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A New Zealand approach to prioritising criminal groups

Zhivan Alach
New Zealand Police, Auckland, New Zealand
Abstract
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to develop a better method for prioritising organised criminal groups, utilising the existing literature on organised crime and risk assessment. Design/methodology/approach The study began with an existing prioritisation model, and then involved a review of relevant literature in the fields of organised crime and risk assessment tools. It was then followed by iterative development of a new tool, the Criminal Group Risk Assessment Model (CGRAM), including semi-structured discussions with subject matter experts to ensure the validity of the tool. Findings There is little agreement on key concepts and definitions of organised crime, and perhaps because of this, a large number of prioritisation tools with widely differing methodologies and guiding philosophies. A better tool can be developed through a closer examination of the academic literature and careful consideration of all relevant factors, including control measures and ease of use. Research limitations/implications Research was limited by the unavailability of source material on other risk assessment tools, and in particular any documents explaining the conceptual underpinnings of those tools. Practical implications CGRAM provides an easy-to-use tool for the prioritisation of organised criminal groups and could be of substantial use to law enforcement agencies worldwide due to its universal approach. Originality/value While there are many prioritisation tools around, most of them are constrained by a limited conception of organised crime and a seeming lack of attention to the academic literature. CGRAM, while simple and easy to use, is founded on a sound research base and could provide a universal aid to law enforcement agencies. Keywords Crime, Crime research, Criminals, Organized crime, Prioritization, Risk assessment, Threat assessment, Strategy, Networks, New Zealand Paper type Technical paper

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Received 3 February 2011 Revised 11 June 2011 Accepted 7 July 2011

Introduction to say that organised crime has become an issue of increased law It is a cliche founded on truth. With that enforcement attention in recent decades but it is a cliche increased attention have come problems, notably in terms of demand. The number of potential organised crime targets far exceeds the capacity of law enforcement agencies to respond. What is required, then, is a tool to determine which groups should be targeted, and when. Many such prioritisation tools have already been developed, such as the Canadian Sleipnir and the British Criminal Networks Prioritisation Matrix (CNPM). All of these tools are useful, but many are exceedingly complex, some are overly narrow, and none is perfect. A better tool is definitely possible. This paper discusses the development of just such a prioritisation tool in the New Zealand Police, the Criminal Group Risk Assessment Model (CGRAM). CGRAM has been designed to be user friendly and universally applicable, from street gangs
The author would like to thank Charl Crous for his assistance in developing the initial AMCOS Prioritisation Model and providing advice on the development of CGRAM. A full copy of CGRAM is available by e-mailing the author.

Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management Vol. 35 No. 3, 2012 pp. 491-504 r Emerald Group Publishing Limited 1363-951X DOI 10.1108/13639511211250767

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through to transnational criminal groups, albeit at the price of some analytical depth. It provides an easy-to-use method suitable for a broader range of law enforcement actors and agencies than is the intended audience of other prioritisation tools. The paper discusses the context for the development of CGRAM, starting with the central issue of defining organised crime. A tool rests on its underlying theory, and thus it is essential to clarify the particular philosophy upon which CGRAM is built. The paper suggests that a broader conception of organised crime than is usual could be useful. The paper then looks at the concept of risk assessment in general, which is central to prioritisation; the degree of risk (or threat) posed by a group is a key, if not the only, criterion for identifying those targets that should be most urgently addressed. The paper then briefly surveys a range of prioritisation tools, noting their general characteristics and commenting on their strengths and weaknesses. A brief summary of CGRAM is then given, explaining the design goals involved in its development, notably an emphasis on universality and ease of use. The paper then examines CGRAMs component sections in some detail, explaining why each was selected, and how each contributes to an overall risk score for the organised crime group being evaluated. Finally, the paper concludes with some additional points about the use of CGRAM and the remaining importance of good command and control procedures. Definition One of the core drivers behind the development of CGRAM was dissatisfaction with the narrow definitional approach that underpinned other prioritisation tools. As such, the purpose of this section is to briefly summarise some of the literature on definitional issues, point out some shortcomings, and explain the definition upon which CGRAM is built[1]. As Sheptycki (2003) has noted, what we have become accustomed to thinking of as organised crime is, in fact, largely an institutional construction. Organised crime does not exist independently of its observers; it is academics, law enforcement personnel, and politicians that give it shape. And, due to the varying levels of each influence each component brings, it is largely traditional perspectives that dominate the field (Sheptycki, 2003). At least three broad approaches to the definitional problem can be identified: (1) (2) (3) a focus on the organisational structure of the groups involved (structural approach); a focus on the type of criminal activities undertaken (functional approach); and network/systems approaches (von Lampe, 2001; Levi, 1998).

Many of the traditional views of organised crime, such as the alien conspiracy concept (Hobbs, 1998; Ruggiero, 2000) and stereotypes of the mafia, are structural conceptions, but a structural approach can be considerably more sophisticated as well. Some advanced analytical work focuses on the market of crime, or vulnerable elements of society (Vander Beken, 2004) rather than criminal entities. This approach is intellectually rigorous, but difficult to operationalise, given that in the words of Vander Beken, law enforcement agencies fight criminals and organizations, not market situations (Vander Beken, 2004). Even within these broad approaches, there are further debates and disagreements about which particular characteristics are to be taken as defining (Hamilton-Smith and

MacKenzie, 2010; Vander Beken, 2004). Often, it is suggested that only serious crime, however, that is to be defined (a further problem), can be organised crime (van Duyne and van Dijck, 2007). At times, it appears that organised crime is seen as synonymous with transnational organised crime. Central to this debate is a commonly held view that only profit-making crime can be regarded as organised crime (Leppa, 1999; Gilmour, 2008; Albanese, 2001; Harfield, 2008). From this perspective, it is transnational crime groups, focused on profit and using force, threats, and corruption to achieve their ends, that define organised crime (Albanese, 2001; Hobbs, 1998). The more extreme manifestations of this approach can lead to statements such as organized crime is a global phenomenon beyond the scope of any one agency or jurisdiction to deal with (Harfield, 2008). Such extreme views in turn lead to perceptions that organised crime is a threat to the world order (Shelley, 1995). This narrow and elevated perception seems odd, because the very term itself with the adjective organised seems to suggest that it is organisation, not particular activities, that is defining. It is impossible to imagine organised crime without an organisation of some sort whether that group is a fleeting street gang, a loose permanent network, a brotherhood of fraudsters, or a hierarchical Mafia but there is nothing in the term that demands its activities be serious, profit focused, and monopolistic (Ekblom, 2003). From the authors perspective, several of the definitions above have serious flaws. They tend to focus on only one niche of the field, such as the monster of transnational crime. They largely ignore the types of organised crime that occur at the local level in a variety of manners (Hobbs, 1998; Gilmour, 2008; Levi, 1998). By limiting their scope, such definitions also lead to the type of behaviour described by Sheptycki (2003) when of policing intelligence tend(s) to be focused on elements he noted that the mentalite that are narrowly circumscribed. To deal properly with organised crime, it seems necessary to rid the term of some of its more portentous and unnecessary significance[2], to demystify it and move away from ritual and into at least a semblance of science (see e.g. van Duyne and Vander Beken, 2009). The easiest way to enhance understanding is to focus on organisation, not activity type: the key thing is the group[3]. To quote from Vander Beken again:
[y] retaining organized crime groups as distinct units of analysis, and indeed a key focus of police targeting strategies, is a fundamental requirement for the success of enriching both analysis and law enforcement responses (Vander Beken, 2004).

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It is vital to understand, then, that CGRAM rests philosophically on a conceptualisation of organised crime where what matters is the existence of some sort of organisation whether called a group, a gang, a network, or anything else for the purposes of promoting, encouraging, or enabling criminal activity (Alach, 2010). CGRAM could have been used on the rape gang that terrorised Sydney, Australia, in 2000 (Unknown Author, 2003). This was a group that was not motivated by profit, but used a loose organisational structure to enable a series of extraordinarily brutal gang rapes, with the leader planning assaults and co-ordinating a number of participants. It is also applicable to violent street gangs, where profit-seeking would be a long bow to draw, given the groups focus on immediate gratification. At the same time, it could also be used on white collar fraudster networks, which are sometimes seen as separate to organised crime (Ruggiero, 2000). The fact that these examples are not commonly seen as organised crime shows how a narrow definition can be dangerous and ignore some of the worst elements of the organised criminal environment. Organised crime is

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best understood by focusing on all its constituent elements, from the local through to the transnational (Hobbs, 2001). Prioritisation and risk tools This paper now turns to how tools can be developed to counter-organised crime[4]. One of the advantages that law enforcement agencies have over their criminal opponents is the ability to be systematic and scientific (Ekblom, 2003), using tools that most criminal groups simply do not see as useful[5], such as prioritisation mechanisms. In simple terms, a prioritisation mechanism ranks targets in order of importance; depending on existing capacity, a line can then be drawn so that all of those above the line can be addressed, while those below the line can be left for a while. Despite their resources and organisational structure, few law enforcement agencies traditionally ranked problems and targets systematically (Albanese, 2001). Recently, however, the advent of rising demands and new methods like intelligence-led policing has led to increased focus on the issue (Sheptycki, 2003). This has allowed law enforcement agencies to move away from parochial approaches to organised crime (Leppa, 1999) towards more strategic, holistic methodologies. The concept of risk (and/or threat) is central to prioritisation for law enforcement. While there are many slightly different nuances, in simple terms risk encompasses both the intrinsic severity of a particular hazard as well as the probability of that hazard causing harm (Di Nicola and McCallister, 2006). Threat is often seen as a sub-component of risk, and refers solely to the intrinsic severity of the hazard; in criminal terms, the intent and capability of a particular group or individual. Risk assessment is often rather ill-defined (van Duyne and Vander Beken, 2009), and there are a thousand different risk assessment methodologies, none of which are perfect, and all of which need to be customised to suit the phenomena that they are assessing (Di Nicola and McCallister, 2006). Criminal risk assessment is often particularly difficult, as there is seldom any easy way to quantify variables (often an essential element of risk assessment), and thus a need to use a more qualitative, subjective, and relative approach (Di Nicola and McCallister, 2006; van Duyne and van Dijck, 2007). Any risk assessment requires information about the phenomena being evaluated. With organised crime, the most common observation instruments are law enforcement officers themselves. This is potentially problematic, as such officers have inherent biases (van Duyne and van Dijck, 2007), but it seems impossible to avoid. While victims of crime are an important (and under-utilised) source (Albanese, 2001), information gathered from them is unlikely to be of equivalent value. Some sort of grading material for source data is essential, as if the raw data are flawed, then any analysis and evaluation will also be flawed (Gregory, 2003). Any raw data also need to be stored for a lengthy period of time, so that evaluations of any change of risk over time can be made (Gilmour, 2008; Albanese, 2001). The larger the amount of raw data (van Duyne and van Dijck, 2007), and the longer the data are kept, the better the risk assessment is likely to be, as bias and parochialism will have less influence over the process. In developing risk assessment frameworks, there can be a tension between ease of use and analytical depth. That is, those assessment frameworks that provide the most detail and the richest picture are often those that are the hardest to use. As such, when developing a tool, it is necessary to take into account how it is intended to be used (Ekblom, 2003). Factors might include its intended audience and the amount of time

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usually allocated within the organisation to prioritisation and related decision-making activities. Once these factors have been considered, a decision can be made as to which end of the spectrum from simple to sophisticated the tool should rest. To better understand why CGRAM was developed, and in particular the niche it is designed to fill, it is necessary to survey the existing field of criminal risk assessment tools. The following section relies heavily on the pioneering work done by Hamilton-Smith and MacKenzie (2010). Three main types of criminal risk assessment tool can be identified: first, an attribute approach; second, an activities approach; and third, a harm or combination approach that examines the effect of both attributes and activities (Hamilton-Smith and MacKenzie, 2010). One of the most common tools is the Brown model (Figure 1). The Brown model is an attribute approach. In it, intent and capability combine to create a threat score, to which is added a separate harm score. This, in turn, creates an overall risk score. The Brown model has been criticised for ignoring factors beyond the characteristics of the criminal group itself (Hamilton-Smith and MacKenzie, 2010), including control measures such as police actions, but a more pressing concern seems to be its treatment of harm. It is hard to fathom how harm can be separate to threat, rather than a consequence of threat; surely it is the intent and capability of a criminal group as expressed through its actions that determines the level of harm? To analogise, the potential and actual harm of a military division is primarily determined by the intent of its commanders and the capability it possesses; to consider potential and actual harm as somehow entirely separate to the orders of its commanders (e.g. to attack a town) or the calibre of its guns would be absurd. Other attribute models include Klerks and Sleipnir. Sleipnir is one of the more commonly used tools, and was developed in Canada through a Delphi method involving a large number of subject matter experts (Hamilton-Smith and MacKenzie, 2010). It is regarded as producing a reliable consensus on the relative threats posed by different organised criminal groups across that country (Sheptycki, 2003). Sleipnir is shorter than other models, such as Klerks, but still requires the person completing it to consider 19 separate attributes in order to arrive at a final score[6]. Harm models attempt to identify the degree of harm caused by a group and thus focus on its activities and its environment. Harm models can be conceptually difficult

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Desire Intent Expectations Threat Resources Risk Capability Knowledge Harm Brown model of risk assessment

Source: Hamilton-Smith and MacKenzie (2010, p. 261)

Figure 1. Brown model of risk assessment

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to utilise due to the difficulty in ranking and comparing types of wildly variant harm (Hamilton-Smith and MacKenzie, 2010). One of the most commonly used harm models is the British CNPM, which evaluates criminal groups in terms of social, economic, and political impacts. The CNPM uses likely sentence lengths as a proxy for the degree of harm caused by particular crimes. More recently, a range of combination tools has been developed that consider both harm and attributes (Hamilton-Smith and MacKenzie, 2010). The European Union Organised Crime Threat Assessment (Europol, 2007) uses a combination of factors to assess the threat, rather than risk, posed by groups. It has received some vigorous analytical criticism (van Duyne and Vander Beken, 2009). Another tool is the British Association of Chief Police Officers Risk Assessment (ACPO RA) tool. The ACPO RA looks at both the characteristics of groups and the degree of harm they cause, and also includes some consideration of the quality of the information that is used to produce such evaluations. The ACPO RA evaluates harm in a different way to the CNPM, which may well be conceptually superior, but may also lead to more ambiguous findings. All of the tools noted above focus on groups, but it is worthwhile to briefly mention the work of Albanese. Rather than focus on groups, his risk assessment tool looks at locations and activities, and attempts to identify the likelihood of particular criminal acts developing in a particular place (Albanese, 2001). Evaluation of the above tools by the authors organisation indicated that while they were useful, they also had significant shortcomings. These included: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) internal logical flaws, such as in the treatment of harm within the Brown model; excessive complexity, notably in Sleipnir and Klerks; over-simplicity, notably in the CNPMs treatment of harm; limited focus, e.g. only attributes, or only harm, rather than a combination; a focus on non-group elements, which while sophisticated was unlikely to be useful; and shallowness and emphasis on rhetoric rather than analysis, termed incantations and ritual dances by at least one author (van Duyne and Vander Beken, 2009).

However, the most important flaw of all of the tools surveyed was their definitional foundation. Almost all focused solely on profit-focused groups, which as the earlier definitional discussion has noted, is problematic. By using a limited definition, they force their own version of organised crime onto the problem (Sheptycki, 2003), thus limiting their utility. The development of CGRAM From the beginning, CGRAM was designed to overcome the definitional, logical, and ease-of-use shortcomings of other prioritisation tools. The design goal was to develop a tool that could evaluate both major, transnational organised crime groups running drugs across borders as well as local street gangs. Given its organisational/structural focus, CGRAM was designed to be primarily an attributes model, but to combine this with examination of harm as well. CGRAM evolved from the AMCOS[7] Prioritisation model, which was in turn a derivative of Sleipnir first developed in 2008, and which initially focused solely on

profit-oriented groups and thus had the same shortcomings noted earlier in the discussion of other models. Early in 2010, the AMCOS Prioritisation model was subjected to a major theoretical revision. Key influences during this process included the writings of those who emphasised the local elements of organised crime (Stelfox, 2003; Hobbs, 1998). Also important were the thoughts of Hamilton-Smith and Vander Beken (Hamilton-Smith and MacKenzie, 2010; Vander Beken, 2004). Once key issues had been identified from the literature, they were consulted with a range of subject matter experts and modified, mixed, or split, before arriving at a final decision about which elements to include, and which to leave out. As such, in the following sections it has been difficult at times to clearly identify links between specific categories and a particular literature source. Several areas for improvement were identified during the revision process: user friendliness; using a broader definition of organised crime, as discussed earlier, in order to enhance utility; incorporating some consideration of community harm and vulnerability; and evaluating the impact of control measures on the risk group. User friendliness was regarded as vital to the acceptance and use of the tool. A key goal was to ensure that CGRAM was useable by any police officer dealing with organised crime whether a trained intelligence analyst or not. As such, the explanatory booklet and score sheet were modelled on easy-to-use forms used by other government agencies, such as the Inland Revenue Departments tax return (Inland Revenue Department, 2011). It was decided to colour code each section of the booklet, so that any person using it can see, at a glance, where he/she is up to in the overall process. Colour coding also facilitates understanding, as distinguishing through colour can assist evaluators to better distinguish the different elements in their own mind, rather than having them blur into a single mass of unsorted information. Another aspect of user friendliness involved reducing detail and the number of scoring categories. Altogether, there are four major areas where the evaluator actively scores the group or environment (intent, capability, community vulnerability, and existing police capability), and three areas where a score is developed by combining elements (threat, potential harm, and risk). The most detail is contained in the intent and capability sections, where there are nine sub-categories. Altogether, any user of CGRAM needs to make only 11 active scoring decisions, which is substantially fewer than required by other models. While this may reduce the analytical depth of the model, it makes it much easier to use and thus more likely to be utilised. From a utilitarian perspective, this is felt to be a worthwhile trade-off (Figure 2).

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Community vulnerability Intent

Potential harm

Threat Existing police capability

Risk

Capability

Figure 2. Structure of CGRAM

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CGRAM in detail Scoring in CGRAM is done through a qualitative-quantitative cross-referencing system, which would be familiar to those who have used standards-based evaluation (New Zealand Qualifications Authority, 2011). This method helps overcome some of the problems associated with the lack of hard quantitative data in the field. A series of descriptive paragraphs is given for each scoring category. Each has its own numerical score. The person scoring the group identifies which paragraph best describes the group, and thus identifies the numerical score for that category. Where information is unknown, a middle of the range score is given per usual risk assessment methodology. During the development phase, a great deal of discussion and consultation was required to ensure that the scores attached to the different descriptive paragraphs were deemed to be accurate in relative terms. There are some cross overs between scoring categories, which was deemed to be unavoidable. However, much care was taken to ensure that any cross overs were minimal. The categories were also designed in a way that ensured that there was no automatic relationship between them; for example, that the score for Category X did not have a direct and causal relationship on the score for Category Y. Where such causal relationships were identified, parsimony demanded the collapse of the two categories into one as the resultant information would still be of the same value. CGRAM provides not only a total risk score, but also a risk profile of the particular group. The risk profile shows how highly a group scores in the various individual categories. This is particularly useful, as two groups with equal scores may well have arrived there by quite different routes, and as such may require quite different responses. The first two sections of CGRAM focus on the core attributes of the criminal group being evaluated, namely its intent and its capability. All intent and capability sub-categories are scored from 0 to 4. Intent (which is colour-coded light blue) has four sub-categories: infiltration and corruption, strategic alliances, violence and intimidation, and primary offending. Intent is determined by studying the behaviour of the group, in the belief that past activity is the best predictor of future actions (Werner et al., 1983; Schwalbe et al., 2007; Keller et al., 2006; Monahan et al., 2001). Infiltration and corruption relates to the groups capability to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate private and public enterprises. The justification for the selection of this category as a scoring criterion is that infiltration and corruption of legitimate enterprises not only facilitates criminal activities not merely fraud, but the whole spectrum of criminality but also enhances the protection the group enjoys from discovery. It is also a precursor to major harm (van Dijk, 2007). The strategic alliance section relates to the major partnerships the group has formed, or might form, with other organised crime entities. The justification for this category is that strategic alliances can allow a criminal group to expand its criminal activities, both in quantity and in diversity. Strategic alliances can expose a criminal group to new knowledge, new markets, and new criminal equipment, such as firearms. They can help local groups expand (Hobbs, 1998). They can also develop into potential avenues for escape in the event that law enforcement pressure on one group becomes particularly strong an allied group can provide temporary respite until the heat has gone down. The violence and intimidation category relates only to the use of violence and intimidation to further criminal organisational objectives. This scoring category includes consideration not only of the nature of violent acts but also the tools used,

such as the presence of firearms. The justification for this category is that violence is not only a direct cause of harm, but can also act as an enabler for criminal expansion. The fourth and last intent sub-category relates to the primary offending type of the criminal group. It is in its treatment of this aspect that CGRAM differs markedly from other organised crime risk assessment models. CGRAM links a range of crime types in each scoring category; in the highest, for example, are placed contract killings, kidnappings, people smuggling, paedophile rings, small arms trafficking, sexual assaults, and terrorist acts. It is notable that drugs crimes are not listed here, as it is believed that the harm resulting directly from drugs smuggling (ignoring secondary harms) is of a lesser nature. An organised rape gang would score very highly in this criterion. Capability (colour-coded pink) has five sub-categories: financial resources, knowledge and expertise, geographical influence, intelligence/counter-intelligence, and insulation from prosecution. Financial resources relates to the wealth of the top five members of the group. It includes the caveat that the members must be able to immediately generate certain dollar amounts, as it is this sort of liquid wealth that determines the capability of the group to engage in large criminal business deals such as major drug shipments. Long-term fixed wealth, while important, is of less importance in the rapidly evolving criminal world. Financial resources are also important insofar as they can be converted into a range of other elements of capability and intent, such as through the acquisition of firearms or corruption of officials through bribery. Knowledge and expertise represents the degree of criminal knowledge available to the criminal group. Criminal groups with greater knowledge can undertake a much wider range of criminal acts than their less knowledgeable counterparts, and it is this adaptability that is particularly harmful, as the group can expand to fit multiple criminal niches. The knowledge and expertise section is scored primarily through focusing on the permanent membership of the group, but it also includes some consideration of the groups tendency to hire in criminal experts and specialists when required. Such experts might include accountants specialising in money laundering or chemists particularly proficient in the manufacture of methamphetamine. The geographical influence element refers to the sphere of influence of the group. This is related to, but distinct from, strategic alliances, as strategic alliances represent interactions with other distinct groups, whereas geographical influence refers to the direct criminal activities of the group itself. The highest score is given to those groups of a multi-national nature, but given that this is only one small element out of many in CGRAM, local/regional groups (which score a 1 or 0 in this element) can still achieve an overall high score. The intelligence/counter-intelligence section relates to the ability of the organised crime group both to gather intelligence (on law enforcement agencies and rival criminal groups) and to counter efforts by law enforcement agencies and rival criminal groups to gather intelligence on its own activities. This category is justified the fact that knowledge about enemies and competitors can enable successful actions. As such, a group that can gather detailed, relevant, and timely intelligence on law enforcement and criminal competitors can consistently be one step ahead of them. If that same group can prevent information on its own activities being gathered, it gains yet further advantage. The counter-intelligence component of this category does not relate to insulation from prosecution per se, but rather the ability of the group to prevent investigations reaching the prosecution stage in the first place.

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The fifth and final element of capability is insulation from prosecution. This relates to the level of difficulty there is in establishing an evidential trail to the leaders of the organised criminal group, and is based on historical events. There is often a relationship between this score and either the hierarchical complexity of the group, or the existence of a code of silence such as the Sicilian omerta. Insulation from prosecution is a key element of capability, as it can enable the group to continue operations even when charges are brought; indeed, from a public relations perspective, beating charges may well be better than never having them brought in the first place (for the group), such as happened with the Teflon Don John Gotti (Raab, 2002). The next phase of CGRAM involves determining the level of threat (colour-coded yellow) posed by the group. This is evaluated by adding together the intent and capability scores. With the current scoring system, threat scores could range from 0 to 36, although there is no reason that the specific scores used could not be altered in the future[8]. This threat score can be seen as the theoretical maximum harm the group could achieve, independent of control measures or other contextual elements. Harm is not sub-divided into, for example, monetary or social harms, as is done by some models (Albanese, 2001). A theoretical maximum harm is not particularly useful in and of itself; we need to know something about the community or communities targeted by the group (Gilmour, 2008). To analogise, we cannot determine the real danger of a 9 mm pistol unless we know its target. A 9 mm pistol is exceedingly dangerous to a naked person, and completely worthless against a main battle tank. It is the same with organised criminal groups. As such, the next segment of CGRAM assesses community vulnerability. More vulnerable communities receive higher scores. The logic behind this is that organised crime can cause much more damage in fragmented, vulnerable communities, corrupting existing economic structures (e.g. through protection), meeting a high demand for drugs (often prevalent in low socio-economic areas), and in general creating a parallel governance structure. The key challenge in evaluating this segment is defining the community affected by the organised criminal group, as this can be almost impossible in situations where the group has a particularly broad area of influence. Adding community vulnerability onto threat gives a potential harm (colour-coded dark yellow) score from 0 to 48. This is the first truly meaningful score, as it gives an idea of the potential for danger from the group in the community, given no control measures. However, as noted earlier:
[y] the probability of a harm being realised is as much dependent on opportunity and control factors (including the control exerted by law enforcement) as it is by the intent and capability of an (organised crime network) (Hamilton-Smith and MacKenzie, 2010).

As such, the next step in CGRAM is to consider control measures, in the form of existing police activities against the group (colour-coded dark blue). This step assesses the quantity and quality of police activities against the group. A very high number of high-intensity police operations will have a major disruptive effect on the group. By subtracting the level of police actions from the potential harm score, a final risk score from 15 to 48 is identified. Over the long term, activities considered in the section on existing police countermeasures may in turn affect the intent and capability of the group. For example a group may be graded out as having potential harm of 35. Police control factors may be evaluated as 10, giving a final risk score of 25. However, over time those police

actions may degrade the capability and intent of the group, meaning that at the next evaluation, the potential harm score might have been reduced to 20, giving a final risk score of 10 if police action remains a constant. As such, intent and capability scores are far from static. A deliberate decision was made not to link particular CGRAM scores with recommended responses, as is sometimes done in prioritisation models. Responses are entirely a command decision and will rest on the availability of resources. In a resource rich environment, a commander may decide that any group with a score over 15 will receive substantial attention. In an environment of scarce policing resources, a commander may decide that the cut-off point is a score of 30. As resource availability fluctuates, the minimum score for major interventions will also fluctuate. Let us now consider the model in action. A police commander is faced with two groups: transnational organised crime network Group A, and street gang Group B. Using CGRAM, Group A receives scores of 2, 3, 1, and 3 for infiltration, strategic alliances, violence, and primary offending, respectively. Group B receives 0, 0, 4, and 3. In the capability elements, Group A receives scores of 3, 3, 2, 2, and 4 for finance, knowledge, influence, intelligence, and insulation, respectively. Group B receives scores of 1, 2, 1, 2, and 1. Group As total threat is thus 23; for Group B the score is 14. However, Group A affects a very wide area, and as such perceived community vulnerability is low (score 3), giving it a potential harm score of 26. Group B in turn is concentrated in a very vulnerable community (score 12), giving it a potential harm score of 26. Neither group is currently the subject of major police countermeasures, making the final risk scores the same as the potential harm scores. The commander can now decide, based on these risk scores, what assets to allocate to which group, and when. Also, because CGRAM identifies not only an overall risk score but also a risk profile, it shows that while the two groups have similar total scores, they are quite dissimilar in their particular characteristics, and thus might demand quite different countermeasures[9]. As currently developed, CGRAM still has several minor shortcomings, although less so than other tools. It is not as analytically rich as other tools, and as such is probably not suitable for long-term, strategic, and future planning. CGRAM is also better suited to those police environments where there are substantial intelligence holdings on relevant criminal groups. Some may also disagree with the scoring proportions of the various categories. Future enhancements to the model will focus on the scores allocated to categories, as alleviating the other shortcomings would likely have more costs than benefits in making the tool less user friendly and less focused. CGRAM was developed because other prioritisation tools were perceived as inadequate, notably in their restricted definitional foundation. CGRAM instead rests on a broad definition of organised crime, increasing its utility. It is a user-friendly tool that examines the attributes of organised crime groups, as well as the vulnerability of the communities they affect, and also weighs the importance of control factors such as police activities. CGRAM provides law enforcement agencies with a tool to examine organised crime not only in its transnational, drug-and-people-smuggling guise, but also in its local, violent, and chaotic forms.
Notes 1. It should be emphasised that developing CGRAM was not the reason for this definitional dissatisfaction. Rather, dissatisfaction with existing definitions led to a range of work on varied topics, of which CGRAM was one. The causal flow is thus: dissatisfaction with definitions and theory leading to applied work, including CGRAM (see Alach, 2010).

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2. See, for example the introduction to United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2010). 3. As such, CGRAM rests primarily on a structural approach to organised crime, albeit with elements of functionalism. 4. Any such tools rest upon the foundational theory/definition/philosophy. A different definition of organised crime will result in a quite different type of prioritisation tool.

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5. That is not to say that organised criminal groups cannot be systematic, only that the level reached is less than that reached by law enforcement agencies with large intelligence and research components (see Kaihla, 2002). 6. The first version of Sleipnir had 19 categories; later iterations have reduced that to 12 (see Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2010; Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2007). 7. Auckland Metro Crime and Operational Support. 8. In particular, later iterations are likely to weight primary crime type higher. 9. The use of CGRAM can be further enriched through combination with a taxonomic tool such as the Alach model (Alach, 2010). References Alach, Z. (2010), An incipient taxonomy of organised crime, New Zealand Police Research Symposium, Royal New Zealand Police College, Porirua, Wellington, July 13-14. Albanese, J. (2001), The prediction and control of organized crime: a risk assessment instrument for targeting law enforcement efforts, Trends in Organized Crime, Vol. 6 Nos 3-4, pp. 4-29. Di Nicola, A. and Mccallister, A. (2006), Existing experiences of risk assessment, European Journal of Criminological Policy Research, Vol. 12 Nos 3-4, pp. 179-87. Ekblom, P. (2003), Organised crime and the conjunction of criminal opportunity framework, in Edwards, A. and Gill, P. (Eds), Transnational Organised Crime: Perspectives on Global Security, Routledge, London, pp. 241-63. Europol (2007), EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2007, Europol, The Hague. Gilmour, S. (2008), Understanding organized crime: a local perspective, Policing, Vol. 2 No. 1, pp. 18-27. Gregory, F. (2003), Classify, report, and measure: the UK organised crime notification scheme, in Edwards, A. and Gill, P. (Eds), Transnational Organised Crime: Perspectives on Global Security, Routledge, London, pp. 78-96. Hamilton-Smith, N. and Mackenzie, S. (2010), The geometry of shadows: a critical review of organised crime risk assessments, Policing and Society, Vol. 20 No. 3, pp. 257-79. Harfield, C. (2008), The organization of organized crime policing and its international context, Criminology and Criminal Justice, Vol. 8 No. 4, pp. 483-507. Hobbs, D. (1998), Going down the glocal: the local context of organised crime, The Howard Journal, Vol. 37 No. 4, pp. 407-22. Hobbs, D. (2001), The firm: organizational logic and criminal culture on a shifting terrain, British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 41 No. 4, pp. 549-60. Inland Revenue Department (2011), Forms and guides, available at: www.ird.govt.nz/formsguides/number/ (accessed February 1, 2011). Kaihla, P. (2002), The technology secrets of cocaine Inc, Business 2.0, Vol. 3 No. 7, available at: www.cocaine.org/cokecrime Keller, J., Gomez, R.G., Kenna, H.A., Poesner, J., Debattista, C. and Flores, B. (2006), Detecting psychotic major depression using psychiatric scales, Journal of Psychiatric Research, Vol. 40 No. 1, pp. 22-9.

Leppa, S. (1999), Anticipating Instead of Preventing: Using the Potential of Crime Risk Assessment in Order to Minimize the Risks of Organised and Other Types of Crime, HEUNI, Helsinki. Levi, M. (1998), Perspectives on organised crime: an overview, The Howard Journal, Vol. 37 No. 4, pp. 335-45. Monahan, J., Steadman, H.J., Silver, E., Appelbaum, P., Robbins, P., Mulvey, E.P., Roth, L., Grisso, T. and Banks, S. (2001), Rethinking Risk Assessment: The MacArthur Study of Mental Disorder and Violence, Oxford University Press, New York, NY. New Zealand Qualifications Authority (2011), Standards, New Zealand Qualifications Authority, Wellington. Raab, S. (2002), John Gotti dies in prison at 61; mafia boss relished the spotlight, The New York Times, New York, NY, available at: www.nytimes.com/2002/06/11/ nyregion/john-gotti-dies-in-prison-at-61-mafia-boss-relished-the-spotlight.html (accessed February 1, 2011). Royal Canadian Mounted Police (2010), Using intelligence led policing as a model to prioritize organized crime investigations a canadian perspective, Ottawa, 2007, available at: http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/2007/DPT00005T.ppt Ruggiero, V. (2000), Transnational crime: official and alternative fears, International Journal of the Sociology of Law, Vol. 28 No. 3, pp. 187-99. Schwalbe, C.S., Fraser, M.W. and Day, S.H. (2007), Predictive validity of the joint risk matrix with juvenile offenders: a focus on gender and race/ethnicity, Criminal Justice and Behaviour, Vol. 34 No. 3, pp. 348-61. Shelley, L. (1995), Transnational organized crime: an imminent threat to the nation-state, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 48 No. 2, pp. 463-89. Sheptycki, J. (2003), The governance of organised crime in Canada, Canadian Journal of Sociology, Vol. 28 No. 4, pp. 489-516. Stelfox, P. (2003), Transnational organised crime: a police perspective, in Edwards, A. and Gill, P. (Eds), Transnational Organised Crime: Perspectives on Global Security, Routledge, London, pp. 114-26. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2010), The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna. Unknown Author (2003), Rapist out of sight but not out of mind, The Age, Melbourne, Fairfax, available at: www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/08/01/1059480552721.html (accessed February 1, 2011). Van Dijk, J. (2007), Mafia markers: assessing organized crime and its impact upon societies, Trends in Organized Crime, Vol. 10 No. 4, pp. 39-56. Van Duyne, P. and Van Dijck, M. (2007), Assessing organised crime: the sad state of an impossible art, in Bovenkerk, F. and Levi, M. (Eds), The Organized Crime Community: Essays in Honor of Alan A. Block, Springer, New York, NY, pp. 101-24. Van Duyne, P. and Vander Beken, T. (2009), The incantations of the EU organised crime policy making, Crime, Law, and Social Change, Vol. 51 No. 2, pp. 261-81. Vander Beken, T. (2004), Risky business: a risk-based methodology to measure organised crime, Crime, Law, and Social Change, Vol. 41 No. 5, pp. 471-516. Von Lampe, K. (2001), Not a process of enlightenment: the conceptual history of organized crime in Germany and the United States of America, Forum on Crime and Society, Vol. 1 No. 2, pp. 100-15. Werner, P.D., Ross, T.L. and Yesavage, J.A. (1983), Reliability, accuracy, and decision-making strategy in clinical predictions of immediate dangerousness, Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, Vol. 51 No. 6, pp. 815-25.

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About the author Zhivan Alach holds a PhD in Political Studies from the University of Auckland and is currently employed by the New Zealand Police in an analytical role. He has published widely on security matters in New Zealand, Australia, the UK and the USA and his primary interests include the post-Cold War security and law enforcement environment, re-interpretation of security threats, conceptual modelling, and the interaction between perceptions and reality in regards to security issues. Currently, his research focuses on organised crime and drugs. Zhivan Alach can be contacted at: zhivan_alach@hotmail.com

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