(b) Develop isolated personnel visual signal plan.
(c) Note PUP terrain description, elevation.
e. Threat suppression:
(a) Suppress immediate threats to the isolated person.
(b) Suppress threats that may affect recovery operations.
(c) Locate OPFOR positions.
(d) Pass all threat data to AMC.
f. Pre-recovery:
(a) Pass 15-line brief to recovery vehicles, RESCORT (see Annex J).
(b) Direct isolated personnel to:
i. Prepare signalling devices but to use them only as briefed or when di-
rected by authenticated PR forces.
ii. Report threats.
iii. Vector recovery vehicles.
iv. Approach recovery vehicles when directed and follow their instructions.
g. Actions at PUP:
204
(a) Direct recovery vehicles as required to proceed from the IP to PUP.
(b) Direct isolated personnel signalling, or delegate isolated personnel control to
the recovery vehicles.
(c) If required, act as Airborne Forward Air Controllers (ABFACs) for RESCORT
overhead.
(d) Be prepared to vector recovery vehicles to safe area if immediate threat oc-
curs.
h. Egress i.a.w. plan once isolated personnel are on board the recovery vehicles.
i. Pass in ight report to AMC.
j. Monitor PR code usage.
RESCORT responsibilities checklist
205
Annex G
RESCORT responsibilities
checklist
a. Route:
(a) Fly detached or attached RESCORT pattern as dictated by RMC or as required
by threat.
(b) Use sensors for threat assessment and to update recovery vehicles position.
b. En-route suppression:
(a) Call all threats by type using bearing and range from recovery vehicles or
spider point until suppression of threat.
(b) No threat to recovery vehicles: hold or vector recovery vehicles to last known
safe spider point.
(c) Threat to recovery vehicles: immediately vector recovery vehicles to avoid
threat and then suppress when recovery vehicles is clear.
(d) If threat cannot be suppressed, determine if route can be changed.
c. Pick up point:
(a) Attached and detached RESCORT secure the OA.
(b) When secure, continue to provide overwatch and security.
d. Monitor PR code usage.
206
Recovery vehicle checklist
207
Annex H
Recovery vehicle checklist
a. Rendezvous at RV with RESCORT, receive brief from RMC when unable to plan and
brief together and hold at RV until reception of execute order.
b. Route:
(a) Transit as appropriate for terrain masking and threat avoidance along the
briefed spider points.
(b) Make checkpoint calls to RESCORT as applicable.
(c) Use bearing and range calls to or from checkpoints to assist RESCORT in main-
taining contact if applicable. Use aircraft lighting as last resort.
(d) Complete 15-line brief before leaving RV.
c. En-route threat suppression
(a) Call threats by type with bearing and range from aircraft, checkpoint or ge-
ographical reference. PRTF members should use typical avoid-suppress-kill
threat prioritisation procedures. Return to last safe checkpoint and hold.
(b) Make checkpoint calls to RESCORT.
(c) RMC will make decision to continue, change route or abort.
d. IP
(a) Update gunners on threat avenues of approach and isolated personnel loca-
tion in objective area.
(b) Update authentication data with recovery team.
(c) Switch frequency to isolated personnel when directed.
e. PUP
(a) Provide threat suppression.
(b) Make threat calls as bearing and range from aircraft, or geographical refer-
ence.
(c) Ask for appropriate signalling from isolated personnel.
(d) Call landing, 30 seconds codeword and heading for take-off.
(e) Egress tactics similar to ingress tactics.
208
Recovery vehicle to RESCORT brief
209
Annex I
Recovery vehicle to RESCORT
brief
a. Recovery vehicle callsign.
b. Number and type.
c. Ingress routes.
d. ETA to holding point.
e. Egress routes.
f. Endurance.
g. Pick-up capabilities.
h. Pararescuemen (PJs).
i. Guns.
j. Speed.
k. Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) protection.
l. Pick up technique.
m. Recovery vehicle wingman plan.
210
15-line pick-up brief
211
Annex J
J.1 15-line pick-up brief
1 Callsign.
2 # of isolated personnel.
3 Isolated personnels location (secure), source and date/time stamp.
4 Isolated personnels condition.
(a) Ambulatory.
(b) Not ambulatory/not critical.
(c) Critical.
(d) Dead.
5 Equipment (comm/signal).
6 Authentication complete? Y/N, method.
7 Threats.
8 Elevation of object location.
9 Description of object location.
10 IP.
(a) Ingress routing.
(b) Egress routing.
11 Ordnance.
12 RESCORT tactics.
13 Recovery tactics.
14 Comm/signal procedures.
15 Questions?
* Line 1 to 9 are minimum information.
212
J.2 Explanation
J.2 Explanation
1 Callsign(s): Give the complete Callsign(s) of the concerned crewmember.
2 Number of isolated personnel: Ideally, this number will correspond to the number
of call signs. However, if call signs are unknown or are incomplete, knowing the
number of isolated personnel will help recovery forces better than the pickup.
3 Location(s): The location of each isolated personnel in Lat / Long, UTM / MGRS
grid, or range and bearing to a known point (SARDOT, waypoint, etc.). Provide
the coordinates / range and bearing in the original format as received from the
source (HOOK 112 GPS coordinates, accompanying aircraft over ight, etc.). Also
provide the source of the location by circling the appropriate descriptor (GPS, Map,
Flyover, Other) and the date / time stamp or code of that location. For example,
if an aircraft ew over the isolated personnel and recorded the position, circle
yover and include the Zulu date / time of this location or code (e.g. 281403Z or
Location B). If given GPS coordinates from the isolated person, circle GPS. The
source of information can be critical when loading into navigation systems due to
the different datum and navigation system defaults. Having the information in its
original format will limit errors induced by various conversions that are handed
down from one controlling agency to another.
4 Isolated personnel condition: Most important is can they walk or not? Answer YES
or NO. This will assist the recovery vehicle in determining the amount of time the
ground team will need. If time permits, provide additional information concerning
the type and extent of injuries.
5 Equipment (Comm / signal): Coordinate the following for the isolated personnel
area: the passing of specic OSC duties from RESCORT to the recovery vehicle and
back, who has control of the isolated person frequency, and who is responsible for
coordinating isolated personnel signalling and when. Provide the recovery vehicle
with the signalling devices available to the isolated person.
6 Authentication completed? YES or NO and how the authentication was accom-
plished (ISOPREP data, letter of the day, etc.). Inform recovery forces of authenti-
cation information previously used and compromised, to include ISOPREP data, PR
word, letter, or number of the day.
7 Threats: Isolated personnel are threats that will affect the recovery vehicle or
RESCORT. Include OPFOR foot soldiers, tanks / armoured vehicles, known or sus-
pected chemical / radiation hazards, AAA, SAMs, etc. Include enroute threats dur-
ing ingress and egress if known.
8 Elevation: Provide the MSL altitude (or nearest 1000 ft) of the isolated personnel
location if known. Elevation is critical above 4000 ft AMSL and / or surface air tem-
perature is 25 degrees Celsius or greater. These factors are used for calculating the
recovery vehicles power available and power required for various hover heights.
9 Description of isolated personnel area: Some possible descriptors: at, rocky, hilly,
sloped, 80-foot trees, valley, and ridgeline. For example, ZORBA 01B is on the
south slope of an east / west running ridgeline halfway up in rocky terrain.
10 (a) Ingress Route: Provide the ingress route for the recovery vehicle to the actual
isolated personnel location from the IP.
213
(b) Egress route: Provide an egress route from the isolated person location to a
planned exit point, FEBA / FLOT crossing, etc. Ingress / egress routes should
avoid threat exposure to the recovery vehicles. Use spider points / routes if
available.
11 Sandy ordnance available: List and describe all available ordnance and quantity
per RESCORT aircraft type.
12 RESCORT tactics: Describe patterns of both attached and detached RESCORT. Also
describe pre-planned reaction against encountered threats, type and location, along
the Rescue track.
13 Rescue tactics: Describe the recovery vehicles type of progression (speed, height,
etc.) related to the position on the track. Announce the type of recovery to be
performed (landing, hoist, etc.). Also describe the nal options for all the recovery
vehicles (landing, hover for protection, split to recover a distant isolated person,
etc.).
14 Comm / Signal procedures: Remind the main Codewords, frequencies, check and
isolated personnel recovery procedures to be used.
15 Additional Items / Questions: Any other business if deemed necessary.
214
J.2 Explanation
Joint formation face-to-face brieng guide
215
Annex K
Joint formation face-to-face
brieng guide
a. Call signs
b. Parking
c. Max Actual Combat Load (ACL)
d. Determine package requirements (navlogs, frags, maps)
(a) Discuss numbering differences etc.
(b) Discuss planning airspeeds and altitudes
(c) Maps and datums
e. Communications
(a) Check in
i. Time
ii. Procedures
(b) Inter-plane frequency
f. Lighting
(a) Discuss lighting congurations
g. Signals and codewords
(a) Light signals (on the objective and off)
(b) Required calls (i.e. turkey, fubar, etc.)
(c) Expected calls (i.e. swapping sides of formation)
(d) Lead change procedures
h. Taxi, take-off, join-up
(a) Spacing
(b) Hover check procedures
(c) Take-off procedures (ground or hover)
i. Formation type
(a) Dene formations (terms may differ)
216
j. Air refuelling
(a) Formation sequencing (critical fuel concerns)
(b) Light signals
(c) Re-constituting the formation
k. Inadvertent IMC procedures
(a) Heading (true vs. magnetic)
l. Weather requirements (per airframe)
m. Discuss overall performance factors
(a) Quick stops
(b) Acceleration
RMC task delegation sheet
217
Annex L
L.1 Mission preparation:
L.1.1 Aim
a. High or complicated threat level
b. Numerous different assets from different countries with different point of view.
Thats why it is necessary to have a common mission planning method, in order to:
(a) prepare the mission as far as possible
(b) be sure that nothing will be forgotten
(c) be sure that everybody knows who do what
L.1.2 Principles
a. delegation of the different tasks to cells
b. coherence of the tasks of each cell
c. coordination and control by the RMC
d. use of brieng at different points of the mission planning
L.1.3 Crew tasks
Tasks for all crew members when they arrive at the operational deployment base:
a. Take and read the documentation (Airspace Control Order (ACO), COMPLAN, SOP,
SPINS)
b. Prepare maps (draw Spider Points, FLOT, gates, etc.)
c. Upload data to the crew mission planning computer
d. Update ISOPREP
218
L.1.4 Chronology
Under the command of the RMC who is responsible for the time management:
a. Initial brieng: presentation of the general situation, the documentation and de-
nition of the different cells.
b. Intermediate brieng(s): presentation of the conclusions of the cells and if neces-
sary correction by the RMC.
c. Mission brieng, using the RMC mission brieng format.
d. Debrieng, using the mission debrieng format.
L.1.5 Cells
Planning activities will be subdivided over cells as depicted in the table below with their
respective responsibilities.
a. Command cell
(a) Assign deputy commander
(b) Lead brainstorm
(c) Coordination between the cells
(d) Coordination recovery - rescort
(e) Authentication (initial and at PUP)
(f) Go / No go criteria
(g) Establish time line
(h) Acknowledge to JPRC / PRCC
b. Intel and electronic warfare cell
(a) Bring Weather to brainstorm
(b) ISOPREP and EPA Isolated Personnel
(c) Prepare tactical situation display
(d) Analyse INTREP
(e) Analyse SARIR / EPA Isolated Personnel
(f) Analyse imagery and LZ
(g) Prepare EW database
(h) Collect documentation (authentication codes, etc.) and distribute
(i) Prepare Intell brief
c. Route cell
(a) Prepare the NOTAMs/ Birdtam
(b) Taxi and take off
(c) Plan route
(d) Prepare the ightplan
(e) Push point split point
219
(f) Air to air TACAN plan
(g) Time On Target (TOT)
(h) RV
(i) Recovery time (if neccessary)
(j) Maximum Rolex
d. OA cell
(a) Develop ingress OA egress plan
(b) OA tactics Deconict:
i. Weapons employement and ROE
ii. Threats call/reaction (techniques)
(c) Identify LZs
(d) Ready to leave target
(e) Contingencies
(f) TOTs
(g) Bad weather plan
(h) Coordinate extraction plan with ground tactics cell
e. Ground tactics cell
(a) Prepare PRTF EPA
(b) Check PRTF ISOPREPs
(c) Ground extraction plan and tactics (see also Annex O)
(d) Co-ordinate with RESCORT, and recovery vehicles
(e) Plan contingencies
f. COMCARD cell
(a) Manage planning timeline
(b) Coordinate with Airborne Early Warning (AEW)
(c) Develop PRTF COMPLAN
(d) Get info on to the COMCARD (data, freqs, timeline and codewords)
g. Holding cell
(a) Location
(b) Altitudes / Heading / Speed / Turns
(c) Weather backup
(d) Latecomer
(e) Push Flow
(f) Bring info and plan to comm card
h. FARP cell
(a) Location
(b) Joining / leaving procedures
(c) Refueling sequence
(d) Holding point / altitude
220
(e) Fuel required vs. available
(f) Information to COMCARD
(g) Contingecies
(h) Emergencies
L.1.6 Check before walk:
a. Updated maps (spiders, FLOT, ingress, egress)
b. Updated COMCARD (frequencies, time line, data, code words) (see Annex P)
c. Updated GPS/nav aid (ingress, egress, survivor(s) position)
d. OA tactics (position and sectors of RESCORT, approach heading of the recovery)
e. What ifs (mechanical, radio, etc.)
f. Documentation (authentication codes, etc.)
g. Time and frequency of the check-in
Suggested PRTF SOP format
221
Annex M
APRTF will have to develop an SOP for iternal use. This SOP should be used as a guideline
for mission planning and execution. Specic mission needs may require to deviate from
this SOP; the SOP is merely a collection of default actions in general, rather than any
kind of rule of law.
As there are signicant differences between operating by day and at night that affect
almost every aspect of this SOP, it is strongly recommended to develop two separate SOP;
one for day and one for night operations.
M.1 Timeline
After receiving the ATO, a timeline shall be given As Soon As Possible (ASAP) by the
person responsible for the time table (together with the RMC) and strictly adhered to by
all participants when the PRTF is tasked to plan (and conduct) a recovery mission.
Activity Time
MET/NOTAM/INTEL/ATO
Commence brainstorm
Complete brainstorm
Start planning
Prepare mapping
Mass brieng
Individual ight brieng
Step
Taxi
Take off
TOT
M.2 Joblist
See Annex L on page 217.
M.3 Flow
a. Assign tasks
222
M.4 Brainstorm checklist
b. Analyse mission
c. Brainstorm
d. Plan mission
e. Plan contingencies
f. Identify showstoppers
g. Brief mission
h. Brief sections/elements
i. Step
j. Execute mission
k. Debrief mission
M.4 Brainstorm checklist
Consider the participants to the brainstorm and the duration.
M.5 Planning checklist
M.5.1 Planning parameters
a. PRTF composition
b. Aircraft speed
c. Weapon load
d. Load capacity (# of isolated personnel)
e. National caveats
f. Weather minima
M.5.2 Planning standards
a. Map markings
b. Communications
M.6 Brieng
a. Format (Vol II Annex N)
b. Timeline
223
M.7 Start-up and taxi standard
a. Start-up sequence
b. Taxi sequence
c. Communications
d. Lighting
M.8 Enroute ying standard
a. Enroute formation
b. Enroute tactics
c. Speed
d. Altitude
e. Communications
f. Lighting
g. Air to air TACAN
M.9 Holding standard
This section may be more applicable to FW aircraft, but a plan for the RW assets close to
the PUP may be necessary for timing and nal mission adjustment purposes.
M.10 FARP standard
See also ATP-3.7.1 Vol II Annex R.
M.11 Objective area standard
a. Authentication (refer to the PR SOP for the operation as that will guidance to the
authentication methods to be used by specic entities
b. FW RESCORT protection
c. RW RESCORT protection
d. Recovery vehicle landing
e. EF standard
f. Recovery vehicle take-off
224
M.12 Contingencies
M.12 Contingencies
a. Threat avoidance
b. Bad weather
c. Aircraft fall out prior take-off
d. Bump plan
e. Comms failure
M.13 Emergencies
a. Inadvertent IMC
b. Blind
c. Downed aircraft
d. NVD malfunction
e. Other
RMC mission brieng format
225
Annex N
All elements to be taken from standing orders (SPINS, COMPLAN, ACO, ATO, etc.) where
applicable.
N.1 General
The Personnel Recovery Mission Brief (PMB) is the PRTF core elements brieng con-
ducted by the RMC, in which supporting staff and all involved mission elements brief
their part of the PR mission. The PMB contains the plan of the recovery vehicles com-
mander, RESCORT commander and EF commander. After the PMB all details regarding
the tasked mission should be clear to all mission elements.
N.2 Mission elements
a. AMC
b. OSC
c. RMC
d. RESCORT commander
e. Recovery vehicles commander
f. Extraction forces commander
g. Intel
N.3 Preparation
Supporting Staff and all involved mission elements must have their part of the PMB
ready, including overlays and sketches. There must be a map 1:100.000 of the operation
area and a map 1:50.000 of the objective area. The PUZ, when known, will be briefed by
using a large-scale sketch and/or photo of the area.
226
N.4 Brieng format
N.4 Brieng format
Slide 1: PRTF mission (RMC)
Roll call
Time hack
References (versions of):
ATO
Map
COMCARD
EPA
Time zone used
Slide 2: General overview (RMC)
Higher commanders intent
Mission
Risk level
Political Planning Indicator (PPI)
Objective
TOT
Slide 3: ROE
ROEIMPL version
National caveats
Special considerations
Slide 4: Intel update
Intel update:
General
Enroute
In / around the OA
PRTF PR codes
RAMROD
SARDOT
SARNEG
Duress
PR word
PR letter
PR number
DAR
Slide 5: Weather / Notice to Airmens (NOTAMs) / birdtam
Weather update:
General
Visibility / cloud base / precipitation
Wind
227
Temperatures / freezing level
Ephemerides
Illumination by night in Lux / thermal x-over IR
Sea-state
Homebase
Enroute
In / around the OA
Diversion
NOTAM update
Birdtam update
Slide 6: Domestics
Flightplans
Base status
Local Operating Procedures (LOPs)
Slide 7: Route
Detailed route description
ACO
Ingress, IP, OA, egress
Hazards (obstacles & powerlines) / MSA
Speeds
Altitude deconiction plan
Splits
Slide 8: Route contingencies
Threat reaction
Timing (lose / add)
Divert airelds
Latest take-off to stay within TOT window
Adverse weather
Slide 9: Holding plan
Location
Altitude(s) / heading / speed / turns
Rejoin plan
Adverse weather backup
Push ow
Slide 10: FARP plan
Location / frequencies
Joining / leaving procedures
Holding point / altitude
Fuel required vs. available
Information on COMCARD
228
N.4 Brieng format
Contingencies
Emergencies
Slide 11: FW RESCORT
Tasks
Tactics
Ingress
OA
Sanitise
Authentication of isolated personnel
Request Execute approval through AMC
Frequency management
Egress
Contingencies
Slide 12: Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD)
Tasks
SEAD plan overview
Flow
Orbit
Electronic Order of Battle (EOB)
pet! (pet!) times / coverage
Vul time
Communications / codewords
Threat reactions
Contingencies
Slide 13: FW RESCAP
Tasks
ROE / ID criteria
Tactics overview
Sweep plan
Detached / embedded escort plan
CAP position
Contingencies
Slide 14: OSC
Authentication
Isolated personnel information update (9 / 15 liner)
Frequency usage
Risk / threat level
Slide 15: OA; ingress
Flow
Formation
229
Route
Tactics
Contingencies
Slide 16: OA; Fire zones / areas of responsibility (Picture vertical cut through of who is
within which cylinder)
Slide 17: OA; overall
OA description
Elevation
Isolated personnel location
Obstacles
Landing zone
Operations (FW / RW RESCORT / recovery vehicles)
Flow
Formation
Tactics
Contingencies
Slide 18: OA; extraction force
Terrain
Threat
EF tactics
Authentication
Contingencies
Slide 19: OA; egress
Flow
Formation
Route
Tactics
Contingencies
Slide 20: OA contingencies
Threat handling
ROEs
Techniques
Weapons employment
Fratricide
Collateral damage
Slide 21: COMPLAN
COMCARD
Codewords
Bullseye
230
N.4 Brieng format
IFF procedures
Emission Control (EMCON) procedures
Communications ow
Priorities
Jamming chattermark procedures / authority
Spoong Gingerbread procedures
EOB update
AEW agreements
Service provided
Radio coverage
Radar coverage
AMC manager
Controlling agency fallout
Slide 22: Snapshots
Taxi and take-off
En-route
Holding
At IP
Ingress
On the ground
Egress
En-route
FARP
Landing and taxi
Slide 23: Contingencies
Go / no-go
Threat vs. risk level
FARP fallout
No AMC
Minimum self protection
Minimum RESCAP
Minimum SEAD
Minimum RESCORT
Minimum recovery vehicles
Minimum EF
Slide 24: Emergencies
Inadvertent IMC
Blind
Others as required
Slide 25: Questions (ALL)
Extraction force mission planning guide
231
Annex O
Extraction force mission planning
guide
O.1 Extraction force planning
The extraction of the isolated personnel is the core of the recovery mission. This part
of the mission should therefore be thoroughly planned. The planning should take as a
minimum the following steps into account:
a. Study the mission
b. Plan use of time
c. Study terrain and situation
d. Study intelligence, prepare IPB
e. Organise the team
f. Select men, weapons, and equipment
g. Issue warning order
h. Coordination (continuous throughout)
i. Request reconnaissance
j. Complete detailed plans
k. Issue operation order
l. Brief-back (to the tasking authority)
m. Supervise (at all times), inspect, rehearse
n. Execute the mission
232
O.2 Extraction force brieng guide
O.2.1 Time hack
O.2.2 Team mission overview (given by team leader)
O.2.3 Marshaling area procedures
a. Manifest
(a) Number of pax
(b) Equipment
(c) Estimated average weight
(d) Weapons carrying procedures (muzzle down, on safe)
b. Loading
(a) Location (restrictions)
(b) Aircraft markings (chalk #)
(c) Restraining devices
(d) Bump plan (diagram)
(e) Team leader location (headset?)
c. Effects of delays
d. Static load training
(a) Time
(b) Location
(c) Players involved
(d) Aircraft familiarisation brieng
aircraft capabilities
emergency exits (location and operation)
emergency shutdown (fuel shutoff, rotor brake)
destruction procedures (sensitive equipment)
O.2.4 Inltration plan
a. Primary LZ
(a) Name
(b) Location (lat/long or MGRS)
(c) Datum used (check GPS)
(d) TOT
b. Alternate LZ
(a) Name
233
(d) TOT
c. Actions on objective
(a) Landing sequence
(b) Landing direction
(c) Weapons status / ring fans
(d) Emergency procedures
(e) Go around procedures
(f) Actions in the event of hot LZ
d. Communications
(a) Aircraft callsigns
(b) Team callsigns
(c) Primary frequency
(d) Secondary frequency
(e) Comm check (time and format)
(f) Time warnings (20, 10, 5, 1 min)
(g) No comm plan
e. Signals
(a) Helicopter Landing Site (HLS) markings
(b) Friendly identication / team markings
(c) Aircraft signals
f. Fire support
(a) Other aviation assets available
i. Fixed wing re support
ii. Rotary wing re support
iii. Other
(b) Location and altitude of re support aviation assets
(c) Indirect re support assets (ground) available
i. Mortars
ii. Artillery
(d) Location and trajectory of rounds
(e) Friendly and threat markings
(f) Comm out re support request signal
g. Contingencies
(a) Lame duck
(b) Shoot down
(c) Weather
i. Takeoff
ii. Enroute
iii. Objective
234
iv. Effects on re support assets
h. PR plan
(a) Responding assets
(b) Notication procedures
(c) ISOPREP / EPA
(d) Medical facilities
O.2.5 Exltration plan
a. Primary LZ
(a) Name
(d) TOT
b. Alternate LZ
(a) Name
(d) TOT
c. Actions on objective
(a) Landing sequence
(b) Landing direction
(c) Weapons status / ring fans
(d) Emergency procedures
(e) Go around procedures
(f) Actions in the event of hot LZ
d. Communications
(a) Aircraft callsigns
(b) Team callsigns
(c) Primary frequency
(d) Secondary frequency
(e) Comm check (time and format)
(f) Time warnings (20, 10, 5, 1 min)
(g) No comm plan
e. Signals
(a) HLS markings
(b) Friendly identication / team markings
(c) Aircraft signals
235
f. Fire support
(a) Other aviation assets available
i. Fixed wing re support
ii. Rotary wing re support
iii. Other
(b) Location and altitude of re support aviation assets
(c) Indirect re support assets (ground) available
i. Mortars
ii. Artillery
(d) Location and trajectory of rounds
(e) friendly and threat markings
(f) Comm out re support request signal
g. Contingencies
(a) Lame duck
(b) Shoot down
(c) Weather
(d) Abort criteria
i. Takeoff
ii. Enroute
iii. Objective
iv. Effects on re support assets
h. PR plan
(a) Responding assets
(b) Notication procedures
(c) Medical facilities
236
Communications
237
Annex P
Communications
P.1 Brevity words
Brevity words are short words to communicate procedures or information in a fast man-
ner. The words selected below are NATO standard and commonly used in especially NATO
air operations
1
. These brevity words can be used in planning or executing a PR mission.
Additional and/or different brevity words may be used. All brevity words to be used in
an operation should be inserted in the SPINS.
REMARKS
ABORT Cease action / attack event / mission /emer-
gency egress
AJAX LZ /PZ clear of threats
ANCHOR(ED) Orbit at a specic point
BANDIT Enemy Aircraft
(system) BENT System indicated inoperative
BINGO Fuel state reached needed for recovery (imme-
diate BUGOUT)
BITTERSWEET Blue on Blue / Neutral engagement
BLIND No visual contact with friendlies (opposite of
VISUAL)
BOGEY Unidentied aircraft
BREAKRIGHT or LEFT Turn 90 degrees Left or Right immediately
BUGOUT Separation of operation with no intent to re-
engage
BUSTER PLUS XX or
MINUS XX
In- or decrease speed plus or minus XX knots
BUZZER Electronic communications jamming
CEASE FIRE Stop ring, missile in ight can continue to
target
CHATTERMARK Switch to the alternate frequency due to MIJI
(Meaconing - Intrusion - Jamming - Interfer-
ence)
CLEARED HOT Ordnance release authorised
CLOSING Decrease separation (opposite of FLOAT)
COMMIT Intercept / engage specied target
CONTACT Sensor contact at stated position
DATA IDM message. Send / received / not received
DEADEYE Laser / IR pointer inoperative
DIVERT Proceed to the alternate base / mission
1
A complete list of all standard brevity words can be found in APP-7 Joint brevity words publication.
238
P.1 Brevity words
EXTEND Manoeuvre for separation / position to re-
attack
FEET WET / DRY Continue ops over water / land
FENCE (IN / OUT) Set switches entering / leaving the combat
area
FLASH Turn on specied system for identication
FLOAT Increase separation (opposite of CLOSING)
GO (DE)ACTIVE De- or activate frequency hopping on specied
radio
GO CLEAR Deactivate encryption on specied radio
GO SECURE Activate encryption on specied radio
HOLD FIRE Stop ring, missile in ight should be aimed
elsewhere if possible
INDIA IFF Mode 4
LEAN (DIRECTION) Manoeuvre to avoid threat
MARSHALLING Establish at a specic point
MUD (type and direc-
tion)
Ground RWR indications
NAKED No RWR indications
NO JOY No visual contact with the non-friendlies (op-
posite of TALLY)
PLAYTIME Time left for mission
POPEYE Flying in reduced visibility (e.g. fog, smoke,
dust)
PRESS Continue attack
RESUME Resume last formation / route / mission
RIFLE Friendly air to ground missile launched
ROLEX Time adjustment from original plan in min-
utes
ROPE Circling IR pointer around aircraft to identify
troops on the ground
SADDLED Return to briefed formation position
SAUNTER (RANGE) Fly max endurance (range)
SCRAMBLE Take off as soon as possible
SHOTGUN Briefed weapon status at which BUGOUT
should begin
SNAKE Oscillate IR pointer about a target
SPARKLE Oscillate IR pointer on target / Mark target
with tracers
SPIKE(D) Direction RWR indications of a radar track or launch
SPLIT Leave formation to pursue separate attack
SPOOFING Voice deception is being used
STATUS Request for information regarding aircraft sta-
tus
STEADY Stop oscillation of IR pointer
TALLY Sighting of non-friendlies (opposite of NO
JOY)
TEN SECONDS Stand-by for Laser ON in ten seconds
TERMINATE Stop laser illumination of target
TUMBLEWEED Loss of situational awareness, request infor-
mation
VISUAL Visual contact with friendlies (opposite of
BLIND)
WHAT LUCK BDA / results of the mission
WHAT STATE Number of fuel / ammo / rockets / missiles of
aircraft
WINCHESTER Out of ammunition
Communications
239
YARDSTICK Directive to use air to air TACAN for range
and bearing
P.2 COMCARD
Here are four generic examples of a COMCARD to be used
2
.
DATE: PACKAGE: AMC: RMC: DATE: PACKAGE: AMC: RMC:
CALL SIGN MSN ACFT M1 M 3 M3 2# TAXI T/0 VHF TAC CALL SIGN ROLL CALL HOLD VFR IFR PUSH TIME INGRESS ALT IP ALT

X (GPS) TIME WILL DECLARED BY CAOC TO START PR MISSION
PACKAGE INFORMATION SARNEG HQ FREQUENCIES
INITIAL CHECK-IN :
0 1 2 3 4 5 ! " # DAY
CALL SIGN RV ROUTE IP AREA ERP
CLEARANCE
TOT WINDOW
WOD
REATTACK WINDOW WORD OF THE DAY
LAST O$T TIME
NET
SARDOT PR NUMBER / LETTER
LOCATION OF ISOLATED PERSONNEL
SURVIVOR CALL SIGN UY UX AUXILIARY UX
STP LAT LONG ELEV POINT SP!DER POINTS
1 A1 B5
2 A2 C1
3 A3 C2
4 A4 C3 BIG PICTURE
5 A5 %
A %
! B1 %
" B2 %
# B3 %
10 B4 %
CODE WORDS IFF
MOD I MOD III
""""## COORDINATION CARD """"""# COORDINATION CARD
$SE &&&&&%LOCAL ALTIMETER SETTING '
IP
RV POINT
SURVIVOR
SANDY 12
SANDY 3$
%OLLY
Figure P.1: A COMCARD example
2
We should attempt to come up with one single COMCARD example that should be good enough to
replace all existing national comcards.
240
P.2 COMCARD
Helo lead to RESCORT Brieng
241
Annex Q
Helo lead to RESCORT Brieng
This checklist is to be used in case of an airborne join-up of the PRTF.
a. Helo callsign
b. Number and type
c. Ingress routes
d. ETA to holding point
e. Egress routes
f. Endurance.
g. Pick-up capabilities
h. PJs
i. Hoist
j. Special Insertion and Extraction (SPIE)
k. Litter
l. Forest penetrator
m. Guns
n. Speed
o. NBC protection
p. Pick up technique
q. Helo wingman plan
242
Tactical arming and refuelling
243
Annex R
1
R.1 Tasks and responsibilities
The JPRC / PRCC will coordinate the establishment of a FARP as appropriate. The FARP
commander will have Operational Control (OPCON) over all personnel in the FARP. A
FARP will consist of personnel of the same nationality, as far as possible. For this annex,
refuelling will be considered to be hot unless otherwise stated.
R.1.1 RMC
The RMC will have responsibility, in full coordination with the JPRC / PRCC, over the
planning of the FARP, in time, as well as in location. He will plan a reconnaissance as
far as possible.
R.1.2 FARP commander
The FARP commander is fully responsible for the execution of the FARP. He will have
OPCON over all personnel that are required to operate the refuelling point.
R.1.3 Recommended personnel available on a FARP
Depending on the size of the FARP and helicopters, the following list of personnel can be
used as a guideline to establish the composition of a FARP.
a. Command element: 1 FARP commander and 1 deputy FARP commander
b. Pad management: 1 pad chief per helicopter pad
c. Fuel supply element: 1 operator for every available fuel nozzle
d. Fire ghting element: according to national regulations
e. Comms element: 1 operator
1
This annex is inserted in the absence of an annex on refuelling procedures in ATP-49. This annex will
therefore be deleted upon promulgation of an new edition of ATP-49.
244
R.2 FARP and FARP area
f. Medical element: according to national regulations
g. Ground and air defence element
R.2 FARP and FARP area
FARP
IN
OUT
1
-
2
N
M
1 - 2 NM
T
HoIding Area
Figure R.1: Generic FARP area layout
The FARP should be large enough to accommodate the number of aircraft requiring fuel
at one time, along with the refuelling equipment involved. It may also include an area
for the fuel trucks, the re and medical crew and the communication devices. A FARP
area will consist of a point in, a holding area, the FARP and a point out The points
in and out will be big enough to allow all helicopters to land. The holding area is 100
meters away from the refuelling points where the helicopters will hover before being
called in. The holding area can be equipped with a landing T See also Figure R.1
R.2.1 Criteria for landing / refuelling points
The size of a landing site for helicopters to be refuelled will depend on the amount and
size of helicopters using the landing site. The minimum recommended distance (d) be-
tween landing points can be found in ATP 49, Chapter 4, Section 1. For Gazelle, A109,
Apache, Cougar, HH 3 F, Puma, Super Puma and UH-1D, the minimum recommended
distance between landing points is 50 meters. If possible, the fuel trucks will stay sta-
tionary during the whole refuelling process. If this is not possible, the fuel trucks will
make a U turn and return to their original position to allow other helicopters entering
the FARP. At no time, helicopters will over y the fuel trucks. During night operations,
all vehicles will only use tactical exterior lighting. See also Figure R.2
A B C D
FIRE
FUEL
COMMS
d d d
Figure R.2: Standard FARP layout
245
R.2.2 Lighting
All night operations will be done with NVG, so all white light has to be avoided. All
lighting will be as follows:
a. All refuelling pads will be indicated by orange coloured chem lights.
b. The pad chief will wear a blue chem light and will use white chem light for hand
signals.
c. Red chem lights will indicate safe zone behind tail rotor for ground crew.
d. The landing T will be outlined with white coloured chem lights.
e. All vehicles will use tactical exterior lighting.
R.2.3 Fire ghting equipment
National regulations will be complied with. The following guidelines can be taken in
consideration in case of doubt;
a. Lightweight water extinguisher
b. One 10 kg CO2
c. Extinguisher 2.5 kg dry powder next to pump
d. 2.5 kg dry powder extinguisher next to each refuel point
R.2.4 Medical crew
Medical crew and their equipment should be available to give immediate aide in case of
a mishap.
R.2.5 Fuel trucks
Depending on the size of the FARP, fuel trucks and their operators will be on a xed
position, or will move between the different refuelling pads. All fuel truck operators will
employ all standard grounding and bonding regulations.
R.2.6 Communications device
There will always be a VHF and/or UHF radio and operator available. Even in case of a
procedural FARP execution, there will always be a radio frequency available in case of
an emergency.
246
R.3 Refuelling procedures
R.3 Refuelling procedures
R.3.1 Radio controlled
a. 5 minutes prior the FARP area, the rst element/section lead of a PRTF will contact
the FARP. After this initial contact the element/section will be cleared to approach
the FARP, or to stand by at point in
b. When cleared to enter the FARP area, helicopters will go to the point in or proceed
immediately to the holding point, as briefed by the RMC, and will be summoned to
enter the FARP. A pad chief will give further visual instructions
c. Helicopters will only enter the FARP if instructed so by radio and pad chief.
d. Cold refuelling only: After landing in the FARP, helicopters will shut down their
engines, and pilots will assist the fuel truck operators if necessary. Start-up will
be initialised after instructed by the pad chief.
e. After having refuelled and after being cleared to leave the FARP, helicopters join
the point out The FARP commander is responsible for the refuelling procedure in
the FARP and the summoning of the helicopters on the FARP frequency. The RMC is
responsible for the refuelling procedure out of the FARP, which includes the choice
of the points in and out, the procedures at those points and at the holding point.
f. Example Radio calls:
(a) TEXACO, this is C/S, request entering the FARP
(b) C/S, this is TEXACO, you are clear to enter the FARP at point in
(c) Next helicopter is clear to enter for pad A, B, C, D
(d) Helicopter at A is clear to leave for point out when ready
R.3.2 Procedural
a. The rst element/section lead of a PRTF will send a scout to reconnoitre whether
the FARP is clear. If that is not the case, helicopters will hold at point in
b. When the FARP is clear, helicopters will proceed immediately to the holding point,
as briefed by the RMC, and will be summoned by a pad chief to enter the FARP. The
pad chief will give further visual instructions.
c. Helicopters will only enter the FARP if instructed so by a pad chief.
d. Cold refuelling only: After landing in the FARP, helicopters will shut down their
engines, and pilots will assist the fuel truck operators if necessary.
e. Start-up will be initialised after instructed by the pad chief.
f. After being cleared to leave the FARP by the pad chief, helicopters join the point
out
The FARP commander remains responsible for the refuelling procedure in the FARP and
the summoning of the helicopters. The RMC is responsible for the refuelling procedure
out of the FARP, which includes the choice of the points in and out, the procedures at
those points and at the holding point.
247
R.4 Safety
R.4.1 Responsibilities
a. FARP Commander: Must ensure that all FARP personnel are briefed and aware of
all normal and emergency procedures.
b. Pad chief: Is responsible for all personnel and actions associated with the normal
and emergency operations of his pad. He is responsible for determining the crew
intentions and all other personnel will remain clear of the pad until directed by
the pad chief.
R.4.2 Fire at the FARP
In case of an A/C that gets on re on the FARP, it is important that all aircrewand ground
crew act according these guidelines. Hand signals are according ATP 49. Personnel will
react as follows:
a. Aircrew.
(a) Signal from / to pad chief: FIRE
(b) Emergency shut down
(c) Egress
(d) Move to RV
b. Pad chief.
(a) Signal : FIRE to fuel operator and air crew
(b) Operate re extinguisher, concentrate on crew
(c) When relieved from re crew, move to RV
c. Fuel truck operator.
(a) Stop fuel ow
(b) Signal FIRE
(c) If nozzle is removed:
i. Insert hose and grounding cables
ii. Move fuel truck to safe location
iii. Report at RV
iv. If nozzle is not removed: move to RV
d. Fire crew.
(a) On FIRE signal, activate siren and emergency lighting
(b) Engage the re / recovery crew
e. Other pads.
(a) Pad chief notify aircrew
(b) Stop refuelling activities
(c) If rotor is not running: emergency shutdown, move to RV
248
R.5 Helicopter landing sites
(d) If rotor is running (and refuelling activities have not started yet, or are totally
nished): take off after clearance from pad chief and move to the point out
(e) Make a MAYDAY call on frequency of controlling agency or guard, passing on:
i. Location of mishap
ii. Source of mishap
(f) Element/section leader will call TEXACO and exchange info.
R.4.3 Fuel spill
A fuel spill must be considered as a potential re hazard and must be acted on accord-
ingly:
a. Pad chief.
(a) Hand signal stop refuel to operator
(b) Call fuel spill, fuel spill, fuel spill
(c) After nozzle has been disconnected perform shutdown procedure
(d) Assist air crew in egress A/C
b. Fuel truck operator.
(a) Stop refuelling
(b) Insert fuel hose and grounding cables in fuel truck
(c) Drive fuel truck to start position
c. Fire crew.
(a) Move to spill location
(b) Clean up fuel spill
(c) When safe give all clear to pad chief
d. Pad chief.
(a) Resume FARP procedures on all clear call from re crew
R.5 Helicopter landing sites
All procedures and standards of ATP-49, Use of helicopters in land operations, Volume
2, Chapter 4, Helicopter Tactical or Non-permanent Landing Sites will be valid during
operations.
R.6 Procedures for marshalling helicopters
All procedures and standards of ATP 49 -Use of helicopters in land operations, Volume
2, Chapter 15; Procedures for marshalling helicopters in land operations- will be valid
during PRTF operations.
249
R.7 Air refuelling brieng checklist
CALL SIGNS: Tanker Receiver
A/R TRACK
ARCT ARIP
ARCP AREP
ALTITUDE: JOINUP REFUEL MSituational Awareness (SA)
AIRSPEED
RADIO: VHF UHF FM HF
PRIMARY RADIO
TANKER: HI LOW
TYPE RENDEZVOUS
COMM OUT: YES NO
NVG LIGHTING: YES NO
STANDBY TANKER
SQUAWK : MODE I MODE II MODE III
TACAN A/A: Tanker Receiver
ALTIMETER
WEATHER
FUEL ONLOAD
ABORT POINT
EMERGENCY BASES
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
BACKUP PLAN
250
R.7 Air refuelling brieng checklist
Training
251
Annex S
Training
T.B.D.
252
253
Volume III
ISOLATED PERSONNEL GUIDE
255
f
256
INTRODUCTION
257
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Aim
This volume is intended to be used by tactical commanders and if required, by individ-
uals. It prescribes generic Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) basic Survival,
Evasion, Resistance and Extraction (SERE) principles concerning potential isolated per-
sonnel during operations. The level of detail is not intended to replace national training
policy.
1.2 Introduction
0101. NATO Nations are responsible for providing their personnel with specic SERE
training and equipment to ensure their survivability. It is also the individuals responsi-
bility to prepare for possible isolation. This responsibility also reects on the personnel
who might endanger themselves during recovery. Thorough preparation will increase
the probability of mission success and decrease the amount of time that recovery forces
must operate in a hostile or uncertain operational environment. The well trained and
educated isolated personnel will be capable of adapting to the various isolation situa-
tions and methods of extraction. Based upon the denition of the term isolated person-
nel, SERE training is needed in order to provide personnel at risk of isolation the skills to
react appropriately and legally, as an isolated person, resistor, or escapee. Evaders have
to survive in order to evade. Attention to personal needs can be postponed temporarily,
but eventually these survival needs must be met, or evaders wont be physically or men-
tally t to continue. Dehydration, heat and cold, lack of sleep, sickness and starvation
contribute to physical weakness and poor decision making. Extraction is the end stage
of the SERE process.
1.3 Mission abort
0102. All levels of command, including the isolated person, can recommend mission
abort. The isolated personnel may be the person with the best situational awareness of
the tactical situation in the recovery area. The isolated person should be aware that he/
she is part of the decision process for aborting the mission and therefore, should always
consider the threat to the recovery force and provide information whenever possible.
258
1.4 PIERIE vs MRIE and HRIE
1.4 PIERIE vs MRIE and HRIE
0103. Personnel Identied as at an Elevated Risk of Isolation and / or Exploitation
(PIERIE) is the general term to indicate that personnel that is at some risk if isolation
and / or exploitation should be trained, equipped and prepared appropriately. Further
distinction can be made between personnel that is identied as Medium Risk of Iso-
lation and / or Exploitation (MRIE) those who are identied as High Risk of Isolation
and / or Exploitation (HRIE). HRIE may require higher levels of training, equipment and
preparation or more extensive risk mitigation measures to prevent them form becoming
isolated.
0104. the level of risk personnel is anticipated to be at does not necesarily equal the
level of effort that will be taken to recover and reintegrate them once they have become
isolated.
PREPARATION AND PLANNING
259
Chapter 2
2.1 General
0201. The following paragraphs are intended as an aide memoire to tactical comman-
ders and trained personnel in the Area of Operations (AO) and as a guide to the relevant
skills and training required of personnel deemed likely to become isolated.
2.2 Preparatory work
2.2.1 Personnel
0202. The successful recovery of isolated personnel in an AO can only be achieved if
the personnel requiring recovery are sufciently trained, equipped, mentally prepared
and properly documented prior to the start of their mission, taking into account the dif-
ference between personnel that is identied as MRIE and HRIE. Pre-emptive operational
/ tactical planning and training is the preparatory work, conducted before an incident
occurs, which facilitates extraction.
2.2.2 Next of kin
0203. The behavior and statements made by next of kin may seriously endanger per-
sonnel that has become isolated or captured. It is a national responsibility to prepare
personnel and next of kin alike for dos and donts in particular towards the media in
an isolating event.
2.3 Levels of training
0204. Isolation may occur following a wide variety of causes, from hostile activity, me-
chanical failure or navigational error. All personnel in the AO are to be trained and
equipped to evade and be recovered in the event of becoming isolated in enemy territory.
The degree of training and the level of equipment will depend on national standards
and the likelihood of isolation applicable to each individuals role. Denitions of levels
of SERE training are given in Chapter 6 and are contained in STANAG 7196. Minimum
standards of training and equipment to be carried will be identied in the Operation
Plan (OPLAN) Annex V / Personnel Recovery (PR) Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
/ Special Instructions (SPINS) for the relevant AO.
260
2.4 Operational planning
2.4 Operational planning
2.4.1 Annex V, PR SOP(s) and SPINS
0205. The Joint Personnel Recovery Cell (JPRC) and/or Personnel Recovery Coordina-
tion Cell (PRCC) should provide detailed instructions to coordinate all PR measures and
activities in the AO. Operations should conform to the Concept of Operation (CONOPS)
produced by JPRC. Details on the execution of PR missions should be disseminated via
the PR SOPs / SPINS. Personnel should study the the PR SOPs / SPINS prior to any opera-
tion in the AO and follow their guidance. Units arriving in theatre should ensure that
the JPRC and/or their PRCC are aware of their presence.
2.4.2 ISOPREP
0206. The Isolated Personnel Report (ISOPREP) is a form designed to enable positive
identication and authentication of an isolated person by recovery forces. It is highly
recommended that all personnel prone to isolation, capture and exploitation are to com-
plete ISOPREP forms, however this is mandatory for level B and C trained personnel.
The PR SOP for the operation will dene who is to have an ISOPREP. Annex A provides
a format of an ISOPREP. The JPRC may disseminate a different format for an ISOPREP
for the specic AO. Directions for its completion and an example can be found at Annex
A. Personnel should seek assistance in completion of the ISOPREP form. The ISOPREP
should be completed and collected prior to deployment, or at least prior to entering the
AO. It is vital that personnel are aware of the content of their ISOPREP and that the
contents are not known by any other individual other than those in the PR chain of
command. Once the ISOPREP is completed, its classication is CONFIDENTIAL. An
electronic copy of the front page of the ISOPREP is to be forwarded to the components
PRCC prior to the start of operations.
2.4.3 EPA
0207. The Evasion Plan of Action (EPA) is developed by individuals or groups before ex-
ecuting missions in a hostile environment. By providing recovery forces with an insight
into the isolated personnels intentions, the EPA can greatly improve isolated personnels
chances of successful recovery. The EPA should be written as directed by the PR SOPs /
SPINS. The PR SOP for the operation will dene who is to have an EPA. An outline of the
content and format of an EPA is shown at Annex B. In consultation with the unit SERE
specialist, intelligence ofcer and ops support staff, an EPA is to be completed for each
aircraft mission, or for each mission for ground forces if appropriate. A copy of the EPA
is to be lodged according to SPINS / SOPs.
2.4.4 Recovery methods
0208. There are a number of ways that isolated personnel may be recovered. The recov-
ery methods are not only military in origin, but may also be through political pressure,
diplomatic negotiations or intervention by civil organisations which will not be further
described in this document.
261
0209. Military recovery interactions are to be described in this ATP and further de-
tailed in the PR SOPs / SPINS. Following assets can be utilized separately or combined in
a task force:
a. Land forces.
b. Rotary Wing (RW) aircraft.
c. Fixed Wing (FW) aircraft.
d. Maritime surface vessels.
e. Submarines.
f. Special Operations Forces (SOF).
2.5 Tactical preparation and planning
2.5.1 Pre-deployment training
0210. The most suitable preparation consists of the appropriate pre-deployment train-
ing, continuation training and (SERE) equipment to be in place at all times. As part of
preparation personnel should sanitize, if possible, their personal equipment which may
compromise them in captivity. Special attention is to be given to remnants of badges
and insignia on uniforms. Additionally, they should carry items that could assist them
in their survival, evasion and extraction (e.g. money, pointie-talkies, etc.) specic to
theatre as appropriate.
SERE guide / country handbook
0211. SERE guide or a country handbook gives the individuals a good view of the coun-
try and the environmental hazards. It can also describe the different parties in the area
and what to avoid during evasion.
2.5.2 Equipment
0212. The the PR SOPs / SPINS will direct the minimum levels of equipment to be carried
by personnel in the AO taking into account the difference between personnel that is
identied as MRIE and HRIE. Prior to deployment units are to contact the JPRC or PRCC
to establish the correct scale of equipment. It is the responsibility of units to arrive in
theatre fully equipped and trained to conduct their operations. Personnel should, where
possible, be equipped and trained to ensure survivability for up to 72 hours in order to
be subsequently extracted.
Promissory Notes (Blood Chit) Promissory notes give an undertaking by the indi-
viduals government to provide anyone who helps the bearer of the note with a reward of
money, goods or services. No specic value is attached and the bearer is not to promise
any specic reward. To avoid the potential for fraudulent use, it is essential that there
is strict control and accounting of promissory notes. Each note is to be numbered in-
dividually and a record of the custodian established. There should be no signatures or
features that would identify the originating unit. The promissory note should not be left
262
with the individual providing the aid, as there is a risk of punishment by the enemy if
it is discovered that help was given, the promissory note number is to be given to the
helper.
Evasion charts. The PR SOPs / SPINS will detail guidance on whether and how to
evade once one has become isolated. During movement there is a greatly increased risk
of capture and less likelihood that the isolated personnel will be ready to be extracted.
The isolated personnel should only move if environmental conditions allow and/or when
necessary. Consequently most survival moves are likely to be over a short distance.
Land forces will typically have their staff charts to assist them in navigating their eva-
sion. Aircrew will typically be issued evasion charts for this purpose. Evasion charts
are usually available in 1:250,000 or 1:500,000 scale depending on the size of the area of
operations. These scales are not suitable for navigation over short distances. It is likely
that an evasion chart will only be of use for long-term evasion when all other means of
extraction have been exhausted.
Carriage of currency and gold. In some theatres the carriage of currency or gold by
personnel to assist in evasion may be authorised by the individuals government. The
use of currency or gold in order to gain aid or favour(s) should only be contemplated as
a last resort.
Pointie-talkies. A pointie-talkie is a sheet of paper with symbols, pictures and words
in the isolated personnels own language and a variety of other languages that may en-
able some basic communications with the indigenous population. Pointie-talkies should
be used only if contact with the local population is unavoidable.
2.5.3 Mission preparation
General
0213. Prior to missions all personnel must prepare themselves for possible isolation.
This must be standard procedure and should be reected in the PR SOPs / SPINS. Certain
personnel could utilize one EPA for more than one mission.
Sanitisation
0214. Equipment should be reviewed prior to the mission to ensure that personnel do
not carry items that could compromise them in captivity.
Equipment
0215. Prior to going on a mission, personnel should ensure that their equipment and
weapons are properly functioning.
Review ISOPREP
0216. Personnel should review their ISOPREP before they go on a mission to ensure
that they are familiar with the authentication information contained in their ISOPREP.
263
Create or review EPA
0217. Personnel should also create an EPA before going on mission to assist them in
choosing their evasive actions should they become isolated. It also helps the recovery
effort to easier locate the isolated personnel and thus facilitates an expedient recovery.
264
SURVIVAL AND EVASION DURING ISOLATION
265
Chapter 3
SURVIVAL AND EVASION
DURING ISOLATION
3.1 Introduction
0301. During ones isolation the isolated personnel can, in different ways, support the
ve tasks of PR (report locate support recover reintegrate). This chapter will
focus on four of these tasks but also reects survival and evasion issues. Reintegration
will be covered in Chapter 4.
3.2 Report and immediate actions
0302. Personnel that have become isolated should attempt as soon as possible to notify
any friendly force via methods described in the PR SOPs / SPINS or any other method
available, depending on the situation.
3.2.1 Ground personnel
0303. Ground personnel will act in accordance with the operations PR SOP.
Immediate actions.
a. Report through the Command and Control (C
2
) chain in accordance with SOPs.
b. If able, move away from threat or hazard.
c. If possible stay by your vehicle.
d. Check for any signicant injury and carry out essential rst aid.
e. If unable to move due to injury consider use of the radio to inform C
2
.
f. Seek cover, camouage yourself and your equipment.
g. If possible attempt to conceal unnecessary equipment.
h. Sanitize yourself but retain any items necessary for survival and evasion.
266
3.2 Report and immediate actions
i. If applicable and possible Rendezvous Point (RV) with any other team members
and assess the situation.
j. If appropriate consider moving to a better location.
k. Assess the benets of another location with the increased chance of detection
whilst moving.
l. Once isolated personnel have a place to hide, they should only move to evade the
enemy, prevent environmental injury or establish communications. However, they
should also be ready to move immediately with their equipment after sanitizing
their hiding place.
m. Act according to EPA and/or SOPs.
Communication. In most circumstances ground personnel are likely to have commu-
nications with their normal chain of command for their initial report. Most ground units
will not have a capability to talk direct with specialized recovery units and will be reliant
on the passage of information through their chain of command. However, there may be a
theatre wide (non-secure) air frequency designated for Close Combat Attack (CCA) / Call
For Fire (CFF) support. This frequency may also be used for reporting in an isolating
event.
3.2.2 Aircrew
Aircrew that becomes isolated will act in accordance with the operations PR SOP. How-
ever, due to the nature of the way they become isolated, they should perform certain
additional actions or may be required to deviate from the PR SOP. Such deviations may
be stated in the PR SOP, but will as a minimum be listed in the PR SPINS.
Immediate actions on the ground
0304. Entry by parachute or forced landing
1
:
a. If able, steer away from habitation and Lines Of Communication (LOC).
b. Upon landing, isolated personnel should check for any signicant injury and carry
out essential rst aid. If unable to move due to injury consider use of the radio to
inform C
2
.
c. If able, move, gather up parachute and Personal Survival Pack (PSP) and seek
cover.
d. Camouage yourself and your equipment.
e. Establish ones exact location (e.g. through the use of a Global Positioning System
(GPS) receiver).
f. Discard the parachute harness and switch on the survival radio.
g. Make an initial call as required by the detailed instructions in the PR SOPs / SPINS.
1
These procedures are dependent on the theatre
267
h. If possible attempt to conceal unnecessary equipment and destroy sensitive equip-
ment if appropriate.
i. Sanitize yourself but retain any items necessary for survival and evasion.
j. If applicable and possible RV with any other crewmembers and assess the situa-
tion.
k. If appropriate consider moving to a better location.
l. Assess the benets of another location with the increased chance of detection
whilst moving.
m. Once isolated personnel have a place to hide, they should only move to evade the
enemy, prevent environmental injury or establish communications. However, they
should also be ready to move immediately with their equipment after sanitizing
their hiding place.
n. Act according to SPINS and EPA.
3.2.3 Radios / beacons
0305. Radios and beacons that comply with STANAG 7007, are the key to early recovery.
Without them, the search for the isolated person, the authentication and the recovery
will be a slower process.
Radio / beacon procedures
0306. The initial call (on ground) should be made as soon as possible / practicable.
The PR SOPs / SPINS will contain specic instructions on the sequence and content of
the initial call. The sequence and content of the initial call are a part of the overall
authentication process. It is desirable that they are completed as expected.
3.2.4 General report
0307. Personnel in communications with the isolated personnel should attempt to
gain as much information to satisfy the requirements of the standard METHANE
or (preferably) the 11-Line report (see volume II Annex J (with explanations). The
JPRC / PRCC need this information to (start to) ll in the Personnel Recovery Incident
Report (PRIR).
3.2.5 Survival
0308. In order to survive, the survivor must identify, understand and cope with the
environmental hazards. As a guideline:
Protection against environment or hostile activity. This can be achieved by the
use of equipment and the environment.
Location. Use all possible means in order to establish own position.
Water. Essential for survival.
Food. Survival without food is possible for at least 30 days. Therefore this is the lowest
priority.
268
3.3 Locate
0309. The order of priority will be dependent upon environmental conditions.
3.2.6 Evasion
Urban environments
0310. Urban environments place a signicantly different and potentially far greater
demand upon the isolated personnel. The likelihood of becoming isolated in close prox-
imity to the local population and hostile elements, perhaps even those responsible for
the hostile activity, is extremely high. Time is critical; the initial actions of any iso-
lated personnel in an urban environment should therefore be focused on allowing their
location and status to be established as quickly as possible by the extraction forces. The
civilian population may be aware of the initial location of the isolated personnel, particu-
larly if the hostile activity has occurred in daylight. The vast majority of such personnel
will move towards the incident. The isolated person cannot be expected to predict the
civilian populations actions.
a. The isolated personnels main effort should be to ensure extraction whilst avoiding
contact with the local population.
b. Furthermore, it is essential that all personnel not positively identied as friendly
forces are assumed to be hostile, and are treated in accordance with Rules of
Engagement (ROE).
c. If possible the isolated person should seek to break away from any crowd.
Non-urban environments
0311. To reduce the chances of being seen by an enemy or by the civilian population,
the isolated person should remove any high-visibility marking from clothing and equip-
ment, apply camouage cream or natural materials to any exposed esh and/or clothing.
Action on imminent capture.
0312. In the event of imminent capture, purge information from radio and GPS re-
ceivers and destroy all compromising information.
3.3 Locate
0313. Location of the isolated person is a critical task for PR operations. Isolated per-
sonnel must be prepared to assist this process by using signalling devices and authen-
tication procedures if requested. Special attention is to be given to the fact that most
personnel has only limited possibilities to signal and / or communicate with with those
who are searching for them or are attempting to recover them. As a part of the initial
call on the radio or other communications device, the isolated personnel should attempt
to pass their location to their chain of command / extraction agencies in such a way that
their location is not revealed to hostile forces.
269
3.3.1 Authentication
0314. Isolated persons will be required to authenticate themselves at any time during
the recovery process. In case of severe doubt, the isolated personnel can seek authen-
tication from the recovery forces. Methods of authentication will be detailed in the
Communication Plan (COMPLAN) / SOPs / SPINS. The method of identication may vary
due to the level of training of the isolated personnel.
3.3.2 Location if no radio available
0315. If no communications can be established, the isolated person should set out a
visual marker. This would be as directed by the COMPLAN / SOPs / SPINS. and may be in
many forms; a letter or symbol, a piece of material or other object set out in a pattern,
or by using an InfraRed (IR) light source.
3.3.3 Evasion
Navigation. In a non-permissive environment, isolated personnel should move with
extreme caution, in principle during the night. The isolated personnel should regularly
change direction and stop to maintain situational awareness. While on the move, RV
have to be identied where evaders should go to in case the group gets spread out.
GPS jamming. Personnel utilizing mobile GPS receivers are to be aware of its limita-
tions. GPS receivers performance can be affected by jamming or environmental restric-
tions. If the GPS receiver does not acquire the appropriate amount of satellite connec-
tions, it may be due to a poor view of the sky or GPS jamming. To counter GPS jamming,
use terrain shielding to remove line- of-sight between the GPS receiver and the sources
of possible jamming. If necessary the GPS receiver may be placed in a shallow depression
to counter ground-based jamming.
3.4 Support
0316. A well equipped and trained isolated personnel can minimise the need of support
to survive. However occasions may arise where support is required
3.4.1 Fire support
0317. Fire support and suppression assets could be used as necessary to create an
environment that permits an immediate extraction. The On Scene Commander (OSC)
/ Rescue Mission Commander (RMC) will coordinate and direct all supporting strike /
suppression sorties and / or ground based re support.
3.4.2 Additional equipment/resupply
0318. Terrain and distance may make it difcult to extract the isolated personnel im-
mediately therefore resupply has to be taken in to consideration.
270
3.5 Extraction
3.4.3 SERE psychology
0319. The chain of command should consider the mental state of the isolated personnel
and where possible offer support and assurance.
3.4.4 Support to family
0320. The chain of command is to ensure that a process is initiated, on a national level
to inform / support isolated personnels next of kin.
3.5 Extraction
0321. Once isolated, personnel should evaluate their situation, equipment, physical
and mental condition to formulate a plan to assist in their extraction. It should, as
much as is practical, follow the intentions that were stated in the EPA.
3.5.1 Actions during extraction procedures
0322. Once an extraction becomes imminent, the isolated personnel should, where pos-
sible, assist in the extraction process by carrying out the following:
a. Prepare to carry out nal authentication procedures with the extraction vehicle(s)
/ force(s).
b. Prepare signalling devices as directed by the RMC. Be prepared to move to the
extraction point.
c. Assist identication as required.
d. Follow all orders given by the extraction force.
e. Position as detailed in EPA or as directed by extraction force.
f. Take actions in accordance with the PR SOPs / SPINS.
Communications with recovery force. Isolated personnel should ensure that they
can get communications from the selected RV. They should remain in cover, listening
on the assigned frequency. Signalling equipment should be prepared as detailed in the
PR SOPs / SPINS, making sure primary, secondary and tertiary devices are ready for
immediate use. All kit should be secured, and weapons made safe and holstered/slung.
Helicopter and land forces extraction/ RV selection of extraction site/ RV. If
possible choose an RV site that gives you good overview of the surrounding area. Make
sure that you can see the RV as early as possible in order to challenge their identity.
271
3.5.2 Helicopter recovery
Selection of helicopter landing site
0323. The isolated personnel should always try to be aware of suitable areas for a heli-
copter to land. Opportunities for a recovery may occur at any time, even when personnel
are on the move. If a suitable Helicopter Landing Site (HLS) cannot be identied, the
isolated personnel should inform the recovery force who may adjust tactics to enable a
recovery to be completed.
Vectoring helicopters
0324. The isolated personnel may be able to see or hear the recovery vehicle before it
sees their signal. If heard they can give general vectors to their location i.e. I hear a
helicopter to my south. If the helicopter is visible to the isolated personnel, they can
use an orientated compass to give the aircraft a heading to their location, (i.e. Steer 270,
steer 245, continue on heading) or use the clock method (i.e. steer to your 10 o clock).
3.5.3 Authentication
0325. In the last stages of an extraction, the isolated personnel should expect to be
authenticated again. When advised that an extraction is imminent, they should keep
monitoring the radio and prepare for the recovery vehicle according to the PR / SOPs /
SPINS.
3.5.4 Extraction tactics
0326. Members from the extraction force will move to the isolated personnel and au-
thenticate them. The isolated personnel must comply with their instructions. The iso-
lated personnel should never move towards the extraction force unless told to do so.
Depending on the situation, personnel may be restrained and carried to the recovery
vehicle.
272
3.5 Extraction
Reintegration
273
Chapter 4
Reintegration
0401. On completion of the recovery phase of the operation, the isolated personnel
should be taken to a pre-assigned medical facility for the rst phase of reintegration.
Plans should be exible enough to allow for changing medical and operational require-
ments. It is imperative that the recovered isolated personnel are debriefed at the ear-
liest opportunity. Lessons learned from the recovered isolated personnel should be for-
warded to the JPRC and disseminated to all appropriate force levels.
0402. The isolated personnel must be prepared to provide tactical intelligence and
SERE information immediately upon return to a secure area (medical condition depen-
dent).
0403. Where appropriate data in the memory of communications and navigational
equipment used in the recovery phase should be downloaded for subsequent analysis.
The isolated personnels radio and other equipment should be segregated for testing to
provide information for detailed investigation. The lessons learned from one recovery
may aid future missions. Each nation should consider the appropriate reintegration
package for their personnel and next of kin.
274
Conduct after capture
275
Chapter 5
Conduct after capture
0501. The overall aim of the Conduct After Capture (CAC) policy is to protect life and
information. Each member nations CAC policy may differ therefore isolated personnel
are to conduct themselves in accordance with their own national policy. However, as it
is not uncommon to operate in joint and combined teams, even at low levels, personnel
has to be aware of the fact that their actions during captivity may pose a threat to their
comrades. The JPRC may therefore provide CAC guidance in the PR SOP.
276
Isolated personnel training
277
Chapter 6
Isolated personnel training
0601. The total training package an individual receives should be in balance with the
risk of isolation and exploitation that person has.
6.1.1 Levels of training
0602. NATO has identied three levels of SERE training
Level A: This is the minimum basic level of SERE training, conducted as initial entry
training and prior to the rst operational deployment.
Level B: This is an intermediate level of SERE training, specically for those personnel
identied by nations as at MRIE.
Level C: This is an advanced level of SERE training, specically for those personnel
identied by nations as at HRIE.
Details of the SERE training levels can be found in Annex F
Prior to departure nations should provide individuals deploying to a NATO AO with ap-
propriate environmental survival training (i.e. specic to that region). Operational area
specic captivity training should also be provided. This training should cover the fol-
lowing topics and will be provided/tailored i.a.w. national specics.
6.2.1 Theatre specic training
0603. Following areas should be reected during theatre specic training:
a. Theatre recovery procedures.
b. Threat from captivity.
c. Legal status of individual and specic legal aspects.
278
6.3 In-theatre training
d. Rules of engagement (ROE).
e. Equipment.
f. Procedures: radio, extraction, etc..
g. PR principles.
h. Intel.
i. Theatre specic Protection, Location, Water, Food (PLWF).
j. Overview concerning the datas
1
of the country to be deployed.
k. History
2
.
l. Religion(s).
m. Language(s).
n. Vaccination program.
o. Practical use of personal weapons.
p. First aid training.
To achieve operational readiness, training exercises must be conducted to:
a. Validate the PR SOP.
c. Adapt procedures to the AO. Continuation training in order to maintain opera-
tional readiness must be conducted by individual persons as required to assure
the best chances of success in the event of a recovery operation.
d. Identify optimum TTPs to facilitate recovery.
6.3 In-theatre training
6.3.1 Prior to conducting operation
0604. Upon arrival in the AO, the primary focus of SERE training is on acclimatisation
and becoming accustomed to the AO. If personnel are not familiar with in theatre PR
procedures, they are to receive appropriate briengs as soon as possible. This is also the
time for nalising any preparation that has not been conducted prior entering the AO.
6.3.2 Refresher training
0605. Personnel should receive refresher or continuation training while in the AO. Con-
tinuation training should encompass academics (review PR SOP, SPINS, etc.) as well as
practical exercises (e.g. conducting an actual recovery during a eld exercise).
1
Position, size, borders, climate, currency, population gure, etc..
2
Major historical events, beginning of the conict, political & economical situation, manners & practise,
United Nations (UN) CoC, situation of refugees (if any), etc.
ISOPREP
279
Annex A
ISOPREP
A.0.3 ISOPREP form (electronic)
Personal Details. An authentication number and 4 personal statements are to be
entered into the boxes (1 15 and 20 24) on the front part of the form. The boxes num-
bered 16 19 are for use by the JPRC in the event of the individual becoming isolated.
Theatre specic items may be required to be added to the additional comments box. A
blank ISOPREP is shown in gures A.1 and A.2.
Authentication Number. The individuals personal authentication number must be
4 digits. Zeros are not to be used as the isolated person may need to signal his personal
authentication number using a series of torch ashes. The number should not contain
duplicated numbers, a sequence of more than 2 digits and should not be from the in-
dividuals service number, date of birth. It must be a number that the isolated person
can recall even at times of great stress. It may be used for authentication by a recovery
helicopter crew or ground recovery team, as it is quick and unique to the individual. An
example of authentication using the personal authentication number would be asking
a question requiring the isolated person to provide the sum of 2 or more digits of the
personal authentication number.
Personal Authentication Statements. Personnel are to use declarative statements,
not a set of questions and answers. The statements should include personal details that
are easy to remember, and that are not subject to change. Details of friends, relatives
(not immediate family) pets, vehicles and holidays are also an option. The 4 statements
must be in simple English so that it may be understood by foreign-speaking recovery
teams, who are unlikely to understand jargon, slang or colloquial English. Avoid refer-
ences to dates, ages (or other information from your military records or public informa-
tion) religious, political or otherwise contentious subjects. Any references to current in-
formation, such as my current car is a Ford, should be avoided as the facts may change
before personnel can update their ISOPREP. Ensure that 4 questions and answers may
be derived from each statement. The recovery forces are usually passed only 2 of the 4
statements. This is to ensure that some statements are still available for further rescue
attempts.
Photograph and Fingerprints. The photograph is to be a current likeness of the
face. No headdress is to be worn. Digital copies are to be forwarded to the JPRC / PRCC
by e-mail when requested. Faxed copied are not to be sent as they are not sufciently
280
A.1 ISOPREP form
clear for purposes of identication. The photograph and ngerprints are available as
nal proofs of identity for recovery teams, but it is more likely to be used to identify
the deceased or insensible, or for use by Unconventional Assisted Recovery. Other than
when required after an isolating event, the ISOPREPs sent to the JPRC are not to contain
photographs or ngerprint data.
A.0.4 Procedures for completion of ISOPREPs
0266. ISOPREPs are to be completed at unit level initially and reviewed by individuals
every six months. ISOPREPs should be lled in by all deployed forces. As a minimum,
ISOPREPs are required for all PIERIE.
A.0.5 Sending of ISOPREPs and EPAs to the PRCC
To enable rapid handling and sorting of the many ISOPREPs and EPA held by units and
the JPRC / PRCC, it is important that all electronic documents arrive with the same
format of labelling.
a. E-Mails Containing EPA. EPA, Callsign, Aircraft Type, Base Name, Air Tasking
Order (ATO) Day (e.g., EPA, ZIPPY 43, GR7, Al Jaber, ATO-L).
b. EPA Documents. Callsign, Aircraft Type, Base Name, ATO Day (e.g., ZIPPY 43,
GR7, Al Jaber, ATO-L).
c. E-Mail Containing ISOPREPs. ISOPREP, Aircraft Type, Sqn, Base (e.g.,ISOPREP,
E3D, 8-23 Sqn, PSAB).
d. ISOPREP Documents. Surname, First name, Middle Initial (e.g., Bigglesworth,
John, W).
A.1 ISOPREP form
ISOPREP
281
Section 9: CONFIDENTIAL (When blocks 50-55 ae !ille"#
$eason:
Declassi!% On: &e'io(s E"ition Obsolete ($e)lace tho(*h attition#
SECTION 1 - PERSONAL INFORMATION
A+T,O$IT-:
&$INCI&AL &+$&OSE(S#: To )otect eco'e% !oces !o. ene.% enta).ent an" !acilitate the eco'e% o! isolate" )esons/
$O+TINE +SE(S#: To be co.)lete" b% "esi*nate" )esonnel s(b0ect to isolation "(e to hostile acti'it%/ Contains )esonal in!o.ation that .a% be (se" to ens(e )ositi'e i"enti!ication/ The !o. 1ill be
(nclassi!ie"2o!!icial (se onl%/ 3locks 504554564 574 584 an" 55 ae o)tional blocks an" ae onl% (tili9e" 1hen "iecte" b% (nit SO& o Se'ice "octine/ When blocks 504554564 574 584 an" 55 ae co.)lete"
this !o. beco.es classi!ie" CONFIDENTIAL an" .(st be han"le" a))o)iatel%/ This !o. .a% onl% be tans.itte" 'ia o!!icial e.ail acco(nts/
DISCLOS+$E IS :ANDATO$-: The in!o.ation is necessa% since it a!!ects the entie )esonnel eco'e% )ocess/ E;ce)tions on "isclos(e ae .a"e !o *o'en.ent contactos/
5a/ LAST NA:E <

5b/ FI$ST NA:E <

5c/ :I

6/ =O 3- NA:E

7/ =ENDE$ < 8/ =$ADE < 5/SSN

>/ COALITION ID

?/ DO3 (----::DD# <

@/ 3$ANC, OF SE$AICE 2 A=ENC- 2 DE&T < 9/ C+$$ENT +NIT <

50/ 3LOOD
T-&E <
55/ ,EI=,T <
inches
56/ WEI=,T
lb/
57/ ,AI$ COLO$ < 58/ E-E COLO$ < 55/ ET,NIC =$O+&

5>/ CITIBENS,I& <: a/
b/ OT,E$:
5?/ ACCENT

5@/ $ELI=IO+S &$EFE$ENCE

59/ 3LOOD C,IT N+:3E$

60/ IDENTIF-IN= SCA$S2:A$CS2TATTOOS <

65/ CNOWN :EDICAL CONDITIONS AND &$ESC$I&TIONS

SECTION 2 - UNIFORM DATA
66/ S,I$T SIBE: 67/ &ANT SIBE: 68/ ,AT SIBE: 65/ 3OOT T-&E: 6>/ 3OOT SIBE: 6?/ 3OOT WIDT,:
SECTION 3 - TRAINING / CAPABILITY DATA
SE$E T$N= a/ T-&E b/ -EA$ (----# c/ :ONT, "/ LOCATION 2 OT,E$ e/ CO::ENTS
6@/ T$N=-5 2
69/ T$N=-6 2
70/ T$N=-7 2
75/ &$I:A$- LAN=+A=E
CA&A3ILIT-
a/ LAN=+A=E: OT,E$: b/ $EADIN=: c/ W$ITIN=: "/ S&EACIN=:
e/ CO::ENTS:
76/ OT,E$ LAN=+A=E CA&A3ILITIES:
SECTION 4 - REINTEGRATION INFORMATION
77/ &$I:A$- NEDT OF CIN 78/ &A$ENT NO/ 5 (Contactos O)tional# 75/ &A$ENT NO/ 6 (Contactos O)tional#
a/ NA:E: a/ NA:E: a/ NA:E:
b/ ADD$ESS: b/ ADD$ESS: b/ ADD$ESS:
c/ CIT-: c/ CIT-: c/ CIT-:
"/ STATE: e/ BI&: "/ STATE: e/ BI&: "/ STATE: e/ BI&:
!/ TELE&,ONE: !/ TELE&,ONE: !/ TELE&,ONE:
*/ SA:E AS: &A$ENT NO/ 5 &A$ENT NO/ 6 7?/ ,O:E OF $ECO$D (Contactos O)tional# 7@/ S&ECIAL FA:IL- SIT+ATIONS
7>/ C,ILD$EN AT ,O:E (Contactos O)tional# b/ ADD$ESS:
a/ NA:E(S#: c/ CIT-:
c/ DO3(S# "/ STATE: e/ BI&:
SECTION 5 - JPRC / PRCC USE ONLY
79/ DATE :ISSIN= (----::DD#

80/ DATE $ECOAE$ED (----::DD#

85/ DATE ENTE$ED $EINTE=$ATION (----::DD#

86/ DATE $ELEASED TO +NIT CONT$OL
(----::DD#
87/ NOTES:

SECTION 6 - ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
88a/ LEFT FIN=E$&$INTS: 88b/ $I=,T FIN=E$&$INTS:
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CONFIDENTIAL (When blocks 50-55 ae !ille" in#
Figure A.1: ISOPREP page 1
44c. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

44d. CONTRACTOR INFORMATION: COMPANY NAME: COMPANY POC:
SECTION 7 PHOTOS
45. FRONT FULL DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPH 46.RIGHT PROFILE DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPH
SECTION 8 - REVIEW INFORMATION
47. DATE COMPLETED (YYYYMMDD) 48. DATE REVIEWED (YYYYMMDD) 4!. "IGNATURE:
SECTION 9 - PERSONAL AUTHENTICATION INFORMATION
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50. (C) PER"ONAL AUTHENTICATION "TATEMENT 9:

5:. (C) PER"ONAL AUTHENTICATION "TATEMENT 9;

5;. (C) PER"ONAL AUTHENTICATION "TATEMENT 92

52. (C) PER"ONAL AUTHENTICATION "TATEMENT 94

54. (C) AUTHENTICATION
9
55. (C) PER"ONAL DURE"" WORD

56. (C) ADDITIONAL AUTHENTICATION INFORMATION

Figure A.2: ISOPREP page 2
282
A.1 ISOPREP form
EPA
283
Annex B
EPA
B.0.1 EPA
The EPA is a course of action developed by individuals or groups of individuals before
executing a mission in a hostile area. By providing recovery forces with an insight into
the intentions of the isolated personnel, the EPA can greatly improve the chances of a
successful recovery. The EPA should include information on the agreed plan from imme-
diate actions through to recovery procedures. The individual or individuals compiling
the EPA should consult the following information sources:
a. PR SPINS.
b. PR SOP.
c. Intelligence personnel.
d. Survival equipment personnel.
e. Unit SERE staff.
B.0.2 EPA form (electronic)
Examples of blank and completed EPA and examples are paragraph B.
B.0.3 Completion and handling EPAs
EPAs are to be completed at unit level initially and briefed to all aircrew on a mission.
EPA are required for all aircraft ying or at risk of ying over hostile or uncertain terri-
tory. Aircraft on airtest or route ying into the AO but not entering hostile or uncertain
operating environments are not required to complete EPA. One EPA per aircraft mission
is required, multi-crew aircraft aircrew are not required to complete individual EPAs.
SPINS may require that the EPA are held by the unit or are lodged with the PRCC before
mission launch.
Non-aircrew are also to ll in an EPA. However, certain information in the standard EPA
form is not available or applicable to non-aicrew. That information may be left blank.
Special attenton is to be give to the survival equipment section as that information may
be critical to the successful execution of a recovery mission if personnel has become
isolated.
284
B.1 EPA form
B.1 EPA form

Page 1 of 21

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Completed)

EVASION PLAN OF ACTION (EPA)

MISSION IDENTIFICATION

DATE
PREPARED
MISSION DATE /
DAY
MISSION
NUMBER
CALLSIGN AIRCRAFT
DEPARTURE BASE
/ LOCATION

UNIT AC INITIAL REVIEW BY CSRO / INTO EPA POC

CREW IDENTIFICATION

CALL SIGN
IDENTIFIER
RANK
NAME
CREW
POSITION
RADIO
TYPE
PLS #
BLOOD
CHIT #
ALLERGIES

AUTHENTICATION

CSAR NUMBER CSAR LETTER CSAR WORD CSAR DURESS WORD

LOCATION

SARNEG SARDOT 01
BASE 02
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

CSAR FREQUENCIES / SIGNALS

CSAR A SIGNALS : PRIMARY ALTERNATE
MHz
DAY :

CSAR B NIGHT :

MHz
RECOVERY ACTIVATION SIGNAL (RAS) :

SIGNAL PROCEDURES (NON RADIO)

COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES

Figure B.1: EPA page 1
EPA
285

Page 2 of 21

SURVIVAL LIFE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT ( ITEMIZED LIST )

SURVIVAL VEST:

SURVIVAL KIT:

INDIVIDUAL KIT:

DAR & SAFE INFORMATION

LEGAL GUIDANCE

EVASION INTENTIONS ( NONPERMISSIVE )

IMMEDIATE EVASION INTENTIONS:
EXTENDED EVASION INTENTIONS:

ADDITIONAL DATA

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Completed
Figure B.2: EPA page 2
286
B.1 EPA form
Notication checklist
287
Annex C
Notication checklist
C.1 Aircrew
While in the air
a. Turn toward friendly forces, Designated Area of Recovery (DAR) or minimumthreat
area.
When on the ground
a. Establish radio contact according to SPINS. When radio communications are estab-
lished the following information should be transmitted:
(a) Callsign.
(b) Position.
(c) Course.
(d) Speed.
(e) Altitude.
(f) Problems and intentions.
(g) Alter Identication Friend or Foe (IFF) equipment according to SPINS.
C.2 Non-aircrew
As soon as personnel is aware of the fact that he has become isolated, he should attempt
to notify the JPRC / PRCC through the means and ways as described by the SPINS or
through the chain of command. The isolated personnel should attempt to give as a
minimum the following information
1
:
a. Identity.
b. Current or last known position.
c. Condition.
d. Intentions.
1
This is a short and simple checklist, but it does not contain a lot of information. Non-aircrew can also
use the standard 11-liner and leave out any unknown information. Proposals are welcome.
288
C.2 Non-aircrew
Isolated personnel initial action checklist
289
Annex D
Isolated personnel initial action
checklist
a. Administering rst aid (for life threatening injuries).
b. Destroying classied material and sensitive equipment or weapons.
c. Concealing unnecessary equipment and move to cover.
d. Determining location.
e. Establishing initial communications with friendly forces. All future communica-
tions should be in accordance with appropriate procedures (e.g. EPA, SPINS, etc.)
using the reporting formats given in AnnexE.
290
Report formats
291
Annex E
Report formats
new annex
E.1 PR 11-line report
As a minimum, the designated Airborne Mission Coordinator (AMC) uses this checklist
to gather information and relay it to the Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC), JPRC
/PRCC, and the Personnel Recovery Task Force (PRTF). All aircraft should have this
checklist available and use it as appropriate during a PR incident.
# Action Data
Command
2 Location .....
Source .....
Time* .....
No)
and by what means)
6 OSC / Bingo / Loadout / Point
Of Contact (POC) (Who is re-
porting and means of com-
munication)
7 # Chutes Seen
8 Cause of incident
b) .....
E.2 METHANE report
The METHANE report is the basic, minimum, report that all personnel in theatre
should be able to pass through whatever channel is available to their unit and / or the
JPRC / PRCC:
292
E.2 METHANE report
a. Callsign (Whos reporting) M
b. Exact location E
c. Type (cause) of incident T
d. Hazards (re, mines, enemies) H
e. Access to the spot A
f. Number and status of isolated personnel N
g. Emergency service required type of injuries E
The NATO SERE training standard
293
Annex F
The NATO SERE training
standard
F.1 General
Both practical and theoretical training to an agreed standard is paramount to the suc-
cess of any North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) operation. In order to achieve the
same training standard amongst the membership nations this document will describe
the minimum requirements of NATO SERE training. This training complements normal
Force Protection measures, which are not mandated by this document.
The NATO SERE training is based on the intention to deliver as efcient information
and/or training as possible. The main difference between the different training levels
is the amount of training and information which will be provided. The diagram of this
concept has been displayed in the gure below.
A
B
C SERE
Instructor
SpeciaIist Instructor
F
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Figure F.1: The NATO SERE training concept
SERE is part of the NATO PR / Joint Personnel Recovery (PR) as described in the basic
document AJP-3.3.9. This Standard NATO Agreement (STANAG) focuses on the Isolated
Personnel part as laid out in gure F.2.
F.2 Responsibilities
Experience has shown that personnel may become isolated and potentially face capture,
captivity and exploitation by governmental and non-governmental organizations which
294
F.3 Scope
ignore Geneva Conventions or other Human Rights Conventions. Therefore personnel
need to be able to survive the environment and theatre of operation whilst evading
capture and preparing for extraction. They should be able to resist exploitation and
escape if captured.
Consequently NATO Nations are to provide a basic level of SERE training to all deploy-
able forces. Additionally they are to identify selected personnel who are considered to be
PIERIE. These personnel require a higher level of training because of their moderate or
high risk of isolation, capture and exploitation, and should be provided with the appro-
priate level of training as dened in this document (para F.4). These PIERIE personnel
may include, but are not limited to, units or personnel operating in small numbers or at
range from own forces (e.g., Special Operations Forces, long-range reconnaissance patrol
members, aircrew).
SERE
Survive environment Survive threat Survive theatre
Figure F.2: The NATO SERE structure
Before entering the Joint Operations Area (JOA), acnato and participating forces are to
be trained and prepared for their appropriate level of PR operations. Hence, the Force
Commander or Component Commander shall be aware of the levels of SERE training of
the Units under their Command.
F.3 Scope
This training provides the SERE skills required from the point at which personnel be-
come isolated, (typically for aircrew this is from the point of man/seat separation or
forced landing and in the case of non-aircrew, when they become separated from their
unit or upon exiting their vehicle). To standardise operational procedures within NATO,
personnel receive doctrine, theoretical and practical training in the following areas:
a. Survive the Environment in a permissive and non-permissive environment.
Conduct Land Survival training.
Conduct Maritime Survival training.
Conduct environmental training.
Safety and Survival Equipment Training.
b. Survive the Threat in a non-permissive environment.
Evade a hostile force or element.
Survive in captivity as a POW or hostage following capture.
Resist exploitation, including interrogation.
Escape captivity.
Prepare for extraction by PR assets or non-conventional recovery.
c. Survive the Theatre.
295
Conduct theatre specic training
Understand the geography, including cultural aspects, topography and cli-
mate.
Understand theatre PR / JPRC procedures.
Understand potential motives and modus operandi of military, governmental
and criminal elements that may enforce captivity on individuals.
SERE is individual training that is complementary to the 5 tasks of PR (Report, Locate,
Support, Recover and Reintegrate).
F.4 SERE training levels
To allow isolated personnel to be extracted by Joint Personnel Recovery (PR) forces and
increase the likelihood of success, SERE training is conducted at the following levels:
SERE level A: This is the minimum basic level of SERE academic training, conducted as
initial entry training and prior to the rst operational deployment, which intro-
duces potential isolated personnel to the concepts of SERE operations, policy and
doctrine.
SERE level B: This is an intermediate level of SERE academic and application training,
specically for those personnel identied by nations at moderate risk of capture
and exploitation.
SERE level C: This is an advanced level of SERE academic and application training,
specically for those personnel identied by nations at high risk of capture and
exploitation. This level must include practical resistance training.
These levels of training are to be supplemented by theatre-specic, pre-deployment and
continuation SERE training.
F.5 Student training objectives
Within SERE training a student must be taught, understand and practise techniques
and procedures to:
a. Survival
Ensure immediate survival.
Maintain psychological and physiological well-being.
Maintain normal body temperature.
Maintain adequate hydration.
Maintain sufcient caloric intake.
b. Evasion
Use location aids.
Avoid detection whilst static and mobile.
Conduct evasion plan of action.
296
F.6 Instructor requirements
c. Resistance
Assess conditions of capture.
Protect sensitive information.
Mitigate physical and mental stress.
Maintain self and others (survive with dignity).
Limit the degree to which you are exploited.
Attempt to escape.
d. Extraction
Aid rescue.
Establish communications with friendly forces.
Carry out RV Procedures.
Carry out extraction procedures.
The preceding paragraphs dene the SERE operational standard and skills required
by NATO personnel to Survive, Evade, Resist and Extract in a permissive and non-
permissive environment. The methods of training delivery will be determined by in-
dividual nations, however, the minimum amount of training required for Level A, B and
C training qualications are dened at Annex A. All training should be conducted us-
ing the same personal equipment that an individual would be issued during operations.
TRAIN AS YOU FIGHT.
F.6 Instructor requirements
F.6.1 SERE instructor
Deliver Theory and Practical SERE Training
a. Deliver theoretical instruction on National SERE+PR organisation.
b. Deliver theoretical and practical survival training
(a) Land survival training
(b) Maritime survival training, including pool and sea drills if applicable (not
Helicopter Underwater Egress Trainer (HUET)/STASS).
c. Teach permissive and non-permissive survival, combat recovery operations tech-
niques.
d. Deliver theory and practical training on survival equipment.
e. Deliver theory and practical training on evasion and extraction.
f. Deliver theoretical resistance and escape training (if applicable to nations).
g. Deliver aircrewemergency drills training if applicable, fromman/seat or man/vehicle
separation or in conjunction with a forced landing.
h. Organise, administer and supervise SERE training, including production of train-
ing documentation.
297
Provide Operational Support
Produce and deliver theatre specic basic survival theory, environmental and resis-
tances briengs.
Pre-training
Complete national instructional techniques training courses. Instructors are to have
received SERE level C training.
F.6.2 Advanced SERE instructor
In addition to the competencies identied in Para F.6.1, an advanced SERE instructor
must be qualied in at least one of the following:
a. Deliver training in at least one of the following areas in addition to their own
national environment.
(a) Desert
(b) Jungle
(c) Arctic + winter
(d) Mountain
b. Or deliver practical resistance and exploitation exercises.
c. Or complete PR training course (US PR301) or equivalent.
F.7 Level A
Applicability. This level of SERE training is the initial-entry PR training for all per-
sonnel involved in military operations who are trained but not equipped and therefore
will employ Combat Recovery (CR) techniques.
Purpose. To give each participant the basic theoretical knowledge;
a. about the NATO PR concept,
b. to optimise their survival using personal equipment and the natural environment,
c. to increase ones readiness for a captivity situation,
d. to increase their chances of a successful recovery / extraction.
a. Survival
Knowledge about Basic survival - PLWF.
Awareness of physiological factors that limit the human body in a survival
situation.
Awareness of how temporary factors
1
affect personal capabilities.
1
e.g. rst aid, environment, water, food, hygiene, etc.
298
F.8 Level B
Ability to use personal equipment to optimise chances of survival.
b. Evasion
Understanding of the principles of evasion.
c. Resistance
Understanding of the Geneva Convention concerning treatment of prison-
ers.
Rudimentary knowledge of Governmental and non Governmental captivity
and understand the difference between POW and Hostage.
Awareness of the stages of capture and the concepts of:
Protection of information,
Protection of life,
Escape
in order to return with dignity.
d. Extraction
Ability to report location.
Awareness of the techniques for signalling position using improvised methods
Knowledge of Search And Rescue (SAR) and CR concepts.
Training method Level A SERE can be taught on a distributed basis at unit level. It
need not be taught by a SERE instructor and may be delivered using some or all of the
following methods: Video, DVD, Computer Based Training (CBT) or other instructional
media.
F.8 Level B
Applicability. This level of SERE training is the intermediate level for specically se-
lected personnel who are prone to isolation, capture and exploitation and at moderate
risk. These personnel are to be trained to fully comply with either PR or Combat Recov-
ery Procedures dependant upon their level of personal equipment.
Purpose. To give each participant the theoretical and limited practical knowledge,
through demonstrations, to conduct the following PR skills and techniques:
a. Show a full understanding of the NATO PR concept.
b. Survive and move against a hunter force.
c. Resist exploitation in a Governmental and non Governmental captivity situation.
d. Use operational personal equipment and the natural environment in order to affect
Extraction.
a. Survival
Performing immediate actions required after bail-out, ditching, forced land-
ing, or other distress situations.
299
Understanding of the principals of PLWF and take account effects of:
human factors (physiological and psychological).
temporary factors (e.g. rst aid, environment, water, food, hygiene, etc.).
b. Evasion
Ability to complete an EPA.
Understanding of evasion techniques, camouage/concealment, navigation and
specialist survival equipment (e.g. blood chit, pointee talkee).
Theoretical understanding of the GPS system and individual GPS equipment.
c. Resistance
ers.
Understanding of the psychological and legal aspects of captivity.
Understanding how to resist exploitation in both a Governmental and non
Governmental captivity exercise.
Understanding of the stages of capture and the concepts of:
Protection of life,
Escape
d. Extraction
Ability to complete their own ISOPREP.
Knowledge of PR / CR procedures as appropriate.
Understanding of SPINS.
Ability to operate Personal Locator Beacons (PLBs) and comply with commu-
nication / authentication procedures in a eld exercise.
Knowledge of recovery procedures (air, land or sea).
Training method Level B academic training and demonstrations are delivered by
SERE instructors. Although this training is mainly conducted in a classroom setting,
students must be afforded the opportunity to participate using demonstrations and syn-
dicates to practice techniques and the use of operational equipment. Resistance training
at this level is not conducted through a practical captivity exercise. However, it should
allow students to practice resistance techniques by means of experiential role plays in
an academic setting. This level may be divided into Level B Combat Recovery and Level
B PR, recognizing that the IP is trained but may or may not be equipped i.e. they may
not posses a PLB.
F.9 Level C
Applicability. This level of SERE training is the advanced level for specically selected
personnel who are prone to isolation, capture and exploitation and at highest risk. These
personnel are to be trained and equipped to fully comply with PR Recovery Procedures.
300
F.9 Level C
Purpose. To give each participant the theoretical and practical knowledge, through a
practical eld exercise, to conduct the following PR skills and techniques:
a. Show a full understanding of the NATO PR concept.
b. Survive and move against a hunter force.
c. Resist exploitation in a Governmental and non Governmental captivity situation.
d. Use operational personal equipment and the natural environment in order to affect
Extraction.
a. Survival
Performing immediate actions required after bail-out, ditching, forced land-
ing, or other distress situations.
Ability to apply the principals of PLWF and take account effects of:
human factors (physiological and psychological).
temporary factors (e.g. rst aid, environment, water, food, hygiene, etc.).
b. Evasion
Ability to complete an EPA.
Ability to conduct evasion techniques, camouage/concealment, navigation
and specialist survival equipment (e.g. blood chit, pointee talkee).
Thorough understanding of the GPS system and individual GPS equipment.
c. Resistance
ers.
Application of the psychological and legal aspects of captivity.
Understanding and demonstrating the ability to resist exploitation in both a
Governmental and non Governmental captivity exercise.
Thorough understanding of the stages of capture and the concepts of:
Protection of life,
Escape
d. Extraction
Ability to complete their own ISOPREP.
Working knowledge of PR procedures as appropriate.
Understanding of SPINS.
Demonstrating the ability to operate PLBs and comply with communication /
authentication procedures in a eld exercise.
Ability to perform recovery procedures (air, land or sea).
301
Training Method This academic and practical training is delivered by SERE in-
structors within specialist schools as part of a theoretical package and a realistic
eld exercise using operational equipment and involving a hunter force that lasts
approximately 72 hours including a simulated captive environment of no less than
12 hours in order for students to develop robust coping mechanisms and demon-
strate resistance techniques in a realistic environment. Furthermore, students
need to be combat conditioned prior to entering the simulated captivity environ-
ment. This conditioning provides the student with battle fatigue and should be
linked to the realistic combat environment they are likely to be in. The simulated
captivity environment should provide the stages of capture they are likely to expe-
rience.
F.10 Pre-deployment training
Generic levels (i.e. A, B, C) do not necessarily prepare individuals for operations in
specic areas. Therefore having completed the appropriate level of SERE training
an individual must conduct a theatre specic pre-deployment training. This train-
ing should cover the following topics and will be provided/tailored i.a.w. national
specics:
(a) Theatre Recovery Procedures;
(b) Threat from captivity;
(c) Legal status of individual and specic legal aspects;
(d) ROE;
(e) Equipment;
(f) Procedures: radio, extraction, etc.;
(g) Personal recovery/ PR principles.;
(h) Intel;
(i) Theatre specic PLWF
i. Overview concerning the datas
2
of the country to be deployed;
ii. History
3
;
iii. Religions;
iv. Language(s);
(j) Vaccination program;
(k) Practical use of personal weapons;
(l) First aid training
The pre-deployment brieng provides the minimum level of continuation train-
ing. Its in the nature of modern conicts and asymmetric warfare that lethal
actions can hardly be predicted. Hence its paramount that every personnel which
is planned to be deployed has received a pre-deployment training regardless how
long the person will stay in theatre.
2
Position, size, borders, climate, currency, population gure, etc.
3
Major historical events, beginning of the conict, political & economical situation, manners & practise,
UN CoC, situation of refugees (if any), etc.;
302
F.11 Continuation training
F.11 Continuation training
To maintain a proper prociency level of SERE skills, personnel rated Level B or
Level Cwill undergo continuation training in accordance with their national policy.
It is recommended to refresh SERE skills at a minimum every four years. This
training is to focus on skills, equipment and procedures.
Acronyms
303
Acronyms
AAA Anti Aircraft Artillery
AAR Air to Air Refuelling
ABCCC Airborne Command, Control and Communications
AC Aircraft
ABFAC Airborne Forward Air Controller
ACC Air Component Commander
ACCS Air Command and Control System
ACL Actual Combat Load
ACO Airspace Control Order
ACM Airspace Control Measures
ACP Air Control Plan
ADF Automatic Direction Finder
AEW Airborne Early Warning
AGL Above Ground Level
AH Attack Helicopter
AHHS Altitude Hover Hold System
AJP Allied Joint Publication
AKA Also Known As
AMC Airborne Mission Coordinator
AMSL Above Mean Sea Level
AO Area of Operations
AOC Air Operation Centre
AOD Air Operations Directive
AOR Area Of Responsibility
ASAP As Soon As Possible
ATC Air Trafc Control
ATD Actual Time of Departure
ATIS Automatic Terminal Information Service
ATM Air Task Message
ATO Air Tasking Order
ATP Allied Tactical Publication
AWACS Airbourne Early Warning and Control System
BCE Battleeld Coordination Element
304
BI-SC Bi Strategic Commands
C
2
Command and Control
C2W Command and Control Warfare
CAC Conduct After Capture
CAOC Combined Air Operations Centre
CAP Combat Air Patrol
CAS Close Air Support
CBRNE Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
CBT Computer Based Training
CC Component Commander
CCA Close Combat Attack
CFF Call For Fire
CHOPS Chief of Operations
CIMIC Civil Military Cooperation
CIS Communication and Information System
CJSOR Combined Joint Status Of Requirements
COA Course of Action
COM Commander
COMCARD Communications Card
COMPLAN Communication Plan
COMSEC Communication Security
CONOPS Concept of Operation
CONPLAN Contingency Plan
COSPAS Cosmicheskaya Systemya Poiska Avariynich Sudov
CPX Command Post Exercise
CR Combat Recovery
CRONOS Crisis Response in NATO Open Systems
CSAR Combat Search And Rescue
CTAPS Contingency Theatre Automated Planning System
CW Continuous Wave
DAR Designated Area of Recovery
DART Downed Aircraft Recovery Team
DF Direction Finder
DME Distance Measuring Equipment
DOB Deployed Operating Base
DOTAH Daily Operations Task Air / Helicopters
DSAR Deployed Search And Rescue
DTG Date / Time Group
EEI Essential Elements of Information
EF Extraction Force
ELT Emergency Location Transmitter
Acronyms
305
EMCON Emission Control
EOB Electronic Order of Battle
EPA Evasion Plan of Action
ETA Estimated Time of Arrival
ETD Estimated Time of Departure
ETE Estimate Time En-route
EVC Evasion Chart
EW Electronic Warfare
FARP Forward Arming and Refuelling Point
FEBA Forward Edge of the Battle Area
FLIR Forward Looking InfraRed
FLOT Forward Line Own Troops
FM Frequency Modulation
FOB Forward Operating Base
FOL Forward Operating Location
FRAGO Fragmentation Order
FW Fixed Wing
GBR United Kingdom (The acronym obviously stands for Great Brittain,
but it actually refers to the United Kingdom)
GCCS Global Command and and Control System
GEOREF Geographical Reference
GPS Global Positioning System
GTAS Ground-To-Air Signals
HAR Helicopter Aerial Refuelling
HCP Helicopter Contact Point
HF High Frequency
HIRSS Hover InfraRed Suppression System
HLS Helicopter Landing Site
HQ Headquarters
HRIE High Risk of Isolation and / or Exploitation
HRO Hostage Release Operations
HUET Helicopter Underwater Egress Trainer
HUMINT Human Intelligence
IAD Integrated Air Defence
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
ICC Integrated Command and Control system
ID Identication
IER Information Exchange Requirement
IFF Identication Friend or Foe
IFR Instrument Flying Rules
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions
IMINT Image Intelligence
306
IMO International Maritime Organisation
INS Inertia Navigation System
INTREP Intelligence Report
IP Initial Point
IPB Intelligence Preparation of the Battleeld
IR InfraRed
IRCM InfraRed Counter Measures
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
ISOPREP Isolated Personnel Report
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
JADOCS Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System
JOA Joint Operations Area
JCO Joint Coordination Order
JFC Joint Force Commander
JIC Joint Intelligence Centre
JISE Joint Intelligence Support Element
JOC Joint Operation Centre
JOG Joint Operational Guidelines
JOPG Joint Operations Planning Group
JPR Joint Personnel Recovery
JPRC Joint Personnel Recovery Cell
JSTP Joint Service Training Programme
KFOR Kosovo Force
KIAS Knots Indicated Airspeed
KTS Knots
LCC Land Component Commander
LEGAD Legal Adviser
LIVEX Live Exercise
LKP Last Known Point
LNO Liaison Ofcer
LOC Lines Of Communication
LOP Local Operating Procedure
LS Landing Site
LZ Landing Zone
MASINT Measurement and Signature Intelligence
MC Mission Coordinator
MCC Maritime Component Command
MCCIS Maritime Command, Control and Information System
MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation
MGRS Military Grid Reference System
MISREP Mission Report
Acronyms
307
MNLC Multinational Logistics Centre
MOPP Mission Oriented Protective Posture
MOU Memorandum Of Understanding
MRIE Medium Risk of Isolation and / or Exploitation
MSA Minimum Safe Altitude
MWS Missile Warning System
NAR Non-conventional Assisted Recovery
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NBC Nuclear, Biological, Chemical
NCO Non-Commissioned ofcer
NEO Non-combatant Evacuation Operation
(N)GO (Non) Governmental Organisation
NORDO No Radio
NOTAM Notice to Airmen
NPSO NATO Peace Support Operation
NVD Night Vision Device
NVG Night Vision Goggles
OA Objective Area
OC Operations Centre
OPCON Operational Control
OPFOR Opposing Forces
OPLAN Operation Plan
OPORD Operations Order
OPP Operational Planning Process
Ops Operations
OPSEC Operational Security
OPTASK Operational Task
ORBAT Order of Battle
OSC On Scene Commander
OWC Obstacle Warning Capability
PDSS Person(s) with Designated Special Status
PIERIE Personnel Identied as at an Elevated Risk of Isolation and / or
Exploitation
PIO Press and Information Ofce
PJs Pararescuemen
PLB Personal Locator Beacon
PLS Personal Locator System
PLWF Protection, Location, Water, Food
PMB Personnel Recovery Mission Brief
POB Persons On Board
POC Point Of Contact
POLAD Political Adviser
308
POW Prisoner Of War
PPI Political Planning Indicator
PR Personnel Recovery
PRCC Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell
PRDO Personnel Recovery Duty Ofcer
PRIR Personnel Recovery Incident Report
PRTF Personnel Recovery Task Force
PSP Personal Survival Pack
PSYOPS Psychologal Operations
PUP Pick-Up Point
PUZ Pick-Up Zone
QRF Quick Reaction Force
RAMROD Numerical Encryption Grid
RAS Recovery Activation Signals
RESCAP Rescue Combat Air Patrol
RESCORT Rescue Escort
RFI Request For Information
RMC Rescue Mission Commander
ROE Rules of Engagement
ROEIMPL ROE Implementation
ROZ Restricted Operation Zone
RV Rendezvous Point
RW Rotary Wing
SA Situational Awareness
SAM Surface to Air Missile
SAR Search And Rescue
SARDOT Search And Rescue Dot
SARIR Search And Rescue Incident Report
SARNEG Search And Rescue Numeric Encryption Grid
SARSAT Search and Rescue Satellite
SARSIT Search And Rescue Situation Report
SATCOM Satellite Communications
SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defence
SERE Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Extraction
SH Support Helicopter
SIGINT Signal Intelligence
SME Subject Matter Expert
SNR Senior National Representative
SOCC Special Operations Component Commander
SOF Special Operations Forces
SOM Scheme Of Manoeuvre
Acronyms
309
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
SOF Special Operations Forces
SNR Senior National Representative
SP Spider Point
SPINS Special Instructions
SPIE Special Insertion and Extraction
SRR Search and Rescue Region
STANAG Standard NATO Agreement
TACAN Tactical Air Navigation
TACON Tactical Control
TAS Terrain Avoidance System
TMRR Temporary Minimum Risk Route
TOA Transfer Of Authority
TOT Time On Target
TRAP Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel
TTPs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
TF Task Force
UHF Ultra High Frequency
UN United Nations
UTM Universal Transversal Mercator
VHF Very High Frequency
VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions
VOR VHF Omni-directional Range
WOC Wing Ops Centre

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Joint Personnel Recovery Joint Operational Guidelines-feb.11-Nato

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(a) Combat cruise

(b) Free cruise

Figure 3.2: Rejoin

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