CASES: ARTICLE 3, SEC.

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PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS v. SECRETARY OF LABOR 27 SCRA 41 (1916 FACTS
Petitioners pray for writs of certiorari and prohibition to restrain respondents, the Secretary of Labor, the Director of Labor Relations and the Registrar of Labor Organizations, from enforcing an order of cancellation of the registration certificate of the Social Security System Employees Association hereinafter referred to as the SSSEA which is affiliated to the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions hereinafter referred to as PAFLU as well as to annul all proceedings in connection with said cancellation and to prohibit respondents from enforcing Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875. Petitioners, likewise, pray for a writ of preliminary injunction pending the final determination of this case. In their answer, respondents traversed some allegations of fact and the legal conclusions made in the petition. Pending such resolution, or on December 16, the PAFLU, the SSSEA, Alfredo Fajardo "and all the officers and members" of the SSSEA commenced the present action, for the purpose stated at the beginning of this decision, upon the ground that Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875 violates their freedom of assembly and association, and is inconsistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; that it unduly delegates judicial power to an administrative agency; that said Section 23 should be deemed repealed by ILO-Convention No. 87; that respondents have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in promulgating, on November 19, 1963, its decision dated October 22, 1963, beyond the 30-day period provided in Section 23(c) of Republic Act No. 875; that "there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law"; that the decision complained of had not been approved by the Secretary of Labor; and that the cancellation of the SSSEA's certificate of registration would cause irreparable injury. To be registered, pursuant to Section 23(b) of Republic Act No. 875, a labor organization, association or union of workers must file with the Department of Labor the following documents: (1) A copy of the constitution and by-laws of the organization together with a list of all officers of the association, their addresses and the address of the principal office of the organization; (2) A sworn statement of all the officers of the said organization, association or union to the effect that they are not members of the Communist Party and that they are not members of any organization which teaches the overthrow of the Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional method; and (3) If the applicant organization has been in existence for one or more years, a copy of its last annual financial report.

DOCTRINE
The Constitution does not guarantee these rights and privileges, much less said personality, which are mere statutory creations, for the possession and exercise of which registration is required to protect both labor and the public against abuses, fraud, or impostors who pose as organizers, although not truly accredited agents of the union they purport to represent. Such requirement is a valid exercise of the police power, because the activities in which labor organizations, associations and union of workers are engaged affect public interest, which should be protected. Furthermore, the obligation to submit financial statements, as a condition for the non-cancellation of a certificate of registration, is a reasonable regulation for the benefit of the members of the organization, considering that the same generally solicits funds or membership, as well as oftentimes collects, on behalf of its members, huge amounts of money due to them or to the organization. prescribing the period within which a decision should be rendered are directory, not mandatory in nature in the sense that, a judgment promulgated after the expiration of said period is not null and void, although the officer who failed to comply with law may be dealt with administratively, in consequence of his delay unless the intention to the contrary is manifest. Justice Black: When a statute specifies the time at or within which an act is to be done by a public officer or body, it is generally held to be directory only as to the time, and not mandatory, unless time is of the essence of the thing to be done, or the language of the statute contains negative words, or shows that the designation of the time was intended as a limitation of power, authority or right. The theory to the effect that Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875 unduly curtails the freedom of assembly and association guaranteed in the Bill of Rights is devoid of factual basis. The registration prescribed in paragraph (b) of said section 1 is not a limitation to the right of assembly or association, which may be exercised with or withoutsaid registration. 2 The latter is merely a condition sine qua non for the acquisition of legal personality by labor organizations, associations or unions and the possession of the "rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations". The determination of the question whether the requirements of paragraph (b) have been met, or whether or not the requisite financial report or non-subversive affidavits have been filed within the period above stated, is not judicial power. Indeed, all officers of the government, including those in the executive department, are supposed, to act on the basis of facts, as they see the same. This is specially true as regards administrative agencies given by law the power to investigate and render decisions concerning details related to the execution of laws the enforcement of which is entrusted thereto.

OTHER CITED DOCTRINES B.S.P. v. Araos, we held that there is no incompatibility between Republic Act No. 875 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Upon the other hand, the cancellation of the SSSEA's registration certificate would not entail a dissolution of said association or its suspension. The existence of the SSSEA would not be affected by said cancellation, although its juridical personality and its statutory rights and privileges as distinguished from those conferred by the Constitution would be suspended thereby.
Footnotes: "Any labor organization, association or union of workers duly organized for the material, intellectual and moral well being of its members shall acquire legal personality and be entitled to all the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations within thirty days of filing with the office of the Secretary of Labor notice of its due organization and existence and the following documents, together with the amount of five pesos as registration fee.

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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AMADO V. HERNANDEZ G.R. No. L-6025 May 30, 1964 FACTS I. That on or about March 15, 1945, and for some time before the said date and continuously thereafter, until the present time, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and the place which they had chosen as the nerve center of all their rebellious activities in the different parts of the Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating and cooperating with each other, as well as with the thirtyone (31) defendants charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 19071, 14082, 14270, 14315 and 14344 of the Court of First Instance of Manila (decided May 11, 1951) and also with others whose whereabouts and identities are still unknown, the said accused and their other co-conspirators, being then high ranking officers and/or members of, or otherwise affiliated with the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), which is now actively engaged in an armed rebellion against the Government of the Philippines thru act theretofore committed and planned to be further committed in Manila and other places in the Philippines, and of which party the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan"(H.M.B.) otherwise or formerly known as the "Hukbalahaps" (Huks), unlawfully and did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously help, support, promote, maintain, cause, direct and/or command the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" (H.M.B.) or the "Hukbalahaps" (Huks) to rise publicly and take arms against the Republic of the Philippines, or otherwise participate in such armed public uprising, for the purpose of removing the territory of the Philippines from the allegiance to the government and laws thereof as in fact the said "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" or "Hukbalahaps" have risen publicly and taken arms to attain the said purpose by then and there making armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary and army detachments as well as innocent civilians, and as a necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, have then and there committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and planned destruction of private and public property to create and spread chaos, disorder, terror, and fear so as to facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, as. follows, to wit: (Enumeration of thirteen attacks on government forces or civilians by Huks on May 6, 1946, August 6, 1946, April 10, 1947, May 9, 1947, August 19, 1947, June, 1946, April 28, 1949, August 25, 1950, August 26, 1950, August 25, 1950, September 12, 1950, March 28, 1950 and March 29, 1950.) II. That during the period of time and under the same circumstances herein-above indicated the said accused in the above-entitled case, conspiring among themselves and with several others as aforesaid, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously organized, established, led and/or maintained the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO), formerly known as the Committee on Labor Organizations (CLO), with central offices in Manila and chapters and affiliated or associated labor unions and other "mass organizations" in different places in the Philippines, as an active agency, organ, and instrumentality of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.) and as such agency, organ, and instrumentality, to fully cooperate in, and synchronize its activities as the CLO thus organized, established, led and/or maintained by the herein accused and their co-conspirators, has in fact fully cooperated in and synchronized its activities with the activities of the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" (H.M.B.) and other organs, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), to thereby assure, facilitate, and effect the complete and permanent success of the above-mentioned armed rebellion against the Government of the Philippines. After trial the Court of First Instance found, as against appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the following: (1) that he is a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines and as such had aliases, namely, Victor or Soliman; (2) that he was furnished copies of "Titis", a Communist publication, as well as other publications of the Party; (3) that he held the position of President of the Congress of Labor Organizations; (4) that he had close connections with the Secretariat of the Communist Party and held continuous DOCTRINE /OTHER CITED DOCTRINES The advocacy of Communism or Communistic theory and principle is not to be considered as a criminal act of conspiracy unless transformed or converted into an advocacy of action. In the very nature of things, mere advocacy of a theory or principle is insufficient unless the communist advocates action, immediate and positive, the actual agreement to start an uprising or rebellion or an agreement forged to use force and violence in an uprising of the working class to overthrow constituted authority and seize the reins of Government itself. Unless action is actually advocated or intended or contemplated, the Communist is a mere theorist, merely holding belief in the supremacy of the proletariat a Communist does not yet advocate the seizing of the reins of Government by it. As a theorist the Communist is not yet actually considered as engaging in the criminal field subject to punishment. Only when the Communist advocates action and actual uprising, war or otherwise, does he become guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion. In this respect, the mere fact of his giving and rendering speeches favoring Communism would not make him guilty of conspiracy, because there was no evidence that the hearers of his speeches of propaganda then and there agreed to rise up in arms for the purpose of obtaining the overthrow of the democratic government as envisaged by the principles of Communism.

The appellant was a politician and a labor leader and it is not unreasonable to suspect that his labor activities especially in connection with the CLO and other trade unions, were impelled and fostered by the desire to secure the labor vote to support his political ambitions. It is doubtful whether his desire to foster the labor union of which he was the head was impelled by an actual desire to advance the cause of Communism, not merely to advance his political aspirations. OTHER CITED DOCTRINES Supreme Court of the United States: In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition of punishment on a status or on conduct can only be justified by reference to the relationship of that status or conduct to other concededly criminal activity (here advocacy of violent overthrow), that relationship must be sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept of personal guilt in order to withstand attack under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Membership, without more, in an organization engaged in illegal advocacy, it is now said, has not heretofore been recognized by this Court to be such a relationship. ... .

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communications with its leaders and its members; (5) that he furnished a mimeographing machine used by the Communist Party, as well as clothes and supplies for the military operations of the Huks; (6) that he had contacted well-known Communists coming to the Philippines and had gone abroad to the WFTU conference Brussels, Belgium as a delegate of the CLO, etc. Evidence was also received by the court that Hernandez made various speeches encouraging the people to join in the Huk movement in the provinces. The court also found that there was a close tie-up between the Communist Party and the Congress of Labor Organizations, of which Hernandez was the President, and that this Congress was organized by Hernandez in conjunction with other Huks, namely: Alfredo Saulo, Mariano Balgos, Guillermo Capadocia, etc. (1) The ultimate goal of the Communist Party is to overthrow the president government by force of aims and violence; thru armed revolution and replace it with the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat the Communist Party carries its program of armed overthrow of the present government by organizing the HMB and other forms of organization's such as the CLO, PKM, union organizations, and the professional and intellectual group; the CLO was organized by the Trade Union Division TUD of the Communist Party. (2) A good majority of the members of the Executive Committee and the Central Committee of the CLO were also top ranking officials of the Communist Party; activities undertaken by the TUD - the vital undertaking of the TUD is to see that the directives coming from the organizational bureau of the Communist Party can be discussed within the CLO especially the Executive Committee. And it is a fact that since a good majority of the members of the Executive Committee are party members, there is no time, there is no single time that those directives and decisions of the organizational department, thru the TUD are being objected to by the Executive Committee of the CLO. These directives refer to how the CLO will conduct its functions. The executive committee is under the chairmanship of accused Amado V. Hernandez. (3) The CLO played its role in the overall Communist program of armed overthrow of the present government and its replacement by the dictatorship of the proletariat by means of propaganda - by propagating the principles of Communism, by giving monetary aid, clothing, medicine and other forms of material help to the HMB. This role is manifested in the very constitution of the CLO itself which expounded the theory of classless society and the eradication of social classes (par. 5, Sec. 1, Art. 2,
page 18 of the CLO Constitution contained in the Fourth Annual Convention Souvenir Program of the CLO.

What must be met, then, is the argument that membership, even when accompanied by the elements of knowledge and specific intent, affords an insufficient quantum of participation in the organization's alleged criminal activity, that is, an insufficiently significant form of aid and encouragement to permit the imposition of criminal sanctions on that basis. It must indeed be recognized that a person who merely becomes a member of an illegal organization, by that "act" alone need be doing nothing more than signifying his assent to its purposes and activities on one hand, and providing, on the other, only the sort of moral encouragement which comes from the knowledge that others believe in what the organization is doing. It may indeed be argued that such assent and encouragement do fall short of the concrete, practical impetus given to a criminal enterprise which is lent for instance by a commitment on the part of the conspirator to act in furtherance of that enterprise. A member, as distinguished from a conspirator, may indicate his approval of a criminal enterprise by the very fact of his membership without thereby necessarily committing himself to further it by any act or course of conduct whatever. (Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 6 L. ed. 782)

PEOPLE v. SIMEON FERRER 48 SCRA 382 (G.R. Nos. Li32613-14, 27 December 1972) FACTS DOCTRINE OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against thefollowing: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The ... [N]o person shall hold or retain Gardner vs. Board of Public Works, 32 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Charter of the City of Los Angeles which provided:

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insult to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness. The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association. Issues: (1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law. (2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression. R.A. No. 1700 "AN ACT TO OUTLAW THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SIMILAR ASSOCIATIONS PENALIZING MEMBERSHIP THEREIN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.) the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The Acts focus is on the conduct not person. Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was acquired with the intent to further the goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof of a members direct participation. Why is membership punished. Membership renders aid and encouragement to the organization. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts. Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes having been made. The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise of Freedom of Expression and Association in this matter. Before the enactment of the statute and statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court further stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY.

or be eligible for any public office or employment in the service of the City of Los Angeles, in any office or department thereof, either elective or appointive, who has within five (5) years prior to the effective date of this section advised, advocated, or taught, or who may, after this section becomes effective, become a member of or affiliated with any group, society, association, organization or party which advises, advocates or teaches or has within said period of five (5) years advised, advocated, or taught the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States of America or of the State of California. In upholding the statute, the Court stressed the prospective application of the Act to the petitioner therein, thus: ... Immaterial here is any opinion we might have as to the charter provision insofar as it purported to apply restrospectively for a fiveyear period to its effective date. We assume that under the Federal Constitution the Charter Amendment is valid to the extent that it bars from the city's public service persons who, subsequently to its adoption in 1941, advise, advocate, or reach the violent overthrow of the Government or who are or become affiliated with any group doing so. The provisions operating thus prospectively were a reasonable regulation to protect the municipal service by establishing an employment qualification of loyalty to the State

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and the United States. The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be established: 1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization purpose is to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts. 2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts. ... Unlike the provisions of the charter and ordinance under which petitioners were removed, the statute in the Lovett case did not declare general and prospectively operative standards of qualification and eligibility for public employment. Rather, by its terms it prohibited any further payment of compensationto named individuals or employees. Under these circumstances, viewed against the legislative background, the statutewas held to have imposed penalties without judicial trial.

RIVER BRIDGE v. WARREN BRIDGE, 11 Pet. 420, 641 (U.S. 1837)

FACTS In 1650, the Legislature of Massachusetts granted to Harvard College the liberty and power to dispose of a ferry by lease or otherwise from Charlestown to Boston, passing over Charles River. The right to set up a ferry between these places had been given by the governor under the authority of the Court of Assistance, by an order dated November 9, 1636, to a particular individual, and was afterwards leased successively to others, they having the privilege of taking tolls regulated in the grant; and when, in 1650, the franchise of this ferry was granted to the college, the rights of the lessees in the same had expired. Under the grant, the college continued to hold the ferry by its lessees and receive the profits therefrom until 1785, when the Legislature of Massachusetts incorporated a company to build a bridge over Charles River where the ferry stood, granting them tolls, the company to pay to Harvard College two hundred pounds a year during the charter, for forty years, which was afterwards extended to seventy years, after which the bridge was to become the property of the Commonwealth. The bridge was built under this charter, and the corporation received the tolls allowed by the law, always keeping the DOCTRINE The object and the end of all Government is to promote the happiness and prosperity of the community by which it is established, and it can never be assumed that the Government intended to diminish its power of accomplishing the end for which it was created; and in a country like ours, free, active, and enterprising, continually advancing in numbers and wealth, new channels of communication are daily found necessary both for travel and trade, and are essential to the comfort, convenience, and prosperity of the people. A State ought never to be presumed to surrender this power because, like the taxing power, the whole community have an interest in preserving it undiminished, and, when a corporation alleges that a State has surrendered, for seventy years, its power of improvement and public accommodation in a great and important line of travel, along which a vast number of its citizens must daily pass, the community have a right to insist, in the language of this Court,"that its abandonment ought not to be presumed in a case in which the deliberate purpose of the State to abandon it does not appear." OTHER CITED DOCTRINES Lord Stowell, whose eminent qualifications as a judge entitle him to great reverence, on that occasion said: "A general presumption arising from these considerations is that government does not mean to divest itself of this universal attribute of sovereignty conferred for such purposes (to be used for peace, as well as war) unless it is so clearly and unequivocally expressed. In conjunction with this universal presumption must be taken also the wise policy of our own peculiar law, which interprets the grants of the Crown in this respect by other rules than those which are applicable in the construction of the grants of individuals. Against an individual, it is presumed that he meant to convey a benefit with the utmost liberality that his words will bear. It is indifferent to the public in which person an interest remains, whether in the grantor or the taker. With

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bridge in order and performing all that was enjoined on them to do. In 1828, the Legislature of Massachusetts incorporated another company for the erection of another bridge, the Warren Bridge, over Charles River from Charlestown to Boston, allowing the company to take tolls, commencing in Charlestown, near where the Charles River Bridge commenced, and terminating in Boston about eight hundred feet from the termination of the Charles River Bridge. The bridge was to become free after a few years, and has actually become free. Travelers who formerly passed over the Charles River Bridge from Charlestown square now pass over the Warren Bridge, and thus the Charles River Bridge Company are deprived of the tolls they would have otherwise received. The value of the franchise granted by the Act of 1783 is now entirely destroyed. The proprietors of the Charles River Bridge filed a bill in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts against the proprietors of the Warren Bridge, first for an injunction to prevent the erection of the bridge and afterwards for general relief, stating that the act of the Legislature of Massachusetts authorizing the building of the Warren Bridge was an act impairing the obligations of a contract, and therefore repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts dismissed the bill of the complainants, and the case was brought by writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States under the provisions of the 25th Section of the Judiciary Act of 1789. The judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts dismissing the bill of the plaintiffs in error was affirmed.

The continued existence of a Government would be of no great value if, by implications and presumptions, it was disarmed of the powers necessary to accomplish the ends of its creation, and the functions it was designed to perform transferred to the hands of privileged corporations. The rule of construction announced by the Court was not confined to the taxing power, nor is it so limited in the opinion delivered. On the contrary, it was distinctly placed on the ground that the interests of the community were concerned in preserving, undiminished, the power then in question; and whenever any power of the State is said to be surrendered or diminished, whether it be the taxing power or any other affecting the public interest, the same principle applies, and the rule of construction must be the same. No one will question that the interests of the great body of the people of the State would, in this instance, be affected by the surrender of this great line of travel to a single corporation, with the right to exact toll and exclude competition for seventy years. While the rights of private property are sacredly guarded, we must not forget that the community also have rights, and that the happiness and wellbeing of every citizen depends on their faithful preservation. When land is granted, the State can exercise no acts of ownership over it unless it be taken for public use, and the same rule applies to a grant for a bridge, a turnpike-road, or any other public improvement. It would assume a bold position to say that a subsequent Legislature may resume the ownership of a tract of land which had been granted at a preceding session, and yet the principle is the same in regard to vested rights under an act of incorporation. By granting a franchise, the State does not divest itself of any portion of its sovereignty, but to advance the public interests, one or more individuals are vested with a capacity to exercise the powers necessary to attain the desired object. In the case under consideration, the necessary powers to construct and keep up the Charles River Bridge were given to Thomas Russell and his associates. This did not withdraw the bridge from the action of the State sovereignty any more than it is withdrawn from land which it has granted. In both cases, the extent of the grant may become a question for judicial investigation and decision, but the rights granted are protected by the law. "Where the mind labors to discover the design of the Legislature, it seizes everything from which aid can be derived, and, in such a case, the title claims a degree of notice, and will have its due share of consideration. "

regard to the grant of the sovereign, it is far otherwise. It is not held by the sovereign himself, as private property, and no alienation shall be presumed except what is clearly and indisputably expressed."

The plaintiffs in error insisted on two grounds for the reversal of the judgment or decree of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. 1. That, by the grant of 1650, Harvard College was entitled, in perpetuity, to the right to keep a ferry between Charlestown and Boston; that the right was exclusive, and the legislature had no right to establish another ferry on the same line of travel, because it would infringe the rights of the college and those of the plaintiffs under the charter of 1785.

2. That the true construction of the acts of the Legislature of Massachusetts granting the privilege to build a bridge necessarily imported that the Legislature would not authorize another bridge, and especially a free one, by the side of the Charles River Bridge, so that the franchise which they held would be of no value, and that this grant of the franchise of the ferry to the college, and the grant of the right of pontage to the proprietors of the Charles River Bridge, is a contract which is impaired by the law authorizing the erection of the Warren Bridge. By the Court. It is very clear that, in the form in which this case comes before us, being a writ of error to a State court, the

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plaintiffs, in claiming under either of these rights, must place themselves on the ground of contract, and cannot support themselves upon the principles that the law divests vested rights. It is well settled by the decisions of this Court that a State law may be retrospective in its character, and may divest vested rights, and yet not violate the Constitution of the United States unless it also impairs the obligation of contract.

The grant remains in full force that the thing granted shall not be resumed or impaired by the grantor. the State impliedly contracts not to resume its grant or to do any act to the prejudice or destruction of its grant.

CITY OF MANILA V. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA 40 Phil 349, (G.R. No. L-14355 October 31, 1919)
FACTS The defendant, the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila [Chinese Community of Manila], answering the petition of the plaintiff, alleged that it was a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippine Islands, having for its purpose the benefit and general welfare of the Chinese Community of the City of Manila; that it was the owner of parcels one and two of the land described in paragraph 2 of the complaint; that it denied that it was either necessary or expedientthat the said parcels be expropriated for street purposes; that existing street and roads furnished ample means of communication for the public in the district covered by such proposed expropriation; that if the construction of the street or road should be considered a public necessity, other routes were available, which would fully satisfy the plaintiff's purposes, at much less expense and without disturbing the resting places of the dead; that it had a Torrens title for the lands in question; that the lands in question had been used by the defendant for cemetery purposes; that a great number of Chinese were buried in said cemetery; that if said expropriation be carried into effect, it would disturb the resting places of the dead, would require the expenditure of a large sum of money in the transfer or removal of the bodies to some other place or site and in the purchase of such new sites, would involve the destruction of existing monuments and the erection of new monuments in their stead, and would create irreparable loss and injury to the defendant and to all those persons owning and interested in the graves and monuments which would have to be destroyed; that the plaintiff was without right or authority to expropriate said cemetery or any part or portion thereof for street purposes; and that the expropriation, in fact, was not necessary as a public improvement. The theory of the plaintiff is, that once it has established the fact, under the law, that it has authority to expropriate land, it may expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the DOCTRINE OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

"the necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain are questions essentially political and not judicial," It is well settled that although the legislature must necessarily determine in the first instance whether the use for which they (municipalities, etc.) attempt to exercise the power is a public one or not, their (municipalities, etc.) determination is not final, but is subject to correction by the courts, who may undoubtedly declare the statute unconstitutional, if it shall clearly appear that the use for which it is proposed to authorize the taking of private property is in reality not public but private." what is a public use is a legislative question But, as long as there is a constitutional or statutory provision denying the right to take land for any use other than a public use, it occurs to us that the question whether any particular use is a public one or not is ultimately, at least, a judicial question.

But when the statute does not designate the property to be taken nor how may be taken, then the necessity of takingparticular property is a question for the courts. Where the application to condemn or appropriate is made directly to the court, the question (of necessity) should be raised and decided in limene. (Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs.
Toledo, Ry, etc., Co. (72 Ohio St., 368 [106 Am. St. rep., 622, 628)

The taking of private property for any use which is not required by the necessities or convenience of the inhabitants of the state, is an unreasonable exercise of the right of eminent domain, and beyond the power of the legislature to delegate. (Bennett vs. Marion, 106 Iowa, 628, 633;
Wilson vs. Pittsburg, etc. Co., 222 Pa. St., 541, 545; Greasy, etc. Co. vs. Ely, etc. Co., 132 Ky., 692, 697.)

It was then held that land already devoted to a public use cannot be taken by the public for another use which is inconsistent with the first, without special authority from the Legislature, or authority granted by necessary and

The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the land.(Morrison vs. Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co.,

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advisible purpose of purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.

reasonable implication. The court said that it is unquestionable that the Legislature has the power to authorize the taking of land already applied to one public use and devote it to another. When the power is granted to municipal or private corporations in express words, no question can arise.

166 Ind., 511; Stearns vs. Barre, 73 Vt., 281; Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry. etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368.)

LEONCIO SEA Y MEDINA vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY and THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT G.R. No. 15915 September 7, 1921 FACTS This is an application for the registration of a parcel of land situated in the barrio of Palsabagon, municipality of Pagbilao, Province of Tayabas, containing three lots of which lot No. 2 is the only one in question. Said lot No. 2 is composed of 35, 327 square meters, and is occupied by the Manila Railroad Company, the same being within civil reservation No. 3 of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas (G. L. R. O. reservation Case No. 242). The lower court denied the registration of said lot upon the ground that the application for registration had not been presented within the time required by law in said civil reservation proceedings.It appears that by Executive Order No. 112, dated December 3, 1914, the Governor-General, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 648, reserved "for railroad purposes" a strip of land 30 meters wide and more than 80 kilometers long, from the municipality of Lucena to the municipality of Caluag, Province of Tayabas. Lot No. 2 in question is included within said reservation. Upon being duly notified by the Governor-General of said Executive Order, the Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas, pursuant to the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 648, on the 21st day of December, 1914, issued the following notice to all the parties concerned: Whereas under the provisions of Act No. 648 of the Philippine Commission, by executive order there have been reserved from settlement or public sale and for railroad purposes the following described lands the public domain the use of which has not otherwise been directed by law. Notice is hereby given that claims for all private lands, buildings, and interests therein, within the limits aforesaid, must be presented in said court for registration under 'The Land Registration Act' within six calendar months from the date of this notice, and that all, lands, buildings and interests therein, within the limits aforesaid not so presented within the time herein limited will be conclusively adjudged to be public lands, and all claims on the part of private individuals for such lands, buildings, or an interest therein not so presented will be forever barred. The lower court denied said petition upon the ground that, the same not having been presented within the six months' period provided by Act No. 627, the land in question was conclusively presumed to be public land. The appellant makes two principal assignments of error: That the lower court erred (1) in not finding that Executive Order No. 112 was void DOCTRINE A historical research discloses the meaning of the term 'public use' to be one of constant growth. As society advances, it demands upon the individual increase and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may be devoted." It cannot be denied that a railroad is a public necessity in this country a factor indispensable to its economic development and material welfare. It is in recognition of this fact that railroad corporations are empowered by law to exercise the right of eminent domain. therefore of the opinion that a railroad is a public use, for "whatever is beneficially employed for the community is a public use." OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

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and of no effect; and (2) in finding that the right of the petitioner had
prescribed.

J. M. TUASON & CO., INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-18128 December 26, 1961 FACTS The Court of First Instance, after the appellate court's decision became final and upon return of the records in due course, issued writ of execution of the judgment against Rosete and Dizon, as prayed for by the landowner Tuason & Company. the Company claiming mainly that the Republic Act was unconstitutional, null and void, as legislation aimed at depriving it of its property for the benefit of squatters and occupants, even if the property had been actually subdivided, and its lots were being sold to the public; and that respondent officers threatened to enforce said law by initiating expropriation proceedings. At petitioner's request, Judge Hermogenes Caluag of the Quezon City Court of First Instance (to whom the prohibition case was assigned) issued an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction on November 18, 1960, upon the filing of a bond of P20,000. The Court of Appeals (Second Division) refused to lift the preliminary injunction; on the contrary, on February 26, upon motion of one of the respondents, the Land Tenure Administration, it clarified the previous writ of preliminary injunction. The Land Tenure Administration avers that the issuance of the injunction in the prohibition case (Q-5527), the denial of the motion to dismiss the case, the refusal to dissolve the injunction, and the refusal to have the complaint for expropriation docketed were all in abuse of discretion and excess of jurisdiction; that furthermore, venue was improperly laid, because an action for prohibition is personal in character, and neither petitioner nor any of the respondents in said prohibition case were domiciled in Quezon City. Petitioner Land Tenure Administration, therefore, prayed that Judge Caluag be ordered by this Court to refrain from proceeding with the prohibition case, from enforcing the writ of preliminary injunction issued therein, from issuing orders of demolition of the tenant's houses, and to allow the expropriation case to be docketed and regularly proceeded with. DOCTRINE The Bill of Rights, in requiring that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation," and Article XIII, section 4 in prescribing that "Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals," prohibit any disturbance of proprietary rights without coetaneous payment of just indemnity. Hence, the mere filing of the condemnation proceedings for the benefit of tenants cannot, by itself alone, lawfully suspend the condemnee's dominical rights, whether of possession, enjoyment, or disposition. And this is especially the case where final and executory judgments of ejectment have been obtained against the occupants of the property. OTHER CITED DOCTRINES Cochiong vs. Dinglasan, 79 Phil. 125, this Court quoted with approval from 28 Am. Jur. 369-371 the rule that It is recognized, however, that an injunction will lie to restrain the threatened enforcement of an invalid law where the lawful use and enjoyment of private property will be injuriously affected by its enforcement ...,

the issue of constitutionality would be like a prejudicial question

to the expropriation, as it would be a waste of time and effort to appoint evaluation commissioners and debate the market value of the property sought to be condemned if it turned out that the condemnation was illegal. It needs no argument to show that by restraining the land owner from enforcing even final judgments in his favor to recover possession of his property, as well as from disposing of it to persons of his choice, he is deprived of the substance of ownership, and his title is left as an empty shell. The land owner would then be deprived of those attributes of ownership that give it value, and his property is virtually taken from him without compensation and in violation of the Constitution, particularly in view of the fact that R.A. 2616 (unlike previous Acts of similar character) does not even provide for a deposit of the current rentals by the tenants during the pendency of the proceedings (Cf. R.A. No. 1126, section 5). The Bill of Rights, in requiring that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation," and Article XIII, section 4 in prescribing that "Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals," prohibit any disturbance of proprietary rights without coetaneous payment of just indemnity. Hence, the mere filing of the condemnation proceedings for the benefit of tenants cannot, by itself alone, lawfully suspend the condemnee's dominical rights, whether of possession, enjoyment, or disposition. EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE v. DULAY 149 SCRA 305, 311 312 (1987)

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FACTS The question raised in this petition is whether or not Presidential Decrees Numbered 76, 464, 794 and 1533 have repealed and superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court, such that in determining the just compensation of property in an expropriation case, the only basis should be its market value as declared by the owner or as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. On February 17, 1981, the respondent judge issued the order of condemnation declaring the petitioner as having the lawful right to take the properties sought to be condemned, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the filing of the complaint. The respondent judge also issued a second order, subject of this petition, appointing certain persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated. The only issue raised in this petition is whether or not Sections 5 to 8, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court had been repealed or deemed amended by P.D. No. 1533 insofar as the appointment of commissioners to determine the just compensation is concerned. Stated in another way, is the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in P.D. No. 1533 valid and constitutional? The petitioner maintains that the respondent judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and in setting the commissioner's report for hearing because under P.D. No. 1533, which is the applicable law herein, the basis of just compensation shall be the fair and current market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. Therefore, there is no more need to appoint commissioners as prescribed by Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court and for said commissioners to consider other highly variable factors in order to determine just compensation. The petitioner further maintains that P.D. No. 1533 has vested on the assessors and the property owners themselves the power or duty to fix the market value of the properties and that said property owners are given the full opportunity to be heard before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. Thus, the vesting on the assessor or the property owner of the right to determine the just compensation in expropriation proceedings, with appropriate procedure for appeal to higher administrative boards, is
valid and constitutional.

DOCTRINE in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property, following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. . However, the strict application of the decrees during the proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only to choose between the valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could substitute for the judge insofar as the determination of constitutional just compensation is concerned. [Court ruled that under the conceded facts,] there should be a recognition that the law as it stands must be applied; that the decree having spoken so clearly and unequivocally calls for obedience; and that on a matter where the applicable law speaks in no uncertain language, the Court has no choice except to yield to its command. We further stated that "the courts should recognize that the rule introduced by P.D. No. 76 and reiterated in subsequent decrees does not upset the established concepts of justice or the constitutional provision on just compensation for, precisely, the owner is allowed to make his own valuation of his property." Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered. The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.

OTHER CITED DOCTRINES .M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413, the Court, speaking thru now Chief Justice Fernando, reiterated the 'well-settled (rule) that just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its taking. Anything beyond that is more and anything short of that is less, than just compensation. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity."

GUIDO v. RURAL PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION 84 Phil. 847, 47 Off. Gaz. 1848 G.R. No. L-2089, FACTS This a petition for prohibition to prevent the Rural Progress DOCTRINE Hand in hand with the announced principle, herein invoked, that "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic OTHER CITED DOCTRINES The expropriation proceedings at bar have been instituted for the economic relief of a few families devoid of any

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Administration and Judge Oscar Castelo of the Court of First Instance of Rizal from proceeding with the expropriation of the petitioner Justa G. Guido's land, two adjoining lots, part commercial, with a combined area of 22,655 square meters, situated in Maypajo, Caloocan, Rizal, just outside the north Manila boundary, on the main street running from this city to the north. Four grounds are adduced in support of the petition, to wit: (1) That the respondent RPA (Rural Progress Administration) acted without jurisdiction or corporate power in filling the expropriation complaint and has no authority to negotiate with the RFC a loan of P100,000 to be used as part payment of the value of the land. (2) That the land sought to be expropriated is commercial and therefore excluded within the purview of the provisions of Act 539. (3) That majority of the tenants have entered with the petitioner valid contracts for lease, or option to buy at an agreed price, and expropriation would impair those existing obligation of contract. (4) That respondent Judge erred in fixing the provisional value of the land at P118,780 only and in ordering its delivery to the respondent RPA.

security of all the people should be the concern of the state," is a declaration, with which the former should be reconciled, that "the Philippines is a Republican state" created to secure to the Filipino people "the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy." Democracy, as a way of life enshrined in the Constitution, embraces as its necessary components freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, and freedom in the pursuit of happiness. Along with these freedoms are included economic freedom and freedom of enterprise within reasonable bounds and under proper control. In paving the way for the breaking up of existing large estates, trust in perpetuity, feudalism, and their concomitant evils, the Constitution did not propose to destroy or undermine the property right or to advocate equal distribution of wealth or to authorize of what is in excess of one's personal needs and the giving of it to another. Evincing much concern for the protection of property, the Constitution distinctly recognize the preferred position which real estate has occupied in law for ages. Property is bound up with every aspects of social life in a democracy as democracy is conceived in the Constitution. The Constitution owned in reasonable quantities and used legitimately, plays in the stimulation to economic effort and the formation and growth of a social middle class that is said to be the bulwark of democracy and the backbone of every progressive and happy country. In a broad sense, expropriation of large estates, trusts in perpetuity, and land that embraces a whole town, or a large section of a town or city, bears direct relation to the public welfare. The size of the land expropriated, the large number of people benefited, and the extent of social and economic reform secured by the condemnation, clothes the expropriation with public interest and public use. The expropriation in such cases tends to abolish economic slavery, feudalistic practices, and other evils inimical to community prosperity and contentment and public peace and order. No fixed line of demarcation between what taking is for public use and what is not can be made; each case has to be judge according to its peculiar circumstances. It suffices to say for the purpose of this decision that the case under consideration is far wanting in those elements which make for public convenience or public use. It is patterned upon an ideology far removed from that consecrated in our system of government and embraced by the majority of the citizens of this country.

consideration of public health, public peace and order, or other public advantage. What is proposed to be done is to take plaintiff's property, which for all we know she acquired by sweat and sacrifice for her and her family's security, and sell it at cost to a few lessees who refuse to pay the stipulated rent or leave the premises. To make the analogy closer, we find no reason why the Rural Progress Administration could not take by condemnation an urban lot containing an area of 1,000 or 2,000 square meters for subdivision into tiny lots for resale to its occupants or those who want to build thereon.

NARRA v. FRANCISCO 109 Phil 764, 768 (1960)

FACTS Appeal on points of law from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija (Civil Case No. 2006) dismissing condemnation proceedings instituted by the National Resettlement and Rehabilition Administration (NARRA). It appears from the record that on June 11, 1955, Republic Act No. DOCTRINE The power to expropriate, under both Republic Act 1266 and Commonwealth Act No. 539, is predicated upon the provisions of Article XIII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution providing: Sec. 4. The Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to OTHER CITED DOCTRINES Guido and Baylosis cases, has already ruled that, under the quoted constitutional provision, the government may only expropriate landed estate with extensive areas, and that once a landed estate has been broken up and divided into parcels of reasonable extent, the resulting portions are no longer subject to further expropriation, the existence

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1266 became operative. This law provided as follows:

SECTION 1. The National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) is hereby authorized to expropriate within six months from the approval of this Act, the Hacienda del Rosario situated at Valdefuente, Cabanatuan City, and pay the price of the land and cost of such expropriation out of its funds. The said hacienda shall be subdivided into lots not bigger than one hectare each and resold to bona-fide occupants thereof at such price is may be determined by the Board of Directors of the NARRA which shall include the price of the land and the cost of such expropriation, administration, subdivision, resale and interests. The purchase price of the resale to bona-fide tenants and lessees shall be payable in installments within the period of not more than ten years. SEC. 2. This shall take effect upon its approval.

individuals"; hence, the rulings of this Court as to the limits of the condemning power in expropriation proceedings instituted persuant to Commonwealth Act No. 539 are applicable to the case at bar.

of tenancy troubles therein notwithstanding.

In accordance with the statute, the NARRA instituted these eminent domain proceedings in the Court below against the heirs of the original owner of the Hacienda (the late Judge Simplicio del Rosario, who died in 1947) and their subsequent vendees. The lands involved totalled 669 hectares, more or less; but during the pendency of the proceedings, the heirs Dolores R. Concepcion Teresa R. de Francisco and Paz R. de Tubangui agreed to the expropriation of their respective holding; while defendant spouses Carmen R. de Ciocon and Jaime Ciocon also agreed to the expropriation of their corresponding share, except a portion of 85.0414 hectares, which said spouses were occupying and wished to reserve for their seven (7) children and sixteen (16) grandchildren. As a result, all the defendants mentioned voluntarily ceded to the NARRA about 3891.7583 hectares. The NARRA appealed from the decision, contending that the authorities cited by the Court below were not applicable because they involved condemnation proceedings under Commonwealth Act No. 539; that in view of the terms of the Republic Act 1266, "the Court can not inquire into nor review the action of the Legislature in designating the paricular property it has authorizes the NARRA to expropriate."

(same rulings viz Guido and Baylosis cases)

City of Manila vs. Chinese Community , 40 Phil., 350, wherein it was stated that where the legislature has directly determined the necessity of appropriating private property for a particular public improvement at a specified location, the utility, necessity and expediency of the improvement and the suitable of the location are questions for the legislature to determine and the courts have no power to interfere and substitute their own discretion. The doctrine thus invoked is entirely inappropriate, for the question now before the Court is not the necessity of the expropriation but the power or authority to expropriate under Article XIII, Sec. 4, of the Constitution. The validity of the statute directing the expropriation is certainly a judicial question.

PEOPLE v. JUAN F. FAJARDO, Et al, G.R. No. L-12172 August 29, 1958
FACTS It appears that on August 15, 1950, during the incumbency of defendant-appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed the ordinance in question providing as follows:
SECTION 1. Any person or persons who will construct or repair a building should, before constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor. SEC. 2. A fee of not less than P2.00 should be charged for each building permit and P1.00 for each repair permit issued. SEC. 3. PENALTY Any violation of the provisions of the above, this ordinance, shall make the violation liable to pay a fine of not less than P25 nor more than P50 or imprisonment of not less than 12 days nor more than 24 days or both, at the discretion of the court. If said building destroys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be removed at the expense of the owner of the building or house. SEC. 4. EFFECTIVITY This ordinance shall take effect on its approval. (Orig. Recs., P. 3)

DOCTRINE We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents. But while property may be regulated in the interest of the general welfare, and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures offensive to the sight. the power of the municipal council to require the issuance of building permits rests upon its first establishing fire limits in populous parts of the town and prescribing the kinds of buildings that may be constructed or repaired within them.

OTHER CITED DOCTRINES (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580), the State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. Zoning which admittedly limits property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it cannot be

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Four years later, after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and his son in-law, appellant Babilonia, filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek (Exh. D). On January 16, 1954, the request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza (Exh. E). On January 18, 1954, defendants reiterated their request for a building permit (Exh. 3), but again the request was turned down by the mayor. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property.On February 26, 1954, appellants were charged before and convicted by the justice of the peace court of Baao, Camarines Sur, for violation of the ordinance in question. Defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance, which affirmed the conviction, and sentenced appellants to pay a fine of P35 each and the costs, as well as to demolish the building in question because it destroys the view of the public plaza of Baao, in that "it hinders the view of travelers from the National Highway to the said public plaza." From this decision, the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter forwarded the records to us because the appeal attacks the constitutionality of
the ordinance in question.

..the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation. Municipal Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, was beyond the authority of said municipality to enact, and is therefore null and void.

said to set aside such property to a use but constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation. Use of property is an element of ownership therein. Regardless of the opinion of zealots that property may properly, by zoning, be utterly destroyed without compensation, such principle finds no support in the genius of our government nor in the principles of justice as we known them. Such a doctrine shocks the sense of justice. If it be of public benefit that property remain open and unused, then certainly the public, and not the private individuals, should bear the cost of reasonable compensation for such property under the rules of law governing the condemnation of private property for public use. (Tews vs. Woolhiser (1933) 352 I11. 212, 185 N.E. 827) An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property. The only substantial difference, in such case, between restriction and actual taking, is that the restriction leaves the owner subject to the burden of payment of taxation, while outright confiscation would relieve him of that burden. (Arverne Bay Constr.
Co.vs . Thatcher (N.Y.) 117 ALR. 1110, 1116).

FELIPE R. HIPOLITO v. THE CITY OF MANILA G.R. No. L-3887 August 21, 1950 FACTS DOCTRINE adopted a General Plan, applies only to "residential buildings subsidized in whole or in part by public funds or assistance." The residential building which petitioner intends to construct may not be so classified, because he asserts, without contradiction, that his proposed construction will be financed wholly by himself, not with public funds or assistance. Therefore, the excuse given by respondent is not valid. OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

This is an action to compel the respondents to issue a building permit in favor of Felipe R. Hipolito. The petitioner and his wife are the registered owners of a parcel of land situated at the corner of Invernes and Renaissance Streets, Santa Ana, Manila. On March 22, 1950, petitioner applied to the respondent Alejo Aquino, as City Engineer, for permission to erect a strong material residential building on his above-mentioned lot. For more than forty days, the respondent took no action. Wherefore, petitioner wrote him a letter manifesting his readiness to pay the fee and to comply with existing ordinances governing the issuance of building permits. The petitioner, who is a lawyer, replied that the said Commission and its plans could not legally affect the construction of residential buildings, like his own, that are not subsidized in whole or in part with public funds, citing section 6 of Executive Order No. 98, s. 1946, which partly reads:

The City has not expropriated the strip of petitioner's land affected by the proposed widening of Invernes Street, and inasmuch as there is no legislative authority to establish a building line, the denial of this permit would amount to the taking of private property for public use under the power of eminent domain without following the procedure prescribed for the exercise of such power. (

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SEC. 6. Legal status of general plans. Whenever the Commission shall have adopted a General Plan, amendment, extension or addition thereto of any urban area or any part thereof, then and thenceforth no street, park or other public way, ground place, or space; no public building or structure, including residential buildings subsidized in whole or part by public funds or assistance; . . . shall be constructed or authorized in such urban area until and unless the location and extent thereof conform to said general plan or have been submitted and approved by the Commission, . . . .

The defense to this petition is planted on the opinion that unless Hipolito's building conforms to the new street line fixed by the National Urban Planning Commission, the building permit will not be issued. It is not claimed that the City of Manila has expropriated, or desires to expropriate, that portion of petitioner's lot between the existing street line and the new street line adopted by the National Urban Planning Commission. No law or ordinance is cited requiring private landowners in Manila to conform to the new street line marked by the National Urban Planning Commission, except the section above quoted. And the question relates only to its interpretation.

REPUBLIC v. VDA. DE CASTILLVI 58 SCRA 336, 352 (August 15, 1974)

FACTS Plaintiff-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines, filed, on June 26, 1959, a complaint for eminent domain against defendant-appellee, Carmen M. Vda. de Castellvi, judicial administratrix of the estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi (hereinafter referred to as Castellvi), over a parcel of land situated in the barrio of San Jose, Floridablanca, Pampanga. In its complaint, the Republic alleged, among other things, that the fair market value of the above-mentioned lands, according to the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per hectare, or a total market value of P259,669.10; and prayed, that the provisional value of the lands be fixed at P259.669.10, that the court authorizes plaintiff to take immediate possession of the lands upon deposit of that amount with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga; that the court appoints three commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be expropriated, and that the court issues thereafter a final order of condemnation. 1. In support of the assigned error that the lower court erred in holding that the "taking" of the properties under expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case, the Republic argues that the "taking" should be reckoned from the year 1947 when by virtue of a special lease agreement between the Republic and appellee Castellvi, the former was granted the "right and privilege" to buy the property should the lessor wish to terminate the lease, and that in the event of such sale, it was stipulated that the fair market value should be as of the time of occupancy; and that the permanent improvements amounting to more that half a million pesos constructed during a period of twelve years on the land, subject of expropriation, were indicative of an agreed pattern of permanency and stability of occupancy by the Philippine Air Force in the interest of DOCTRINE The first (time) occupied the same pursuant to the contract of lease, and that the just compensation to be paid for the property should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year. the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. It must be considered, however, that the amount fixed as the provisional value of the lands that are being expropriated does not necessarily represent the true and correct value of the land. The value is only "provisional" or "tentative", to serve as the basis for the immediate occupancy of the property being expropriated by the condemnor. The important factor in expropriation proceeding is that the owner is awarded the just compensation for his property. In eminent domain proceedings, in order that evidence as to the sale price of other lands may be admitted in evidence to prove the fair market value of the land sought to be expropriated, the lands must, among other things, be shown to be similar. OTHER CITED DOCTRINES So many and varied are the circumstances to be taken into account in determining the value of property condemned for public purposes, that it is practically impossible to formulate a rule to govern its appraisement in all cases. Exceptional circumstances will modify the most carefully guarded rule, but, as a general thing, we should say that the compensation of the owner is to be estimated by reference to the use for which the property is suitable, having regard to the existing business or wants of the community, or such as may be reasonably expected in the immediate future. (Miss. and Rum River Boom Co. vs. Patterson, 98 U.S., 403).

Any lawyer with a modicum of ability handling this expropriation case would have right away though [sic] of digging up documents diligently showing conveyances of lands near or around the parcels of land sought to be expropriated in this case in the offices that would have naturally come to his mind such as the offices mentioned above, and had counsel for the movant really exercised the reasonable diligence required by the Rule' undoubtedly they would have been able to find these documents and/or caused the issuance of subpoena duces

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national Security. 7 Appellee Castellvi, on the other hand, maintains that the "taking" of property under the power of eminent domain requires two essential elements, to wit: (1) entrance and occupation by condemn or upon the private property for more than a momentary or limited period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. This appellee argues that in the instant case the first element is wanting, for the contract of lease relied upon provides for a lease from year to year; that the second element is also wanting, because the Republic was paying the lessor Castellvi a monthly rental of P445.58; and that the contract of lease does not grant the Republic the "right and privilege" to buy the premises "at the value at the time of occupancy."

tecum. ...

PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE v. CITY OF ZAMBOANGA 22 SCRA 1334, 1341 (1968)G.R. No. L-24440 March 28, 1968
FACTS Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province. On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Sec. 50 of the Act also provided that Buildings and properties which the province shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General. The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and some buildings constructed thereon, located in the City of Zamboanga and covered individually by Torrens certificates of title in the name of Zamboanga Province. Pursuant thereto, the Auditor General, on January 11, 1955, apportioned the assets and obligations of the defunct Province of Zamboanga as follows: 54.39% for Zamboanga del Norte and 45.61% for Zamboanga del Sur. Zamboanga del Norte therefore became entitled to 54.39% of P1,294,244.00, the total value of the lots and buildings in question, or P704,220.05 payable by Zamboanga City. On March 17, 1959, the Executive Secretary, by order of the President, issued a ruling 4 holding that Zamboanga del Norte had a vested right as owner (should be co-owner pro-indiviso) of the properties mentioned in Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39, and is entitled to the price thereof, payable by Zamboanga City. This ruling
revoked the previous Cabinet Resolution of July 13, 1951 conveying all the said 50 lots and buildings thereon to Zamboanga City for P1.00, effective as of 1945, when the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog.

DOCTRINE For, the matter involved here is the extent of legislative control over the properties of a municipal corporation, of which a province is one. The principle itself is simple: If the property is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public and governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just compensation. 6 Even the capital site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school sites will be considered patrimonial for they are not for public use. They would fall under the phrase "public works for public service" for it has been held that under theejusdem generis rule, such public works must be for free and indiscriminate use by anyone to be considered public, it is enough that the property be held and, devoted for governmental purposes like local administration, public education, public health, etc. that provincial funds were used, still the buildings constitute mere accessories to the lands, which are public in nature, and so, they follow the nature of said lands, i.e., public. buildings, though located in the city, will not be for the exclusive use and benefit of city residents for they could be availed of also by the provincial residents. The province then and its successors-in-interest are not really deprived of the benefits thereof. this Court is not inclined to hold that municipal property held and devoted to public service is in the same category as ordinary private property. The consequences are dire. As ordinary private properties, they can be levied upon and attached. They can even be acquired thru adverse possession all these to the detriment of the local community. Lastly, the classification of properties other than those for public use in the municipalities as patrimonial under

OTHER CITED DOCTRINES Municipality of Catbalogan v. Director of Lands, 8 and in Municipality of Tacloban v. Director of Lands, 9 it was held that the capitol site and the school sites in municipalities constitute their patrimonial properties. This result is understandable because, unlike in the classification regarding State properties, properties for public service in the municipalities are not classified as public. (1) HINUNANGAN V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, 11where it was stated that "... where the municipality has occupied lands distinctly for public purposes, such as for the municipal court house, the public school, the public market, or other necessary municipal building, we will, in the absence of proof to the contrary, presume a grant from the States in favor of the municipality; but, as indicated by the wording, that rule may be invoked only as to property which is used distinctly for public purposes...." (2) VIUDA DE TANTOCO V. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILO 12 held that municipal properties necessary for governmental purposes are public in nature. Thus, the auto trucks used by the municipality for street sprinkling, the police patrol automobile, police stations and concrete structures with the corresponding lots used as markets were declared exempt from execution and attachment since they were not patrimonial properties. (3) MUNICIPALITY OF BATANGAS VS. CANTOS 13 held squarely that a municipal lot which had always been devoted to school purposes is one dedicated to public use and is not patrimonial property of a

The Secretary of Finance then authorized the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to deduct an amount equal to 25% of the regular internal revenue allotment for the City of Zamboanga for the quarter ending March 31, 1960, then for the quarter ending June 30, 1960, and again for the first quarter of the fiscal year 1960-1961. all the properties in question, except the two (2) lots used as High School playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga province. Even the capital site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school sites will be considered

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patrimonial for they are not for public use. They would fall under the phrase "public works for public service" for it has been held that under theejusdem generis rule, such public works must be for free and indiscriminate use by anyone, just like the preceding enumerated properties in the first paragraph of Art 424. 7 The playgrounds, however, would fit into this category

Art. 424 of the Civil Code is "... without prejudice to the provisions of special laws." For purpose of this article, the principles, obtaining under the Law of Municipal Corporations can be considered as "special laws". Hence, the classification of municipal property devoted for distinctly governmental purposes as public should prevail over the Civil Code classification in this particular case.

municipality.

VICENTE NOBLE v. CITY OF MANILA G.R. No. 44142 December 24, 1938
FACTS Under a contract entered into between Jose Syquia and the City of Manila on October 18, 1926, the former constructed on a piece of land of the latter on Tayuman Street, Tondo, Manila, a school building, containing twenty compartments, pursuant to the instructions, specifications and conditions imposed by the city. On April 25, 1935, the court rendered its decision declaring that the City of Manila has no right to expropriate the building and that it should comply with the terms of the contract of October 18, 1926, and to pay to the plaintiff, for the price of the building, the sum of P46,000, plus the rentals thereof, corresponding to the month of February, 1934 and following, until the final and absolute conveyance of the building is made, with legal interest on the rentals due an unpaid.After the filing of the complaint and the answer, the court, upon petition of the defendant and by virtue of the cross-complaint, ordered, on June 11, 1934, that, upon the deposit of the amount of P46,000 by the defendant, the latter take immediate possession of the building for the purpose of the expropriation thereof, convoking and hearing the parties on the appointment of the commissioners to appraise the building. On March 21, 1933, the then mayor of the city, Tomas Earnshaw, proposed to Vicente Noble that, in order to comply with the rules of accounting then existing, the contract be amended in the sense that, the lease be made renewable every year, instead of every three years (Exhibit 1), and for this purpose it was agreed, by the document Exhibit J, that it be renewable from year to year until the leased building is purchased in accordance with the original contract of July 22, 1927.The City of Manila failed to pay the stipulated rent corresponding to the month of February, 1934, and following, whereupon Vicente Noble, on April 10, 1934, filed the complaint which gave rise to this case, wherein he asks that the city be ordered to purchase the building for the price of P46,600, with legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint, and to pay the rentals at the rate of P600 a month, corresponding to the month of February, 1934 and following, until the purchase of the building is effected and the price thereof paid.Under the terms of these transfers, all the rights of Syquia flowing from his contract with the city, were fully transferred, first, to Sandoval, and, thereafter, to Noble. DOCTRINE The contract, therefore, in so far as it refers to the purchase of the building, as we have interpreted it, is in force, not having been revoked by the parties or by judicial decision. Expropriation lies only when it is made necessary by the opposition of the owner to the sale or by the lack of any agreement as to the price. There being in the present case a valid and subsisting contract, between the owner of the building and the city, for the purchase thereof at an agreed price, there is no reason for the expropriation. Expropriation, as a manifestation of the right of eminent domain of the state and as a limitation upon private ownership, is based upon the consideration that it should not be an obstacle to human progress and to the development of the general welfare of the community. In the circumstances of the present case, however, the expropriation would depart from its own purposes and turn out to be an instrument to repudiate compliance with obligations legally and validly contracted. It is said that the contract should be rescinded as unfair and against morals, not because it was so when it was entered into, but because after what has already been paid by way of rentals for the lease, if the sale is now made, the same would be excessively favorable to the plaintiff and prejudicial to the defendant. But if this state of things is the result of too much delay in effecting the purchase, this is attributable to the defendant itself, for it was up to it entirely to make the purchase at any time since the contract was entered into. OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

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