THE PROCEDURE FOR HAZARD AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY

THE PROCEDURE FOR HAZARD AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY

THE PROCEDURE FOR HAZARD AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY

Table of Contents

1. PURPOSE ....................................................................................................................... 3 2. APPLICABLE CODES AND STANDARDS...................................................................... 3 3. HAZOP STUDY TEAM COMPOSITION .......................................................................... 3 4. TECHNICAL INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 4 5. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS .......................................................................................... 6 6. ANALYSIS PROCEDURE ............................................................................................... 6 7. RISK CHARACTERIZATION ......................................................................................... 11 8. FORMS USED .............................................................................................................. 13 9. SCHEDULE AND LOCATION ....................................................................................... 14 ATTACHMENT : SAMPLE OF HAZOP WORKSHEET

THE PROCEDURE FOR HAZARD AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY

1. PURPOSE This procedure describes the procedure of the HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) Study. The HAZOP yields a qualitative description of the hazards and operability problems, provides ranking of hazardous situations and indicates recommendations for reducing or eliminating hazards and operability problems in the plant. 2. APPLICABLE CODES AND STANDARDS The following code and standards are referred to as useful guidelines in the application of this procedure. (1) QP.GDL - S - 001 : QP Guide for Hazard & Operability Studies (2) OSHA Legislation on Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals (29 CFR 1910.119) (3) American Petroleum Institute (API) Recommended Practice No. 750 (4) Center of Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE), Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures 3. HAZOP STUDY TEAM COMPOSITION In performing a HAZOP Study, the proper selection of team participants is very important. The study team should consist of personnel who are knowledgeable in the process technology and experienced in the operations of the process. The team should have the necessary technical expertise to answer most questions raised during the review. The chairman will be independent of the Contractor and Company will review and approve of his curriculum vitae prior to the HAZOP meeting. The HAZOP Study team includes the following; (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Chairman who has experiences in leading HAZOP Study of similar plant Scribe Process Engineer who has experiences in design of similar plant Operating Engineer who has experience in operation of related plant Piping Engineer Electrical Engineer Mechanical Engineer Instrument Engineer

THE PROCEDURE FOR HAZARD AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY

(9) (10) (11) (12) Safety Engineer Environmental Engineer Licensor Representatives COMPANY Representatives

Of these personnel, several are often only part-time participants but remain on call for assistance. 4. TECHNICAL INTRODUCTION 4.1 The HAZOP Study will be performed during the process plants detailed design or during operating the existing process plant. There are two principal advantages of using the HAZOP Study during the process plants detailed design.

4.2

(1) It can identify potential hazards and operability problems at a time when they can be corrected at minimal cost and disruption. (2) It can help the development team identify and/or develop operating guidelines that can be used throughout the life of process. 4.3 The HAZOP Study shall be performed based on the following sequence.

(1) The Piping and Instrument Diagrams (P&IDs) for HAZOP Study will contain all requirements for Start-up, S/D, catalyst regeneration, Vendor, APC, LIMS, all modes of operation and so on. (2) P&IDs will be reviewed by COMPANY, CONTRACTOR, Licensors (if applicable) (3) The comments of P&IDs review will be incorporated in the P&IDs. (4) The HAZOP Study will be performed for these P&IDs, which are incorporated the comments of P&IDs review, and necessary changes incorporated in the detailed design. 4.4 This is a simple, structured methodology for hazard identification. It is an investigation technique that is designed to inspire imaginative thinking (or brainstorming) by a team of experts to identify hazards and operational problems while examining a process or system in a thorough and systematic manner.

THE PROCEDURE FOR HAZARD AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY

4.5 This involves a systematic, methodical examination of design documents that describe the facility. This is performed by a multidisciplinary team to identify hazards or operability problems by evaluating deviations from design intents. As each hazardous situation or operability problem is identified, the potential causes, effects and possible corrective/preventive measures will be listed in the final HAZOP report. In HAZOP Study, an experienced leader systematically steers the team through the system components identified in the design documents by using a set of guide words to identify deviations from the design intents of key parameters. These guide words are used on specific, defined areas of the plant design(called nodes) that encompass a common set of process parameters that are relevant to the goals of the HAZOP Study. A systematic method of identifying nodes is used on the P&IDs for the process unit to focus the attention of the HAZOP team and to provide sufficient documentation for later reviews. The team then identifies possible causes of deviations, and the resulting consequences. Any realistic causes and consequences are qualitatively prioritized, using a risk ranking matrix. Some findings may result in corrective actions, and other findings may prove to be not of concern at all, given the goals of the HAZOP Study. A basic premise for a HAZOP Study is that the process does not have inherent hazards or operating problems when the unit is operating with process parameters within ranges specified by the unit design. These parameters are defined by the basic design documents for the unit such as the process flow diagrams, P&IDs, equipment specifications, operating procedures, etc. In other words, if there are no deviations from the expected norm, by definition, there are no hazards or operability problems.

4.6

4.7

4.8

4.9

4.10 A related premise for the HAZOP study is that the safety / environmental rules and regulations are followed by operating and maintenance personnel. This means that the facility safety features are not bypassed, or process guarantee are not exceeded and maintenance is not performed without proper administrative controls so that the facility does not endanger anyone. It also means that the equipment is tested, inspected, and maintained according to approved policies and that the operators are trained to operate the unit in accordance with approved written operating procedures.

THE PROCEDURE FOR HAZARD AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY

5. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS The following documents or information are necessary to perform the HAZOP Study; (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (12) Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&ID) Process Flow Diagrams (PFD) Overall Plot Plan including existing facilities, Process Plot Plan & Offsite Plot Plan Process Description Codes, Regulations and Plant Design Criteria including design specification to be applied. Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) Equipment Data Sheet Safety Valve Data Sheet Safety Valve Load Calculation Sheet Interlock Logic Description Hazardous Area Classification Cause & Effect Chart for process and Fire & Gas system Fire & Gas Detection Drawings. Tie-in Summary Operating Procedure

6. ANALYSIS PROCEDURE The sequence of activities followed during a HAZOP Study is as follows. 6.1 Introduce Team Members : A short biographical sketch by each team member that identifies the skills and experience that each brings to meet the expectations of the study. Conduct HAZOP Orientation

6.2

6.2.1 HAZOP Methodology A presentation is made by the team leader of the methodology to be used in the HAZOP Study. This establishes a common starting basis for the team that is necessary to conduct an effective HAZOP Study. This is done by guiding the team members through an example or two of a typical HAZOP session.

THE PROCEDURE FOR HAZARD AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY

6.2.2 Purpose of HAZOP Study A presentation of the overall purpose of the HAZOP Study is made to focus the efforts of the team members. 6.2.3 Scope of HAZOP Study For the established purpose of the HAZOP Study and the properties the hazardous materials present, a general discussion is conducted of the hazards present within the process and areas of the plant where hazards could exist. 6.2.4 Establish the Risk Ranking Matrix The parameters of the risk matrix are discussed by the team for subsequent use in classifying hazards identified during the HAZOP Study. 6.2.5 Process Description The process engineer presents an overall explanation of the plants process so that all team members have a clear understanding of the basic operations of the plant. This also acquaints the team members with typical scenarios that may lead to a hazardous condition, based on the limiting release rates or spill sizes. 6.3 Conduct HAZOP Study The HAZOP Study sequence is presented in figure 1. A systematic node by node review is performed of the systems and equipment contained within the HAZOP scope. Nodes are selected in the sequence of the process itself. A sample of specific guide word/parameter phrases or deviations used is given in Table 1. Table 2 is the guide word/parameter deviation matrix provided to team members during the study that reflects deviations in Table 1. 6.4 Issue Preliminary Data Reports A draft, unedited listing of all node information developed to date during the HAZOP Study is provided daily for use by management in tracking HAZOP progress.

THE PROCEDURE FOR HAZARD AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY

6.5 Issue an Interim HAZOP Report An abbreviated report is prepared by the team leader and submitted immediately following completion of the study. This report provides timely notification to project management of any unacceptable hazards that were identified during the HAZOP meetings. 6.6 Issue the HAZOP Report This HAZOP report will be issued as a formal report after review and comment by the other members. This report shall summarize as a minimum : (1) Executive Summary (2) Purpose of HAZOP (3) Scope of HAZOP (4) Methodology of HAZOP Study (5) Process Description (6) Safety Data for Materials used in the Plant (7) Summary of Findings & Recommendations (8) HAZOP Worksheets (9) P&IDs marked HAZOP Nodes

THE PROCEDURE FOR HAZARD AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY

Table 1. Deviation Listing The following deviation will be used during the HAZOP study for each node identified on P&IDs. Operating Deviations More Flow Less Flow No Flow Back Flow Higher Pressure Lower Pressure Vacuum Higher Temperature Lower Temperature Higher Level Lower Level No Level Utility Failure Other Deviations Wrong Percentage Contaminants Wrong Material Poor Separation Higher Reaction Rate Lower Reaction Rate Other Reactions Hardware Failure (H/Ex Tube rupture) (Sight-glass) (Gaskets) (Hoses) (Corrosion) (Single Valve Leakage)

THE PROCEDURE FOR HAZARD AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY

Figure 1. HAZOP Study Sequence 1. Select P&ID. 2. Select study node (equipment, segment of lines and equipment) and identify on master drawing. 3. Define design intent using pertinent process parameters. 4. Select process parameter. 5. Select guideword described deviation in design intent. 6. Identify and record causes. 7. Identify and record consequences. 8. Evaluate and record severity consequence severity table). of consequence (see

9. Identify and record safeguards or protection provided to reduce likelihood or severity of consequences. 10. Evaluate and record frequency of cause and consequences (see likelihood table) 11. Record risk level (see risk ranking matrix table). 12. Record the recommendation to mitigate and prevent the consequences, if risk rank is 1 or 2. 13. Repeat for each guideword applicable to parameter. 14. Repeat for each parameter for study node. 15. Mark study node completed on P&ID when all appropriate parameters considered. 16. Repeat for each study node. 17. Repeat for each P&ID.

THE PROCEDURE FOR HAZARD AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY

Table 2. The Guide Word / Parameter Deviation Used in a HAZOP Study Guide Word Design Parameter Flow Pressure More Less None Reverse Part Of As Well As Other Than Wrong material

More flow Less flow

No flow

Wrong Contamin Back flow percentag ant e

Higher Lower Vacuum pressure pressure Higher Lower Temperature temperatu temperatu re re Excessive Poor Mixing No mixing Foaming mixing mixing Higher Lower Level No level level level Higher Lower No Reverse Incomplet Side Reaction reaction reaction reaction reaction e reaction reactions rate rate Time Too long Too short

Wrong reaction

Wrong time Part of Extra Wrong Step too Step too Step left Step Sequence step left action action late early out backwards out included taken Other parameters : Hardware Failure ; pH ; heat capacity ; number of phases ; flash point ; viscosity ; static charge ; specific concentration ; etc. 7. RISK CHARACTERIZATION 7.1 Risk Ranking During the initial stages of the HAZOP study, Team leader establishes a riskranking matrix with severity rankings and frequency rankings to allow for a qualitative assessment of the consequences of each hazard. This matrix allows the HAZOP team to screen each identified hazard and to assign a ranking and recommend suitable measures to eliminate/mitigate high ranked hazards. To accomplish this qualitative assessment of risk, each hazard event is ranked through a team consensus judgment in two ways : first, deciding the severity of the consequences of the event, and second, deciding the expected frequency or likelihood of the scenario resulting in the consequences identified for the hazard.

THE PROCEDURE FOR HAZARD AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY

Table 3 presents the consequence severity and event likelihood used in ranking the hazards found in HAZOP Study performed. Table 4 portrays how the relationship between severity and likelihood rankings is used to assign risk rankings to each hazard, and risk rank definitions used in ranking the hazards found in the HAZOP Study. 7.2 Severity and Likelihood To establish the severity of the consequences of an event, the HAZOP teams familiarity with the process is used to estimate the consequence severity for the potential of worker injury and/or death from toxic exposure, fire or explosion. In assigning a frequency to the hazard scenarios, the team uses operational and maintenance experience to recall similar process deviations and excursions, especially those that required immediate operators action for mitigation.

Table 3. Assignment of Severity and Likelihood Categories Consequence Severity Category Public Worker Property A Major release of AHM Loss of life Major fire or explosion and/or loss of production B Moderate release of AHM Severe injury or Moderate fire or explosion disability and/or loss of production C Small release or AHM Loss time injury but Small equipment damage or no disability loss of production D Very small release of AHM First aid injury but no Minor equipment damage or with no significant offsite disability minor loss of production impact E Not a significant hazard Not a significant Not a significant hazard hazard AHM : Acutely Hazardous Material Consequence Likelihood Category 1 Likely; may occur as often as once in an operating year in any similar plant 2 May occur; frequency between once a year and once in 10 operating years or at least once in 10 similar plants operated for 1 year 3 Not likely; frequency between once in 10 years and once in 30 operating years or at least once in 30 similar plants operated for 1 year 4 Very unlikely; frequency of less than once in 30 year or less than once a year in 30 similar plants operated for 1 year 5 Not probable

THE PROCEDURE FOR HAZARD AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY

Table 4. Risk Ranking Matrix Increasing Risk Categories Severity of Likelihood of Consequence Consequen 1 2 3 4 ce A 1 1 2 3 B 1 2 3 4 C 3 3 4 4 D 4 4 4 4 E NH NH NH NH NH (No Hazard), NP (No Probable)

5 NP NP NP NP NH

Increasing

Risk Decision Criteria Risk Rank 1 2 3 4 Recommendation Unacceptable - should be mitigated to risk rank 3 or lower as soon as possible Undesirable - should be mitigated to risk rank 3 or lower within reasonable period Acceptable with controls - verify that procedures, controls, and safeguards are in place Acceptable as is - no action is necessary

7.3

Recommendation HAZOP Study team shall recommend addition, deletion or modification to be made in plant for mitigating or eliminating the consequences of hazard events identified during the HAZOP Study.

8. FORMS USED 8.1 Microsoft Excel program will be used for recording and documenting the HAZOP Worksheets. HAZOP Study information is recorded onto Worksheets (a sample Worksheet is attached), showing the deviations resulting from the combinations of guide words and process parameters, causes and any resulting consequences, risk ranking, and suggested actions to prevent or mitigate the consequences. Each Worksheet has a banner at the top that identifies the company, facility, date of the review session, the node and parameter reviewed, and the design intention of the

8.2

THE PROCEDURE FOR HAZARD AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY

process parameter. The drawings are identified in the node description.

8.3

The HAZOP team shall identify possible means of reducing the severity or likelihood associated with a deviation, or a possible plant improvement. In addition, the team indicates the organization or group that shall be responsible for implementing the recommendation in the By column. The Recommendation column is also used to identify additional information needed for completing the review of a particular deviation. Wherever applicable, consequences of a particular deviation are worded such that obtaining the information would confirm the scenario. The Comments column is used to record drawing corrections that are required for evaluation of the node and to document any assumptions made by the team in developing the HAZOP scenarios.

8.4

8.5

9. SCHEDULE AND LOCATION The HAZOP Study will be performed on all P&IDs at CONTRACTORs offices, Seoul, Korea. The schedule of HAZOP Study is as follow: HAZOP for Utility & Offsite : May 17, 2004 ~ May 21, 2004 Wrap up meeting for Utility & Offsite : May 24, 2004 HAZOP for Process 1 & 2 : May 31, 2004 ~ June 11, 2004 Wrap up meeting for Process : June 14 ~ 15, 2004

ATTACHMENT 1 : Sample of HAZOP Worksheet

Unit P&ID No. Node Description Deviation Flow More Flow (Fuel gas) Area 3 Unit 64 Kerosene/ Gas Oil Hydrotreater Unit 7J48N-64-00-30-003, 7J48N-64-00-30-017, 7J48N-64-00-30-018 P64-3 Reactor charge heater (6401B) Cause Consequences S Safeguard To use approximately approximately 1,350 Nm3/hr fuel gas. PV-009 sticks open, Increased heater firing. A TAH-009A/B. mismanaged open or bypass Possible tube damage. TAH-055/056 (skin mismanaged open or TIC-008 Potential heater fire. temperature). malfunctions. Increased coking and possible TI-053. catalyst damage in reactor. FAH-036 (fuel gas line). Multiple reactor temperature indicators. More Flow (Pilot) PCV-001 malfunctions or Possible pilot flameout. A BAL-001A-C. misoperated. Potential heater explosion at startStart-up procedure. up. PI-067. Less Flow (Fuel PV-009 fails closed, sticks Reactor upset. C PALL-064. gas) closed, mismanaged closed Off-spec products. FAL-063. or manual valve mismanaged Possible flameout. TI-009A/B. closed or Multiple reactor temperature indicators. TIC-008 malfunctions or Valve position indicator for XV-002/065 fails closed. XV-002/065. Less Flow (Fuel XV-068/ 069 fails open. Fuel gas vented to atmosphere. C Valve position indicator. gas)

L 4 3

Recommendations See previous recommendation for multiple thermocouples in Node 1.

Date : 24. July. 1999 Comments By

SAMPLE

4 3

3 4

3 4

Less Flow (Pilot) PCV-001 malfunctions or Possible pilot flameout. misoperated or manual valve Heater shutdown. or strainer plugging or XV-001/070 fails closed.

Wrong Flow (Nitrogen)

XV-066 fails open.

Loss of main burners. Heater shutdown. Possible backflow of nitrogen to fuel gas drum. Upset in entire fuel gas system.

C PALL-057. BAL-001A-C. Start-up procedure. PDI-138. Valve position indicator for XV-001/070. C Valve position indicator.

2 3

Consider locating vent downwind of ignition sources. Also consider a hydrocarbon detector. Consider a low pressure alarm on PI-067.

LGEN

LGEN

3 4

Consider a restriction orifice (RO) to restrict nitrogen pressure to prevent backflow.

LGEN