A Chance for Peace in Afghanistan: The Taliban's Days Are Numbered Author(s): Peter Tomsen Source: Foreign Affairs,

Vol. 79, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2000), pp. 179-182 Published by: Council on Foreign Relations Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20049624 . Accessed: 07/07/2013 13:23
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Response

A Chance

for Peace

in

Afghanistan

The Taliban's Days Are Numbered Peter Tomsen

The Taliban movement, depicted by Ahmed Rashid ("TheTaliban: Exporting

Extremism," has passed November/December its high-water mark. 1999), It is now

of Osama bin Ladin's including members terrorist network. Together, these forces a unleashed coalition that sallied powerful northward from the Pushtun belt that bor ders Pakistan, of 90 percent ultimately gaining control of the country. The Taliban

the rapid rise echoing disintegrating, and fall of similar religious movements

inAfghan history. With

demise, Afghanistan

the Taliban's

faces a new challenge: the Taliban their

were initiallywelcomed by anAfghan population tired of war and disgusted by

Kabul's inept, corrupt mujahideen govern

who will fill their place?

notes, in the mid-1990s, when leader Muhammad As Rashid emerged radical in

ment, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani.

THINGS Since FALL APART seizure Taliban incapable of Kabul mullahs in 1996, the have proven the areas

Omar

succeeded

melding religious fervor with the tribal

of Afghanistan's patriotism largest group, the Pushtuns. Omar and the other militant mullahs from rural southern leadership Pakistani in the Taliban by the powerful Afghanistan were assisted Inter-Services

their

semiliterate singularly

of governing

they control. Their rigid Islam, blending

and anti-Shia funda aspects of anti-Sufi mentalism from India, Pakistan, and the Persian Gulf states, is alien to the moderate most Islam practiced by Afghans. the authoritarianism Taliban's on, Early and

agency (isi), the extremist Intelligence Pakistani religious party Jamiat-ul-Ulema e-Islam (jui), and radical Arab Muslims,

Peter University

Tom

s en

of Nebraska with

Resistance,

at the Studies and Programs served as Special Envoy to the Afghan the rank of ambassador, in 1989-92. of International He at Omaha.

is Professor

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Peter Tomsen
intolerance who Afghans, the population. alienated make More non-Pushtun up more recently, Pushtuns than half the Taliban as well.

any indication, Kabul will fall yet again to

well-armed foreign-supported, But is doomed faction. too, it, Afghan to be a out driven force, transitory by the overwhelming military strength of other of coalesce against groups that will eventually it.Death could continually and destruction wrack Most the country. agree that to escape Afghans this cycle of violence, the country's major ethnic and groups must cooperate religious to choose rather their own leadership, than have the outside. mechanism Assembly, in other 300 years could one imposed could They on them from do so through a such as the proposed Grand models over can be found the last If successful, considered of trouble another

have begun to alienate The flow of thousands Pakistani has fueled Afghanistan the local populace. of 1999 exposed military coalition back pushed

of extremist supporters the resentment into

and Arab Taliban

The Taliban's failed offensive in the fall

the movement's declining non-Pushtun A mostly punch. in northern Afghanistan turned attacks and has since

the Taliban's

the front lines toward Kabul, cap areas in northern, Taliban-controlled turing The eastern, and western Afghanistan. earlier that greeted enthusiasm popular

for which times

Taliban offensives has faded: Pushtun

youth the Taliban, are no join longer volunteering are and Pushtun fighters the Taliban's ranks, gravitating southern tribal areas. to

of Afghan

history. leader

this type of largeAfghan gathering

produce the first

leaving back to their

legitimate by the people since 1973. In

November 1999, Afghan ex-monarch in Rome in 2000.

Signs of the Taliban's disintegration

are abound. Afghans suspicious growing of how heavily the isi controls the Taliban; 1si officers and Pakistani religious-party in have become firebrands ubiquitous Taliban-controlled Kabul. Taliban including are profiting from these suspicions. Moreover, corrup tion, inspired by the lucrative opium has now started to infect Taliban business, leaders; this has raised questions among about whether their followers they have cities, adversaries

Zahir Shah presided over the second

consultative Afghan a Grand to facilitate conference Assembly

Many Afghans
suitable?but achieve on how consensus

consider Zahir Shah a

not to the only?vehicle within Afghanistan about peace. Worried however, foreign to derail Taliban backers the

to restore

their own poor prospects, leaders and their radical are

already maneuvering initiative. Grand Assembly

The Grand Assembly

consider reform more

could also
than

abandoned their professed spirituality in

order to gain personal wealth and power.

fundamental

A GRAND ASSEMBLY a supporters of broad-based politi Afghan must now consider who cal reconciliation

leader the country's merely changing for instance, what ship. It could decide, is best for form of Islamic government

Afghanistan.
be structured how much

Should the Afghan

in a federal should

state

will fill the vacuum leftwhen theTaliban

are forced as as from Kabul, perhaps early this summer. If the past seven years are FOREIGN

power and at the national the country's

and pattern, rest at the state are

levels? What

reconstruction

priorities?

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AFFAIRS-Volume

79No. i

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What

A Chance for Peace in Afghanistan kind of constitution and legal many Afghans
serve Afghanistan? Pakistani groups, Afghan tribal leaders and the commander are such isi, the jui, Arab all cooperate orchestrated

describe

best system would All non-Taliban including Pushtun

invasion

"creeping The of Afghanistan. such as Osama isi has coalition;

as a

extremists

bin Ladin, and the Taliban leadership

closely. The this Islamist to a long its

powerful Tajik Shah Masoud, Ahmed a

northern

consensus-building and lower-level Pushtuns ranks have tribal notified

advocating process. Even mid in the Taliban's

continuing support for theTaliban is the

obstacle biggest in Afghanistan. PUTTING American deliver U.S. more political settlement

leaders

Pushtun prominent that they, too, support a

dialogue. intra-Afghan all Afghan Without groups exception, declared their preference have publically for a united, Afghanistan. unpartitioned If the post-Taliban iswise, leadership steer itwill away from the Afghanistan crusade

broad-based

IT TOGETHER

to policy today is inadequate on U.S. inAfghanistan. interests makers must craft a foreign-policy

other

and of Pakistani, Arab, to extremists attempting foreign Islam to Central Asia export militant world. and other parts of the Muslim Islamist has more of its own. than enough and Internal

creative, and effective forceful, ap to address America's proach geostrategic the soaring concerns, opium trade, Afghan massive Taliban violations of human rights, and the return population emphasis in the world. of the largest The refugee current U.S. is a neces

Afghanistan problems reconstruction

on bin Ladin's It should,

arrest

cooperation The Taliban's

stability will take years of domestic to achieve. and hard work

should realize replacements will that the international community

be part however, sary objective. of a larger regional policy framework toward geared achieving U.S. goals. The chief danger to U.S. interests is the rising tide of Islamist militancy terrorism emanating international bases board other Muslim where in Afghanistan. for Islamist pro-Western The militancy Afghan and from spring

to assist them if not be willing foreign to divert continue Islamists Afghanistan toward violent abroad while campaigns its problems The most peaceful, continue though fester acute at home. threat to a stable, and neutral Afghanistan will from Pakistan, all of Afghanistan's even

endangers in the governments Saudi Arabia, world, including a turn toward extremism would interests. Afghanistan and training for worldwide ranging mili from

to come

American soil to the Middle East, Central Islamabad has been South and the Philippines. Asia, Afghanistan, fiinneling Asia,
more resources to save troops and military its own asset, the Taliban. More than one 10,000 Pakistanis (and "brigade" of Muslim southern extremists periphery, for Moscow's ultra antidemocratic, nationalist advocates of regimentation at home to defend 2000 against enemies Russia's menacing ammunition providing are

other nearly own also their support neighbors Afghan as the Soviets tried saving proxies. Just asset in Kabul their communist by invading

set back U.S. severely is the documented inspirational tant Islamist base

operations

from Arab states) now fight alongside Taliban forces inwhat radicalMuslims
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

from

January/February

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Peter Tomsen
abroad. The Muslims the more those greater the influence of radical in the Central Asian republics, of the governments tempted will be to seek Russian further This undermining has already is now their blatant and extensive interference that in Afghanistan. Ahmed "until Rashid the United correctly observes States demonstrates

republics assistance, military their independence. occurred virtually A more should a Russian

that it has

the determination effort

to mobilize

an international

in Tajikistan,

which

energetic

protectorate. American

interference, spread." Recent the north,

for ending outside chaos will only Afghanistan's political developments, sanctions about policy, the on the its

policy

such as the failed Taliban offensive in

international doubts Taliban, Islamist-centered in Pakistan Afghan

discreetly consensus process also advocate lagging

the Afghan encourage now It should underway. a fresh for the beginning negotiations the nonproduc forum that even has criti on

international

by replacing Afghanistan tive "Six-Plus-Two" U.N. Secretary-General cized as ineffective.

coup in Pakistan, military initiatives toward a Grand meeting, concerns and other about

intra-Afghan Assembly

Kofi Annan U.S.

regional powers' the Taliban have opened to make an informed,

must diplomacy as an arena focus on removing Afghanistan of competition Iran, among Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. The 1955 State Russia, can serve on Austrian Neutrality Treaty as a useful it led to the with precedent; and Soviet forces from drawal ofWestern Austrian the first territory and produced in the Cold War, when the major "thaw" not to outside powers agreed contending extend The demand on their spheres of influence to Austria. to United States should continue that Islamabad

the door for America

diplomatic push on Afghanistan.

real progress United congruent Afghanistan A promising States with toward creates ending a

But

the Afghan

nightmare will be possible only if the

American more policy in interests

and the surrounding region. for a peaceful opportunity out of the Taliban's States should decline. it.?

settlement of theAfghan conflict is

emerging The United seize

its course change can to It the appeal Afghanistan. own self-interest, military leadership's to the and strategic, political, pointing to stands Pakistan economic benefits gain in an Afghan search desperate routes Chinese until its A to Central markets settlement: for overland Pakistan's trade

and Asian, European, will not be realized

the Afghan recognizes population as not imposed. legitimate, leadership international formal treaty respecting and sovereignty neutrality Islamabad's military to discontinue?with honor? FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1

Afghanistan's would permit leaders

[182]

Volume79No.

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