Analysis

March 17, 2014

Summary: This brief assesses whether Turkeys balancing act between Russia and the West is sustainable given the pressures from within Turkey to take a stance against Moscows policies, and in light of Turkeys Euro-Atlantic vocation.

From Sochi to Euromaidan: Where is Turkey along Europes Eastern Fault-Lines?

by Diba Nigar Gksel
Introduction Geopolitical rivalry and a clash of political values between Russia and the EU has sharpened in their shared neighborhood. The battle within and over Ukraine has recently been the most drama-ridden case. The European policy community has demonstrated a relatively united stance on the side of Ukraines demonstrators, albeit fitfully. Until the crisis swung to the Crimean peninsula where Turkic Tatars live, it was noteworthy that there was no statement about the crisis in Ukraine from Turkeys political leadership. And while Turkish citizens of Crimean descent have been vocal about the risks posed by Russias intervention into Ukraine, Turkeys pro-European civil society has been relatively detached from the debate. Besides economic and energy-related interests, there are also political complexities involved, such as the shared concern of the Turkish and Russian establishment about the potential ripple effect of pro-European protests. Accordingly, pro-government media in Turkey drew parallels between the Euromaidan demonstrations in Kyiv and the Gezi Park protests in Istanbul, saying that the same Western plot was being employed in both cases. On March 16, in a vote that most ethnic Tatars boycotted, Crimeans voted overwhelmingly to secede from Ukraine and join Russia. The risk of conflict escalation remains significant. Pressure for Turkey to take a stance against Moscows policies in the region is likely to mount. This brief assesses whether Turkeys balancing act between Russia and the West is sustainable. A Foot in Both Camps As long as the countries in this neighborhood are stuck in between Brussels and Moscow, Turkeys interests lie in keeping its foot in both camps. It is welcome as an economic and strategic power in this neighborhood primarily by those countries or parties that are seeking a counterbalance to Moscow. Yet, Ankaras soft power also flourishes where the EU falls short. Brussels demands for democratic rule without a clearly articulated prospect for meaningful integration leaves a vacuum for Turkey to fill. In other words, Ankaras soft power has flourished in countries that are seeking to curb Russias economic and strategic hold, yet are also challenged by Brussels conditionality for European integration.

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Turkish big business vested interests play into Ankaras conundrum, as could be observed during the Sochi Winter Olympics in February when Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin about opportunities in the construction sector while Turkish citizens of Circassian origin were protesting in Istanbul. In March, while the Turkish foreign minister stated that Turkey would protect Crimean Tatars, the Turkish energy minister underlined that the crisis was between the EU and Russia, so Turkeys relations with Russia would not be affected. Turkeys space for maneuverability may narrow as the tug-of-war between Moscow and Brussels evolves. All six countries in this post-Soviet region, as well as Russia itself, face internal schisms based on economic, security, political, and identity/culture considerations. While Georgia and Moldova tilt distinctly toward Europe in terms of their civilizational choice and geopolitical alignment, Armenia has increasingly consolidated its place in Moscows orbit, Belarus is firmly in Moscows grip, and Azerbaijan is managing a balancing act. While all are stuck somewhat in between, the fault-lines that will define a medium-term timeframe are becoming more distinct. Turkey needs to keep the longer term in sight. While a wide range of scenarios could play out, if the mental maps of today were to unfold, some Eastern Partnership countries could integrate more deeply with this bloc, while the others would be consolidated under Moscows Eurasia Union. Where would this leave Turkey? We may be entering an era when coherence in Turkeys domestic and foreign policies will be called for. Common Sense of Destiny On a strategic level, Turkey is contributing to the European integration of the Caucasus, most notably with the pipeline, railway, and logistics centers that plug Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey into continental Europe. Driven primarily at the initiative of these three countries, this integration serves European strategic interests too. However, advocates of European integration in the Eastern Partnership region express disillusionment about not hearing solidarity for their cause from Turkey. If those struggling for liberal democracies in Eastern European societies today do not hear from their Turkish counterparts, this will leave a mark and not a positive one on their future orientation vis-a-vis Turkey, if and when they prevail as political elite in their countries. In the long term, Turkish interests are aligned with those of the EU in this neighborhood: the solution of conflicts, oligarchic structures coming under the rule of law, and the establishment of well-governed democracies. However, unless and until balances of power in the region shift toward the West, Ankara prefers not to aggravate Moscow. However, depending on the nature of sanctions against Russia and the NATO response, the crisis in Ukraine could challenge Ankaras effort not take sides. In any case, the Turkish leadership should refrain from its common public displays of close friendship with Russian counterparts, and Turkish civil society can partially compensate for Turkeys Euro-skeptic image in the region by portraying solidarity and shared values with their like minded counterparts in the region, given their shared interest in Europeanization. One reason for the disconnect between Turkeys pro-European civic activists and their counterparts in countries such as Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine is that they simply do not know each other. Turks often assume their European aspirations are artificially planted by Western powers for geostrategic leverage. Left-wing segments of the human rights community in Turkey that define themselves as antiimperialist are suspicious of Western meddling in Ukraine, as are Islamic conservatives. It is unfortunate that the EU has not created opportunities for Turkish civil society to engage in the existing structured discussions among civil society in Eastern Partnership countries that foster a common sense of destiny such as the Civil Society Forum.1 Given the shared objectives among Turkish counterparts for visa free travel to the Schengen zone and policies against LGBT discrimination bringing them into the fold of related exchanges makes sense. Turkeys official development aid and cultural outreach largely focuses on relatives abroad people with kinship, linguistic, and religious links to Turkey, including the Muslim minorities and the Abkhaz of Georgia, Turkicspeaking Moldovans, and Crimeas Tatars. This has created the impression that Turkey is trying to act as an alterna1 This author has elaborated on this issue in Turkish Civil Society: From Black Sheep to Synergy in the Black Sea http://www.gmfus.org/galleries/ct_publication_attachments/ Goskel_CanTurkeyInspire_Sept11_Pt2.pdf

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tive center of power. Many in Georgia and Moldova would welcome Turkish influence more if it portrays itself as a stakeholder in their national cause of European integration. To the extent that Turkey has soft power with its relatives, incorporating a European vision into its outreach could bring win-win benefits. In his recent visit to Ankara, the president of Moldova reportedly expressed his wish that Turkey help relate the benefits of European integration to the Turkic-speaking Gagauz of Moldova. The need for this became apparent soon after, when on February 2, a (illegitimate) referendum in this Turkic-speaking Orthodox Christian region of Moldova resulted in overwhelming support for joining Russias Customs Union instead of EU integration. There is also unrealized potential for Turkey to capitalize on its ties with Abkhazia in a way that would highlight the potential benefits of European integration for the Abkhaz people. Is there a Viable European Choice? Besides Turkeys concern about confronting Russia, its sense of exclusion from the EU and the notion of having alternatives have removed it from normative debates over the EUs Eastern Neighborhood. The impression that countries like Moldova and Georgia are more welcome than Turkey in the EU has led to understandable but misplaced Turkish bitterness. For example, when French President Sarkozy traveled to Tbilisi in 2011 and stated that he was in Europe, resentment surfaced in Turkish platforms. In 2007, Sarkozy had said that Turkey has no place inside the European Union because of geography. Why should Turks support the European integration of this neighborhood if Turkey an EU candidate is not welcome in Europe? One reason is that it has become clearer to all that Turkey does not really have alternative alignments be it in the MENA region or in Eurasia. With Paris now showing signs that it will cease blocking Turkeys accession process, and the prospect of a settlement of the Cyprus problem on the agenda, the viability of Turkey joining the EU has been strengthened. Turkeys position in the region will ultimately depend on whether the EU manages to gain ground in Turkey and in the wider Eastern European region. EU debates are now reflecting the realization that Brussels needs to put more weight, and smarter weight, onto its Eastern approach to avoid further losses in this neighborhood. The EU needs to project vision and clarity in its promise to these countries. Today, Georgians and Moldovans underline that if the West lets Ukraine slip away, this will leave their countries ever more vulnerable. Meanwhile, the EU wavering in its offer of a membership prospect to Turkey serves as a cautionary tale for those in Ukraine considering gambling on the EU. While policymakers in Western Europe tend to look at Turkey in the context of Middle East-related challenges, Turkeys history, its present, and its future also remain intertwined with the destiny of the wider Black Sea region.

About the Author

Diba Nigar Gksel is editor-in-chief of Turkish Policy Quarterly. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of GMF.

About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 as a non-partisan, non-profit organization through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has offices in Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, Warsaw, and Tunis. GMF also has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.

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