Cabutihan vs Landcenter Construction Breach of contract gives rise to a cause of action for specific performance or for rescission.

A suit for such breach is not capable of pecuniary estimation; hence, the assessed value of the real estate, subject of the said action, should not be considered in computing the filing fees. Neither a misjoinder nor a non-joinder of parties is a ground for dismissal of an action, because parties may be dropped or added at any stage of the proceedings. Facts: Respondent Corporation engage the assistance of Rebecca Cabutihan herein petitioner (facilitator) in facilitating and recovery of the property (land) as well as financing of such undertakings and as compensation shes entitled to 20% of the total area of the property that would be recovered in behalf of the corporation. A person named Luz Baylon Ponce entered a deed of undertaking with a group composed of Wilfredo Forro, Nicanor Radan and Prospero Anave for the recovery of the said property inexchange of compensation based on the gross value of the land or the proceeds of the sale thereof. And that a deed of assignment was executed in favor of the respondents corresponding to their respective shares in the subject parcel of land. Petitioner filed an action for specific performance for failure of the respondent act on the demand sent by petitioner for their accomplished undertakings under the subject agreement and undertakings. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss based on 3 grounds a. improper venue that thepresent case filed by petitioner & her companion is for the recovery of 36.5% of land or her interest therein therefore the present case filed is an action in rem or a real action; 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, as amended x x x the present case should have been filed by [petitioner] with the proper court in Paranque City which has jurisdiction over the x x x Fourth Estate Subdivision because said subdivision is situated in Paranaque City. Since [petitioner] filed the present case with this x x x [c]ourt in Pasig City, she chose a wrong venue b. lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter- P. Forro, Nicanor Radan, Sr. and Atty. Prospero A. Anave are not named as plaintiffs in the complaint. [Petitioner] x x x is not named as representative of Forro, Radan and Anave by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney or other formal written authority. According to the Rules, where the action is allowed to

be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest (Sec. 3, Rule 3, Rules of Court, as amended x x x). and c. non payment of the proper docket fees- Obviously, [petitioner] has not paid the docket or filing fees on the value of her land claim x x x. Thirty-six percent (36%) x x x is P180,000,000.00, x x x. RTC ruled that the allegations in the Complaint show that its primary objective was to recover real property. Equally important, the prayer was to compel respondent to execute the necessary deeds of transfer and conveyance of a portion of the property corresponding to 36.5 percent of its total area or, in the alternative, to hold respondent liable for the value of the said portion, based on the prevailing market price. The RTC further ruled that, since the suit would affect the title to the property, it should [12] have been instituted in the trial court where the property was situated. Furthermore, the action was filed only by petitioner. There was no allegation that she had been authorized by Forro, Radan and Anave to represent their respective shares in the compensation. Finally, since this case was an action in rem, it was imperative for petitioner to pay the appropriate docket or filing fees equivalent to the pecuniary value of her claim, a duty she failed to discharge. Consequently, [13] following Manchester Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the case. Hence, this Petition.
[14]

Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of the [C]omplaint was in accordance with the pertinent law and jurisprudence on the matter. She argues that the RTC erred in dismissing her Complaint on the grounds of (1) improper venue, (2) non-joinder of necessary parties, and (3) non-payment of proper docket fees.

RULING: First Issue: ImProper venue Petitioner seeks payment of her services in accordance with the undertaking the parties signed. Breach of contract gives rise to a cause of action for specific performance or for rescission. If petitioner had filed an action in rem for the conveyance of real property, the dismissal of the case would have been proper on the ground of lack of cause of action. Second Issue: Non Joinder of Parties Although the Complaint prayed for the conveyance of the whole 36.5 percent claim without impleading the companions of petitioner as partylitigants, the RTC could have separately proceeded with the case as far as her 20 percent share in the claim was concerned, independent of the other 16.5 percent. This fact means that her companions are not indispensable parties without whom no final determination can be had. At best, they are mere necessary parties who ought to be impleaded for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. The noninclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding with the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such party. Third Issue: Correct Docket Fees The filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Wherefore, the Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed Orders REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin which is ordered toPROCEED with deliberate speed in disposing of the case. No costs.

Spouses GREGORIO GO and JUANA TAN GO, Petitioners, v. JOHNSON Y. TONG; COURT OF APPEALS; and Honorable Judge JUAN NABONG of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, As a rule, docket fees should be paid upon the filing of the initiatory pleadings. However, for cogent reasons to be determined by the trial judge, staggered payment thereof within a reasonable period may be allowed. Unless grave abuse of discretion is demonstrated, the discretion of the trial judge in granting staggered payment shall not be disturbed. Facts: Petitioner Juana purchased a cashier check bearing the word Final Payment/Quitclaim in favor of payee respondent allegedly to insure that the private respondent would honor that he would no longer ask for further payments for his interest on their informal business partnership which has been dissolved. However, the said check was dishonor by the bank because the said final word has been erased without signature from the bank. Private respondent request for the check to be replaced for the same amount but the bank refused to do it. Hence private respondent filed a complaint against the bank and the spouses. On the answer filed by the spouses on the supplemental complaint of the plaintiff, they alleged that the case should be dismissed unless the corresponding docket fee and legal fees for the monetary claims are paid for. The public respondent (COURT) allowed the release of the 500,000 acting on the manifestation by the private respondents counsel. Petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration but subsequently denied by the Court.

Issue: WON Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave and serious errors which [are] tantamount to grave abuse of discretion when it upheld the orders above stated. Whether or not public respondent Judge Juan Nabong committed grave abuse of discretion in not suspending the proceedings pending appeal with the Honorable Court of Appeals, and in x x x refusing to inhibit himself.

RULING: MODE of APPEAL Private respondent argues that the instant Petition should have been brought under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court and not under Rule 65. On the other hand, petitioners maintain that their suit questions interlocutory orders issued by the RTC and thus falls within the ambit of Rule 65, under which questions of law and facts may be raised. Rule 45 of the Rules of Court specifically states that in all cases, the CAs decisions, final orders or resolutions -- regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved -- may be appealed to this Court through a petition for review, which is just a continuation of the appellate process involving the original case.[15] On the other hand, a special civil action under Rule 65 is an independent suit based on the specific grounds provided therein. As a general rule, certiorari cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that under Rule 45.

Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Further clarified that certiorari to lie against respondent judge, the abuse of discretion committed must be grave, as when power is exercised arbitrarily or despotically by reason of passion or personal hostility; and such exercise must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform it or to act in contemplation of law. Petition DENIED.

RELEASE of the MONEY DEPOSITED SC agreed with CAs decision that the petitioner failed to assail within the prescribed period, the order allowing the release of the money. And that private respondent was entitled to the deposit, because it represented the amount indicated on the check that undeniably belonged to him. In all the pleadings they filed, petitioners never denied that the amount of P500,000 properly belonged to him. PAYMENT OF THE DOCKET FEES Petitioners argue that respondent judge and the CA erred in allowing private respondent to pay the docket fee on a staggered basis. The court clarified the ruling in Sun Insurance thus: It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action.

ERIBERTO P. ROSARIO and PAZ UNTALAN DE ROSARIO, PlaintiffsAppellants, v. FILOMENO CARANDANG, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees. To be sure, there is authority for the proposition that when it appears from the very face of the complaint that the Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, amendment of the complaint could not be allowed so as to confer jurisdiction over the case in order to act validly therein. FACTS: This case arose when Filomeno Carandang illegally entered into the
premises, destroyed the nipa plants thereon, and made dikes to convert the place into a fishpond; that in spite of warnings and notices from plaintiffs-appellants Ediberto Rosario et al, defendants continued to possess and occupy the premises; and that as a result of defendants entry into and possession of the land in question, plaintiffs have suffered damages in the amount of P2,000. Plaintiff-appellant thus filed a complaint allegeding that they are the owners and parcel of land which the defendants illegally occupied. Defendants move for the dismissal of the complaint for the reason that the court has no jurisdiction over the case because it is one of forcible entry and unlawful detainer and that the damages prayed for is not more than 2000. And that there is another action pending for land registration case, a claim for ownership title and ownership of the parcel in question is involved and contested. The lower order the dismissed the complaint, plaintiff move for reconsideration of the order of dismissal. ISSUE: WON the order of dismissal for the motion for reconsideration made by plaintiff is proper. RULING: YES. There is no averment in the complaint that the defendants claim or dispute the ownership of the parcel in question. The simple allegation therein that defendants have filed an opposition in the case where plaintiffs have applied for the registration of said parcel, does not amount to an allegation that the defendants are claiming

ownership thereof, since an opposition in a registration case may be based on claims or interest other than ownership in the land sought to be registered. And neither does the fact that appellants pray in their complaint that they be declared owners of the parcel in question convert their action from one of forcible entry into one for declaration of ownership or quieting of title; for the prayer is not a material part of the complaint and it is the allegations of the complaint, and not the prayer, that not only determine the jurisdiction of the court, but confer that jurisdiction. 2nd Error: Appellants contend that the lower Court erred in denying their motion for reconsideration and in refusing to admit their amended complaint. Again we find this assignment of error to be without merit. While it is true that under the liberal provisions of our Rules of Court, amendments to pleadings are favored and liberally allowed in the furtherance of justice, it is obvious that when it appears from the very face of the complaint that the Court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the case, an amendment of the complaint can not be allowed so as to confer jurisdiction upon the SC ruled that the appellants original complaint is one for forcible entry and detainer, over which the Court has no jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the original complaint, the lower court has neither the power nor the jurisdiction to act on the motion for the admission of the amended complaint, much less to allow such amendment, since it is elementary that the court must first acquire jurisdiction over the case in order to act validly therein. Wherefore, the Court below did not err in refusing to admit plaintiffs-appellants amended complaint. The case might be different had the amendment been made before an answer or a motion to dismiss had been filed, since the original complaint was then amendable, and the amendment could supersede the original pleading, as of right, without leave of court being required, and without the Court taking cognizance at all of the original complaint. The orders appealed from are affirmed, without appellants filing another case for reivindicacion. prejudice to

CAMPOS RUEDA CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE S. BAUTISTA, as Presiding Judge, HON. BALTAZAR M. VILLANUEVA, HON. ARSENIO I. MARTINEZ, HON. AMANDO C. BUGAYONG, as Associate Judges, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, and MANUEL MUYOT, respondents ISSUE: This case arosed when Muyot (respondent)filed a complaint against petitioner with the Court of Industrial relations to recover compensation for the alleged overtime rendered during that time that he was still employed. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the case as is it already barred by the stature of limitations. Muyot opposed the said motion to dismissed as the same did not constitute res judicata; that his causes of action were not barred by the statute of limitations because the legal period provided for in Section 7-A of Commonwealth Act No. 444, as amended by Republic Act No. 1993, was interrupted when he filed a case with the Department of Labor on October 27, 1955 and another with the Court of First Instance on July 7, 1956. Petitioner fileda supplementary motion to dismissed for the reason that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter because the complaint did not seek for reistatement for Muyot who ceased to be an employee of petitioner. That the claim is merely involved collection of pay for overtime (money claims). ISSUE: WON the CIR has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. RULING: NO. The SC ruled that Muyot is no longer an employee of the petitioner during the time the case was filed and hes not seeking for reinstatement for to their respective positions. Hence, no labor dispute is involved in the case and for that reason the CIR has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the respondents complaint. It also appears the Muyot finally realized that CIR has no jurisdiction over his claims when he filed a motion to amend his complaint and to admit the amendment complaint attached to his motion, such consist of adding the third cause of action which he was allegedly dismissed by the petitioner and that as a consequence he was entitled for reinstatement.

It is settled in this jurisdiction that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations made in the complaint or petition. On the other hand, we have also held heretofore that this principle applies to proceedings in the Court of Industrial Relations. The insufficiency of the allegations of Muyot's complaint to place his action within the jurisdiction of the respondent court could not be cured by amendment, for in Rosario vs. Carandang, we clearly held that "a complaint cannot be amended so as to confer jurisdiction on the court in which it is filed, if the cause of action originally set forth was not within the court's jurisdiction." Writs prayed was granted.

DELTAVENTURES RESOURCES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. FERNANDO P. CABATO, Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court, La Trinidad, Benguet FACTS: The case arose when the property owned by the petitioner was subjected to a writ or execution to levy real property to satisfy the monetary award in a labor case. A month before the said auction, petitioner filed a third party complaint in the commission asserting ownership over the property levied upon and subject of the Sherif notice of sale. LA issued an order directing suspension of the said sale until the issue of ownership has been resolved. Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet a complaint for injunction and damages, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary retraining order against Sheriff Ventura, reiterating the same allegations it raised in the third party claim it field with the Commission. Respondent judge Cabato order TRO relative to the enforcement of the decision in the labor case. Petitioner filed with the commission a manifestation questioning the LA authority to decide the case. This was dismissed by LA. Private Laborers moved for dismissal of the civil case for lack of jurisdiction. The judge upheld the dismissal, petitioner filed motion for recon which was subsequently denied hence this petition. ISSUE: whether or not the trial court may take cognizance of the complaint filed by petitioner and consequently provide the injunction relief sought. Such cognizance in turn, would depend on whether the acts complained of are related to, connected or interwoven with the cases falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor arbiter or the NLRC. RULING: NO:

The broad powers granted to the Labor Arbiter and to the National Labor Relations Commission by Articles 217, 218 and 224 of the Labor Code can only be interpreted as vesting in them jurisdiction over incidents arising from, in connection with or relating to labor disputes, as the controversy under consideration, to the exclusion of the regular courts. The power of the Labor Arbiter to issue a writ of execution carries with it the power to inquire into the correctness of the execution of his decision and to consider whatever supervening events might transpire during such execution.

Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. Whatever irregularities attended the issuance and execution of the alias writ of execution should be referred to the same administrative tribunal which rendered the decision. This is because any court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes.