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delv <delv@tds.net> <plato@yahoogroups.com> vendredi 26 novembre 2010 14:43 Re: [plato] Questions about Plato

Let me add to this well reasoned reply that the original question assumes we have any idea of what Plato himself thought. Where in any dialog does Plato speak anything, much less anything of philosophic value? Plato uses spokesmen and it is often assumed (perhaps incorrectly) that the words he puts into his Socratic protagonist's mouth are Plato's own thoughts or actually were Socrates'. Yet that cannot be true because Socrates says conflicting, and sometimes very stupid, things to very different people. How stupid people react to the stupid statements reveals much to the other participants in the dialogue and to the careful reader. The characters say certain things in the sunlight and different, and seemingly incompatible things in the shade, for but one example. It has been well illustrated by others that Plato was an ironic writer and I have often said that if one is not laughing while reading Plato one is certainly missing a part of the point he is making. Irony cannot but provoke deeper introspective thought that can approach, if not actually be, philosophical. Thus the Platonic Socrates makes the greatest knowledge claim made in western thought, that he truly knows that he knows nothing - No-Thing (in eastern thought wuji or the empty state -- that which is without being). It is not that he knows nothing (viz. he does not know anything), which is a claim of ignorance. Ray On 26 Nov , 2010, at 10:18 AM, Bernard SUZANNE wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Plato was (and still is through his dialogues) an "educator" trying to help people think by themselves, not to tell the world what HE thought about this or that! As a result, trying to figure out what Plato himself thought or was is completely misunderstanding his purpose in writing his dialogues! What seems clear from reading the dialogues is that Plato wanted us to understand both the power AND LIMITS of human reason ("logos" in Greek). Those limits imply that human beings will never be able to acquire absolute certainty (such as the one we may acquire about a geometrical theorem such as the one Socrates uses in his experiment with Meno's slave about the doubling of the square) on the most important issues for the conduct of their lives: whether there is such thing as a "soul" ("psuch" in Greek), and if so whether it is eternal or not, what happens at death, and the like. As a result, we have to build our own lives on "hypotheses" on such issues, and should try to select for that the most "reasonable" and "consistent" hypotheses (consistent between themselves and with the data of our own experience). In helping us in this search, he strongly suggests that radical "materialism" (only what we can feel ant touch exists), of the kind of that supposedly held by what he calls "Sons of the Earth" in the Sophist, is not acceptable and contrary to our own experience, but that, on the other hand, absolute "idealism", of the kind supposedly held by those he calls "Friends of ideas/forms" in the same dialogue (assuming that there only "exists"

> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >

what is outside space and time) is no more acceptable. In fact, he is trying to help us replace the "either..., or..." approach by an "and..., and..." approach: not "either matter or forms", but "both matter and forms"; not "either body or mind" but "both body and mind"; not "either matter or spirit" but "both matter and spirit"; not "either passions or reason", but "both passions and reason", eand so on, trying in each case to assign to each of the two elements its proper properties, role and place. More generally speaking, he was trying to get people away from "ontology" to think in terms of what I call "agathology" (build on "agathos", meaning "good" in Greek, in the same way "ontology" is build on "on, ontos" meaning "being" in Greek): assuming that some things "are" and other "are not" is futile and vain, and besides, it is looking backward toward some sort of "origin", whereas trying to figure out what "good" can result from this or that is all that should matter for us and besides is looking forward, toward our future and the good that might result for us. This difference of prespective is summarized in the difference between the Greek words "to on" ("being") and "ousia": "to on" is the least meaningful predicate of all, because it can apply to EVERYTHING (see the definition of "to on" given in the Sophist) and means nothing so long as we don't add something to it by saying WHAT it is, whereas "ousia", another Greek word derived from "ousa", the feminine form of the present participle of the verb "einai" (to be), of which "to on" is the neutral form substantized by the addition of the article "to" (the), something like "beingness", is a word whose pre-metaphysical meaning in common language was "wealth, estate" ( the English word "substance" used to have the same duality of meaning). "To on", or "esti" ('is"), is meaningless and teaches us nothing about what it is applied to if one stays at that, whereas "ousia" invites us to investigate what makes the "wealth", the "good" of what it is applied to, and at least implies that there must be some wealth out there!... So, the appropriate question is not "Was Plato a dualist, or realist or idealist?", but, after you have told me what you mean by "dualist", "realist" and "idealist", "Which one of those understandings of the "whole" seems more appropriate to help us explain consistently the facts of experience and help us lead "decent" lives and reach "true" happiness?" and then, "Can Plato's dialogues be of some help to us in investigating those issues?" Yours, Bernard SUZANNE

At 20:43 26/11/2010, Ray wrote: >Let me add to this well reasoned reply that the original question assumes >we have any idea of what Plato himself thought. Where in any dialog does >Plato speak anything, much less anything of philosophic value? Plato uses >spokesmen and it is often assumed (perhaps incorrectly) that the words he >puts into his Socratic protagonist's mouth are Plato's own thoughts or >actually were Socrates'. As a matter of fact, I do believe that it is possible to a certain extent to guess from the dialogues where Plato's own sympathies were heading. For instance, I think we can fairly safely guess that he was more sympathetic to Socrates than to, say, Hippias, or Euthyphro, or Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. But the question is, what good does it do us to know, or guess, what Plato, a guy having lived 25 centuries ago in Athens, thought 2

on this or that? Nobody will ever accept to die after being unjustly, but lawfully, condemned to death simply because that guy Plato said that another Athenian named Socrates was great in doing just that. If anyone does accept such fate, it will be because HE HIMSELF believes deep inside that it is the best thing to do FOR HIM. Now, that the fact of having heard of Socrates through Plato may have played a part in HIS OWN choice doesn't mean that he did it because Plato said so, but that Plato developed in his dialogues arguments that he found convincing enough. And that is all Plato was interested in in writing his dialogues... >Yet that cannot be true because Socrates says conflicting, and sometimes >very stupid, things to very different people. One of the key features of Plato's Socrates is that he tries to convince his interlocutors they are wrong (or at least haven't dig far enough the issues at hand) by using THEIR own assumtions and showing them they lead to inconsistencies or even absurdities. That is why he may seem to be saying conflicting things. If indeed one thinks that all he says is what HE thinks, then he misses the point! A good example of this is the Protagoras and Meno: people think that, in the former, Socrates is holding that "aret" ("excellence" as a human being, rather than the more usual "virtue") can be taught, while in the later he holds that "aret" cannot be taught. But that is not the case! In the Protagoras, he is trying to show Protagoras that , IF one upholds, as does Protagoras, that man is the measure of all things and there is no "objective" truth or good, THEN our happiness depends solely on pleasures outweighting pains and one, in order to be happy and lead an "excellent" life, should investigate a "science" of mesurement of present and future pleasures and pains in order to be able in all situations, to weight the respective net total of pleasures and pains brought by the various courses of action available to him and "aret" could be "taught" by teaching such science of measurement. In the Meno, he is facing a young boy who doesn't want to tell him what he means by "aret", who only wants to know if it is "teachable" (probably because he had heard at home, before coming to Athens, that Socrates was a teacher of "aret" and he wants to embarass him), and who is a "pragmatist" who only believes what he can feel and touch; so Socrates will take him at his own game and eventually tell him that IF "aret" was teachable, then, there would be teachers of it acknowledged by all, as there are teachers of geometry, or of lyre playing, or of pottery, and so on, and then ask him if he knows of anybody who would be recognized as a teacher of "aret" by everybody. But, in neither dialogue does Socrates try to "demonstrate" HIS OWN views, only to push the consequences of what his interlocutor explicitely or implicitely admits till it leads to some inconsistencies IN THE EYES OF HIS INTERLOCUTOR (it is Protagoras who, in the end, doesn't want to admit that people should behave in trying to maximize their pleasures and minimize their pains and that he should teach such a science of measurement; it is Meno who admits that not all people agree on the names of teachers of "aret" after he has seen his host Anytos strongly disagree 3

that sophists are such teachers). That such ways of discussion may at times lead Plato's Socrates into saying "stupid" things doesn't mean he is stupid, but only that what his interlocutors beleive leads to stupid consequences. And in exhibiting such discussions, Plato wants US to realize that such consequences are stupid so that we seek other "hypotheses" more consistent with one another. > How stupid people react to the stupid statements reveals much to the > other participants in the dialogue and to the careful reader. I would prefer, based on what I said above: "how stupid people react to the exhibition of the stupid consequences of their own beliefs..." >The characters say certain things in the sunlight and different, and >seemingly incompatible things in the shade, for but one example. Who does that where? >It has been well illustrated by others that Plato was an ironic writer and >I have often said that if one is not laughing while reading Plato one is >certainly missing a part of the point he is making. Irony cannot but >provoke deeper introspective thought that can approach, if not actually >be, philosophical. Thus the Platonic Socrates makes the greatest >knowledge claim made in western thought, that he truly knows that he knows >nothing - No-Thing (in eastern thought wuji or the empty state -- that >which is without being). It is not that he knows nothing (viz. he does >not know anything), which is a claim of ignorance. When Plato's Socrates says "I know nothing", this has to be read in light of the Delphic precept he is often quoting: "get to know thyself", thyself, that is, thyself as an individual, but also thyself as a human being, which implies: "get to know what it means to be a human being, what constitue true "excellence" (aret) for a human being, what constitutes true "happiness" for a human being, and the like" So, when he says "I know nothing", that has to be understood by giving the strongest meaning to "know", that is, "know with absolute demonstrable certainty, in a way that can be taught and accepted by every human being in his right mind as would be a theorem of geometry", and and by taking "nothing" as meaning "nothing of what should most matter to me as a human being in order to determine how to live my life in the best possible way". Indeed, as I said in my previous post, Plato wants us to realize that, though our reason may enable us to "know" all sorts of things, both in the practical fields and in the abstract, theoretical fields surch as mathematics and geometry, it does not, and will never, enable us to "know" in the same way the most important things of all about us and the meaning of our lives. >Ray 4

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"phiwilli" <Frank.Williams@eku.edu> <plato@yahoogroups.com> samedi 1 janvier 2011 18:43 [plato] Re: The Protagoras.

Bernard, I've been re-reading your posts of Nov 24 & 26 (because I find them very helpful), but I do have a couple of questions they have provoked. 1) Where does Socrates say "I know nothing"? He doesn't actually say that in the Delphi section of the Apology, and indeed later in the Apology he mentions a thing or two he does know (29b). He does say that he knows nothing at Republic 354c, but in context that seems to mean nothing about the issues just discussed, not nothing at all. 2) Your Protagoras comments rely on the Protagorean "man is the measure" doctrine, but there is (as I recall) no mention of that in the Protagoras dialogue - it's only found in the Theaetetus. So why interpret the Protagoras based on something in the Theaetetus? Maybe based on an inference from the measurement comments (356-57)? 3) And I have a thought or two about part of the Protagoras, and I'd like to hear your (or anyone else's) response to it! Here goes . . . In his soul-nourishment and buying groceries analogy (311a-314c, especially 313d-314b), Socrates says (314a) that with purchased food you can test it before eating it, but (314b) you can't do that with teachings - they go into your soul and have a good or bad effect - unless you are a knowledgeable consumer (313e). I suspect Plato wanted the reader to figure out that teachings, rather like purchased food, CAN be evaluated before "ingesting" them; he wanted Hippocrates and the reader to see how to become a knowledgeable consumer of teachings. Then Socrates and Hippocrates go to hear Protagoras, et al. One (by no means the only) underlying issue is, should Hippocrates become a student of (make a "teaching purchase" from) Protagoras? By the end of the dialogue that question hasn't been discussed any more, but Socrates perhaps has demonstrated, by his questioning, how to become a knowledgeable consumer. If Hippocrates emulates the demonstration, there would be little risk should he make a purchase from Protagoras. Frank Williams

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Bernard SUZANNE <bernard.suzanne@polytechnique.org> <plato@yahoogroups.com> lundi 3 janvier 2011 4:38

It is true that the saying attributed to Socrates "I know one thing which is that I know nothing (hen oida hoti ouden oida)" cannot be found in 5

Plato's dialogues. The closest to it that can be found is Apology 21d, where Socrates, after having been told of the Pythoness saying to Chaerephon that he is the wisest of men, tested the wisdom of someone having the repute of being wise and found that he was not so wise after all and that "neither of us really knows anything fine and good, but this man thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas I, as I do not know anything, do not think I do either (hmn oudeteros ouden kalon kagathon eidenai, all' houtos men oietai ti eidenai ouk eids, eg de, hsper oun ouk oida, oude oiomai)", thus concluding that he is a little wiser that the other only because "what I do not know I do not think I know either (ha m oida oude oiomai eidenai)". Notice that Socrates says that neither of them knew anything "kalon kagathon", litteraly "beautiful and good", not that they knew nothing at all! And this confirms what I was saying in my Nov 26 post. "Kalos kagathos" (a contraction of "kalos kai agathos") was a formula in Socrates' time to qualify a good, well educated person. The LSJ says the expression originaly denotes a perfect gentleman, and then, in a moral sense, a perfect character; and from that expression, an adjective was derived, "kalokagathia", meaning nobleness, goodness. In other words, it is possible to understand what Socrates said as "neither of us knew anything good" with minimal load on "good", but it is also possible to put a maximal load on "kalon kagathon" and take it to mean "neither of us knew anything with regard to the perfection of Man". Similarly, Rep. I, 354b9-c1, at the end of the dialogue with Thrasymachus, has Socrates saying "for me, the present outcome of the discussion is that I know nothing (moi nuni gegonen ek tou dialogou mden eidenai)", adding immediately after: "For if I don't know what the just is, I shall hardly know whether it is a virtue or not, and whether its possessor is or is not happy (hopote gar to dikaion m oida ho estin, scholi eisomai eite aret tis ousa tugkanei eite kai ou, kai poteron ho echn auto ouk eudaimn estin eudaimn)". Again, "knowing nothing (medn eidenai)" is related to knowing or not knowing what justice is, and whether or not it is some sort of "excellence (aret)" (a better translation of "aret" than "virtue") for man and whether or not it is able to make man happy (eudaimn). Thus, as in the Apology quotation, knowing "nothing" has to do with things relating to "excellence" and human happiness. One last quote of interest is Meno 98b, where Socrates says: "And indeed I too speak as one who does not know but only conjectures: yet that there is a difference between right opinion and knowledge is not at all a conjecture 6

with me but something I would particularly assert that I knew: there are not many things of which I would say that, but this one, at any rate, I will include among those that I know (kai mn kai eg hs ouk eids leg, alla eikazn. hti de estin ti alloion orth doxa kai epistm, ou panu moi dok touto eikazein, all' eiper ti allo phain an eidenai--oliga d' an phain--hen d'oun kai touto ekeinn thein an hn oida)". Here he doesn't say plainly that he knows nothing, but that he is talking "as one who doesn't know", only to add immediately after that there are very few things he would say he knows, and that one of them is that right opinion (orth doxa) is not the same thing as knowledge (epistm). And indeed, earlier in the dialogue he has shown us that he knew at least one theorem of geometry, the one on the doubling of the square he uses in his experiment with the slaveboy. And when we go back to that section of the Meno and read the comments of Socrates to Meno during the experiment, we see how he stresses the difference between the three stages the slaveboy goes through: thinking he knows when he doesn't; then, knowing that he doesn't know; and eventually being on his way to knowing when he has found the right answer to Socrates' question. Yet Socrates still says in the above quote that he is talking as one who doesn't know. But that has to do with the main issue of the dialogue: what is "aret (excellence)"? And here we go again! What Socrates is interested in knowing is not some theorem of geometry, which is of little or no use to help us reach happiness in life, but what is the "aret" of Man ("get to know thyself", as a human being that is). In fact, the above quote suggests that, for Socrates, the main value of the theorem of geometry he knows and used in the experiment with the slave has been to serve in this particular instance to show what true knowledge is as opposed to mere opinion, only to help us realize that, with regard to man's "aret", the most important issue for leading a good life, nobody has "knowledge" of what it is, not even Socrates. >2) Your Protagoras comments rely on the Protagorean "man is the measure" >doctrine, but there is (as I recall) no mention of that in the Protagoras >dialogue - it's only found in the Theaetetus. So why interpret the >Protagoras based on something in the Theaetetus? Maybe based on an >inference from the measurement comments (356-57)? What you say here amounts to saying that we should ignore that most interlocutors of the dialogues are historical characters and deal with them only based on what is said of them in the dialogue at hand! If that were the case, why do you think Plato chose to use historical characters for his dialogues?!...

In much the same way we are entitled to use all we know about, say, Alcibiades, or Pericles, or Aristides, or Nicias, when they are staged or mentioned in a dialogue, even if it is not explicitely mentioned in that dialogue, or about writers such as Aristophanes or Agathon, we are entitled to use all we know about Protagoras, Parmenides, Hippias, Gorgias, etc. as background to any dialogue where they are staged or mentioned (indeed that is PRECISELY the reason why Plato chose to stage or mention that guy rather than an imaginary character). And the fact that, in those later cases, a lot of what we know about the doctrines of those thinkers comes from Plato doesn't invalidate that point of method! Protagoras' doctrine of man-measure is not a doctrine of Plato's Theaetetus, but a doctrine of Protagoras which turns out to be known to us mostly through Plato's Theaetetus. But for at least some educated readers of Plato at the time he wrote his dialogues, that doctrine of Protagoras was known to be his from Protagoras' own writings, not from Plato's Theaetetus, and when they read the name of Protagoras, even in the Protagoras (which might have been written before the Theaetetus), they had that doctrine in mind in much the same way a reader of today reading the name of Freud knows he is the father of psychoalaysis, or the name of Einstein knows he is the author of the relativity theory, or the name of Sartre knows he was an existentialist, whatever that means. And the question of knowing whether Plato was faithful to Protagoras in expounding his doctrines is no different from the question of knowing whether today's reader reading or hearing the name of Freud has an accurate understanding of what Freud realy meant, or the name of Einstein accurately understands the relativity theory and the meaning of the e=mc2 equation, or the name of Sartre understands what existetialism meant to him (the only difference being that we can still read the writings of Freud or Einstein or Sartre where we can no longer read the writings of Protagoras; but reading the very words of an author is no guarantee that we accurately understand what he had in mind, and besides, in some cases--and the case of Plato's dialogues might well be one of those cases--understanding what people thought an author meant might be more important than understanding what the author himself actually meant, because the influence of that author on the world around him is more due to what people understood of his toughts than to what he really meant). >3) And I have a thought or two about part of the Protagoras, and I'd like >to hear your (or anyone else's) response to it! Here goes . . . > >In his soul-nourishment and buying groceries analogy (311a-314c, 8

>especially 313d-314b), Socrates says (314a) that with purchased food you >can test it before eating it, but (314b) you can't do that with teachings >- they go into your soul and have a good or bad effect - unless you are a >knowledgeable consumer (313e). I suspect Plato wanted the reader to figure >out that teachings, rather like purchased food, CAN be evaluated before >"ingesting" them; he wanted Hippocrates and the reader to see how to >become a knowledgeable consumer of teachings. Sticking to the analogy, I would say the following: for food, you can test food before you buy only to a certain extent: you can see that the fruit you are buying is not rotten or that there are no worms in the meat you are buying, or that the fish you are buying doesn't smell too strongly; you can also, with adequate knowledge, recognize whether the mushroom you are buying or picking is eatable or not; but there are limits to what you can test without eating and there still is a possibility that what you think is good will turn out to be poisonous or get you sick. With teachings, it is true that there is no way to test them without either hearing or reading them, that is, getting them into your mind/soul. Yet, the effect of those "teachings" in your mind depends on your age (as is the case with food: not all foods can be eaten, even if perfectly sound, at any age) and on what is already in your mind that would allow you to balance the effect of those teachings and "test" their soundness. So, it is true that Plato's purpose is to offer us a "test kit" (the dialogues as a whole) as a means to take less risks in "ingesting" teachings in our minds. But this "test kit" has to be assimilated and understood before it can be effective, and that takes time, in much the same way a vaccine is not immediately effective. In this perspective, the Protagoras, staging a young Hippocrates and an old Socrates (and coming quite early int he "program" of the dialogues as I understand it, where it stands as the introductory dialogue of the second of my tetralogies, that is, the fifth dialogue out of 28) warns us about willing to "eat" too early "food" that needs a more mature mind to be ingested without too much risks. >Then Socrates and Hippocrates go to hear Protagoras, et al. One (by no >means the only) underlying issue is, should Hippocrates become a student >of (make a "teaching purchase" from) Protagoras? By the end of the >dialogue that question hasn't been discussed any more, but Socrates >perhaps has demonstrated, by his questioning, how to become a >knowledgeable consumer. If Hippocrates emulates the demonstration, there >would be little risk should he make a purchase from Protagoras. Plato doesn't care what happened to Hippocrates at the end of the dialogue 9

because 1) he is not writing history (the more so if, as I believe, that Hippocrates is not a historical character, but a creation of Plato's mind) 2) even if Hippocrates were a historical character and the Protagoras a "journalistic" report of an actual conversation having really taken place between Socrates and Protagoras in the presence of that Hippocrates, knowing whether or not HE had been discouraged by Socrates to seek Protagoras' lessons, is of absolutely no use to US: the only thing that counts for us is whether or not WE, as readers of the dialogue, have been convinced by Plato's Socrates that there is more value in what he wants us to understand (notice that I have not said "in what he said") than in what Protagoras stands for (here again, I have not said "what Protagoras said", because Protagoras, as Socrates, has long been dead and buried, and WE will not have a chance to take lessons from him more than we will have a chance to become followers of the historical Socrates). >Frank Williams Yours, Bernard SUZANNE

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"Williams, Frank" <Frank.Williams@eku.edu> "plato@yahoogroups.com" <plato@yahoogroups.com> lundi 3 janvier 2011 18:47 [plato] RE: The Protagoras.

Bernard, Thanks for your comments, helpful as always! I was especially helped by your comments on Plato's use of historical characters. But it seems to me that you too much discount the significance of Hippocrates and his concerns. He appears in the dialogue for five or so pages (310 to 316) - Plato could easily have gotten Socrates into the discussion with Protagoras et al. some other way, without bringing in the Hippocrates interlude at all. But he didn't do that, which leads me to think that it is significant and it is worth pondering why he wrote it that way. I suggest that, perhaps, it is to provoke the reader to ponder, after reading the dialogue, "Well, should Hippocrates become a student of Protagoras? Why, or why not?" And that's an open question with no clear answer; but if we consider different possible answers (and imagine reasons that could be offered for and against each, in the light of Socrates' interaction with the sophists present), that WILL be useful to US, it will help US to clarify our thinking about "teaching" and "learning" and "testing soul-food."

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Best, Frank W. Expditeur: Destinataire: Date: Objet: Bernard SUZANNE <bernard.suzanne@polytechnique.org> <plato@yahoogroups.com> mercredi 5 janvier 2011 1:05 Re: [plato] RE: The Protagoras.

At 00:44 04/01/2011, Franck Williams wrote: >Bernard, > >Thanks for your comments, helpful as always! You're welcome! >I was especially helped by your comments on Plato's use of historical >characters. > >But it seems to me that you too much discount the significance of >Hippocrates and his concerns. He appears in the dialogue for five or so >pages (310 to 316) - Plato could easily have gotten Socrates into the >discussion with Protagoras et al. some other way, without bringing in the >Hippocrates interlude at all. But he didn't do that, which leads me to >think that it is significant and it is worth pondering why he wrote it >that way. I suggest that, perhaps, it is to provoke the reader to ponder, >after reading the dialogue, "Well, should Hippocrates become a student of >Protagoras? Why, or why not?" And that's an open question with no clear >answer; but if we consider different possible answers (and imagine reasons >that could be offered for and against each, in the light of Socrates' >interaction with the sophists present), that WILL be useful to US, it will >help US to clarify our thinking about "teaching" and "learning" and >"testing soul-food." This is exactly what I was trying to suggest: I was only answering to your remark that, AT THE END OF THE DIALOGUE, Plato doesn't tell us what Hippocrates has decided! And I answered: "Plato doesn't care what happened to Hippocrates AT THE END OF THE DIALOGUE", for reasons that are basically the ones you suggest here! But that wasn't meant to suggest that Plato didn't care about Hippocrates AT ALL. Of course not! Of course, the staging of the dialogue with Hippocrates and the introductory scenes are quite important. And, as you say, they are meant to have us wonder about the worth of Protagoras' teaching FOR YOUNG PEOPLE, compared to the influence of Socrates (I say "influence" because Plato's Socrates never pretended to "teach" anybody) on those same kids, especially in light of the fact that Socrates was condemned on charges of corrupting the young!... >Best, > >Frank W. Yours,

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Bernard SUZANNE Expditeur: Destinataire: Date: Objet: "cplaneau" <cplaneau@iupui.edu> <plato@yahoogroups.com> jeudi 6 janvier 2011 11:18 [plato] Re: The Protagoras.

Bernard F. Suzanne wrote: >> (the more so if, as I believe, that Hippocrates is not a historical >> character, but a creation of Plato's mind) Robert Eldon Taylor wrote: > Why is that. Bernard? I thought you were generally of my > persuasion that almost all of Plato's characters are based on > reality. We have some evidence that this Hippokrates existed, though indirect, and we need to fill-in a gap or two to complete the picture. Start first with the description of his "great & wealthy" family. This description, we assume, is not happenstance. Given that Platon remains very precise & selective describing the scene, emphasising the "vast" collection of Perikles' relatives @ the House of Kallias, noting as well the absence of Perikles himself and Kleinias (319e-320b), Hippokrates was, most likely, a nephew of Perikles -- whose father, Apollodoros, perhaps married Perikles' first wife (that last one is a suggested inference [not mine, btw, though I find it attractive] and not really necessary for the identification). More importantly, the name Hippokrates is well attested in Perikles' family as far back as Peisistratos (see Athenian Propertied Families 11811 for details). The precise identification of this Hippokrates stems from a scholia entry in Aristophanes (Thesm. 273), produced ca. 411 BCE, where Euripides' relative shouts "You might as well swear by Hippokrates' Townhouse!" The scholiast remarks that this refers to three (3) raunchy young men mentioned in the *Clouds* (1001), produced ca. 423 BCE - i.e. Hippokrates, the nephew of Perikles. Now, the base presupposition here, of course, remains that Hippokrates *IS* historical. If you reject the premise, then you can toss the above to the wind. -cheers

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Bernard SUZANNE <bernard.suzanne@polytechnique.org> <plato@yahoogroups.com> jeudi 6 janvier 2011 16:56 Re: [plato] Re: The Protagoras.

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Robert, I am not dogmatic on the issue of historicity of Plato's characters in the dialogues. As a matter of fact, there are several characters which I think are Plato's creations. These include, aside from the Hippocrates of the Protagoras, Eudicus of the Hippias minor, Callicles in the Gorgias (and maybe also Polos), Euthyphro, Philebus and Protachus in the Philebus, Megillus and Clinias of the Laws, and also possibly, though I am less sure on those ones, Diotime in the Symposium, Ion, Timaeus, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, Menexenus, and maybe a few others (Christopher, I have by my side Debra Nails' "The People of Plato", so there is no use in giving me all the arguments she gives about those characters!...). But to me, the main issue is elsewhere. As I said in previous posts, if Plato uses historical characters in his dialogues it is because he wants his readers to have in mind what is well known about those persons, so that he doesn't have to waist time introducing them, telling us about their life and, for thinkers, doctrines, except for what is directly relevant to the dramatic flow of the dialogue. And this goal can only be achieved if those people were well known at the time he wrote the dialogues they appear in (which was probably several years, or tenth of years, after Socrates' death, which means that some of those people might have been dead already at the time, and in any case that readers knew not only who they were at the time the dilaogue is supposed to take place, but what happened to them afterwards (which is also a point that was probably relevant to Plato in chosing them, as is most likely the case with, for instance, Alicibiades and Meno). Now, it is sure that the fact that we, 25 centuries later, no longer know anything about this or that character doesn't mean that contemporaries of Plato at the time he wrote the dialogues knew nothing about them. Now, I can understand that historians be interested in using Plato's dialogues to find incidental evidence about people of Socrates' and Plato's time but I am not ready to accept the petitio principii that ALL of Plato's characters MUST BE historical characters to justify the use of "evidence" from the dialogues in such a work. Such issues must be dealt with on a case per case basis and in so doing, one should accept to take into account the fact that some of Plato's characters might be creations of his mind, as is the case with the Elean stranger of Sophist and Statesman and the Old Athenian of the Laws (in such cases they are anonymous, but the case of Megillus and Clinias of the Laws, which are most certainly also creations of Plato shows that he may create characters which are not anonymous), and also that it is not because we know of a person by the same name that it is necessarily the one Plato had in mind. But I am not reading the dialogues as a historian. I'm trying to figure out what Plato wanted me to understand, which, except in a few cases (eg: book 3 of the Laws, which is a lesson on how to use history to get lessons from it in order to build our future), has, in my opinion, little or nothing to do with "history". In so doing, it may well be that I lose part of the meaning of Plato's staging and dramatic scenarization of his dialogue by lack of knowledge of facts on this or that character that might have been known to his first readers, but, if that is the fact, so be it! And if the result of "historical" research and the hypotheses made about this or that character by historians and their identification with a person of similar

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name known from other sources doesn't add significance to the dialogue he shows in and sheds no light on the reasons why Plato might have chosen him to play the role he plays in the dialogue or to mention his name where it is mentioned, I haver no use for such hypotheses. Applying this to the case of the Hippocrates of Protagoras: to me, the fact that we know of a Hippocrates that was a nephew of Pericles doesn't prove that Plato's Hippocrates was that Hippocrates (pace Debra Nails, whose "People of Plato" inspired Christopher' mail), but, if that were the case, what interests me is to figure out if knowing that Hippocrates was a nephew of Pericles sheds new light on the Protagoras and adds meaning to the dialogue. And even if it is because we don't know as much about that nephew of Pericles as we konw about, say, Alcibiades, that we cannot understand part or all of what Plato had in mind in chosing that guy rather than some other historical character to play the part he plays in the Protagoras, if that is the case, it may be regretable for us, but the end result remains that we end up with the same understanding of the dialogue whether we read it assuming that Hippocrates was a creation of Plato's mind or accepting the hypothese that he was Pericles' nephew. And I could even reverse Debra Nail's/Christopher's argument about the reasons to believe he was Pericles' nephew: what Plato wants to have us think about through the Protagoras is the relevance of Protagoras' teaching for the education of wealthy son's of Athens great families compared to the influence of Socrates. One way of doing that is to stage a historical character of which the reader (at least the reader at the time Plato WROTE the dialogue) knows what the end result was by knowing what happened later in life to the said character: that is the case with Alcibiades and Critias, and also with Meno with regard to Gorgias' lessons. Yet, in the Protagoras, Plato stages Alcibiades and Critias, but only as bystanders taking little part in the discussion. Another way is to create a fictional character that might by ANY son of a "great and wealthy" family! And in such case, the only thing you have to say about him is precisely what Socrates says of Hippocrates: not "he is the nephew of Pericles" (in the way he says about Alcibiades that he had Pericles as tutor at 320a), but simply "he comes from a rich and wealthy family", as does Socrates at 316b. And the fact that Plato mentions many relatives of Pericles in the dialogues but doesn't mention any link between Hippocrates and Pericles might be read as another proof that Hippocrates was NOT Pericles's nephew: why insist on links with Pericles for simple bystanders, and NOT stress that link for one of the main characters in the dialogue, if he were also related to him and it was important for the reader to know that?!... Why then chose the name "Hippocrates" for this Mr Son-of-a-wealth-family? I can think of several. One is the homonymy with Hippocrates of Cos, the well known physician and healer of bodies, explicitely mentioned by Socrates at 311b, and alluded to at 313e by wondering whether sophists might be healers of the soul. Another is the meaning of "hippocrates" in Greek: "power of/over horses". Remembering the analogy developed in the Phaedrus about the soul, compared to a wing chariot with two horses and a charioteer, we can see horses as an allegory for the lower parts of the soul, and to have power over those horses is the goal of education. And the fact that this Hippocrates is said to be son of Apollodorus, whose name means "gift of Apollo", might be a hint to help us understand that the way to gain that hippo-krates, that power over the horses of our soul, is to make good use of the gift of the gods to us, our "logos", the "charioteer" of the allegory. Sure! This is only a set of hypotheses! And we will never be able to know if Plato had that in mind in writing the Protagoras. But assuming that the Hippocrates of the Protagoras is Pericles' nephew is also a mere assumption

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that can be proven no more... Now, which one of those assumptions is more valuable FOR US TODAY to help us become better human beings?... Bernard SUZANNE Expditeur: Destinataire: Date: Objet: "cplaneau" <cplaneau@iupui.edu> <plato@yahoogroups.com> jeudi 6 janvier 2011 23:13 [plato] Re: The Protagoras

The dichotomy presupposed here, me thinks is misplaced. A historical reading does not negate nor take from a more metaphorical / philosophical reading -- a point I remember raising as an example with Debra when we spoke (@ a CAMWS conference, I think) -- just before my BMCR review of her book came-out. We do not have, in other words, an either-or proposition. In many ways, Bernard's readings of Platon (hells bells almost anyone's readings) are far more insightful than I will ever gleam -- when it comes to lofty hypotheses -- a fact to which I resigned myself many years ago. What I like to stress in counter to overly passionate "purely philosophical" readings is that the approach too easily, imho, dismisses the apologetic nature of the dialogues. I view this quality as essential. If others do not, we do not stand opposed simply apart.

Expditeur:

Bernard SUZANNE <bernard.suzanne@polytechnique.org>

Destinataire:

<plato@yahoogroups.com>

Date:

vendredi 7 janvier 2011 4:05

Objet:

Re: [plato] The Protagoras.

At 05:13 07/01/2011, Christopher Planeaux wrote:

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[skip] >We do not have, in other words, an either-or proposition. Seems to me you are the one making it an either-or proposition! >In many ways, Bernard's readings of Platon (hells bells almost anyone's >readings) Being French, I don't understand all the nuances of colloquial English. Here, I don't understand what "HELLS BELLS almost anyone's reading" means. So, please, help me improve my English. >are far more insightful than I will ever gleam -- when it comes to lofty >hypotheses -- a fact to which I resigned myself many years ago. > >What I like to stress in counter to overly passionate "purely >philosophical" readings Here you go with your either-or reading of my reading of Plato. I never said "PURELY philosophical" and scores of my mails and pages of my site show that I am ALSO interested in the "historical" background of the dialogues to the extent they help understand Plato's points. >is that the approach too easily, imho, dismisses the apologetic nature of >the dialogues. Where did I say dialogues were not apologetic? I remember writing years ago on one or more of those lists, at a time you were already there, posts to explain the significance of the staging of the Republic with regard to Socrates' trial: Socrates was condemned to death for bringing new gods to the city and corrupting the youth, and the Republic is staged the very day the city holds the first festival in honor of a new godess, Bendis, a Thracian godess, that is, brings a new godess in the official calendar of the "polis", and shows Socrates keeping a bunch of youth away from the orgiac part of the festival discussing on the "ideal city" and justice in man! If that is not acknowledging the apologetic character of the Republic, I'll be damned!!!... >I would stress that each dialogue is **ALSO** a lengthy apologia for Sokrates I agree and you know it, but you keep pretending I don't and raising your either-or business in order to have a chance to "NAILing the

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discussion"!...:>) >by dramatizing supposed conversations he had with actual people. The stress here is, in my case at least, on "supposed". In other words, I take it that the dialogues are all litterary creations of Platon INSPIRED by his knowledge and frequentation of Socrates, in which he includes other historical characters when it suits his purpose, but doesn't bind himself to staging ONLY historical characters ("ONLY" is not an "either-or" approach!!!....:>) >If we assume characters are simply conjured from thin air, the apologia >aspect loses foundation. Did you read my previous posts on some of the reasons why Plato used historical characters? Again, it is not because SOME characters MIGHT BE fictionnal ones that ALL are! And it is not because SOME dialogues might not have an apologetic character with regard to Socrates' trial that ALL dialogues lose that character! The Laws probably stages only fictionnal characters and doesnt' even stages Socrates. Does that ruin the apologetic character of the Republic or other dialogues like the Gorgias (with a clear allusion to Socrates' trial in the mouth of Callicles at the very center of the dialogue)? Does that mean we should dismiss the Laws altogether?... >In short, I am not arguing against Bernard (nor anyone for that matter), What would it have been if you had?!!!...:>) >I simply propose that examining the historical nature of the conversations >Platon depicts opens different avenues of exploration. That's exactly what I suggest too, so long as this quest doesn't take so huge proportions that it leaves no place for other avenues. You seem not to see the difference between a historical reading of the dialogues (meaning taking historical references in the dialogues as meaningfull to their purpose, which is what I do) and reading the dialogues as a historian (that is roughly, looking for historical data in the dialogues as pieces of evidence to be added to other in order to shed light on the historical study of Athens and Greece in the Vth and IVth

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centuries BC, which is what I leave to historians, being all too happy to use the result of their work in a historical reading of the dialogues). >If you are not interested in the defense of Sokrates aspect, then of >course these musings are irrelevent -- or of cursory importance. I am interested in this as you well know, but not as a means to know more about a guy who lived in Vth century Athens and died in 399 BC condemned to death by his city for bringing new gods and corrupting the youth, but as a means of taking example on an archeypal figure whose "idealized" portrait Plato drew in his dialogues in order to better undesrtand what it means to be a human being so that I could live a better life HERE AND NOW. But keep quiet! Don't shoot too fast!...:>) "Idealized" doent mean "fictionnal"! An "idealized" man (see Rep. IV, 420c-d) still is made of flesh and bones, has two feet and two arms, a head with two ears, two eyes, a nose and a mouth, is either a man or a woman with sexual organs and pulsions, is mortal and rarely lives more than a hundred years, cannot fly or live underwater, needs air to breeze and food to eat and drink; an "idealized" city such as the one depicted in the Republic is not a city of gods, not even a city of "philosophoi", but a city of men and women, some smarter than other, some gifted for one craft, other for another, some leading and other obeying, which needs land to feed its citizens, soldiers to protect it against potential ennemies, farmers and craftsmen to provide it with food and shelter, clothing and furniture, and so on. In the same way, an "idealized" Socrates has to be close enough to the "historical" one to be recognizable. And in this perspective, the defining feature of the "historical" Socrates is the circumstances of his death and the purpose of an "idealized" portrait of him is to make us understand the reasons why his condemnation to death, though legal from the standpoint of Athens' laws, was utterly unjust. Hence what you call the "apologetic" nature of maybe not "all", but most of the dialogues. But, at the same time, the dialogues were meant to be usefull for the future, for readers living after the historical Socrates was dead and who thus wouldn't be able to become followers of the historical Socrates. They thus had to

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suggest ways of becoming likes of Socrates, which is what the Laws, as the concluding dialogues of the whole educational program a read in my 7 tetralogies, attempts to do in the specific realm of lawmaking.

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