Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION A.C. No.

5108 May 26, 2005

In August 1992, Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, counsel of complainant, died. On February 7, 1994, respondent entered his appearance before the trial court as collaborating counsel for complainant.3 On March 16, 1994, respondent filed his Notice of Substitution of Counsel,4 informing the RTC of Pasig City that he has been appointed as counsel for the complainant, in substitution of Atty. de Leon. It also appears that on April 13, 1999, respondent filed a criminal action against complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City, entitled "Atty. Julito Vitriolo, et al. v. Rose Dela Cruz F. Mercado," and docketed as I.S. No. PSG 99-9823, for violation of Articles 171 and 172 (falsification of public document) of the Revised Penal Code.5 Respondent alleged that complainant made false entries in the Certificates of Live Birth of her children, Angelica and Katelyn Anne. More specifically, complainant allegedly indicated in said Certificates of Live Birth that she is married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their marriage was solemnized on April 11, 1979, when in truth, she is legally married to Ruben G. Mercado and their marriage took place on April 11, 1978. Complainant denied the accusations of respondent against her. She denied using any other name than "Rosa F. Mercado." She also insisted that she has gotten married only once, on April 11, 1978, to Ruben G. Mercado. In addition, complainant Mercado cited other charges against respondent that are pending before or decided upon by other tribunals (1) libel suit before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City;6 (2) administrative case for dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, pursuit of private business, vocation or profession without the permission required by Civil Service rules and regulations, and violations of the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," before the then Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption;7 (3) complaint for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service before the Office of the Ombudsman, where he was found guilty of misconduct and meted out the penalty of one month suspension without pay;8 and, (4) the Information for violation of Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act

ROSA F. MERCADO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, respondent. DECISION PUNO, J.: Rosa F. Mercado filed the instant administrative complaint against Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, seeking his disbarment from the practice of law. The complainant alleged that respondent maliciously instituted a criminal case for falsification of public document against her, a former client, based on confidential information gained from their attorney-client relationship. Let us first hearken to the facts. Complainant is a Senior Education Program Specialist of the Standards Development Division, Office of Programs and Standards while respondent is a Deputy Executive Director IV of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED).1 Complainant's husband filed Civil Case No. 40537 entitled "Ruben G. Mercado v. Rosa C. Francisco," for annulment of their marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. This annulment case had been dismissed by the trial court, and the dismissal became final and executory on July 15, 1992.2

No. 6713, as amended, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees before the Sandiganbayan.9 Complainant Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint for falsification of public document (I.S. No. PSG 99-9823) disclosed confidential facts and information relating to the civil case for annulment, then handled by respondent Vitriolo as her counsel. This prompted complainant Mercado to bring this action against respondent. She claims that, in filing the criminal case for falsification, respondent is guilty of breaching their privileged and confidential lawyer-client relationship, and should be disbarred. Respondent filed his Comment/Motion to Dismiss on November 3, 1999 where he alleged that the complaint for disbarment was all hearsay, misleading and irrelevant because all the allegations leveled against him are subject of separate fact-finding bodies. Respondent claimed that the pending cases against him are not grounds for disbarment, and that he is presumed to be innocent until proven otherwise.10 He also states that the decision of the Ombudsman finding him guilty of misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of suspension for one month without pay is on appeal with the Court of Appeals. He adds that he was found guilty, only of simple misconduct, which he committed in good faith.11 In addition, respondent maintains that his filing of the criminal complaint for falsification of public documents against complainant does not violate the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client because the bases of the falsification case are two certificates of live birth which are public documents and in no way connected with the confidence taken during the engagement of respondent as counsel. According to respondent, the complainant confided to him as then counsel only matters of facts relating to the annulment case. Nothing was said about the alleged falsification of the entries in the birth certificates of her two daughters. The birth certificates are filed in the Records Division of CHED and are accessible to anyone.12

In a Resolution dated February 9, 2000, this Court referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.13 The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set two dates for hearing but complainant failed to appear in both. Investigating Commissioner Rosalina R. Datiles thus granted respondent's motion to file his memorandum, and the case was submitted for resolution based on the pleadings submitted by the parties.14 On June 21, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors approved the report of investigating commissioner Datiles, finding the respondent guilty of violating the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client, and recommending his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year. On August 6, 2003, complainant, upon receiving a copy of the IBP report and recommendation, wrote Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., a letter of desistance. She stated that after the passage of so many years, she has now found forgiveness for those who have wronged her. At the outset, we stress that we shall not inquire into the merits of the various criminal and administrative cases filed against respondent. It is the duty of the tribunals where these cases are pending to determine the guilt or innocence of the respondent. We also emphasize that the Court is not bound by any withdrawal of the complaint or desistance by the complainant. The letter of complainant to the Chief Justice imparting forgiveness upon respondent is inconsequential in disbarment proceedings. We now resolve whether respondent violated the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client when he filed a criminal case for falsification of public document against his former client. A brief discussion of the nature of the relationship between attorney and client and the rule on attorney-client privilege that is designed to protect such relation is in order.

In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him special powers of trust and confidence. Their relationship is strictly personal and highly confidential and fiduciary. The relation is of such delicate, exacting and confidential nature that is required by necessity and public interest.15 Only by such confidentiality and protection will a person be encouraged to repose his confidence in an attorney. The hypothesis is that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice.16 Thus, the preservation and protection of that relation will encourage a client to entrust his legal problems to an attorney, which is of paramount importance to the administration of justice.17 One rule adopted to serve this purpose is the attorney-client privilege: an attorney is to keep inviolate his client's secrets or confidence and not to abuse them.18 Thus, the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's secrets and confidence outlasts the termination of the attorney-client relationship,19 and continues even after the client's death.20 It is the glory of the legal profession that its fidelity to its client can be depended on, and that a man may safely go to a lawyer and converse with him upon his rights or supposed rights in any litigation with absolute assurance that the lawyer's tongue is tied from ever disclosing it.21 With full disclosure of the facts of the case by the client to his attorney, adequate legal representation will result in the ascertainment and enforcement of rights or the prosecution or defense of the client's cause. Now, we go to the rule on attorney-client privilege. Dean Wigmore cites the factors essential to establish the existence of the privilege, viz: (1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.22 In fine, the factors are as follows:

(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorneyclient relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the communication. Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter declines the employment.23 The reason for this is to make the prospective client free to discuss whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or used against him, and for the lawyer to be equally free to obtain information from the prospective client.24 On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client to a lawyer for some purpose other than on account of the (prospective) attorney-client relation is not privileged. Instructive is the case of Pfleider v. Palanca,25 where the client and his wife leased to their attorney a 1,328-hectare agricultural land for a period of ten years. In their contract, the parties agreed, among others, that a specified portion of the lease rentals would be paid to the client-lessors, and the remainder would be delivered by counsellessee to client's listed creditors. The client alleged that the list of creditors which he had "confidentially" supplied counsel for the purpose of carrying out the terms of payment contained in the lease contract was disclosed by counsel, in violation of their lawyer-client relation, to parties whose interests are adverse to those of the client. As the client himself, however, states, in the execution of the terms of the aforesaid lease contract between the parties, he furnished counsel with the "confidential" list of his creditors. We ruled that this indicates that client delivered the list of his creditors to counsel not because of the professional relation then existing between them, but on account of the lease agreement. We then held that a violation of the confidence that accompanied the delivery of that list would partake more of a private and civil wrong than of a breach of the fidelity owing from a lawyer to his client. (2) The client made the communication in confidence.

The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality.26 The client must intend the communication to be confidential.27 A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given.28 Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise agreement prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered to the opposing party,29 an offer and counter-offer for settlement,30 or a document given by a client to his counsel not in his professional capacity,31 are not privileged communications, the element of confidentiality not being present.32 (3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.33 The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations. The communication must have been transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice.34 If the client seeks an accounting service,35 or business or personal assistance,36 and not legal advice, the privilege does not attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose. Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold that the evidence on record fails to substantiate complainant's allegations. We note that complainant did not even specify the alleged communication in confidence disclosed by respondent. All her claims were couched in general terms and lacked specificity. She contends that respondent violated the rule on privileged communication when he instituted a criminal action against her

for falsification of public documents because the criminal complaint disclosed facts relating to the civil case for annulment then handled by respondent. She did not, however, spell out these facts which will determine the merit of her complaint. The Court cannot be involved in a guessing game as to the existence of facts which the complainant must prove. Indeed, complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP. Without any testimony from the complainant as to the specific confidential information allegedly divulged by respondent without her consent, it is difficult, if not impossible to determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged communication. Such confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege.37 The burden of proving that the privilege applies is placed upon the party asserting the privilege.38 IN VIEW WHEREOF, the complaint against respondent Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur. Tinga, J., out of the country. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 3745 October 2, 1995 CYNTHIA B. ROSACIA, complainant,

vs. ATTY. BENJAMIN B. BULALACAO, respondent. RESOLUTION

before the National Labor Relations Commission, and appearing in their behalf. 3 The sole issue to be addressed is whether or not respondent breached his oath of office for representing the employees of his former client, Tacma, Phils., Inc., after the termination of their attorney-client relationship. We agree with the findings of the IBP that respondent breached his oath of office. Respondent does not now dispute this. In fact, in his motion for reconsideration, respondent admitted that he "did commit an act bordering on grave misconduct, if not outright violation of his attorney's oath". 4 However, respondent is pleading for the Court's compassion and leniency to reduce the IBP recommended three months suspension to either fine or admonition with the following proffered grounds: that he is relatively new in the profession having been admitted to the Philippine Bar on April 10, 1990 at the age of 46 when the complained conduct was committed on August 1991; that he is of humble beginnings and his suspension will deprive his family of its only source of livelihood he being the sole bread winner in the family; that he has fully realized his mistake and the gravity of his offense for which he is fully repentant; that he has severed his attorneyclient relationship with the employees of Tacma, Phils., Inc. by inhibiting himself and withdrawing his appearance as counsel in the labor case against Tacma, Phils., Inc.; and that he pledges not to commit the same mistake and to henceforth strictly adhere to the professional standards set forth by the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court reiterates that an attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated as it is not good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case other person against his former client under the pretext that the case is distinct from, and independent of the former case. 5 It behooves respondent not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. 6 The relation of attorney and client is one of confidence and trust in

FRANCISCO, J.: Complainant Cynthia B. Rosacia, president of Tacma, Phils., Inc., a duly registered corporation, filed a complaint for disbarment dated October 25, 1991, against herein respondent Atty. Benjamin B. Bulalacao. Acting on the complaint, the Court in a resolution dated February 24, 1992, resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez, the IBP investigating commissioner, found that respondent breached his oath of office and accordingly recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months. 1 In a resolution dated July 30, 1994, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the commissioner's report and recommendation. 2 As found by the IBP, the undisputed facts are as follows: On June 1, 1990, by virtue of a written Agreement (Exh. "3-a"), respondent Atty. Benjamin B. Bulalacao was hired as retained counsel of a corporation by the name of Tacma Phils., Inc. On October 31, 1990, the lawyer-client relationship between the respondent and Tacma Phils., Inc. was severed as shown by another agreement of even date (Exh. "3-b"). On July, 1991, or after almost nine (9) months from the date respondent's retainer agreement with Tacma, Phils., Inc. was terminated, several employees of the corporation consulted the respondent for the purpose of filing an action for illegal dismissal. Thereafter, he agreed to handle the case for the said employees as against Tacma, Phils., Inc. by filing a complaint

the highest degree. 7 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he ought to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. 8 An attorney not only becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client's cause, but also learns from his client the weak and strong points of the case. No opportunity must be given attorneys to take advantage of the secrets of clients obtained while the confidential relation of attorney and client exists. Otherwise, the legal profession will suffer by the loss of the confidence of the people. 9 Respondent's plea for leniency cannot be granted. We note that respondent is new in the profession as he was just admitted to the Philippine Bar on April 10, 1990, when the breach of his oath of office occurred more than a year after. Having just hurdled the bar examinations which included an examination in legal ethics, surely the precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility to keep inviolate the client's trust and confidence even after the attorney-client relation is terminated 10 must have been still fresh in his mind. A lawyer starting to establish his stature in the legal profession must start right and dutifully abide by the norms of conduct of the profession. This will ineluctably redound to his benefit and to the upliftment of the legal profession as well. ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three months. Let this resolution be attached to respondent's record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof furnished to all courts and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION ADM. CASE No. 5105 August 12, 1999

Adm. Case No. 419 Commission on Bar Discipline IBP FERNANDO SALONGA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ISIDRO T. HILDAWA, respondent. VITUG, J.: In an affidavit-complaint, dated 29 March 1996, Fernando Salonga, President of Sikap at Tiyaga Alabang Vendors Association, Inc., ("STAVA"), of Muntinlupa City, charged Atty. Isidro T. Hildawa with gross misconduct and/or deceit. Complainant averred that respondent lawyer was a retained counsel of STAVA for a number of years and, in December 1993, represented the association in Civil Cases No. 2406, No. 2413 and No. 2416, for ejectment against, respectively, Linda Del Rosario, Angelita Manuel and Francisco Vega, all stallholders at the Alabang market, before the Municipal Trial Court of Muntinlupa. The defendants deposited the accrued rentals with the Municipal Trial Court of Muntinlupa. The defendants deposited the accrued rentals with court. On 14 November 1994, respondent lawyer filed a motion to withdraw the deposit; thus: JOINT MOTION TO WITHDRAW DEPOSIT Counsel for complainant, unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully manifest: 1. That, defendants-appellants Linda del Rosario, Angelita Manuel and Francisco Vega made their deposit of accrued rentals on their stalls up to October 15, 1994, as follows: a. Linda del Rosario b. Angelita Manuel c. Francisco Vega P24,440.60 46,436.60 33,666.60

Total ________________________ ________________P104,543.80 =========== 2. That, plaintiff is entitled to such deposits made by the appellants in order to pay its obligation with the cooperative which granted the concession to the transient area for the plaintiff to operate; 3. That, counsel for the appellants register no objection to such withdrawal as shown by his conformity to the herein motion. Wherefore, it is prayed of this Honorable Court that plaintiff be authorized to withdraw the corresponding amounts deposited by the defendants in the above-entitled cases. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. November 14, 1994. MAKATI for Muntinlupa. HILDAWA & GOMEZ #3484 Gen. Lucban St., cor. South Superhighway, Makati, Metro Manila By: (Sgd.) ISIDRO T. HILDAWA PTR NO. 9428868 / 1-21-94 / Muntinlupa IBP NO. 347727 / 5-06-94 / Makati With My Conformity: (Sgd.) Atty. PATRICIO L. BONCAYAO, JR.

2nd Flr. Cattleya Commercial National Road, Alabang1 Respondent lawyer issued a receipt, dated 09 December 1994, that acknowledged his having received the withdrawn deposit of P104,543.80. Complainant alleged that STAVA was not informed of the filing of the motion nor did it authorize Atty. Hildawa to withdraw the amount. Despite repeated demands, respondent lawyer refused to turn over the withdrawn sum to STAVA. To make matters even worse, added the complainant, Atty. Hildawa appeared as counsel for Kilusang Bayan ng mga Magtitinda sa Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa ("KBMBPM"), an opponent of STAVA in Civil Case No. 95-192, for Injunction with Urgent Prayer for Restraining Order, before Branch 276 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa. Eventually, the RTC, acting on a motion to disqualify respondent in said case, directed, in its order of 26 December 1995, the latter "to withdraw from the case and avoid committing an unethical conduct."2 In his answer to the complaint, Atty. Hildawa countered that complainant was fully aware of the withdrawal of the rental in arrears deposited by the defendants in the ejectment cases and that complainant, on several occasions, even accompanied him in following up the release of the money. He said he did not turn over the amount withdrawn to complainant since Salonga was then on leave; instead, he handed over, on 10 December 1994, the sum to Dolores Javinar, the treasurer of the association, who issued the corresponding receipt therefor.1wphi1.nt In his reply, Salonga disclaimed the supposed turn-over of the money to Javinar and the allegation that he was on leave of absence. This Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") for investigation, report and recommendation. In a resolution, dated 13 March 1998, the Commission on Bar Discipline, through Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan, found respondent guilty of violation of Canons 16 and 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended that he be suspended for one year from the practice of law.

On 25 April 1998, the IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XIII-9872, resolved to adopt and approve the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Soon after receiving a copy of the above-numbered resolution, respondent reverted to IBP seeking a reconsideration of its resolution only to be thereupon informed that the case had already been forwarded to this Court. Respondent submitted to the Court a memorandum, dated 05 August 1998, asseverating that the findings of the Investigating Commissioner were contrary to the evidence on record. He cited the resolution of the STAVA Board of Trustees, dated 30 October 1994, that read: KATITIKAN NG PULONG NG BOARD OF TRUSTEES NG SIKAP AT TIYAGA ALABANG VENDORS ASSOCIATION, INC. Ginanap noong ika-30 ng Oktubre, 1994 sa Tanggapan nito sa Alabang ________________________________________ Mga Dumalo: President Fernando Salonga Executive Vice-Pres. Tirso Sapar VP internal Domingo Silava VP Security Leonardo Gumapos

Auditor Undo Cipriano Hindi Dumalo: VP External Aser Arevalo Treasurer Dolores Javinar ________________________________________ Unang tinalakay sa pagpupulong ang kaayusan ng samahan at mga dapat tupdin ng mga kasapi bilang kanilang tungkulin sa samahan at sa lugar na kanilang pinagtitindahan. Ang kalinisan ay pinagtutuunan ng pansin. Bagama't "on-leave" ang pangulo natin, sa kahalagahan ng pinaguusapan siya ay narito sa pagpupulong. Tinalakay ang hindi pagbabayad ng Market Fee at gamit electrical ng 11 dating miyembro ng STAVA na tuwirang nagbabayad ngayon sa kooperatiba. Dahil dito ay nawawalan ng P450.00 hanggang P500.00 ang samahan sangayon sa taya ng pangulo. Dahil dito, binigyan ng karapatan ang abogado ng samahan na isaayos ang dapat na hakbanging legal upang malikom ang salapi para sa STAVA upang makatugon ito sa bayarin sa KBMBPM at sa iba pang pagkakagastusan sa hinaharap na okasyon. Mayroong pag-uusap upang wakasan ang usapin na idinulog ng STAVA laban sa Kooperatiba sapagkat sa diwa ng magandang pagkakaunawaan at mabuting samahan, nais ng ipagkaloob ng Kooperatiba ang hinihingi ng STAVA na lagyan ng hangganan ang lugar na ang mga miembro ng STAVA ang siya lamang magtitinda sa halagang itatakda ng bawa't panig. Dito tumindig si Ester Dalde at ipinabatid sa kapulungan na siya ay kinausap ng Gen. Manager ng Kooperatiba at tinatanong kung maari daw ay huwag ng paalisin ang labing-isang (11) tumiwalag sa STAVA.

Tinalakay ng pamunuan ang bagay na ito at ang lahat ay nagkakaisa sa kanilang paninindigan na dapat lamang palayasin ang lahat ng taksil at anay ng samahan upang maiwasan ang hindi pagkakaunawaan at tuloy maging aral na din sa iba pa. Isinunod na tinalakay ang mga "balimbing" o nagdadalawang mukha at inatasan na bumuo ng kommitte tungkol dito upang mabatid kung sino-sino ang mga ito at malapatan ng kaukulang lunas. Sa ano mang Compromise Agreement na gagawin, hindi dapat pumayag na manatili pa ang mga taksil sa STAVA at ang kooperatiba ang siyang magbibigay sa kanila ng lugar sa alin mang parte ng palengke ngunit hindi sa Transient Area. Ang pagpupulong ay itinindig sa ganap na ika-2:00 ng hapon. (Sgd.) Fernando Salonga President Tirso Sapar Executive Vice-President (Sgd.)

Undo Cipriano Auditor3 Respondent likewise sought to make the clarification that his services as counsel of STAVA were already terminated in February 1995, long before he appeared as counsel for KBMBPM in December 1995. After a close review of the records, the Court is inclined to partially grant the motion for reconsideration submitted by respondent. The basis of the Investigating Commissioner for finding respondent lawyer to have violated Canon 164 was the supposed admission of Atty. Hildawa that he withdrew the amount of P104,543.80 for STAVA. This fact, however, was never denied by Atty. Hildawa. It would appear that the real focus should have been then on the issue of whether or not the withdrawal of the deposit by respondent had the client's authority. Apparently, he did have that authority under the resolution, dated 30 October 1994, of the Board of Trustees of STAVA. The resolution, in part, was to the following effect: Dahil dito, binigyan ng karapatan ang abogado ng samahan na isaayos ang dapat na hakbanging legal upang malikom ang salapi para sa STAVA upang makatugon ito sa bayarin sa KBMBPM at sa iba pang pagkakagastusan sa hinaharap na okasyon.5 One of the signatories of the resolution was complainant Fernando Salonga himself. Atty. Hildawa did not keep the money but turned it over on 10 December 1994, or just one day after receiving it (on 09 December 1994), to Dolores Javinar, the STAVA treasurer, who issued a corresponding receipt therefor. What the treasurer or STAVA might have done thereafter with the funds was no concern of respondent counsel. The Court agrees with the Investigating Commissioner, however, that respondent lawyer has transgressed Canon 21 which requires a lawyer to preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorneyclient relation ceases, a mandate that he has placed in possible jeopardy by

(Sgd.) Domingo Silava VP Internal Leonardo Gumapos VP Security (Sgd.) (Sgd.)

agreeing to appear as counsel for a party his client has previously contended with in a case similarly involving said parties. WHEREFORE, the Court ABSOLVES Atty. Isidro T. Hildawa from the charge of having violated his obligation to hold in trust the funds of his client but REPRIMANDS him for having placed at risk his obligation of preserving the confidentiality relationship with a previous client, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar conduct in the future will be dealt with most severely.1wphi1.nt SO ORDERED. Melo, Panganiban, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION A.C. No. 5280 March 30, 2004

Sometime in April 1999, he engaged the services of respondent lawyer to prepare and file a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title. After confiding with respondent the circumstances surrounding the lost title and discussing the fees and costs, respondent prepared, finalized and submitted to him a petition to be filed before the Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan. When the petition was about to be filed, respondent went to his (complainants) office at Virra Mall, Greenhills and demanded a certain amount from him other than what they had previously agreed upon. Respondent left his office after reasoning with him. Expecting that said petition would be filed, he was shocked to find out later that instead of filing the petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title, respondent filed a letter-complaint dated July 26, 1999 against him with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Tayug, Pangasinan for "Falsification of Public Documents."1 The letter-complaint contained facts and circumstances pertaining to the transfer certificate of title that was the subject matter of the petition which respondent was supposed to have filed. Portions of said letter-complaint read: The undersigned complainant accuses WILLIAM S. UY, of legal age, Filipino, married and a resident of 132-A Gilmore Street corner 9th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, Michael Angelo T. UY, CRISTINA EARL T. UY, minors and residents of the aforesaid address, Luviminda G. Tomagos, of legal age, married, Filipino and a resident of Carmay East, Rosales, Pangasinan, and F. Madayag, with office address at A12, 2/F Vira Mall Shopping Complex, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, for ESTAFA THRU FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS, committed as follows: That on March 15, 1996, William S. Uy acquired by purchase a parcel of land consisting of 4.001 ha. for the amount of P100,000.00, Philippine Currency, situated at Brgy. Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan, from FERMIN C. GONZALES, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed by the latter in favor of the former; that in the said date, William S. Uy received the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-33122, covering the said land; That instead of registering said Deed of Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-33122, in the Register of Deeds for the purpose of transferring

WILLIAM S. UY, complainant, vs. ATTY. FERMIN L. GONZALES, respondent.

RESOLUTION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: William S. Uy filed before this Court an administrative case against Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales for violation of the confidentiality of their lawyer-client relationship. The complainant alleges:

the same in his name, William S. Uy executed a Deed of Voluntary Land Transfer of the aforesaid land in favor of his children, namely, Michael Angelo T. Uy and Cristina Earl T. Uy, wherein William S. Uy made it appear that his said children are of legal age, and residents of Brgy. Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan, when in fact and in truth, they are minors and residents of Metro Manila, to qualify them as farmers/beneficiaries, thus placing the said property within the coverage of the Land Reform Program; That the above-named accused, conspiring together and helping one another procured the falsified documents which they used as supporting papers so that they can secure from the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tayug, Pangasinan, TCT No. T-5165 (Certificate of Land Ownership Award No. 004 32930) in favor of his above-named children. Some of these Falsified documents are purported Affidavit of Seller/Transferor and Affidavit of Non-Tenancy, both dated August 20, 1996, without the signature of affiant, Fermin C. Gonzales, and that on that said date, Fermin C. Gonzales was already dead ; That on December 17, 1998, William S. Uy with deceit and evident intent to defraud undersigned, still accepted the amount of P340,000.00, from Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales, P300,000.00, in PNB Check No. 0000606, and P40,000.00, in cash, as full payment of the redemption of TCT No. 33122knowing fully well that at that time the said TCT cannot be redeemed anymore because the same was already transferred in the name of his children; That William S. Uy has appropriated the amount covered by the aforesaid check, as evidenced by the said check which was encashed by him; That inspite of repeated demands, both oral and in writing, William S. Uy refused and continue to refuse to deliver to him a TCT in the name of the undersigned or to return and repay the said P340,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of the undersigned.2 With the execution of the letter-complaint, respondent violated his oath as a lawyer and grossly disregarded his duty to preserve the secrets of his

client. Respondent unceremoniously turned against him just because he refused to grant respondents request for additional compensation. Respondents act tarnished his reputation and social standing.3 In compliance with this Courts Resolution dated July 31, 2000,4 respondent filed his Comment narrating his version, as follows: On December 17, 1998, he offered to redeem from complainant a 4.9 hectare-property situated in Brgy. Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan covered by TCT No. T-33122 which the latter acquired by purchase from his (respondents) son, the late Fermin C. Gonzales, Jr.. On the same date, he paid complainant P340,000.00 and demanded the delivery of TCT No. T33122 as well as the execution of the Deed of Redemption. Upon request, he gave complainant additional time to locate said title or until after Christmas to deliver the same and execute the Deed of Redemption. After the said period, he went to complainants office and demanded the delivery of the title and the execution of the Deed of Redemption. Instead, complainant gave him photocopies of TCT No. T-33122 and TCT No. T-5165. Complainant explained that he had already transferred the title of the property, covered by TCT No.T-5165 to his children Michael and Cristina Uy and that TCT No. T-5165 was misplaced and cannot be located despite efforts to locate it. Wanting to protect his interest over the property coupled with his desire to get hold of TCT No. T-5165 the earliest possible time, he offered his assistance pro bono to prepare a petition for lost title provided that all necessary expenses incident thereto including expenses for transportation and others, estimated at P20,000.00, will be shouldered by complainant. To these, complainant agreed. On April 9, 1999, he submitted to complainant a draft of the petition for the lost title ready for signing and notarization. On April 14, 1999, he went to complainants office informing him that the petition is ready for filing and needs funds for expenses. Complainant who was with a client asked him to wait at the anteroom where he waited for almost two hours until he found out that complainant had already left without leaving any instructions nor funds for the filing of the petition. Complainants conduct infuriated him which prompted him to give a handwritten letter telling complainant that

he is withdrawing the petition he prepared and that complainant should get another lawyer to file the petition. Respondent maintains that the lawyer-client relationship between him and complainant was terminated when he gave the handwritten letter to complainant; that there was no longer any professional relationship between the two of them when he filed the letter-complaint for falsification of public document; that the facts and allegations contained in the lettercomplaint for falsification were culled from public documents procured from the Office of the Register of Deeds in Tayug, Pangasinan.5 In a Resolution dated October 18, 2000, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.6 Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala ordered both parties to appear on April 2, 2003 before the IBP.7 On said date, complainant did not appear despite due notice. There was no showing that respondent received the notice for that days hearing and so the hearing was reset to May 28, 2003.8 On April 29, 2003, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala received a letter from one Atty. Augusto M. Macam dated April 24, 2003, stating that his client, William S. Uy, had lost interest in pursuing the complaint he filed against Atty. Gonzales and requesting that the case against Atty. Gonzales be dismissed.9 On June 2, 2003, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala submitted her report and recommendation, portions of which read as follows: The facts and evidence presented show that when respondent agreed to handle the filing of the Verified Petition for the loss of TCT No. T-5165, complainant had confided to respondent the fact of the loss and the circumstances attendant thereto. When respondent filed the LetterComplaint to the Office of the Special Prosecutor in Tayug, Pangasinan, he violated Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which expressly provides that "A lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is terminated." Respondent

cannot argue that there was no lawyer-client relationship between them when he filed the Letter-Complaint on 26 July 1999 considering that as early as 14 April 1999, or three (3) months after, respondent had already terminated complainants perceived lawyer-client relationship between them. The duty to maintain inviolate the clients confidences and secrets is not temporary but permanent. It is in effect perpetual for "it outlasts the lawyers employment" (Canon 37, Code of Professional Responsibility) which means even after the relationship has been terminated, the duty to preserve the clients confidences and secrets remains effective. Likewise Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility provides that "A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with the full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto." On 29 April 2003, the Commission received a letter dated 24 April 2003 from Atty. Augusto M. Macam, who claims to represent complainant, William S. Uy, alleging that complainant is no longer interested in pursuing this case and requested that the same be dismissed. The aforesaid letter hardly deserves consideration as proceedings of this nature cannot be "interrupted by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same. (Section 5, Rule 139-B, Rules of Court). Moreover, in Boliver vs. Simbol, 16 SCRA 623, the Court ruled that "any person may bring to this Courts attention the misconduct of any lawyer, and action will usually be taken regardless of the interest or lack of interest of the complainant, if the facts proven so warrant." IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales to have violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and it is hereby recommended that he be SUSPENDED for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS from receipt hereof, from the practice of his profession as a lawyer and member of the Bar.10 On June 21, 2003, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued Resolution No. XV-2003-365, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws and rules, and considering that respondent violated Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.11 Preliminarily, we agree with Commissioner Villanueva-Maala that the manifestation of complainant Uy expressing his desire to dismiss the administrative complaint he filed against respondent, has no persuasive bearing in the present case. Sec. 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that: . No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same. This is because: A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.12

Now to the merits of the complaint against the respondent. Practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, as well as legal principles, practice or procedure and calls for legal knowledge, training and experience.13 While it is true that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court,14 complainant failed to prove any of the circumstances enumerated above that would warrant the disbarment or suspension of herein respondent. Notwithstanding respondents own perception on the matter, a scrutiny of the records reveals that the relationship between complainant and respondent stemmed from a personal transaction or dealings between them rather than the practice of law by respondent. Respondent dealt with complainant only because he redeemed a property which complainant had earlier purchased from his (complainants) son. It is not refuted that respondent paid complainant P340,000.00 and gave him ample time to produce its title and execute the Deed of Redemption. However, despite the period given to him, complainant failed to fulfill his end of the bargain because of the alleged loss of the title which he had admitted to respondent as having prematurely transferred to his children, thus prompting respondent to offer his assistance so as to secure the issuance of a new title to the property, in lieu of the lost one, with complainant assuming the expenses therefor. As a rule, an attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation of a person, who in respect to a business or trouble of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view of obtaining professional advice or assistance. It is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney on any previous occasion or that any retainer should have been paid, promised or charged for, neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had, for as long as the advice and

assistance of the attorney is sought and received, in matters pertinent to his profession.15 Considering the attendant peculiar circumstances, said rule cannot apply to the present case. Evidently, the facts alleged in the complaint for "Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents" filed by respondent against complainant were obtained by respondent due to his personal dealings with complainant. Respondent volunteered his service to hasten the issuance of the certificate of title of the land he has redeemed from complainant. Respondents immediate objective was to secure the title of the property that complainant had earlier bought from his son. Clearly, there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent and complainant. The preparation and the proposed filing of the petition was only incidental to their personal transaction. Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reads: Canon 21 A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED. Rule 21.01 A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except: a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure; b) When required by law; c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates or by judicial action. The alleged "secrets" of complainant were not specified by him in his affidavit-complaint. Whatever facts alleged by respondent against complainant were not obtained by respondent in his professional capacity but as a redemptioner of a property originally owned by his deceased son and therefore, when respondent filed the complaint for estafa against herein complainant, which necessarily involved alleging facts that would

constitute estafa, respondent was not, in any way, violating Canon 21. There is no way we can equate the filing of the affidavit-complaint against herein complainant to a misconduct that is wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or that renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. To hold otherwise would be precluding any lawyer from instituting a case against anyone to protect his personal or proprietary interests. WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XV-2003-365 dated June 21, 2003 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the administrative case filed against Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales, docketed as A.C. No. 5280, is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION ADM. CASE NO. 5018 January 26, 2007

ROGELIO H. VILLANUEVA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. AMADO B. DELORIA, Respondent. RESOLUTION TINGA, J.: This treats of the Complaint1 for Disbarment dated February 17, 1999 filed by Rogelio H. Villanueva (Villanueva) against Atty. Amado B. Deloria in connection with HLRB Case No. REM-080592-5166, entitled "Spouses

Conrado De Gracia v. Estate of Jaime Gonzales, et al." Atty. Deloria, a former full-time Commissioner of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), appeared as counsel for the spouses De Gracia. Villanueva avers that a decision in that case was rendered by Housing and Land Use Arbiter,2 Atty. Teresita R. Alferez, requiring the Estate of Jaime Gonzales to, among other things, refund to the spouses De Gracia the amount of P69,000.00 plus interest at the prevailing commercial interest rates. The case was eventually assigned to Villanueva upon the latters designation as Arbiter. It appears that Atty. Deloria filed a Motion for Issuance of Substitute Judgment and for Consignation3 claiming that the Estate of Jaime Gonzales does not want to pay interest based on commercial interest rates. Villanueva asserts, however, that Atty. Delorias allegation is belied by two motions filed by counsel for the Estate of Jaime Gonzales which merely seek to clarify the precise interest rate applicable to the case in order for it to fully comply with the decision. Atty. Delorias misrepresentation is allegedly a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), particularly Canons 1,4 10,5 126 and 197 thereof, the Attorneys Oath of Office and Art. 19 of the Civil Code. Atty. Deloria also allegedly violated Canon 118 of the Code because he sought the substitution of a decision which he knew had already become final and partially executed. Villanueva notes that Atty. Deloria enclosed with his motion a check in the amount of P69,000.00 payable to the order of the Estate of Jaime Gonzales and Corazon Gonzales, representing the principal refunded to the spouses De Gracia in compliance with the decision. Villanueva states that the check was drawn against Atty. Delorias personal checking account in violation of Canon 169 of the Code. Moreover, according to Villanueva, Atty. Deloria offered him 50% of the recoverable amount in the case if he resolves the latters motion favorably.10 Atty. Delorias conduct allegedly violates the previously cited

canons of the Code, Canon 13,11 Rule 15.06,12 Canon 15 of the Code, Art. 212 of the Revised Penal Code, the Attorneys Oath of Office and Art. 19 of the Civil Code. Villanueva also alleges that Atty. Deloria used his influence as former Commissioner of the HLURB to persuade Atty. Alferez to impose interest based on commercial rates instead of the interest rate fixed in Resolution No. R-42113 and Memorandum Circular No. 19,14 both of which provide a uniform rate of interest in decisions involving refunds. Atty. Deloria also allegedly used his connections in the HLURB to prevent Villanueva from releasing an Order denying the formers motion and to prevail upon the agencys Legal Services Group to interpret the term "commercial rate of interest" in a way that is favorable to his clients case, again in violation of the Code.15 Further, Villanueva claims that Atty. Deloria assisted his client in filing an unfounded criminal case against him before the Office of the Ombudsman with the purpose of getting even with Villanueva for denying their motion. When his client pursued this course of action, Atty. Deloria allegedly should have withdrawn his services in accordance with Rule 22.01,16 Canon 22 of the Code. In his Comment17 dated September 22, 2000, Atty. Deloria denies any wrongdoing and sought the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of merit. He avers that the refusal of the Estate of Jaime Gonzales to pay the interest stipulated in the decision is evident from the various motions it has filed. On the alleged commingling of his funds with those of his clients, Atty. Deloria claims that the spouses De Gracia requested him to advance the amount intended for consignation as they were then on vacation in the United States. He also maintains that he did not exert any influence on the HLURB to rule in his clients favor, adding that the draft order which he filed in the case is required under the rules of the agency. Atty. Deloria counters that it is Villanueva who has exhibited partiality in favor of the Estate of Jaime Gonzales by failing to rule on the motions for clarification filed by the latter, thereby forcing the spouses De Gracia to wait

for an inordinately long time for the decision in their favor to be fully implemented. Villanueva, in his Reply18 dated November 10, 2000, contends that he would have been indicted by the Office of the Ombudsman if it were true that his Order in the case was motivated by bias and partiality in favor of the Estate of Jaime Gonzales. In a Resolution19 dated February 19, 2001, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. Investigating Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan submitted a Report20 dated September 29, 2005, finding merit in the Complaint and recommending that Atty. Deloria be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years and/or be fined in the amount of P20,000.00. This recommendation was annulled and set aside by the IBP in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-279 dated May 26, 2006. The case was instead dismissed for lack of merit. The report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner appears to be based solely on the Rollo of the case which the Court sent to the IBP pursuant to the Resolution dated February 19, 2001. The Investigating Commissioner did not conduct any hearing to determine the veracity of the allegations in Villanuevas Complaint and the truthfulness of Atty. Delorias answers thereto. A formal investigation is a mandatory requirement which may not be dispensed with except for valid and compelling reasons.21 In Baldomar v. Paras,22 we held: Complaints against lawyers for misconduct are normally addressed to the Court. If, at the outset, the Court finds a complaint to be clearly wanting in merit, it outrightly dismisses the case. If, however, the Court deems it necessary that further inquiry should be made, such as when the matter could not be resolved by merely evaluating the pleadings submitted, a referral is made to the IBP for a formal investigation of the case during which the parties are accorded an opportunity to be heard. An ex-parte

investigation may only be conducted when respondent fails to appear despite reasonable notice. x x x Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for investigation in disbarment and disciplinary proceedings against attorneys before the IBP, thus: Sec. 8. Investigation.Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to answer, the Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of the case. He shall have the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on his behalf, and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex-parte. The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3) months from the date of its commencement, unless extended for good cause by the Board of Governors upon prior application. Willful failure or refusal to obey a subpoena or any other lawful order issued by the Investigator shall be dealt with as for indirect contempt of court. The corresponding charge shall be filed by the Investigator before the IBP Board of Governors which shall require the alleged contemnor to show cause within ten (10) days from notice. The IBP Board of Governors may thereafter conduct hearings, if necessary, in accordance with the procedure set forth in this Rule for hearings before the Investigator. Such hearing shall as far as practicable be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its commencement. Thereafter, the IBP Baord of Governors shall within a like period of fifteen (15) days issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations, which shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action and if warranted, the imposition of penalty. We find that due observance of the foregoing rules is necessary for the proper resolution of this case.

WHEREFORE, the instant administrative case is REMANDED to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for further proceedings. The IBP is also directed to act on this referral with deliberate dispatch. SO ORDERED. DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION A.C. No. 4215 May 21, 2001

2. The parties agreed upon attorney's fees in the amount of P15,000.00 fifty percent (50%) of which was payable upon acceptance of the case and the remaining balance upon the termination of the case. Accordingly, complainant paid respondent the amount of P7,500.00 representing 50% of the attorney's fee. 3. Thereafter, even before respondent counsel had prepared the appellant's brief and contrary to their agreement that the remaining balance be payable after the termination of the case, Atty. Dealca demanded an additional payment from complainant obliged by paying the amount of P4,000.00. 4. Prior to the filing of the appellant's brief, respondent counsel again demanded payment of the remaining balance of P3,500.00. When complainant was unable to do so, respondent lawyer withdraw his appearance as complainant's counsel without his prior knowledge and/or conformity. Returning the case folder to the complainant, respondent counsel attached a Note dated February 28, 1993,2 stating: 28 February 1994 Pepe and Del Montano, For breaking your promise, since you do not want to fulfill your end of the bargain, here's your reward: Henceforth, you lawyer for yourselves. Here are your papers. Johnny Complainant claimed that such conduct by respondent counsel exceeded the ethical standards of the law profession and prays that the latter be sternly dealt with administratively. Complainant later on filed motions praying for the imposition of the maximum penalty of disbarment. After respondent counsel filed his comment on the complaint, the Court in the Resolution of August 1, 1994, referred the case of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

FELICISIMO M. MONTANO, complainant, vs. INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES and Atty. JUAN S. DEALCA, respondents. KAPUNAN, J.: In a verified complaint filed before this Court on March 9, 1994, complaint Felicisimo M. Montano charged Atty. Juan Dealca with misconduct and prays that he be "sternly dealt with administratively." The complaint1 is summarized as follows: 1. On November 14, 1992, the complainant hired the services of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as his counsel in collaboration with Atty. Ronando L. Gerona in a case pending before the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 3767 wherein the complainant was the plaintiff-appellant.

The Investigating Commissioner found respondent counsel guilty of unprofessional conduct and recommended that he be "severely reprimanded." However, in a Resolution3 by the IBP Board of Governors on July 26, 1997, it was resolved that the penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner meted to respondent be amended to "three (3) months suspension from the practice of law for having been found guilty of misconduct, which eroded the public confidence regarding his duty as a lawyer." Respondent counsel sought reconsideration of the aforementioned resolution of the IBP, alleging that the latter misapprehended the facts and that, in any case, he did not deserve the penalty imposed. The true facts, according to him, are the following. 1. Complainant is being represented by Atty. Ronando L. Gerona in his case on appeal; 2. Due to the ailment of Atty. Gerona's daughter, he could not prepare and submit complainant's appellant's brief on time; 3. Complainant wen to the respondent to do just that, i.e., prepare and submit his appellant's brief on time at the agreed fee of P15,000.00, 50% down and 50% upon its completion; 4. Working overtime, respondent was able to finish the appellant's brief ahead of its deadline, so he advised the complainant about its completion with the request that the remaining balance of P7,500.00 be paid. Complainant paid P4,000.00 only, promising to pay the P3,500.00 "tomorrow" or on "later particular date." Please take note that, at this juncture, there was already a breach of the agreement on complainant's part. 5. When that "tomorrow" or on a "later particular date" came, respondent, thru a messenger, requested the complainant to pay the P3,500.00 as promised but word was sent that he will again pay "tomorrow" or on a "later date." This promise-non-payment cycle went on repeatedly until the last day of the filing of the brief. Please take note again that it was not the

respondent but the complainant who sets the date when he will pay, yet he fails to pay as promised; 6. Even without being paid completely, respondent, of his own free will and accord, filed complainant's brief on time; 7. After the brief was filed, respondent tried to collect from the complainant the remaining balance of P3,500.00, but the latter made himself scare. As the records would show, such P3,500.00 remains unpaid until now; 8. Sensing that something was amiss, respondent sent the February 28, 1993 note and case folder to the complainant, hoping that the latter would see personally the former about it to settle the matter between them; 9. However, instead of seeing the respondent, complainant filed this case; 10. Respondent was constrained to file his withdrawal with the Court of Appeals because of this case to avoid further misunderstanding since he was the one who signed the appellant's brief although Atty. Gerona was his counsel of record. Such withdrawal was accordingly granted by the appellate court; xxx xxx xxx.4

Respondent counsel further averred that complainant's refusal to pay the agreed lawyer's fees, measly as it was, was deliberate and in bad faith; hence, his withdrawal as counsel was "just, ethical and proper." Respondent counsel concluded that not only was the penalty of suspension harsh for his act of merely trying to collect payment for his services rendered, but it indirectly would punish his family since he was the sole breadwinner with children in school and his wife terminally ill with cancer. In its Resolution No. XIII-97-129 dated October 25, 1997, the IBP denied Atty. Dealca's motion for reconsideration, to wit: xxx

RESOLVED TO DENY Atty. Dealca's Motion For Reconsideration of the Board's Decision in the above-entitled case there being no substantive reason to reverse the finding therein. Moreover, the motion is improperly laid the remedy of the respondent is to file the appropriate pleading with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of said Decision pursuant to Sec. 12 [c] of Rule 139-B.5 On December 10, 1997, this Court noted the following pleadings filed in the present complaint, (a) notice and a copy of Resolution No. XII-97-154 dated July 26, 1997 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines amending the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of reprimand to three (3) months suspension of respondent from the practice of law for having been found guilty of misconduct which eroded the public confidence regarding his duty as a lawyer; (a) complainant's motion praying for the imposition of the maximum penalty of disbarment; (b) motion dated September 15, 1997 of respondent for reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution of July 26, 1997; (c) comment/opposition of respondent praying that the motion for the imposition of the maximum penalty be denied; (d) comment of complainant praying that the penalty of three (3) months suspension from the practice of law as recommended by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines pursuant to resolution No. XII-97-154 be raised to a heavier penalty; (e) comment/manifestation/opposition of complainant praying that the respondent be disbarred; and (g) rejoinder of respondent praying that this case be dismissed for being baseless.6 and referred the same to the IBP for evaluation and report.

In compliance therewith, on March 28, 1998, the IBP issued Resolution No. XIII-98-42 referring the above-entitled case to Commissioner Vibar for evaluation, report and recommendation "in view of the Motion for Reconsideration granted by the Supreme Court." The Investigating Commissioner, after referring the case, recommended that his original recommendation of the imposition of the penalty of reprimand be maintained, noting that respondent counsel had served the IBP well as President of the Sorsogon Chapter.7 Accordingly, on February 23, 1999, the IBP Board of Governors, issued the following resolution: RESOLUTION NO. XIII-99-48 xxx RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the Motion for Reconsideration be granted and that the penalty of REPRIMAND earlier recommended by the Investigating Commissioner be imposed on Atty. Juan S. Dealca.8 Complainant asked the IBP to reconsider the foregoing resolution but the motion was denied.9 On April 10, 2000, complainant filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari in connection with Administrative Case No. 4215 against the IBP and respondent counsel averring that the IBP Board of Governors committed grave abuse of discretion when it overturned its earlier resolution and granted respondent counsel's motion for reconsideration on February 23, 1999. He claimed that the earlier resolution denying the motion for reconsideration issued on October 25, 1997 had already become final and executory; hence, any further action or motion subsequent to such final and executory judgment shall be null and void.

When the Court issued the resolution of December 10, 1997 treating the several pleadings filed in the present complaint, it should be noted that the IBP resolution denying respondent's motion for reconsideration (Resolution No. XIII-97-129) dated October 25, 1997, for some reason, had not yet reached this Court. As of that date, the only IBP resolution attached to the records of the case was Resolution No. XII-97-54 amending the administrative sanction from reprimand to three months suspension. Hence, at the time the pleadings were referred back to the IBP in the same resolution, the Court was not aware that the IBP had already disposed of the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent counsel. Thus, when the IBP was informed of the said Court resolution, it construed the same as granting Atty. Dealca's motion for reconsideration and as an order for IBP to conduct a re-evaluation of the case. The IBP assumed that its resolution of October 25, 1997 was already considered by this Court when it referred the case back to the IBP. It failed to notice that its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration was not among those pleadings and resolution referred back to it. Hence, on the strength of this Court's resolution which it had inadvertently misconstrued, the IBP conducted a re-evaluation of the case and came up with the assailed resolution now sought to be reversed. The Court holds that the error is not attributable to the IBP. It is regrettable that the procedural infirmity alleged by complainant actually arose from a mere oversight which was attributable to neither party. Going into the merits, we affirm the findings made by the IBP that complainant engaged the services of respondent lawyer only for the preparation and submission of the appellant's brief and the attorney's fees was payable upon the completion and submission of the appellant's brief and not upon the termination of the case. There is sufficient evidence which indicates complainant's willingness to pay the attorney's fees. AS agreed upon, complainant paid half of the fees in the amount of P7,500.00 upon acceptance of the case. And while the remaining balance was not yet due as it was agreed to be paid only upon the

completion and submission of the brief, complainant nonetheless delivered to respondent lawyer P4,000.00 as the latter demanded. This, notwithstanding, Atty. Dealca withdrew his appearance simply because of complainant's failure to pay the remaining balance of P3,500.00 which does not appear to be deliberate. The situation was aggravated by respondent counsel's note to complainant withdrawing as counsel which was couched in impolite and insulting language.10 Given the above circumstances, was Atty. Dealca's conduct just and proper? We find Atty. Dealca's conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal profession. Under Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances. Although he may withdraw his services when the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services,11 under the circumstances of the present case, Atty. Dealca's withdrawal was unjustified as complainant did not deliberately fail to pay him the attorney's fees. In fact, complainant exerted honest efforts to fulfill his obligation. Respondent's contemptuous conduct does not speak well of a member of the bar considering that the amount owing to him was only P3,500.00. rule 20.4 of Canon 20, mandates that a lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Sadly, for not so large a sum owed to him by complainant, respondent lawyer failed to act in accordance with the demands of the Code. The Court, however, does not agree with complainant's contention that the maximum penalty of disbarment should be imposed on respondent lawyer. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty. It should never be decreed where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired.12 In the present case, reprimand is deemed sufficient.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca is REPRIMANDED with a warning that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely.1wphi1.nt SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., Puno, Pardo, Ynares-Santiago, JJ: concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

P20,000.00 P10,000.00 to be paid upon signing of the contract and the balance to be paid on or before the conclusion of the case. Complainant was also to pay P500.00 per appearance of respondent before the court and fiscal. This agreement was embodied in a contract executed on February 22, 1991. 1 In accordance with the contract, complainant paid respondent the sum of P5,000.00 on February 25, 1991, 2another P5,000.00 on March 31, 1991, 3 and P10,000.00 on May 21, 1991, 4 for a total of P20,000.00. Forthwith, respondent entered into his duties. He interviewed witnesses and gathered evidence to build a case against the suspects. He drew up the necessary sworn statements and dutifully attended the preliminary investigation. The case was thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Baloc, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija. 5 As private prosecutor, respondent religiously attended the bail hearings for the accused although these hearings were postponed on motion of the accused's counsel. Respondent however failed to attend the hearing scheduled in August 1991. It was at this nearing that the court, over complainant's objections, granted bail to all the accused. After the hearing, complainant immediately went to respondent's residence and confronted him with his absence. 6Respondent explained that he did not receive formal notice of the hearing. 7 Complainant became belligerent and started accusing him of jeopardizing the case by his absence. Respondent said that her suspicions were based on rumors and intrigues fed to her by her relatives. 8 Complainant, however, continued accusing him belligerently. She asked for the records of the case saying that she could refer them to another lawyer. Stung by her words, respondent gave her the records. 9 Complainant never returned the records nor did she see respondent. On September 18, 1991, respondent filed before the trial court a "Motion to Withdraw as Counsel." 10 The motion did not bear the consent of complainant.

A.C. No. 3773 September 24, 1997 ANGELITA C. ORCINO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSUE GASPAR, respondent.

PUNO, J.: On June 14, 1992, complainant Angelita C. Orcino filed with this Court a letter-complaint dated December 10, 1991 against respondent Atty. Josue Gaspar, her former counsel. Complainant prayed that this Court impose disciplinary sanctions on respondent for abandoning his duties and for failing to return the legal fees she fully paid for his services. The complaint arose from the following facts: Complainant engaged the services of respondent to prosecute a criminal case she intended to file against several suspects in the slaying of her husband. In consideration thereof, complainant bound herself to pay respondent legal fees of

On October 23, 1991, the court issued an order directing respondent to secure complainant's consent to the motion "and his appearance as private prosecutor shall continue until he has secured this consent." 11 Complainant refused to sign her conformity to respondent's withdrawal. 12 Meanwhile, the hearings in the criminal case continued. Respondent did not appear at the hearings nor did he contact complainant. Complainant was thus compelled to engage the services of another lawyer. Hence, the lettercomplaint. We referred the letter-complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline, for investigation, report and recommendation. The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at any time with or without cause. 13 The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted. 14 Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. 15 He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. 16 A lawyer's right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the client's written consent or from a good cause. 17 Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Sec. 26. Change of attorneys An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party. xxx xxx xxx

A lawyer may retire at any time from any action special proceeding with the written consent of his client filed in court and copy thereof served upon the adverse party. Should the client refuse to give his consent, the lawyer must file an application with the court. The court, on notice to the client and adverse party, shall determine whether he ought to be allowed to retire. The application for withdrawal must be based on a good cause. 18 In the instant case, complainant did not give her written consent to respondent's withdrawal. The court thus ordered respondent to secure this consent. Respondent allegedly informed the court that complainant had become hostile and refused to sign his motion. 19 He, however, did not file an application with the court for it to determine whether he should be allowed to withdraw. Granting that respondent's motion without complainant's consent was an application for withdrawal with the court, we find that this reason is insufficient to justify his withdrawal from the case. Respondent's withdrawal was made on the ground that "there no longer exist[ed] the . . . confidence" between them and that there had been "serious differences between them relating to the manner of private prosecution." 20 Rule 22.01 of Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: CANON 22 A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. Rule 22.01 A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the following cases: a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with the matter he is handling; b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules; c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of the client;

d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out the employment effectively; e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to comply with the retainer agreement; f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; and g) Other similar cases. A lawyer may withdraw his services from his client only in the following instances: (a) when a client insists upon an unjust or immoral conduct of his case; (b) when the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility; (c) when the client has two or more retained lawyers and the lawyers could not get along to the detriment of the case; (d) when the mental or physical condition of the lawyer makes him incapable of handling the case effectively; (e) when the client deliberately fails to pay the attorney's fees agreed upon; (f) when the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; (g) other similar cases. The instant case does not fall under any of the grounds mentioned. Neither can this be considered analogous to the grounds enumerated. As found by the Commission on Bar Discipline, this case arose from a simple misunderstanding between complainant and respondent. Complainant was upset by respondent's absence at the hearing where bail was granted to the suspected killers of her husband. She vehemently opposed the grant of bail. It was thus a spontaneous and natural reaction for her to confront respondent with his absence. Her belligerence arose from her overzealousness, nothing more. Complainant's words and actions may have hurt respondent's feelings considering the work he had put into the case. But her words were uttered in a burst of passion. And even at that moment, complainant did not expressly terminate respondent's services. She made this clear when she refused to sign his "Motion to Withdraw as Counsel." Assuming, nevertheless, that respondent was justified in terminating his services, he, however, cannot just do so and leave complainant in the cold unprotected. The lawyer has no right to presume that his petition for

withdrawal will be granted by the court. 21 Until his withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer remains counsel of record who is expected by his client as well as by the court to do what the interests of his client require. 22 He must still appear on the date of hearing 23 for the attorneyclient relation does not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of record. 24 Respondent expressly bound himself under the contract to bring the criminal case to its termination. He was in fact paid in full for his services. Respondent failed to comply with his undertaking, hence, it is but fair that he return to complainant half of the amount paid him. The peculiar circumstances of the case have rendered it impossible for respondent and complainant to continue their relation under the contract. IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent is admonished to exercise more prudence and judiciousness in dealing with his clients. He is also ordered to return to complainant within fifteen (15) days from notice the amount of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) representing a portion of his legal fees received from the latter with a warning that failure on his part to do so will result in the imposition of stiffer disciplinary action. SO ORDERED. Regalado and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 6166

October 2, 2009

MARIA EARL BEVERLY C. CENIZA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. VIVIAN G. RUBIA, Respondent.

However, three months lapsed before respondent informed them that it was already filed in court. It was then that they received a copy of the complaint with "Civil Case No. 4198" and a rubber stamped "RECEIVED" thereon. However, when complainant verified the status of the case with the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, she was informed that no case with said title and docket number was filed.2

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In a verified complaint1 dated July 25, 2003 filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant, Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza charged Atty. Vivian G. Rubia with grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and falsification of public documents.

Further, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the law for intending to file the complaint in Davao del Sur when the properties to be recovered were located in Koronadal, South Cotabato and Malungon, Sarangani Province, in violation of the rule on venue that real actions shall be filed in the place where the property is situated. Complainant also alleged that respondent forged the signature of her husband, Carlito C. Ceniza, in the Affidavit of Loss attached to a petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate certificate of title filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Digos City, Branch 20, in Misc. Case No. 1142202.3

The facts of the case are as follows:

On May 3, 2002, complainant sought the legal services of the respondent in regard to the share of her mother-in-law in the estate of her husband Carlos Ceniza. As she had no money to pay for attorneys fees since her mother-inlaw would arrive from the United States only in June 2002, respondent made her sign a promissory note for P32,000.00, which amount was lent by Domingo Natavio. After her mother-in-law arrived and paid the loan, respondent furnished them a copy of the complaint for partition and recovery of ownership/possession representing legitime but with no docket number on it. They kept on following up the progress of the complaint.

In her comment, respondent assailed the personality of the complainant to institute the administrative complaint for disbarment as she was not a party to the action for partition and recovery of ownership/possession. As such, her allegations in the administrative complaint were all hearsay, self-serving and unsubstantiated. Further, the charge of forgery of the Affidavit of Loss was belied by the March 3, 2003 decision of the trial court, wherein Carlito C. Ceniza affirmed his statements in the said affidavit when he was called to testify.4

On February 2, 2004, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

On April 29, 2004, respondent filed a Supplemental Comment explaining the rubber stamped "RECEIVED" on the complaint. According to her, when her staff Jan Kirt Lester Soledad was at the RTC Office of the Clerk of Court, she called him through cellular phone and directed him to stop the filing of the complaint as the same lacked certain attachments. However, one copy thereof was already stamped "RECEIVED" by the receiving court personnel, who also assigned a docket number. She kept the copies of the complaint, including the one with the stamp, to be filed later when the attachments are complete.

Prescinding from the aforequoted ruling, it is therefore irrelevant and immaterial if herein complainant is not a party to the subject civil complaint prepared by the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge has been proven.

Meanwhile, on November 7, 2005, respondent filed a Manifestation with Urgent Motion praying that the administrative complaint be likewise dismissed in view of the dismissal of the criminal case due to complainants apparent lack of interest to prosecute.

On January 19, 2007, the IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be found guilty of falsification of public document and be meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three years. The report reads in part, as follows:

On the payment of the acceptance fee in the amount of P32,000.00, respondents contention that she acted as guarantor of Carlos Ceniza, complainants husband, when he borrowed money from a money lender, Domingo Natavio, the amount representing the acceptance, does not inspire belief. The promissory note dated May 3, 2002, appended as Annex "A" of the complaint-affidavit eloquently shows that consistent with the complainants allegation, she was made to borrow said amount to be paid as respondents acceptance fee. It bears stress that the date of the promissory note is the same date when respondents services were engaged leading to the preparation of the subject civil complaint. Complainants allegation is further enhanced by the fact that such promissory note was even notarized by the respondent.

A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action, where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. It involved no private interest. The complainant or person who called the attention of the court to the attorneys misconduct is in no sense a party and has generally no interest in its outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. It affords no redress for private grievance. (Tejan v. Cusi, 57 SCRA 154)

On the alleged filing of the subject civil complaint, it is undisputed that the same was not filed before the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC Davao Del Sur, as evidenced by a Certification from the said office appended as Annex "A" of complainants Manifestation dated October 14, 2005. Thus, the claim of complainant that respondent falsified or caused it to falsify the stamp marked received dated May 10, 2002 including the case number "4198", finds factual and legal bases.

It bears stress that a copy of the subject civil complaint was obtained by complainant from the respondent herself who tried to impress upon the former that contrary to her suspicion, the subject civil complaint was

already filed in court. However, inquiry made by the complainant shows otherwise.

Respondents contention that after one copy of the complaint was already stamped by court personnel in preparation for receiving the same and entering in the courts docket, she caused it to be withdrawn after realizing that the same lacked certain attachments, is bereft of merit.

different and it is not sound public policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before the court act on a complaint against a lawyer as it may emasculate the disciplinary power of the court. (In re Brillantes, 76 SCRA 1) Nor is his acquittal, by this fact alone, a bar to an administrative complaint against him. (Piatt vs. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350).

The other allegations in the complaint about ignorance of the law are found to be without basis.

In the first place, respondent miserably failed to mention these lacking attachments that allegedly caused the withdrawal of the complaint. Secondly, and assuming arguendo that the withdrawal was due to lacking attachments, how come the same was not filed in the next office day complete with attachments. And lastly, the Certification of the Clerk of Court clearly states that Civil Case No. 4188 is not the case of Mercedes Callejo vda. De Ceniza, et al. vs. Charlotte Ceniza, et al.

RECOMMENDATION

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that herein respondent Atty. Vivian C. Rubia, be found guilty of the charge of falsification of public document and be meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years.

xxxx On May 31, 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a Resolution adopting the Investigating Commissioners recommendation with modification, as follows:

The fact that the City Prosecutors Office of Digos, upon motion for reconsideration of the respondent, dismissed a similar complaint filed by herein complainant will not in anyway affect the above captioned administrative complaint.

RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2007-237

The pendency of a criminal action against the respondent, from the facts of which the disciplinary proceeding is predicated, does not pose prejudicial question to the resolution of the issues in the disbarment case. (Calo vs. Degano, 20 SCRA 447) His conviction is not necessary to hold the lawyer administratively liable because the two proceedings and their objectives are

Adm. Case No. 6166

Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza vs.

Atty. Vivian G. Rubia

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents falsification of public document, Atty. Vivian G. Rubia is hereby DISBARRED.

applicable laws and rules, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED with modification, that Resolution RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2007-237 of the Board of Governors dated 31 May 2007 recommending the Disbarment of Atty. Vivian G. Rubia is reduced to Five (5) years Suspension from the practice of law.

On April 20, 2009, the IBP forwarded the instant case to this Court as provided under Rule 139-B, Section 12(b) of the Rules of Court.

However, in its December 11, 2008 Resolution, the Board of Governors reconsidered its May 31, 2007 Resolution by reducing the recommended penalty of disbarment to five years suspension from the practice of law, thus:

RESOLUTION NO. XVIII-2008-715

Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent from the practice of law for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law and for falsification of public document. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.5

Adm. Case No. 6166

Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza vs. Atty. Vivian G. Rubia

The sole issue in this case is whether or not there is preponderant evidence to warrant the imposition of administrative sanction against the respondent.

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Recommendation of the Board of Governors First Division of the aboveentitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the

In accusing respondent of falsification of public document, complainant alleged that respondent misrepresented to her that the complaint was already filed in court, when in fact, upon verification with the RTC Clerk of Court, it was not. Such misrepresentation is shown by the copy of the complaint with a stamped "RECEIVED" and docket number thereon. Apart

from said allegations, complainant has not proferred any proof tending to show that respondent deliberately falsified a public document.

Thus, for lack of preponderant evidence, the investigating commissioners ruling that respondent was guilty of falsification of public document, as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors, has no factual basis to stand on.1avvphi1

A perusal of the records shows that complainants evidence consists solely of her Affidavit-Complaint and the annexes attached therewith. She did not appear in all the mandatory conferences set by the investigating commissioner in order to give respondent the chance to test the veracity of her assertions. It is one thing to allege gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or falsification of public document and another to demonstrate by evidence the specific acts constituting the same.

However, we find that respondent committed some acts for which she should be disciplined or administratively sanctioned.

Indeed, complainant has no way of knowing the surrounding circumstances behind the filing of the complaint by respondents staff because she was not present when the same was filed with the trial court. Complainant failed to disprove by preponderant evidence respondents claim that the case was not filed but was in fact withdrawn after it was stamped with "RECEIVED" and assigned with a docket number. We find this explanation satisfactory and plausible considering that the stamp did not bear the signature of the receiving court personnel, which is normally done when pleadings are received by the court.

We find nothing illegal or reprehensible in respondents act of charging an acceptance fee of P32,000.00, which amount appears to be reasonable under the circumstances. The impropriety lies in the fact that she suggested that complainant borrow money from Domingo Natavio for the payment thereof. This act impresses upon the Court that respondent would do nothing to the cause of complainants mother-in-law unless payment of the acceptance fee is made. Her duty to render legal services to her client with competence and diligence should not depend on the payment of acceptance fee, which was in this case promised to be paid upon the arrival of complainants mother-in-law in June 2002, or barely a month after respondent accepted the case.

Further, the certification of the RTC Clerk of Court that the complaint was not filed and that "CIVIL CASE NO. 4198" pertained to another case, did not diminish the truthfulness of respondents claim, but even tended to bolster it. Necessarily, as the complaint was not filed, docket number "4198" indicated in the copy of the complaint was assigned to another case thereafter filed in court.

Respondents transgression is compounded further when she severed the lawyer-client relationship due to overwhelming workload demanded by her new employer Nakayama Group of Companies, which constrained her to return the money received as well as the records of the case, thereby leaving her client with no representation. Standing alone, heavy workload is not sufficient reason for the withdrawal of her services.

Moreover, respondent failed to maintain an open line of communication with her client regarding the status of their complaint.

Clearly, respondent violated the Lawyers Oath which imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18, and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:

with reasonable dispatch. Failure to fulfill his duties will subject him to grave administrative liability as a member of the Bar. For the overriding need to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the legal profession demands that an erring lawyer should be sanctioned.6

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Vivian G. Rubia is found GUILTY of violation of Rule 18.03 and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, she is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective immediately, with a warning that similar infractions in the future will be dealt with more severely.

xxxx Let all courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant, be notified of this Decision, and be it duly recorded in the personal file of respondent Atty. Vivian G. Rubia.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO CANON 22 - A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. Associate Justice

When a lawyer accepts to handle a case, whether for a fee or gratis et amore, he undertakes to give his utmost attention, skill and competence to it, regardless of its significance. Thus, his client, whether rich or poor, has the right to expect that he will discharge his duties diligently and exert his best efforts, learning and ability to prosecute or defend his (clients) cause