Citizenship Studies, Vol. 4, No.

3, 2000

Neo-liberalisms New Gendered Market Citizens: The Civilizing Dimension of Social Programmes in Chile
NICA SCHILD VERO

This article explores the recon guration of social citizenship, or market citizenship, underway in Chile, as one crucial dimension of the refashioning of state institutions along neo-liberal lines in Latin America. It focuses on the civilizing dimension of social citizenship, as an instance of the states involvement in the regulation of subordinate populations. Speci cally, the article studies the case of new social policy aimed at poverty alleviation. Inspired by Michel Foucaults late work but moving beyond it, it examines institutional transformation as on-the-ground practices through which policies take effect and sees market citizenship as emerging from the rearticulation of the efforts of myriad individuals located at different levels of government, civil society, and poor and working-class communities. In this process, state agents are translators on the one hand of of cial documents into instances of participatory learning and empowerment, and on the other of people s realities into instances of documentary categories of poverty. This culturalpolitical transformation of neo-liberal modernization in Chile and beyond is potentially radical, and we need to ask: to what extent will the new market terms of belonging in the national community, which increasingly permeate private and public actions and discourse, change the very material and cultural contexts in which peoples lives and struggles are framed?

Citizenship has been a central preoccupation of projects of state formation and capitalist modernization in Latin America since independence. At different moments, speci c cultural contents of citizenship have explicitly stated the terms of belonging in the political community. Although by de nition citizenship is about legitimate membership, beyond this narrow basis, and the legal issues stemming from it, it is centrally about who has the appropriate qualities to be a member of the national community. Citizenship, then, is encrusted in a series of
(Vero nica Schild, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Western Ontario, Social Science Centre, London, Ontario N6A 5C2, Canada.
ISSN 1362-1025 print; ISSN 1469-3593 online/00/030275-31 2000 Taylor & Francis Ltd

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Vero nica Schild notions of deservedness which are not exhausted by its legal de nition. Nowhere is this more evident than in the arena of social welfare. In the 20th century, legitimate membership came to include the right to social entitlements. Central to this right to entitlements is the notion that one has to possess the qualities needed to legitimately claim such rights. This is the moral, or civilizing, dimension of citizenship and an instance of the states involvement in the regulation of subordinate populations, or what Philip Abrams has so aptly termed politically organized subjection. It is, furthermore, a dimension that is recon gured differently in different nation-states at different historical moments. This article explores the shifting notions of social citizenship underway in Chile, as one crucial dimension of the refashioning of state institutions along neo-liberal lines in Latin American electoral democratic contexts. Fiscal retrenchment, along with the accompanying privatization and decentralization of the provision of education, health, and social services, characterizes the dismantling of earlier state-centric, populist arrangements of Latin American welfare states. These trends are coterminous with the neo-liberal restructuring of the state itselfor so-called neo-liberal modernizationand efforts to address the problems of massive poverty and inequality. This neo-liberal modernization with a human face is the context for my analysis. Citizens are newly conceivedand producedas empowered clients, who as individuals are viewed as capable of enhancing their lives through judicious, responsible choices as consumers of services and other goods. These citizens are enterprising agents, consumers and producers, whose aim is to maximize their quality of life as individuals within small communities, for example, neighbourhoods, schools, or health clinics. The thrust of the shift in emphasis, in conceptions of citizenship, from clients of public goods to empowered clients is ostensibly to make citizens responsiblethrough their own individual choices for themselves. Because the cultural contents shaping these neo-liberal political subjects are none other than the liberal norms of the marketplace, I refer to such citizens as market citizens.1 The domain of social policy, and within that of programmes stemming from the new social policy which is rapidly becoming the norm throughout the Latin American region (Bienefeld, 1997), is central for understanding the entrenchment of neo-liberal modernizations in electoral democratic contexts. The new social policy claims that welfare problems are best solved within a framework that maintains the primacy of the market in the interests of state decentralization, greater exibility and ef ciency. It also articulates a recon guration of state responsibilities toward those sectors in need of social assistance that differs radically from the one in place in the post-World War II period. The state appears as only one partner, while great emphasis is placed on the involvement of so-called civil societyin essence, the private sector broadly understood to include business, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including philanthropic organizations, and professional groups. Active participation of clients as consumers in the delivery of services is the cornerstone of the new social policy, which is in sharp contrast with the client relation of earlier welfare rights. The approach I use to examine the link between innovative social programmes and Latin American con gurations of a new social citizenship focuses on 276

Neo-liberalism s Gendered Market Citizens institutional transformation as on-the-ground practices through which policies take effect. This approach occupies a position between, on the one hand, those who tend to regard state (welfare) policies entirely in terms of their stated goals and the degree to which they reach them, and those who tend to focus very strongly on policies as discursive formations. The former tend to view recipients as ahistorical rational actors, and the latter see the production of subjectivities as the effect of discursive formations without ever actually looking at the speci c institutions built up to do this. My position in this article takes its inspiration from Michel Foucaults work, and speci cally through his concern with governmentality, bio-power and techniques of the self, in emphasizing the moral/educational dimension of social policy discourses, particularly when they make claims linking proper forms of social citizenship with the need to address the perceived wants of subordinate groups. 2 Having said this, however, I offer an analysis which attends to what I would call the materiality of processes leading to the rede nition of social citizenship. In other words, I explore the effects of the ways in which social policies, and the programmes that ow from them, rearticulate the efforts of myriad individuals located at different levels of government, civil society, and poor and working-class communities. Following this approach, I argue that the con guration of a marketized citizenship is an outcome of the redirecting of peoples work, not only of poor and working-class people and localities targeted by social programmes, but also of programme coordinators, of professionals and of other experts working within and outside state agencies, not to mention that veritable army of extension of cers ( promotores(as) ) implementing programmes in the eld. Doing things differently, including using a novel grammar for accessing state resources, is what I have in mind when I suggest that neo-liberal modernizations, as hegemonic projects, ensnare social subjects, make them act as agents and hence implicate them in their own unfolding (new) subjectivities. 3 I take social policy and the programmes stemming from them to be one paradigmatic form of governing through which subjects and needs are produced. Furthermore, forms of governing are always gendered and gendering, and so are their effects. 4 In other words, individuals, or members of distinct client groups, and their needs, are not pre-given static and gender-neutral categories but are instead socially and historically constructed through contextualized processes. 5 The relation between the state, in this case in the form of institutions in charge of social policies and programmes, and subjects is always dynamic. Thus, for example, the state does not simply re ect gender inequalities but, through its practices, plays an important role in constituting them; simultaneously, gender practices become institutionalized in historically speci c state forms (Pringle and Watson, 1992, p. 64). Social policy has typically represented the domain of social policy as masculine, and treated women as the objects or recipients of policy decisions (Pringle and Watson, 1992, p. 57). The historical record, however, suggests a different story. Women, through their day-to-day activities as professionals and practitioners of one kind or another (for example, health or education practitioners, experts, social workers and extension workers in the eld), have been the concrete, although largely overlooked, agents for the recon gurations of social policy. 6 Today, women as agents are at the heart of the 277

Vero nica Schild efforts to transform those who are excluded from the bene ts of an empowered life in the market, into active, responsible citizens. In the following pages, I explore the shifting notions of social citizenship of Latin Americas neo-liberal modernizations by studying the practices and discourses of new social policies in Chile. Chile has the distinct reputation of being a long-term pioneer in social policy reform. By 1973, the country was considered to have one of the two most advanced social insurance systems in the Western Hemisphere (Mesa-Lago, 1978). The meaning of social citizenship remained throughout entwined with universal notions of rights as entitlements, enshrined in law, and guaranteed by an active Estado de Bene ciencia (Welfare State). The reality, of course, was rather different: the policies and programmes in place were achieved piecemeal through protracted struggles, and they excluded whole categories of people not active in the labour market, for example, peasants, the self-employed and the unemployed. 7 Women remained subordinates to the end, though social legislation introduced throughout the period did bene t them, especially in their capacity as members of families, and to a lesser degree as workers.8 Today, Chile is once again considered a pioneer because it became the rst country in the world to privatize its state pension programme, replacing completely the traditional public programme (Mesa-Lago, 1978). Since 1990, its new social policies serve as blueprints for social policy reform in other Latin American countries. I begin with a critical examination of the recent Latin American debate on social citizenship, arguing that rather than mechanically embracing T.H. Marshalls awed model of social citizenship, we rescue instead his historical approach linking the rise of political identities with speci c state forms in contexts shaped by con ict and unequal power relations. I will then move to a discussion of the evolution of Chiles neo-liberal modernization, highlighting brie y its social costs, and concentrating on efforts since 1990 to combine neo-liberal modernization with ostensibly social democratic goals, or growth with equity. I suggest that the politicalcultural changes associated with the modernization of state agencies in charge of social policy and programmes, as heralded by the new social policy, are a fertile setting for understanding the recon guration of social citizenship in Chile. To illustrate this, I examine in detail Entre Todos (Amongst Us All), one of the showcase programmes of the Social Investment Programmes. Social Investment Programmes are one version of the new social policy that enjoy widespread support among national and international policy experts and practitioners, NGOs, and a range of development funding agencies, including the World Bank and private foundations. Entre Todos, I show, is one paradigmatic instance of the intricate and extended processes of work, bringing together potential clients with bureaucrats, professionals, and local politicians that produce market citizens. The Incipient Latin American Citizenship Debate Citizenship has received increasing attention in contemporary debates on democracy in Latin America.9 Much of the emergent literature takes for granted the tri-partite notion of citizenship promoted by the in uential British sociologist 278

Neo-liberalism s Gendered Market Citizens T.H. Marshall. Citizenship, Marshall proposed, is best understood as an evolutionary achievement of three interrelated dimensions or types of rights: civic rights, those rights which are necessary for individual freedom, appeared rst; they were followed by political rights, the right to elect and be elected and thus to participate in the exercise of political power; and, nally, social rights, access to those economic and social conditions necessary to live a civilized life, according to prevailing standards, and which presumably give the fullest expression to the exercise of citizenship. This last dimension of citizenship is, according to Marshall, a 20th century achievement (Marshall, 1963, pp. 7374). Social citizenship, in this evolutionary scheme, is the necessary corollary of social democracythe political form of tamed capitalism Marshall optimistically saw as realizable in this century. In addition to rights to the means for living a decent, meaningful life, social citizenship stipulates (non-compulsory) duties which spell out new ways of acting as citizens. Central among these is the activity of paid work (Sarvasy, 1997, p. 57). For Latin Americanists, and more generally for scholars preoccupied with democratization in the region and beyond, citizenship in its Marshallian version has become a taken-for-granted model of modern citizenship that poses challenges for new democracies. In transforming a notion of citizenship proposed in the very speci c circumstances of post-war Britain in 1949 into a set of normative prescriptions a series of steps to be followed either to build on inadequate forms, or achieve the non-existent formsthis new scholarship reproduces the major aws and limitations of Marshalls account. Appropriating Marshalls tri-partite notion as a universal model of modern citizenship is to forget the limitations of a deeply contextualized account. Jyette Klausen reminds of this in her searing critique of the use of Marshalls notion of social citizenship by European reformers and welfare state theorists. She points out that a consideration of the longstanding experiences of Scandinavian welfare states, arguably the most developed in Europe, would have resulted in less sanguine conclusions about the link between social citizenship and social rights (Klausen, 1995, p. 248). Marshalls emphasis on the historically constructed link between certain rights and their class-based enabling institutions is either downplayed or ignored by his followers in Europe and Latin America. He characterized the social dimension of citizenship as the single most important evolutionary achievement of capitalist Britain in the present century. Although Marshall never abandoned the view that capitalism was synonymous with class con ict, he was convinced that the social dimension of citizenship would be an effective means of class abatement (Marshall, 1963). Just as the war had been a leveller of sorts of class-based status, so would social citizenshipproposed Marshall in the aftermath of World War IIcontribute to undermine the cultures of class and thus blunt class con ict.10 In practice, the demand for social citizenship that governments not only treat citizens as equals but actually make them equals did not translate into granting social rights without strings attached. In fact, welfare states designed to entrench social citizenship promoted new forms of desirable behaviours, policed through criteria of eligibility, and excluded the undeserving (Klausen, 1995, p. 248). Thus, in the name of upholding universal rights to entitlements, welfare states con gured new ways for govern279

Vero nica Schild ing subordinate populations. Shortly before his death, however, Marshall expressed his disenchantment with the potential of social citizenship to educate con icting classes. In an essay written in the 1960s, and largely ignored by theorists of citizenship in Latin America and beyond, he pointed out that the behaviour and values of the ruling classes had not been changed by social citizenship and thus that it had failed to blunt class con ict after all (Marshall, 1972). 11 Another fundamental weakness of Marshalls account of citizenship is its gender bias. Marshalls conception of social citizenship hinges on the world of paid work in the public sphere, and the status it confers to workers. This conception takes for granted the gendered division of labour. The community of full membersin other words, the place in which legitimate members have legitimate claims to entitlementsis by de nition a masculine world of work. Excluded from the very de nition of community is the world of reproductive, unpaid work which is predominantly the responsibility of women (Pateman, 1989, pp. 184185). Women, it turns out, in their capacity as mothers and homemakers have no legitimate basis for claiming entitlements in their own right, but are dependent on employed men or on the state. Women, in this conception of social citizenship, are at best second-class citizens (Pateman, 1989; Sarvasy, 1997; Vogel, 1991). Feminist scholars have convincingly shown that women present a dilemma for Marshalls de nition of social citizenship, and that because of the inherent gender bias in his account, his notion of rights as entitlements poses serious problems for a conception of universal democratic citizenship. 12 Indeed, seen from the vantage point of womens peculiar relation to rights as entitlements as conceived by Marshall, social citizenship is far from universal or democratic. The conventional scholarship on Latin American democratization ignores these important challenges to Marshalls conception of social citizenship. Some of it is, in fact, surprisingly ahistorical in its application of Marshalls account as a model of modern citizenship. Adam Przeworski et al., for example, suggest that the new democracies face a dif cult task: they must address simultaneously the civil, political, and social requirements of citizenship (1995, p. 36). Assuming new democracies to be tabula rasas on which symbolisms, institutions, and practices must be inscribed anew, they state that these emerging democracies cannot follow the long experience of Western Europe, where the rule of law, the system of political rights, and the rights to social welfare and education were faced as successive challenges (p. 36). Those scholars who are more sensitive to the historical speci cities of Latin America insist that in the case of Latin America there is a vast distance between formal rights of citizenship and meaningful citizenship in practice, particularly in the dimensions of civic and political rights (Jelin, 1995, 1996; Roberts, 1995). According to Jelin, for example, in those cases where formal citizenship rights are clearly de ned, people have not necessarily been able to exercise them in their everyday lives (1996, p. 122). These scholars suggest that the modern Latin American experience with citizenship, particularly in the post-WW II, populist period, is best characterized as one in which the rights of social citizenship, in other words, the right to social bene ts, are overdeveloped in relation to political 280

Neo-liberalism s Gendered Market Citizens and particularly civic rights (Jelin, 1996; Roberts, 1995). According to Jelin, the myriad movements for human rights that emerged in the context of authoritarian regimes in the 1970s and 1980s have brought civic rights to the forefront of the debates on democracy. The well-documented violation of basic individual rights by the elected regimes which have replaced dictatorships throughout Latin America suggest to her that the democratic challenge continues to be to devise procedures and institutions to instil and ensure the construction and practice of civic citizenship (Jelin, 1996, pp. 120122). As provocative as Jelins characterization of social citizenship in 20th century Latin America is, following Marshalls tri-partite model, it oversimpli es the actual historical experience. Citizenship has also been the focus of other recent scholarship that has focused on the contribution of contemporary social movements to the democratization of society, and thereby the rede nition of politics in Latin America. Some authors argue that the struggles of womens, environmental, popular, and other social movements have resulted in new forms of citizenship (for example, Baierle, 1998; Dagnino, 1998; Gomes da Cunha, 1998). What these debates share in common is an emphasis on agency, and on the presumably autonomous realm of civil society as its proper context, which downplays or simply ignores the fundamental investment of the state in citizenship. Beyond Marshalls own disenchantment with the educational potential of social citizenship, it is undeniable that the institutions and practices of governing which were framed by a discourse of entitlements constituted a major form of societal education. The transformations of pre-existing statesociety relations through these new forms of governmental intervention in Latin America and elsewhere were radical and long lasting. More recently, the state reforms of neo-liberalismor neo-liberal modernizationssimilarly radical in scope compared with that earlier moment in modern state formation identi ed with the welfare state, and congruent with capitalism in its latest neo-liberal phase, convincingly show that the meaning of social citizenship, and the institutions and procedures associated with it, are after all far from permanent. In fact, today, the very meaning of Marshalls category of social citizenship is being undermined. The obvious question to ask at this point is this: if social citizenship, as conceived by Marshall, is unravelling with the dismantling of the agencies and practices of welfare states, what discourses and practices, or what form of state processes and related citizenship, is replacing it? What is important to rescue from Marshalls account of citizenship is the historical approach he develops, which links the rise of political identities with speci c agencies and practices, or state forms, a link which, furthermore, is best understood as shaped by unequal power relations and con ict. Discourses of citizenship always acquire their meaning in relation to the state. Thus, social citizenship is a relational concept in the sense that to speak about citizenship is to refer to a relation between state-related agencies, institutional practices and subjects. Moreover, social citizenship is an abstraction masking relations of subjection and exclusion which are always classed, gendered, and racialized. Studying the production of social citizenship is, in this sense, about the relations between state agencies and peopleinvolving both discourses and practices 281

Vero nica Schild and the very tangible effects of those discourses and practices on the lives of subordinate categories of people. The welfare state in Latin America and elsewhere was a set of institutions, agencies, and organized practices for governing those deserving of entitlements. The neo-liberal state in Latin America is best understood as emerging institutional practices and discourses for empowering people for the market and making them responsible for their own selves, including their own failures, and, ultimately, their own poverty. Chiles Neo-liberal Modernization and Social Citizenship Although there were important variations in the governments that ruled Chile from the 1930s to 1973, leading in turn to the expansion or addition of new social programmes, and the construction of new categories of bene ciaries, there was a strong continuity in modes of governing the population. The ousting in 1973 of Salvador Allendes Popular Unity government by the bloody coup led by Augusto Pinochet marked the end of that era in Chile. In the ensuing years, the military not only dismantled the then dominant economic development strategy, it also brutally severed the links that held together the state and civil society, and rede ned the meaning of modernity and the goals of modernization. 13 From the 1930s to 1973, Chiles social reforms were guided by the powerful image of an Estado de Bene ciencia (Welfare State). After 1973, and over the course of the next decade, the military embarked on a programme of free-market reforms which included the privatization and decentralization of government social responsibilities, whose effect was to dismantle the welfare state. This programme, known as the Plan de Modernizaciones (Plan of Modernizations), was carried out through legal reforms, policy measures, and the use of unprecedented levels of repression. 14 A discourse which saw the market, not the state, as the engine of development, and income distribution and social equity as natural outcomes of economic growth, not as goals of government planning, framed the reforms. The idea of the Estado Subsidiario (Subsidiary State), a state subservient to the dictates of the market, replaced the Welfare State, although, as critics have pointed out, the idea of a non-interventionist state was never more than a myth. The state, in other words, simply shifted its focus away from being a mediator of class con ict, under the guise of protecting labour, to explicitly protecting employers. The neo-liberal modernizations introduced a signi cant shift in discourses of social policy. Accordingly, social spending was to reach the truly needy and not special interest groups such as organized labour and organized middle-class professionals and public servants. Thus, although social assistance spending was not eliminated altogether, it became highly targeted to groups deemed most vulnerable, the poorest sectors, and mothers with infants. 15 The reforms associated with the Chilean economic miracle brought devastation to millions of Chileans. Successive orthodox stabilization programmes in the 1970s and external shocks, coupled with the drastic withdrawal of the state from social programmes, led to high levels of unemployment and a sharp deterioration in living conditions for many (Vergara, 1994, p. 238). Moreover, 282

Neo-liberalism s Gendered Market Citizens the combined impact of cutbacks in social spending and the drastic loss of wages had a particularly acute impact on poor and working-class women who retained sole responsibility for the survival of their children and their families. Further reforms in the 1980s led to additional losses in wages and more cuts in social spending. In 1981, for instance, regressive labour legislation was enshrined in the new Labour Code, whose main purpose was to privilege employers in their attempts to rationalize and streamline their operations in search of foreign trade. These reforms were followed by the privatization of health and social security, and by the devolution of responsibility for public education and social programmes to municipal governments. Flexibilization of labour through a policy of systematic subcontracting has been aggressively pursued since the mid-1980s and its effect has been to further drive down wages.16 This strategy of segmentation and cheapening of production has become known worldwide as the Chileanization of labour because of its brutal form.17 In the name of international competitiveness, exibilization has become entrenched in the most dynamic sectors of the export economy: fruit production, forestry, shing, the garment industry, and mining (Martnez and Daz, 1996, p. 73). It has also increasingly become the norm in the service sector. The segmentation of production is gendered and racialized. Women, mostly young, often with low quali cations, working for poor pay, without bene ts or access to social security, make up a vast number of exibilized workers. 18 Furthermore, women also make up the majority of people engaged in informal, unregulated income generating activitiesthe ranks of which swelled massively during the late 1970s and 1980s. Today, these workers are linked to the regulated work sector through subcontracting. The garment industry is a case in point. National rms and subsidiaries of multinationals, concentrated in Santiago, continue to downsize and streamline their production by subcontracting piecework. This form of workunregulated, poorly paid, and invisible to the outsideis rapidly becoming the predominant economic activity among women in poor neighbourhoods on the periphery of the city. Companies are not simply tapping into a pool of low skilled female labour, but are often constructing that pool by releasing their permanent female workers and then subcontracting them for piecework.19 Access to the many new forms of low paid, low end work in the fast growing service sector is regulated informally by standards of physical appearance. Racism has received little attention by policy experts and labour analysts. Indeed, the virtual silence around the topic of race and racism in Chile, part of the myth that Chile is not a racist country, is mirrored in social science research, including feminist research. Race and racism are simply invisible. Practitioners on the ground, however, know and recognize racism as the single most important factor contributing to the limited success of the skills training programmes they attempt to implement. So far, however, this knowledge has remained at that level, as part of the taken-for-granted landscape with which social workers and extension workers must work to make programmes succeed. They, and the participants themselves, single out physical appearance and/or an indigenous (for example, Mapuche ) sounding surname as the main impediments to nding work 283

Vero nica Schild for which they have been trained, particularly in the areas of computer operation and service to the public. As these women repeatedly put it, the message from employers seems to be that those who are bajitas y negritas (short and dark), a reference to presumed indigenous physical traits, need not apply. For working people, then, neo-liberal modernization, including the presumed modernization of labour, brought about through exibilization, has meant a loss of gains and entitlements obtained through bitter struggles, and which were enshrined in law until 1981. Poor and working-class women, however, have found new opportunities in the types of work being created, and for many this has meant, without a doubt, new freedoms from limiting domestic relations. However, the price of these freedoms has been high, for they continue to be the sole persons responsible for the wellbeing of families. The majority, or those who do not fall in the categories targeted by social programmes (for example, those living in extreme poverty who are single heads of households) must do so without any form of support. 20 Today, the majority of the poor are the so-called working poor.21 In fact, according to Martnez and Daz, precarious waged employment constitutes the single most important element of poverty in presentday Chile (p. 127). The rst Concertacio n government, an alliance by the Christian Democratic and Socialist parties headed by the Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin, inherited a strong economygrowing at unprecedented levels of 7% annually since 1986and with levels upwards of 40% of people living in poverty in 1990 (Vergara, 1994, p. 237). It set out to maintain these levels of economic performance, reassuring the business sector that democracy does not generate economic chaos (Gonzales, 1995, p. 113), while also garnering the support of vast sectors of the population who were adversely affected by the neo-liberal reforms responsible for the economic miracle. More broadly, what this reveals is the degree to which parties of the centre and left in Chile have abandoned their historical commitment to social egalitarianism and democratic participation. In this context, handling the social debt, or the social costs of the economic model, with the existing policy mechanisms became the preferred strategy of a government attempting to combine economic growth with the pursuit of greater social equity. 22 Poverty levels were reduced during the rst half of the 1990s from 40% to roughly over 30% of the population. 23 However, after nearly a decade of electoral democracy, Chile continues to be one of the worlds most inequitable countries: in the World Bank Report of 1995, the country placed seventh worst out of 65 in terms of income distribution, a place it shares with Kenya and Zimbabwe (World Bank, 1997). Although the wages of the very poor have increased somewhat, wages on average have decreased by 10% since 1986, and have not caught up to pre-1973 levels. In a country with costs of living increasingly comparable with industrialized countries, one third of Chileans earn $30 a week.24 Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei, second president of the Concertacio n government (19942000), made the problem of poverty a central plank of his programme.25 The present government of Socialist Ricardo Lagos promises to continue with this focus. The recruitment of sectors of the intelligentsia, professionals, the church, NGOs, and private sector philanthropies for the governments campaign has a fervour reminiscent of the efforts to 284

Neo-liberalism s Gendered Market Citizens nd solutions to the social question in the rst part of this century. The solutions being proposed today, however, take the unlikely form of a neo-liberalinspired social democratic formula, or growth with equity. In practice this means that the neo-liberal social reforms introduced by Pinochets dictatorship have not been radically altered. For example, targeting for the purpose of effective social spending continues to be the guiding principle of social policy in the elds of health, education, housing, and welfare. Although, the targeted categories have been expanded to include groups like youth or women heads of households, as well as regions, the principle of favouring only those with urgent needs remains unchanged. The anti-poverty campaign is guided by a Plan Nacional para la Superacio n de la Pobreza (National Plan for Overcoming Poverty). This document stipulated the creation of a body representative of civil society, the Consejo Nacional Para la Superacio n de la Pobreza (National Council for Overcoming Poverty). The Consejo is composed of representatives from labour, business, NGOs, the church, and professionals. The goal of this many-sided campaign is to rede ne poverty and shape a new societal response to it. Among the tasks of the Consejo is the development of TV ads to promote a new attitude toward the poor.26 It has also funded the creation of a programme, Programa Pa s (Country Programme), to recruit young professionals for work in poor communities throughout the country. 27 The Reconstitution of the Discourse of Poverty Since 1990, the neo-liberal discourse of modernization, once limited predominantly to the economic sphere, has come to cover with its dynamic and optimistic mantle all dimensions of social life. The problem of poverty is no exception. The best and the brightest of left and left-of-centre professionals and intellectuals, many with postgraduate degrees from US and European universities, have embraced the task of eshing out the contours of this discourse. 28 For these people, many of whom spent the Pinochet period housed in private research institutes and non-governmental agencies, and in some cases who spent time abroad as exiles, the dictatorship has become discursively transformed into a powerful, though admittedly brutal, modernizing force. Eugenio Tironi, a proli c writer and social movement specialist-turned-Information-Minister in the Aylwin government, articulated this most clearly in suggesting that there was a purpose to the Pinochet revolution, namely, that it placed the country on a par with the rest of the modernizing world (Petras and Leiva, 1994, p. 63). Thus, under civilian rule, neo-liberalism has been transmuted into a powerful, politically neutral discourse of modernity and modernization which acts as the new basis for legitimation in Chile. As far as social policy transformation is concerned, the discourse of neoliberal modernization emphasizes an active relation to the market, expressed on the part of citizens as the autonomous exercise of responsibilities, including economic self-reliance and political participation. The implicit value underpinning this modernization is freedom through the market, as old a value as the liberal economic thought of Adam Smith. In practice, this has meant that those 285

Vero nica Schild who participate actively in the market are free to access high quality private services; those who cannot do so depend on limited and insuf ciently funded programmes; and those who participate actively in the market, for example, a great number of the working poor, but who cannot afford to pay for services, must do without services. 29 The enactment of the vision of modern society as a marketplace occurs through documents, policy papers, and other of cial texts, the effects of which are to construct a new reality to be acted upon, and to be lived in. In the discourse on poverty, poverty stipulates as bene ciaries for social spending those who are constructed through a re ned measurement tool known as the Ficha CAS. It produces categories of peoplenon-poor, poor , and indigentfor social intervention by itemizing household possessions (for example, appliances and furniture) in addition to the more standard measures which classify individuals and households on the basis of levels of income and schooling. The Ficha CAS is a legacy of the Pinochet government which contributes to make social spending effective and ef cient according to market principles. It was much critiqued by social policy experts in the opposition when it was rst introduced, but since then it has been adopted and ne-tuned by the Aylwin and Frei governments. This administrative strategy of identi cation and designation of the poor has also been used to classify and target poor areas within cities and towns, and poor regions throughout the national territory. Ostensibly the survey targets the really needy for social bene ts, but in effect it shifts the meaning of deservedness away from notions of universal entitlements. According to the discourse of poverty, the poor are a broad and diverse category of people, and by extension so are certain communities and regions. The poor are de ned as those excluded because of lack of skills or opportunities, from effectively participating in the market and becoming masters of their own destiny. The thrust of social policy is therefore to help individuals and communities access the market. In other words, this framing of poverty considers the poor not as objects of charity, or as being personally de cient, or as subjects of universal rights, but as untrained, and unmarketable, and therefore as remediable.30 This new discourse of poverty renders invisible the link between the effects of neo-liberal modernization and the steady decline in peoples quality of life. Moreover, with its presumed gender neutrality, it exacerbates the gender-based subordination of women.31 In addition to the contributions of sectors of the intelligentsia, international support has been fundamental in shaping and funding social policy and programmes. This international dimension, which has been a constant in Chile and in other Latin American countries for most of the present century, remains crucial to the new social policy today. A cursory exploration of the historical record shows that the responses of successive post-WW II governments to the so-called social question were themselves always shaped with the aid of external, primarily but not exclusively US, expertise and funding. Indeed, what tends to be forgotten by both policy makers and policy experts today is that those social policy agendas deemed today to be inadequate, inef cient, or simply not modern, were themselves the outcome of approaches, paths, and experiments to 286

Neo-liberalism s Gendered Market Citizens modernize the public sector suggested by successive foreign missions, or technical assistance projects of one kind or another. Moreover, with the ascendance of developmentalist discourses and the new-found commitment to modernization of the 1960s, such agendas were not only strongly encouraged but heavily funded by agencies such as the World Health Organization, the Pan American Health Organization, the International Labour Of ce, the International Security Organization, the Iberoamerican Organization of Social Security, and the International Permanent Committee on Social Security (Mesa-Lago, 1978). The Alliance for Progress, initiated by the Kennedy administration in 1961, is a key example here. It made funds available to Latin American governments willing to reform and develop their economies, and demanded the drafting of national public investment plans as a prerequisite for receiving loans. It is often forgotten that Chile, then an example of strong, centralized government, became a showcase for the Alliance for Progress. 32 The production of the problem of poverty as an object of state policy since the mid-1970s has been framed by a discourse of modernization premised on the requirements of the existing model of capital accumulation. Within this discourse, poverty, and solutions to it, acquire their meaning in relation to the market. These market-oriented social policy reforms correspond to much broader efforts to transform the institutions of the state along the lines of a neo-liberal modernizing project. Efforts to radically transform the form of Latin American states, and statesociety relations, proceed apace with the retrenchment of a neo-liberal economic model. What is afoot is a profound transformation with equally profound social and politicalcultural effects. Moreover, as with earlier modernization projects, this one relies heavily on the long tradition of guiding and funding by international, predominantly US agencies. Curiously, though, the active process of institutional forgetting which seems to be inherent to discourses of modernity, and is central to the transformative thrust of neo-liberal modernization, occludes these continuities. The neo-liberal modernization project does not really constitute a break with the past in a fundamental way; rather, it relies on pre-existing discourses, capacities and experiences accumulated over a long period of time. In this sense, to borrow Jose Nuns apt formulation, the emphasis on the new amounts to an imaginary break with the past (Nun, 1993). During the period of the dictatorship, practices and discourses which had emerged in the context of social democratic-inspired reforms of the 1960s, for example, popular education and participation initiatives meant to bring about the Christian Democratic programme of social reform known as revolution in freedom, and which later became key planks in the participatory projects of the Popular Unity government, were preserved and re ned. In the 1970s and 1980s, non-governmental organizations housing many erstwhile professionals and experts who had been part of the Popular Unity government, increased massively in number with the support of international agencies like the Ford Foundation, the Canadian IDRC, and the Swedish SAREC, to name but a few of the many agencies that supported the activities of Chilean scholars and professionals during the dictatorship. This in ux of money, earmarked for the most part for so-called action research with the poor, made possible myriad activities with 287

Vero nica Schild working-class people which guaranteed the survival and perfectioning of that earlier project of empowerment and participation. The United Nations Declaration on Women of 1975, which committed national governments to work toward integrating women into the development process, and which Pinochets government also signed, introduced a new element to this longstanding tradition of participatory work. UN attention to the condition of Third World women in uenced the lending practices of solidarity NGOs, church-based and private philanthropic societies, and also, eventually, bilateral agencies like USAID, IDRC, and SAREC. Poor women became objects of funding in their own right and participatory research was extended to include explicitly feminist concerns. Thus, for example, OXFAM and other solidarity NGOs supported the creation of womens centres, the activities of womens groups, and initiatives in community health and housing; and funding from the Ford Foundation as well as agencies from Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Spain, and elsewhere stipulated that women be a key component of those research programmes claiming to promote self-development and participation through popular education schemes. The impact of nearly 20 years of work involving educators, social workers, health practitioners, and many other professionals and experts, not to mention local community organizations and activists, has been signi cant. Today, these capacities, experiences, discourses, and personnel are amongst signi cant resources from which the new social policy is being crafted. External funding, and more precisely the rerouting of that funding directly to the efforts of government ministries and agencies, continues to play a fundamental role in the shaping of the neo-liberal modernization project. Women and certain feminist discourses on women and development have come to play an explicit role in this transformation. The national Womens Bureau ( Servicio Nacional de la Mujer), established in 1991, and heavily funded by international agencies, has made an important contribution to the rearticulation of existing discourses of empowerment and participation of the poor into new anti-poverty strategies: it has made the category poor womenhistorically the main bene ciaries of social action, but always indirectlyvisible and thus an explicit target of social programmes. In other words, this agency has made it possible for women to be represented as explicit agents of anti-poverty strategies. 33 The new social policy, and the neo-liberal modernization of the state more generallyexpressed in the widespread commitment to issues of governance is being actively supported by the World Bank, the Interamerican Development Bank (IDB), the US Agency for International Development, and the Economic Commission for Latin America (Chalmers et al., 1997). Moreover, the World Bank and the IDB play a prominent role in supporting those programmes in the elds of health, education, and poverty alleviation which promote the sharing of costs by bene ciaries through their active contribution of time and effort. More recently, other organizations like the OAS, various UN agencies, the US-based National Endowment for Democracy, and European foundations, as well as international representatives of labour and private donors, have all joined in supporting social programmes with this participatory component (Chalmers et al., 1997, p. 562). 288

Neo-liberalism s Gendered Market Citizens Social Investment Funds: Innovative Social Programmes Participation of bene ciaries and of civil society (for example, the private sector) is a central plank of Social Investment Programmes, the innovative poverty alleviation strategy which has become a model of the new social policy. Social Investment Programmes take several forms, for example, support for micro-enterprises, for skills training, or for community self-development. They make funds available to projects of self-development proposed by individuals or groups of individuals from poor communities, on the condition that individuals contribute their own time and labour to them. The civilian coalition governments that have ruled Chile since 1990 have focused increasingly on the need to address the so-called social costs of implementing market reforms by increasing social spending. They have not, however, altered the market principles governing the design and implementation of social policy. Eligibility for these poverty alleviation programmes, subsidies, and bene ts, for example, continues to be determined by the targeting approach rst introduced during the dictatorship. In fact, the main innovation in social policy today is to involve recipients in sharing the costs of social spending through a discourse of participation which, in effect, invites the poor to participate in the modernization effort (Bengoa, 1995; Raczynski, 1995). Clearly, the commitment to repay the so-called social debt has taken the form not of a return to welfarist approachesto notions of universality and entitlements, and ultimately charity, which were the cornerstone of a Marshallian social citizenshipbut of the explicit embracing of investment in human capital, the ethos of the neo-liberal approach. The funding made available by the Solidarity and Social Investment Fund (FOSIS), a social agency established in 1990, is a case in point. FOSISs key role is to target speci c groups of the poor who are not covered by the social security net who meet the criteria of poverty stipulated by the Ficha CAS.34 FOSIS aims to be more a Bank for Social Projects than a Ministry of Social Welfare (Flan o, 1991, p. 154). What is innovative about it is its emphasis on sustainable self-directed programmes, its insistence on a relatively high level of participation in the costs on the part of bene ciaries, and its willingness to coordinate its activities with other governmental institutions and programmes (Glaessner et al., 1995, p. 36). The actual amounts of funds FOSIS makes available through its programmes are very limited. 35 Nevertheless, since its inception, FOSIS has become a model of social spending because of its efforts in coordinating the involvement of the private sector and local governments, and, above all, because of the emphasis of its programmes on client participation. In fact, today, every ministry and government agency, as well as private and party-based foundations which are involved with social programmes, make a portion of their funds available through project-based competition ( fondos concursables ) only. 36 FOSIS has been characterized as a synthesis between, on the one hand, the approach of the most progressive sectors of society, of myriad professionals and activists funded from abroad who during the dictatorship were engaged in action research with the poor, and on the other hand the notion of state subsidiarity defended by neo-liberals (Flan o, 1991 p. 154). This observation hints at the 289

Vero nica Schild nature of institutional transformations taking place in present-day Chile. In the aftermath of the election in 1990, large numbers of these professionals and experts, housed in independent research institutes, non-governmental organizations, and universities, were recruited into the ministries and agencies of government. Among them were women and men who had been actively engaged in the opposition to the dictatorship through their activities in NGOs and in private research institutes. Many of them, especially women professionals, had also been active in social movements. All were working within a framework of participation and self-empowerment. FOSIS was masterminded and set up by this group of highly motivated and committed people from the NGO world, and its programmes depend on a vast number of professionals and technicians still housed in NGOs. Roughly half of the NGOs operating during the dictatorship exist today. International funding that once directly supported this work with the poor has signi cantly declined, and what remains has been redirected to the national governments own social spending efforts. Of those NGOs that have survived, a great number have opted to become involved with the government, not only as executors of social programmes, but also as providers of services such as programme evaluations, policy proposals, and the design of simple, straightforward popular education texts. In fact, it is very rare today to nd NGOs that are not, in one way or another, connected with government activities. To understand the link between innovative programmes like those promoted by FOSIS and shifting terms of citizenship, we need to move beyond assessments of policies and programmes in their own terms. We need to focus on these programmes as forms of coordinated work involving a vast number of people, for example, bureaucrats, professionals, experts, and activists, and the object of their efforts, namely, ordinary people in everyday contexts. What are different categories of people being asked to do, and what is being done to people, in the name of this or that programme claiming to address poverty by promoting participation and self-suf ciency? In other words, how are new citizens being organized and how is social citizenship being recon gured? For an exploration of these questions I turn to one programme, the Programa Entre Todos (Between Us All Programme), and use a description of the work involved in implementing it in one Villa in Santiagos southern periphery, as an illustration. 37

Educating Market Citizens: Learning to Work for What You Want The Programa Entre Todos claims to build organizational and participatory capacities in groups, organizations, and inhabitants of poor localities. Its goal is to help people develop initiatives which respond to their own needs and priorities in order to improve their quality of life by allowing them to face and combat their conditions of poverty and social marginality (FOSIS, 1993, p. 12). At a broader levelthe institutional building level that bene ciaries do not seethe purpose of this programme is to facilitate the articulation between public institutions and private organizations, and organized social actors in local 290

Neo-liberalism s Gendered Market Citizens development. This programme and project-driven programmes in general are embedded in the logic of decentralization and privatization of the neo-liberal model of development. Reforming municipal government is what is really at stake in local development programmes like Entre Todos . Since the programme was rst designed municipal governments have been given increased responsibilities. Today, municipal governments are considered important partners and are asked to play an articulating role, by contributing materials and technical expertise in urban matters. FOSIS provides the funds, sometimes matched by the municipal government, and poor residents are asked to contribute their share, usually in the form of labour power, time and effort, to see a particular project through. Hence, the name Entre Todos . The goals of the programme are best characterized by the terms decentralized and participatory. The promotional discourse describes the (new) municipal government as an articulating agent, responsible for opening spaces for democratic participation of inhabitants of poor neighbourhoods in their quest for solutions to their most pressing needs. These goals directly rearticulate the model for local, neighbourhood -based, grassroots participation created in the early 1960s by the Christian Democratic government and further developed by the Popular Unity government. Thus, although these goals are represented as new, they are in effect an appropriation, relocation, and transformation, within state structures and processes, of existing organizational strategies and agendas, and the popular legitimacy thereof. For example, democratically elected Juntas de Vecinos (Neighbourhood Councils) were historically the means for conveying community demands to the local government. In practice, Juntas were often marked by deep political divisions and tended to relegate women to non-decision-making positions, or to exclude them altogether if they could not make child care arrangements on meeting days. During the dictatorship these councils suffered a major blow when their leadership was appointed by the military government. Reconquering this space for democratic representation of community needs became a focus of political struggle in many communities. In some cases these efforts led to the creation of parallel, elected Juntas, while on rare occasions they resulted in democratized existing ones. The present strategy is to promote a model of local participation that seems to bypass the pre-existing structures of Juntas . Entre Todos articulates the activities of a vast number of professionals and technical experts working for municipal governments and for NGOs, as well as for FOSIS and its regional of ces. In addition, it coordinates the activities of suppliers from the private sector, and last but not least, of the inhabitants from poor areas targeted for development. 38 Central to the operation of the programme are NGOs acting as Organismos Promotores or Ejecutores , also known as Servicio de Apoyo a la Gestio n Territorial or AGT (Support Services for Territorial Management). The NGOs must compete for the right to work as AGTs in one of the areas offered for bidding by FOSIS by submitting project proposals, along with budgets and demonstrated capacities and expertise. To even be considered, NGOs must rst meet fairly stringent prerequisites. For example, they must have a team of properly accredited professionals and experts with experience in promotional work with poor communities. When an NGO is 291

Vero nica Schild selected to participate in the Entre Todos programme, it is directed to one of the areas targeted for social assistance (known now as social investment). In addition, it is given 12 months to complete projects. 39 In the course of these 12 months the organismos engage in skills training work in the following ve areas: (1) self-diagnostics, prioritization of problems; (2) project proposal elaboration; (3) proposal presentation; (4) project execution; and (5) project administration. Ideally, at the end of 12 months, these skills and capabilities will promote future forms of autogestio n (self-negotiation) for community development in the targeted locality. Beyond the position papers and the technical documents outlining Entre Todos, not to mention the preparatory work of coordinating the involvement of local governments, NGOs, and private business, lies a virtual army of extension workers in the eld, organizing people and teaching skills. It is through the activities of the extension workers, known as promotores(as), that bene ciaries of new social programmes learn a new sociality, and are encouraged to adopt certain social behaviours and are discouraged from others. Promotores(as) are mostly young, lowermiddle-class professionals or university students, or working-class activists, mostly women, who built careers working for NGOs during the dictatorship (though such people are nding it hard to qualify under the strict professional accreditation rule imposed by government agencies on NGOs). Theirs is very time-consuming work and is an illustration of the new quasivolunteer work opportunities parallel with the wider economys exibilized model, one might say, though sometimes with minimum health coveragewhich offer a considerable number of lowermiddle-class professionals some form of steady work. Promotores(as) are responsible for the programmes on the ground. It is their task to act as mediators between the everyday reality of their clients and the imperatives of the programmes as textual realities. They are translators, then, on the one hand of of cial documents into instances of participatory learning and empowerment, and on the other of people s realities into instances of documentary categories of poverty. Promotores(as) visit the sites on a weekly basis, usually juggling more than one programme, though not covering all aspects of it. In addition, they create a textual record of all their activities on the ground. For this purpose, they generate computer-based texts which rely on materials from their interactions with their clients, with technical experts and municipal level of cials, and with suppliers from the business sector, as well as on the forms and other written exercises that the programme participants are asked to complete on a regular basis. Not only are promotores(as) required to keep a careful log of their encounters, but they must also record their impressions about the degree of organization found in a particular neighbourhood. According to one promotora , when she goes to a new site she must attempt to nd out if people really do participate in the community, or if leaders are deceiving them. In addition to ascertaining whether or not legally registered community organizations are active, promotores(as) must also nd out if the president of the neighbourhood council has any real support, and if the neighbourhood council is active. Important aspects of the context in which a programme like Entre Todos is 292

Neo-liberalism s Gendered Market Citizens implemented are sifted out of what is actually happening on the ground as part of the work of partially tting people s actualities into the terms of the new discourse. For example, promotores(as) are aware of political sectarianism and of corruption, especially at the level of the municipal government (for example, misuse of funds earmarked for community self-development, or deals with private businesses supplying construction materials) which continue to characterize these supposedly new forms of popular organization. Moreover, often the professionals implementing the programme may not see the gender of the participants, nor think it out of the ordinary that in a group primarily composed of women, it is the few men present who get to decide, or negotiate with government representatives. However, a new generation of social workers and activists who work as promotoras , who are sensitive to gender issues, increasingly do notice. They report little change in the position of women in these new programmes. These extension workers or promotores(as) arrive at their assigned sites armed with a pedagogic kit consisting of documents, or modulos (modules) which introduce the key concepts of the programme, and explain skills training goals in simple language richly illustrated with drawings. The rst pedagogic task consists in conveying some basic de nitions like poverty, community needs, and participation. Poverty, according to the introductory module, implies much effort to survive from day to day which limits people s possibilities for organizing, assessing their situation, and prioritizing possible solutions. Living in poverty limits the developing capacities needed to overcome it (FOSIS, 1993, p. 12). Given this reality, promotores(as) play an essential role because they help the poor help themselves to organize and to understand their reality, and to discover the causes of their problems, as well as to nd solutions for them (FOSIS, 1993, p. 11). These popular education tools are a far cry from the Freirean-inspired originals which had been developed to foster collective awareness ( c oncientizacao was Freires word) among the oppressed, and to collectively mobilize for social change. Today, these tools are used to teach the language of individualism for example, of self-help, personal and, by extension, group responsibility and accountability and are an ingenious strategy for integrating the poor into the market. 40 But the pedagogic exercise does not consist in handing people these new de nitions and asking them to forget the old ones, but rather in training them to work differently in the context of an organization. Promoters, then, are key agents in providing a discursive framing for neo-liberal market citizenship. In the eld, these footsoldiers of FOSIS rst create a category of people to work on with the women and men they encounter. When starting at a new site, for example, extension workers encounter not atomized individuals occupying a geographical space (as implied by the programmes description), but neighbour hoods with varying degrees of organization. 41 Julia, a dynamic working-class extension worker whose involvement in one of the Entre Todos programmes I followed in July 1995, is aware that the reality of the neighbourhood rarely coincides with the picture of anomie and dysfunction presented in the reality of the poverty of the texts she must work with. When entering a Villa in the southern periphery of the city, she found a variety of active associations, 293

Vero nica Schild including a neighbourhood council. She also encountered a sports club (a soccer club), a mothers centre, a group of Alcoholics Anonymous, and a catechism group. This Villa had approximately 3000 families living in poor conditions. The main forms of employment the inhabitants engaged in were construction work and (unspeci ed) informal activities for the men and domestic service for the women. Even the poorest of the poor areas have such types of associations. The rst step for someone in Julias position, then, is to create something else out of this lived organizational reality. 42 The entry into poor neighbourhoods by NGO personnel is typically made possible by local leaders. Julia worked very hard to convince the president of the Junta de Vecino (Neighbourhood Council) in the Villa she was assigned to: One doesnt just walk in and set up shop. This particular leader was very suspicious of anything coming from the government. Her account is revealing: The rst reaction of neighbourhood leaders is If the government wants to help us, why so little money? what can you do with 4 million pesos? [the xed amount for projects under the Entre Todos programme]. At that level you are dealing with leaders who are experienced, who at the very least who know well how much it costs to do anything. Nevertheless, she pressed on selling the programme as if it were a product. Once the president was persuaded by her to give the programme a chance he called a meeting of leaders of community organizations, and of members at large, to allow Julia to sell the programme all over again. The programme is very confusing to people and, thus, although time is not stipulated for discussing FOSIS and its many programmes, promotores(as) nd themselves spending time explaining the nature and value of self-help programmes, especially of their volunteer aspect. According to Julia: People s rst reaction is to believe that they have already won money, and have to be reminded that you havent won anything yet other than the right to work for what you want. Promotores(as) must skilfully involve those who have never been active before in the new community work, and at the same time convince, or simply keep at bay, those individuals whose perceptions of the situation pose impediments to the implementation of the programme. Julia and her colleagues see themselves as purveyors of a more modern and more democratic vision of local participation. For them, longstanding leaders who often challenge both their legitimacy and their control of the process, or of the funds, are obstacles to be overcome. As Julia puts it: In many cases, the real participation level in a neighbourhood is limited to the president, secretary, and treasurer of the Junta de Vecinos . They decide without consultation. Leaders, on the other hand, who tend to be politically seasoned men, distrustful of government, and used to being unquestioned leaders of their communities, see the situation quite differently. For them, the real issue is who may legitimately be entitled to decide on behalf of the community. In the case of the programme in the Villa in Santiagos southern periphery, Julias description of the ideas that come up in the discussion is revealing of the translation effort she is involved in: 294

Neo-liberalism s Gendered Market Citizens A number suggested that the money be used to build additions to their homes. Most live with their grown up children as allegados [a term used to refer to two or more families living in a single dwelling]. A man who was leader of one of the community organizations proposed a programme to generate employment for youth. He owned materials and wanted to control the funds and create a micro-enterprise. Others wanted to have the football eld refurbishedits lights were no longer working. Still others wanted to buy bicycles for every man to move to and from work. The women tended to want other things, like social centres, day care centres, a rst aid clinic. In the end, I had to convince them that we could not arrive at any conclusions about what the community needed until we conducted a survey and established their urgent needs. The goals of Entre Todos are more cogent with womens aspirations and dreams. This is without doubt an indication of the implicit gender dimension of programmes like this one. Women are the main actors in keeping communities going, and thus the real targets of community development programmes like Entre Todos . The fact that Entre Todos will support a very limited range of initiatives is never fully disclosed to the participants. Instead, the promotora must skilfully steer the debate away from certain proposals and toward others. At this point many people, particularly men, lose interest in the programme and leave. 43 The rst step in educating people involved in the programme is to teach them to assess the situation of poverty in their neighbourhood. Participants are taught to conduct a house to house survey, ask questions about their neighbours possessions, employment situation, and family size. They are also asked to produce a list of services and businesses available in the neighbourhood. These detailed surveys, promotores(as) claim, are in nitely more accurate than the of cial ones they must work with, although they are only used as a pedagogic tool. Moreover, in the context of the overall pedagogic aims of the programme, this exercise is the initial hook through which volunteers are involved in a process of learning to match what they know to be their communitys shortcomings with community needs that can be translated into local development projects. Based on this diagnostic, the participants are asked to propose three projects, and it is at this point that the promotores(as) steer their preferences in the direction of what they already know is fundable. The group then learns to design a projectthe disen o operativo (operative design) phaseon the basis of the need identi ed. Next, they learn to develop the interconnected steps leading to the implementation of the project: coordinating skills, buying materials, and keeping accounts. In cases where the neighbours do not have the skills required by a particular aspect of the project, the coordinating committee must contract out. The responsibility for raising funds for this purpose falls on the group overseeing the project, and other volunteers they manage to recruit. Thus, in addition to learning skills related to the implementation and administration of the project, the coordinating committee 295

Vero nica Schild gets to rehearse the very old practice of rustling up funds from neighbours, typically by cooking and selling food, organizing parties and raf es. State ritual also has a place in the FOSIS scheme. In the case of the Villa in Santiagos southern periphery, the Intendente handed over a cheque to the coordinating committee for the project they had (presumably) proposed in a public ceremony attended by the neighbourhood. This, no doubt, helps legitimate the presence of FOSIS in the neighbourhood, and adds to the demonstration effect of the programme. What happens once the funds are awarded to a selected project? Typically, while the organizational activities may be in place, problems arise in relation to the work commitment people have made. Volunteers, especially men, nd it dif cult to keep their promise to donate their labour one day per week, on the weekend. After all, these are not projects of their choice, and they have typically been recruited by neighbours, wives, and relatives. Given that most of them work far away from the neighbourhood for the remainder of the week, this extra volunteer work amounts to a great sacri ce. Invariably, their commitment wanes over time. 44 Ultimately, then, without explicitly targeting women, the programme depends on womens community-based and personal skills, not to mention their inordinate capacity to volunteer their efforts. Women with young children in poor communities tend not to be gainfully employed outside their neighbourhoods, and are more willing to volunteer their time for the ongoing work demanded by the programme. They often end up being the backbone of the coordinating bodieseven in cases where, as is very common, they do the work and the handful of men also involved end up making the decisionsand interacting with experts and local government representatives. 45 The gender of the human resources mobilized by programmes such as Entre Todos is not an explicit concern for FOSIS or for the organismos promotores , nor are its possible implications. In effect, unless the programmes are directed speci cally at women, for example, those aimed at women heads of households, the concrete experiences of women and men recruited for projects of self-development are divested of their particularity and transformed into textual accounts of poverty, populated by neighbours or poor people . Conclusions Critics of recent trends in Latin America that foster neo-liberal modernization and social democracy have begun to explore the long-term implications of the profound transformations in economic, social, and political practices, as well as in those institutional arrangements associated with the neo-liberal reforms (for example, Smith et al., 1994; Smith and Korzeniewicz, 1997). 46 This article shares their interest in the long duree (though not their commitment to social democracy), that is, on the long-term implications of these transformations. It has done so by drawing attention to the politicalcultural dimension of institutional change, and, more speci cally, to its implications for the recon guration of power relations between subjects and the state.47 In this essay I have suggested that the social citizenship associated with the agencies and practices of welfare states, eloquently and problematically 296

Neo-liberalism s Gendered Market Citizens theorized by T.H. Marshall, is giving way to a new form, market citizenship. I have explored this new form by examining the on-the-ground practices through which the agencies of the neo-liberal state in Chile are rede ning the relation between individuals and the state. I have shown that innovative social programmes such as Entre Todos are not really new, or a complete break with the past, but are a complex historicalcultural realignment of social practices which have an effect on social relations and social identities. The effectiveness of such programmes, then, lies in their capacity for reorganizing the practices, discourses, and experiences, of vast groups of individuals and collectivities. Post-independence Latin America as a whole, not only Chile, has historically been shaped in dialectical relation with outside forces. At the close of the millennium, the effects of intensi ed movements and accumulation of capital, of rapid technological innovation, and of the spread of ideologies of global restructuring across national boundaries, constitute powerful external forces impinging on the region. In this context, national states are not emasculated bystanders, however, but are the architects of renewed projects of modernization and of national belonging, or citizenship, and hence are at the centre of the cultural articulations associated with these changes as they unfold in speci c local contexts. 48 Market citizenship, then, is a transnational phenomenon, though it is localized in ways that respond to the speci c, historical and local character of cultural patterns in each country. In Chile, for example, market citizenship articulates and mediates a tradition of popular activism that stretches back to the early 1960s, including strong womens organizational experiences and community work, in addition to the practices and discourses of popular participation which came to be central in the socialist government of Salvador Allende, and which were preserved and developed further in research institutes and NGOs funded from abroad during the dictatorship. Chile is in many ways an exception to the rule in Latin America. For example, the economy was successfully restructured under Pinochets iron st, without debilitating resistance from the bourgeoisie, and without a chance of opposition on the part of organized labour. In most cases in Latin American countries, however, restructuring has been a laborious process, marked not only by repression but also by con ict, and compromises with powerful social sectors. This is particularly evident in places like Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina, once strong examples of KeynsianFordist-inspired modernization. Despite these important differences, there is a shared commitment among the elites throughout the region to international competitiveness, and to neo-liberal modernization, in the context of electoral regimes. Moreover, the new agenda of economic and political modernization is strongly supported by international experts and funds, through programmes promoting institutional reform (also known as good governance), the strengthening of civil society, not to mention the integration of the poor majority into development through participatory programmes. 49 The radical transformations in Chile suggest that in addition to analysing the successes or failures of neo-liberal modernization in dismantling the institutions of the regions older development model, or in restructuring its economies and class structures, we also need to consider the culturalpolitical impact of these changes. Cultural modernization, that is, the rede nition of social relations and 297

Vero nica Schild social identities, is potentially the most revolutionary aspect of the transformations afoot in the region. I would suggest that a pressing question for research in the new millennium is: what is the hegemonic potential and what are the hegemonic achievements of neo-liberal modernization? 50 That is, to what extent will the new market terms of belonging in the national community, which increasingly permeate private and public actions and discourse, change the very material and cultural contexts in which peoples lives and struggles are framed? Acknowledgements This paper was originally written for the workshop State, Colony, Empire: A Workshop on State Formation in Comparative Historical & Cultural Perspectives at St. Peters College, Oxford, England, March 1997. A short version was also presented at the XX International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Guadalajara, Mexico, 1997. I want to acknowledge the Canadian International Development Research Centre for funds that made the bulk of the research for this article possible, and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, as well as the University of Western Ontario for additional funding. I thank Marisa Weinstein for facilitating my research in Santiago and Leonora Reyes for her research assistance there. Michael Keating, Carol Agocs, Philip Corrigan, and Ted Schrecker made useful suggestions on earlier drafts. I am grateful to Gavin Smith, Linzi Manicom, and Malcolm Blincow, as well as to the anonymous reviewers of this journal for their detailed comments. Notes
1. I deliberately use the term market to refer to the neo-liberal citizenship I discuss in this article, to highlight the dimensions of agency and process involved. I consider the alternative marketized, suggested to me on several occasions, problematic precisely because it conveys the sense of a political identity already xed, that is, imposed on subjects as an already present hegemonic achievement. In the text I use marketized in those places where I refer speci cally to policy discourse as text. In my reference to the liberal norms of the marketplace as forming a bedrock for new forms of political identities I echo C.B. Macphersons brilliant study The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (1962). He traced the origins of capitalism as cultural form. 2. For a discussion of Foucaults notion of governmentality, see Foucault (1991). For applications of this type of analysis see, for example, Burchell et al . (1991) and Barry et al . (1996). 3. In using the notion of hegemonic project I rely on William Roseberrys useful distinction between projects and achievements, as well as on his reminder that hegemony, in Gramscis sense, is not about constructing a shared ideology but a common material and meaningful framework for living through, talking about, and acting upon social orders characterized by domination (1994, p. 361). In Latin America, the various modernization projects have not succeeded in saturating the social as it is lived, thereby becoming the cultural system taken for granted. About these successive hegemonic projects much needs to be said, though, until recently, Latin Americanists have been inclined to say little (for an exception, see Rubin, 1997; Joseph and Nugent, 1994). 4. Social policy discourse and, indeed, all discourses on governmentality are masculine in the sense highlighted by feminist critiques; namely, they take men as the norm, and mens interests as the only ones that exist. In fact, as Pringle and Watson suggest, Foucaults very notion of governmentality was originally conceived on the model of (a fathers) management of a family, and family remains an important instrument of government (Pringle and Watson, 1992, p. 56).

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5. Nancy Fraser offers a suggestive theoretical re ection of this point in her essay Women, welfare, and the politics of need interpretation (1989). 6. This is an argument developed compellingly for the history of US social policy by Theda Skocpol in her study, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers (1992). The Latin American case still awaits such a thorough telling. Nevertheless, one obtains important clues of womens roles in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, in Lavrin (1995) and Miller (1991). 7. See DeShazo (1983), Salazar (1985, 1990), Rosenblatt (1996), Hutchison (1995), and Klubock (1993) for the gendered, deeply contested, violent context of the rise of the discourse and practice of social policy in Chile. For an account of the intellectual and political underpinnings of the so-called solutions to Chiles social question, see Morris (1966) and Drake (1978). For accounts of the origins and evolution of social policy, see Arellano (1988, 1985), Vergara (1990), and Graham (1994). 8. Many women who did not t the norm of salaried work or family arrangements stipulated by the law were neglected by the existing social security schemes. On the other hand, women did bene t from nearly universal coverage in health care, and, those with children, from universal primary education. Also, the Labour Code of 1931 stipulated protective measures which bene ted working mothers (Montecinos, 1994, 1998). 9. For recent interdisciplinary contributions to the debate, see, for example, Jelin (1996), Schild (1998a), and Social Politics (1998). Reference to citizenship is also found in conventional political science discussions of Latin American democratization, for example, in the work of Przeworski et al . (1995), ODonnell (1994), and the much cited text, ODonnell et al. (1986). 10. Marshall de ned class as not merely economic groups but as status groups. Class inequalities were tolerable, he believed, but class as a mechanism for creating a culture of privilege was directly responsible for class con ict. See Marshall (1938, p. 97). 11. I am grateful to Philip Corrigan (1990) for drawing my attention to this important piece. 12. This is not to suggest that all feminist discussions of citizenship dismiss Marshall. Some, for example, the in uential work of Scandinavian feminist Helga Hernes, use Marshalls notion of social citizenship to theorize women and the welfare state. More recently, Wendy Sarvasy proposes a reconceptualization of social citizenship beyond Marshall from a feminist perspective (Sarvasy, 1997). 13. It is common knowledge, of course, that while the armed forces brought these changes into place through brutal forceits members jailed, tortured, exiled, disappeared, and killed civilians with impunitythe ideological watershed that this period represents must be credited to the group of Chicago-trained free-market economists known in Chile as the Chicago Boys. This group offered the Junta the blueprint of policy reform. For a discussion of these economists involvement in the early days of the dictatorship, see Collins and Lear (1985) and Valde s (1989). And, for a description of the process through which the 500-page proposal to reform the economy reached the Junta, see Constable and Valenzuela (1991). The literature outlining the errors committed by this group of orthodox reformers, and the economic crisis of 19811983 precipitated by their policies, is vast. See, for example, Edwards and Edwards (1987); Foxley (1983); and Ffrench-Davis (1983). 14. The details of this economic strategy have been the subject of a substantial critical literature. See, for example, Foxleys text cited earlier. Also, Mart nez and D az (1996) and Petras and Leiva (1994). 15. Make-work programmes designed to alleviate the impact of massive unemployment were one form social spending took. Another form was nutritional bene ts for pregnant and lactating women and children under the age of six. See Vergara (1994) and Raczynski and Oyarzo (1981) for a critical discussion of these social programmes. 16. Sheltered by the regressive labour code which remains fundamentally unchanged after nearly a decade of electoral democracy, rms pursue a policy of systematic subcontracting of operations which previously were carried out with a complement of (mostly male) workers employed on a full-time basis. 17. The economic crisis of 19811983 led the military to pursue a more pragmatic neo-liberal strategy with the support of the IMF and the World Bank. This strategy paved the way to unprecedented levels of growth, 7% annually on average, and is celebrated as the economic miracle. 18. Women make up the bulk of those employed in the service sector working as receptionists, saleswomen, telephone operators, and computer operators. Studies show that womens work in Chile is still concentrated in the traditionally female areas of servicesdomestic, secretarial, sales, and so onwith only some slight variation in the last 10 years (Marquez and Schkolnik, 1997). On this topic, see also Mun oz (1988) and FLACSO (1994). 19. Interview with Miriam Ortega (December 1997), director of Centro Ana Clara, an NGO operating on a

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shoe string that addresses women and labour issues. At the time of the interview, she had just lost her permanent job with the Arrow Shirt company, where she had worked for 20 years. As part of her settlement package she had been given a sewing machine and a commitment to be subcontracted for piece work. For example, social policy reforms have led to the dismantling of preventive programmes in health available to women and children since the 1950s. For a detailed discussion of the impact on women of neo-liberal economic and social reforms in Chile, see Montecinos (1994). The census of 1990 showed, for example, that the vast majority of the poor live in urban areas (only 20% live in rural areas). Moreover, in terms of employment, 41% of the two lowest income quintiles of the households surveyed are associated with formal urban employment, and 25% with informal employment (not including domestic service, a female-dominated activity). Cited in Mart nez and D az (1996, p. 126). This attempt has been critically assessed by Vergara (1994). See Petras and Leiva (1994) for a more comprehensive critique of the attempt by the centreleft in Chile to pursue neo-liberalism with a human face. Though, as studies show, this decrease in poverty levels was not the result of increased social spending, but rather of increases in employment and of moderate wage increases (Petras and Leiva, 1994). Added to this is the continued vulnerability of workers in the formal economy due to regressive labour legislation which has not been changed signi cantly, and to the risks and abuses of the privatized pension system. Pension plans were privatized during the dictatorship. Today, though employers continue to not contribute a cent to their workers pension plans, they do retain the right to withhold employee contributions for transfer to a fund. The result has been a plethora of news stories detailing how companies have simply forgotten to transfer funds, robbing employees of millions of dollars in interest (Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 1998). The issues of rising poverty and extreme forms of inequality are not the exclusive preoccupation of the Chilean government. In fact, efforts to overcome poverty were addressed at meetings of Ministers of Development and Social Welfare that took place, rst in Santiago, in December 1994, and then in Buenos Aires, in May 1995. There is widespread recognition in government circles throughout the region that Latin American societies are increasingly unequal and inequitable, and that the numbers of the poor are increasing, not diminishing (Bengoa, 1995). The Council developed a number of hard hitting publicity spots in an attempt to instil a sense of shared responsibility for the problem of poverty among the population at large. A survey conducted after the spot Poverty is my problem and yours. Together we can overcome it was shown on television revealed predictable reactions: uppermiddle and upper income sectors felt directly attacked and reacted defensively; middle income sectors did not feel called upon to the tasks. Although middle-class viewers felt opportunities needed to be generated for poor people, they also felt that somebody else should do it, not them. Low income sectors, on the other hand, did not believe either in the will of the government or in the possibility of sensitizing other sectors of society, especially wealthier ones, to the plight of the poor. These responses are consistent with another survey, conducted in 1994, about the major causes of poverty. The answers were as follows: lack of education (44%); lack of opportunities (37%); and laziness (36%) (Valde s, 1995, p. 106). Interview with Gloria Vio, member of the National Council, July 1995. For a discussion of the role of intellectuals in recent Chilean politics, see Puryear (1994), and for a critique of critical intellectuals turned defenders of the status quo, see Petras and Leiva (1994, Chapter 4). On this, see Vergaras (1994) lucid and balanced critical assessment of Chiles current dual social welfare policy and two-tiered social programmes. Vergara is very sceptical of the implications of this inherently inequitable system for Chilean democracy. This discourse is increasingly being questioned by social policy critics and social workers in Chile. See, for example, the articles in Pobreza: el lado oscuro de la modernizacion, the special issue of Revista de Trabajo Social , 66 (1995). See Montecinos (1994) for a detailed discussion of the impact on women of presumably gender-blind neo-liberal social reforms. The Development Corporation (CORFO) produced a 10 year public investment plan. The Frei government (19641970), with its reformist commitmentembodied in the idea of Revolution in Freedom t perfectly with the Alliance for Progress until 1967. USAID, the World Bank and IABD lent heavily during this period. A whole range of capacities were promoted under the aegis of this programme, including the government s own project generating capacities, and, more indirectly, the training of Chilean professionals

20.

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23. 24.

25.

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27. 28. 29.

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31. 32.

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and civil servants at US institutions, or in Chile itself in exchange programmes that brought US scholars to local universities (Lerdau and Mesmer, 1997). The Ford and Rockefeller foundations poured money into exchange programmes, as did US universities such as Chicago. For a discussion of intellectuals and professionals during that period, see Puryear (1994). One needs to ask to what extent these policies, premised on a KeynesianFordist model of economic development, were a response to the fear of a potential domino effect of the Cuban revolution in the Latin American region. See Schild (1998b, 1995) for further elaboration of this point. The original Ficha CAS was replaced by Ficha CAS2 (though everyone continues to refer to it by its old name) and it aims to classify people, and by extension communities, as poor, not poor, and indigents. It consists of a survey that measures housing conditions (quality of the unit, access to basic infrastructure) and the condition of families (for example, the age, educational level, occupation, kinship relations, and incomes of members of a family unit). The personnel who conduct the survey do not assign points; this task belongs to another level of government, the Intendencia . Municipal governments, through a person in charge of estrati cacio n (strati cation), emphasize one or the other dimension for their own social assistance purposes. For example, those classi ed as indigents become eligible for health subsidies, but not for housing subsidies (interview with Bernarda, a social worker with the Catholic charity, Hogar de Cristo, December 1997). See Raczynski (1994) for a sympathetic, technical evaluation of FOSISs aims, achievements, and shortcomings. For a more comprehensive political critique of this initiative and of its broader implications, see Petras and Leiva (1994) and Vergara (1994). Information on these projects, including funds available, and requirements for accessing them, is contained in the comprehensive guide published by Fundacio n Andes (1995). The members of the NGO acting as Organismo Promotor I interviewed in December 1997 indicated that this guide has become a bible for NGOs struggling to survive in the new competitive funding arena. For this purpose I rely extensively on interviews with three promotoras working in the NGOs who turned organismo promotor particularly the very detailed account provided by Julia of her own workwhose travails and transformations I have followed since 1986. I also rely on interviews and informal conversations with local residents, and with community and political activists in La Pintana, San Ramon, and La Granja, which I have gathered in the course of doing eldwork there since 1986. I have not engaged in representative sampling because the object of my investigations has been to understand the routine work people engage in, and their ways of speaking about this work. Currently, this interest extends to the interactions, again understood as routine, everyday practices, between people located at different levels of government and within local communities. This section relies extensively on interviews conducted in July 1995 with representatives from FOSIS, both at the national and regional of ce in Santiago, as well as an in-depth interviews with the director and promotoras of one NGO that had become an executor of FOSIS programmes. Originally the timeframe for completion of projects was 10 months, but it proved to be unrealistic. See Raczynski (1995) for an assessment of the limitations posed on the programmes by this timeframe. The new timeframe is still considered to be unrealistic by those involved in the actual work of executing projects, revealing at heart the con ict existing between the expectations of government agencies and NGOs recruited to execute programmes. In my interviews during 1995 and 1997 with NGO representatives turned executors of social programmes, I heard repeatedly that the government is interested in measuring output, while NGOs are committed to projects as processes leading to individual and group change. Originally, in the late 1950s, popular education was a working-class initiative in Chile. It was subsequently professionalized. CIDE, the Centre for Educational Investigations, specialized in developing popular education materials during the dictatorship and, in some sense, kept the Freirian tradition alive. Today, it is the major provider of popular education kits to government agencies, and any other private or public organization seeking to reach working-class people. CIDE sells its expertise for a price (too hefty a price, NGOs operating on a shoe string complain) and is, thus, among the successful survivors of the NGO restructuring. It would seem that the closer the individuals own awareness of the living conditions of their potential clients, the greater the dissonance for them. I nd Dorothy Smiths point about the discursive creation of reality in organizational settings very relevant here. She has called strategies like the one followed by the promotora working in Santiagos southern periphery, the social organization of facticity. In her view, facticity is an organization of practices accomplishing as a virtual reality what is or what actually happened or some other statement of what

33. 34.

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41. 42.

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is the case (Smith, 1990, pp. 7071). Power, in this context, according to Smith, is always a mobilization of peoples concerted activities. If facticity, if objective knowledge, is a form of power, it arises in the distinctive concerting of peoples activities that breaks knowledge from the active experiencing of subjects (1990, pp. 7980). This response on the part of men is suggestive. The Entre Todos programme promotes participatory capacities, but is vague about how these capacities will be matched to real job possibilities. Ultimately, there is a gendered dimension at work here: the programme ostensibly addresses community self-development in gender-neutral terms, yet historically, all the way back to the initiatives of the Popular Unity period, working for the improvement of the neighbourhood (though not making the key decisions) has traditionally been part of poor and working-class womens responsibilities. The dif culties in getting the work done are illustrated by a case which has by now acquired the status of a communal anecdote among those involved with FOSIS projects. One targeted neighbourhood in Puente Alto, a semi-rural area on the southern outskirts of Santiago, was granted a project to pave streets. The materials and technical expertise were to be provided by the municipal government and FOSIS, and the labour by the residents. The project took forever to complete. The residents were reluctant to do the hard work of digging and levelling the ground after spending the entire week working in nearby farms. To get the job done the municipal representative resorted to a ruse. He sent an of cial letter to each household informing them that if the streets were not paved by a speci ed date, they would be nancially responsible for nishing the job. Faced with this option, the residents came out in droves on the weekend to build the roads. It just so happened that representatives from FOSISs main of ce were touring the site. This scam proved to be something of an embarrassment for FOSIS ideologues, though also a great source of amusement for some of the NGO personnel involved in the programme. In this discussion of peoples involvement with the programme I am focusing on the attempted transformation of social relations and social identities by agents of the state. The degree to which those who are the objects of these transformations are actually changed along gender lines, as well as unintended de ections of the projects intended aims, are matters which require further research. Having said this, however, this discussion suggests that older men in the Villa had an instrumental relation to the programme, while the relation of women to the programme seems unclear. Are they being instrumental in their pursuit of those community projects that they value? Are they being drawn into the parameters of the discourse as they do this? In other research (Schild, 1998a,b) I have indicated that in some instances women do buy into the new language of empowerment and begin to use it. Some scholars, for example, have turned to Karl Polanyis magisterial study of the rise and eventual demise of an earlier period of unfettered capitalism, The Great Transformation , to nd direction. See, for example, Smith and Korzeniewicz (1997). My reference to power here owes more to Dorothy Smiths embedded approach than to Foucaults. With her, I conceive of power as arising as peoples actual activities are coordinated to give the multiplied effects of cooperation (Smith, 1990, p. 70). This goes against the grain of the fashionable argument that nation-states have been weakened by globalization, and, therefore, that radical alternatives to the present are to be sought in the global space, bypassing nation-states altogether (for example, Held, 1995). Panitch (1996) and Weiss (1997), for example, make it amply clear that this view is simply false. Furthermore, arguments like Helds reduce the complex subject of the state (see on this Abrams brilliant essay, 1982; Corrigan and Sayer, 1985; Joseph and Nugent, 1994, for the case of Latin America, 1994) to the one-dimensional and theoretically impoverished version dominant in international relations literature. The new focus of funding from the World Bank, the IADB, and other agencies, under the aegis of plans for promoting better governance and democracy in the region, is institutional modernization for example, revamping judiciaries, and developing state capacities, including effective social spending (in other words, spending that does not involve signi cant increases in scal expenses). See World Bank (1997) and Petras and Leiva (1994). The new model for the ef cient delivery of social services promoted by the Bank, for example, emphasizes the use of competitive markets to improve delivery. It suggests that: In those areas where competition in the market is not feasible, it may still be possible to foster competition for the market (World Bank, 1997, p. 88). The Chilean FOSIS has become a model for other parts of Latin America on how to coordinate government, NGOs, and private rms in the effective delivery of social services promoted by this institution (Glaessner et al ., 1995). In using the term hegemony, as I have indicated, I follow recent readings of Gramsci, for example, in Sayer (1994), and Joseph and Nugent (1994), and insist with Roseberry (1994) on distinguishing between hegemonic projects and hegemonic achievements .

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