Angeles vs. Uy, Jr. Facts: Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of the RTC of Caloocan City charged Atty.

Thomas C. Uy with the violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Thomas C. Uy is the lawyer of Primitiva Malansing who was awarded a sum of money in a civil case against Norma Trajano. In a hearing, Norma Trajano manifested that she had already settled in full the civil aspect in the criminal case involving herself and Primitiva Malansing. She alleged that she paid P20,000.00 directly to Malansing, while the balance of P16,500 she delivered to Atty. Uy. She even had a receipt signed by Atty. Uy himself. Malansing however manifested that she did not receive the amount of P16,500.00. Atty. Uy argued that Malansing did not want to accept the money, but this was disputed by Malansing who manifested her willingness to accept the money. The Court thus directed Atty. Uy to produce the money, who said it was in his office. The Court suspended the proceedings to enable Atty. Uy to get the money from his law office which is located only at the second floor of the same building where this court is located. Afterwards, he never returned. For his part, Atty. Uy alleges that despite several offers to Malansing to get the money, Malansing declined and insisted that the money be kept in his office; and that on the day of the trial when Judge Angeles ordered for the money to be produced, Jamisola, his staff who had the key, did not arrive on time, thus his failure to produce the money. Issue: WON Atty. Uys actions merit a sanction Ruling: The Bar Confidant recommended Atty. Uy be suspended for a month. The Supreme Court upheld this recommendation. The relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly fiduciary; it requires a high degree of fidelity and good faith. It is designed "to remove all such temptation and to prevent everything of that kind from being done for the protection of the client."[5]

Thus, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession." Furthermore, Rule 16.01 of the Code also states that "a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client." The Canons of Professional Ethics is even more explicit: "The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client. "Money of the client collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him."[6] In the present case, it is clear that respondent failed to promptly report and account for the P16,500 he had received from Norma Trajano on behalf of his client, Primitiva Del Rosario. Although the amount had been entrusted to respondent on December 14, 1998, his client revealed during the February 10, 1999 hearing that she had not yet received it. Worse, she did not even know where it was. Verily, the question is not necessarily whether the rights of the clients have been prejudiced, but whether the lawyer has adhered to the ethical standards of the bar.[11] In this case, respondent has not done so. Indeed, we agree with the following observation of the Office of the Bar Confidant: "Keeping the money in his possession without his client's knowledge only provided Atty. Uy the tempting opportunity to appropriate for himself the money belonging to his client. This situation should, at all times, be avoided by members of the bar. Like judges, lawyers must not only be clean; they must also appear clean. This way, the people's faith in the justice system would remain undisturbed."

Cruz vs. Jacinto Facts: Spouses Fernando C. Cruz and Amelia Manimbo Cruz seek the disbarment of Atty. Ernesto C. Jacinto. Atty. Ernesto Jacinto, lawyer of the couple in an unrelated case, requested the Cruz spouses for a loan in behalf of a certain Concepcion G. Padilla, who he claimed to be an old friend as she was allegedly in need of money. The loan requested was for PhP 285,000.00 payable after 100 days for PhP 360,000 to be secured by a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land located at Quezon City. The spouses, believing Atty. Jacinto was a good risk, agreed to lend him money. Upon maturity of the loan on 15 October 1990, the spouses demanded payment from Concepcion G. Padilla by going to the address given by the respondent but there proved to be no person by that name living therein. When the complainants verified the genuineness of the land title with Register of Deeds of Quezon City, it was certified by the said office to be a fake and spurious title. Further efforts to locate the debtor-mortgagor likewise proved futile. The complainants evidence included the sworn statements of Estrella Ermino-Palipada, the secretary of the Atty. Jacinto at the Neri Law Office, and Avegail Payos, a housemaid of Atty. Jacinto. Ms. Palipada stated that: 1. she was the one who prepared the Real Estate Mortgage Contract and the Receipt of the loan upon the instruction of the respondents; 2. she was a witness to the transaction and never once saw the person of Concepcion G. Padilla, the alleged mortgagor; and that 3. she was instructed by Atty. Jacinto to notarize the said contract by signing the name of one Atty. Ricardo Neri. Avegail Payos, the housemaid of the respondent, in turn stated that she was the one who simulated the signature of one Emmanuel Gimarino, the Deputy Register of Deeds of Quezon City upon the instruction of Atty. Jacinto to make it appear that the real estate mortgage was registered and the annotation to appear at the back of the TCT as an encumbrance.

In his version of the facts, Atty. Jacinto averred that while he indeed facilitated the loan agreement between the Cruz spouses and Concepcion G. Padilla, he had no idea that the latter would give a falsified Certificate of Title and use it to obtain a loan. He claimed that he himself was a victim under the circumstances. Issue: WON Atty. Jacinto, as per the IBPs recommendation, should be suspended for 6 mos. Ruling: The Court adopted the recommendation of the Board of Governors of the IBP. Undeniably, respondent represented complainants in the loan transaction. By his own admission, he was the one who negotiated with the borrower, his long-time friend and a former client. He acted not merely as an agent but as a lawyer of complaints, thus, the execution of the real estate mortgage contract, as well as its registration and annotation on the title were entrusted to him. In fact, respondent even received his share in the interest earnings which complainants realized from the transaction. His refusal to recognize any wrongdoing or carelessness by claiming that he is likewise a victim when it was shown that the title to the property, the registration of the real estate mortgage contract, and the annotation thereon were all feigned, will not at all exonerate him. As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. However, the measure of good faith which an attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with this client is a much higher standard than is required in business dealings where the parties trade at arms length. Business transactions between an attorney and his client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the law. Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to be sure that no advantage is taken by a lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on public policy for, by virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, no presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorneys favor. Further, his fidelity to the cause of his client requires him to be ever mindful of the responsibilities that should be expected of him.

Diaz vs. Kapunan Issue: WoN Atty. Kapunan is guilty of malpractice Facts: In 1917, Vicente Diaz and Secundino de Mendezona formed a partnership and entered into extensive business transactions in the Province of Leyte. The capital of the partnership was P380,000. Unfortunately, however, the business failed to prosper, with the result that on liquidation, it was found to have suffered a loss of P67,000. When Diaz and Mendezona came to settle up their affairs, they eventually formulated a document of sale and mortgage in which Mendezona recognized a debt in favor of Diaz in the sum of P80,000 and an additional sum of P10,000 owing to Diaz, laid upon the hacienda "Mapuyo," and to be paid within the term of one year. When the year had expired Mendezona was not to be found and his family was unable to meet the payment. There followed the usual proceedings for foreclosure and sale, which, after considerable delay, resulted in the hacienda's being offered for sale at public auction. At the time fixed for the sale, December 23, 1922, there appeared Vicente Diaz, accompanied by his lawyer Emilio Benitez, and Attorney Ruperto Kapunan. Luis Velarde, the deputy sheriff of Leyte, is authority for the statement that Kapunan told him that he, Kapunan, was ready to bid on the property up to P16,000 in order to assist the Mendezona family which was in financial straits. At any rate, the bidding was opened by Kapunan offering P12,000 for the property and with Diaz and Kapunan raising the bids until finally Diaz offered P12,500. There the bids stopped on account of Diaz and Kapunan entering into the agreement, of decisive importance, wherein Kapunan agreed to withdraw his bid in consideration of P1,000. Prior to the disbarment proceedings, Kapunan filed a motion to the court to allow him to retain P500 as his professional fees. Later on, after the filing of the disbarment proceedings, Kapunan filed another motion to return the money to Diaz. While the judge refused the motion, Kapunan nevertheless returned the money. During much of the time here mentioned, Kapunan was the attorney of Mendezona. Kapunan was given extensive authority by the letter of Mendezona of April 12, 1919. When Kapunan took part in the sale, it must be assumed that he was bidding in representation of his client and for the benefit of the client. 3 Ruling: Article 1459 of the Civil Code was held in force in the case of Hernandez vs. Villanueva ([1920], 40 Phil., 775). It provides that the following persons, naming them, "cannot take by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another." The provision contained in the last paragraph of said article is made to include lawyers, with respect to any property or rights involved in any litigation in which they may take party by virtue of their profession and office. This article has not been infringed by the respondent because he has not purchased property at a public or judicial auction and because his participation in the auction was in representation of his client. It has been held that an execution sale to the attorney of the defendant is not unlawful if made in good faith, with the consent of the client, and without any purpose of defrauding the latter's creditors. Kapunan appears to have been acting in good faith for his client, although adopting an irregular procedure, and although attempting to make tardy restitution of the money received by him. Our judgment is that Attorney Ruperto Kapunan shall stand reprimanded and that the complainant, Vicente Diaz, shall immediately return to the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Leyte the P500 received by Diaz from the clerk and receipted for by Diaz, and the clerk of court shall transmit the P500 to Secundino de Mendezona or, in case of his absence, to Miss Carmen de Mendezona.

Gonato vs. Adaza Facts: Sometime in February, 1993, complainants engaged theservices of respondent as their counsel in Civil Case No. 92-263 entitled Goking vs. Yacapin, et al." Complainants among others alleged that respondent demanded from them the sum of P15,980.00 to be used in paying the docket fee and other court fees in connection with the aforementioned case. Complainants asked for the official receipts evidencing the amount of court fees purportedly paid by respondent. However, only photocopies was provided to them. Dissatisfied, complainant personally went to respondent's law office at least three times, and asked for the original copies of thereceipts, but to no avail. It was discovered that the triplicate originalcopies of the receipts did not reflect the same amount contained on the photocopies of the receipts given by respondent. to conform to the amount paid by complainant which was P15,980.00. Complainants demanded the return of P15,980.00 but respondent refused to do so. Thus, in April, 1993, complainants urged respondent to withdraw as counsel due to loss of trust and confidence. Respondent on the other hand, after a careful study contest that the counterclaim is compulsory and not permissive, and so, applied instead the aforesaid sum of P15,690.00 to his acceptance and appearance fees. Issue: Whether or not respondent Atty. Adaza is guilty of malpractice and violation of trust. Held: Respondent Atty. Cesilo A. Adaza is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months from notice, with the warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that "a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession." The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the lawyer a high standard and appreciation of his duty to them. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the profession.

The facts and evidence obtaining in this case glaringly reveal respondent's failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Canon 16 which provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession." As a member of the Bar, respondent was and is expected to always live up to the standards embodied in said Code particularly Canons 15, 16, 17 and 20, for the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith. The Court believes that a longer period of suspension than that recommended by the IBP is called for under the circumstances.

Celaje vs. Soriano Facts: This is a disbarment case filed against Atty. Santiago C. Soriano (respondent) for gross misconduct. Andrea Balce Celaje alleged that Atty. Soriano asked for money to be put up as an injunction bond, which she found out later, however, to be unnecessary as the application for the writ was denied by the trial court. Atty. Soriano also asked for money on several occasions allegedly to be given to the judge handling their case, Judge Milagros Quijano, of the Regional Trial Court, Iriga City, Branch 36. When complainant approached Judge Quijano and asked whether what respondent was saying was true, Judge Quijano outrightly denied the allegations and advised her to file an administrative case against respondent. Atty. Soriano denied the charges against him and averred that the same were merely concocted by complainant to destroy his character. He also contended that it was Celaje who boasted that she is a professional fixer in administrative agencies as well as in the judiciary; and that Celaje promised to pay him large amounts of attorney's fees which Celaje however did not keep. The case was heard before the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline. During the hearing it was found that Celaje alleged to have paid respondent amounts totaling to P270,000. These amounts were undocumented and not acknowledged in writing. There were however some documents made in writing for the P14,800 intended for the injunction. Due credence must be given to Complainant's allegations especially over the amount of P14,800.00 intended for the injunction. Unfortunately, none of the P270,000.00 given by Complainant to Respondent was ever documented and therefore accuracy of the amounts could not be established and substantiated. What has been documented only pertains to the unpaid P5,800.00 intended for the injunction bond. However, it has been established that indeed an accumulated amount of P9,000.00 has been remitted and only the unpaid P5,800.00 remains unaccounted for. Issue: WoN Atty. Soriano should be disbarred 5 Ruling: The Supreme Court affirmed the IBP recommendation that Atty. Soriano be suspended for two years. The Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), particularly Canon 16 thereof, mandates that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. He shall account for all money or property collected or received from his client and shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. Respondent's failure to return the money to complainant upon demand gave rise to the presumption that he misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. It is a gross violation of general morality and of professional ethics and impairs public confidence in the legal profession which deserves punishment. As the Court has pronounced, when a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for a particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his client. The Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members of the Bar who are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Indeed, membership in the legal profession is a privilege. The attorney-client relationship is highly fiduciary in nature. As such, it requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity and disinterestedness on the part of the lawyer.

Penticostes vs. Ibanez Facts: Encarnacion Pascual, the sister-in-law of Atty. Prudencio Penticostes was sued for non-remittance of SSS payments. The complaint was assigned to Prosecutor Dioasdado Ibanez. During the investigation, Pascual gave P1,804.00 to Ibanez as payment of her SSS contribution. Ibanez however did not remit the amount to the system. A year later, Penticostes filed a complaint against Ibanez for failure to remit the contributions of his sister-in-law. Seven days later, Ibanez paid P1,804 to SSS in behalf of Pascual. In his defense, Ibanez claimed that his act of accommodating Pascuals request to pay to the SSS was not a professional misconduct but an act of Christian charity. He claimed that the complaint against him was moot and academic as he had already paid the amount. He lastly disclaimed liability, arguing that the acts were not done by him in his capacity as a lawyer but as a prosecutor. Issue: WoN Atty. Ibanez should be disciplined Ruling: The Supreme Court adopted the recommendation that he be reprimanded. IBPs

(t)he relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature...[thus] lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. The failure of respondent to immediately remit the amount to the SSS gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use. This is a gross violation of general morality as well as professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. Respondents claim that he may not be held liable because he committed such acts, not in his capacity as a private lawyer, but as a prosecutor is unavailing. Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks. As stated by the IBP Committee that drafted the Code, a lawyer does not shed his professional obligations upon assuming public office. In fact, his public office should make him more sensitive to his professional obligations because a lawyers disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the publics eye. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office.

While it may be true that Atty. Ibanez remitted the payment, it is clear that the same was made only after a complaint had been filed against him. Furthermore, the duties of prosecutor do not include receiving money from persons with official transactions with his office. This Court has repeatedly admonished lawyers that a high sense of morality, honesty and fair dealing is expected and required of a member of the bar. Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It is glaringly clear that respondents non-remittance for over one year of the funds coming from Encarnacion Pascual constitutes conduct in gross violation of the above canon. The belated payment of the same to the SSS does not excuse his misconduct. While Pascual may not strictly be considered a client of respondent, the rules relating to a lawyers handling of funds of a client is applicable. In Daroy v. Legaspi,[1] this court held that 6

Rubias vs. Batiller Facts: This case concerns a land dispute between Atty. Domingo Rubias and Isaias Batiller. Francisco Militante claimed ownership of a parcel of land in General Luna, Iloilo, which he caused to be surveyed. Before the war with Japan, Militante filed with the Court of First Instance an application for the registration of the title of the land. However, during the war, the record of the case was lost, so after the war Militante petitioned the court to reconstitute the record of the case. His application was dismissed. Pending his appeal, Militante sold to Atty. Rubias the land, which sale was recorded in the Register of Deeds in Iloilo. Atty. Rubias declared the land for tax purposes. On April 22, 1960, the plaintiff filed forcible Entry and Detainer case against Isaias Batiller to which the defendant Isaias Batiller filed his answer. The Municipal Court of Barotac Viejo after trial, decided the case on May 10, 1961 in favor of Batiller. On August 17, 1965, defendant's counsel manifested in open court that before any trial on the merit of the case could proceed he would file a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint which he did, alleging that plaintiff does not have cause of action against him because the property in dispute which he (plaintiff) allegedly bought from his father-in-law, Francisco Militante was the subject matter of LRC No. 695 filed in the CFI of Iloilo, which case was brought on appeal to this Court and docketed as CAG.R. No. 13497-R in which aforesaid case plaintiff was the counsel on record of his father-in-law, Francisco Militante. Issue: WoN the sale was valid Ruling: No. The sale is void from the beginning, thus the appeal by Atty. Rubias is dismissed.

judicial officers and employees, prosecuting attorneys, and lawyers; and (6) others especially disqualified by law. The reason thus given by Manresa in considering such prohibited acquisitions under Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil Code as merely voidable at the instance and option of the vendor and not void "that the Code does not recognize such nullity de pleno derecho" is no longer true and applicable to our own Philippine Civil Code which does recognize the absolute nullity of contracts "whose cause, object, or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy" or which are "expressly prohibited or declared void by law" and declares such contracts "inexistent and void from the beginning." Indeed, the nullity of such prohibited contracts is definite and permanent and cannot be cured by ratification. The public interest and public policy remain paramount and do not permit of compromise or ratification. In his aspect, the permanent disqualification of public and judicial officers and lawyers grounded on public policy differs from the first three cases of guardians, agents and administrators (Article 1491, Civil Code), as to whose transactions it had been opined that they may be "ratified" by means of and in "the form of a new contact, in which cases its validity shall be determined only by the circumstances at the time the execution of such new contract. The causes of nullity which have ceased to exist cannot impair the validity of the new contract. Thus, the object which was illegal at the time of the first contract, may have already become lawful at the time of the ratification or second contract; or the service which was impossible may have become possible; or the intention which could not be ascertained may have been clarified by the parties. The ratification or second contract would then be valid from its execution; however, it does not retroact to the date of the first contract."

Article 1491 of our Civil Code (like Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil Code) prohibits in its six paragraphs certain persons, by reason of the relation of trust or their peculiar control over the property, from acquiring such property in their trust or control either directly or indirectly and "even at a public or judicial auction," as follows: (1) guardians; (2) agents; (3) administrators; (4) public officers and employees; 7

Laig vs. Court of Appeals Facts: Galero obtained from the Bureau of Lands Homestead a parcel of land covering 219,949 square meters at Barrio Pinagtambangan, Labo, Camarines Norte, for which Original Certificate of Title No. 1097 was issued in Galero's name. On June 25, 1940, Galero sold the land to a certain Mario Escuta for P300.00. Escuta in turn, sold the same land to Florencio Caramoan in December, 1942. Later, however, Petre Galero, through proper court action, and with Atty. Benito K. Laig the deceased husband of herein petitioner Rosario Vda. de Laig as counsel recovered the land, the court having been convinced that its alienation violated Section 118 of the Public Land Act. On June 1, 1948, a deed of sale was executed by and between Petre Galero as vendor and Atty. Benito K. Laig as vendee, whereby the former sold to the latter the land in question with its improvements, for P1,500.00 plus attorney's fees due Atty. Laig for his legal services as counsel for Galero in the successful reconveyance case. Original Certificate of Title No. 1097 was delivered by Galero to Atty. Laig. Unfortunately, vendee Atty. Benito K. Laig failed to solicit the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as required by Section 118 of the Public Land Act, as amended. It was only after Atty. Laig's death in 1951 that his wife, herein petitioner Rosario, noticed the deficiency. On March 29, 1952,petitioner Vda. de Laig filed with the Bureau of Lands an affidavit together with copy of the deed of sale in her husband's favor. Said affidavit stated that she wanted to have the ownership over the land transferred to her husband's name. On August 14, 1952, the Bureau of Lands forwarded the said affidavit of Vda. de Laig, together with the deed of sale, to the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources with a recommendation that the said deed of sale be approved as the same does not violate any pertinent provisions of the Public Land Act or the corresponding rules and regulations thereunder promulgated. On the same day, the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, thru then Undersecretary Jose S. Camus, approved the deed of sale. Meanwhile however, Galero, after having acquired a duplicate copy of the title, sold the same to Carmen Verzo. Issues: Who between petitioner Vda. de Laig and respondent Carmen Verzo should be considered as the rightful owner of the land in question? Should the respondents register of deeds, Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, together with respondent Carmen Verzo, be held liable for damages for approving the sale of one and the same piece of land in favor of two different persons? Ruling: The sale made between Atty. Laig and Galero was held to be valid. Carmen Verzo was held to be a buyer in bad faith. Atty. Benito K. Laig, as Verzos boarder, must have mentioned to Carmen Verzo, his landlady, the land sold to him by Galero. By the same token, Carmen Verzo must have known such sale; because transactions of this sort in the rural areas do not escape the knowledge of persons living under one roof with a party to the document, more especially when there exists between such persons and party the peculiarly intimate relationship of landlady and boarder in a small town. Furthermore, her sister-inlaw was witness to the sale. Petre Galero was able to procure another copy of the duplicate of Original Certificate of Title No. 1097 covering the disputed land through the aid of Atty. Jose Lapak who is the son of the respondent register of deeds, Baldomero Lapak, under clearly dubious circumstances. For one, it was done without observing the required formalities of notice and hearing. Secondly, it was an over in a record-setting period of ONLY four days. Moreover, the expeditious disposal of the land in litigation by Petre Galero to Carmen Verzo was done immediately after the death of Atty. Benito Laig, and during the time that his wife Rosario Vda. de Laig, who was residing in faraway Manila, was seeking all legal means to have the title over the property transferred to her name. Such bad faith on the part of respondent Carmen Verzo and Baldomero Lapak is further underscored by the fact that Atty. Jose Lapak himself (a) was the 8

notary public before whom the deed of sale executed by and between Petre Galero and Carmen Verzo was acknowledged, and (b) was the same lawyer who assisted Carmen Verzo in writing the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, enclosing therewith an affidavit also sworn before said Atty. Lapak, praying that the deed of sale be approved. As heretofore indicated, the malicious participation of respondent register of deeds Baldomero Lapak and his son Atty. Lapak is evident. Knowing of the existence in his records of the original of OCT No. 1097, Baldomero Lapak effected the issuance of the second duplicate of OCT No. 1097 to Petre Galero in just four (4) days, dispensing with the requirements of notice and hearing to interested parties. For his malicious involvement, WE find Baldomero Lapak liable under the following provision of the Land Registration Act: Whoever fraudulently procures, or assists in fraudulently procuring or is privy to the fraudulent procurement of any certificate of title or owner's duplicate certificate, shall be fined not exceeding five thousand dollars (ten thousand pesos) or imprisoned not exceeding five years, or both, in the discretion of the court. WE also find Atty. Jose L. Lapak liable under the abovequoted Section 117 of Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act), for which he should be, not only prosecuted but also, disciplined as a member of the Bar.

Mananquil vs. Villegas Villegas was the counsel of record of Felix Leong, the administrator for the testate estate of Felomina Zerna. In 1963, Leong, as administrator of Zernas estate, entered into a lease contract with the partnership of Hijos de Villegas over several lots included in Zernas estate. The said lease contract was renewed several times. Villegas was both counsel of Leong and a partner in the partnership of HIJOS DE VILLEGAS. After Leongs death, this disbarment suit was filed by Mananquil, the appointed administrator for Leongs estate. He alleged that the lease contracts were made under iniquitous terms and conditions. Also, Mananquil alleged that Villegas should have first notified and secured the approval of the probate court in Zernas estate before the con tracts were renewed, Villegas being counsel of that estates administrator. In his defense, respondent claims that he was neither aware of, nor participated in, the execution of the original lease contract entered into between his client and his family partnership, which was then represented by his brother-in-law Marcelo Pastrano. And although he admits that he participated in the execution of subsequent renewals of the lease contract as managing partner of HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS, he argues that he acted in good faith considering that the heirs of Filomena Zerna consented or acquiesced to the terms and conditions stipulated in the original lease contract. Issues: Whether VILLEGAS should have first secured the probate courts approval regarding the lease Whether VILLEGAS should be disbarred. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that Villegas should be suspended for four months for his participation in the renewals of the lease agreement involving properties of the estate in favor of the partnership HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS, of which respondent is a member and in 1968 was appointed managing partner.

Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court, a judicial executor or administrator has the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration. He may, therefore, exercise acts of administration without special authority from the court having jurisdiction of the estate. For instance, it has long been settled that an administrator has the power to enter into lease contracts involving the properties of the estate even without prior judicial authority and approval. Thus, considering that administrator Leong was not required under the law and prevailing jurisprudence to seek prior authority from the probate court in order to validly lease real properties of the estate, Villegas, as counsel of Leong, cannot be taken to task for failing to notify the probate court of the various lease contracts involved herein and to secure its judicial approval thereto. There is no evidence as well to warrant disbarment, although Villegas should be suspended from practice of law because he participated in the renewals of the lease contracts involving properties of Zernas estate in favor of the partnership of Hijos de Villegas. Under Art. 1646 of the Civil Code, lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession are prohibited from leasing, either in person or through the mediation of another, the properties or things mentioned. Such act constituted gross misconduct, hence, suspension for four months. It cannot be denied that respondent himself had knowledge of and allowed the subsequent renewals of the lease contract. In fact, he actively participated in the lease contracts dated January 13, 1975 and December 4, 1978 by signing on behalf of the lessee HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS. Moreover, the claim that the heirs of Filomena Zerna have acquiesced and consented to the assailed lease contracts does not militate against respondent's liability under the rules of professional ethics. The prohibition referred to in Articles 1491 and 1646 of the new Civil Code, as far as lawyers are concerned, is intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client on account of his fiduciary and confidential association. 10

Ordonio vs. Eduarte Facts: This is a complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. Josephine Palogan-Eduarte. Antonia Ulibari filed with the RTC, Branch 22, Cabagan, Isabela, a case for annulment of a document against her children. The case was handled by Atty. Henedino Eduarte, herein respondent's husband, until his appointment as RTC judge on October 26, 1984. His wife, Atty. Josephine Palogan-Eduarte, took over. On August 22, 1985, decision was rendered in favor of Antonia Ulibari. Except for Dominga Velasco-Ordonio, one of the children of Antonia Ulibari and complainant in the instant case, the rest of the defendants did not appeal. On June 13, 1987, while said case was pending appeal in the Court of Appeals, Antonia Ulibari conveyed some parcels of her land to her children in the form of deeds of absolute sale, prepared and notarized by herein respondent. Significantly, on the same day, Antonia Ulibari also conveyed 20 hectares of land to herein respondent and her husband as their Attorney's fees for legal services rendered. All the titles of the lands subject of the deeds of absolute sale and the deed of conveyance however remained in the name of Antonia Ulibari. On April 4, 1988, Dominga Velasco-Ordonio filed this complaint for disbarment against herein respondent on the basis of an affidavit executed by her mother Antonia Ulibari on March 2, 1988 stating that affiant never conveyed the subject parcel of land to respondent as her attorney's fees and that the deeds of absolute sale executed in favor of her children were not known to her (and that she received no consideration therefor). On August 10, 1989, the Investigation Commissioner submitted a report finding the charges to be true and recommending a one-year suspension of the respondent from the practice of law. Issue: Whether Antonia Ulibari was defrauded into signing the Deed of Conveyance transferring to her lawyer (herein respondent) the subject parcel of land containing 298,420 square meters as the latter's attorney's fees Whether respondent violated any law in preparing and notarizing the deeds of absolute sale in making

it appear that there were considerations, when in truth there were none Ruling: It is clear from Antonia Ulibari's affidavit and deposition that she never conveyed the said land to her lawyer as attorney's fees. Respondent is hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, and, for having stated falsehoods in the four (4) deeds of absolute sale she prepared and notarized, in violation of the lawyer's oath and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent is also ordered suspended from the practice or law for a period of another six (6) months, resulting in a total period on one year. Even granting for the sake argument that Antonia Ulibari knowingly and voluntarily conveyed the subject property in favor of the respondent and her husband, the respondent, in causing the execution of the Deed of Conveyance during the pendency of the appeal of the case involving the said property, has violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code which prohibits lawyers from "acquiring by assignment property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession." In the case at bar, the property was already in actual litigation first in the lower court and then in the Court of Appeals. Whether the deed of conveyance was executed at the instance of the client driven by financial necessity or of the lawyers is of no moment. The act constitutes malpractice, even if the lawyer had purchased the property in litigation. The prohibition applies when the lawyer has not paid money for it and the property was merely assigned to him in consideration of legal services rendered at a time when the property is still the subject of a pending case. Respondent has manifestly violated that part of her oath as a lawyer that she shall not do any falsehood. Not only that. In preparing the documents which do not reflect the true transaction, respondent has likewise violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: Rule 10.01. A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall be mislead or allow the court to be mislead by any artifice. 11