From Affect Programs to Higher Cognitive Emotions: An Emotion-Based Control Approach

Juan D. Velsquez
MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory 545 Technology Square, NE43-935 Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139 jvelas@ai.mit.edu Abstract
We present a computational framework for Emotion-Based Control as an alternative approach to the study of affective phenomena. Drawing upon diverse evidence supporting the affect programs theory of emotion, we show how several systems that mediate perception, attention, motivation, emotion, behavior, and motor control can be integrated into specific circuits that implement affect programs. Finally, we suggest how new processing elements such as learning, can be incorporated into these programs to extend and refine emotional responses in ways that may resemble the higher cognitive emotions.

we have developed to demonstrate and exercise the usefulness of the emotion-based control approach. Finally, we conclude with some examples of the systems we have built using this framework, and suggest how extensions to this work could be useful in describing and accounting for more complex emotional phenomena such as the higher cognitive emotions.

The Affect Program Approach to Emotion

Like other psychoevolutionary approaches, the affect program theory has its origin in Darwins The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals [Darwin (1872) 1998]. In this seminal work, Darwin studied and reported on the various facial and bodily expressions concerning distinct emotions. Moreover, he suggested what their possible functions could be, and alluded to homologies to responses in other species. Darwins approach to emotion influenced most modern work on emotional expression [Izard 1971; Ekman and Friesen 1986]. These recent theories, together with objective analysis of subjective human experiences, and recent evidence of specific brain systems [LeDoux 1996; Panksepp 1998], have led researchers to believe in the existence of a small set of discrete primary emotional systems, or affect programs. Affect programs can be defined as executive, operating systems that generate and coordinate short-term, stereotypical responses that allow organisms to deal with biologically significant events in ways that promote survival. These responses involve a variety of elements such as facial and behavioral expressions, arousal of the autonomic nervous system (ANS), vocal expressions, modulation of attention, and affective feelings. It is important to note that no one of these elements constitutes the essence of an emotion. In particular, and contrary to other views, emotion feelings are no more central to the identity of a particular emotion than is its characteristic facial expression. Different theorists have various reasons to classify affect programs as basic, such as the fact that some of these response patterns are pan-cultural and homologues can be found in related species [Ekman 1992; Izard 1994], but there is also ample neuroscientific evidence to support these claims [Flynn 1967; LeDoux 1996; Panksepp 1998]. At present, there is good evidence for several intrinsic emotional systems in the mammalian brain, including

Introduction
Computational approaches to emotion, and affect in general, have received increased attention over the last couple of years. Several models and architectures have been proposed for a variety of domains and environments. Some examples include the use of emotions to create synthetic agents with lifelike qualities and personalities [Bates 1994; Kline and Blumberg 1999; Elliott 1992; Reilly 1996; Arafa et al. 1998], systems that reason about emotions in narrative [Elliott et al. 1998], systems that rely on emotional processing to mediate social interactions [Breazeal 1998], architectures that model the influences of emotions in behavior and learning [Caamero 1997; Kitano 1995; Seif El-Naser et al. 1998; Velsquez 1998a], and systems for recognizing the affective state of people [Vyzas and Picard 1998; Tosa and Nakatsu 1996]. The depth and extent to which these models address different affective phenomena vary widely, and so do the theories and taxonomies upon which they are ultimately based. This has led to discussions and arguments for primacy concerning which model or theory of emotion is the right one. Clearly, affect can be studied at many different levels, and all approaches offer different insights into this complex area. Different approaches work best in different domains, and the decision to follow one or the other depends greatly on the specific goals and purposes of these models. Our goal is to understand affect from a computational perspective. In this paper, we present Emotion-Based Control as an alternative approach to the study of affective phenomena. We begin by discussing the affect programs theory of emotion, which we have found to be both compelling and

useful for our purposes. Next, we describe a framework

those mediating fear, anger, sorrow, interest, play, sexual lust, and disgust. But what about the higher cognitive emotions? Are there brain circuits for envy, jealousy, guilt, and even love? Do these concepts fit with the affect program view, or are quite different accounts, such as the cognitive attitude theories or the social constructivist views, needed to study and understand these phenomena? These important issues can only be resolved with further evidence, and at this moment, the best available data, both from evolutionary and biological standpoints, favors the affect programs view.

systems also receive and integrate error signals from drives. The emotional systems assess the affective significance of these different stimuli and bias behavioral responses and future perception accordingly. Finally, relevant behaviors generate and execute appropriate motor actions. In the sections that follow, we describe some of these systems in more detail within the context of a robot control system. A more detailed description of the framework can be found elsewhere [Velsquez 1998b].

Implementing Affect Programs

We have implemented several control systems for an autonomous mobile robot. These systems range from simple emotion-modulated reflexes, to facilitation of attention, and emotional learning, all of which exercise the EBC approach effectively. Yuppy, Figure 2, has a number of onboard sensors, including two color CCD cameras, one of which is mounted on a two degrees of freedom head that is used for both navigation and for looking at objects of interest; an active stereo audio system composed of two microphones mounted on Yuppys ears; eight IR proximity sensors mounted around the robot; a pressure sensor that simulates a patch of touch-sensitive skin; a pyro-electric sensor used to detect changes in temperature due to the presence of people; and a simple proprioception system that senses changes in head and body orientation and alignment. In addition to its motors, which are used for both mobility and for steering the cameras, Yuppy also has an actuated tail and a breathing simulation mechanism. The tail is a very expressive part of Yuppys body, but the breathing mechanism and the gross motions of its head and body can also express its emotional state.

Emotion-Based Control
Progress in the neurobiology of affect programs has set up a foundation for the development of computational models that are more concerned with the neural substrates of emotional processing. This paper proposes an alternative approach to the study of emotion that relies on the use of computational frameworks for what we have previously defined as EmotionBased Control (EBC): control of autonomous agents that relies on, and arises from, emotional processing [Velsquez 1998b]. Our current framework, depicted in Figure 1, is an extension of the Cathexis model [Velsquez 1996; Velsquez 1997] and has been used to create a variety of EBC systems that have proven useful in providing insights about the inner workings of emotion and its interaction with other processes.

Figure 1 A computational framework for Emotion-Based Control.

The EBC framework captures important aspects of emotional processing and integrates these with other systems that mediate perception, attention, motivation, behavior, and motor control. In other words, it essentially implements affect programs by organizing these systems into specific, functional circuits. Affective information processing in these circuits generally works as follows: Perceptual systems obtain information from the world and provide the emotional and behavior systems with stimuli features and objects. These

Figure 2 Yuppy, an Emotional Pet Robot

Circuits of Basic Computational Units

The basic elements of the framework correspond to nonlinear computational units that are used to represent all relevant systems (i.e., perceptual, emotional, behavior, drive, and motor systems). Each of these systems can be thought of as consisting of

a set of inputs, an appraisal mechanism and a set of outputs. An important component of the appraisal mechanism consists of what we have called Releasers, which correspond to computational units that filter sensory data and identify special conditions which will provide excitatory (positive) or inhibitory (negative) input to the system they are associated with. Releasers can be innate and hard-wired (Natural Releasers), or they can be learned (Learned Releasers). The latter kind represent stimuli that tend to be associated with and predictive of the occurrence of Natural Releasers. The general form of the response or activation of each basic system is a nonlinear function of its input. Which in turn is proportional to the output of its Releasers and the strengths of their connections, or weights, as described in Equation (1):
A i = f ( R ki W ki ) k

Figure 3 Perceptual-Processing Pathways

(1)

Where Ai is the activation of System i; Rki is the value of Releaser k, and Wki is its associated weight, where k ranges over the set of releasers for System i, and f is a limiting function such as the standard ramp and logistic functions.

Currently, Yuppy has different perceptual systems based on visual and auditory processing that are capable of providing both stimuli features (e.g., color, shape, motion, intensity of sounds), and objects (e.g., people, specific sound frequencies, styrofoam bones and horses).

Balancing Needs and Resources

Drives are motivational systems representing urges that impel the robot into action. These systems bias specific behaviors based on the balance between the robots needs and the demands of its environment. Their activation comes from releasers that monitor some controlled variable. This variable is measured through some of the robots sensors and compared to a desired value or set point. If its value does not match the set point, an error signal is produced. This error signal is fed to the appropriate drive, in which it can be combined with error signals from other relevant releasers. For instance, in the case of Yuppy two different batteries power its base and the different actuators in its body. A Recharging-Regulation drive thus combines the signals from two different releasers: one monitoring the base battery level and one monitoring the body battery level. Besides its Recharging-Regulation drive, Yuppy also has three more different drives: Imitation and Dance, which correspond to different instances of a more general need to interact with people; and Fatigue, which monitors the robots [over]activity levels.

Each specific system (i.e., Perceptual System, Emotional System, Behavior System, Motor System, or Drive System), however, may compute its activation value in a slightly different manner as it is described in more detail in [Velsquez 1998b].

Perceiving and Attending to Affective Stimuli

Drawing its inspiration from current knowledge on information-processing in the amygdala [LeDoux 1996], perceptual systems initiate two different pathways from which information about external and internal stimuli reaches all other systems. Figure 3 shows an example of affective information processing through these pathways. The low activation pathway is a direct connection from simple perceptual systems to an emotional system. Because of its simplicity in processing information, this is a faster transmission route compared to the high pathway. However, it only provides the emotional system with a crude representation of the stimulus. The high pathway, on the other hand, involves more complex, time-consuming processing that provides a richer representation of the stimulus. This multi-scale activation pathways are very important in emotional processing as it is possible to facilitate attention, and begin appropriate responses before the stimulus has been fully identified.

Acting on the Environment

As in many other architectures [Brooks 1986; Arkin 1990; Maes 1991; Blumberg 1994], behaviors represent goaldirected activities that a robot can generate when faced with different situations. Unlike in these architectures, behaviors depend more heavily on affect (emotional systems) to provide a motivational context that determines their relevance and arbitrates possible conflicts with other activities. Through its releasers, a behavior obtains the necessary information supporting the low-level motor response that

is to be issued when the behavior becomes active. Releasers might represent physical objects and specific conditions, such as battery recharger is present, as well as motivational states such as battery level is low and distress is high, which would most likely increase the activity of a Recharge-Batteries behavior. Given its several degrees of freedom and rich sensing abilities, it may be possible for the robot to engage in more than one activity at the same time. We deal with this issue by allowing active, non-conflicting behaviors to be executed simultaneously as long as the sensory and motor systems they depend on are separable. Behaviors may also inhibit or excite each other. For instance, Wag-Tail might inhibit Running and vice-versa. Whereas behaviors such as Play-With-Person might excite lower-level ones like Seek-For-Person. To account for this type of interactions, processing units representing behaviors extend the general form of response described in Equation (1) to include excitatory and inhibitory inputs from other behaviors. Currently, Yuppys behavior systems exist as a distributed network of approximately nineteen different behaviors, directed in most part toward satisfying its needs and interacting with people. Examples of such behaviors include Startle, Cower, Dance, Imitate, Greet-Person, Search-For-Bone, Approach-Bone, Navigate, Wag-Tail, Orient-To-Sound-Location, Wander, Avoid-Obstacle, Approach-Person, and Express-Emotion.

Running the Show

Emotional systems are at the core of affect programs. In other words, these systems correspond to the main nodes that execute and coordinate appropriate responses that allow the robot to exhibit robust and adaptive behavior in the presence of affectively significant stimuli. Emotional systems bear resemblance to some of the aspects in which the interactions between neural systems involving the amygdala, the hippocampus, and the prefrontal cortices have been considered to mediate emotions, such as assigning an emotional valence to different stimuli, activation of emotional behaviors, and emotional learning [Damasio 1994; LeDoux 1996; Panksepp 1995]. Based on some of the neurobiological evidence supporting the ideas described above, and drawing on work from different theorists [Ekman 1992; Johnson-Laird and Oatley 1992; Panksepp 1998], we have identified and created explicit models for six different types of affect programs: Anger, Fear, Distress/Sorrow, Joy/Happiness, Disgust, and Surprise. In contrast to other models proposed to date that emphasize on cognitively generated emotions we consider both cognitive and noncognitive releasers of emotion, which, influenced by [Izard 1993], we divide into four different groups: neural, sensorimotor, motivational, and cognitive. See [Velsquez 1997 or 1998a] for a detailed description. The activation of Emotional Systems differs slightly from that of the general form described in Equation (1). Its

main differences include considering the excitatory (positive) and inhibitory (negative) input from other emotional systems, as well as the addition of a function that controls its temporal decay. Yuppy currently has emotional systems with natural releasers for the set of basic affect programs described before. Some of the most representative releasers and their associated emotional circuits are summarized below: Surprise: The circuits implemented by the surprise emotional system deal with novelty, anticipatory expectancy, and other issues that have been considered essential components of a general attentional system, including orienting to sensory stimuli, executive functions such as the detection of target events, and maintenance of a general alert state [Posner and Badgaiyan 1998]. Typical responses mediated by this system include LookAround, Orient-To-[Stimulus], and Look-At-[Stimulus] behaviors. In addition, the detection of sudden, unexpected stimuli might also mediate more reflex-like responses such as the acoustic startle reflex described below. Fear: The affect programs implemented through the fear emotional system deal mainly with dangerous contingencies. Concerning Yuppy, these include, among other things, situations in which its sensory systems would not work properly (e.g., dark environments for its vision system), and the detection of archetypal predators such as the blue Styrofoam horses (a.k.a the evil pool-ponies). When active, these programs release cowering and retreating responses. Joy/Happiness: This system orchestrates emotional reactions in response to appetitive stimuli, which in our robot include the presence of people and the detection of pink Styrofoam bones and big yellow balls. Typical responses mediated by these affect programs include Greet-Person and Imitate behaviors, as well as Approach[Stimulus] and Play-With-[Stimulus] behaviors. Distress/Sorrow: The affect programs implemented through this system are occupied with responding to certain kinds of stressful stimuli in the robots environment. For instance, all motivations release distress when they are not satisfied, and in extreme cases they may also release anger. Responses to this kind of stimuli typically lead the robot to pursue the needed resources in its environment (e.g., seeking people to interact with, or pink bones and yellow balls to play with). For Yuppy, affect programs serve many different purposes. First, they provide the motivational context that biases the activation of different behaviors and maintains their relevance and coherence. Second, they can facilitate attention by means of the multi-scale activation pathways described before. For instance, the Surprise emotional system modulates the Orient-To-Sound-Location behavior

when an auditory stimulus is present. Activation of that behavior turns Yuppys head towards the approximate sound location. Thus, facilitating Yuppys attention by means of other perceptual systems (e.g., vision). Third, emotions can bias perceptual systems, paying more attention to or neglecting different stimuli. Fourth, they establish appropriate emotional expressions, which are useful in social interactions. And finally, they are adaptive, providing the means by which the robot can learn from past emotional experiences and modify its behavior accordingly.

Toward Higher Cognitive Emotions

Some of the affect programs described above are somewhat fixed and closed. Their natural releasers are preestablished and their responses are often short and stereotyped. They can be seen as useful solutions to prototypical situations, but which have only limited involvement with the cognitive processes that help mediate behavior in the longer term. Some of the more complex human social emotions, such as shame, guilt, jealousy, and sympathy, are less closed, and they appear to be more cognitively involved with processes that lead to long-term, more flexible responses. Are there basic circuits for these emotions as well? How can the affect programs model account for these higher order emotions? A common view has been to suggest that all emotions involve the basic affect programs in some way or another. Two of the most common approaches are described below.

Emotional Memories. We implement this in our framework by allowing emotional systems to acquire learned releasers, which, as we previously mentioned, correspond to stimuli that tend to be associated with and predictive of natural releasers. In contrast to the fast, primary emotions elicited by natural releasers, learned releasers elicit secondary emotions, which in Damasios view occur only after we begin experiencing feelings and start making orderly associations between objects and situations, and primary emotions. These emotional memories have been modeled with an associative network comparable to Minskys K-lines [Minsky 1986], in which salient stimuli (e.g., features and percepts representing objects and agents) are connected to primary emotions when these have become active throughout the robots interaction with the world. During emotional learning, connections within this network are changed according to a modified Hebbian rule that prevents saturation of the connection weight between the new releaser and the active emotional system.

Emotion-Based Learning Systems

Based on the affective significance of events, emotionbased learning allows the robot to take into account internal needs and external stimuli in deciding what should or should not be learned in a particular situation. Using this model, we have implemented several different emotion-based learning systems with Yuppy. These include examples of both nonassociative and associative learning as described below. Habituation and Sensitization. All releasers in our model posses short-term memory and thus can habituate to stimuli using a model of rate-sensitive habituation similar to that proposed by [Staddon 1993]. Inspired by work in neurobiology, we implemented a simple model of the acoustic startle reflex system that exhibits both habituation and sensitization. The reflex, which is mediated by the Surprise emotional system, is elicited by an intense auditory stimulus, which evokes a startle response consisting of a fast upward tilt of the robots head and tail. As a result of repeated presentations of the auditory stimulus a decreased startle response (habituation) is observed. Similarly, presentation of a noxious stimuli, which is mediated through the Distress emotional system, enhances the acoustic startle reflex (sensitization). Emotional Conditioning. We have developed several systems of emotional conditioning across different sensory modalities (e.g., pairing tactile and auditory stimuli, or visual and auditory stimuli). Some of these systems include examples of alpha conditioning, as well as classical fear and appetitive conditioning. Figure 4 illustrates one example of emotional conditioning in which the Fear emotional system acquires new releasers for specific sound frequencies. In this classical scenario of fear conditioning, a natural

Affect Programs Cocktails

One common suggestion made by many adherents to the affect programs theory is that emotions which do not fit this model are blends of one or more affect programs [Izard 1977; Plutchik 1994]. For instance, according to Plutchik, fear and surprise would generate alarm, whereas joy and fear would produce guilt. It seems clear from the work of Izard, Ekman, and others that there can be blends of basic affects. In our framework, these occur when two or more of the basic affect programs are activated simultaneously. It is less apparent, and rather unlikely, however, that these mixtures can account for the whole domain of emotional phenomena.

Affect and Cognition: The Friendly Version

A more interesting hypothesis that still builds on affect programs theory yet addresses concerns about cognitive involvement in the higher order emotions, suggests that these other emotions are affect programs accompanied by distinctive higher cognitive activity. In this view, the central role of affect programs is maintained, but it is now possible to introduce new higher-processing elements into each emotional response. This is in many ways similar to what Izard refers to as AffectiveCognitive structures [Izard 1993], and what Damasio refers to as secondary emotions [Damasio 1994].

releaser (presence of the blue pool-pony) generates a fearful response (Flight behavior). Different tone frequencies played with a flute, however, do not produce any activation in the Fear emotional system, thus the Flight behavior does not become active either. If both stimuli are presented simultaneously, the Fear emotional system forms a new cognitive releaser for the sound stimulus. After only one trial, the newly formed releaser for the specific sound frequency that was paired with the blue pool-pony is capable of producing some activation of the Fear emotional system. After several more trials, the connection between the sound frequency releaser and the Fear emotional system is strong enough to produce activation of the Flight behavior, and thus an emotional memory is formed.

Summary
We have proposed the affect programs theory as a well established model and useful strategy for the study of emotions from a computational perspective. Using a robotic instance, we presented a biologically plausible framework that supports Emotion-Based Control. This framework implements affect programs by modeling and integrating important aspects of emotional systems with separate models for perception, attention, motivation, behavior, and motor control. Finally, we suggested how affect programs can lay a foundation for our understanding of a variety of emotional phenomena. Some initial steps toward this end have been presented which we believe will ultimately lead us from affect programs to higher cognitive emotions.

Acknowledgments
Work on the Yuppy robot is carried out in conjunction with Professor Rodney Brooks, Charles Kemp, and Makoto Yoshida.

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Are We There Yet? Are We There Yet?

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