Counter-Gang Strategy in Tactical Solutions Magazine, Spring 2014

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SPRING 2014
A JOURNAL FOR INTERNATIONAL TACTICAL TRAINING ASSOCIATION PROFESSIONALS
actical Solutions
T
John A. Bertetto on COIN in Policing Criminal Street Gangs
Ron Martinelli on Pre-Contact Threat Assessment
Cristine B. Massengale on Coordinating Crisis Communication
Lawrence Lujan on Mobile Active Shooter
NDEX
Tactical Solutions
Tactical Solutions Spring 2014
Tactics
by R. Martinelli
by C. B. Massengale
by. J. A. Bertetto
by G. Serna
by S. Lee
Coordinating Crisis Communications
COVER STORY
DEPARTMENTS
I
p.37
The Art of Force - Pre Contact Threat Assessment
p.42
Counter-Gang Strategy: Adapted COIN in Policing Criminal Street Gangs
p.22
by L. Lujan
Mobile Active Shooter (M.A.S.)
p.13
From The Editor
p.6
Scrambler Course
p.8
by P. Johnson
Leadership
Tactical Survival for the Career Professional
p.46
by Editor
Equipment
Doorkicker Tactical Operator Gloves
p.34
Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance
Introduction to Covert Rural Surveillance (RS)
Observation Post Operations (OP)
p.17
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TACTICAL SOLUTIONS
Tactical Solutions
This journal is provided to members of the International Tactical
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Firearms Safety
Always adhere to and obey firearms safety rules:
1. Treat every gun as if it were loaded.
2. Always keep the gun pointed in a safe direction
and do not muzzle anything that you are
not willing to destroy.
3. Keep your finger off of the trigger and out of the
trigger guard until ready to fire.
4. Be aware of your target and what is beyond it.
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SPRING 2014
E DI T OR- I N- CHI E F
LAWRENCE LUJAN
LLujan@ITTAcorp.org
P RE S I DE NT
AARON CUNNINGHAM
ACunningham@ITTAcorp.org
A DVA NCE D TA CT I CA L T RA I NI NG -
L AW E NF ORCE ME NT DI V I S I ON
MARK STEPHENSON
MStephenson@ITTAcorp.org
S E CRE TA RY
SUNG JOO LEE SJLee@ITTAcorp.org
GRA P HI C A RT I S T
VANESSA M.
TACTICAL SOLUTIONS is the digital
Journal of the International Tactical
Training Association. Written by and
for special operators, police operators,
and intelligence officers and for all
those in the mission against crime and
terror worldwide.
TACTICAL SOLUTIONS is published in
Winter-December, Spring-March,
Summer-June, and Fall-September
For inquiries regarding advertising in
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For inquiries regarding existing TACTICAL
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CONTRIBUTING PHOTOGRAPHERS
Hyung-gook Byun, Mike Williams at
http://www.mwilliamschattanoogaphoto.com/,
Lawrence Lujan, Sung Joo Lee, Ji Yong Yoon,
ON THE COVER
Ji Yong Yoon-Dajeon SWAT Team
CONTRIBUTING WRITERS
John A. Bertetto, Pete Johnson, Ron Martinelli, Lawrence
Lujan, Christine Massengale, and Gabriel Serna
FOLLOW US ONLINE
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TACTICAL SOLUTIONS
Learn more today! iismu.org - (8l4) 824-2l3l
MERCYHURST UNIVERSITY
Intelligence Studies
The Institute of Intelligence Studies at Mercyhurst University is
world-renowned for lts premler degree programs at the undergraduate,
graduate and certlcate levels.
A rlgorous currlculum that emphaslzes crltlcal thlnklng, lnformatlon
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lntelllgence analysls careers. Graduates wlll [oln more than 800 alumnl
currently employed by preemlnent government agencles, Portune 500
corporatlons and non-government organlzatlons.
An lmpresslve record for hlgh [ob and graduate school placement ls
a result of our rlch learnlng envlronment, whlch lncludes:
Meet acclalmed Mercyhurst |ntelllgence faculty at the
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S
pring is upon us here at TSM and we look forward to
the warm weather to keep active out on the range and
on the trails. Training is never ending, the cold of
winter is not an excuse to not be active and sharpening the
blade and maintaining your edge.
This month brings to you new
contributors on important topics
that you will find of great
interest. Because tactical teams
and their operations function on
communication, you will find the
article Crisis Communication to
highlight the need for trained
telecommunicators and the
important role that they play
during operations. In addition,
you will learn valuable tips for
pre-contact threat assessment in
the article The Art of Force. You
will learn to apply the principles
of COIN to your gang strategy in
the article Counter-Gang Strategy:
Adapted COIN in Policing
Criminal Street Gangs. You will
also learn tactics and techniques
for your rural surveillance
operations in Introduction To
Covert Rural Surveillance (RS)
Observation Post (OP)
Operations. The tactical leader
will also receive key suggestions
on the importance of being able
to communicate. Lastly, we
provide you with a firearms drill
for you to run practice.
Now, shake off the cold
and go get some!!!
Lawrence Lujan
Editor-in-Chief
Tactical Solutions Magazine
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SPRING 2014
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SCRAMBLER
actics Techniques and Procedures
T
8
COURSE
The Scrambler Course is a combined
skills course of fire often utilized in
competitive 3-gun events which
implements shooting on the move,
shooting from prone, shooting from a
barricade, and shooting from a kneel-
ing position. Without a doubt, the
course can prove of benefit to our law
enforcement members.
Thunder Ranch/Gunsites legendary
Clint Smith is credited with the devel-
opment of this exercise to simulate his
combat experiences in the Vietnam
War. Today, it remains a useful train-
ing tool inasmuch as it trains the
deployment of the carbine or patrol
rifle and provides a practical context
for the shooter in simulating response
from a vehicle. Depending on how
your patrol rifle is carried (in the
trunk, transport mode/cruiser ready),
the drill should begin from wherever
your patrol rifle is carried.
The purpose of this training concept
is to enhance fast patrol response to
time critical incidents. This course
will aid in enabling those trained to
safely handle and deploy the rifle in
an urban setting. As firearms instruc-
tors, we develop various courses of
fire to provide logical structure to
progressive steps in training.
Operator readiness is frequently test-
ed by ensuring that officers can per-
form essential tasks in different situa-
tions and under a variety of circum-
stance. To this end, combined skills
exercises like the scrambler are an
important recipe for success.
The scrambler course of fire is an
opportunity to evaluate the officers
demonstration of proficiency in all
patrol rifle fundamentals and firearm
safety, handling and carry methods,
use of sling systems, overall marks-
manship and skill in combat shooting
methods. If necessary, this drill may
also test the need for transition to pis-
tol and other immediate action given
a malfunction. An officers ability to
perform a combined skill in a live-fire
exercise is an important milestone in
training. Those not already familiar
will soon learn that the patrol rifle is a
tactical tool which provides enhanced
safety and a strategic response to spe-
cific threats.
Written by Sang Lee
Glossary
Hammer Drills:
The firing of multiple consecutive
shots in quick repetition. Depending
upon your situation and at close
range (10 feet or less) perfect sight
alignment may not be necessary. We
refer to this as Sight Gear #3 or
front sight proximity shooting. The
concept of front sight proximity
shooting applies to both rifle and pis-
tol and depends upon the skill level
of the operator.
Sight gear #3 follows Plaxos Rule
or 1st Best decision-making in that
what comes first is not always best
and what is best may not be first. The
various sight gears are meant to bal-
ance considerations of speed against
the need for precision and accuracy.
Consideration of distance, speed, and
accuracy should come into play with
every shot taken. The operators will
have to know their own skill level
and capability.
SHOOTING
FROM PRONE:
Types of prone positions: 1. Prone
position with one leg bent. 2. Prone
position where both legs are straight
back and with both heels as close to
the ground as they will allow. Unless
your legs are interlocked, avoid prone
methods leaving the heels straight up
which can introduce sway and move-
ment that transfers to the sights. Both
positions have their pros and cons.
Pros for bent leg: With the bent leg
position (shooting side leg bent), the
diaphragm is off the ground and thus
will allow for easier breathing.
Cons for bent leg: The operator is
higher off the ground, creating a big-
ger signature that will expose more of
their body.
Pros for straight legs: Lying as flat as
possible presents a smaller operator
signature with less exposed surface
area.
Cons for straight leg: Lying on the
diaphragm makes it harder to
breathe. The operator will experience
more muzzle sway down the sights
when lying on their diaphragm.
SHOOTING FROM
BEHIND A BARRICADE:
Shooting From Behind A Barricade:
Know your mechanical offset (Your
sight may see over the barricade but
that does not mean that the muzzle is
clear of the barricade). Shooting
through a wood barricade is an
acceptable mistake, but unacceptable
outside of practice. For instance if an
operator were to shoot through cinder
block or brick, there will be high
velocity spalling coming back in the
shooters direction. Without eye pro-
tection, the spalling could lead to a
permanent injury. Lets be honest,
how many L.E.O.s are wearing eye
and ear protection when a firefight
starts? I would say its easier to learn
it the correct way during training,
rather than suffering a fatal injury.
(Consider low-light conditions and
offset for any weapon-mounted light.)
SHOOTING FROM A
KNEELING POSTION:
Types of kneeling positions: The High
Kneel, Supported Kneel, One Knee
Kneel, and One Knee Supported.
High kneel: Down on both knees, but
not sitting on your heels.
Pro for the High Kneel: It is a quick
position to get into and is a stable
position for short periods of time.
Con for the High Kneel: Being on
both knees takes more time to get out
of in order to move.
The Scrambler Course of Fire
On command, move to, retrieve, load and make your rifle ready.
Move to stage 1 and fire a Six Shot Hammer Drill on the move,
on a paper target ten feet away.
Move to stage 2, go prone and fire two rounds at steel target (50 yards away).
Move to stage 3 and fire two rounds from behind a barricade. (50 yards
away; safety - use caution with muzzle clearance)
Move to final stage. Go to a Kneeling Position and fire two shots.
Timer stops on final round. Clear all rounds and make you weapon safe.
Equipment
3 metal targets 1 paper target
Scoring
To shoot this course of fire clean, six shots on paper in the required area
must be hit with no misses on the steel. There will be a total of twelve
rounds. This is timed event with penalty given for missed rounds.
Supported Kneeling: Down on both
knees and sitting on your heels.
Pro for Supported Kneeling: As it is
practically sitting, it is a very stable
position. The operator can stay in this
position for a longer period of time.
Con for Supported Kneeling: Being
that it is a sitting position, it takes
much longer to get out of if you have
to move.
One Knee Kneeling: Down on one
knee with the other foot flat on the
ground. If one arm is used to support
on the knee, remember not to put bone
on bone (elbow on the kneecap). If the
elbow is placed on the kneecap, the
elbow will roll around, thus unstable.
Pro for One Knee: The operator can
change their level of height and lean
with the One Knee Position and use
supported or unsupported. It is also a
quick position to get out of when they
have to move.
Con for One Knee: One knee is a stable
position but not as stable as the previ-
ous positions mentioned earlier.
In as much as advanced shooting is
entirely based upon the way in which
fundamental skills are exercised, the
scrambler course of fire can be an
excellent way to challenge those new to
the rifle and test those more experi-
enced. By introducing time standards
here, we can create challenges for most
shooters regardless of skill-level.
Shooting the Scrambler may validate
your current training models or suggest
a need for review. Either way it is time
worn course of fire enjoyable to all.
Sang Lee is the Director of Security for ITTA and an NRA certified firearms instructor and NRA
certified armorer. He spends the majority of his time instructing in-service law enforcement
officers in the state of Illinois as well as providing concealed carry (CCW) courses to civilians.
About the Author
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02 558 1818
www.smg.co.kr
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MOBILE ACTIVE SHOOTER
(M.A.S.)
T
Written by Lawrence Lujan
In October 2013, the Albuquerque
Police Department came face to face
with evil when a Mobile Active
Shooter-MAS, named Christopher
Chase, confronted them.
Here, the suspect was dressed in
camouflage, wore body armor, a
mask and was armed with an Ak-47
rifle. The suspect also had cop
killer tattooed across his knuckles.
After creating a call for service he
waited for officers to respond in an
ambush position.
After firing at the initial unit and
causing the officer to take cover, he
hijacked the police unit and went
mobile while continuing his assault
against officers. The shooting ended
with the offender being shot and
terminated. Three APD Officers and
one Bernalillo County Deputy suf-
fered gun shot wounds. Further
investigation found that the offend-
er had set up and left fake booby
traps at his home.
There were several factors that led to
the successful conclusion of this inci-
dent. Some including:
Use of the Patrol Rifle
Advanced weapons tactics
Tactical Combat Casualty Care
Taking the fight to the suspect
We have trained for school/business
active shooters, the MACTAC (multi-
ple active shooter type incident) and
or the 4th Generation Active Shooter-
(small cells motivated by terrorist ide-
ology). Now we have experienced the
Mobile Active Shooter-M.A.S., that is,
an offender actively killing others
while utilizing a motor vehicle to
accomplish his deadly acts. These
incidents can cover a large area and
result in multiple crime scene loca-
tions. Active management of the inci-
dent while it is occurring and post-
incident will challenge both the offi-
cers in direct contact with the offender
as well as agency leadership.
Things to consider:
Responding law enforcement
officers need to be aware of their sur-
roundings and backdrops if respond-
ing with their weapons. The Mobile
Active Shooter is driving through
neighborhoods, and business districts
and does not care of where they are
shooting, but as law enforcement offi-
cers, we remain accountable for
rounds fired.
Leaders, you have just become
part of a real life chess game with a
Mobile Active Shooter and you are
tasked with planning your tactical
moves to keep ahead of the lethal threat.
Do you apply stop sticks to the
incident and what risks exist in
attempting to do so?
Do you establish a choke point
with a lethal response for the
mobile offender?
Do you direct and attempt
offensive vehicle maneuvers?
Telecommunicators and their
supervisors, what is your role in the
on-going mobile incident.
Long-term strategic response
training for incident of this type need
to be discussed and practiced in
order to be prepared for an incident
of this type.
Does your agency now see a
need for advanced weapon
drills such as shooting through
a windshield?
Has your agency provided
IFAKs or med kits and trained your
officers on Tactical Combat Casualty
Care-TCCC?
Is your agency trained on offen-
sive vehicle maneuvers?
As we have learned, there will always
be the two to three copycats after an
active shooter incident. So, stand
ready for that day, because it will
come. Have your patrol rifle ready,
have ready access to your med
kit/IFAK, and know how to access and
to use both under stress. Strategize
on effective methods of response and
drill on those techniques.
T
Lawrence Lujan is a decorated field operations and training sergeant with 23-plus years of
service to the El Paso, Texas Police Department. A longtime member of the EPPD SWAT team, he
was a key player as team leader, operator, firearms instructor and tactics instructor of that Unit.
Operationally, he has participated in high-risk warrant execution, raid planning, barricaded
suspects and incident command. He presents passionate instruction and has international
teaching experience. Lawrence brings a very unique set of leadership, firearms and operational
skills to the law enforcement arena.
About the Author
Video and images
edited and produced
by Pat Vasquez-Cunningham
Albuquerque Journal
Stay safe, Stay alert,
Stay Alive..........
Click here to view video:
TTOS specializes in the provision of Visual Tracking, Dismounted Operations, Trans-National Border Interdiction, Network
Defeat, Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) and Advanced Counterinsurgency (COIN); training, consulting and
web based e-learning services to Military, Law Enforcement Organizations, and Government Agencies.

The Company TTOS is a privately owned and operated for-profit small business which serves primarily as a Defense Contractor. As a
school, TTOSs primary focus has been in developing training curriculums and teaching DoD and Law Enforcement personnel how to
identify, collect and exploit actionable intelligence. This dedicated focus on curriculum development has made TTOS is a leading innovator
for Visual Intelligence, Technical Tracking, Combat Tracking, Network Defeat, and Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) training;
especially when it comes to research and development of new techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs). Since its inception in 1994, TTOS
has focused exclusively on developing training programs of instruction (POIs) for U.S. Department of Defense and Law Enforcement
Agencies. TTOS initially started by providing visual and technical tracking training; Combat Tracking to elite and conventional military units;
and Tactical Tracking to law enforcement. Since then, TTOS has expanded on the POIs it offers to military and law enforcement
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Explosive Devices (C-IED), Network Defeat, and Transnational Border Interdiction and Targeting.

TTOS Training Programs: Due to the high level of success, customer satisfaction and demand, TTOS has expanded its operations and now
offers a variety of specialized tactical training programs of instruction to its clients:

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Visual Acuity and Hazard Detection Course (C-IED)
Rural Law Enforcement Operations Academy
Rural Narcotics Operators Course Level I, II, and III
Cross Border Interdiction and Tracking (XBIT)

Mobile Training Team (MTT: TTOS is experienced in planning and executing training
in any location, based on client requirements, to include CONUS/OCONUS,
urban/rural, or remote supported sites. TTOS can provide training support to elements
operating in theaters of combat, low intensity conflict, and other uncertain environments.

TTOS Instructors: TTOS executes its mission by providing experienced, vetted Special
Operations Forces (SOF) Veterans, Military Combat Veterans, and Law Enforcement
Agency (LEA) operatives to support client training requirements and initiatives.

Program Development and Web Based e-Learning: TTOS has a tremendous amount
of experience developing customized training programs for its clients. To maintain TTOSs position as a premier supply of training programs,
TTOS now offer customized web-based e-learning programs of instruction to its clients. TTOS can either, develop a training program of
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Consulting: TTOS has a long history of providing consulting service to government and military clients in Manhunting, COIN, Border
Security, Network Exploitation, and C-IED.

Contact TTOS: If your unit or agency is interested in any of the training, consulting or program development service TTOS offers, please
contact us at peter.kerr@ttoscorp.com or visit our website at www.ttoscorp.com

"Always the Hunter, Never the Hunted"

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INTRODUCTION TO
Covert Rural Surveillance (RS)
Observation Post (OP) Operations
Covert rural surveillance OP opera-
tions present challenging variations
compared to mobile or static surveil-
lance operations conducted in urban
environments. Many of the skills
required for a successful Covert
Rural Surveillance (RS)/Observation
Post (OP) operation can be found
within the ranks of specialist
Government Agencies, Law
Enforcement and Military Covert
Rural Surveillance Teams around
the world. Rural operations can be
short or long duration and are usu-
ally physically arduous in nature,
requiring a high level of discipline,
personal fitness and commitment.
ntelligence, Surveillance &Reconnaissance
I
Written by Pete Johnson
may include:
1. Abort the drop off and wait
until the vehicle has departed
2. Use an alternative DOP
(which may or may not have been
pre-selected)
3. Orchestrate an action that
will ensure the DOP is clear when
it's required
4. Abort the mission
Available personnel
and resources
should be
assigned to cover
all the required
tasks and a
Liaison Officer
appointed from the
RS Support Team to coor-
dinate with any required out-
side agencies, units or quick reac-
tion forces etc.
RS Operative -
Individual Qualities
and Skills
RS Operatives are expected to be
Skills Required
Planning and PreparationThe
skills required include the ability to
meticulously and thoroughly plan
and prepare for all phases of a
Rural Surveillance/Observation
Post operation. The RS Team or
Operation Leader is responsible for
development and delivery of the
operational plan- in the form
of an extensive opera-
tional briefing
(Military Orders
Format) to all
personnel
involved in the
operation. RS
Team Members
and Support Team
Personnel should be
given the opportunity to ask
clarifying questions throughout the
operational briefing.
The operational plan is often pre-
ceded by an extensive physical and
technical target information/intelli-
gence gathering effort - the aim of
which is to determine all the RS
coverage options available. It takes
into consideration all of the positive
and negative factors so the best
option is selected to achieve the
tasking (mission). The "What If's"
and associated "Actions On"
(should a what-if/action occur dur-
ing the course of the operation)
need to be identified, understood
and implemented by all. Nothing
should be assumed or left to chance.
For example: what if the selected
team drop-off point (DOP) cannot
be utilized due to an occupied vehi-
cle being parked in the vicinity? A
planned action on this occurring
physically arduous in
nature, requiring a high
level of discipline, personal
fitness and commitment.
able to:
Deploy and navigate to the tar-
get using a variety of land, air and
waterborne resources
Carry heavy loads consisting
of personal/team clothing, opera-
tional equipment, OP construction
material and tools
Setup, establish and maintain
secure HF/VHF/UHF/SAT/
IT communications
Construct a camouflaged and
concealed OP that affords an unre-
stricted field of view of the target,
with protection from view (direct
observation/optics/IR and Thermal
devices) and if there is the potential
- protection from small arms fire
Maintain constant observation
of the target and use technical sur-
veillance equipment
Operate in confined and unhy-
gienic (dirty) work and living con-
ditions for protracted periods of
time in all weather conditions
Log/record events (surveil-
lance log/notes/report/
photograph/video)
Remain covert and undetected
throughout the entire operation
Maintain operational &
OP site security
Obtain information/intelli-
gence/evidence - as stipulated by
the objective of the task (mission)
Not an easy undertaking, even for
an experienced non-RS operative.
The following are some of the per-
sonal attributes/qualities that are
considered essential:
Above average physical fitness
and stamina to carry heavy loads
over distance
Patience is required to watch
and wait for hours and days
A high level of focus and
determination to successfully com-
plete the mission
Self-reliant and resourceful,
able to improvise, adapt and
resolve problems
Ability to work alone or in a
small team for protracted periods
of time
Intelligent and mature outlook
A good sense of humour
The ability to deal with hard-
ship in sustained arduous conditions
Required Individual knowledge and
skills include (but not limited to):
Field Craft - the art of stealthy
movement, individual camouflage,
OP hide construction and camou-
flage, observation and tracking
skills and caching techniques
Survival Skills - the ability to
live and if necessary, survive in the
rural environment
Weapon Handling - proficient
use, safe handling and maintenance
of weapon systems in the
rural environment
Navigation - RS Operatives
must be able to navigate in difficult
country by day and night
Communications - all team
members need to know how to
operate the communications equip-
ment required for the mission
First Aid - a high standard of
first aid competency is necessary as
casualty evacuation may not be
immediate in remote locations -
especially at night
Each RS OP operation is
unique and a number of factors will
dictate the composition of the team
and how the rural observation post
will be manned.
Observation Post
(OP) Duration
Given a high calibre, properly
trained and equipped RS operative,
with optimal climatic conditions for
the duration of the OP, it is reason-
able to expect the following dura-
tion/ manning configurations for
the maintained and sustained obser-
vation of a target:
One (1) operative up to
twelve hours (12)
Two (2) operatives up to
thirty-six hours (36)
Four (4) operatives up to
fourteen days (14)
A larger RS Support Team maybe
required the longer the operation
continues in order to maintain and
support it (logistics and personnel).
The following factors need to be con-
sidered in the manning of a RS OP:
A. Availability of personnel
B. Availability of cover
and concealment
C. Duration OP is to
be maintained
D. Weather conditions
E. Target surveillance
awareness level
F. OP task (mission)
RS Clothing &
Equipment
The RS task or mission should dic-
tate the appropriate selection of the
necessary clothing, equipment and
tools required, taking into account
much of what has already been cov-
ered in this article:
The weather conditions
Remoteness and accessibility
of the target location
Availability of water
Insertion & transportation
method
Resupply capability
Available manpower to complete
the mission and support it
Communications capability
Emergency medical/
evacuation capability
Target profile
Mandated requirements
Op duration
Available cover/concealment
Distance from OP to Target
In summary
Rural Surveillance is a very special-
ized field and should only be
undertaken by properly trained and
equipped personnel. To cover all
the aspects involved, RS training
courses are usually very intensive
and vary in duration from ten to
fourteen or more days. However,
specific RS skills can be covered
over shorter periods of time.
Refresher training should be con-
ducted frequently, especially for
those operatives that have taken a
course but never put their acquired
skills into practice or deployed
operationally!
T
Pete Johnson is a former A4 Mobile Surveillance Officer of the British Security Service MI5;
Canadian (BC) Licensed Private Investigator & Security Consultant; New Canadian based
Surveillance Training Company Advisor & Instructor.
About the Author
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Introduction
In preparation for military opera-
tions against the insurgencies in
both Afghanistan and Iraq, the mili-
tary recognized the need to adapt
law enforcement practices and tech-
niques, working directly with law
enforcement agencies to develop
their patrol tactics and investigative
capabilities (Calese, 2005; Musa,
Morgan, & Keegan, 2011; Watson,
2010). Both the military and law
enforcement recognize that a key
factor in successfully defeating an
entrenched criminal problem is
establishing government legitimacy
in the eyes of the local community
(Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler &
Huo, 2002; U.S. Army, 2006). In FM
3-24 Counterinsurgency (U.S. Army,
2006), the military codified the les-
sons adapted from law enforce-
ments community policing efforts
and the need for establishing gov-
ernment legitimacy by working with
and through the local population. At
least one significant evaluation of
that doctrine describing guiding
principles has been written
(Kilcullen, 2010). In return for that
favor, studies have been conducted
examining the use of the popula-
tion-centric counterinsurgency
(COIN) strategy in combating crimi-
nal networks and describing guid-
ntelligence, Surveillance &Reconnaissance
I
Counter-Gang Strategy:
Adapted COIN in Policing
Criminal Street Gangs
Written by John A. Bertetto
ing principles for designing law
enforcement strategies adapted from
COIN strategy (Bertetto, 2012;
Burgoyne, 2011; Calese, 2005). What
remains is to describe the actual
strategy based on those principles.
This document describes that com-
prehensive counter-gang strategy.
Community
Policing and
Street Gangs
The U.S. Department of Justice
(2012) defines community policing
as a philosophy that promotes
organizational strategies that sup-
port the systematic use of partner-
ships and problem-solving tech-
niques, to proactively address the
immediate conditions that give rise
to public safety issues such as crime,
social disorder, and fear of crime.
Community policing is comprised of
three primary components: (1) Com-
munity Partnerships, described as
collaborative partnerships between
the law enforcement agency and the
individuals and organizations they
serve to develop solutions to prob-
lems and increase trust in police;
(2) Organizational Transformation,
described as the alignment of orga-
nizational management, structure,
personnel, and information systems
to support community partnerships
and proactive problem solving; and
(3) Problem Solving, described as
the process of engaging in the
proactive and systematic examina-
tion of identified problems to devel-
op and evaluate effective responses
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2012).
Problem Solving offers the opera-
tional model SARA: Scanning,
Analysis, Response, and
Assessment. Response describes
developing solutions to bring
about lasting reductions in the num-
ber and extent of problems (U.S.
Department of Justice, 2012).
Relative to criminal street gangs and
the violence associated with them,
the word problem is wholly inade-
quate. Law enforcement is left to
determine whether this word choice
is deliberate because of the wide
array of issues it might cover or
because the proponents of commu-
nity policing do not mean to include
criminal street gangs as something
that is solvable through communi-
ty policing. Certainly, community
policing makes no direct reference to
combating criminal street gangs.
Weisel and Shelley (2004) studied the
role of specialized gang units within
the overall framework of community
policing. They determined that spe-
cialized units and specialized strate-
gies for combating criminal street
gangs through these units do not
conflict with community policing in
either philosophy or practice. The
implication, then, is that specific
counter-gang strategies can be creat-
ed that align with the overall philos-
ophy of community policing.
Community policing, thusly defined
and described, lacks any specific
strategic elements. This is not neces-
sarily a bad thing; crime, criminals,
and communities are unique in their
structure and relation to each other,
and law enforcement must be
afforded the latitude to develop
appropriately unique solutions.
However, without a strategic map,
such solutions invariably have dif-
fering levels of success.
Furthermore, a proper strategy
allows for uniqueness to be recog-
nized and accounted for at the oper-
ational level. Without this strategic
map, operations risk losing focus,
deviating from the strategic goal,
and strategic failure.
Instead of focusing on specific
strategies, community policing
efforts typically focus on law
enforcement and community inter-
action. To facilitate this interaction,
law enforcement efforts are organ-
ized in accordance with bureaucratic
structureby creating specific units
to implement community policing.
Unfortunately, such a practice cre-
ates real and imagined separation
between those officers assigned to
the community policing efforts and
those assigned to patrol or inves-
tigative dutiesa real separation in
that officers assigned to community
policing duties are removed from
the day-to-day interaction with
those in the community in an
enforcement capacity; and imagined
as a cognitive separation in that offi-
cers assigned to community policing
efforts are often viewed as non-
operators and their efforts perceived
as a public relations effort instead of
a law enforcement one.
Counter-Gang
Strategy
The goal, then, is to create a specific
counter-gang strategy that (1) is
focused, accounts for uniqueness,
and delivers results; (2) remains
faithful to the philosophy of commu-
nity policing; and (3) breaks down
the real and imagined barriers
between community policing and
counter-gang efforts. The popula-
tion-centric COIN strategy, with its
inclusion of law enforcement compe-
tencies, provides this strategy. Law
enforcement, therefore, can examine
this strategy and the lessons learned
from its application to create a
counter-gang strategy. This strategy
blends traditional law enforcement
competencies with military intelli-
gence and targeting practices that
have proven to be effective in identi-
fying criminal actors and fracturing
networks. The individual strategic
elements provide operational focus
but retain the flexibility required to
allow for the uniqueness of every
environment.
1. Creating and Adhering to a
Mission Statement
Most law enforcement agencies have
a mission statement. This second
mission statement serves the count-
er-gang strategy specifically. All
investigations and operations must
align with the mission statement or
those actions detract from strategic
success. Investigations and opera-
tions that lead away from the mis-
sion may still be valuable, but they
should be recognized as outside the
scope of the counter-gang mission,
and the responsibility for these
should be passed along to another
group to pursue.
2. Locating and Establishing
Relationships with Trusted
Community Leaders
Law enforcement must actively seek
out trusted community leaders
(TCLs) and develop these people as
intelligence assets. These individuals
must be local residents or local busi-
ness operators with both established
roots in the community and accept-
ance as persons of significant
standing by other members of the
community. The TCLs not only
work directly with law enforcement
but are also expected to win the
support of the larger community.
Cooperation is a two-way street: law
enforcement engages the TCLs to
assist them with local community-
issue resolution, and the TCLs assist
law enforcement by providing or
conveying information that can be
processed into actionable intelli-
gence. The mutual gain is legitimacy
for both the agency and the TCLs.
As legitimacy is increased for both,
more voluntary reporting of infor-
mation by other community mem-
bers will be made.
When working with community
leaders, law enforcement agents
often find themselves pulled in the
direction of that leaders specific
wants or personal efforts. Those
efforts may in fact be well-inten-
tioned or noble; however, law
enforcement must not be deviated
from the primary mission as
described in the mission statement.
The TCLs actions must always sup-
port the mission statement, and
actions suggested by the TCLs
should be continually checked
against it.
3. Recruitment of Local Street
Leaders by TCLs
TCLs should be expected to recruit
street leaders. The street leader is an
individual known and trusted by the
TCL and suggested to law enforce-
ment for cooperation. These street
leaders are vetted by law enforce-
ment and, passing this, can provide
information covertly to law enforce-
ment. Whereas the TCLs serve as a
public liaison between the agency
and the community, the street leader
acts more as a confidential informant.
This protects the street leader from
retribution by gang members. The
street leaders increase law enforce-
ments ability to generate informa-
tion exponentially.
4. Development of Intelligence
Gathering and Processing
Capabilities and the Tactical
(Street) Level
Every local police station should
have one officer specifically trained
in intelligence collection and pro-
cessing. This officer should be under
the supervision of the local com-
mander but belong to a larger, cen-
tralized intelligence unit. This officer
is responsible for collecting local
information, processing it locally,
and preparing detailed reports that
include suggested operations based
on that intelligence. This report is
approved by the local commander
and forwarded to the officers pri-
mary unit for review. The larger
intelligence unit maintains these
reports and includes them in context
for understanding the larger intelli-
gence picture. Unless specifically
instructed otherwise by the home
unit, the operations described in the
submitted report will be conducted
by the local unit. This gives the cen-
tralized intelligence unit an oppor-
tunity to ensure that local operations
are coordinated and do not interfere
with any larger-context investiga-
tions. Concurrently, it is the respon-
sibility of this intelligence officer to
maintain a local intelligence file,
communicate the intelligence pic-
ture regularly to the local command-
er and command staff, participate in
local search warrant executions and
engage in site exploitation, be pres-
ent for postarrest debriefings of any
significant arrestees, and providing
some measure of information recog-
nition and collection training to the
local officers. These officers, then,
will be actively working to help
develop the local intelligence pic-
ture. By pushing this information
and intelligence expectation down
the chain of command and develop-
ing local capabilities, the intelligence
picture grows exponentially and
operations are more focused and
more efficient.
The responsibility of this officer is
not an administrative one. The intel-
ligence officer must be out on the
street engaged in regular street oper-
ations. This puts this officer in direct
contact with information sources on
a daily basis and allows all opera-
tions to be witnessed and evaluated
firsthand. The ability to accurately
frame the intelligence picture and
make proper assessments depends
on this officer having the proper sit-
uational context.
5. Use of Questions-Based
Organizational Analysis at the
Tactical (Street) Level with Regular
Reassessment
An organizational analysis should
provide for two things: (1) a thor-
ough and specific understanding of
the targeted organization and (2) the
creation of strategies and operations
that specifically target that organiza-
tion. Questions-based organizational
analysis allows law enforcement to
develop a specific understanding of
each organization. With questions
focused on specific aspects of the
organization, such as organizational
objective, organizational operating
practices, organizational structure
and command, organizational
financing, and organizational sup-
port, targeting and operations can
be tailored to the individual answers
for each question asked. In this
manner, targeting and operations
are not only more efficient but are
also most effective.
A questions-based organizational
analysis framework is replicable,
ensuring that comparisons between
organizations are truly apples to
apples. A questions-based organi-
zational analysis should be repeated
with regularity within the same
organization, allowing law enforce-
ment to determine if leadership
changes within the organization are
affecting or have affected the organi-
zations objectives or operations, or
if the organization is expanding or changing in
any significant way.
6. Use of Social Network Analysis to Identify
Criminal Networks and Target Critical Nodes
Networks may be defined as a series of relation-
ships between individuals who are working in
some coordinated manner to achieve an intended
goal. The key to understanding and mapping
these networks, then, is discovering and map-
ping these relationships. Social network analysis
(SNA) software generates a web-like graph that
shows links people have with one another.
Individuals may be viewed as either links to one
another, links to locations, or links to specific
groups. In SNA, individuals (nodes) and lines
indicating relationships/connections between
nodes (edges) are plotted intention-
ally. Nodes that are more critical to
holding the network together, typi-
cally by having the most direct con-
tact with other network members,
serving as the connector between
the most network members, or serv-
ing as the connector between sub-
groups, are readily identified. Nodes
that have stronger relationships or
connectivity are placed closer
together (shorter edges), while
nodes less associated are spaced fur-
ther apart (longer edges). In this
manner, the resultant network visu-
alization is a very effective mapping
tool for understanding which nodes
are most critical and which nodes
are more strongly connected.
Community-finding capabilities
allow subgroups within a network
to be identified and relationships
between subgroups to be under-
stood. By examining relationships, it
is also possible to identify network
members who might exist who were
previously unknown if they had not
claimed group membership. For
example, if law enforcement identi-
fies gang membership only by
known/admitted gang members, it
is likely missing out on gang mem-
bers who have never declared mem-
bership. By focusing analysis on
relationships, not self-identification,
law enforcement sees who is inter-
acting with whoma more accurate
means to measure network member-
ship and reach. Additionally, the
focus of relationships allows for
identification of human bridges
those individuals who serve as the
connection between cooperating net-
works. Once these people are identi-
fied, operations can be focused upon
their removal from the network,
severing the ties that bind networks
to other networks. With this visual
graph, law enforcement is able to
clearly identify the key nodes in
criminal networks. Once these
nodes are identified, they can be tar-
geted and removed, fracturing the
network in the most efficient and
effective manner.
SNA software should possess cogni-
tive capabilities, allowing for
dynamic network analysis. Such
dynamic analysis allows law
enforcement to engage in target
forecasting. Using target forecasting,
law enforcement can remove the
critical nodes identified and observe
how the network changes in
response, providing a glimpse at
possible future network structure.
Past efforts by law enforcement tar-
geting and removing only the heads
of these criminal networks have
resulted in power vacuums that cre-
ate factionalization and increased
violence. As such, it is advisable to
simultaneously target and remove
several middle-tier criminal opera-
tors. If SNA has identified several
critical nodes, law enforcement can
then remove these nodes in the SNA
software in multiple orders and con-
figurations to determine the best
method for network destabilization
and fracture.
SNA software should also include
geospatial and spatial-temporal
analysis capabilities. Geospatial
analysis examines the social net-
work where it exists in geography
and overlays this upon a map.
Whereas the social network analysis
creates visualizations in which
placement of nodes and edges is
determined by the type and strength
of relationships, geospatial analysis
shows where those network mem-
bers exist in geographic space. This
allows law enforcement to identify
network location and reach. Spatial-
temporal analysis examines where
the network exists in geography per
unit of time. Using crime data over a
given length of time, this can be bro-
ken down into smaller units of time.
For example, three years worth of
crime data on any network can be
broken down into visualizations of
network structure and geography as
it existed over every successive
three-month period. The visualiza-
tions can be viewed in chronological
succession, providing a time-lapse-
like view of the network as it
evolved over the total three-year
period. When viewed in such a
manner, patterns of movement
and/or conflict can be more readily
identified, leading toward better
recognition of habitual patterns.
Additionally, this analysis can be
used to make predictions on future
movements. Such predictions can be
considered probabilities, and law
enforcement can plan operations
accordingly.
Recently, a new SNA software pro-
gram has been developed that
includes several of these features.
Developed in conjunction with the
Chicago Police Department and the
U.S. Military Academy West Point,
the Organizational, Relationship,
and Contact Analyzer (ORCA) is
designed specifically for law
enforcement and allows for the visu-
alization and identification of the
social structure of street gangs
(Paulo, Fischl, Markow, Martin, &
Shakarian, 2013). Furthermore,
ORCA allows for the following
analysis:
Ability to Determine Degree of
Network Membership Not all gang
members self-identify or can be
identified by law enforcement as
gang members. ORCA examines the
number of direct relationships
(through co-arrest or other co-con-
tact field data) an individual has
with known or admitted gang mem-
bers and calculates a probability, or
degree of confidence, that the indi-
vidual is a member of that gang.
This information is useful when
determining potential overall gang
membership. It is also useful in
identifying relationships between
gangs. For instance, when a known
member of Gang A is calculated
with a high probability of being a
member of Gang B, law enforcement
is alerted to a possible close relation-
ship between these two gangs.
Ability to Identify Sets of Influential
Members Though many gangs may
be decentralized in organizational
structure, there tend to be several
individuals who exert tremendous
influence over other members.
ORCA identifies this set of individu-
als. Law enforcement can then
choose to target these individuals
with social service efforts, knowing
that their exit from the gang is likely
to pull many other members out
with them; target them for anti-vio-
lence messaging, knowing that their
communications to the rest of the
gang is likely to have the most
meaningful effect; or target them for
removal via incarceration.
Ability to Map the Ecosystem of a
Given Gang Within any social net-
work, certain individuals tend to
associate with each other more than
with other network
members. In regard
to street gangs, this
may best be under-
stood through the
concept of street cor-
ner drug crews.
Though members of
a larger gang, corner
crews tend to associ-
ate with each other
more often than
with other members
in the same gang.
ORCA identifies
these internal sub-
groups.
Additionally, this
analysis is run for
gangs and gang fac-
tions themselves. In
this manner, gangs
and gang factions
that tend to associ-
ate with each other
may be identified.
This is useful in
identifying potential
cooperative efforts
between gangs
and/or gang fac-
tions.
ORCA is currently
being tested with
several municipal
and state law
enforcement agen-
cies. Future versions
will include the
geospatial and spa-
tial-temporal capa-
bilities previously
identified.
7. Operations
Driven by
Intelligence
Locating and establishing relation-
ships with TCLs, recruiting and
effectively utilizing street leaders,
comprehensively using SNA, and
pushing information collection and
intelligence processing down the
chain of command organizes the law
enforcement agency for intelligence-
driven operations. Law enforcement
should then use aggressive counter-
network targeting models such as
Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, and
Analyze (F3EA) to find criminal
actors, fix their location, and quickly
move in to apprehend or finish
the offender(s) (Faint & Harris, 2012;
Flynn, Juergens, & Cantrell, 2008).
Information gathered on-scene is
then exploited for new intelligence
and analyzed to drive the next oper-
ation in a cyclical pattern. Regular
reassessment of the environment
and regularly
repeated organiza-
tional analysis
keeps the intelli-
gence picture
fresh, ensures the
problem is proper-
ly diagnosed as the
environment
evolves over time
and in response to
law enforcement
operations within
it, and allows for
law enforcement to
remain properly
agile in operations
while remaining
stable in strategy.
Relationships with
the community are
also enhanced via
selective targeting
and apprehension
of verified criminal
actors. The need to
conduct large
street sweeps,
raids, and vehicle
checkpoint-style
operations that
alienate communi-
ty members from
law enforcement
are decreased over
time as the overall
intelligence picture
grows.
8.
Comprehensive
Strategic
Communications
Operations
Creating compre-
hensive strategic
communications
operations is a three-step process.
First, law enforcement must gather
information and engage directly
with community members, focusing
on the perceptions the community
members have of law enforcement,
COIN strategy is
undeniably a military
strategy; however,
the core competencies
of working with
and through the
community, collecting
evidence, and
conducting
investigations
are fundamental
law enforcement
procedures.
the street gangs around them, and
the world in which they live and
taking the time necessary to build
partnerships and networks within
the community. Second, information
gathered must be integrated into
law enforcement operations. Law
enforcement must ensure that their
actions align with the realities with-
in the community and understand
how operations can influence com-
munity perception. Third, law
enforcement must ensure that all
available resources are used to com-
municate the intended message.
This involves coordinating informa-
tion operations, increasing public
presence and engagement, conduct-
ing regular community meetings,
and advancing a specific counter-
narrative, and it includes participa-
tion in community-sponsored events
such as fairs or carnivals, direct
engagement with school and faith-
based officials, and the creation of
joint police-TCL radio messages.
Just as gangs often recruit members
outside schools or local youth hang-
outs, law enforcement and commu-
nity leaders should work together to
recruit outside these same loca-
tions. An active police-community
partnership that approaches and
engages youth outside schools not
only conveys a powerful counter-
gang message but also dis-suades
gang members from recruiting there.
Law enforcement must also ensure
that their actions constantly support
the mission statement. This includes
ensuring that all community mem-
bers are treated with respect and
receive impartial treatment.
Regular community meetings must
be convened and focus specifically
on gang abatement. Law enforce-
ment should communicate success
stories and seek community input
for further cooperative operations.
Community input should be encour-
aged, but all discussions must sup-
port the mission statement to pre-
vent loss of focus. Involved commu-
nity members must be encouraged
to become active participants in
community issue resolution, and
specific tasks should be delegated
out to them for completion. These
community members are then
expected to return to the next com-
munity meeting and report the sta-
tus of their project. This encourages
project follow-through and enhances
the sense of community ownership.
9. Whole of Government
Approach with Law Enforcement
Hand-Off
Law enforcement must liaise with
the various civic service providers
required throughout the community
or ensure that representatives from
these civic service providers are
available to meet directly with mem-
bers of the community and law
enforcement on an on-demand
basis. Repair or restoration of civic
services should coincide with law
enforcement operations. This should
occur no later than 24 hours after
law enforcement operations so that
the community is able to directly
observe the coordinated response to
local issues. This whole-government
approach removes immediate crimi-
nal activity, takes a measured step
toward helping remove many of the
conditions that allow it to set up in
the location to begin with, and
sends a signal to the local communi-
ty that the whole of government is
committed to resolving their local
issues and reinvesting in the neigh-
borhood.
Once this has been done, responsi-
bility for the maintenance of these
gains must be transferred to the
TCLs and any other responsible
community organizations. This
allows law enforcement to move
from a position of agency sponsor-
ship to agency support. This keeps
law enforcements commitment
lighter and less expensive, which
also means sustainable.
Furthermore, this transfer of respon-
sibility creates a real sense of owner-
ship within the community and
reinforces the TCLs local stature,
leading to enhanced voluntary
reporting of other criminal activity
and actors.
A Strategy
in Pratice
In 2009, Massachusetts State Police
(MSP) troopers Michael Cutone and
Thomas Sarrouf, both Green Berets
and Iraq War veterans, began
Counter Criminal Continuum (C3)
Policing in Springfield,
Massachusetts (Hibbard, Barbieri,
Domnarski, & Cutone, 2011). Using
the above strategic elements,
Troopers Cutone and Sarrouf,
together with a small team of dedi-
cated MSP troopers and local
Springfield Police Department per-
sonnel, focused their efforts on an
eight-block section of a neighbor-
hood in northern Springfield with a
significant gang problem (Goode,
2012). Results indicate decreases in
violent crime, property crime, and
weapons offenses (MSP, 2012). The
program has expanded in scope
from its initial eight blocks to 30
blocks. Calls for police service in the
area have risen, indicating increased
community involvement, a greater
willingness to report crime, and
stronger perceptions of police legiti-
macy (Goode, 2012). The success
and expansion of the C3 Policing
Model indicate that population-cen-
tric COIN strategy can be adapted
and implemented to great effect
against criminal street gangs and
local criminal networks.
Conclusion
COIN strategy is undeniably a mili-
tary strategy; however, the core
competencies of working with and
through the community, collecting
evidence, and conducting investiga-
tions are fundamental law enforce-
ment procedures. The military
learned and adapted these compe-
tencies, mated them to their target-
ing and intelligence models, and
applied them with success through
their special operations communi-
ties. Law enforcement should now
examine these practices, adapt the
lessons learned from their use, and
create that which has always been
missing in community policing: a
defined strategy to eliminate crimi-
nal street gangs. To describe it
another way, counter-gang strategy
provides what community policing
has always been missing: a specific
strategy with the linking and lever-
aging of strong agency and commu-
nity relationships to identify, target,
and remove the criminals who cause
them harm. When such strategy and
intelligence-driven targeting and
operations are deployed against the
criminal street gang or other crimi-
nal network, law enforcement is
afforded the most effective and effi-
cient means to disrupt, destabilize,
and ultimately dismantle the crimi-
nal street gang.
References
Bertetto, J. A. (2012). Countering criminal
street gangs: Lessons from the counterinsur-
gent battlespace. Law Enforcement Executive
Forum, 12(3), 43-52.
Burgoyne, M. L. (2011). The right tool for the
job: An evaluation of the effectiveness of
counterinsurgency principles against criminal
insurgency. Small Wars Journal. Retrieved
September 19, 2013, from http://small-
warsjournal.com/sites/default/files/Burgoy
ne%20The%20Right%20Tool%20for%20the%2
0Job%20SWJ%20FINAL.pdf.
Calese, G. D. (2005). Law enforcement meth-
ods for counterinsurgency operations.
Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College.
Faint, C., & Harris, M. (2012). F3EAD:
Ops/intel fusion feeds the SOF targeting
process. Small Wars Journal. Retrieved
September 19, 2013, from http://small-
warsjournal.com/jrnl/art/f3ead-opsintel-
fusion-%E2%80% 9Cfeeds%E2%80%9D-the-
sof-targeting-process.
Flynn, M. T., Juergens, R., & Cantrell, T. L.
(2008). Employing ISR: SOF best practices.
Joint Forces Quarterly, 50(3), 56-61.
Goode, E. (2012, April 30). Combating gang
warfare with Green Beret tactics. The New
York Times, p. A10.
Hibbard, B. G., Barbieri, G., Domnarski, M., &
Cutone, M. (2011). Counter Criminal
Continuum (C3) Policing in Springfield,
Massachusetts: A collaborative effort between
city and state police to reduce gang violence.
The Police Chief, 78, 30-36.
Kilcullen, D. (2010). Counterinsurgency. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Massachusetts State Police (MSP). (2012).
Massachusetts State Police: Special projects
team. Retrieved September 19, 2013, from
http://mspc3policing.com.
Musa, S., Morgan, J., & Keegan, M. (2011).
Policing and COIN operations: Lessons
learned, strategies and future directions.
Washington, DC: National Defense
University Press.
Paulo, D., Fischl, B., Markow, T., Martin, M.,
& Shakarian, P. (2013). Social network intelli-
gence analysis to combat street gang vio-
lence. In Proc. 2013 Intl. Symposium on
Foundations of Open Source Intelligence and
Security Informatics (FOSINT-SI).
Sunshine, J., & Tyler, T. R. (2003). The role of
procedural justice and legitimacy in shaping
public support for policing. Law & Society
Review, 37(3), 513-547.
Tyler, T. R., & Huo, Y. J. (2002). Trust in the
law: Encouraging public cooperation with the
police and the courts. New York: Russell Sage
Foundation.
U.S. Army. (2006). FM 3-24 counterinsur-
gency. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army.
U.S. Department of Justice. (2012).
Community policing defined. Washington,
DC: U.S. Department of Justice. Retrieved
September 19, 2013, from
www.cops.usdoj.gov/Publications/e05122947
6_CP-Defined-TEXT_v8_092712.pdf.
Watson, J. (Writer). (2010, July 12). Cops show
Marines how to take on the Taliban
[Television broadcast]. Los Angeles. National
Broadcasting Service.
Weisel, D. L., & Shelley, T. O. (2004).
Specialized gang units: Form and function in
community policing. Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of Justice. Retrieved September
19, 2013, from https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdf-
files1/nij/grants/207204.pdf.
John A. Bertetto is a sworn member of the Chicago Police Department. He is the author of
the following articles: Countering Criminal Street Gangs: Lessons from the Counterinsurgent
Battlespace, Designing Law Enforcement: Adaptive Strategies for the Complex Envi-ronment,
and Toward a Police Ethos: Defining Our Values as a Call to Action. Officer Bertetto holds a
Master of Science degree from Western Illinois University and a Master of Business
Administration from St. Xavier University.
About the Author
T
Editor' s Note: Tactical Solutions Magazine would like to thank the Illinois Law Enforcement
Training and Standards Board's Executive Institute for allowing us to republish this article.
It was originally published in Law Enforcement Executive Forum 13(3). Having worked both
gang investigations and gang enforcement, I know that you will benefit.
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COORDINATING CRISIS
COMMUNICATIONS
DISPATCHING FOR SWAT
& TACTICAL TEAMS
T
Written by Christine Burke Massengale
The number one duty of an emer-
gency telecommunicator is to protect
the public safety at any cost and this
responsibility is never more crucial
than during periods of heightened
response: active-shooter or hostage
incidents, terrorist attacks, natural
disasters, even planned events that
occur on a large scale. The heroic
actions of police and firefighters grab
headlines, and behind every one of
them is a telecommunicator who
makes sure that information gets to
where it is needed most.
This article examines the roles and
responsibilities of dispatchers for
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)
or tactical incidents in both main cen-
ter operations and field-deployment
situations. It also looks at the benefits
and challenges of forming a special-
ized SWAT or tactical dispatch team
based on agency size and the levels of
response and training required by the
field responders supported by the
agency. There are a number of train-
ing and response options, including
mutual aid and regional response
teams, for smaller agencies with low
call frequency. Any agency might
someday face a high-risk, large-scale
incident, and such an incident could
overwhelm the agencys available
resources if it is caught unprepared.
Understanding
Tactical Comms
How do a telecommunicators daily
roles and responsibilities differ from
the response needed to properly man-
age crisis incidents or even planned
large-scale events such as parades or
conventions?
Broadly speaking, a telecommunica-
tors duty is to gather information in
order to prioritize, allocate and man-
age resources. It is then the telecom-
municators responsibility to docu-
ment that activity. A dispatcher for
SWAT or tactical forces performs
those same tasks, only with greater
nuance and in close coordination with
the incident commander or SWAT
team leader.
Some responsibilities, such as allocat-
ing and managing resources, may rest
more heavily with the on-scene com-
mander, while documenting and
tracking resources may become a
heightened priority for the dispatcher.
A tactical dispatcher deployed to the
field has even greater responsibility,
as he or she will often become an
indispensable resource for the inci-
dent commander and a critical point
of contact between the command post
and the comm center.
SWAT teams provide a specially
trained law enforcement response to
incidents and events outside the nor-
mal scope of daily patrol operations.
Beyond the high-profile incidents
such as barricaded gunmen, hostage
situations, high-risk warrant service
and riot control, SWAT also provides
dignitary protection details, security
planning and response to large-scale
planned events, and specialized
patrol functions such as directed
patrol, crime suppression and even
search and rescue.
The application, selection and train-
ing process for SWAT teams is rigor-
ous, and typically requires additional
training in first aid, explosives, K-9
handling, urban search and rescue,
sharp shooting and other skills.
Depending on location and agency
size, different skillsets are parsed out
among different divisions or even
entire agencies, meaning there are a
variety of specialists, and no one per-
son is expert in everything.
A dedicated SWAT team requires vast
resources. Many agencies in rural and
suburban areas are unable to justify
the cost of compiling and maintaining
such a team. Often, smaller agencies
rely solely on their patrol officers to
respond to exceptional
incidents. Those patrol
officers must prepare
and train to ramp up
response during times
of crisis, even if it is a
once-in-a-career situa-
tion.
Whether crisis inci-
dents are handled by
dedicated SWAT teams
or trained patrol offi-
cers, they all have one
thing in common: a
telecommunicator is
always involved. Thus,
it only makes sense to
include communica-
tions in any special-
ized training and
response planning.
Role of the
Agency
Whats the difference
between SWAT dis-
patching and tactical
dispatching? On the
surface, the difference
seems obviousSWAT
dispatch indicates
assignment to han-
dling a SWAT call, and
tactical dispatch is all
other heightened situ-
ations, right? Yes and
no.
No national standard
exists to define a dis-
patcher or telecommu-
nicator, and similarly
there is no single defi-
nition for a SWAT or
tactical dispatcher. In the absence of a
standard to define the training, selec-
tion process and credentials necessary,
each agency is left to tailor its
response to meet the specific needs of
the area it serves.
Generally speaking, a SWAT dispatch-
er is specially trained to handle the
needs of a SWAT-level law enforce-
ment response, but a tactical dispatch-
er is trained to handle a variety of
specialized responses to a variety of
situations, including but not limited
to SWAT calls. These requests might
be for high-profile or prolonged law
enforcement cases, search and rescue,
large fires and planned events.
Just as not every agency will have or
require a SWAT team, not every
agency will have a specifically trained
SWAT or tactical dispatch team. The
more advanced and better-trained
team is not always the most readily
available option anyway. Incidents
unfold rapidly, so sometimes a
response team isnt assembled until
after casualties are amassed. This
unfortunate fact was never more evi-
dent than after the 1999 school shoot-
ing in Columbine, Colo. Responding
law enforcement agencies were criti-
cized for setting up a perimeter and
relying on SWAT response rather than
a rapid entry team. The best option is
the one that stops
the threat first.
Whether or not
they have formal
tactical dispatch
teams, agencies
should consider
providing all
telecommunicators
with some formal
training to respond
to exceptional inci-
dents and events.
Almost every
telecommunicator
has filled the role
of a tactical dis-
patcher at one time
or anotherfrom
natural disasters to
man-made inci-
dents and planned
events. Any
telecommunicator
who has worked
through localized
flooding or storm
damage, a multi-
ple-alarm fire or a
structure collapse,
a parade or county
fair has responded
to some of the chal-
lenges and
demands that a
tactical dispatcher
faces. Whether
handling calls for a
specific discipline
(police, fire or
EMS) or across all
disciplines, each
call taker and dis-
patcher will experi-
ence something
extraordinary given enough time.
Its not a matter of if a
large-scale incident will occur, but
when, and knowing this can help
agency administrators determine how
to prepare telecommunicators to best
respond based on agency size, call
load and needs of the service area.
If the
telecommunicator
demonstrates a firm
understanding of
incident management
in the earliest stages
of the response, it
will help the first
responders focus
on managing the
incident and
prioritizing response
Training &
Preparation
As a member of a specialized SWAT
or tactical team, the required skills
and competence levels are structured
and evaluated. Just as a police officer
works the street before becoming a
member of the SWAT teamand
must be a member of the SWAT team
before becoming a sniperskill levels
for the telecommunicator are similarly
built. The agency must decide on
team selection criteriameasure-
ments of experience and skillssuch
as tenure and written or oral testing.
Some agencies require that dispatch-
ers participate in physical agility test-
ing and tactical-level training with
local law enforcement.
Preparing employees to properly
respond, and deciding what level of
response to provide, is ultimately the
agencys responsibility, as is training
and coordination with field respon-
ders. The first step is for agency man-
agement to decide if and how a team
is formed. The second step is to
decide how and where that team is to
respond. If the team is required to
respond to incidents on-scene, then
the third step
is to train and
equip them for
the specific
challenges
associated
with field
deployment.
They must
train the way
they are
expected to work, so theyll work the
way theyve been trained.
Just like any other team effort, all
parts of the organization should train
with the other respective parts of the
entity in a realistic, real-time training
environment to simulate an actual
operation, Mike Williams, retired
deputy chief of Chattanooga (Tenn.)
PD says. It makes no sense to expect
people to work hand-in-glove during
a crisis when they have never trained
together prior to the event.
There are three basic tiers of response
in telecommunications, and the level
of response typically depends on the
size of the agency. The first tier of
response is handling the incident at
the primary console on the primary
talkgroup for the response agency.
This is the most likely level of
response that a one or two-person
console agency can reasonably pro-
vide.
The second tier of response moves the
incident to a secondary channel or
talkgroup, and assigns another
telecommunica-
tor to handle the
incident as his or
her primary duty.
There may be
protocol in place
to consciously
assign a more
experienced
telecommunica-
tor to the inci-
dent, but this
could present some challenges with
other employees feeling usurped of
their duty or deprived of valuable
experience.
The third tier of response is most
applicable to larger agencies and
requires a formally designated or pre-
determined response team based on
regional or mutual-aid agreements
(especially for smaller agencies that
work well together). This level of
response involves sending a telecom-
municator into the
field to coordinate
face-to-face with
the incident com-
mander at a com-
mand post. It may
also include assign-
ment to an emer-
gency operations
center (EOC) or
liaison position.
The level of response an agency can
provide depends not only on agency
size, but also on call load and person-
nel. Even the smallest agency may
determine that it can send personnel
into the field if call-out situations are
very infrequentits simply a matter
of logistics in availability, scheduling
and back-filling positions.
Smaller agencies may be able to coor-
dinate a regional response team with-
in their county or surrounding coun-
ties. This is often the backbone for
creating a regional response team
available for telecommunicator emer-
gency response taskforce (TERT)
deployments. However, this type of
coordination must be supported with
a memorandum of understanding
(MOU) and regular training to deter-
mine call-out procedures and pro-
curement and allocation of supplies in
order to ensure success.
Williams says there are benefits in
deploying a telecommunicator into
the field to coordinate with a SWAT
commander. It frees up tactical oper-
ators or negotia-
tors to do what
they are trained
to do, he says.
The dispatch-
ers are profes-
sionals at what
they do and
want to do it. As
a result, they do
a much better
job at running
the communications than someone
who is not trained to do it and does
not want to do it.
The tactical dispatcher is often a great
source of intelligence and informa-
tioneven before deploying to the
scenebecause they have information
from the very beginning of the inci-
dent, and also because they also have
access to background information
such as criminal history, computer
aided dispatch (CAD) records, fusion
centers, records management system
(RMS) files, maps and contact num-
bers. A trained tactical dispatcher
should feel comfortable assisting with
planning and strategy, sharing infor-
mation about available resources and
logistics, communicating with outside
agencies or support personnel and
properly addressing safety issues as
they arise.
Considerations
The way to determine the specific role
and responsibilities of an on-scene
dispatcher is through policy, proce-
dure and trainingnot during an
active incident.
Building and training a deployable
dispatch team requires managing
expectations across client agencies.
The field responders must be aware
of the level of response they can
expect at all timeswhether its
knowing theyll only have a talk-
group and a dedicated telecommuni-
cator assigned to work the incident
from the comm center, or knowing
that a tactical dispatcher automatical-
ly deploys into the field with them. If
the dispatch team has set response
criteria, then the team must be avail-
able to fulfill that obligation. If a tacti-
cal dispatcher is unavailable for some
reason, field responders must be
made aware so that proper resources
can be allocated in the field to handle
duties that would otherwise be dele-
gated to the dispatcher.
Criteria must also be established to
determine if employees are field-
deployable. This could include pre-
requisites such as a medical release or
physical fitness test to ensure field
dispatchers are healthy enough to
perform the necessary tasks. How
will they be dressed in the field? The
employee will require the necessary
tools to do the jobeverything from
portable radios to command boards
or laptops, cellphones, air cards, go-
bag, etc. There are certain costs associ-
ated with field deployment, and the
agency must evaluate and assess their
ability to meet these costs before
sending employees into the field ill-
equipped or ill-prepared.
There are numerous training chal-
lenges for both small and large agen-
cies. Smaller agencies experience
high-risk incidents with low frequen-
cy. Larger agencies must be wary of
complacency as they deal with similar
incidents and events on a more fre-
quent basis. Keeping employees
skills fresh when they are only able to
practice rather than apply the skills in
real settings can be a challenge. No
one wants to practice and learn skills
they feel will never be used. In these
situations, visualization and what-if
discussions can keep employees
engaged, especially by looking at cur-
rent news stories and case studies that
mirror a similar operational setting.
After-action reviews of incidents are a
must for every agency, and every
member should bring suggestions to
the table for making improvements.
Most importantly, there should be an
implementation plan in place for any
improvements or suggestions after
the review.
Unexpected incidents, and even large-
scale planned events, can be over-
whelming. The overall response to
Columbine included more than 600
police, fire and EMS personnel from
35 different local, state and federal
law enforcement agencies and 11 fire
and EMS agencies. Whether the inci-
dent is a natural disaster, active-
shooter situation or planned event,
there will be challenges regarding
interoperability, staging, logistics and
personnel management. National
Incident Management System (NIMS)
and Incident Command System (ICS)
concepts should be incorporated in
every agencys training and response
plans. Much of NIMS and ICS train-
ing is online and freeit should not
be overlooked as a valuable resource
to help ensure that as a profession, we
are moving toward standardizing our
response.
In Sum
Two key questions based on basic ICS
principles will help even the greenest
telecommunicator maintain some
semblance of order during the initial
response phase of an expanding inci-
dent: Whos in command? and
Wheres the command post? If the
telecommunicator demonstrates a
firm understanding of incident man-
agement in the earliest stages of the
response, it will help the first respon-
ders focus on managing the incident
and prioritizing response.
Christine Burke Massengale is the training and quality assurance specialist at Hamilton
County 9-1-1 Emergency Communications District in Chattanooga, Ten.
Contact her at burke_c@hc911.org.
About the Author
T
Editor' s Note: Tactical Solutions Magazine Magazine would like to thank APCO International
Inc. for allowing us to republish this article. Reprinted with permission of APCO International.
First published in Public Safety Communications, December 2013, p. 26-31. Copyright 2013.
San Francisco Police officers respond
to a call of an agitated mentally dis-
turbed and disabled man in a wheel
chair wielding a knife and vandalizing
parked cars on a downtown city
street. A group of at least six uni-
formed and plainclothes officers locate
and surround the man who remains
seated in his wheel chair. The officers
initial attempts to communicate with
the angry, apparently delusional and
armed man prove ineffective.
The officers isolate and contain the
disabled subject who remains armed
and menacing, but still confined to his
motorized wheel chair. For some
unknown reason, the officers reduce
their officer safety reactionary gap
and draw closer to the man. Lacking
TASER electronic control devices
(ECDs), the officers elect to use a stun
bag projectile weapon as their force
option. Their back-up force option is
deadly force, so several of the officers
are also covering the subject with
their firearms drawn.
During the course of the confronta-
tion with the man, officers fire one
stun bag projectile at the subject as he
moves forward towards them, which
appears to be ineffective. At one
point, one officer moves in to physi-
cally engage the subject. In response,
the disabled man responds quickly
with a knife slash, striking and injur-
ing the officer. Next, the subject
throws his knife in the direction of the
officers and begins to turn his wheel
chair around. The officers respond to
the knife throw with deadly force,
shooting and disabling the subject.
The wounded officer and his assailant
are both transported to a local hospi-
eadership
L
Written by Ron Martinelli
Pre-Contact Threat Assessment
TACTICAL SOLUTIONS 42
tal for treatment.
Consistent with our technology
advanced society, much of the inci-
dent including the officer-involved
shooting (OIS) was captured on video
and immediately appear on the
Internet via YouTube for everyones
review and critique. It is the second
OIS in one week involving SFPD offi-
cers. The following day, SFPD Chief
of Police Gascon holds a press confer-
ence where he tells the assembled
press that the incident could have
been avoided if his officers would
have been armed with TASER
devices. My response to this episode
and the chiefs comments are, Maybe
and maybe not. It all depends. But
what does it depend on?
Police officers and the citizens we
protect live and work within a society
that is both driven and dependent
upon advanced technology. It is cer-
tainly true that technology has been
very helpful over the years to law
enforcement. However, it is important
to keep in mind that technological
advancements in law enforcement
force options such as TASER elec-
tronic control devices (ECDs) are not
a panacea for good training in officer
safety tactics, accurate threat percep-
tion and force management.
As a former police officer and a 30-
year use of force instructor and
Certified Force Analyst specializing in
the investigation of officer-involved
shootings and major uses of force, I
have used and researched the proper
tactical use of ECDs and other force
options. I am also a strong proponent
of arming police officers with ECDs. I
also sympathize with and support
SFPDs chief as he attempts to lobby
his citys Police Commission and its
notoriously liberal Board of
Supervisors to allow his officers to
add TASER devices to their force
options. I have reviewed a number of
cases in San Francisco and in other
cities where the tactical use of an ECD
or other forms of non-deadly
weaponry would have most likely
resolved the confrontation without
the officers having to resort to deadly
force. However, I am also mindful
that the addition of ECDs to any
departments use of force arsenal is
only one of a number of important
components that should be employed
to enhance officer and citizen safety
while mitigating risk exposure. I
the proper tactical equipment for.
However, this does not mean that you
lack situational awareness or that
you cannot immediately adapt and
modify your tactics to ultimately
overcome and control a resistant or
potentially violent subject. If you
allow the environment to control you
when you have a clear opportunity to
control the environment, you are
doomed to failure. Whenever possi-
ble, take the time to think clearly and
outside the box about what
resources you have available; or how
you can exploit the same environment
to succeed in safely and effectively
taking a resistive or threatening sub-
ject into custody.
#3 Remember the Five
Components of Arrest Can you
accomplish them?
In every arrest scenario, there are five
components; (1) verbalization, (2)
approaching the subject, (3) going
hands on with the subject, (4) arrest
& control tactics, and (5) handcuff-
ing/searching prior to transport. It is
in assessing the subject and your situ-
ation that you must determine
whether you and your partner offi-
cer(s) can successfully accomplish all
five of these components. This is the
most important component of any
pre-contact threat assessment. If after
considering your circumstances, you
believe that you cannot safety accom-
plish all five of the arrest components
do not make contact! That does not
mean that you never make contact; it
just means that you do not force the
issue at that moment. Rather, when-
ever the situation allows follow rules
#1 and #2. Keep calm, focus on main-
taining situational awareness, manip-
ulate the environment by adapting
and thinking outside the box, and call
for additional resources so that you
can eventually and safely prevail.
Rule #4 If at all possible; avoid
time compression
Police officers have a habit of wanting
to take immediate action during the
course of an incident when it is nei-
ther safe nor prudent to do so. This
again speaks to a lack of situational
awareness. Remember that there is a
distinction between potential and
imminent jeopardy. While all con-
tacts with resistant subjects are poten-
tially dangerous; significantly fewer
would have us all consider one officer
safety strategy that could well have
avoided the most recent SFPD OIS
and costs nothing. This strategy is the
concept of Pre-contact Threat
Assessment. The intent of this article
is to provide the reader with some
fundamental rules associated with the
officer safety concept of pre-contact
threat assessment.
Pre-contact Threat
Assessment: Rules
Pertaining to The
Art of Force
Rule #1 You cannot seek to
control others unless you are first in
control (emotionally)
Angry, agitated or emotionally dis-
turbed subjects are often affected by a
naturally produced or external (illicit
or psychotropic) chemical imbalance
that causes them to present symptoms
when threatened. However, officers
who are untrained or lacking in confi-
dence with their officer safety tactics
and force management skills allow
themselves to become emotionally
captured by a subjects resistance.
When this happens and they experi-
ence a phobic scale response
(fear/threatened), they infuse them-
selves with survival chemicals such as
adrenaline, epinephrine, endorphins
and euphoric dopamine. These natu-
ral chemicals, which are also affecting
the subjects they are dealing with, can
cause officers to experience visual and
temporal distortions. The acute
dumping of simulants may cause offi-
cers to lose situational awareness
and present with hypervigilance
(panic and confusion). This could
lead to the application of excessive
force and potential lapses of memory.
Officers engaged in any confrontation
need to focus as much in maintaining
their center and balance as they do
in dealing with resistant or threaten-
ing subjects.
Rule #2 Manipulate the envi-
ronment; dont be manipulated by it.
One slogan of US Army Rangers is,
Improvise, adapt and overcome.
Police officers are often challenged in
the field by unique and rapidly evolv-
ing circumstances that they may lack
Maintaining distance from resistant
and/or threatening subjects present-
ing as; (1) agitated
and psychotic, or
(2) those intent
upon choreo-
graphing a sui-
cide by cop sce-
nario, significantly
reduces the acute
paranoia these
subjects might
experience through
space and time compression.
Maintaining distance from a resistant
and threatening subject ultimately
allows officers an enhanced opportu-
nity to observe and assess what is
happening more accurately and to
respond to potential and imminent
jeopardy in a safer and more effective
manner.
Ultimately, it will nearly always be a
departments and an officers commit-
ment to and the employment of sound
police practices and training in contem-
porary officer safety tactics and force
management; rather than an over-
reliance on technological gadgets that
will allow officers to prevail over resist-
ant subjects in challenging situations.
lag time that rarely favor the
involved officer(s).
Rule #5 Distance and cover are
your friends
Whenever possible, utilize and main-
tain distance and cover from any
resistant and potentially violent sub-
ject you intend to arrest. Distance
allows you to observe more and pre-
vents visual distortions such as per-
ceptional narrowing or tunnel
vision. Distance also enhances hear-
ing, situational awareness and length-
ens reactionary gap. These benefits
allow the involved officer(s) to main-
tain center and balance, as well as
working to mitigate or lessen the
potential for the officer(s) to become
emotionally captured in the event.
encounters actually place officers in
imminent danger. The trick is to fol-
low Rule #1 and
not to become so
emotionally
captured in an
event with a
resistant or
threatening sub-
ject that you
become unrea-
sonably phobic
and adrenalized
to the point that you rush into a situa-
tion when you do not have to.
Examples of unnecessary time com-
pression include; (1) moving too close
to the subject, (2) posturing by
screaming and yelling complex or
confusing orders, or (3) rapidly
engaging an already agitated, angry,
delusional or otherwise psychotic per-
son that does not present an immi-
nent danger from a distance.
Unnecessary time compression nearly
always exacerbates any difficult tacti-
cal situation by significantly reducing
an officers reactionary gap (distance
vs. reaction time). This in turn causes
the involved officer(s) to experience
visual, auditory and temporal distor-
tions. These distortions often lead to
subject action officer reaction prob-
lems such as perception shooting
T
Ron Martinelli, Ph.D., is a former police officer and detective with over 22 years of street
experience primarily with the San Jose (CA) Police Department. Dr. Martinelli, is a former director
of a POST academy and a multi-certified use of force instructor who is also a forensic criminolo-
gist and a federal and state qualified police practices expert specializing in officer-involved shoot-
ings and major uses of force. He is NCCM Board Certified in Forensic Trauma, holds diplomate sta-
tus in the Academy of Experts in Traumatic Stress, is a Certified Force Analyst with the Force
Science Center and is a recognized member of the American College of Forensic Experts
Institute. Dr. Martinelli is nationally recognized as a subject matter expert in psychophysiology
and officer stress-induced responses. He can be reached at: (951) 719-1450 and at
Code3Law@martinelliandassoc.com
About the Author
eadership
L
Stay safe out there!
commitment to and the employment
of sound police practices and training in
contemporary officer safety tactics
and force management; rather than an
over-reliance on technological gadgets
eadership
L
Tactical
Survival for
the Career
Professional
What we have here is a failure to Communicate
Strother Martin~ Cool Hand Luke 1967
From the time you were sit-
ting before a Review Board,
going through an interview
process to become a Law
Enforcement Officer, to the
last day on the job, when you
give your little going away
speech, you are constantly
communicating. The most
effective tool in your profes-
sional arsenal is your ability
to communicate both verbally
and non-verbally.
Up to this point we should
know more about who we are
and how our people view us.
We should also have a better
understanding of other per-
sonality types and what moti-
vates them and how we can
better communicate with
them. With the advent of the
Internet you may look up
Written by Gabriel Serna
websites on the different per-
sonality types and if you took
the personality tests, recom-
mended in article 2, you can
identify those different types.
As an example, if you are the
get down to business
type, with only
enough time for a
quick hello, you may
not interact well with
the, good morning
how is your day
going, how is your
family, how are you,
would you like to see
the new pictures of
my kids type. So it
would benefit you to
know this and take
the time to exchange
least a couple of
pleasantries.
As there are countless
articles and books on
the subject of commu-
nicating I wont
rehash how impor-
tant it is since we all
know how important
it is to any tactical
operation and especially as to
how it relates to the law
enforcement profession. I
would however, like to address
my personal observations on
the lack of communicating
even when you as the commu-
nicator have followed all the
steps necessary to get your
message across clearly and
thus have held up your end of
the communication process.
As an example, I would like to
share this little incident with
you, two officers are going to
transport 6 arrestees to book-
tactical perspective it does not
appear to be a good idea so
you nix that idea explaining
that you dont want them
stranded with 6 arrestees out
on the street, and direct them
to follow your
directive. At this
point communica-
tion is very clear
and has even pro-
vided for the offi-
cers to offer their
input. They thus
run off to accom-
plish their mission
until, you get a
radio call from the
transport van that
they were on the
way to the gas
pumps and ran out
of gas with all the
arrestees in the van.
As I am a disciple
of Theory X, it did
not surprise me one
bit and just rein-
forced my belief
that you need to be
prepared for people
not to follow your direction.
Example #2, my unit was
responsible for providing dig-
nitary protection assisting
Secret Service for Dan Quayle,
who would go on to be the
Vice President. Secret Service,
of course, was the lead agency
and we were responsible for
specific location security and
backup to the Secret Service.
One of the key locations was
an exit door next to where Mr.
Quayle was speaking and if
anything should threaten the
Quayle Vice President then
ing, in the booking van, but
the van has very little gas and
they might not make it to the
municipal gas pumps, that are
on the way to booking and
closer to the station then the
jail. Using an office tactical
approach you tell the officers
to leave the 6 arrestees in their
holding cells, under the care
of one of the officers, and the
other officer needs to drive
the van to the gas pumps fill
up and return for the full load
of arrestees and his partner.
Officers, being as they are,
propose taking all the
arrestees in the van and
attempt to make it to the gas
pumps and if they run out of
gas we can send a unit to
assist. Looking at it from a
The core issue
is individual
behavior so we
need to begin
with behavior
modification
and it all starts
with you.
So if you are communicating
clearly then the behavior of
the listener is the question.
The easiest course of action is
to write it off as a disciplinary
issue and move on to the next
incident and more discipline,
the core problem however has
not been addressed and when
you get the major event occur-
ring and youre the person in
charge, you will be communi-
cating with these same indi-
viduals who believe they have
a better idea then you and
will do what they think is
right and not what direction
you give them. This of
course, would be a tactical
disaster in any storyline; thus
we better address the core
problem while we still have
time. The core issue is indi-
vidual behavior so we need to
begin with behavior modifica-
tion and it all starts with you.
acquired the same mindset
and disregarded sound logic
choosing their plan over a log-
ical one. In the other, the offi-
cer jeopardized the whole
operation and brought dis-
credit on us simply to drive
around knowing his position
was highly critical.
These unfortunately are not
isolated incidents and occur
all the time in all areas of this
profession sometimes with
very deadly outcomes. Even
in highly trained units inci-
dents where direction is cir-
cumvented occur; these usual-
ly make the national news.
Look around, have these inci-
dents occurred in your unit or
agency? Of course they have,
thats why policies, procedures,
rules and regulations were cre-
ated, each agency has them
and they all get bent, flexed
and broken on a daily basis.
he would be rushed out the
exit door into a waiting
unmarked car manned by one
of my officers. Of course you
know, I got a radio call from
Secret Service asking what
had happened to the car as it
was not at the key location. I
was checking on all assign-
ments and quickly went to
this location and discovered
the officer had left his location
and was cruising the hotel
parking lot. His lame excuse
was that he had seen some
suspicious activity and had
gone to check it out. If we
dissect these incidents we def-
initely are looking at disci-
pline but the question remains
why did they not follow direc-
tions; lazy? dumb? defiant?
attitude? these can easily
answer the question except
that in one case there were
two of them and they T
Gabriel Serna, Lieutenant, El Paso Police Department retired, served for 32 years with the El
Paso Police Department and started his career in 1975 (7 years as a Patrol Officer, 5 years as a
Patrol Sergeant, and 20 years as a Lieutenant administering many of the Departments operations
such as Communications, Crime Scene, Identifications and Records, Tactical Unit, Dignitary protec-
tion, Narcotics, Patrol, Family Violence unit, Taxi Detail, Pawn Shop detail, Alarm Detail, Crime
Stoppers, and the Volunteer program). Among the most notable training: The International
Association of Chiefs of Police training in Leadership and Management, Problem Solving
Techniques, Planning and Resources, Quality Service Strategies and Human Resources
Management and Development; Interim Chief of Police Socorro Police Department El Paso, Texas.
About the Author
eadership
L
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