Aristotles Understanding of Virtue as Found in Nichomachean Ethics by, Matthew Dugandzic

Introduction: The Nicomachean Ethics (abbreviated EN for its Latin name, Ethica Nicomachea) is Aristotles best-known ethical work. It begins with a discussion of happiness. According to Aristotle, every action is completed for some end, or good, and many ends

are completed for the sake of other ends. For him, this indicates that not all ends are complete. However, if all ends were completed for the sake of some other end, this process would go on ad infinitum and human desire would be empty. Therefore there must be one end, or possibly a few ends, that is chosen for its own sake. If there is a good higher than all others, it must be complete in that it is chosen for its own sake and not for something else, self-sufficient in that it makes ones life choice-worthy and lacking nothing, (it is important to note that, for Aristotle, this self-sufficiency suffices not just for the life of a person, but also for those who surround him) and a good that is the most choice-worthy of all goods, not a good among goods. According to Aristotle, happiness fits these requirements. From here, Aristotle launches into a discussion that aims to give a more precise description of happiness as the best good. This discussion contains many analogies to human activities, because after all, Aristotle is seeking a description of the highest good, which is an ultimate end, and ends are the results of activities. The conclusion of this discussion is that, [s]ince happiness is a certain sort of activity of the soul in accord with complete virtue, we must examine virtue; for that will perhaps also be a way to study happiness better. This examination of virtue comprises most of the EN. Clearly, to grasp how Aristotle understands virtue would enable one to understand both how he thinks happiness is achieved and what he thinks it is. This essay, then, will begin by developing a working definition of virtue according to Aristotle and will then explore the essence, formation, and importance of virtue. Finally, this understanding of virtue according to Aristotle will be related back to happiness to show how Aristotle thought happiness was achieved and what he thought it was.

Working Definition of Virtue: The first description of virtue that Aristotle gives in the EN comes after an analogy. The analogy begins with a discussion of different human crafts and activities. A craft is done in accord with its function, that is, the craft of a musician is to produce music. A craft is done well ...by being completed in accord with the virtue proper [to that kind of thing]. Here we see that virtue describes the state which a person must possess to complete an action well. Going a little further, Aristotle wonders if human beings have a function. He concludes that vegetative functions and sensation do not describe the special function of a human being, because they are shared with plants and animals respectively. So then, the only possibility is that activity of the soul in accord with reason or requiring reason could qualify as the function of a human being. Although an adequate description of what Aristotle means by soul is impossible in a paper such as this, let it suffice to say that in his view, the soul of a human being includes the faculties of intellect and will. From this one can conclude that a virtuous human is one who acts in accord with reason and does it well. Later in the EN, Aristotle defines virtue as ...a state that decides, consisting in a mean, the mean relative to us, which is defined by reference to reason, that is to say, to the reason by reference to which the prudent person would define it. As will become clear later, this definition links the virtues of character and thought in a way that describes the overall function of the human being. Prudence, which will be discussed later, is none other than the virtue concerned with the use of reason. From this, a simple, easily-understood definition of virtue can be derived for use throughout the rest of

this discussion. According to Aristotle, virtue is a state that describes a person who completes actions well and in accord with reason.

The Faculties of the Human Person: From here, Aristotle begins to analyze the virtues that concern the different faculties of the human person. Since, as was shown above, virtue is a matter of the soul, it is Aristotles division of the soul that will here be of concern. Aristotle first divides the soul into two parts. The first part is the nonrational part, and the other part is the one with reason. The nonrational part consists of the parts of the soul concerned with nutrition and growth. This part is shared with plants, and is of no concern to a discussion of virtue and happiness. In Aristotles view there is, however, another nonrational part of the soul that, though it is nonrational, is somehow related to reason. This is the part that concerns appetites and desires, for, although it is not itself reasonable, it is persuaded in some way by reason. Aristotle indicates that this part of the soul is related to reason because it is subject to correction ... reproof and exhortation. Lastly, there is the part of the soul that has reason fully, by having it within itself. Virtue, since it involves reason, involves the last two parts of the soul that were described here. So since the parts of the soul which involve reason are two, so Aristotle divides the virtues into two main categories: virtue of character and virtue of thought.

Virtues of Character: In Aristotles view, the virtues of character correspond to the part of the soul that is reasonable, but does not have reason within itself. He gives the examples of

generosity and temperance, as opposed to wisdom or comprehension, in order to clarify the distinction between virtue of character and virtue of thought. Another distinction between the two is given in terms of how they are developed; virtue of thought is a result of teaching, experience, and time, where as virtue of character is the result of habit. Though these virtues do not arise naturally in human beings, the ability to acquire them is natural and they are completed by habit. To get a better idea of Aristotles understanding of the virtues of character, the rest of this section will be dedicated to an exploration of Aristotles discussion the development, nature, and purpose of the virtues of character. Firstly, Aristotle says that the virtues of character concern pleasures, pains, and the states the deal with them. These states are proper when they are intermediate, and ruined by excess and deficiency. For example, concerning the virtue of bravery, a man should neither be too rash nor too cowardly. Rather, he must act appropriately in any given dangerous situation. Sometimes it is appropriate to run, other times it is appropriate to stand firm. The person who is too cowardly will experience pain when he is in a dangerous situation, and this will prompt him to run. The person who is rash will experience pleasure in a dangerous situation, and he will stand firm when he should run instead. So, a person must strive for the mean, and so develop a habit which will enable him to act properly. The importance of pleasure and pain cannot be neglected in a discussion of Aristotles understanding of virtue. These sensations serve not only to the development, or detriment, of virtue but also to its identification. That is, for example, a generous person is not one who does generous things. A person could do something that seemed generous for the sake of something else; for example, in order to gain a good reputation.

The mark of the genuinely generous person is that he does generous things with pleasure. A person who is not generous will experience pain when doing something that a generous person would. Experiencing too much pleasure, however, would indicate that a person gives things away too freely. So the pleasure or pain which follows a persons actions indicates the state of his character. This importance of pleasure and pain has other consequences. For example, since pleasure causes us to do base actions, and pain causes us to abstain from fine ones, it is important to raise children properly. In Aristotles view, children are not yet capable of reason, and so they act on their feelings. Therefore they need to be properly educated so that they learn to find enjoyment or pain in the right things. So virtue is concerned with pleasures, pains, intermediates, and extremes, but how is it developed? Since it concerns habitual action, virtue is produced through repetition. Repetitive actions develop a state of character that facilitates those same actions. Unlike a mere habit, however, virtue is willfully developed. It also involves more than action; the corresponding experience of pleasure and/or pain is also important. So since these habitual actions are arrived at by willfully striving towards an intermediate state of character, a virtuous individual will act the right way, at the right time, easily, readily, freely, with the right attitude, and will be fully aware that he is acting virtuously. To go even further, temperance and continence will now be discussed. For Aristotle, temperance is the virtue concerning bodily pleasures, specifically those of touch and taste. Like the other virtues, temperance is a mean between two extremes. On the one hand, a person could experience pain if he did not overindulge in bodily pleasures. This person is referred to as intemperate by Aristotle. The other extreme,

which is obviously far less common, concerns the person who does not enjoy pleasures enough. Aristotle refers to this person as, insensible. Interestingly, in Aristotles view, the person who has fully developed the virtue of temperance will not only enjoy bodily pleasures properly, he will even enjoy not enjoying them improperly. That is, for example, a temperate person will take pleasure in abstaining from eating too much food. He will find the lack of pleasure pleasurable in itself! Now, a distinction has to be made between intemperance and incontinence according to Aristotle. Both of these conditions prevent a person from properly enjoying bodily pleasures. The intemperate person, however, chooses to behave as he does and is therefore incurable and worse-off than the incontinent person. That is because the intemperate person perceives what he is doing as right, and so it is difficult to persuade him otherwise. On the other hand, the incontinent person knows the right thing to do, and even decides to do it, but is overcome by desire. ... the incontinent person is like a city who that votes for all the right decrees and has excellent laws, but does not apply them... Aristotle makes a distinction between two different types of incontinence. The first is due to weakness. An incontinent person of this type perceives and decides on the right course of action, but his desire is too strong for him to control. The incontinence due to impetuosity, however, is characteristic of a person whose volatile desires drive him to act faster than reason can act. In Aristotles opinion the person who is incontinent due to impetuousness is easier to cure. Now, the incontinent person may not necessarily be intemperate, but he cannot be prudent. For although the incontinent person knows what is right and decides to do it, he still does not follow through with his decision. This following through is a requisite for

prudence, which will be discussed later. Moreover, there is also a distinction between the continent person and the temperate person. Although the two of them act the same way, the continent person has base desires which he controls, and the temperate person lacks base desires. In light of this discussion on temperance and intemperance versus continence and incontinence, the profundity of Aristotles conception of virtue of character is made clear. Virtue of character is not just a way of acting. It involves the feeling, desire, and perception of a person in addition to his way of acting.

Virtues of Thought: After finishing his discussion on the virtues of character, Aristotle beings to discuss the virtues of thought. While the virtues of character guide actions in accord with right reason and aim at an intermediate, this knowledge in itself is useless. One needs to know what right reason prescribes and where the intermediate is in order to target it. According to Aristotle, this is the function of the virtues of thought. These virtues enable a person to determine what should be done, and so the virtues of thought guide the virtues of character. To begin his discussion, Aristotle divides the rational part of the soul into two parts. The first part concerns things whose principles do not admit of being otherwise than they are. The other part concerns things whose principles do admit of being otherwise. To clarify, the first part is regarded as the part that concerns scientific knowledge, and the second part concerns rational calculation, or deliberation. The reason for this distinction is that people do not deliberate about things that they are sure of,

but scientific knowledge involves certainty. As is clear from the earlier discussion, the virtue of something corresponds to the best state of that things function. So, in order to determine the virtues concerned with these parts of the soul, their function needs to be determined. Therefore this discussion will proceed by describing Aristotles further divisions of the soul and their corresponding virtues. Finally, it will explore the allimportant role of prudence. Aristotle states that there are three capacities of the soul, sense perception, understanding, and desire. Of these, he holds that sense perception is not relevant to the discussion of virtue, because it does not take part in action. So, since decision is either understanding combined with desire or desire combined with thought and the function of each of the understanding parts ... is truth, the virtues of each part will be the states that best direct it towards the truth. Aristotle then says that there are five states of the soul that grasp truth. These are craft, scientific knowledge, prudence, wisdom, and understanding. Scientific knowledge concerns those things whose principles, as has been said, do not admit of being otherwise and, Aristotle says, are therefore everlasting, ingenerable, and indestructible. Craft knowledge entails knowledge about things whose principle is in a producer and not in the thing itself. Prudence is a state grasping the truth, involving reason, concerned with action about things that are good or bad for the human being. Understanding is about principles; it involves neither reason nor demonstration, which are what distinguish it from scientific knowledge. Finally, wisdom is understanding and scientific knowledge about the things that are by nature honorable.

Aristotle spends much less time in the EN on these virtues than he did on the virtues of character. He gives a description of each one individually and then discusses a few puzzles that arise when one tries to make distinctions among them. One result of this lack of discussion is that it remains unclear whether or not Aristotle conceived of the virtues of thought as intermediates. When he speaks of them, he speaks of their importance, purpose, and nature. There is never any mention of excess or extreme. Perhaps Aristotle thought it was obvious that these virtues are not intermediates. After all, scientific knowledge of unchangeable principles is simply knowledge. One can have more of it or less of it, but is there a right amount? It would seem that regulation of the amount of knowledge somebody should have would fall under the direction of prudence. However, as for scientific knowledge itself, it is hard to conceive of this virtue as a sort of intermediate between two extremes. The possibility that Aristotle did not conceive of the virtues of thought as means is also suggested by the way they are developed. The virtues of character are developed through repetitive action aimed at a certain mean. However, Aristotle says that understanding, for example, seems to grow naturally. That is, it develops gradually over time. It is unlikely that Aristotle conceived of the virtues of thought as developing naturally, otherwise he would not stress the importance of experience in the development of prudence. So since the virtues of thought develop with experience, it seems that they are either present or absent to a greater or lesser degree. They improve and increase with experience, and are not prone to fall towards one extreme or another. In his discussion, Aristotle gives special consideration to the virtue of prudence. The function of this virtue is to good deliberation. The person who deliberates well

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is the one whose aim accords with rational calculation in pursuit of the best good for a human being that is achievable in action. Prudence therefore does not concern impossibilities. Also, in order for a person to be prudent, he must possess knowledge of both universals and particulars. Here it becomes evident that the virtue of prudence is the bridge between the virtues of thought and the virtues of character. For the purpose of the virtues of thought is to enable a person to determine the truth, and prudence involves the proper application of this truth to action via deliberation. Every virtue of character is therefore dependent on prudence and is an expression of it.

The Fine Reading the EN can leave one confused about some of Aristotles most important points. For example, when talking about the virtues of character, Aristotle determines that they are states that decide on a mean ...defined by reference to reason, that is to say, the reason by which the prudent person would define it. Later, he describes the prudent person as one who deliberates finely about the things that are good for himself, about all the things that enable him to live well in general. Furthermore, Aristotle describes the virtuous person as one who acts for the sake of the fine and does things in the right way, at the right time etc. What is the fine (kalos in Greek)? How is one to determine which way of acting is right? Aristotle gives some clues throughout the EN that suggest answers to these questions. Very often, he determines which actions are good and which are bad by saying that good actions are praiseworthy and bad ones are blameworthy.

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Apparently he values the popular perception of whether actions are good or bad. Additionally, he associates the fine with aesthetic beauty, something deserving of admiration. When used as an adverb, doing something finely is associated with doing it rightly or correctly. These actions are contrasted with acting under compulsion. For Aristotle, the fine should be pursued for its own sake and not for the sake of something else. It can therefore be concluded that kalos, when Aristotle uses it as a noun, describes something that is intrinsically good, that a person deserves praise for having or pursuing, and that is chosen for its own sake. When Aristotle uses kalos to describe an action, it means that the action is done in such a way that the acting agent aims at the fine voluntarily.

Pleasure, Happiness, and the Result of a Virtuous life: Aristotle beings the last book of the EN with a discussion of pleasure. This is an important topic to cover in a discussion of virtue because taking pleasure in the right things is integral to the virtues of character and because pleasure is connected to living a happy life. After this discussion, Aristotle brings up happiness again, and speaks of its relationship to virtue. Aristotles discussion of pleasure starts with an examination of the points of view on the subject. Some argue that pleasure should always be avoided. Their arguments are that if people pursue pleasure, they easily become slaves to it and so, people should act to avoid pleasure so as to reach the intermediate, virtuous condition. Aristotle quickly dismisses this position by saying that anyone who holds it is impossible to take seriously,

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since it would be impossible not to pursue pleasure on at least some occasions. Other philosophers take the other extreme position, that pleasure is the greatest good. Aristotle also dismisses this position by examining and refuting the arguments of a philosopher named Eudoxus. Eudoxus argues that pleasure is the good, since everyone seeks it in everything. Furthermore, its opposite, pain, is always avoided. Even further, when pleasure is added to any good action, it makes that action more choiceworthy. Aristotle refutes this position by saying that the fact that adding pleasure to something to make it better shows that pleasure is a good among goods, and not the good. In order for something to be the good, it has to be choiceworthy by itself and cannot be made better by the addition of something else. So pleasure is not evil and it is not the good, but a good among goods. But what is it? It is not a process, for processes can happen quickly or slowly and it is not possible to be pleased quickly. Nor is it a becoming, for things that become come to be from something else. It follows that whatever pleasure comes from, pain should perish into. Rather, Aristotle says that pleasure completes activity. An activity that is completed best, that is, by a subject in the best condition relative to the best object of the capacity, is the most pleasant. Additionally, each activity will have its own proper pleasure. It is here that the connection to virtue becomes evident. Virtue is a state that enables a person to complete an action well. Therefore, possessing a variety of virtues should bring the person a variety of pleasures as he acts virtuously in his life. After discussing pleasure, Aristotle resumes the discussion that he left unfinished in the beginning of the EN. He reiterates the points that happiness is not a state, that it is an activity, and that it is choiceworthy in its own right. Which activities are

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choiceworthy in their own right? Those in accord with virtue, which aim at the fine. Aristotle remarks that this will not seem to be the case to everyone. For everyone will choose according to his own state. That is, a base person will see base activities as the most pleasant and choiceworthy. Therefore, Aristotle says that the activities that aim at the fine will be the ones that the virtuous person participates in, and this person will find the most pleasure in participating in these activities. Continuing his discussion, Aristotle says that if happiness is activity in accord with virtue, it is reasonable for it to be in accord with supreme virtue, which will be the virtue of the best thing. Aristotle concludes that understanding is the best thing, because it is through understanding that a person grasps what is fine and excellent. Therefore, understanding rules the virtues, and the virtue of understanding is study. Study is, therefore, the activity that is most proper to a human person and will bring him the most happiness. Aristotle backs up this point by saying that study is the most continuous of human activities, that it is self-sufficient in that a person can complete it by himself, and that it is choiceworthy in itself. He concludes by saying that since understanding is the supreme element of a person, supreme to the point that he identifies the person with his understanding, and what is proper to each things nature is supremely best and most pleasant for it, the life of a human being in accord with understanding will be best and most pleasant ... [and] will also be the happiest. So a human, fulfilling his function best, that is, virtuously, and obtaining for himself the highest good, that is, happiness, will have the happiest and most pleasant life.

Conclusion:

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The question that remains to be discussed is that, for Aristotle, is happiness a destination or a journey? Is it something to be attained, or it is a process? It seems that the answer is not one or the other, but both. Happiness is an end, the end chosen for its own sake, but it is also an activity. Vital to this activity is for it to be in accord with the function of the human being. As the function of a human being is to understand, action guided by reason will allow a person to form himself in such a way that in all his actions he acts effortlessly for the sake of the fine. By developing the virtues, a person becomes better able to act according to his function, and therefore to attain and live a happy life.

Works Cited: Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated with notes by Terence Irwin. 2nd ed. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc., 1999.

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