CONSTI II REVIEWER POLICE POWER ASSO. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. SEC. OF DAR [175 SCRA 343; G.R. NO.

L-78742; 14 JUL 1989] Facts: Several petitions are the root of the case: a. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four tenants. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD 27. The petitioners now contend that President Aquino usurped the legislatures power. b. A petition by landowners and sugarplanters in Victorias Mill Negros Occidental against Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion. c. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer.

d. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares. Issue: Whether or Not the aforementioned EOs, PD, and RA were constitutional. Held: The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power and eminent domain. The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power and Eminent Domain. RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to deprive owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is

required is the surrender of the title and the physical possession of said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer. A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is concurrence of the lawful subject and the method. Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to be determined is the method employed to achieve it.

taxation is public purpose. Taxes are exacted only for a public purpose. They cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons is is simple. The power to tax exists for the general welfare; hence, implicit in its power is the limitation that it

TAXATION DOUBLE TAXATION same subject by the same taxing jurisdiction during the same taxing period for the same purpose prohibiting double taxation, but will not be allowed if it violates equal protection

should be used only for a public purpose.

minimize the injury to the proprietary rights of a taxpayer.

uniformly, lest the tax collector kill the hen that lays the golden eggs. in order to maintain the general publics trust and confidence in the Government, this power must be used justly and not treacherously.

C. Vis--vis Power to Tax

(Roxas y Cia vs. CTA, 23 SCRA 276)

Premature issuance of final assessment notice and demand letter is tantamount to denial of reply to the preliminary assessment notice. [THESE ARE] essential elements of due process because they constitute the notice and opportunity to present ones si

otherwise, the States power to legislate for the public welfare might be seriously curtailed Specific Limitations

a. General Rule: simply geographical uniformity, meaning it operates with the

C. Limitations General Limitations

same force and effect in every place where the subject of it is found b. Exception: rule does not prohibit

should be exercised only for a public purpose

classification for purposes of taxation, provided the ff requisites are met: i. standards used are substantial and

if the immediate beneficiaries are private individuals

not arbitrary ii. categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose

measure is so unconscionable as to amount to confiscation of property, the Court will invalidate it. But invalidating a tax measure must be exercised with utmost caution,

iii. the law applies, all things being equal to both present and future conditions iv. applies equally to members of the

same class

which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just.

o Constitutional Tax Exemptions: Religious, charitable, educational institutions and their properties All revenues and assets of NON-STOCK NONPROFIT EDUCATIONAL institutions are exempt from taxes and duties PROVIDED that such revenues and assets are actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes ( sec. 4 (3) Art XIV). Grants, endowments, donations or contributions used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from tax, subject to conditions prescribed by law (sec. 4 (4) Art XIV). essence is simply the opportunity to be heard DUE PROCESS Substantive due process one's side or to seek are consideration of the action / ruling complained of. enforced. reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive on individuals. 3. Procedural due process h the law is in general, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the intervention of the State

trial-type hearing. In labor cases, for example, Judicial due process is satisfied so long as the parties are given the opportunity to submit their proceedings, civil or criminal. position papers, and the parties cannot demand an adversarial trial as a matter of right (1) an impartial and disinterested court clothed by law with authority to hear and determine the matter before it (this does not preclude a judge from asking questions during the trial itself. Test of impartiality: whether the judges 1 0 0 % U P L A W U P B A R O P S 2 0 0 8 Page 58 of 210 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 intervention tends to prevent the proper presentation of the case or the ascertainment of the truth [People v. Larranaga]); (2) jurisdiction lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or the property which is the subject matter of the proceeding; (3) notice and opportunity to be heard given the defendant (but note that not all cases require a [Mariveles Shipyard v. CA, G.R. 144134]); (4) judgment to be rendered after lawful hearing, and judge must clearly explain its factual and legal bases. (Art. VIII, Sec. 14, 1987 CONST.; Banco Espaol-Filipino v. Palanca) l is not a natural right or a part of due process, except in cases where the right to appeal is guaranteed by the Constitution (Art. VIII, Sec. 5(2)) or by a statute. Reyes v. CA 80 SCRA 144 (1977) The allowance or denial of motions for extension rests principally on the sound discretion of the court to which it is addressed, but such discretion must be exercised wisely and prudently, with a view to substantial justice. The main cause of the delay was petitioner's inability to obtain the amount necessary for printing. Poverty is

recognized as a sufficient ground for extending existing period for filing. The right to appeal is part of due process of law. b. Administrative ocess before Administrative Agencies (Ang Tibay v CIR [1940]) (1) The right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights. (2) A real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights (3) A tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality. (4) A finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained the records or made known to the parties affected.

(b1) Strict observance not indispensable rt is a matter of right in judicial proceedings it is otherwise in administrative proceedings, since the latter rests upon different principles. In certain proceedings of an administrative character, due process, in the strict legal sense, is not indispensable. The rigid requirements of procedural laws are not strictly enforceable. (b2) Necessity of notice and hearing is practicing a quasi-judicial function; but in the performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with said requirements. (PhilComSat v Alcuaz) applied to administrative proceedings, the requirements of due process are satisfied when a party is afforded an

opportunity to explain his side or to seek a reconsideration of the ruling or the action taken.

prosecution. It is sufficient that the party is apprised of the substance of the charge against him; what is controlling is the allegation of the facts complained of, not the designation of the

hearing may be dispensed with, where, because of public need or for practical reasons, the same is not feasible. is sufficient if opportunity is later given to the individual adversely affected to test the validity or propriety of the administrative action on appeal to superior administrative authorities or to the court, or both. are not rendered invalid merely bsubject to court review. (b3) Requirement for discipline of civil service officers and employees ge against the respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted with the precision of an information in a criminal

offense. Conditions for valid classification: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Search and seizure BURGOS, SR. V. CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP [133 SCRA 800; G.R. NO. 64261; 26 DEC 1984] Facts: Petitioners assail the validity of 2 search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Cruz-Pano of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, under which the premises known as

No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued. Respondents contend that petitioners should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them before impugning the validity of the same before this Court. Respondents also assail the petition on ground of laches (Failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising

due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it). Respondents further state that since petitioner had already used as evidence some of the documents seized in a prior criminal case, he is stopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants. Petitioners submit the following reasons to nullify the questioned warrants: 1. Respondent Judge failed to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision as well as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. 2. The search warrants pinpointed only one address which would be the former abovementioned address. 3. Articles belonging to his co-petitioners were also seized although the warrants were only directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. 4. Real properties were seized.

5. The application along with a joint affidavit, upon which the warrants were issued, from the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may be validly issued in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. Respondents justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that they have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which authorizes sequestration of the property of any person engaged in subversive activities against the government in accordance with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense. Issue: Whether or Not the 2 search warrants were validly issued and executed. Held: In regard to the quashal of warrants that petitioners should have initially filed to the lower court, this Court takes cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the

constitutional Issue raised, not to mention the public interest generated by the search of the "We Forum" offices which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. With the contention pertaining to laches, the petitioners gave an explanation evidencing that they have exhausted other extra-judicial efforts to remedy the situation, negating the presumption that they have abandoned their right to the possession of the seized property. On the enumerated reasons: 1. This objection may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses. 2. The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two

warrants intended for one and the same place. 3. Section 2, Rule 126, of the Rules of Court, does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. 4. Petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground, remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant. 5. The broad statements in the application and joint affidavit are mere conclusions of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Deficient of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner

or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question are too general. With regard to the respondents invoking PD 885, there is an absence of any implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National Defense. Furthermore, President Marcos himself denies the request of military authorities to sequester the property seized from petitioners. The closure of the premises subjected to search and seizure is contrary to the freedom of the press as guaranteed in our fundamental law. The search warrants are declared null and void.

STONEHILL VS. DIOKNOSTONEHILL VS. DIOKNO [20 SCRA 383; L-19550; 19 JUN 1967]

Facts: Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors several judges2 hereinafter referred to as RespondentsJudges issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit: Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers). as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the

applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code." Petitioners contentions are: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law Respondents-prosecutors contentions (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.

The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein. Issue: Whether or not those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations are obtained legally. Whether or not those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein are obtained legally. Held: The petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations,

and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein. Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had

committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or __________________________ 1Hon. Jose W. Diokno, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, Jose Lukban, in his capacity as

Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation, Special Prosecutors Pedro D. Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and Manuel Villareal, Jr. and Assistant Fiscal Maneses G. Reyes, City of Manila. 2Hon. Amado Roan, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Roman Cansino, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Hermogenes Caluag, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, Hon. Eulogio Mencias, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch, and Hon. Damian Jimenez, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Quezon City. 3Covering the period from March 3 to March 9, 1962. 4Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck. 5U.S. Tobacco Corporation, Atlas Cement Corporation, Atlas Development Corporation, Far East Publishing Corporation (Evening News), Investment Inc., Industrial Business Management Corporation, General Agricultural Corporation, American Asiatic Oil Corporation, Investment Management Corporation, Holiday Hills, Inc., Republic Glass Corporation, Industrial and Business Management Corporation, United Housing Corporation, The Philippine Tobacco-Flue-

Curing and Redrying Corporation, Republic Real Estate Corporation and Merconsel Corporation.

production and issuance of postage stamps as would be advantageous to the government. Issue:

Freedom of religion AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ [64 PHIL 201; G.R. NO. 45459; 13 MAR 1937] Facts: Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress. Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional provision stating that no public funds shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any church, system of religion, etc. This provision is a result of the principle of the separation of church and state, for the purpose of avoiding the occasion wherein the state will use the church, or vice versa, as a weapon to further their ends and aims. Respondent contends that such issuance is in accordance to Act No. 4052, providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for the

Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion. Held: What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religious toleration. It is however not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052 advantageous to the government does not authorize violation of the Constitution. The issuance of the stamps was not inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. They were not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage stamps, instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of Manila, with the words Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic

Congress. The focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila, being the seat of that congress. This was to to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists, the officials merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance. Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic Church, any benefit and propaganda incidentally resulting from it was no the aim or purpose of the Government.

Freedom of expression

Freedom of Assembly

TESTS Purpose Test Ideally, the test should be the purpose of the assembly regardless of its backers (De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 US 353) Auspices Test But the ruling in Evangelista v. Earnshaw, 52 Phil 255 has not yet been abrogated. Here, the Manila mayor revoked the permits he already granted because the group was found by the fiscal to be an illegal association.