Grasping the idea of upamna

In the tarkasagraha, the section on Upamna when read without the nyya sutra bhya may seem baffling at first glance. Part of this difficulty arises with translating upamana as comparison as opposed to assimilation or similitude and understanding it with the constituent elements that make up the definition. Once we learn to let go of the term comparison, and focus on the constituent technical terms in the text (and related texts/commentaries) it becomes an easier concept to understand. ,

Then the text goes about giving the standard and oft-repeated example of One could potentially replace a bird or other creature for gavaya and cow, but the reader is still left wondering about the point or pointlessness or the utility-futility of upamna as a prama. This is where the bhya comes to the rescue. It alludes to an application of the means of knowledge and provides an example from vaidyastra and how useful it is for a student of that stra to know the means of identification of a herb as signified by its technical name. Yet we must also understand that this is not an identical exa mple to the case of the cow but provided to illustrate the general idea. Though I am not an entrant to that system, I understand that Kumrila too provides other applicable examples.

Now that we are convinced of the utility of this prama, we would then think about the necessity for it to be a distinct prama. One obvious thought that occurs is whether the gavaya or a r aven / jackdaw (if you are looking for a change) example can be restated as a five-membered syllogism or a pancvayava vkya similar to parvato vahnimn. When we try this exercise with the above example, it becomes clear that upamna does not exactly work the same way and that some elements are missing. This animal has features Just like the cow This is also like that Hence this is a gavaya. Neither are we able to define a hetu here nor do we process the information of the informant who provides the information An unknown X is like known Y or in other words, The unknown animal denoted by the word X is like Y. We also are unable to account for the recollection or for the atidesa vakya that we heard back then and the process of making sense of the word. It then becomes clear that upamna is a superset of the other prama -s and cannot be contained in them. Jayanta and Udayana too provide reasons as to why upamnas scope is not covered by pratyaka and abda. Even though internally within the fold of naiyyika-s writers like bhsarvaja reject upamna the one example that the bhyakra gives brings to light something that is rather obscure when read in the stra. To me, this is part of the beauty of the stra -bhya system which automatically allows a commentator to add their viewpoints and then expand the idea in the text. In summary one can say that the following as prerequisites for upamna: 1.An atidea vkya 2.The indirect knowledge of similarity 3.The recollection of the sense of the artha of that atid ea vkya.
About these ads

Rate this:

Rate This
Related

Some concepts Alankara ShastraIn "bh" Hermeneutics, Methodology etcIn "stra" Sagtastra - Electronic texts in utf8In "sagta"
Written by Vidya S Jayaraman Posted in stra

5 comments
1.
APRIL 16, 2012 - 10:58 AMombhurbhuva

Whenever the example chosen is always the same you can be virtually certain that the proposer does not understand what is at issue and is staying close to the shore of the canonical. Even the translation of upamana sends one in the wrong direction. Its not really a comparison but more of a slipping back from the specific into the generic. You dont know, by virtue of having no experience of, a bos gavaya but you do know a bos bos. By falling back into the generic concept of bos, (an unexperienceable conception), divided hoof, horned etc you can recognise another species the bos gavaya. The knowledge gained from a reliable source that there exists such creatures is an unnecessary addendum in my opinion. Zoologists find new species without that. Why is this a valid means of knowledge not reducible to any other? I believe that it is due to the mystery of how general concepts arise, if in fact they do arise. We know what red, green, yellow objects are by ostensive definition but how is the conceptcoloured arrived at. This is a concept which is required for the experience of various colours but which itself cannot be arrived at by experience. Wittgenstein inPhilosophical Investigations talks of the procedure of going on as in 2, 4, 6, 8 now go on. We know what the answer is but how can we be taught what going is. All our examples of it assume it. This may be part of Platos puzzlement about universals and curiously enough Shankara in B.S.B. I.iii.28 offers the notion of vedic words which is not a long way off the same aporia. In short we have a means of attaining valid knowledge which is embedded within us. It is not reducible to any other means of knowledge and is therefore a pramana. This is of course anathema to the empiricist tradition.
Reply APRIL 17, 2012 - 7:04 PMVidya

2.

Thanks for your comment. One of the main issues is that the word upamna has long been ingrained in popular psyche as comparison due to its use as a figure of speech in context of literature and translators tended to use that term. As far as the naiyyika -s are concerned, they use this means of knowledge to find the particular meaning of a word. In that sense it is not really the identification of an animal by likening to something whether particular or by means of general characteristics of the genus that is the resultant knowledge. The resultant knowledge is not that of arriving at the fact that the animal(x) you perceive in the forest is a bovine creature like the cow by virtue of common characteristics but understanding the signification that this animal is what is represented by the word gavaya a term you already know. This is the process of aktigraha knowing what the word gavaya signifies before the perception occurs ie To know what a term means, you still have to either look up in an authoritative text or ask a zoologist. This does requires an atidea vkya. It should be more of understanding the word indigo and recognizing it to be similar to

blue aided by the act of perception when you see an indigo cloth. In a sense I think this pramna is way too narrowly defined that they did not even venture into extending the idea of word-meaning association into the realm of generic-specific which seems the next logical/obvious course which the vaisheshika-s and others too seemed to have arrived at. In some systems, it is the horse of theology and belief that many times leads the cart of epistemology and sometimes philosophical schools also like to maintain a tradition of difference -in-identity of individual philosophical positions through metaphysical emeans. Here I am puzzled as to why a commentary-writer brings in an example all the way from ayurveda in order to meaningfully explain this. If I were to hazard a guess, I would think the primary purpose of introducing upamana as a separate means allowed them to establish that pratyaksha and anumana are indeed distinct (and maintain their philosophy position w.r.to the vaiseshikas and others).
Reply APRIL 18, 2012 - 10:40 PMombhurbhuva

3.

Thank you very much for your notes on upamana and the sharing of your expertise with a dilettante such as myself. Have you any thoughts on anupalabadhi? The text that I am familiar with on the subject of pramanas is Vedanta Paribhasa and of course the bos gavaya comes out to play there too. Now the question I put to myself is: suppose upamana is a separate pramana distinct from perception and inference etc. Does the classical account bear the weight of this position? The empiricist account with perception as its mainstay seems to be a stronger candidate for the power behind the naming of this strange beast. We have seen domestic cattle, we have seen their hooves and horns, we now see this new creature. By a sort of mental Venn diagram it moves partially into the cow area. Prior to this we have been primed by a reliable source so we can now name it with confidence. To answer this story I propose the view that you cant gain the concept of commonas in common features without having the concept common already and that is not perceptible or inferential etc. If I accept the notion of upamana as a pramana this is the direction I find I am pushed in. On the face of it this seems to be a sustainable interpretation. Here by a process of agreement and difference the knowledge of the likeness of a cow which exists in the gayal is the instrument, and the knowledge of that likeness of a gayal which exists in a cow is the result. (Vedanta Paribhasa) knowledge of the likeness is the common of common feature In Vedanta Paribhasa the establishing of the concept of upamana as a means of knowledge not reducible to any other is done by showing that the alternatives are impossible. This is not possible through perception, for then the cows form is not in contact with the eyes. Nor is it possible through inference for that likeness of a cow which exists in a gayal cannot be the sign (reason) for inferring the likeness of a gayal in a cow. Nor can it be urged that this is possible through the following inference: My cow is like this gayal. Because it corresponds to its likeness existing in a gayal. That which corresponds to its likeness existing in in a thing is like the latter. The latter reasoning underscores the question begging aspect of seeing common features. o
Reply APRIL 20, 2012 - 3:40 PMVidya

With the disclaimer, that I too am a dilettante.. The above post was about upamna as elaborated within the nyya system. From what I understand of the vednta paribha and through Dr.Hiriyannas explanations in his Outlines/Essentials text, it looks like vednta (and mmsa too) accepts it as a prama but offers a different explanation. They do not take the wor d-meaning, shaktigraha etc into consideration but use the idea of known and unknown and only the idea of likeness and the cognitive process of I compare.

The last part of Dharmarja Adhvarndras(DA) statement that in this case the person has the anuvyavasya of upaminomi, I am comparing the two is also key to understanding this. That said, based on DAs explanation, I am not yet quite clear on the idea of upamna as per vednta and have sought clarification from someone who knows that system well and will share the information if I receive it.
Reply APRIL 20, 2012 - 11:40 AMombhurbhuva

4.

I have blogged on this issue in a slightly expanded form athttp://ombhurbhuva.blogspot.com/2012/04/upamanaonce-again.html

Reply

Upamana once again

The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something - because it is always before ones eyes.) The real foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless thatfact has at some time struck him. - And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful. Philosophical Investigations #121 by Ludwig Wittgenstein.

I quote this in full because the valid means of knowledge (pramana) known as upamana (comparison) is so fundamental and basic to consciousness of the world, i.e. classification, differentiation, exclusion and inclusion, specification etc., that we no longer see it as such. Moreover the continued use of a single example in its traditional Nyaya explication misleads us as to this global nature. I refer back to my earlier thoughts on the matter at upamana but I will reproduce the entry on upamana in Vedanta Paribhasa in full. My present thinking on the matter arises out of my comments on the topic at the blog:cidabhasa

To save going back and forth to my earlier note I will reproduce in full the entry on upamana in V.P. Now comparison is being described. The instrument of the valid knowledge of similarity is comparison. For instance a man who has seen a cow's form in cities and has gone to a forest, where his eyes have come in contact with a gayal (gavaya - bos gaurus) has the cognition, "This thing is like a cow". Then he has the conviction, "My cow is like this." Here by a process of agreement and difference, the knowledge of the likeness of a cow which exists in a gayal is the instrument, and the knowledge of that likeness of a gayal which exists in a cow is the result. this is not possible through perception, for then the cow's form is not in contact with the eyes. Nor is it possible through inference, for that likeness of a cow which exists in a gayal cannot be the sign (reason) for inferring the

likeness of a gayal in a cow. Nor can it be urged that this is possible through the following inference: My cow is like this gayal. Because it corresponds to its likeness existing in a gayal. That which corresponds to its likeness existing in a thing is like the latter. As Caitra, who corresponds to his likeness existing in Maitra, is like him. For even without this sort of inference, the cognition, "My cow is like this," is a matter of common experience, and has also the apperception, "I am comparing the two,". Hence comparison is a distinct means of knowledge.

In my first comment on the general topic at cidabhasa I began at the aspect of genus/species differentiation. Whenever the example chosen is always the same you can be virtually certain that the proposer does not understand what is at issue and is staying close to the shore of the canonical. Even the translation of upamana sends one in the wrong direction. Its not really a comparison but more of a slipping back from the specific into the generic. You dont know, by virtue of having no experience of, a bos gaurus but you do know a bos bos. By falling back into the generic concept of bos, (an unexperienceable conception), divided hoof, horned etc you can recognise another species the bos gaurus. The knowledge gained from a reliable source that there exists such creatures is an unnecessary addendum in my opinion. Zoologists find new species without that.

Why is this a valid means of knowledge not reducible to any other? I believe that it is due to the mystery of how general concepts arise, if in fact they do arise. We know what red, green, yellow objects are by ostensive definition but how is the conceptcoloured arrived at. This is a concept which is required for the experience of various colours but which itself cannot be arrived at by experience. Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations talks of the procedure of going on as in 2, 4, 6, 8 now go on. We know what the answer is but how can we be taught what going on is. All our examples of it assume it.

This may be part of Platos puzzlement about universals and curiously enough Shankara in B.S.B. I.iii.28 offers the notion ofvedic words which is not a long way off the same aporia.

In short we have a means of attaining valid knowledge which is embedded within us. It is not reducible to any other means of knowledge and is therefore a pramana. This is of course anathema to the empiricist tradition.

In my second comment on Cidabhasa blog I get down to the task of discovering in the V.P. treatment of upamana a deictic demonstration of a facet of differentiation i.e. the discovery of similarity.

The text that I am familiar with on the subject of pramanas is Vedanta Paribhasa and of course the bos gaurus comes out to play there too. Now the question I put to myself is: suppose upamana is a separate pramana distinct from perception and inference etc. Does the classical account bear the weight of this position? The empiricist account with perception as its mainstay seems to be a stronger candidate for the power behind the naming of this strange beast. We have seen domestic cattle, we have seen their hooves and horns, we now see this new creature. By a sort of mental Venn diagram it moves partially into the cow area. Prior to this we have been primed by a reliable source so we can now name it with confidence.

To answer this story I propose the view that you cant gain the concept of common as in common features without having the concept common already and that is not perceptible or inferential etc. If I accept the notion of upamana as a pramana this is the direction I find I am pushed in. On the face of it this seems to be a sustainable interpretation. Here by a process of agreement and difference the knowledge of the likeness of a cow which exists in the gayal is the instrument, and the knowledge of that likeness of a gayal which exists in a cow is the result. (Vedanta Paribhasa)

knowledge of the likeness is the common of common feature

In Vedanta Paribhasa the establishing of the concept of upamana as a means of knowledge not reducible to any other is done by showing that the alternatives are impossible. This is not possible through perception, for then the cows form is not in contact with the eyes. Nor is it possible through inference for that likeness of a cow which exists in a gayal cannot be the sign (reason) for inferring the likeness of a gayal in a cow. Nor can it be urged that this is possible through the following inference: My cow is like this gayal. Because it corresponds to its likeness existing in a gayal. That which corresponds to its likeness existing in in a thing is like the latter.

The latter reasoning underscores the question begging aspect of seeing common features. (End Comment)

Now that last sentence might be better expressed as the circularity of abstracting the concept common from features that we know are common. In short upamana is a power which is innate like perception itself. It might well be said to be the eye of the mind in that it distinguishes forms/eidoi. Henry Bergson uses the term cut for this cutting out of whole cloth. What is this whole cloth? More, much more can be written on this topic. Anon.

Lastly I leave you with an alteration of Leibnizs Question: Why is there something rather than nothing? -- Why are there some things rather than an undifferentiated continuum?
POSTED BY OMBHURBHUVA AT 12:38

LABELS: MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE, PRAMANA, UPAMANA

2 COMMENTS:

Vidya said... The explanation of upamna in nyya is quite different from vednta and mmmsa though all of them admit it as a valid means of knowledge. There the word-meaning idea is distinctly stated whereas in vednta does not need that.

That said I am not quite sure I understand the following "upaminomi" line of reasoning which seems to be assuming that cognition takes only a certain path. May be this is due to the fact that they do not consider mind as an indriya etc.

"For even without this sort of inference, the cognition, "My cow is like this," is a matter of common experience, and has also the apperception, "I am comparing the two,". Hence comparison is a distinct means of knowledge". 20 APRIL 2012 16:48

ombhurbhuva said... Vidya: Thanks for your explication. Does that last paragraph represent the core Nyaya view. If it does I can see some problems with it. Suppose you see a white bird, a seagull say. Now to recognise that bird under all the headings that it could be put

under would require that your comparison engine/mind would be at work for a while. Compare that counter intuitive picture with our normal experience of having concepts ie immediate recognition. Besides that apperception requires an inner comparison which Wittgenstein in his private language critique in Philosophical Investigations exploded.

My understanding of D.A. based on the account given by Prof. Bina Gupta in her book Perceiving in Advaita Vedanta (an examination of the account of perception in V.P.), is that he was an expert in Nyaya logic. As well the translator of the edition I use, (Advaita Asrama , Swami Madhavananda,) says in his introduction that D.A. uses the method of Navya-Nyaya. Obviously there will be differences. Today I managed to download a copy ofPerception by Matilal so I will be furthering my education. It looks comprehensive. 20 APRIL 2012 23:58