THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF CIVIL LAW

I. The Law
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1. LORENZO M. TANADA vs. JUAN C. TUVERA G. R. No. !"1# A$%&' ()* 1"+# FACTS In this case petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. etitioners contend that in order for these laws to be effective it must be published in the Official Gazette. !he respondents, on the other hand, contend that the case should be dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no legal personalit". #ithout showing that the non$ publication of these laws would bring in%ur" to the petitioners, the" have no cause of action, as provided for under the &ules of 'ourt. ISSUES 1. #hether or not petitioners have legal standing (. #hether or not various laws in )uestion should be published to be valid and enforceable. RULING !he petitioners have legal standing. !he *upreme 'ourt has alread" decided in various cases that a part" has a cause of action when the )uestion posed is one of public right and the ob%ect of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public dut". +nder such, the people are regarded as the real part" in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has an" legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws. ,s to the necessit" of publication, the *upreme 'ourt ruled that laws should be published. !he clear ob%ect of such is to give the general public ade)uate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. #ithout such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim -ignorantia legis non excusat.- It would be the height of in%ustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. !he publication of all presidential issuances -of a public nature- or -of general applicabilit"- is mandated b" law. Obviousl", presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this categor". Other presidential issuances which appl" onl" to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that the" have been circularized to all concerned.

(. ,-I vs. CASA MONTESSORI INTERNATIONALE G. R. No. 1)")#) . 1)"#/0 Ma1 (+* (//) FACTS ',*, .ontessori International opened an account with / I, with ',*,0s resident as one of its authorized signatories. It discovered that 1 of its checks had been encashed b" a certain *onn" 2. *antos whose name turned out to be fictitious, and was used b" a certain 3abut, ',*,0s external auditor. 4e voluntaril" admitted that he forged the signature and encashed the checks. &!' granted the 'omplaint for 'ollection with 2amages against / I ordering to reinstate the amount in the account, with interest. ', took account of ',*,0s contributor" negligence and apportioned the loss between ',*, and / I, and ordred 3abut to reimburse both. / I contends that the monthl" statements it issues to its clients contain a notice worded as follows5 6If no error is reported in 17 da"s, account will be correct8 and as such, it should be considered a waiver. ISSUE #hether or not waiver or estoppel results from failure to report the error in the bank statement RULING *uch notice cannot be considered a waiver, even if ',*, failed to report the error. 9either is it estopped from )uestioning the mistake after the lapse of the ten$da" period. !his notice is a simple confirmation or -circularization- $$ in accounting parlance $$ that re)uests client$depositors to affirm the accurac" of items recorded b" the banks. Its purpose is to obtain from the depositors a direct corroboration of the correctness of their account balances with their respective banks. :ver" right has sub%ects $$ active and passive. #hile the active sub%ect is entitled to demand its enforcement, the passive one is dut"$bound to suffer such enforcement. On the one hand, / I could not have been an active sub%ect, because it could not have demanded from ',*, a response to its notice. ',*,, on the other hand, could not have been a passive sub%ect, either, because it had no obligation to respond. It could $$ as it did $$ choose not to respond. :stoppel precludes individuals from den"ing or asserting, b" their own deed or representation, an"thing contrar" to that established as the truth, in legal contemplation. Our rules on evidence even make a %uris et de %ure presumption that whenever one has, b" one0s own act or omission, intentionall" and deliberatel" led another to believe a particular thing to be true and to act upon that belief, one cannot $$ in an" litigation arising from such act or omission $$ be permitted to falsif" that supposed truth.
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In the instant case, ',*, never made an" deed or representation that misled / I. !he former0s omission, if an", ma" onl" be deemed an innocent mistake oblivious to the procedures and conse)uences of periodic audits. *ince its conduct was due to such ignorance founded upon an innocent mistake, estoppel will not arise. , person who has no knowledge of or consent to a transaction ma" not be estopped b" it. -:stoppel cannot be sustained b" mere argument or doubtful inference x x x.- ',*, is not barred from )uestioning / I0s error even after the lapse of the period given in the notice. !. CONSUNJI vs. COURT OF A--EALS G. R. No. 1!0+0! A$%&' (/* (//1 FACTS <ose <uego, a construction worker of 2. .. 'onsun%i, Inc., fell 1= floors from the &enaissance !ower, asig 'it" to his death. 4e was crushed to death when the platform he was then on board and performing work, fell. ,nd the falling of the platform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was merel" inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a safet" lock. <ose <uego0s widow, .aria, filed in the &egional !rial 'ourt >&!'? of asig a complaint for damages against the deceased0s emplo"er, 2... 'onsun%i, Inc. !he emplo"er raised, among other defenses, the widow0s prior availment of the benefits from the *tate Insurance @und. &espondent avers, among others that the widow cannot recover for from the compan" an"more an civil damages on the account that it has recovered damages under the Aabor 'ode. ,fter trial, the &!' rendered a decision in favor of the widow and awarded actual and compensator" damages. On appeal, the ', affirmed the &!' in toto. ISSUE #hether or not private respondent is barred from availing of death benefits under the 'ivil 'ode after recovering from damages provided for under the Aabor 'ode. RULING !he *upreme 'ourt has alread" ruled in various cases that a recover" of damages under the #orker0s 'ompensation ,ct is a bar to a recover" under an ordinar" civil action. It ruled that an in%ured worker has a choice of either remedies. !he *upreme 'ourt allowed some exceptions. In the case at bar, the ', ruled that the widow had a right to file an ordinar" action for civil actions because she was not aware and was ignorant of her rights and courses of action. #hen a part" having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent remedies, the election is final and bars an" action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remed", in the absence of fraud b" the other part". !he first act of election acts as a bar. :)uitable in nature, the doctrine of election of remedies is designed to mitigate possible unfairness to both parties. It rests on the moral premise that it is fair to
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hold people responsible for their choices. !he purpose of the doctrine is not to prevent an" recourse to an" remed", but to prevent a double redress for a single wrong. !he choice of a part" between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver b" election. 4owever, waiver re)uires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an awareness of its conse)uences. !hat a waiver is made knowingl" and intelligentl" must be illustrated on the record or b" the evidence. , person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a right exists and has ade)uate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent decision. In the case at bar, the widow was not aware of her rights and remedies and thus her election to claim from the Insurance @und does not constitute a waiver on her part to claim from the petitioner$compan". etitioner0s argument that ,rt ; of the 9ew 'ivil 'ode, stating that 6Ignorance of the law excuses no one8 cannot stand. !he *upreme 'ourt ruled that the application of ,rticle ; is limited to mandator" and prohibitor" laws. !his ma" be deduced from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a person0s ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws. !he rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is neither mandator" nor prohibitor". ,ccordingl", her ignorance thereof cannot be held against her . ). DUENAS vs. SANTOS SU,DIVISION HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION G. R. No. 1)")10 J23e )* (//) FACTS etitioner 2ueBas is the daughter of the late 'ecilio *antos who, during his lifetime, owned a parcel of land with a total area of (.( hectares located at General !. 2e Aeon, Calenzuela 'it" , .etro .anila. In 11DD, 'ecilio had the realt" subdivided into smaller lots, the whole forming the 'ecilio <. *antos *ubdivision. !he Aand &egistration 'ommission approved the pro%ect and the 9ational 4ousing ,uthorit" issued the re)uired 'ertificate of &egistration and Aicense to *ell. ,t the time of 'ecilio0s death in 11EE, there were alread" several residents and homeowners in *antos *ubdivision. *ometime in 111F, the members of the **4, submitted to the petitioner a resolution asking her to provide within the subdivision an open space for recreational and other communit" activities, in accordance with the provisions of .2. 9o. 1GF, as amended b" .2. 9o. 1(1D. etitioner, however, re%ected the re)uest, thus, prompting the members of **4, to seek redress from the 94,. !he &egional 2irector 4A+&/ opined that the open space re)uirement of .2. 9o. 1GF was not applicable to *antos *ubdivision. **4, filed a motion for reconsideration, which averred among others that5 .2. 9o. 1GF should appl" retroactivel" to *antos *ubdivision. 4A+&/$9'& dismissed the complaint. It ruled that while **4, failed to present evidence showing that it is an association dul" organized under hilippine law with capacit" to sue. **4, then appealed to the 4A+&/ /oard of 'ommissioners. !he latter bod", however, affirmed the action taken b" the 4A+&/$9'& office. &espondent sought relief from the 'ourt of ,ppeals which granted the petition and accordingl" ordered the case to be remanded to the 4A+&/. etitioner moved for reconsideration which the 'ourt of ,ppeals denied.
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ISSUE #hether or not 2 9o. 1GF should be retroactivel" applies in this case RULING !he petitioner assails the appellate court0s finding based on the *upreme 'ourt0s previous ruling in Eugenio v. Exec. Sec. Drilon which allowed .2. 9o. 1GF, as amended, to appl" retroactivel". !he *upreme 'ourt ruled that Eugenio v. Exec. Sec. Drilon is inapplicable in this case. !he issue in Eugenio was the applicabilit" of .2. 9o. 1GF to purchase agreements on lots entered into prior to its enactment where there was non$pa"ment of amortizations, and failure to develop the subdivision. It held therein that although .2. 9o. 1GF does not provide for an" retroactive application, nonetheless, the intent of the law of protecting the helpless citizens from the manipulations and machinations of unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers %ustif" its retroactive application to contracts entered into prior to its enactment. 4ence, the *' ruled that the non$pa"ment of amortizations was %ustified under *ection (; of the said decree in view of the failure of the subdivision owner to develop the subdivision pro%ect. +nlike Eugenio, non$development of the subdivision is not present in this case, nor an" allegation of non$pa"ment of amortizations. @urther, it has held in a subse)uent case that .2. 9o. 1GF, as amended, cannot be applied retroactivel" in view of the absence of an" express provision on its retroactive application. !hus5 Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrar is provided. !hus, it is necessar that an express provision for its retroactive application must "e made in the law. !here "eing no such provision in "oth #.D. $os. %&' and ()44, these decrees cannot "e applied to a situation that occurred ears "efore their promulgation. !he *' has examined the text of .2. 9o. 1(1D and has not found an" clause or provision expressl" providing for its retroactive application. /asic is the rule that no statute, decree, ordinance, rule or regulation shall be given retrospective effect unless explicitl" stated. 4ence, there is no legal basis to hold that .2. 9o. 1(1D should appl" retroactivel".

#. -N, vs. NE-OMUCENO -U,LICATIONS G. R. No. 1!")0" De4e56e% (0* (//( FACTS etitioner 9/ granted respondents = million pesos of credit line to finance a movie pro%ect. !he loan was secured b" mortgages on respondents0 real and personal properties. &espondents defaulted in their obligation. etitioner sought foreclosure of
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the mortgaged properties. !he auction sale was re$scheduled several times without need of republication of the notice of sale. *ubse)uentl", the respondents filed an action for annulment of the foreclosure sale claiming that such was void because, among others, there was lack of publication of the notice of foreclosure sale. !he trail court ordered the annulment and set aside the foreclosure proceedings. +pon appeal, the ', affirmed the lower court. ISSUE #hether or not publication of foreclosure sale can be validl" waived b" agreement of the parties. RULING A47. No. !1!#* as a5e38e8, governing extra%udicial foreclosure of mortgages on real propert" is specific with regard to the posting and publication re)uirements of the notice of sale, to wit5 *Sec. ). $otice shall "e given " posting notices of the sale for not less than twent da s in at least three pu"lic places of the municipalit or cit where the propert is situated, and if such propert is worth more than four hundred pesos, such notice shall also "e pu"lished once a wee+ for at least three consecutive wee+s in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipalit or cit .It is well settled that what ,ct 9o. ;1;G re)uires is5 >1? the posting of notices of sale in three public placesH and, >(? the publication of the same in a newspaper of general circulation. @ailure to publish the notice of sale constitutes a %urisdictional defect, which invalidates the sale. etitioner, however, insists that the posting and publication re)uirements can be dispensed with since the parties agreed in writing that the auction sale ma" proceed without need of re$publication and re$posting of the notice of sale. !he *upreme 'ourt is not convinced. etitioner and respondents have absolutel" no right to waive the posting and publication re)uirements of ,ct 9o. ;1;G. #hile it is established that rights ma" be waived, ,rticle D of the 'ivil 'ode explicitl" provides that such waiver is sub%ect to the condition that it is not contrar" to law, public order, public polic", morals, or good customs, or pre%udicial to a third person with a right recognized b" law. !he principal ob%ect of a notice of sale in a foreclosure of mortgage is not so much to notif" the mortgagor as to inform the public generall" of the nature and condition of the propert" to be sold, and of the time, place, and terms of the sale. 9otices are given to secure bidders and prevent a sacrifice of the propert". 'learl", the statutor"
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re)uirements of posting and publication are mandated, not for the mortgagor0s benefit, but for the public or third persons. In fact, personal notice to the mortgagor in extra%udicial foreclosure proceedings is not even necessar", unless stipulated. ,s such, it is imbued with public polic" considerations and an" waiver thereon would be inconsistent with the intent and letter of ,ct 9o. ;1;G. . FILINVEST DEVELO-MENT COR-ORATION vs. CIR* e7 a'. G. R. No. 1) ")1 A292s7 "* (//0 FACTS @ilinvest 2evelopment 'orporation filed a claim for refund or in the alternative the issuance of a tax credit certificate >!''? with the 'ommissioner of Internal &evenue >'I&? representing excess creditable withholding taxes for taxable "ears 111=, 111G, 111D. !he 'I& did not resolve the claim for refund and the two$"ear prescriptive period was about to lapse which prompted the petitioner to file a petition for review before the 'ourt of !ax ,ppeals >'!,?. In the petition, it pra"ed for refund or in the alternative the issuance of !'' amounting ;,1F;,EDE.77.!he amount of 1,77=,(;D.77 representing excess/unutilized creditable withholding taxes for 111= was no longer included as it was alread" barred b" prescription. :ventuall", '!, dismissed the petition for review. .otion for review was filed before the 'ourt of ,ppeals which was dismissed so as the motion for reconsideration, denied. !hen here comes the petition before the *upreme 'ourt which was also denied but later in the motion for reconsideration it was at last granted. !he petitioner alleged among others that the ', erred in rel"ing on '!, cases where the" cited in its decision as %urisprudential basis to support its ruling. ISSUE #hether or not decisions of the '!, are %urisprudential basis for coming up a decision. RULING !he *' ruled that the ', was wrong in rel"ing decisions of the '!, as %urisprudential basis in resolving the case. /" tradition and in our s"stem of administration, the *upreme 'ourt has the last word on what the law is, and that its decisions appl"ing or interpreting the laws or the 'onstitution form part of the legal s"stem of the countr", all other courts should take their bearings from the decisions of this court. !he principle of 6stare decisis et non )uieta movere, as embodied in ,&! E of the 'ICIA 'O2: of the hilippines,en%oins adherence to %udicial precedents. It re)uires our courts
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to follow a rule alread" established in a final decision of the *'. !hat decision becomes a %udicial precedent to be followed in subse)uent cases b" all courts in the land. 0. DAVID RE:ES vs. JOSE LIM G. R. No. 1!)()1 A292s7 11* (//! FACTS etitioner &e"es filed a complaint for annulment of contract and damages against respondent Aim and 4arrison Aumber. In his complaint he alleged that he and Aim entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land wherein the other respondent 4arrison Aumber was occup"ing as lessee. !hat petitioner had informed 4arrison Aumber to vacate the propert" and if the" failed to vacate, he will hold them liable for the penalt" of =77,777 a month as provided in the contract to sell. 4e further alleged that Aim connived with 4arrison Aumber not to vacate the propert" until the =77,777 monthl" penalties would have accumulated and e)ualed the unpaid purchase price of 1E,777. 4arrison in their answer denies the allegation of connivance between them and Aim to defraud &e"es. !he" alleged that &e"es approved their re)uest to extend their time to vacate the premise due to the difficult" in finding a new location for their business. #hile Aim in his answer alleged that he was read" and willing to pa" the balance of the purchase price and re)uested a meeting with &e"es but &e"es kept on postponing the meeting and instead offered to return the 17,777,777 down pa"ment because &e"es has a hard time in removing the lessee to the propert" but Aim re%ected the offer and proceeded to verif" the status of &e"es title to the propert", and he learned that it was alread" sold to Aine One 'orporation. ISSUES 1. #hether or not the act of &e"es constitute un%ust enrichment (. #hether or not the principle of un%ust enrichment applies to procedural remedies RULING !he principle that no person ma" un%ustl" enrich himself at the expense of another is embodied in ,rticle (( of the 'ivil 'ode. !his principle applies not onl" to substantive rights but also to procedural remedies. One condition for invoking this principle is that the aggrieved part" has no other action based on contract, )uasi$contract, crime, )uasi$ delict or an" other provision of law. 'ourts can extend this condition to the hiatus in the &ules of 'ourt where the aggrieved part", during the pendenc" of the case, has no other recourse based on the provisional remedies of the &ules of 'ourt. !hus, a court ma" not permit a seller to retain, pendente lite, mone" paid b" a bu"er if the seller himself seeks rescission of the sale because he has subse)uentl" sold the same propert" to another bu"er. /" seeking rescission, a seller necessaril" offers to return what he has received from the bu"er. *uch a seller ma" not take back his offer if the court deems it e)uitable, to prevent un%ust enrichment and ensure restitution, to put the mone" in %udicial deposit.

!here is un%ust enrichment when a person un%ustl" retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains mone" or propert" of another against the fundamental principles of %ustice, e)uit" and good conscience. In this case, it was %ust, e)uitable and proper for the trial court to order the deposit of the 17 million down pa"ment to prevent un%ust enrichment b" &e"es at the expense of Aim. +. ROMMEL JACINTO* DANTES SILVERIO vs. RE-U,LIC OF THE -HIL. G. R. No. 10) +" O47o6e% 1"* (//0 FACTS On 9ovember (D, (77(, petitioner &ommel <acinto 2antes *ilverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the &!' of .anila, /ranch E. etitioner was born in the 'it" of .anila to the spouses .elecio *ilverio and ,nita 2antes on ,pril =, 11D(. 4is name was registered as -&ommel <acinto 2antes *ilverioin his certificate of live birth. 4is sex was registered as -male.4e alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, -anatomicall" male but feels, thinks and acts as a female- and that he had alwa"s identified himself with girls since childhood. @eeling trapped in a man0s bod", he underwent ps"chological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. 4is attempts to transform himself to a -woman- culminated on <anuar" (F, (771 when he underwent sex reassignment surger" in /angkok, !hailand. 4e was thereafter examined b" 2r. .arcelino &e"sio$ 'ruz, <r., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the hilippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he had in fact undergone the procedure. @rom then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. 4e then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from -&ommel <acinto- to -.el",- and his sex from -male- to -female.!he trial court ruled in favor of petitioner. !he granting of the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of %ustice and e)uit". !he &epublic of the hilippines, thru the O*G, filed a petition for certiorari in the 'ourt of ,ppeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate b" reason of sex alteration.!he 'ourt of ,ppeals ruled that the trial court0s decision lacked legal basis. !here is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surger". etitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. 4ence, this petition. ISSUE #hether or not petitioner0s claim that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under ,rticles =7F to =1; of the 'ivil 'ode, &ules 17; and 17E of the &ules of 'ourt and &, 17=E. RULING !he petition lacks merit.
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, erson0s @irst 9ame 'annot /e 'hanged On the Ground of *ex &eassignment !he *tate has an interest in the names borne b" individuals and entities for purposes of identification. , change of name is a privilege, not a right. etitions for change of name are controlled b" statutes. ,rticle ;FD of the 'ivil 'ode was amended b" &, 17=E >'lerical :rror Aaw?. &, 17=E now governs the change of first name. +nder the law, %urisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primaril" lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. In sum, the remed" and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primaril" administrative in nature, not %udicial. &, 17=E likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name ma" be allowed. etitioner0s basis in the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. 4owever, a change of name does not alter one0s legal capacit" or civil status. &, 17=E does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. /efore a person can legall" change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or an" compelling reason %ustif"ing such change. 4e must show that he will be pre%udiced b" the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, an" pre%udice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name. In sum, the petition in the trial court was not within that court0s primar" %urisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legall" done. It was an improper remed" because the proper remed" was administrative, provided under &, 17=E. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the 'ivil &egistrar of .anila where his birth certificate is kept. .ore importantl", it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not pre%udice him at all. 9o Aaw ,llows !he 'hange of :ntr" In !he /irth 'ertificate ,s !o *ex On the Ground of *ex &eassignment !he determination of a person0s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. *ection (>c? of &, 17=E defines what a -clerical or t"pographical error- is and that no correction must involve the change of nationalit", age, status or sex of the petitioner. +nder &, 17=E, a correction in the civil registr" involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or t"pographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is &ule 17E of the &ules of 'ourt. !here is no such special law in the hilippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. !his is fatal to petitioner0s cause.
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+nder the 'ivil &egister Aaw, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as the" existed at the time of birth. !hus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visuall" done b" the birth attendant >the ph"sician or midwife? b" examining the genitals of the infant. 'onsidering that there is no law legall" recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person0s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended b" error, is immutable. @or these reasons, while petitioner ma" have succeeded in altering his bod" and appearance through the intervention of modern surger", no law authorizes the change of entr" as to sex in the civil registr" for that reason. !hus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate. 9either .a" :ntries in the /irth 'ertificate ,s to @irst 9ame or *ex /e 'hanged on the Ground of :)uit" !he changes sought b" petitioner will have serious and wide$ranging legal and public polic" conse)uences. @irst, the petition was petitioner0s first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancI. 4owever, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. One of its essential re)uisites is the legal capacit" of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female. !o grant the changes sought b" petitioner will substantiall" reconfigure and greatl" alter the laws on marriage and famil" relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment >a male$to$ female post$operative transsexual?. *econd, there are various laws which appl" particularl" to women such as the provisions of the Aabor 'ode on emplo"ment of women, certain felonies under the &evised enal 'ode and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under &ule 1;1 of the &ules of 'ourt, among others. !hese laws underscore the public polic" in relation to women which could be substantiall" affected if petitioner0s petition were to be granted. It is true that ,rticle 1 of the 'ivil 'ode mandates that -JnKo %udge or court shall decline to render %udgment b" reason of the silence, obscurit" or insufficienc" of the law.4owever, it is not a license for courts to engage in %udicial legislation. !he dut" of the courts is to appl" or interpret the law, not to make or amend it. !o reiterate, the statutes define who ma" file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registr", where the" ma" be filed, what grounds ma" be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation la"ing down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege. !he 'ourt cannot render %udgment %udgment to change name or sex on the ground of e)uit"
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It is true that ,rticle 1 of the 'ivil 'ode mandates that -JnKo %udge or court shall decline to render %udgment b" reason of the silence, obscurit" or insufficienc" of the law.4owever, it is not a license for courts to engage in ;28&4&a' 'e9&s'a7&o3. !he dut" of the courts is to appl" or interpret the law, not to make or amend it. !he 'ourt cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can onl" appl" or interpret the written word of its co$e)ual branch of government, 'ongress. ". RADIN C. ALCIRA vs. NLRC G. R. No. 1)"+#" J23e "* (//) FACTS !he petitioner, &adin ,lcira, was hired b" the respondent .iddleb" hilippines 'orporation as engineering support services supervisor under probationar" status for D months. ,fterwards, the service of the petitioner was terminated b" the respondent on the ground that the latter was not satisfied on the performance of the former. ,s a result, the petitioner filed a complaint foe illegal dismissal in the 9ational Aabor &elations 'ommission >9A&'? against the respondent. etitioner contended that his termination in the service tantamount to illegal dismissal since he attained the status of a regular emplo"ee as of the time of dismissal. 4e presented the appointment paper showing that he was hired on .a" (7, 111D, conse)uentl", his dismissal on 9ovember (7, 111D was illegal because at that time, he was alread" a regular emplo"ee since the D$month probationar" period ended on 9ovember 1D, 111D. !he respondent, on the other hand, asserted that during the petitioner0s probationar" period, he showed poor performance on his assigned tasks, was late couple of times and violated the compan"0s rule. !hus, the petitioner was terminated and his application to become a regular emplo"ment was disapproved. !he respondent also insisted that the removal of the petitioner from office was within the probationar" period. !he Aabor ,rbiter dismissed the complaint on the ground that the dismissal of the petitioner was done before his regularization because the D$ month probationar" period, counting from .a" (7, 111D shall end on 9ovember (7, 111D. !he 9A&' affirmed the decision of the Aabor ,rbiter. !he 'ourt of ,ppeals affirmed the decision of 9A&'. 4ence, the present recourse. ISSUE #hether the petitioner was alread" a regular emplo"ee in respondent0s compan" at the time of his dismissal from the service RULING !he *upreme 'ourt ruled in the negative. !he status of the petitioner at the time of his termination was still probationar". 4is dismissal on 9ovember (7, 111D was within the D$ month probationar" period. ,rticle 1; of the 'ivil 'ode provides that when the law
1;

speaks of "ears, months, and da"s and nights, it shall be understood that "ears are of ;DG da"s, months of ;7 da"s, da"s of (= hours and nights are from sunset to sunrise. *ince, one month is composed of ;7 da"s, then, D months shall be understood to be composed of 1E7 da"s. ,nd the computation of the D$ month period is reckoned from the date of appointment up to the same calendar date of the Dth month following. *ince, the number of da"s of a particular month is irrelevant, petitioner was still a probationar" emplo"ee at the time of his dismissal. #herefore, the petition is dismissed. 1/. LUCIO MORIGO vs. -EO-LE OF THE -HILS G. R. No. 1)#(( Fe6%2a%1 * (//) FACTS Aucio .origo and Aucia /arrete were boardmates, after school "ear, the" lost contact with each other. In 11E=, Aucio .origo was surprised to receive a card from Aucia /arrete from *ingapore. !he former replied and after an exchange of letters, the" became sweethearts. In 11ED, Aucia returned to the hilippines but left again for 'anada to work there. #hile in 'anada, the" maintained constant communication. In 1117, Aucia came back to the hilippines and proposed to petition appellant to %oin her in 'anada. /oth agreed to get married, thus the" were married on ,ugust ;7, 1117 at the Iglesia de @ilipina 9acional at 'atagdaan, ilar, /ohol. On *eptember E, 1117, Aucia reported back to her work in 'anada leaving appellant Aucio behind. On ,ugust 11, 1111, Aucia filed with the Ontario 'ourt >General 2ivision? a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted b" the court on <anuar" 1F, 111( and to take effect on @ebruar" 1F, 111(. On October =, 111(, appellant Aucio .origo married .aria <ececha Aumbago. On *eptember (1, 111;, accused filed a complaint for %udicial declaration of nullit" of marriage in the &egional !rial 'ourt of /ohol. !he complaint seek among others, the declaration of nullit" of accused0s marriage with Aucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremon" actuall" took place. On October 11, 111;, appellant was charged with /igam" in an Information filed b" the 'it" rosecutor of !agbilaran, with the &egional !rial 'ourt of /ohol. !he petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for %udicial nullification of his marriage with Aucia posed a pre%udicial )uestion in the bigam" case. 4is motion was granted, but subse)uentl" denied upon motion for reconsideration b" the prosecution. #hen arraigned in the bigam" case, petitioner pleaded not guilt" to the charge. !rial thereafter ensued. On ,ugust G, 111D, the &!' of /ohol handed down its %udgment in 'riminal 'ase 9o. EDEE, convicting the accused guilt" be"ond reasonable doubt of the crime of /igam" and sentences him to suffer the penalt" of imprisonment ranging from *even >F? .onths
1=

of rision 'orreccional as minimum to *ix >D? 3ears and One >1? 2a" of as maximum.

rision .a"or

In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner0s claim that his first marriage to Aucia was null and void ab initio. !he trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremon" is not a defense in a charge of bigam". !he parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a %udicial declaration of the nullit" of their marriage before the" can be allowed to marr" again. On October (;, 111F, while the criminal case was pending before the appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in 'ivil 'ase 9o. D7(7 declaring the marriage between Aucio and Aucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremon" actuall" took place. 9o appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executor". 4owever, the appelate court affirmed the decision of the lower court in toto. In affirming the assailed %udgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subse)uent declaration of nullit" of Aucio0s marriage to Aucia could not ac)uit Aucio. !he reason is that what is sought to be punished b" ,rticle ;=1 of the &evised enal 'ode is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved. 4ence, the ', held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigam" case. ISSUE #hether or not petitioner committed bigam". RULING !he petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for rel"ing in good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario court. 4e highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openl" and publicl", which a person intent upon bigam" would not be doing. !he petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or ac)uittal in the instant case. !he crime of bigam", %ust like other felonies punished under the &evised enal 'ode, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. 4e stresses that there is a difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. 4ence, it does not necessaril" follow that his intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigam". @or the respondent, the Office of the *olicitor General >O*G? submits that good faith in the instant case is a convenient but flims" excuse. !he *olicitor General relies upon our ruling in .arbella$/obis v. /obis, which held that bigam" can be successfull" prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing that under ,rticle =7 of the @amil" 'ode, a %udicial declaration of nullit" is a must before a part" ma" re$marr". #hether or not the petitioner was aware of said ,rticle =7 is of no account as ever"one is presumed to know the law. !he O*G counters that petitioner0s contention that he was
1G

in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated b" his act of filing 'ivil 'ase 9o. D7(7, seeking a %udicial declaration of nullit" of his marriage to Aucia. /efore we delve into petitioner0s defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first determine whether all the elements of bigam" are present in this case. In .arbella$/obis v. /obis,(7 we laid down the elements of bigam" thus5 >1? the offender has been legall" marriedH >(? the first marriage has not been legall" dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been %udiciall" declared presumptivel" deadH >;? he contracts a subse)uent marriageH and >=? the subse)uent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. ,ppl"ing the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendenc" of civil case, the &!' of /ohol /ranch 1, rendered %udgment decreeing the annulment of the marriage entered into b" petitioner Aucio .origo and Aucia /arrete on ,ugust (;, 1117 in ilar, /ohol and further directing the Aocal 'ivil &egistrar of ilar, /ohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract. !he trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremon" performed between Aucio and Aucia b" a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract b" the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. !he trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with ,rticles ; and = of the @amil" 'ode. ,s the dissenting opinion in ',$G.&. '& 9o. (7F77, correctl" puts it, -!his simpl" means that there was no marriage to begin withH and that such declaration of nullit" retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the e"es of the law, never married.- !he records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in 'ivil 'ase 9o. D7(7, hence, the decision had long become final and executor". !he first element of bigam" as a crime re)uires that the accused must have been legall" married. /ut in this case, legall" speaking, the petitioner was never married to Aucia /arrete. !hus, there is no first marriage to speak of. +nder the principle of retroactivit" of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married -from the beginning.- !he contract of marriage is nullH it bears no legal effect. !aking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Aucia at the time he contracted the marriage with .aria <ececha. !he existence and the validit" of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigam", it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. !he petitioner, must, perforce be ac)uitted of the instant charge.
1D

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremon" at all was performed b" a dul" authorized solemnizing officer. etitioner and Aucia /arrete merel" signed a marriage contract on their own. !he mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no %udicial declaration of nullit". *uch act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibl" valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigam" unless he first secures a %udicial declaration of nullit" before he contracts a subse)uent marriage. 11. -AULA T. LLORENTE vs. COURT OF A--EALS G. R. No. 1()!01 Nove56e% (!* (/// FACTS On @ebruar" ((, 11;F, Aorenzo and petitioner aula were married before a parish priest in 9abua, 'amarines *ur. On 9ovember ;7, 11=;, Aorenzo was admitted to +nited *tates citizenship and 'ertificate of 9aturalization 9o. GGF1E1D was issued in his favor b" the +nited *tates 2istrict 'ourt, *outhern 2istrict of 9ew 3ork. +pon the liberation of the hilippines b" the ,merican @orces in 11=G, Aorenzo was granted an accrued leave b" the +. *. 9av", to visit his wife and he visited the hilippines. 4e discovered that his wife aula was pregnant and was 6living in8 and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, 'eferino Alorente. Aorenzo refused to forgive aula and live with her . 4e then returned to the +nited *tates and on 9ovember 1D, 11G1 filed for divorce with the *uperior 'ourt of the *tate of 'alifornia in and for the 'ount" of *an 2iego. aula was represented b" counsel, <ohn &ile", and activel" participated in the proceedings. On 9ovember (F, 11G1, the *uperior 'ourt of the *tate of 'alifornia, for the 'ount" of *an 2iego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutor" %udgment of divorce. On 2ecember =, 11G(, the divorce decree became final. Aorenzo went back to the Alorente in .anila. hilippines and on <anuar" 1D, 11GE married ,licia @.

@rom 11GE to 11EG, Aorenzo and ,licia lived together as husband and wife.!heir twent"$five >(G? "ear union produced three children, &aul, Auz and /everl", all surnamed Alorente. On .arch 1;, 11E1, Aorenzo executed a Aast #ill and !estament. !he will was notarized b" 9otar" ublic *alvador .. Occiano, dul" signed b" Aorenzo with attesting witnesses @rancisco 4ugo, @rancisco 9eibres and !ito !ra%ano. In the will, Aorenzo be)ueathed all his propert" to ,licia and their three children.
1F

On 2ecember 1=, 11E;, Aorenzo filed with the &egional !rial 'ourt, Iriga, 'amarines *ur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Aorenzo moved that ,licia be appointed *pecial ,dministratrix of his estate. On <anuar" (=, 11E=, finding that the will was dul" executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate but before the proceedings could be terminated , Aorenzo died. aula filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over Aorenzo0s estate in her favor contending that she was Aorenzo0s surviving spouse, that such properties were ac)uired during their marriage and that Aorenzo0s will would encroach her legitime. ,licia filed in the testate proceeding , a petition for the issuance of letters testamentar". On October 1=, 11EG, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to aula0s petition. !he &egional !rial 'ourt found that the divorce decree granted to the late Aorenzo Alorente is void and inapplicable in the hilippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with ,licia @ortunato on <anuar" 1D, 11GE at .anila is likewise void. !his being so the petition of ,licia @. Alorente for the issuance of letters testamentar" is denied. Aikewise, she is not entitled to receive an" share from the estate even if the will especiall" said so her relationship with Aorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under ,rt. F;1 >1?. 6 etitioner, aula Alorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, Aorenzo Alorente. ISSUE #ho are entitled to inherit from the late Aorenzo 9. AlorenteL RULING !he trial court held that the will was intrinsicall" invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of ,lice, who in the trial court0s opinion was a mere paramour. !he trial court threw the will out, leaving ,lice, and her two children, &aul and Auz, with nothing. !he 'ourt of ,ppeals also disregarded the will. It declared ,lice entitled to one half >1/(? of whatever propert" she and Aorenzo ac)uired during their cohabitation, appl"ing ,rticle 1== of the 'ivil 'ode of the hilippines. !he hast" application of hilippine law and the complete disregard of the will, alread" probated as dul" executed in accordance with the formalities of hilippine law, is fatal, especiall" in light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.

1E

Aorenzo 9. Alorente became an ,merican citizen long before and at the time of5 >1? his divorce from aulaH >(? marriage to ,liciaH >;? execution of his willH and >=? death, is dul" established, admitted and undisputed. !hus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessaril" governed b" foreign law. 6 Art. (,. -eal propert as well as personal propert is su".ect to the law of the countr where it is situated. 64owever, intestate and testamentar" succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validit" of testamentar" provisions, shall be regulated b" the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever ma" be the nature of the propert" and regardless of the countr" wherein said propert" ma" be found.8 /ut the hast" disregard of both the &!' and ', of Aorenzo0s #ill b" calling to the fore the &:9COI doctrine, claiming that ,merican law follows domiciliar" rule is un%ustified. !here is no such thing as ,merican law for the whole nation of the +*, for the countr" comprises of a group of *tates, each *tate having its own applicable law, enforceable onl" within that state. ,s to the validit" of the foreign divorce , %urisprudence reiterates that once it is proven that an individual is no longer a @ilipino, thus an alien, when he obtains a divorce abroad, its effects shall be recognized in the hilippines. !he *upreme 'ourt held that the divorce obtained b" Aorenzo 4. Alorente from his first wife aula was valid and recognized in this %urisdiction as a matter of comit". 9ow, the effects of this divorce >as to the succession to the estate of the decedent? are matters best left to the determination of the trial court. Whe7he% 7he w&'' &s &37%&3s&4a''1 va'&8 a38 who sha'' &3he%&7 <%o5 Lo%e3=o a%e &ss2es 6es7 $%ove8 61 <o%e&93 'aw wh&4h 52s7 6e $'ea8e8 a38 $%ove8. Whe7he% 7he w&'' was e>e427e8 &3 a44o%8a34e w&7h 7he <o%5a'&7&es %e?2&%e8 &s a3swe%e8 61 %e<e%%&39 7o -h&'&$$&3e 'aw. I3 <a47* 7he w&'' was 82'1 $%o6a7e8. The 8e4&s&o3 o< 7he CA &s se7 as&8e a38 7ha7 o< 7he RTC &s %eve%se8. Co2%7 REMANDS 7he 4ases 7o 7he 4o2%7 o< o%&9&3 <o% 8e7e%5&3a7&o3 o< 7he &37%&3s&4 va'&8&71 o< Lo%e3=o N. L'o%e37e@s w&'' a38 8e7e%5&3a7&o3 o< 7he $a%7&es@ s244ess&o3a' %&9h7s a''ow&39 $%oo< o< <o%e&93 'aw w&7h &3s7%247&o3s 7ha7 7he 7%&a' 4o2%7 sha'' $%o4ee8 w&7h a'' 8e'&6e%a7e 8&s$a74h 7o se77'e 7he es7a7e o< 7he 8e4ease8 w&7h&3 7he <%a5ewo%A o< 7he R2'es o< Co2%7.

11

II. Who &s a -e%so3 238e% 7he C&v&' Co8eB

1. -EO-LE OF THE -HILI--INES vs. FERNANDO FELI-E G. R. No. LC)/)!( J2'1 1"* 1"+( FACTS 4erein accused @ernando @elipe was convicted b" the lower court of the crime of rape committed b" him against his niece$in$law &uth ancho. ,s a result of the incident the victim got pregnant, who was then (G "ears old. #hen the accused appealed his case, one of his defenses was the fact that the victim0s child was born on .arch 1;, 11F( and that the victim could not have been raped on <ul"
(7

1, 11F1 because there are onl" (=F da"s between these dates. ,ccused claimed that the normal period of gestation is (E7 da"s and the 'ivil 'ode considers ;77 da"s as the length of uterine development of a child. ISSUE #hether or not the victim0s child is considered a normal child. RULING 3es, the victim0s child was normal. ,s aptl" contended b" the *olicitor General in his brief, -a child born E months and seven da"s after conception is considered normal. ...H that in certain instances the 'ivil 'ode considers ;77 da"s as the length of the uterine development of a child, but b" providing that a premature child is one which has an intra$uterine life of less than seven months >,rt. =1, 'ivil 'ode? the 'ode impliedl" recognizes that a child which had an intra$uterine life of E months, as in the case at bar, is a normal child.(. MILAGROS JOAQUINO vs. LOURDES RE:ES G. R. No. 1#) )# J2'1 1!* (//) FACTS +nder the law capacit" to act is the power to do acts with legal effects, this however is not inherent it can onl" be ac)uired at the same time it can also be restricted. ,mong its limitations is b" reason of famil" relations. /digester0s own interpretation of the case in relation to the topic1 !his case is originall" an action for reconve"ance filed b" the legal wife herein respondent Aourdes &e"es against the paramour of her husband herein petitioner .ilgaros <oa)uino. !his case involved a disputed propert" in /@ homes which was registered under the name of .ilagros ac)uired b" the deceased husband of Aourdes before his death and during the subsistence of their marriage. Aourdes >wife? alleged that the said propert" is a 'on%ugal ropert" because the same was ac)uired b" her husband from his salaries and earnings. .ilagros >paramour? on the other hand claimed that the same was ac)uired b" her form her exclusive income. !he trial court and the 'ourt of ,ppeals both ruled in favor of the wife and ordered the reconve"ance of the said propert" ISSUE #hether the propert" is con%ugal >owned b" &odolfo and Aourdes? or exclusive >owned b" .ilagros? or co$owned b" &odolfo and .ilagros. RULING !he propert" is con%ugal. It was clearl" shown that the propert" was bought during the marriage of &odolfo and Aourdes, a fact that gives rise to the presumption that it is con%ugal. .ore important, the" have established that the proceeds of the loan obtained
(1

b" &odolfo were used to pa" for the propert"H and that the loan was, in turn, paid from his salaries and earnings, which were con%ugal funds under the 'ivil 'ode. +nder the circumstances, therefore, the purchase and the subse)uent registration of the realt" in the paramour0s name was tantamount to a donation b" &odolfo to .ilagros >paramour?. /" express provision of ,rticle F;1>1? of the 'ivil 'ode, such donation was void, because it was -made between persons who were guilt" of adulter" or concubinage at the time of the donation.!he prohibition against donations between spouses must likewise appl" to donations between persons living together in illicit relationsH otherwise, the latter would be better situated than the former.;D ,rticle EF of the @amil" 'ode now expressl" provides thus5 -,rt. EF. :ver" donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses ma" give each other on the occasion of an" famil" re%oicing. !he prohi"ition shall also appl to persons living together as hus"and and wife without a valid marriage.- >Italics supplied?. !. ,OARD OF O-TOMETR: vs. HON. ANGEL ,. COLET G. R. No. 1((()1 J2'1 !/* 1"" FACTS 4erein private respondents ,cebedo Optical 'o., Inc., &epublica ,. anol, and the alleged -presidents- of Optometr" ractitioner ,ssociation of the hilippines >O , ?, 'enevis Optometrist ,ssociation >'O,?, ,ssociation of 'hristian$.uslim Optometrist >,'.O?, *outhern .indanao Optometrist ,ssociation of the hilippines >*.O, ? )uestioned the validit" of &, E7G7 known as the &evised Optometr" Aaw in a petition for declarator" relief and for prohibition and in%unction, with a pra"er for a temporar" restraining order. !he &egional !rial 'ourt then issued the now assailed order granting a writ of preliminar" in%unction en%oining, restraining, restricting, and forbidding the respondents therein >herein petitioners?, their agents, officers, and emplo"ees from performing or undertaking an" act in implementation or enforcement of &.,. 9o. E7G7, or an" of its provisions. In the said petition filed b" the private respondents each allegedl" represented b" its president. !he bod" of the petition, however, gave no details as to the %uridical personalit" and addresses of these alleged associations, save for ,cebedo Optical 'o., Inc. It merel" listed the names of the alleged presidents as well as their profession and home addresses. 4ence this instant petition. ISSUE #hether or not private respondents have the re)uisite capacit" >locus standi?
((

RULING 9o, private respondents failed to establish their locus standi. Onl" natural and %uridical persons or entities authorized b" law ma" be parties in a civil action, and ever" action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real part" in interest. 1+ +nder ,rticle == of the 'ivil 'ode, an association is considered a %uridical person if the law grants it a personalit" separate and distinct from that of its members. !here is serious doubt as to the existence of private respondents O , , 'O,, ,'.O, and *.O, . @or one, the bod" of the petition in 'ivil 'ase 9o. 1G$F=FF7 makes no mention of these associations nor state their addresses. @urther, nowhere is it claimed therein that the" are %uridical entities. !hese run counter to *ection =, &ule E of the &ules of 'ourt, which provides that facts showing the capacit" of a part" to sue or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a part" must be averred. *econd, not even in the sworn statements. of the alleged presidents representing the -associations,- which were offered in evidence in support of the application for a writ of preliminar" in%unction, were such -associations- mentioned or named. @inall", in their 'omment on the instant petition, the private respondents chose to remain silent on the issue of the %uridical personalit" of their -associations.@or having failed to show that the" are %uridical entities, private respondents O , , 'O,, ,'.O, and *.O, must then be deemed to be devoid of legal personalit" to bring an action.

). IMELDA ROMUALDEZCMARCOS vs. COMELEC G. R. No. 11""0 Se$7e56e% 1+* 1""# FACTS etitioner Imelda &omualdez$.arcos filed her 'ertificate of 'andidac" for the position of &epresentative of the @irst 2istrict of Ae"te. *he indicated in her 'O' that resided in the constituenc" she sought to be elected for seven months. !hus, private respondent 'irilo &o" .onte%o, the incumbent &epresentative of the @irst 2istrict of Ae"te and a candidate for the same position, filed a - etition for 'ancellation and 2is)ualification- # with the 'ommission on :lections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional re)uirement for residenc" which under the 'onstitution re)uires one "ear residenc" for candidates for the 4ouse of &epresentatives. In her answer, herein petitioner asserted that that her domicile is !acloban 'it", a component of the @irst 2istrict, to which she alwa"s intended to return whenever absent and which she has never abandoned. !hat there was onl" an honest mistake on her part when she wrote in her 'O' seven months >residenc"? while in fact she intended it to be 6since childhood.8 9ot convinced, 'O.:A:' granted the petition for
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2is)ualification, holding that Imelda is deemed to have abandoned !acloban 'it" as her place of domicile when she lived and even voted in Ilocos and .anila. ISSUE #hether or not herein petitioner >Imelda? abandoned her domicile of origin and as conse)uence thereof is she )ualified to run as representative of the @irst 2istrict of Ae"te RULING Imelda did not lose her domicile of origin. 2omicile of origin is not easil" lost. !o successfull" effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate5 1. ,n actual removal or an actual change of domicileH (. , "ona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new oneH and ;. ,cts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. !he evidence adduced b" private respondent plainl" lacks the degree of persuasiveness re)uired to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. !o effect an abandonment re)uires the voluntar" act of relin)uishing petitionerMs former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing >domicilium voluntarium?. ,rticle G7 of the 'ivil 'ode decrees that -JfKor the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence.- In 2ng vs. -epu"lic (/ this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individualMs -permanent home-, -a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that the" disclose intent.- (1 /ased on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of -the fact of residing or ph"sical presence in a fixed place- and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanentl". &esidence, in its ordinar" conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the ph"sical presence of a person in a given area, communit" or countr". !he essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One ma" seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a personMs intent be to remain, it becomes his domicileH if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. @or political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated b" the peculiar criteria of political laws. ,s these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearl" and une)uivocall" emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used s"non"mousl" with domicile.

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In Fa pon vs. 3uirino, court held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. *o settled is the concept >of domicile? in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this 'ourt has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile. !herefore, petitioner possesses the necessar" residence )ualifications to run for a seat in the 4ouse of &epresentatives in the @irst 2istrict of Ae"te. #. ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. RE-U,LIC G. R. No. 10) +" O47o6e% 1"* (//0 FACTS 4erein petitioner underwent a sex reassignment surger" from a man to a woman. ,s a result he now files this petition to change his name in his birth certificate from -&ommel <acinto- to -.el",- and his sex from -male- to -female,8 as he is engaged and wish to get married. !he trial court rendered a decision in favor of herein petitioner. 4owever, the &epublic of the hilippines thru the *olicitor General filed a petition for certiorari in the 'ourt of ,ppeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate b" reason of sex alteration. !he court of ,ppeals then rendered a decision in favor of the &epublic based on the ground that there is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surger". 4ence, this petition. ISSUES 1. #hether or not a person0s first name can be changed on the rgounf of sex$re$ assignment. (. #hether or not petitioner can change his sex from male to female in his birth certificate via %udicial petition. RULING !he governing rule for change of first name is &, 17=E and grounds provided thereof are5 >1? !he petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremel" difficult to write or pronounceH >(? !he new first name or nickname has been habituall" and continuousl" used b" the petitioner and he has been publicl" known b" that first name or nickname in the communit"H or >;? !he change will avoid confusion. &, 17=E does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. ,nd it is worth" to note that a change of name does not alter one0s legal capacit" or legal status, thus to allow petitioner would contravene the law.
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!here is also no laws that allows the change of entr" in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignement. +nder the 'ivil &egister Aaw, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as the" existed at the time of birth. !hus, the sex of a person is determined at "irth, visuall" done b" the birth attendant >the ph"sician or midwife? b" examining the genitals of the infant. 'onsidering that there is no law legall" recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person0s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended b" error, is immutable >absolute?. @or these reasons, while petitioner ma" have succeeded in altering his bod" and appearance through the intervention of modern surger", no law authorizes the change of entr" as to sex in the civil registr" for that reason. !hus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate. .oreover, the changes sought b" petitioner will have serious and wide$ranging legal and public polic" conse)uences. @irst, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner0s first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancI. 4owever, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union "etween a man and a woman. One of its essential re)uisites is the legal capacit of the contracting parties who must "e a male and a female . !o grant the changes sought b" petitioner will substantiall" reconfigure and greatl" alter the laws on marriage and famil" relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment >a male$to$female post$operative transsexual?. etition is denied.

III. The ,as&4s o< H25a3 Re'a7&o3s

1. CE,U COUNTR: CLU, INC. vs. RICARDO F. ELIZAGAQUE G. R. No. 1 !(0! Ja32a%1 1+* (//+ FACTS *an .iguel 'orporation, a special compan" proprietar" member of '''I, designated respondent &icardo @. :lizaga)ue, its *enior Cice resident and Operations .anager for the Cisa"as and .indanao, as a special non$proprietar" member. !he designation was thereafter approved b" the '''I0s /oard of 2irectors. &espondent then purchased a '''I share where he was issued a roprietar" Ownership 'ertificate. !hereafter, respondent applied a '''I proprietar" membership but this was deferred. Aater, his application was finall" voted upon b" the /oard of 2irectors and he was informed that it was disapproved.

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&espondent wrote a letter of reconsideration but he was not answered, letter he wrote another letter in)uiring as to the reasons wh" his application has been denied but still did not receive an" repl" from '''I. &espondent filed an action for damages against petitioner. /oth the !rial 'ourt and the 'ourt of ,ppeal rendered decision in favor of herein respondent rel"ing on the basic of human relations found under ,rticles 11 and (1 of the 'ivil 'ode. 4ence, this petition. ISSUE #hether or not petitioner is liable to herein respondent for damages. RULING 3es, in re%ecting respondent0s application for proprietar" membership, we find that petitioners violated the rules governing human relations, the basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stabilit" of social order. Obviousl", the '''I /oard of 2irectors, under its ,rticles of Incorporation, has the right to approve or disapprove an application for proprietar" membership. /ut such right should not be exercised arbitraril". ,rticles 11, (7 and (1 of the 'ivil 'ode on the 'hapter on 4uman &elations provide such restrictions !he trial court and the 'ourt of ,ppeals aptl" held that petitioners committed fraud and evident bad faith in disapproving respondent0s applications. !his fraud and bad faith on the part of '''I was evident when it amended its /"$Aaws as to how its members are elected changing it to a re)uired unanimous approval of all directors present, this without informing the respondent of such change and as to wh" his application was disapproved. In 4F E5uit , 6nc. v. 7alen8ona , we expounded ,rticle 11 and correlated it with ,rticle (1, thus5 !his article, known to contain what is commonl" referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not onl" in the exercise of oneMs rights but also in the performance of oneMs duties. !hese standards are the following5 to act with %usticeH to give ever"one his dueH and to observe honest" and good faith. !he law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rightsH that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in ,rticle 11 must be observed. A %&9h7* 7ho29h 61 &7se'< 'e9a' 6e4a2se %e4o93&=e8 o% 9%a37e8 61 'aw as s24h* 5a1 3eve%7he'ess 6e4o5e 7he so2%4e o< so5e &''e9a'&71. Whe3 a %&9h7 &s e>e%4&se8 &3 a 5a33e% wh&4h 8oes 3o7 4o3<o%5 w&7h 7he 3o%5s e3sh%&3e8 &3 A%7&4'e 1" a38 %es2'7s &3 8a5a9e 7o a3o7he%* a 'e9a' w%o39 &s 7he%e61 4o55&77e8 <o% wh&4h 7he w%o398oe% 52s7 6e he'8 %es$o3s&6'e . /ut while ,rticle 11 la"s down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remed" for its violation. Generall", an action for damages under either ,rticle (7 or ,rticle (1 would be proper. >:mphasis in the original?.

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(. GASHEM SHOODAT ,ADSH vs. COURT OF A--EALS G. R. No. "0!! Fe6%2a%1 1"* 1""! FACTS rivate respondent, a @ilipina filed an action for damages against petitioner an Iranian .oslem for alleged breach of promise to marr". &epondent averred that because of his persuasive promise to marr" her, she allowed herself to be deflowered b" him , agreed to lived with him and surrendered here honor and womanhood. ,dditionall", b" reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents N in accordance with @ilipino customs and traditions N made some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 11EF b" looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors. ,ll these petitioner denied. !rial court and 'ourt of ,ppeals awarded damages in favor of respondent based on ,rt. (1 of the 'ivil 'ode. 4ence, this petition. ISSUE #hether or not in a breach of promise to marr" ,rt. (1 of the 'ivil 'ode can be applied. RULING 3es, ,rt. (1 is applicable where a manMs promise to marr" is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love b" a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in realit", no intention of marr"ing her and that the promise was onl" a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could %ustif" the award of damages pursuant to ,rticle (1 not because of such promise to marr" but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful in%ur" to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such in%ur" should have been committed in a manner contrar" to morals, good customs or public polic". In the instant case, it was the petitionerMs -fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marr" plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellantMs part that made plaintiffMs parents agree to their daughterMs living$in with him preparator" to their supposed marriage.- In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginit", the cherished possession of ever" single @ilipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction. !he essential feature of seduction in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriageH it connotes essentiall" the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has "ielded.

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,rticle (1 on the other hand does not appl" if the sexual intercourse was due to mutual lust or where the sexual act is accomplished without an" deceit or )ualif"ing circumstance of abuse of authorit" or influence, but the woman, alread" of age, has knowingl" given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an in%ur" which can be the basis for indemnit". etition is denied. !. ASJ COR-ORATION* e7 a'. vs. EFREN AND MAURA EVANGELISTA G. R. No. 1#+/+ Fe6%2a%1 1)* (//+ FACTS &espondents, under the name and st"le of &... *" 'hicks, are engaged in the large$ scale business of bu"ing broiler eggs, hatching them, and selling their hatchlings >chicks? and egg b"$products in /ulacan and 9ueva :ci%a. @or the incubation and hatching of these eggs, respondents availed of the hatcher" services of ,*< 'orp., a corporation dul" registered in the name of *an <uan and his famil". Initiall", the service fees were paid upon release of the eggs and b"$products to respondents. /ut as their business went along, respondents0 dela"s on their pa"ments were tolerated b" *an <uan, who %ust carried over the balance, as there ma" be, into the next deliver", out of keeping goodwill with respondents. 4owever, respondent continued to fail in its pa"ments, prompting *an <uan to refuse the release of the chicks and b"$products. ,t one instance, petitioner still refused to release the same despite offer of respondent partial pa"ment of the amount due having in mind that the products left in the hands of the petitioner were more than their amount due. etitioner allegedl" threatened to impound their vehicle and detain them at the hatcher" compound if the" should come back unprepared to full" settle their accounts with him. !hus, respondent filed with the &!' an action for damages based on petitioner0s retention of the chicks and the b"$products. !he !rial 'ourt and 'ourt of ,ppeals rendered %udgment in favor of herein respondent based on ,rt. 11 of the 'ivil 'ode. ISSUE #hether or not award of damages based on ,rt. 11 of the 'ivil 'ode in favor of respondents was proper. RULING 3es, ,rt. 11 of the 'ivil 'ode can be properl" applied when *an <uan threatened the respondents. +nder ,rticle 11 of the 'ivil 'ode, an act constitutes an abuse of right if the following elements are present5 >a? the existence of a legal right or dut"H >b? which is exercised in bad faithH and >c? for the sole intent of pre%udicing or in%uring another.4ere, while petitioners had the right to withhold deliver", the high$handed and oppressive acts of petitioners on threatening the repsodentns, as aptl" found b" the two courts below, had no legal leg to stand on.
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.oreover, &espondents0 offer to partiall" satisf" their accounts is not enough to extinguish their obligation. +nder ,rticle 1(=E of the 'ivil 'ode, the creditor cannot be compelled to accept partial pa"ments from the debtor, unless there is an express stipulation to that effect. .ore so, respondents cannot substitute or appl" as their pa"ment the value of the chicks and b"$products the" expect to derive because it is necessar" that all the debts be for the same kind, generall" of a monetar" character. 9eedless to sa", there was no valid application of pa"ment in this case. @urthermore, it was respondents who violated the ver" essence of reciprocit" in contracts, conse)uentl" giving rise to petitioners0 right of retention. !his case is clearl" one among the species of non$performance of a reciprocal obligation. &eciprocal obligations are those which arise from the same cause, wherein each part" is a debtor and a creditor of the other, such that the performance of one is conditioned upon the simultaneous fulfillment of the other. @rom the moment one of the parties fulfills his obligation, dela" b" the other part" begins. *ince respondents are guilt" of dela" in the performance of their obligations, the" are also liable to pa" petitioners actual damages. etition partl" granted. ). FAR EAST ,AND vs. THEMISTOCLES -ACILAN* JR. G. R. No. 1#0!1) J2'1 ("* (//# FACTS &espondent had a current savings account with petitioner$bank, since then he issued post$ dated checks to different pa"ees. In ,pril =, 11EE petitioner had an overdraft , which led to the subse)uent dishonor of that check. /ut a da" after that she made a deposit in order to cover up for the said overdraft, her deposit was accepted b" the bank. *ubse)uentl", when the respondent verified with petitioner bank about the dishonor of 'heck, he discovered that his current account was closed on the ground that it was -improperl" handled.!he respondent wrote to petitioner bank complaining that the closure of his account was un%ustified. #hen he did not receive a repl" from petitioner bank, the respondent filed with the &!', a complaint for damages against petitioner bank and accountant Cilladelgado. /oth the !rial 'ourt and the 'ourt of ,ppeals rendered a decision in favor of respondent based on ,rt. 11 of the 'ivil 'ode. &espondent claimed that his reputation was tainted b" the act of petitioner$bank. !he facts of the case also revealed that respondent had several times in the past mishandled his account where he overdrawn 1GD times in 11ED , 11F times in 11EF and (D times in 11EE. In all these instances, the account was overdrawn due to the issuance of checks against insufficient funds.
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ISSUE #hether or not ,rt.11 of the 'ivil 'ode was properl" applied in respondent0s favor RULING 9o, because of the absence of bad faith on the part of petitioner$bank and it has no intention of pre%udicing the respondent. !his case is a case of damage without in%ur" or often called damnum a"s5ue in.uria. !he elements of abuse of rights are the following5 >a? the existence of a legal right or dut"H >b? which is exercised in bad faithH and >c? for the sole intent of pre%udicing or in%uring another..alice or bad faith is at the core of the said provision.!he law alwa"s presumes good faith and an" person who seeks to be awarded damages due to acts of another has the burden of proving that the latter acted in bad faith or with ill$ motive.Good faith refers to the state of the mind which is manifested b" the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another./ad faith does not simpl" connote bad %udgment or simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obli)uit" and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known dut" due to some motives or interest or ill$will that partakes of the nature of fraud..alice connotes ill$will or spite and speaks not in response to dut". It implies an intention to do ulterior and un%ustifiable harm. .alice is bad faith or bad motive. +nder the &ules and &egulations of petitioner$bank it reserves the right to close an account if the depositor fre)uentl" draws checks against insufficient funds and/or uncollected deposits. It is clearl" understood that the depositor is not entitled, as a matter of right, to overdraw on this deposit and the bank reserves the right at an" time to return checks of the depositor which are drawn against insufficient funds or for an" other reason. !here were also several instances when the respondent issued checks deliberatel" using a signature different from his specimen signature on file with petitioner bank.J1DK ,ll these circumstances taken together %ustified the petitioner bank0s closure of the respondent0s account on ,pril =, 11EE for -improper handling.!he respondent had thus failed to discharge his burden of proving bad faith on the part of petitioner bank or that it was motivated b" ill$will or spite in closing his account on ,pril =, 11EE and in inadvertentl" accepting his deposit on ,pril G, 11EE. @urther, it has not been shown that these acts were done b" petitioner bank with the sole intention of pre%udicing and in%uring the respondent. #hatever damages the respondent ma" have suffered as a conse)uence, e.g., dishonor of his other insufficientl" funded checks, would have to be borne b" him alone. It was the respondent0s repeated improper and irregular handling of his account which constrained petitioner bank to close the same in accordance with the rules and regulations governing its depositors0 current accounts. etition is granted.
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#. VICENTE S. ALMARIO vs. -HILI--INES AIRLINES* INC. G. R. No. 10/"(+ Se$7e56e% 11* (//0 FACTS ,lmario is a ;1 pilot of the hilippine ,irlines > ,A?. /" reason of his promotion he was sent b" ,A to training in .anila and in ,ustralia for G$months with cost and expense borne b" ,A. 4owever, after his training and with onl" Emonths of rendering service to ,A he tendered resignation. ,A ob%ected and claimed that as part of their agreement under their '/, he is supposed to render ; more "ears of service after his training in order for ,A to recover the expenses it incurred in ,lmario0s training. ,lmario denied having such agreement and insisted on his resignation. !hus, ,A filed n action for reimbursement with the &!' as to the cost of the training expenses of ,lmario. !he trial 'ourt rendered %udgment in favor of ,lmario and held that there was no such provision found in the '/,. +pon appeal b" both parties the 'ourt of ,ppeals reversed the lower court0s decision and held ,lmario liable under its '/, and based on ,rt. (( of the 'ivil 'ode, hence this petition. ISSUE #hether or not ,lmario should be held liable under that ,rticle (( of the 'ivil 'ode >un%ust enrichment? with respect to his training costs.

RULING 3es, ,lmario is liable based on the principle embodied in ,rt (( of the 'ivil 'ode on un%ust enrichment. :nrichment of the defendant consists in ever" patrimonial, ph"sical, or moral advantage, so long as it is appreciable in mone". It ma" consist of some positive pecuniar" value incorporated into the patrimon" of the defendant, such as5 >1? the en%o"ment of a thing belonging to the plaintiffH >(? the benefits from service rendered b" the plaintiff to the defendantH >;? the ac)uisition of a right, whether real or personalH >=? the increase of value of propert" of the defendantH >G? the improvement of a right of the defendant, such as the ac)uisition of a right of preferenceH >D? the recognition of the existence of a right in the defendantH and >F? the improvement of the conditions of life of the defendant. ,dmittedl", ,A invested for the training of ,lmario to enable him to ac)uire a higher level of skill, proficienc", or technical competence so that he could efficientl" discharge the position of ,$;77 @irst Officer. Given that, ,A expected to recover the training costs b" availing of ,lmario0s services for at least three "ears. !he expectation of ,A was not full" realized, however, due to ,lmario0s resignation after onl" eight months of service following the completion of his training course. 4e cannot, therefore, refuse to reimburse the costs of training without violating the principle of un%ust enrichment.

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. ANTONIO CHIENG* s26s7&727e8 61 WILLIAM CHIENG vs. S-OUSES EULOGIIO AND TERESITA SANTOS G. R. No. 1 " )0 A292s7 !1* (//0 FACTS ,ugust 1F, 11E1, petitioner 'hieng extended a loan in favor of respondent spouses :ulogio and !eresita *antos. ,s securit" for such loan, the respondents executed in favor of petitioner a 2eed of &eal :state .ortgage over a piece of land. On even date, the 2eed of &eal :state .ortgage was registered with the &egistr" of 2eeds and was dul" annotated on !'!. !hereafter, respondent issued several checks in favor of petitioner as pa"ment for the loan. *ome of these checks were dishonored, prompting the petitioner to file a criminal case against respondent :ulogio for violation of / /lg. (( before the &!'. 2uring the pre$trial conference of these cases, petitioner and respondent :ulogio entered into a compromise agreement, which was contained in the Order of the court, that the total indebtedness of .r. *antos as of <ul" 1G, 1111 amounts to (77,777.77 esos including interest since the beginning and excluding those alread" paid for. &espondent failed to compl" with his obligation in the compromise agreement. On 1F <une 111;, petitioner filed with the &!', an action for foreclosure of mortgage constituted on respondents0 real propert" docketed as 'ivil 'ase. ISSUE #hether petitioner, b" filing 'riminal 'ases for violation of /atas ambansa /lg. (( against respondent :ulogio, was alread" barred or precluded from availing himself of the other civil remed" of the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. RULING 9o. , mortgage$creditor ma", in the recover" of a debt secured b" a real estate mortgage, institute against the mortgage$debtor either a personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. !hese remedies available to the mortgage$ creditor are deemed alternative and not cumulative. ,n election of one remed" operates as a waiver of the other. #hen petitioner filed 'riminal 'ases for violation of / . (( against respondent :ulogio, petitioner0s civil action for the recover" of the amount of the dishonored checks was impliedl" instituted therein pursuant to *ection 1>b? of &ule 111 of the (777 &ules on 'riminal rocedure. 4owever, it should be stressed that respondents have not "et full" paid the loan. In fact, respondents themselves admitted that the" still owe petitioner the balance of the loan. !o allow respondents to benefit from the loan without pa"ing its whole amount to petitioner, and to preclude the petitioner from recovering the remaining balance of the loan, would constitute un%ust enrichment at the expense of petitioner. !he principle that
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no person ma" un%ustl" enrich himself at the expense of another >9emo cum alterius detrimento locupletari potest? is embodied in ,rticle (( of the 9ew 'ivil 'ode, to wit5 ,&!. ((. :ver" person who through an act of performance b" another, or an" other means, ac)uires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without %ust or legal ground, shall return the same to him. ,s can be gleaned from the foregoing, there is un%ust enrichment when >1? a person is un%ustl" benefited, and >(? such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another. !he main ob%ective of the principle of un%ust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching oneself at the expense of another. It is commonl" accepted that this doctrine simpl" means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself ine)uitabl" at another0s expense. One condition for invoking this principle is that the aggrieved part" has no other action based on contract, )uasi$contract, crime, )uasi$delict or an" other provision of law. !he principle of un%ust enrichment obliges the respondents to pa" the remaining balance of the loan plus interest. &elieving the respondents of their obligation to pa" the balance of the loan would, indeed, be to sanction un%ust enrichment in favor of respondents and cause un%ust povert" to petitioner. In the exercise of our mandate as a court of %ustice and e)uit", we hold, pro hac vice, that respondents are still liable to pa" the remaining balance of the loan. 0. S-OUSES JAMES a38 FLORENCE TAN vs. CARMINA MANDAG. R. No. 1#/"(# Ma1 (0* (//) FACTS &espondents are the legitimate children of the marriage of 2ionisio .andap, *r., and .aria 'ontreras .andap. #hen the .andap spouses parted wa"s, their children opted to sta" with .aria. !o help support the children, .aria filed a 'ivil 'ase for the dissolution and separation of the con%ugal partnership. !wo separate lots, each with an area of EE s)uare meters covered b" !'! 9os. ==F;7 and GGE=F, respectivel", located in @elix 4uertas *treet, *ta. 'ruz, .anila, with improvements thereon, were ad%udicated b" the <uvenile and 2omestic &elations 'ourt in favor of 2ionisio .andap, *r. .eanwhile, 2ionisio .andap, *r., until his death on October (, 1111 at age D=, lived with 2iorita 2o%oles, with whom he had two children. 4e suffered from diabetes since 11;1, became totall" blind in 11=7, and was crippled for about 17 "ears until his death. 4owever, before his death on .a" (G, 11E1, he conve"ed the sub%ect properties to his common$law wife0s sister, :lenita 2o%oles Cas)uezH and her husband, 'rispulo Cas)uez.

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On *eptember 11, 11E1, the Cas)uez spouses conve"ed the parcel of land covered b" !'! 9o. 1EDF=E in favor of petitioners. !'! 9o. 1EEED( covering the sub%ect lot was then issued in favor of the latter. On *eptember G, 11E1, prior to the sale to petitioners, the respondents filed an action for cancellation of title with damages, before the &!' of .anila against 2iorita 2o%oles and the Cas)uez spouses, alleging that the sale of sub%ect properties b" their father was fictitious, and without an" consideration. @urther, the consent of their father was vitiated due to his ph"sical infirmities. ISSUES 1. #hether or not the sale between .andap *r. and the Cas)ueses is valid. (. #hether or not the sale between the Cas)ueses and petitioners is valid. RULING 1. !he sale was not valid. ,t the time 2ionisio .andap, *r., purportedl" sold the lots in )uestion to the Cas)uez spouses, he was alread" totall" blind and paral"zed. 4e could not possibl" have read the contents of the deeds of sale. 4e could not have consented to a contract whose terms he never knew nor understood. It cannot be presumed .andap, *r., knew the contents of the deeds of sale disposing of his properties. ,ppl"ing ,rticle 1;;( of the 'ivil 'ode the part" seeking to enforce the contract, petitioners should have presented evidence showing that the terms of the deeds of sale to the Cas)uez spouses were full" explained to .andap, *r. /ut petitioners failed to compl" with the strict re)uirements of ,rticle 1;;(, thereb" casting doubt on the alleged consent of the vendor. *ince the vendor in this case was totall" blind and crippled at the time of the sale, entirel" dependent on outside support, ever" care to protect his interest conformabl" with ,rticle (= of the 'ivil 'ode must be taken. ,rticle (= is clear on this that 6In all contractual, propert" or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.8 etitioners presented no evidence disproving that >1? .andap, *r. was totall" blind and suffering from acute diabetes such that he could no longer discern the legal conse)uences of his acts, and >(? that undue influence was exerted upon him, which vitiated his consent. !hus, the presumption of fraud and undue influence was not rebutted. etitioners do not dispute the fact that the notar" public who notarized the deeds of sale was not dul" commissioned and that .andap, *r., did not personall" appear before a notar" public. (. Invalid. /ased on the evidence on record, the sale in favor of the Cas)uez spouses is void. 4ence, it follows that the sale to petitioners is also void, because petitioners merel" stepped into the shoes of the Cas)uez spouses. *ince the Cas)uezes as sellers had no valid title over the parcel of land the" sold, petitioners as bu"ers thereof could not claim that the contract of sale is valid.
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+. SAMSON CHING vs. CLARITA NICDAO* e7 a'. G. R. No. 1)11+1 A$%&' (0* (//0 FACTS On October (1, 111F, petitioner 'hing, a 'hinese national, instituted criminal complaints for 11 counts of violation of / (( against respondent 9icdao. 'onse)uentl", 11 Information were filed with the @irst .'!' of 2inalupihan$4ermosa, rovince of /ataan, which, except as to the amounts and check numbers the" were uniforml" read. ,t about the same time, 1= other criminal complaints, also for violation of / ((, were filed against respondent 9icdao b" :mma 9uguid, said to be the common law spouse of petitioner 'hing. ,llegedl" 1= checks, amounting to 1,1G7,777.77, were issued b" respondent 9icdao to 9uguid but were dishonored for lack of sufficient funds. !he Informations were filed with the same .'!' . ,t her arraignment, 9icdao entered the plea of -not guilt"- to all the charges. , %oint trial was then conducted for 'riminal 'ase. On direct$examination, 9icdao stated that she onl" dealt with 9uguid. *he vehementl" denied the allegation that she had borrowed mone" from both petitioner 'hing and 9uguid in the total amount of ((,1G7,777.77. &espondent 9icdao admitted, however, that she had obtained a loan from 9uguid but onl" for (,177,777.77 and the same was alread" full" paid. ,s proof of such pa"ment, she presented a lanters /ank demand draft dated ,ugust 1;, 111D in the amount of 1,(77,777.77. !he annotation at the back of the said demand draft showed that it was endorsed and negotiated to the account of petitioner 'hing. In addition, 9icdao also presented and identified several cigarette wrappers at the back of which appeared computations. *he explained that 9uguid went to the grocer" store ever"da" to collect interest pa"ments. !he principal loan was (,177,777.77 with 1(O interest per da". 9uguid allegedl" wrote the pa"ments for the dail" interests at the back of the cigarette wrappers that she gave to respondent 9icdao. !he principal loan amount of (,177,777.77 was allegedl" delivered b" 9uguid to respondent 9icdao in var"ing amounts of 177,777.77 and 1G7,777.77. 9icdao refuted the averment of petitioner 'hing that prior to 111G, the" had another transaction. #ith respect to the (7,777,777.77 check, respondent 9icdao admitted that the signature thereon was hers but denied that she issued the same to petitioner 'hing. ,nent the other ten >17? checks, she likewise admitted that the signatures thereon were hers while the amounts and pa"ee thereon were written b" either <ocel"n 9icdao or .elanie !olentino, who were emplo"ees of Cignette *uperstore and authorized b" her to do so.
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&espondent 9icdao clarified that, except for the (7,777,777.77 check, the other ten >17? checks were handed to 9uguid on different occasions. 9uguid came to the grocer" store ever"da" to collect the interest pa"ments. &espondent 9icdao said that she purposel" left the checks undated because she would still have to notif" 9uguid if she alread" had the mone" to fund the checks. ,fter the said incident, respondent 9icdao was surprised to be notified b" 4*A/ that her check in the amount of (7,777,777.77 was %ust presented to the bank for pa"ment. *he claimed that it was onl" then that she remembered that sometime in 111G, she was informed b" her emplo"ee that one of her checks was missing. ,t that time, she did not let it bother her thinking that it would eventuall" surface when presented to the bank. 9icdao was ac)uitted in ',. ISSUE #hether or not petitioner 'hing is entitled to civil aspect of the case even the criminal case has been decided in favor of the respondent RULING 9o. In *apiera v. 'ourt of ,ppeals, the 'ourt enunciated that the civil liabilit" is not extinguished b" ac)uittal5 >a? where the ac)uittal is based on reasonable doubtH >b? where the court expressl" declares that the liabilit" of the accused is not criminal but onl" civil in natureH and >c? where the civil liabilit" is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is ac)uitted. !hus, under ,rticle (1 of the 'ivil 'ode P ,&!. (1. #hen the accused in a criminal prosecution is ac)uitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved be"ond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission ma" be instituted. *uch action re)uires onl" a preponderance of evidence. +pon motion of the defendant, the court ma" re)uire the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious. *alazar also enunciated that the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final %udgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liabilit" ma" arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the act or omission imputed to him. @or reasons that will be discussed shortl", the 'ourt holds that respondent 9icdao cannot be held civill" liable to petitioner 'hing. !he ac)uittal of respondent 9icdao likewise effectivel" extinguished her civil liabilit" , painstaking review of the case leads to the conclusion that respondent 9icdao0s ac)uittal likewise carried with it the extinction of the action to enforce her civil liabilit". !here is simpl" no basis to hold respondent 9icdao civill" liable to petitioner 'hing.
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@irst, the ',0s ac)uittal of respondent 9icdao is not merel" based on reasonable doubt. &ather, it is based on the finding that she did not commit the act penalized under / ((. In particular, the ', found that the (7,777,777.77 check was a stolen check which was never issued nor delivered b" respondent 9icdao to petitioner 'hing. ,s such, according to the ',, petitioner 'hing -did not ac)uire an" right or interest over 'heck 9o. 77(G(= and cannot assert an" cause of action founded on said check,- and that respondent 9icdao -has no obligation to make good the stolen check and cannot, therefore, be held liable for violation of /. . /lg. ((.*econd, in ac)uitting respondent 9icdao, the ', did not ad%udge her to be civill" liable to petitioner 'hing. In fact, the ', explicitl" stated that she had alread" full" paid her obligations. On the other hand, its finding relative to the (7,777,777.77 check that it was a stolen check necessaril" absolved respondent 9icdao of an" civil liabilit" thereon as well. !hird, while petitioner 'hing attempts to show that respondent 9icdao0s liabilit" did not arise from or was not based upon the criminal act of which she was ac)uitted >ex delicto? but from her loan obligations to him >ex contractu?, however, petitioner 'hing miserabl" failed to prove b" preponderant evidence the existence of these unpaid loan obligations. *ignificantl", it can be inferred from the following findings of the ', in its decision ac)uitting respondent 9icdao that the act or omission from which her civil liabilit" ma" arise did not exist. On the (7,777,777.77 check, the ', found as follows5 !rue, indeed, the missing pre$signed and undated check no. 77(G(= surfaced in the possession of complainant 'hing who, in cahoots with his paramour :mma 9uguid, filled up the blank check with his name as pa"ee and in the fantastic amount of (7,777,777.77, dated it October D, 111F, and presented it to the bank on October F, 111F, along with the other checks, for pa"ment. !herefore, the inference that the check was stolen is anchored on competent circumstantial evidence. !he fact alread" established is that :mma 9uguid , previous owner of the store, had access to said store. .oreover, the possession of a thing that was stolen , absent a credible reason, as in this case, gives rise to the presumption that the person in possession of the stolen article is presumed to be guilt" of taking the stolen article > eople v. Qafra, (;F *'&, DD=?. ". MANOLO -. SAMSON vs. RE:NALDO ,. DAWA: G. R. Nos. 1 //#)C## J2'1 (1* (//) FACTS On .arch F, (77(, two information for unfair competition under *ection 1DE.; >a?, in relation to *ection 1F7, of the Intellectual ropert" 'ode >&epublic ,ct 9o. E(1;?, similarl" worded save for the dates and places of commission, were filed against petitioner .anolo . *amson, the registered owner of I!!I *hoes. It is written there that above$named accused, owner/proprietor of I!!I *hoes/.ano *hoes .anufactuirng
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'orporation located at &obinson0s Galleria, :2*, corner Ortigas ,venue, Ruezon 'it", did then and there willfull", unlawfull" and feloniousl" distribute, sell and/or offer for sale ',!:& IAA,& products such as footwear, garments, clothing, bags, accessories and paraphernalia which are closel" identical to and/or colorable imitations of the authentic 'aterpillar products and likewise using trademarks, s"mbols and/or designs as would cause confusion, mistake or deception on the part of the bu"ing public to the damage and pre%udice of ',!:& IAA,&, I9' On ,pril 11, (77(, petitioner filed a motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings in view of the existence of an alleged pre%udicial )uestion involved in 'ivil 'ase 9o. R$77$=1==D for unfair competition pending with the same branchH and also in view of the pendenc" of a petition for review filed with the *ecretar" of <ustice assailing the 'hief *tate rosecutor0s resolution finding probable cause to charge petitioner with unfair competition. ISSUE #hether or not there is a pre%udicial )uestion of the said case RULING etitioner failed to substantiate his claim that there was a pre%udicial )uestion. ,t an" rate, there is no pre%udicial )uestion if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independentl" of each other. +nder &ule 111, *ection ; of the &evised &ules on 'riminal rocedure, in the cases provided in ,rticles ;(, ;;, ;= and (1FD of the 'ivil 'ode, the independent civil action ma" be brought b" the offended part". It shall proceed independentl" of the criminal action and shall re)uire onl" a preponderance of evidence. In the case at bar, the common element in the acts constituting unfair competition under *ection 1DE of &.,. 9o. E(1; is fraud. ursuant to ,rticle ;; of the 'ivil 'ode, in cases of defamation, fraud, and ph"sical in%uries, a civil action for damages, entirel" separate and distinct from the criminal action, ma" be brought b" the in%ured part". 4ence, 'ivil 'ase, which as admitted b" private respondent also relate to unfair competition, is an independent civil action under ,rticle ;; of the 'ivil 'ode. ,s such, it will not operate as a pre%udicial )uestion that will %ustif" the suspension of the criminal cases at bar. 1/. RE:NALDO V. TUANDA vs. SANDIGAN,A:AN G. R. No. 11/#)) O47o6e% 10* 1""# FACTS On 1 @ebruar" 11E1, private respondents 2elia :strellanes and /artolome /inaohan were designated as industrial labor sectoral representative and agricultural labor sectoral representative respectivel", for the *angguniang /a"an of <imalalud, rovince of 9egros Oriental b" then *ecretar" Auis !. *antos of the 2epartment of Aocal
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Government. rivate respondents /inaohan and :strellanes took their oath of office on 1D @ebruar" 11E1 and 1F @ebruar" 11E1, respectivel". *ubse)uentl", petitioners filed an undated petition with the Office of the resident for review and recall of said designations. !he latter, however, in a letter dated (7 .arch 11E1, denied the petition and en%oined .a"or &e"naldo !uanda to recognize private respondents as sectoral representatives. On = .a" 1117, private respondents filed a petition for mandamus with the &!', docketed as *pecial 'ivil ,ction for recognition as members of the *angguniang /a"an. It was dismissed on (; <ul" 1111. !hereafter, on (7 <une 1111, petitioners filed an action with the &!' of 2umaguete 'it" to declare null and void the designations of private respondents as sectoral representatives in 'ivil 'ase entitled -&e"naldo !uanda, et al. versus *ecretar" of the 2epartment of Aocal Government, et al.On (1 <ul" 1111, a 'riminal 'ase was filed before the *andiganba"an entitled - eople of the hilippines versus &e"naldo !uanda, et al.- charging petitioners for refusing to pa" despite demand the amount 1G,;G7.77 and 17E,177.77 representing respectivel" their per diems, salaries and other privileges and benefits, and such undue in%ur" continuing to the present to the pre%udice and damage of /artolome /inaohan and 2elia :strellanes. On 1 *eptember 1111, petitioners filed a motion with the *andiganba"an for suspension of the proceedings in 'riminal 'ase on the ground that a pre%udicial )uestion exists in 'ivil 'ase pending . ISSUE #hether or not the legalit" or validit" of private respondentsM designation as sectoral representatives >civil case? is a pre%udicial )uestion %ustif"ing suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners RULING !he issue in the civil case constitutes a valid pre%udicial )uestion to warrant suspension of the arraignment and further proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners. ,ll the elements of a pre%udicial )uestion are clearl" and unmistakabl" present in this case. !here is no doubt that the facts and issues involved in the civil action >9o. ;DFD1? and the criminal case >9o. 1D1;D? are closel" related. !he filing of the criminal case was premised on petitionersM alleged partialit" and evident bad faith in not pa"ing private respondentsM salaries and per diems as sectoral representatives, while the civil action was instituted precisel" to resolve whether or not the designations of private respondents as sectoral representatives were made in accordance with law.

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.ore importantl", the resolution of the civil case will certainl" determine if there will still be an" reason to proceed with the criminal action. etitioners were criminall" charged under the ,nti$Graft S 'orrupt ractices ,ct >&, ;711, sec, ;JeK? due to their refusal, allegedl" in bad faith and with manifest partialit", to pa" private respondentsM salaries as sectoral representatives. !his refusal, however, was anchored on petitionersM assertion that said designations were made in violation of the Aocal Government 'ode >/. . /lg. ;;F? and thus, were null and void. !herefore, should the 'ourt of ,ppeals uphold the trial courtMs decision declaring null and void private respondentsM designations as sectoral representatives for failure to compl" with the provisions of the Aocal Government 'ode >/. . /lg. ;;F, sec. 1=DJ(K?, the charges against petitioners would no longer, so to speak, have a leg to stand on. etitioners cannot be accused of bad faith and partialit" there being in the first place no obligation on their part to pa" private respondentsM claims. rivate respondents do not have an" legal right to demand salaries, per diems and other benefits. In other words, the 'ourt of ,ppealsM resolution of the issues raised in the civil action will ultimatel" determine whether or not there is basis to proceed with the criminal case. rivate respondents insist that even if their designations are nullified, the" are entitled to compensation for actual services rendered. #e disagree. ,s found b" the trial court and as borne out b" the records, from the start, private respondentsM designations as sectoral representatives have been challenged b" petitioners. !he" began with a petition filed with the Office of the resident copies of which were received b" private respondents on (D @ebruar" 11E1, barel" eight >E? da"s after the" took their oath of office. 4ence, private respondentsM claim that the" have actuall" rendered services as sectoral representatives has not been established. 11. ME:NARDO L. ,ELTRAN vs. -EO-LE OF THE -HILI--INES G. R. No. 1!0# 0 J23e (/* (/// FACTS etitioner .e"nardo /eltran and wife 'harmaine :. @elix were married on <une 1D, 11F; at the Immaculate 'oncepcion arish 'hurch in 'ubao, Ruezon 'it". On @ebruar" F, 111F, after twent"$four "ears of marriage and four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullit" of marriage on the ground of ps"chological incapacit" under ,rticle ;D of the @amil" 'ode. In her ,nswer to the said petition, petitionerMs wife 'harmaine @elix alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the con%ugal home and lived with a certain woman named .ilagros *alting. 'harmaine subse)uentl" filed a criminal complaint for concubinage under ,rticle ;;= of the & ' against petitioner and his paramour before the 'it" rosecutorMs Office of .akati who, in a &esolution dated *eptember 1D, 111F, found probable cause and ordered the filing of an Information against them.
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On .arch (7, 111E, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a .otion to 2efer roceedings Including the Issuance of the #arrant of ,rrest in the criminal case. etitioner argued that the pendenc" of the civil case for declaration of nullit" of his marriage posed a pre%udicial )uestion to the determination of the criminal case. ISSUE #hether or not the pendenc" of the petition for declaration of nullit" of his marriage based on ps"chological incapacit" under ,rticle ;D of the @amil" 'ode is a pre%udicial )uestion that should merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him b" his wife RULING etitionerMs contentions are untenable. !he rationale behind the principle of pre%udicial )uestion is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements5 >a? the civil action involves an issue similar or intimatel" related to the issue raised in the criminal actionH and >b? the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action ma" proceed. 11 !he pendenc" of the case for declaration of nullit" of petitionerMs marriage is not a pre%udicial )uestion to the concubinage case. @or a civil case to be considered pre%udicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not onl" that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessaril" be determined. ,rt. =7 of the @amil" 'ode provides5 !he absolute nullit" of a previous marriage ma" be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solel" of a final %udgment declaring such previous marriage void. ,nalogous to this case is that of Aandicho vs. &elova cited in 2onato vs. Auna where this 'ourt held that5 . . . ,ssuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged b" petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. arties to the marriage should not be permitted to %udge for themselves its nullit", for the same must be submitted to the %udgment of the competent courts and onl" when the nullit" of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. !herefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the %udicial declaration of nullit" of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigam". !hus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to %udge for themselves its nullit", for the same must be submitted to the
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%udgment of the competent courts and onl" when the nullit" of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. !herefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the %udicial declaration of nullit" of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. !he lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the %udge of the .etropolitan !rial 'ourt ruling that pendenc" of a civil action for nullit" of marriage does not pose a pre%udicial )uestion in a criminal case for concubinage.

IV. Ma%%&a9e a38 Fa5&'1 Re'a7&o3s

i. On Valid and Invalid Marriages 1. EDWIN A. ACE,EDO vs. EDDIE -. ARQUERO A. M. No. -C")C1/#) Ma%4h 11* (//! FACTS :dwin ,. ,cebedo charged :ddie oint, alawan for immoralit". . ,r)uero, rocess *erver of the .!' of /rooke0s

'omplainant alleged that his wife, 2ed%e Irader ,cebedo, a former stenographer of the .!' /rooke0s oint, and respondent unlawfull" and scandalousl" cohabited as husband and wife at /ancudo ulot, /rooke0s oint, alawan as a result of which a girl, 2esiree .a" Irader ,r)uero, was born to the two on .a" (1, 11E1. /" .emorandum, the O',, disagreeing with the recommendation of the Investigating <udge that the case should be dismissed, recommends that respondent be held guilt" of immoralit" and that he be suspended from office for a period of one >1? "ear without pa". !hus the O', ratiocinates5 . . . J&Kespondent admitted the fact that for eight >E? to nine >1? months, he a single man maintained relations with 2ed%e Irader ,cebedo, wife of herein complainant, attended with 6sexual union8. /ased on his testimon", we observed that respondent %ustified his
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having a relationship with 2ed%e I. ,cebedo solel" on the written document purportedl" a 6Tasunduan8 or agreement entered into b" complainant and his wife, consenting to and giving freedom to either of them to seek an" partner and to live with him or her. /eing a court emplo"ee respondent should have known that said agreement was void despite it having been notarized. :ven granting that 2ed%ie I. ,cebedo was separated from her husband during their short lived relation, to hold on to said scandalous agreement and enter an immoral relationship with a ver" much married woman and a co$court$emplo"ee at that is highl" improper. It is contrar" to the 'ode of 'onduct and :thical *tandards of ublic Officials and :mplo"ees which provides that public emplo"ees of which respondent is one, xxx 6 shall at times >sic? respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrar" to law, good morals, good customs, public polic", public order, public safet" and public interest. .oreover, respondent cannot seek refuge and 6sling mud8 at complainant for having executed an ,ffidavit dated *eptember 1;, 111=, acknowledging that he bore a woman other than his wife, a child. It would seem that respondent would want to appl" the principle of in pari delicto in the instant case. &espondent would have it appear that a married man with an extra$ marital relation and an illegitimate child is precluded from complaining if his wife enters into a relationship with another man. ISSUE #hether or not the Tasunduan is valid. RULING 9o. &espondent %ustified his pursuing a relationship with complainant0s wife with the spouses having priorl" entered into a settlement with respect to their marriage which was embodied in a 6Tasunduan8, the pertinent portions of which are reproduced hereunder5 Tami, :2#I9 ,G+I9,A2O ,':/:2O at 2:2<: I&,2:& ,':/:2O, ma" sapat na taong gulang, mag$asawa, ilipino, at kasaluku"ang nakatira sa oblacion, /roke0s >sic? oint, alawan, a" mala"ang nagkasundo ng mga sumusunod5 1. 9a, "a"amang hindi kami magkasundo bilang mag$asawa, at magiging miserable lamang ang aming mga buha" kung aming ipagpapatulo" pa ang aming pagsasama bilang mag$asawa, kami a" mala"ang nagkasundo nga"on na maghiwala" na bilang mag$asawa, at ang bawat isa sa amin a" ma" kala"aan na humanap na ng kani"ang makakasama sa buha" bilang asawa at hindi kami maghahabol sa isat isa sa alin pa mang hukumanH /eing an emplo"ee of the %udiciar", respondent ought to have known that the Tasunduan had absolutel" no force and effect on the validit" of the marriage between complainant and his wife. ,rticle 1 of the @amil" 'ode provides that marriage is 6an inviolable social institution whose nature, conse)uences, and incidents are governed b" law and not sub%ect to stipulation.8 It is an institution of public order or polic", governed b" rules established b" law which cannot be made inoperative b" the stipulation of the parties.
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(. ALEJANDRO ESTRADA vs. SOLEDAD ESCRITOR A. M. No. -C/(C1 #1 A292s7 )* (//! FACTS ,le%andro :strada wrote to <udge <ose @. 'aoibes, <r., re)uesting for an investigation of rumors that *oledad :scritor, court interpreter, is living with a man not her husband. !he" allegedl" have a child of eighteen to twent" "ears old. :strada is not personall" related either to :scritor or her partner. 9evertheless, he filed the charge against :scritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain emplo"ed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. &espondent :scritor testified that when she entered the %udiciar" in 1111, she was alread" a widow, her husband having died in 111E. *he admitted that she has been living with Auciano Ruilapio, <r. without the benefit of marriage for twent" "ears and that the" have a son. /ut as a member of the religious sect known as the <ehovahMs #itnesses and the #atch !ower and /ible !ract *ociet", their con%ugal arrangement is in conformit" with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten "ears of living together, she executed on <ul" (E, 1111 a -2eclaration of ledging @aithfulness,- insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about the con%ugal arrangement between :scritor and Ruilapio and the" remain members in good standing in the congregation. ISSUE #hether or not respondent should be found guilt" of the administrative charge of -gross and immoral conduct.RULING 9o. ,ppl"ing benevolent neutralit" recognizes, government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strives to uphold religious libert" to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. !hus, although the moralit" contemplated b" laws is secular, benevolent neutralit" could allow for accommodation of moralit" based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. It still remains to be seen if respondent is entitled to such doctrine as the state has not been afforded the chance has demonstrate the compelling state interest of prohibiting the act of respondent, thus the case is remanded to the &!'. /enevolent neutralit" is inconsistent with the @ree :xercise 'lause as far as it prohibits such exercise given a compelling state interest. It is the respondent0s stance that the respondent0s con%ugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection. *hould the 'ourt prohibit and punish her conduct where it is protected b" the @ree :xercise 'lause, the 'ourt0s action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. !he 'ourt cannot therefore simpl" take a passing look at respondent0s claim of religious freedom, but
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must instead appl" the 6compelling state interest8 test. !he government must be heard on the issue as it has not been given an opportunit" to discharge its burden of demonstrating the state0s compelling interest which can override respondent0s religious belief and practice. !. -HILI--INE TELEGRA-H AND TELE-HONE COM-AN: vs. NLRC a38 GRACE DE GUZMAN G. R. No. 11+"0+ Ma1 (!* 1""0 FACTS On *eptember (, 1111, private respondent was once more asked to %oin petitioner compan" as a probationar" emplo"ee, the probationar" period to cover 1G7 da"s. In the %ob application form that was furnished her to be filled up for the purpose, she indicated in the portion for civil status therein that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier, that is, on .a" (D, 1111. It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in the two successive reliever agreements which she signed on <une 17, 1111 and <ul" E, 1111. #hen petitioner supposedl" learned about the same later, its branch supervisor in /aguio 'it", 2elia .. Oficial, sent to private respondent a memorandum re)uiring her to explain the discrepanc". In that memorandum, she was reminded about the compan"Ms polic" of not accepting married women for emplo"ment. In her repl", private respondent stated that she was not aware of !S!Ms polic" regarding married women at the time, and that all along she had not deliberatel" hidden her true civil status. etitioner nonetheless remained unconvinced b" her explanations. rivate respondent was dismissed from the compan" effective <anuar" (1, 111(, which she readil" contested b" initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal, coupled with a claim for non$pa"ment of cost of living allowances >'OA,?, before the &egional ,rbitration /ranch of the 9ational Aabor &elations 'ommission in /aguio 'it". ISSUE #hether or not the polic" is valid. RULING 9o. etitionerMs polic" is not onl" in derogation of the provisions of ,rticle 1;D of the Aabor 'ode on the right of a woman to be free from an" kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her emplo"ment, but it likewise assaults good morals and public polic", tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that b" all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right.4ence, while it is true that the parties to a contract ma" establish an" agreements, terms, and conditions that the" ma" deem convenient, the same should not be contrar" to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public polic". 'arried to its logical conse)uences, it ma" even be said that petitionerMs polic" against legitimate
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marital bonds would encourage illicit or common$law relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage. arentheticall", the 'ivil 'ode provisions on the contract of labor state that the relations between the parties, that is, of capital and labor, are not merel" contractual, impressed as the" are with so much public interest that the same should "ield to the common good. It goes on to intone that neither capital nor labor should visit acts of oppression against the other, nor impair the interest or convenience of the public. In the final reckoning, the danger of %ust such a polic" against marriage followed b" petitioner ! S ! is that it strikes at the ver" essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimatel", of the famil" as the foundation of the nation. !hat it must be effectivel" interdicted here in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminator" conduct derogator" of the laws of the land is not onl" in order but imperativel" re)uired.

). MARIETTA ,. ANCHETA* vs. RODOLFO S. ANCHETA G. R. No. 1)#!0/ Ma%4h )* (//)* FACTS ,fter their marriage on .arch G, 11G1, the petitioner and the respondent resided in .untinlupa, .etro .anila. !he" had eight children during their coverture. On 2ecember D, 111(, the respondent left the con%ugal home and abandoned the petitioner and their children. On <anuar" (G, 111=, petitioner .arietta ,ncheta filed a petition with the &!', against the respondent for the dissolution of their con%ugal partnership and %udicial separation of propert" with a plea for support and support pendente lite. On ,pril (7, 111=, the parties executed a 'ompromise ,greement where some of the con%ugal properties were ad%udicated to the petitioner and her eight children, including the following5 b. , parcel of land >ad%oining the two lots covered b" !'! 9os. 1(77E( and !'! 9o. 1(77E;$'avite? located at /ancal, 'armona, 'avite, registered in the name of the famil" ,ncheta. /iofood 'orporation under !'! 9o. ;17EE(, together with the resort .unting araiso, !raining 'enter, four$store" building, pavilion, swimming pool and all improvements. ,ll of the shares of stocks of ,ncheta /iofoods 'orporation were distributed one$third >1/;? to the petitioner and the eight children one$twelfth >1/1(? each. In the meantime, the respondent intended to marr" again. On <une G, 111G, he filed a petition with the &!', for the declaration of nullit" of his marriage with the petitioner on the ground of ps"chological incapacit".
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2uring the hearing on the said date, there was no appearance for the petitioner. !he public prosecutor appeared for the *tate and offered no ob%ection to the motion of the respondent who appeared with counsel. !he trial court granted the motion and declared the petitioner in default, and allowed the respondent to adduce evidence ex$parte. !he respondent testified in his behalf and adduced documentar" evidence. On <ul" F, 111G, the trial court issued an Order granting the petition and declaring the marriage of the parties void ab initio. ISSUE #hether or not the decision of the lower court is valid. RULING Invalid. In the case of &epublic v. 'ourt of ,ppeals, this 'ourt laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of ,rt. =E of the @amil" 'ode, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting attorne" or fiscal and the *olicitor General to appear as counsel for the *tate5 >E? !he trial court must order the prosecuting attorne" or fiscal and the *olicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. 9o decision shall be handed down unless the *olicitor General issues a certification, which will be )uoted in the decision, briefl" stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case ma" be, to the petition. !he *olicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorne", shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen >1G? da"s from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. !he *olicitor General shall discharge the e)uivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under 'anon 171G.;E , grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation b" default is fraught with the danger of collusion. 4ence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullit" of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorne" or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the *tate for the purpose of preventing an" collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant$spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorne" to determine if collusion exists between the parties. !he prosecuting attorne" or fiscal ma" oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated. #. LEONCIA a38 GAUDIOSO ,ALOG,OG vs. COURT OF A--EALS G. R. No. +!#"+ Ma%4h 0* 1""0 FACTS etitioners are the children of /asilio /alogbog and Genoveva ,rzibal who died intestate. !he" had an older brother, Gavino, who predeceased their parents. rivate respondents brought an action for partition and accounting against petitioners, claiming that the" were the legitimate children of Gavino b" 'atalina +bas and that the" are
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entitled to the 1/; share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents. alleged that their brother Gavino died single and without issue.

etitioners

!he ma"or of ,sturias, 'ebu testified that he had attended the wedding of Gavino and 'atalina sometime in 11(1, in which &ev. @ather :miliano <omao$as officiated and :gmidio .anuel, then a municipal councilor, acted as one of the witnesses. , famil" friend of private respondents also testified that private respondents are the children of Gavino and 'atalina. ,ccording to him, the wedding of Gavino and 'atalina was solemnized in the 'atholic 'hurch of ,sturias, 'ebu and that he knew this because he attended their wedding. 4e testified that Gavino died in 11;G in his residence, in the presence of his wife. >!his contradicts petitionersM claim made in their answer that Gavino died in the ancestral house.? 4e said that he was the one who made the coffin of Gavino and the coffin of the coupleMs son who died when he was six. 'atalina +bas testified that after the wedding, she was handed a -receipt,- presumabl" the marriage certificate, b" @r. <omao$as, but it was burned during the war. *he said that she and Gavino lived together and begot three children. *he stated that after the death of Gavino, she lived in common law relation with a man for a "ear and then the" separated. rivate respondents produced a certificate that the &egister of .arriages did not have a record of the marriage of Gavino and 'atalina, another certificate from the Office of the !reasurer that there was no record of the birth of &amonito in that office and, for this reason, the record must be presumed to have been lost or destro"ed during the war, and a certificate b" the arish riest of ,sturias that there was likewise no record of birth of &amonito in the church, the records of which were either lost or destro"ed during the war. !he '@I of 'ebu 'it" declared private respondents heirs of the deceased /asilio and Genoveva /alogbog entitling them to inherit from their grand parents. !he ', affirmed the decision of the '@I. It held that petitioners failed to overcome the legal presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are in fact married, that a child is presumed to be legitimate. ISSUE #hether or not testimonial evidence is a competent proof to prove that fact of marriage. RULING +nder the &ules of 'ourt, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legall" married. !his presumption ma" be rebutted onl" b" cogent proof to the contrar". In this case, petitionersM claim that the certification presented b" private respondents >to the effect that the record of the marriage had been lost or destro"ed during the war? was belied b" the production of the /ook of .arriages b" the assistant municipal treasurer of ,sturias. etitioners argue that this book does not contain an" entr" pertaining to the alleged marriage of private respondentsM parents.
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In #ugeda v. !rias, the *' held that in the absence of the record of marriage, evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses are competent to prove the marriage. ,lthough a marriage contract is considered primar" evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence ma" be presented to prove marriage. 4ere, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence, that Gavino and 'atalina were married in 11(1H that the" had three children, one of whom died in infanc"H that their marriage subsisted until 11;G when Gavino diedH and that their children, private respondents herein, were recognized b" GavinoMs famil" and b" the public as the legitimate children of Gavino. 9either is there merit in the argument that the existence of the marriage cannot be presumed because there was no evidence showing in particular that Gavino and 'atalina, in the presence of two witnesses, declared that the" were taking each other as husband and wife. ,n exchange of vows can be presumed to have been made from the testimonies of the witnesses who state that a wedding took place, since the ver" purpose for having a wedding is to exchange vows of marital commitment. !he law favors the validit" of marriage, because the *tate is interested in the preservation of the famil" and the sanctit" of the famil" is a matter of constitutional concern. !he decision appealed from is ,@@I&.:2. . RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA vs. ROSITA A. ALCANTARA a38 HON. COURT OF A--EALS G. R. No. 1 00) A292s7 (+* (//0 FACTS , petition for annulment of marriage was filed b" petitioner against private respondent alleging that he and respondent, without securing a marriage license, went to the .anila 'it" 4all to look for a fixer who could arrange a marriage for them. !he fixer arranged their wedding before a certain .inister of the Gospel of the '2'' /& 'hapel. !he" got married on 2ecember E, 11E( at the stairs of the .anila 'it" 4all and not in '2'' /& 'hapel. etitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremon" at the *an <ose de .anuguit 'hurch in !ondo, .anila. !he marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. !he alleged marriage license appearing on the marriage contract is a sham because it was procured from 'armona, 'avite where he nor the private respondent was a resident of the place. etitioner also alleged that the certification states that the .arriage Aicense number is F7G=1;; while the marriage contract bears the number F7G=7;; for their marriage license number. rivate respondent asserts the validit" of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced b" a certification from the Office of the 'ivil &egistr". etitioner has a mistress with whom he has three children. etitioner onl" filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. rivate respondent, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against petitioner before the .!' of .andalu"ong 'it". &espondent pra"s that the petition for annulment of marriage be denied for lack of merit.
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!he &!' of .akati dismissed the petition. !he ', affirmed the &!' and held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to be regularl" issued and petitioner had not presented an" evidence to overcome the presumption. .oreover, the parties marriage contract being a public document is a prima facie proof of the )uestioned marriage under *ection ==, &ule 1;7 of the &ules of 'ourt. ISSUE #hether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent is void on the ground of lack of marriage license. RULING !he marriage involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivit" of the @amil" 'ode, the applicable law to determine its validit" is the 'ivil 'ode which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. , valid marriage license is a re)uisite of marriage under ,rticle G; of the 'ivil 'ode, the absence of which renders the marriage void a" initio pursuant to ,rticle E7>;? in relation to ,rticle GE of the same 'ode. !he re)uirement and issuance of a marriage license is the *tate0s demonstration of its involvement and participation in ever" marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. etitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validit" of his marriage. !o be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law re)uires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the ver" least, supported b" a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. , certification to this effect was also issued b" the local civil registrar of 'armona, 'avite. !he certification moreover is precise in that it specificall" identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein. ,part from these, petitioner, b" counsel, admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in 'armona, 'avite. !here is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondents marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a cit" or municipalit", not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 17$da" period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validit" of the marriage. ,n irregularit" in an" of the formal re)uisites of marriage does not affect its validit" but the part" or parties responsible for the irregularit" are civill", criminall" and administrativel" liable. !he parties utilized the same marriage license during their church wedding which bolsters the conclusion that the church ceremon" was confirmator" of their civil marriage, thereb" cleansing whatever irregularit" or defect attended the civil wedding. etition is DENIED. !he decision of the ', affirming the decision of the &!' is AFFIRMED. 0. SUSAN NICDAO CARIEO vs. SUSAN :EE CARIEO
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G. R. No. 1!(#("

Fe6%2a%1 (* (//1

FACTS 2uring the lifetime of the late * O= *antiago *. 'ariBo, he contracted two marriages, the first was on <une (7, 11D1, with petitioner *usan 9icdao 'ariBoH and the second was on 9ovember 17, 111(, with respondent *usan 3ee 'ariBo. * O= *antiago *. 'ariBo died on 9ovember (;, 111(, under the care of *usan 3ee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. /oth petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetar" benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. &espondent *usan 3ee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a %udicial declaration of nullit" of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. *he, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it onl" at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. &espondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void a" initio because the same was solemnized without the re)uired marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented5 1? the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license numberH and (? a certification from the Aocal 'ivil &egistrar that there is no record of marriage license of the spouses *antiago 'arino and *usan 9icdao. !he &!' ruled in favor of respondent, *usan 3ee, thereb" ordering *usan 9icdao to pa" the former half of the amount that was paid to her in the form of death benefits from the death of *antiago 'arino. !he ', affirmed in toto the decision of the &!'. ISSUES 1. #hether or not the marriage between the deceased and the petitioner is valid. (. #hether or not the marriage between the deceased and the respondent is valid. ;. #hether or not the respondent has a better right over the petitioner with respect to the death benefits of the deceased. RULING +nder ,rticle =7 of the @amil" 'ode, the absolute nullit" of a previous marriage ma" be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solel" of a final %udgment declaring such previous marriage void. .eaning, where the absolute nullit" of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said pro%ected marriage to be free from legal infirmit", is a final %udgment declaring the previous marriage void. 4owever, for purposes other than remarriage, no %udicial action is necessar" to declare a marriage an absolute nullit". @or other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimac" or illegitimac" of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of propert" regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court ma" pass upon the validit" of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directl" instituted to )uestion the validit" of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In
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such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentar", to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullit". +nder the 'ivil 'ode, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner *usan 9icdao and the deceased was solemnized in 11D1, a valid marriage license is a re)uisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, sub%ect to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. !he marriage between petitioner *usan 9icdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessar" marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license re)uirement, is undoubtedl" void ab initio. *uch being the case, the presumed validit" of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been sufficientl" overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that the" secured the re)uired marriage license. /ut petitioner avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in %eopard". 4ence, the presumed validit" of their marriage cannot stand. 4owever, it does not follow that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the 6death benefits8 under scrutin" would now be awarded to *usan 3ee. +nder ,rticle =7 of the @amil" 'ode, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior %udicial declaration of the nullit" of a previous marriage, though void, before a part" can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. ,ccordingl", the declaration in the instant case of nullit" of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner *usan 9icdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent *usan 3ee. !he fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a %udicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner *usan 9icdao and the deceased void. 4ence, the marriage of respondent *usan 3ee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio. +. RE-U,LIC OF THE -HILI--INES vs. JOSE A. DA:OT G. R. No. 10##+1 Ma%4h (+* (//+ FACTS On (= 9ovember 11ED, <ose and @elisa were married at the asa" 'it" 4all that was solemnized b" &ev. !omas C. ,tienza. In lieu of a marriage license, <ose and @elisa executed a sworn affidavit attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturit", and that being unmarried, the" had lived together as husband and wife for at least five "ears. <ose filed a 'omplaint for ,nnulment and/or 2eclaration of 9ullit" of .arriage with the &!' of /inan, Aaguna. 4e contended that his marriage with @elisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremon" was celebrated between the partiesH that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and @elisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five "earsH and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
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@elisa denied <oseMs allegations and defended the validit" of their marriage. @elisa expounded that while her marriage to <ose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with &ufina ascual on ;1 ,ugust 1117. On ; <une 111;, @elisa filed an action for bigam" against <ose. *ubse)uentl", she filed an administrative complaint against <ose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since <ose and &ufina were both emplo"ees of a government agenc". !he &!' dismissed the 'omplaint. <oseMs claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied b" the fact that he acknowledged @elisa !ecson as his wife when he wrote the latter0s name in the dul" notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up one "ear after he discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false. In his compan" I.2., he wrote the name of @elisa as the person to be contacted in case of emergenc". !he ', affirmed the &!'. <ose filed a .otion for &econ alleging that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed b" him and @elisa was false. !he ', reversed its earlier decision and declared the marriage between <ose and @elisa void ab initio because of the absence of marriage license. !he &epublic of the hilippines, through the O*G, filed a etition for &eview before this 'ourt in G.&. 9o. 1FGGE1, pra"ing that the ',0s ,mended 2ecision be reversed and set aside. @elisa filed a separate etition for &eview >G.&. 9o. 1F1=F=? similarl" assailing the ',Ms ,mended 2ecision. !he 'ourt consolidated the two etitions. ISSUE #hether or not the falsit" of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five$"ear re)uirement, effectivel" renders the marriage void a" initio for lack of a marriage license. RULING !he exception of a marriage license under ,rticle FD applies onl" to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five "ears and desire to marr" each other. !he minimum re)uisite of five "ears of cohabitation cannot be dispensed with. !his re)uirement partakes of a mandator" character. !he declaration of the 'ivil 'ode that ever" intendment of law or fact leans towards the validit" of marriage will not salvage the partiesM marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law. !he marriage of <ose and @elisa was entered into without the re)uisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent re)uirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. !he solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwar" parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent b" making a prior license a prere)uisite for a valid marriage. !o permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an ab%ect circumvention of the law. !he falsit" of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of <ose and
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@elisaMs cohabitation, which would have )ualified their marriage as an exception to the re)uirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularit", for it refers to a )uintessential fact that the law precisel" re)uired to be deposed and attested to b" the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. 4ence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all. <urisprudence has laid down the rule that the five$"ear common$law cohabitation period under ,rticle FD means a five$"ear period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the "ears immediatel" preceding the da" of the marriage, characterized b" exclusivit" $ meaning no third part" was involved at an" time within the five "ears $ and continuit" that is unbroken.

". ENGRACE NIEAL vs. NORMA ,A:ADOG G. R. No. 1!!00+ Ma%4h 1)* (/// FACTS epito 9iBal was married to !eodulfa /ellones on *eptember (D, 11F=. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. !eodulfa was shot b" epito resulting in her death. One "ear and E months thereafter or on 2ecember 11, 11ED, epito and respondent got married without an" marriage license. In lieu thereof, epito and 9orma executed an affidavit stating that the" had lived together as husband and wife for at least five "ears and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On @ebruar" 11, 111F, epito died in a car accident. ,fter their fatherMs death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullit" of the marriage of epito to 9orma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. !he case was filed under the assumption that the validit" or invalidit" of the second marriage would affect petitionerMs successional rights. 9orma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since the" are not among the persons who could file an action for -annulment of marriage- under ,rticle =F of the @amil" 'ode. !he &!' of !oledo 'it", 'ebu, dismissed the petition. ISSUES 1. #hether or not the second marriage of plaintiffsM deceased father with defendant is null and void a" initio. (. #hether or not the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullit" of his marriage after his death.
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RULING !he five$"ear common$law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. !his G$"ear period should be the "ears immediatel" before the da" of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized b" exclusivit" N meaning no third part" was involved at an"time within the G "ears and continuit" N that is unbroken. In this case, at the time of epito and respondentMs marriage, it cannot be said that the" have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five "ears prior to their wedding da". @rom the time epitoMs first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, onl" about twent" months had elapsed. :ven assuming that epito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both epito and respondent had started living with each other that has alread" lasted for five "ears, the fact remains that their five$"ear period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated b" law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect onl" b" the absence of the marriage contract. epito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when the" lived with each other, epito had alread" been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. !he subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make an" cohabitation b" either spouse with an" third part" as being one as -husband and wife. !herefore, the second marriage is not covered b" the exception to the re)uirement of a marriage license, it is void a" initio because of the absence of such element. Coid marriages can be )uestioned even after the death of either part" that is wh" the action or defense for nullit" is imprescriptible and can be collaterall" attacked. 'ontrar" to the trial courtMs ruling, the death of petitionerMs father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and respondent. !he conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing. ,rticle =7 of the @amil" 'ode expressl" provides that there must be a %udicial declaration of the nullit" of a previous marriage, though void, for the purpose of remarriage. 4owever, other than for purposes of remarriage, no %udicial action is necessar" to declare a marriage an absolute nullit". @or other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimac" or illegitimac" of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of propert" regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court ma" pass upon the validit" of marriage even in a suit not directl" instituted to )uestion the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. !his is without pre%udice to an" issue that ma" arise in the case. #hen such need arises, a final %udgment of declaration of nullit" is necessar" even if the purpose is other than to remarr". !he clause -on the basis of a final %udgment declaring such previous marriage void- in ,rticle =7 of the @amil" 'ode connotes that such final %udgment need not be obtained onl" for purpose of remarriage.
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1/. HERMINIA ,ORJACMANZANO vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ A. M. No. MTJC//C1!(" Ma%4h +* (//1 FACTS 'omplainant 4erminia /or%a$.anzano charges respondent <udge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn 'omplaint$,ffidavit filed with the Office of the 'ourt ,dministrator on 1( .a" 1111. 'omplainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late 2avid .anzano, having been married to him on (1 .a" 11DD. On (( .arch 111;, her husband contracted another marriage with Auzviminda a"ao before respondent <udge. &espondent <udge claims that when he officiated the marriage between .anzano and a"ao he did not know that .anzano was legall" married. #hat he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven "ears alread" without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their %oint affidavit. ,ccording to him, had he known that the late .anzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marr" againH otherwise, he >.anzano? could be charged with bigam". In their separate affidavits executed and sworn to before respondent <udge, .anzano and a"ao expressl" stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. ,nd that since their respective marriages had been marked b" constant )uarrels, the" had both left their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses an"more. ,lso, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were -separated.- &espondent <udge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in )uestion in accordance with ,rticle ;= of the @amil" 'ode. !he 'ourt ,dministrator recommended that respondent <udge be found guilt" of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pa" a fine of (,777, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severel". ISSUE #hether or not the marriage between .anzano and marriage contemplated in ,rticle ;= of the @amil" 'ode. a"ao properl" fall under the

RULING ,rticle ;= of the @amil" 'ode provides5 $o license shall "e necessar for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as hus"and and wife for at least five ears and without an legal impediment to marr each other. !he contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit "efore an person authori8ed " law to administer oaths. !he solemni8ing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the 5ualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage. !he fact that .anzano and a"ao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time alread" is immaterial. ,rticle D;>1? of the @amil" 'ode allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separatel" from each other, but
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in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. :lsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarr". !his holds true all the more when the separation is merel" de facto, as in the case at bar. 9either can respondent <udge take refuge on the <oint ,ffidavit of 2avid .anzano and Auzviminda a"ao stating that the" had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven "ears. <ust like separation, free and voluntar" cohabitation with another person for at least five "ears does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. .arital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legall" capacitated to marr" each other is merel" a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a %ustification for respondent <udge to solemnize a subse)uent marriage vitiated b" the impediment of a prior existing marriage. &espondent <udge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. !he recommendation of the 'ourt ,dministrator is ,2O !:2, with the .O2I@I',!IO9 that the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent <udge &o)ue *anchez is increased to (7,777. 11. REINEL ANTHON: ,. DE CASTRO vs. ANNA,ELLE ASSIDAOCDE CASTRO G. R. No. 1 /10( Fe6%2a%1 1!* (//+ FACTS etitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1111. !he" applied for a marriage license with the Office of the 'ivil &egistrar of asig 'it" in *eptember 111=. #hen the couple went back to the Office of the 'ivil &egistrar, the marriage license had alread" expired. !o push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, the" executed an affidavit stating that the" had been living together as husband and wife for at least five "ears. !he couple got married. 9evertheless, after the ceremon", petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife. &espondent gave birth to a child. *ince the child0s birth, respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and from her private practice. On = <une 111E, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the &!' of asig 'it". *he alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has reneged on his responsibilit"/obligation to financiall" support her as his wife and their child. etitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void a" initio since the marriage was facilitated b" a fake affidavitH and that he was merel" prevailed upon b" respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to her pregnant stateH and
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that he was not able to get parental advice from his parents before he got married. 4e also averred that the" never lived together as husband and wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child. !he &!' ruled that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. 4owever, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support. etitioner elevated the case to the ',. !he ', denied the appeal. rompted b" the rule that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a %udicial declaration of nullit" has been made, the appellate court declared that the child was born during the subsistence and validit" of the partie0s marriage. etitioner stresses that the affidavit the" executed, in lieu of a marriage license, contained a false narration of facts, the truth being that he and respondent never lived together as husband and wife. !he false affidavit should never be allowed or admitted as a substitute to fill the absence of a marriage license. ISSUE #hether or not the false affidavit executed b" the parties affects the validit" of their marriage. RULING +nder the @amil" 'ode, the absence of an" of the essential or formal re)uisites shall render the marriage void a" initio, whereas a defect in an" of the essential re)uisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when the" contracted their marriage. Instead, the" presented an affidavit stating that the" had been living together for more than five "ears. !he falsit" of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularit" in the formal re)uisites of marriage. !he law dispenses with the marriage license re)uirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusivel" with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five "ears before the marriage. !he aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of ever" applicant0s name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no scandalous cohabitation to protectH in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. !he false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so the" could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoeverH it is a mere scrap of paper. !he" were not exempt from the marriage license re)uirement. !heir failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void a" initio.

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etition is granted in part. !he assailed 2ecision and &esolution of the ', are *:! ,*I2: and the decision of the &!' is &:I9*!,!:2. 1(. HEIRS OF JOSE S: ,ANG* e7 a'. vs. ROLANDO S:* e7 a'. G. R. No. 11)(10 O47o6e% 1!* (//" FACTS &espondent &olando *" filed a 'omplaint for artition against spouses <ose *" /ang and Iluminada !an, spouses <ulian *" and &osa !an, Qenaida *", .a. :mma *", Oscar *", &osalino *", Aucio *", :nri)ue *", &osauro *", /artolome *", @lorecita *", Aourdes *", <ulieta *", &osita @errera$*", and &enato *" before the then '@I of Ruezon. &espondents &olando *", &osalino *", Aucio *", :nri)ue *", &osauro *", /artolome *", <ulieta *", Aourdes *", and @lorecita *" are the children of *" /ang b" his second marriage to respondent &osita @errera$*", while petitioners <ose *" /ang, <ulian *" and Oscar *" are the children of *" /ang from his first marriage to /a 9ga, and petitioners Qenaida !an and .a. :mma *" are the children of petitioner spouses <ose *" /ang and Iluminada !an. *" /ang died intestate in 11F1, leaving behind real and personal properties, including several businesses. On .a" 1, 111D, &osita @errera$*" filed a .otion for a"ment of #idow0s ,llowance. *he alleged that her deceased husband, *" /ang, left an extensive estate. !he properties of the estate were found b" the trial court to be their con%ugal properties. @rom the time of *" /ang0s death in 11F1 until the filing of the motion, &osita was not given an" widow0s allowance b" the parties in possession and control of her husband0s estate, or her share in the con%ugal partnership. !he .otion for a"ment of #idow0s ,llowance was granted b" the 'ourt. .eanwhile, on *eptember ;7, 111D, respondents filed a <oint etition for the Guardianship of the Incompetent &osita @errera$*" before the &!' of Aucena 'it", /ranch GE >Guardianship court?. 2uring the trial, petitioners stressed that *" /ang0s marriage to &osita @errera is void. !he" claimed that respondents have falsified documents to lead the courts into believing that &osita0s marriage to *" /ang is valid. , 2O< &esolution finding probable cause to file the falsification charges against respondents was issued. On the strength of the 2O< resolution, petitioners contended that the criminal cases for falsification expose &osita as a mere common$law wife and not a 6widow8H hence, there is no legal %ustification to give her the widow0s allowance. ISSUE #hether or not the marriage between *" /ang and &osita @errera is valid.
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RULING , finding of probable cause does not conclusivel" prove the charge of falsification against respondents. robable cause 3ee8 3o7 6e 6ase8 o3 4'ea% a38 4o3v&34&39 ev&8e34e o< 92&'7, neither on evidence establishing guilt be"ond reasonable doubt, and definitel" not on evidence establishing absolute certaint" of guilt. 4ence, until the marriage is finall" declared void b" the court, the same is presumed valid and &osita is entitled to receive her widow0s allowance to be taken from the estate of *" /ang. 1!. MERCEDITA MATA ARAEES vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO A. M. No. MTJC/(C1!"/ A$%&' 11* (//( FACTS etitioner charges respondent %udge with Gross Ignorance of the Aaw because he solemnized her marriage to her late groom 2ominador /. Orobia without the re)uisite marriage license and at 9abua, 'amarines *ur which is outside his territorial %urisdiction. !he" lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband passed awa". 4owever, since the marriage was a nullit", petitionerMs right to inherit the -vast properties- left b" Orobia was not recognized. *he was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia. etitioner pra"s that sanctions be imposed against respondent %udge for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations. &espondent %udge averred that he was re)uested b" <uan ,rro"o to solemnize the marriage of the parties. 4aving been assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the .!' of /alatan, 'amarines *ur. ,rro"o re)uested if respondent %udge could solemnize the marriage in 9abua, instead of having it in /alatan because of the health condition of Orobia, to which re)uest he acceded. #hen he discovered that the parties did not possess the re)uisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage. 4owever, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the deliver" of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. ,fter the solemnization, he reiterated the necessit" for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. etitioner and Orobia assured respondent %udge that the" would give the license to him on the same da". #hen the" failed to compl", respondent %udge followed it up with ,rro"o but the latter onl" gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala. &espondent %udge vigorousl" denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid despite the absence of a marriage license. etitioner and Orobia filed their ,pplication for .arriage Aicense on G <anuar" (777. It was stamped in this ,pplication that the marriage license shall be issued on 1F <anuar" (777. 4owever, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it. !he Office of the 'ivil &egistrar General issued a 'ertification that it has no record of such marriage that allegedl" took place on 1F @ebruar" (777. Aikewise, the Office of the Aocal 'ivil &egistrar of 9abua,
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'amarines *ur issued another 'ertification that it cannot issue a true cop" of the .arriage 'ontract of the parties since it has no record of their marriage. ISSUES 1. #hether or not a marriage solemnized b" a %udge outside its territorial %urisdiction is valid. (. #hether or not the subse)uent issuance of marriage license cures the defect of lack of marriage license. RULING +nder the <udiciar" &eorganization ,ct of 11E7, or /. . 1(1, the authorit" of the regional trial court %udges and %udges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial %urisdiction as defined b" the *upreme 'ourt. ,s held b" the *' in $avarro vs. Domagto , 6a priest who is commissioned and allowed b" his local ordinance to marr" the faithful is authorized to do so onl" within the area or diocese or place allowed b" his /ishop. ,n appellate court <ustice or a <ustice of this 'ourt has %urisdiction over the entire hilippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the re)uisites of the law are complied with. Howeve%* ;289es who a%e a$$o&37e8 7o s$e4&<&4 ;2%&s8&47&o3s* 5a1 o<<&4&a7e &3 we88&39s o3'1 w&7h&3 sa&8 a%eas a38 3o7 6e1o38. Whe%e a ;289e so'e53&=es a 5a%%&a9e o27s&8e h&s 4o2%7Fs ;2%&s8&47&o3* 7he%e &s a %es2'7a37 &%%e92'a%&71 &3 7he <o%5a' %e?2&s&7e 'a&8 8ow3 &3 A%7&4'e !* wh&4h wh&'e &7 5a1 3o7 a<<e47 7he va'&8&71 o< 7he 5a%%&a9e* 5a1 s26;e47 7he o<<&4&a7&39 o<<&4&a' 7o a85&3&s7%a7&ve '&a6&'&71. In the case at bar, the territorial %urisdiction of respondent %udge is limited to the municipalit" of /alatan, 'amarines *ur. 4is act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in 9abua, 'amarines *ur therefore is contrar" to law and sub%ects him to administrative liabilit". 4is act ma" not amount to gross ignorance of the law but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liabilit" for violating the law on marriage. &espondent %udge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the re)uisite marriage license. In #eople vs. 9ara, the *' held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subse)uent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validit" to the marriage. :xcept in cases provided b" law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authorit" to solemnize a marriage. &espondent %udge did not possess such authorit" when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent %udge acted in gross ignorance of the law. Respondent <udge is fined G,777.77 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severel". 1). ZENAIDA S. ,ESO vs. JUDGE JUAN DAGUMAN A. M. No. ""C1(11 Ja32a%1 (+* (/// FACTS
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'omplainant charged respondent %udge with solemnizing marriage outside of his %urisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a cop" and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Aocal &egistrar. 'omplainant alleges that she and her fiancI, /ernardito 3man, got married and their marriage was solemnized b" respondent %udge in his residence of <. .&. *ubdivision in 'alba"og 'it", *amar. ,fter their wedding, her husband abandoned her without an" reason at all. #hen she in)uired about their .arriage 'ontract, the Aocal 'ivil &egistrar of 'alba"og 'it" informed her that their marriage was not registered. *he was also informed b" respondent %udge that all the copies of the .arriage 'ontract were taken b" her husband and that no cop" was retained b" respondent %udge. &espondent <udge averred that the civil marriage had to be solemnized b" in 'alba"og 'it" though outside his territor" as municipal <udge of *ta. .argarita, *amar because he was ph"sicall" indisposed and unable to report to his station in *ta. .argita. ,nd that without prior appointment, the contracting parties unexpectedl" came to his residence, urgentl" re)uesting the celebration of their marriage right then and there, first, because complainants said she must leave that same da" to be able to fl" from .anila for abroad as scheduledH second, that for the parties to go to another town for the marriage would be expensive and would entail serious problems of finding a solemnizing officer and another pair of witnesses or sponsorsH third, if the" failed to get married on that specific date, complainant would be out of the countr" for a long period and their marriage license would lapse and necessitate another publication of noticeH fourth, if the parties go be"ond their plans for the scheduled marriage, complainant feared it would complicate her emplo"ment abroadH and, last, all other alternatives as to date and venue of marriage were considered impracticable b" the parties. ISSUE 1. #hether or not a marriage celebrated outside of the territorial %urisdiction of a %udge is valid. (. #hether or not respondent %udge is negligent in not retaining a cop" and not registering the marriage contract with the Aocal 'ivil &egistrar. RULING ,rticle E of the @amil" 'ode clearl" states, a marriage can be held outside the %udgeMs chambers or courtroom onl" in the following instances5 1.K at the point of deathH (.K in remote places in accordance with ,rticle (1, or ;.K upon the re)uest of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant /eso or her fiancI 3man was at the point of death or in a remote place. 9either was there a sworn written re)uest made b" the contracting parties to respondent <udge that the marriage be solemnized outside his chambers or at a place other than his sala. &espondent <udge should be reminded that N
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A priest who is commissioned and allowed " his ordinar to marr the faithful, is authori8ed to do so onl within the area of the diocese or place allowed " is :ishop. An appellate court .ustice or a ;ustice of this Court has .urisdiction over the entire #hilippines to solemni8e marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the re5uisites of the law are complied with. <owever, ;udges who are appointed to specific .urisdictions ma officiate in weddings onl within said areas and not "e ond. =here a .udge solemni8es a marriage outside his court>s .urisdiction, there is a resultant irregularit in the formal re5uisite laid down in Article ), which while it ma not affect the validit of the marriage, ma su".ect the officiating official to administrative lia"ilit . 'onsidering that respondents <udgeMs %urisdiction covers the municipalit" of *ta. .argarita$!arangan$ agsan%an, *amar onl", he was not clothed with authorit" to solemnize a marriage in the 'it" of 'alba"og. ,rticle (; of the @amil" 'ode states that 6it is the dut" of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties, the original of the marriage contract referred to in ,rticle D and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen da s after the marriage , to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemni8ed . #roper receipts shall "e issued " the local civil registrar to the solemni8ing officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate . !he solemni8ing officer shall retain in his file the 5uadruplicate cop of the marriage certificate, the original of the marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting part" regarding the solemnization of the marriage in a place other than those mentioned in ,rticle E.8 1#. MA. ARMIDA -EREZCFERRARIS vs. ,RIG FERRARIS G. R. No. 1 (! + J2'1 10* (// FACTS On @ebruar" (7, (771, the &egional !rial 'ourt of asig 'it", /ranch 1G1 rendered a 2ecision den"ing the petition for declaration of nullit" of petitionerMs marriage with /rix @erraris. !he trial court noted that suffering from epileps" does not amount to ps"chological incapacit" under ,rticle ;D of the 'ivil 'ode and the evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelit". etitionerMs motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated ,pril (7, (771 where the trial court reiterated that there was no evidence that respondent is mentall" or ph"sicall" ill to such an extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. etitioner appealed to the 'ourt of ,ppeals which affirmed in toto the %udgment of the trial court. *he then filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied for lack of merit. !hus, she filed a petition for review on certiorari with this 'ourt. !he petition for review was denied for failure of petitioner to show that the appellate tribunal committed an" reversible error. etitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration.
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ISSUE #hether or not the marriage in this case should be annulled based on ps"chological incapacit". RULING 9o. !he term -ps"chological incapacit"- to be a ground for the nullit" of marriage under ,rticle ;D of the @amil" 'ode, refers to a serious ps"chological illness afflicting a part" even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malad" so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. ,s all people ma" have certain )uirks and idios"ncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personalit" disorders, there is hardl" an" doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of -ps"chological incapacit"- to the most serious cases of personalit" disorders clearl" demonstrative of an utter insensitivit" or inabilit" to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It is for this reason that the 'ourt relies heavil" on ps"chological experts for its understanding of the human personalit". 4owever, the root cause must be identified as a ps"chological illness and its incapacitating nature must be full" explained, which petitioner failed to convincingl" demonstrate. 1 . RE-U,LIC OF THE -HILI--INES vs. L:NETTE CA,ANTUGC,AGUIO G. R. No. 101/)( J23e !/* (//+ FACTS On ,ugust 1(, 111F, &espondent A"nette contracted marriage to .artini. Aess than three >;? "ears later respondent filed before the &egional !rial 'ourt >&!'? of 'ebu 'it" a complaint for declaration of nullit" of marriage on the ground of .artini0s ps"chological incapacit" to compl" with the essential marital duties and obligations under ,rticles DE$ F7 of the @amil" 'ode. &espondent presented a ps"chological evaluation report b" 2r. Gerong, a clinical ps"chologist, stating that .artini shows immature personalit" disorder, dependenc" patterns, and self$centered motive. !his situation is serious, grave, existing alread" during the adolescent period, and incurable because personalit" and character are stable whether it is normal and adaptive. !he &!' found .artini ps"chologicall" incapacitated to compl" with the essential marital obligations of marriage, and that the same incapacit" existed at the time the couple exchanged their marriage vows. !he *olicitor General, via appeal, challenged before the 'ourt of ,ppeals >',? the trial court0s decision. !he ', affirmed the trial court0s decision. , .otion for &econsideration was filed but the same was denied. 4ence, the present petition for review is filed. ISSUE #hether or not the marriage between respondent A"nette and .artini is null and void on the ground of the latter0s ps"chological incapacit". RULING
DG

!he *upreme 'ourt ruled that the marriage between respondent A"nette and .artini valid because respondent failed to prove the ps"chological incapacit" of the latter. :ven when the rules have been relaxed and the personal examination of the defendant b" a ps"chiatrist or ps"chologist is no longer mandator" for the declaration of nullit" of marriage under ,rticle ;D of the @amil" 'ode, the totalit" of evidence presented during trial b" private respondent must still prove the gravit", %uridical antecedence and incurabilit" of the alleged ps"chological incapacit". s"chological Incapacit" to be a ground for the nullit" of marriage under ,rticle ;D of the @amil" 'ode refers to a serious ps"chological illness afflicting a part" even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malad" so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about t assume. !he mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute ps"chological incapacit". .oreover, does failure of the parties to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons. It is essential that the parties to a marriage must be shown to be insensitive to or incapable of meeting their duties and responsibilities due to some ps"chological illness, which insensitivit" or incapacit" should have been existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage even if it becomes manifest onl" after its solemnization. &espondent0s marriage with martini ma" have failed then, but it cannot be declared void ab initio on the ground of ps"chological incapacit" in light of the insufficient evidence presented. 10. EONILO ANTONIO ve%s2s MARIE IVONNE F. RE:ES G. R. No. 1##+// Ma%4h 1/* (// FACTS !his is a landmark case on s"chological Incapacit" which proclaims, under certain circumstances, habitual l"ing as constitutive of ps"chological incapacit" which ma" lead to nullit" of marriage. !he petitioner$husband claimed that respondent persistentl" lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things. ISSUE #hether or not repeated l"ing is abnormal and pathological and amounts to ps"chological incapacit" of the respondent RULING 3es. !he 'ourt acknowledges that the definition of ps"chological incapacit", as intended b" the revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. <udicial understanding of ps"chological incapacit" ma" be informed b" evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in ps"chological and even canonical thought, and experience. !he case sufficientl" satisfies the guidelines in .olina. .olina has proven indubitabl" useful in providing a unitar" framework that guides courts in ad%udicating petitioners for declaration of nullit" under ,rticle ;D. ,t the same time, the .olina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case$to$case perception of each situation, and .olina itself arising from this evolutionar" understanding of ,rticle ;D.
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&espondent0s abilit" to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live a world of make$believe. !his made her ps"chologicall" incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. One unable to adhere to realit" cannot be expected to adhere as well to an" legal or emotional commitments. !he root cause of respondent0s ps"chological incapacit" has been medicall" or clinicall" identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficientl" proven b" experts, and clearl" explained in the trial court0s decision. !he initiator" complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior 6of perenniall" telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations,8 of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of l"ing about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and famil" background, among others.

1+. RENNE ENRIQUE ,IER vs. MA. LOURDES A. ,IER G. R. No. 10!(") Fe6%2a%1 (0* (//+ FACTS On <ul" (D, 111(, petitioner &enne :nri)ue /ier married with the herein respondent .a. Aourdes ,. /ier after six months of courtship. ,s petitioner was based in *audi ,rabia, the parties decided to maintain two residences, one in the hilippines and another in *audi ,rabia. :ver"thing went well for the first three "ears of their marriage. 4owever, after three "ears thereof, the couple experiencing marital problems as respondent ceased to be the person petitioner knew and married. ,ccording to the petitioner, respondent started becoming aloof towards the later and began to spend more time with her friends than with him, refusing even to have sexual relations with him for no apparent reason. *he became an alcoholic and a chain$ smoker. *he also started neglecting her husbandMs needs and the upkeep of their home, and became an absentee wife. ,fter being gone from their home for da"s on end, she would return without bothering to account for her absence. ,s a result, the" fre)uentl" )uarreled. @inall", on ,pril 17, 111F, respondent suddenl" left for the +nited *tates. etitioner has not heard from her since. 4ence, this petition for the declaration of nullit" of marriage on the ground that respondent was ps"chologicall" incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations to petitioner. ISSUE
DF

#hether the totalit" of the evidence presented was enough to establish that respondent was ps"chologicall" incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. RULING !he *upreme 'ourt ruled in the negative. etitioner was able to establish that respondent was remiss in her duties as a wife and had become a happ"$go$luck" woman who failed to attend to her husbandMs needs and who eventuall" abandoned him. 4owever, the totalit" of her acts, as testified to b" petitioner and his brother, was not tantamount to a ps"chological incapacit", as petitioner would have us believe. 4abitual alcoholism, chain$smoking, failure or refusal to meet oneMs duties and responsibilities as a married person and eventual abandonment of a spouse do not suffice to nullif" a marriage on the basis of ps"chological incapacit", if not shown to be due to some ps"chological >as opposed to ph"sical? illness. !he 'ourt has been consistent in holding that if a petition for nullit" based on ps"chological incapacit" is to be given due course, its gravit", root cause, incurabilit" and the fact that it existed prior to or at the time of celebration of the marriage must alwa"s be proved. !hese must be strictl" complied with as the granting of a petition for nullit" of marriage based on ps"chological incapacit" must be confined onl" to the most serious cases of personalit" disorders clearl" demonstrative of an utter insensitivit" or inabilit" to give meaning and significance to the marriage. !his is speciall" so since the @amil" 'ode does not define ps"chological incapacit". !he determination thereof is left solel" to the discretion of the courts and must be made on a case$to$case basis. 1". EDWARD DENNETH NGO TE vs. ROWENA ONG GUTIEREZ :UCTE G. R. No. 1 10"! Fe6%2a%1 1!* (//" FACTS On <anuar" 111D when petitioner was a sophomore and respondent, a freshman met in a gathering organized b" the @ilipino$'hinese association in their college. :dward was then attracted to &owena0s friendH but as the latter had alread" a bo"friend, the "oung man courted &owena. *haring the same angst towards their families, the two understood one another and develop a degree of closeness towards each other. On .arch 111D, or around three months after their first meeting, &owena asked :dward that the" elope. ,t first, he refused, bickering that he has "oung and %obless. 4er persistence, however, made him relent. !hus, the" left .anila and sailed to 'ebu that monthH he, providing their travel mone" and she, purchasing the boat ticket. 4owever, :dward0s mone" lasted onl" for a month, the two decided to go back to .anila on ,pril 111D since the" could not find a %ob. &owena proceeded to her uncle0s house and :dward in his parents0 home. #hile the" were separated &owena kept on calling :dward threatening him that she would commit suicide, thus :dward agreed to sta" with &owena at her uncle0s place. On ,pril (;, 111D, &owena0s uncle brought them to a court to get married. 4e was then (G "ears old and she (7. !he two then continued to sta" at her uncle0s house where
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:dward was treated like a prisoner$ he was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. 4er uncle also showed :dward his guns and warned the latter not to leave &owena. #hen :dward got the chance to talk to his brother, the latter persuade him to go home. :dward rela"ed the message to &owenaH however &owena suggested that he should get his inheritance so the" could leave separatel". ,fter a month, :dward escaped from the house of &owena0s uncle, and sta"ed with his parents. On <une 1E, (777, :dward filed a petition before the &!' of Ruezon 'it" for the annulment of his marriage to &owena on the basis of the latter0s ps"chological incapacit". !he trial court, on <une ;7, (771, rendered its decision declaring the marriage null and void on the ground that both parties were ps"chologicall" incapacitated to compl" with the essential marital obligations. On review the appellate court reversed and set aside the decision of the &!'. ISSUE #hether or not the marriage between the parties is null and void on the ground of ps"chological incapacit"L RULING !he court ruled that the seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravit" of the disorders considered it find as decisive the ps"chological evaluation made b" the expert witness5 and, thus rules that the marriage of the parties is null and void on ground of both parties ps"chological incapacit". Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personalit" disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelit" and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make decisions without advice from the others, allows others most of his important decisions, such as where to live, tends to agree with people even when he believes the" are wrong, has a difficult" doing things on his own. !he same ma" also be said to respondent. 4er being afflicted with antisocial personalit" disorders makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. !his findings takes into account her disregard of the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendenc" to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed b" the societ". /oth parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable ps"chological incapacit", the precipitous marriage which the" contracted on ,pril (;, 111D is thus, declared null and void.
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(/. ,ENJAMIN TING vs. CARMEN VELEZCTING G. R. No. 1 #( Ma%4h !1* (//" FACTS etitioner and &espondent met during medical school sometime in 11F( and got married on <ul" (D, 11FG in 'ebu 'it" . !he" begot six JDK children during their marriage. ,fter being married to petitioner for more than eighteen J1EK "ears, respondent filed a verified petition before the &egional !rial 'ourt of 'ebu 'it" on October (1, 111; for the declaration of nullit" of their marriage based on ,rticle ;D of the @amil" 'ode. *he claimed that petitioner suffers from ps"chological incapacit" even from the time of celebration of their marriage, which onl" became manifested thereafter through the petitioner0s alcoholism, violent nature brought about b" excessive drinking, compulsive gambling habits which led him to sell their famil" car and a propert", and the petitioner0s irresponsibilit" and immaturit" as shown b" his failure to support his famil". &espondent presented as witness a certain 2r. OUate, a ps"chiatrist, who, instead of conducting the usual interview, evaluated the petitioner through onl" the transcript of stenographic notes taken during petitioner0s deposition. !he ps"chiatrist concluded that the petitioner0s compulsive drinking, gambling and ph"sical abuse of respondent are clear indications that he suffers from a personalit" disorder. On his side, petitioner presented 2r. Obra, a ps"chiatrist and a consultant at the 2epartment of s"chiatr" in 2on Cicente *otto .emorial .edical 'enter , as his expert witness. 2r. Obra evaluated petitioner0s ps"chological behavior based on the transcript of stenographic notes, as well as the ps"chiatric evaluation report prepared b" a 2r. entz, a ps"chiatrist from the +niversit" of retoria in *outh ,frica , and 2r. Obra0s interview with petitioner0s brothers. 'ontrar" to 2r. OUate0s findings, 2r. Obra observed that there is nothing wrong with petitioner0s personalit". !he &egional !rial 'ourt nevertheless declared the marriage null and void which was also lastl" upheld b" the 'ourt of ,ppeals upon appeal. 4ence, this petition. ISSUE #ere the lower court and the 'ourt of ,ppeals correct in declaring the marriage null and void b" the basis that respondent0s presented evidence is sufficient enough to support the ground of ps"chological incapacit"L RULING !he *upreme 'ourt ruled in the negative. !he totalit" of evidence adduced b" the respondent is insufficient to prove that the petitioner is ps"chologicall" unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband even during the time their marriage was celebrated.

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!he ps"chological illness that must have afflicted a part" at the inception of the marriage should be a malad" so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is to assume. In the case at bar, respondent failed to prove that the petitioner0s defects were alread" existent at the time of the celebration of their marriage. *he merel" cited that prior to their marriage, petitioner was known to occasionall" drink and gamble with his friends, but such statement b" itself, is insufficient to prove an" pre$existing ps"chological defect on the part of her husband. 9either did the evidence adduce that such defects are incurable. !he two ps"chiatrists presented as expert witnesses provided diametricall" contradicting ps"chological evaluations. 9evertheless, great weight should be given unto the report of 2r. Obra because, aside from anal"zing the petitioner0s depositions, he went the extra mile b" taking into consideration the ps"chological evaluation report furnished b" another ps"chiatrist based in *outh ,frica , as well as conducting personal interviews with the petitioner0s brothers. !he balance tilts in favor of 2r. Obra. It should be remembered that the presumption is alwa"s in favor of the validit" of marriage. In this case, presumption has not been simpl" rebutted and must, perforce, prevail. etition G&,9!:2. (1. LESTER ,ENJAMIN HALILI vs. CHONA SANTOSC HALILI G. R. NO. 1 #)() JUNE "* (//" FACTS etitioner Aester /en%amin 4alili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent 'hona *antos$ 4alili null and void on the basis of his ps"chological incapacit" to perform the essential obligations of marriage in the &!', asig 'it", /r. 1GE. 4e alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a 6%oke.8 ,fter the ceremonies, the" never lived together as husband and wife, but maintained the relationship. 4owever, the" started fighting constantl" a "ear later, at which point petitioner decide to stop seeing respondent and started dating other women. Immediatel" thereafter, he received prank calls telling him to stop dating other women as he was alread" a married man. It was onl" upon making an in)uir" that he found out that the marriage was not 6fake.8 :ventuall", the &!' found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed personalit" disorder, as diagnosed b" his expert witness, 2r. 9atividad 2a"an. !he court a )uo held that petitioner0s personalit" disorder was serious and incurable and directl" affected his capacit" to compl" with his essential marital obligations to respondent. It declared the marriage null and void. It was reversed b" the ', and affirmed b" the *'. 4owever, the *' recognized the motion for reconsideration the" filed. ISSUE #hether the marriage is null and void on the ground of ps"chological incapacit" on the part of petitioner.
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RULING In the recent case of !e vs. 3u$ !e and the &epublic, this 'ourt reiterated that courts should interpret the provision on ps"chological incapacit" >as a ground for the declaration of nullit" of a marriage? on a case to case basis$ guided b" experience, the findings of experts and researchers in ps"chological disciplines and b" decisions of church tribunals. In !e, this 'ourt defined dependent personalit" disorder as5 JaK personalit" disorder characterized b" a pattern of dependent and submissive behaviour. *uch individuals usuall" lack self$esteem and fre)uentl" belittle their capabilitiesH the" fear criticism and are easil" hurt b" other0s comments. ,t times the" actuall" bring about dominance b" others through a )uest for overprotection. 2ependent personalit" disorder usuall" begins in earl" adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder ma" be unable to make ever"da" decisions without advice or reassurance from others, ma" allow others to make most of their important decisions >such as where to live?, tend to agree with people even when the" believe the" are wrong, have difficult" starting pro%ects or doing things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. It has been sufficientl" established that petitioner has a ps"chological condition that was grave and incurable and had a deepl" rooted cause. !his 'ourt, in the same !e case, recognized that individuals with diagnosable personalit" disorders usuall" have long$ term concerns, and thus therap" ma" be long$ term. articularl", personalit" disorders are 6long$standing, inflexible wa"s of behaving that are not so much severe mental disorders as d"sfunctional st"les of living. !hese disorders affect all areas of functioning and, beginning in childhood or adolescence, create problems for those who displa" them and for others.8 @rom the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from ps"chological incapacit" that effectivel" renders him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage. ,ccordingl", the marriage between petitioner and respondent is declared null and void. ((. MARIETTA AZCUETA vs. RE-U,LIC AND CA G. R. No. 1+/ + Ma1 ( * (//" FACTS .arietta ,zcueta >.arietta? filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullit" of her marriage to &odolfo ,zcueta >&odolfo? before the &egional !rial 'ourt >&!'?. .arietta averred that &odolfo was ps"chologicall" incapacitated to compl" with the essential obligations of marriage. .arietta complained that despite her encouragement, &odolfo never bothered to look for a %ob and alwa"s depended on his mother for financial assistance and for his decisions. It was &odolfo0s mother who found them a room near the ,zcueta home and paid the monthl" rental. &odolfo also pretended to have found work and gave .arietta mone" which actuall" came from &odolfo0s mother. #hen
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.arietta confronted him, &odolfo cried like a child and told her his parents could support their needs. !he" had sex onl" once a month which .arietta never en%o"ed. #hen the" discussed this, &odolfo told .arietta that sex was sacred and should not be en%o"ed or abused. &odolfo also told her he was not read" for a child. #hen .arietta asked &odolfo if the" could move to another place, he did not agree and she was forced to leave and see if he would follow her. 4e did not. &odolfo0s first cousin, who at one time lived with &odolfo0s famil", corroborated .arietta0s testimon" that &odolfo was not gainfull" emplo"ed and relied on the allowance given b" his mother who also paid the rentals for the room the couple lived in. !he ps"chiatrist who examined .arietta testified that she found the latter to be mature, independent, focused, and responsible, had a direction and ambition in life, and was not ps"chologicall" incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. /ased on information gathered from .arietta, the same ps"chiatrist found &odolfo to be suffering from 2ependent ersonalit" 2isorder characterized b" loss of self$confidence, constant self$doubt, and inabilit" to make his own decisions and dependenc" on other people. !he ps"chiatrist explained that the root cause of the disorder was a cross$identification with &odolfo0s mother who was the dominant figure in the famil" considering that &odolfo0s father, a seaman, was alwa"s out of the house. *he added that the problem began during the earl" stages of &odolfo0s life but manifested onl" after his marriage. *he stated that the problem was severe, because he would not be able take on the responsibilities of a spouse, and incurable, because it began in earl" development and had been deepl" ingrained in his personalit". *he, thus, concluded that &odolfo was ps"chologicall" incapacitated to perform his marital duties and responsibilities. &odolfo failed to appear and file an answer despite service of summons on him. !he 'it" rosecutor found no collusion between the parties. /ased on the evidence presented b" .arietta, the &egional !rial 'ourt >&!'? declared the marriage void ab initio. !he *olicitor General appealed the &!'0s decision, arguing that the ps"chiatric report was based solel" on the information given b" .arietta, and there was no showing that the alleged ps"chological disorder was present at the start of the marriage or that it was grave, permanent and incurable. !he 'ourt of ,ppeals reversed the &!'0s decision. .arietta, thus, brought the case to the *upreme 'ourt on a petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE #hether or not &odolfo is ps"chologicall" incapacitated to %ustif" a declaration that his marriage to .arietta is void ab initio under ,rticle ;D of the @amil" 'ode. RULING &odolfo was ps"chologicall" incapacitated to perform his marital duties because of his 2ependent ersonalit" 2isorder. 4is marriage to .arietta was declared void ab initio. .arietta sufficientl" discharged her burden to prove her husband0s ps"chological incapacit". ,s held in .arcos vs. .arcos J;1F hil. E=7 >(777?K, there is no re)uirement that the respondent spouse should be personall" examined b" a ph"sician or ps"chologist as condition sine )ua non for the declaration of nullit" of marriage based on ps"chological incapacit". #hat matters is whether the totalit" of evidence presented is ade)uate to sustain finding of ps"chological incapacit". .arietta0s testimon" was corroborated in material points b" &odolfo0s close relative, and supported
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b" the ps"chiatrist0s testimon" linking the manifestations of &odolfo0s ps"chological incapacit" and the ps"chological disorder itself. It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibilit" of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunit" to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimon" which ma" indicate their candor or lack thereof. *ince the trial court itself accepted the veracit" of .arietta0s factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of ps"chological incapacit" drawn there from b" her expert witness. !he root cause of &odolfo0s ps"chological incapacit" was alleged in the petition, medicall" or clinicall" identified, sufficientl" proven b" testimon" of an expert witness with more than =7 "ears experience in the field of ps"cholog" and ps"chological incapacit", and clearl" explained in the trial court0s decision. ,s held in !e vs. !e >G.&. 9o. 1D1F1;, 1; @ebruar"(771?, 6>b?" the ver" nature of ,rticle ;D, courts, despite having the primar" task and burden of decision$ making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the ps"chological and mental temperaments of the parties.8&odolfo0s ps"chological incapacit" was also established to have clearl" existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. #itnesses were united in testif"ing that from the start of the marriage, &odolfo0s irresponsibilit", overdependence on his mother and abnormal sexual reticence were alread" evident. !hese manifestations of &odolfo0s 2ependent ersonalit" 2isorder must have existed even prior to the marriage being rooted in his earl" development and a b"$product of his upbringing and famil" life. @urthermore, &odolfo0s ps"chological incapacit" had been shown to be grave so as to render him unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. !he 'ourt of ,ppeals Vopinion that &odolfo0s re)uests for financial assistance from his mother might have been due to embarrassment for failing to contribute to the famil" coffers and that his motive for not wanting a child was a 6responsible8 realization since he was unemplo"ed, were dismissed b" the 4igh 'ourt for being speculative and unsupported b" evidence. !he *upreme 'ourt likewise disagreed with the 'ourt of ,ppeals0 finding that &odolfo0s irresponsibilit" and overdependence on his mother could be attributed to immaturit", noting that at the time of his marriage, &odolfo was almost (1 "ears old. ,lso, the expert testimon" identified a grave clinical or medical cause for &odolfo0s abnormal behavior P 2ependent ersonalit" 2isorder. , person afflicted with 2ependent ersonalit" 2isorder cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelit" and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make ever"da" decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions >such as where to live?, tends to agree with people even when he believes the" are wrong, has difficult" doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. >!e vs. !e,supra?One who is unable to support himself, much less a wifeH one who cannot independentl" make decisions regarding even the most basic matters that spouses face ever" da"H and one who cannot contribute to the material, ph"sical and emotional well$being of his spouse, is ps"chologicall" incapacitated to compl" with the marital obligations within the meaning of ,rticle;D of the @amil" 'ode. !his is not to sa", however, that an"one diagnosed with 2ependent ersonalit" 2isorders automaticall" deemed ps"chologicall" incapacitated to perform his/her marital
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obligations. !he court must evaluate the facts, as guided b" expert opinion, and carefull" examine the t"pe of disorder and the gravit" thereof before declaring the nullit" of a marriage under ,rticle ;D.@inall", it has been established that &odolfo0s condition is incurable, having been deepl" ingrained in his s"stem since his earl" "ears. (!. DIGNA A. NAJERA vs. EDUARDO J. NAJERA G. R. No. 1 )+10 J2'1 !* (//" FACTS etitioner filed with the &!' a verified etition for 2eclaration of 9ullit" of .arriage with ,lternative ra"er for Aegal *eparation, with ,pplication for 2esignation as ,dministrator endente Aite of the 'on%ugal artnership of Gains. etitioner alleged at the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent was ps"chologicall" incapacitated to compl" with the essential marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacit" became manifest onl" after marriage. ,t the time of their marriage, petitioner was alread" emplo"ed with the *pecial *ervices 2ivision of the rovincial Government of angasinan, while respondent was %obless. 4e did not exert enough effort to find a %ob and was dependent on petitioner for support. Onl" with the help of petitioner0s elder brother, who was a seaman, was respondent able to land a %ob as a seaman in 11EE through the Intercrew *hipping ,genc". #hile emplo"ed as a seaman, respondent did not give petitioner sufficient financial support and she had to rel" on her own efforts and the help of her parents in order to live. #hen he came home from his ship vo"age, he started to )uarrel with petitioner and falsel" accused her of having an affair with another man. 4e took to smoking mari%uana and tried to force petitioner into it. #hen she refused, he insulted her and uttered unprintable wordsWX against her. 4e would go out of the house and when he arrived home, he was alwa"s drunk. &espondent filed his ,nswer wherein he denied the material allegations in the petition and averred that petitioner was incurabl" immature, of dubious integrit", with ver" low moralit", and guilt" of infidelit". 4e claimed that the sub%ect house and lot were ac)uired through his sole effort and mone". !he Office of the *olicitor General filed its 9otice of ,ppearance. !he &!' issued an Order terminating the pre$trial conference after the parties signed a @ormal .anifestation/.otion, which stated that the" had agreed to dissolve their con%ugal partnership of gains and divide e)uall" their con%ugal properties. !he &!' rendered a 2ecision that decreed onl" the legal separation of the petitioner and respondent, but not the annulment of their marriage. etitioner appealed the &!' 2ecision and &esolution to the 'ourt of ,ppeals. !he 'ourt of ,ppeals affirmed the 2ecision of the &!'. ISSUE #hether or not the totalit" of petitioner0s evidence was able to prove that respondent is ps"chologicall" incapacitated to compl" with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage under ,rticle ;D of the @amil" 'ode. RULING
FG

!he guidelines incorporate the three basic re)uirements earlier mandated b" the 'ourt in *antos v. 'ourt of ,ppeals5 -ps"chological incapacit" must be characterized b" >a? gravit" >b? %uridical antecedence, and >c? incurabilit". !he foregoing guidelines do not re)uire that a ph"sician examine the person to be declared ps"chologicall" incapacitated. In fact, the root cause ma" be -medicall" or clinicall" identified.- #hat is important is the presence of evidence that can ade)uatel" establish the part"Ms ps"chological condition. @or indeed, if the totalit" of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of ps"chological incapacit", then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. In this case, the 'ourt agrees with the 'ourt of ,ppeals that the totalit" of the evidence submitted b" petitioner failed to satisfactoril" prove that respondent was ps"chologicall" incapacitated to compl" with the essential obligations of marriage. !he root cause of respondentWXYs alleged ps"chological incapacit" was not sufficientl" proven b" experts or shown to be medicall" or clinicall" permanent or incurable. ,s found b" the 'ourt of ,ppeals, s"chologist 'ristina GatesWXY conclusion that respondent was ps"chologicall" incapacitated was based on facts rela"ed to her b" petitioner and was not based on her personal knowledge and evaluation of respondentH thus, her finding is unscientific and unreliable. .oreover, the trial court correctl" found that petitioner failed to prove with certaint" that the alleged personalit" disorder of respondent was incurable as ma" be gleaned from s"chologist 'ristina GatesWXY testimon". !he 'ourt agrees with the 'ourt of ,ppeals that the evidence presented b" petitioner in regard to the ph"sical violence or grossl" abusive conduct of respondent toward petitioner and respondentWXYs abandonment of petitioner without %ustifiable cause for more than one "ear are grounds for legal separation onl" and not for annulment of marriage under ,rticle ;D of the @amil" 'ode. (). ROWENA -ADILLACRAM,AUA vs. EDWARD RAM,AUA G. R. 1 0!+ A292s7 1) (//" FACTS etitioner had a secret marriage with respondent because the latterMs parents are against their relationship. !he parties lived together as husband and wife for the first six months of their marriage, after which, the respondent insisted to live apart allegedl" because it might affect the respondents application for ,A scholarship where, the respondent stated 6single8 regarding his status and, in order to avoid public knowledge about their marriage as such marriage ma" antagonize the respondents parents. !he parents of respondent, particularl" his mother discovered about the secret marriage and the parties continued to live separatel" in order to appease respondents mother. *ubse)uentl", respondent failed to send greeting cards to petitioner or even greet her a happ" birthda".
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Aater on, the respondents mother died and he blamed the petitioner for allegedl" causing the death of his mother due to ill feelings towards them. #hen petitioner and her mother visited respondent in 2avao, the" found out that respondent have been cohabiting with another woman. etitioner then filed an action to render null and void the marriage between her and the respondent on the ground of ps"chological incapacit" considering the pronouncement of a clinical ps"chologist, 2r. !a"ag, which states that respondent have a narcissistic personalit" disorder which is declared to be grave, severe and incurable. !he &egional !rial 'ourt declared the marriage null and void due to ps"chological incapacit". !his was subse)uentl" reversed b" the 'ourt of ,ppeals stating that 6the illness must be shown as downright incapacit" or inabilit", not a refusal, neglect, or difficult" to perform the essential obligations of marriage8. 4ence, this present action. ISSUE #hether or not respondent is ps"chologicall" incapacitated, whether or not the O*G certification under the case of &epublic vs. .olina is indispensable and whether or not the deficienc" of 2r. !a"ags report was cured b" his testimon". RULING :!I!IO9 2:9I:2. &,!IO 2:':2:92I5 ,... 9o. 7($11$17$*', as a remedial measure, removed the mandator" nature of an O*G certification and ma" be applied retroactivel" to pending matters. In effect, the measure cures in an" pending matter an" procedural lapse on the certification prior to its promulgation. Our rulings in ,ntonio v. &e"es and 9avales v. 9avales have since confirmed and clarified that ,... 9o. 7($11$17$*' has dispensed with the .olina guideline on the matter of certification, although ,rticle =E mandates the appearance of the prosecuting attorne" or fiscal to ensure that no collusion between the parties would take place. !hus, what is important is the presence of the prosecutor in the case, not the remedial re)uirement that he be certified to be present. @rom this perspective, the petitioner0s ob%ection regarding the .olina guideline on certification lacks merit. In santos vs. *antos, it was held that am action based on ps"chological incapacit" must be characterized b" a.? gravit" b.? incurabilit" and c.? %uridical antecedence. It must be confined to the most serious cases of personalit" disorders clearl" demonstrative of an utter insensitivit" or inabilit" to give meaning and significance to the marriage. !he petitioner0s evidence merel" showed that the respondent5 >a? reneged on his promise to cohabit with herH >b? visited her occasionall" from 111; to 111FH >c? forgot her birthda" in 111(, and did not send her greeting cards during special occasionsH >d? represented himself as single in his visa applicationH >e? blamed her for the death of his
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motherH and >f? told her he was working in 2avao when in fact he was cohabiting with another woman in 111F. In the present case, the respondent0s stubborn refusal to cohabit with the petitioner was doubtlessl" irresponsible, but it was never proven to be rooted in some ps"chological illness. ,s the petitioner0s testimon" reveals, respondent merel" refused to cohabit with her for fear of %eopardizing his application for a scholarship, and later due to his fear of antagonizing his famil". !he respondent0s failure to greet the petitioner on her birthda" and to send her cards during special occasions, as well as his acts of blaming petitioner for his mother0s death and of representing himself as single in his visa application, could onl" at best amount to forgetfulness, insensitivit" or emotional immaturit", not necessaril" ps"chological incapacit". Aikewise, the respondent0s act of living with another woman four "ears into the marriage cannot automaticall" be e)uated with a ps"chological disorder, especiall" when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuit" was a trait alread" existing at the inception of marriage. In fact, petitioner herself admitted that respondent was caring and faithful when the" were going stead" and for a time after their marriageH their problems onl" came in later. #ith regard to 2r. !a"agMs testimon", what she medicall" described was not related or linked to the respondent0s exact condition except in a ver" general wa". In short, her testimon" and report were rich in generalities but disastrousl" short on particulars, most notabl" on how the respondent can be said to be suffering from narcissistic personalit" disorderH wh" and to what extent the disorder is grave and incurableH how and wh" it was alread" present at the time of the marriageH and the effects of the disorder on the respondent0s awareness of and his capabilit" to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage. ,ll these are critical to the success of the petitioner0s case. @urther, her testimon" was short on factual basis for her diagnosis because it was wholl" based on what the petitioner related to her. ,s the doctor admitted to the prosecutor, she did not at all examine the respondent, onl" the petitioner. 9either the law nor %urisprudence re)uires, of course, that the person sought to be declared ps"chologicall" incapacitated should be personall" examined b" a ph"sician or ps"chologist as a condition sine )ua non to arrive at such declaration. (#. RODOLFO AS-ILLAGA vs. AURORA AS-ILLAGA G. R. No. 10/"(# O47o6e% ( * (//" FACTS ,urora left for <apan to stud" <apanese culture, literature and language. 2espite the distance, &odolfo and ,urora maintained communication as lovers. In 11E7, after ,urora returned to the hilippines, she and &odolfo got married. !he" begot two children, but &odolfo claimed their marriage was 6tumultuous.8 4e described ,urora as domineering and fre)uentl" humiliated him even in front of his friends. 4e complained that ,urora was a spendthrift as she overspent the famil" budget and made crucial famil" decisions without consulting him. &odolfo added that ,urora was tactless,
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suspicious, given to nagging and %ealous" as evidenced b" the latter0s filing against him a criminal case >concubinage? and an administrative case. 4e left the con%ugal home, and filed on .arch F, 111G, a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of ps"chological incapacit" on the part of ,urora. 4e averred that ,urora failed to compl" with the essential obligations of marriage. ,urora, for her part, alleged that sometime in 1111, &odolfo gave her plane ticket to <apan to enable her to assume her teaching position in a universit" for a period of three months. In ,ugust 1111, upon her return to .anila, she discovered that while she was in <apan, &odolfo brought into their con%ugal home her cousin, Aecita &ose ,. /esina, as his concubine. ,urora alleged that &odolfo0s cohabitation with her cousin led to the disintegration of their marriage and their eventual separation. In .a" 111(, &odolfo abandoned their con%ugal home to live with /esina. 2uring trial, expert witness 2r. :duardo .aaba explained his ps"chiatric evaluation of the parties as well as his recommendation that the petition be granted. In this report, he stated that both petitioner and respondent harbor ps"chological handicaps which could be traced from unhealth" maturational development. 4owever, respondent0s mistrust, shallow heterosexual relationships resulted in incapacitation in her abilit" to compl" with the obligation of marriage. 2r. .aaba recommended that the petition to annul the marriage be granted, on the grounds existing ps"chological incapacitation of both petitioner and respondent, which will hamper their capacit" to compl" with their marital obligations. 2issolution of the marital bond will offer both of them, peace of mind. &!' found the parties ps"chologicall" incapacitated to enter into marriage. On appeal, the 'ourt of ,ppeals reversed and set aside the &!' decision and declared the marriage of &odolfo and ,urora ,spillaga valid. etitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was also denied. ISSUE #hether the marriage is void on the ground of the parties0 ps"chological incapacit" RULING !he petition failed. In *antos v. 'ourt of ,ppeals, s"chological incapacit" re)uired b" ,rt. ;D must be characterized b" >a? gravit", >b? %uridical antecedence, and >c? incurabilit". !he incapacit" must be grave or serious such that the part" would be incapable of carr"ing out the ordinar" duties re)uired in marriageH it must be rooted in the histor" of the part" antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations ma" emerge onl" after the marriageH and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be be"ond the means of the part" involved. In the instant case, 2r. .aaba failed to link the parties0 ps"chological disorders to his conclusion that the" are ps"chologicall" incapacitated to perform their obligations as husband and wife. !he fact that these ps"chological conditions will hamper >as 2r. .aaba puts it? their performance of their marital obligations does not mean that the" suffer from ps"chological incapacit" as contemplated under ,rticle ;D of the @amil" 'ode. .ere difficult" is not s"non"mous to incapacit". .oreover, there is no evidence to prove that each part"0s condition is so grave or is of such nature as to render said part" incapable of carr"ing out the ordinar" duties re)uired in marriage. !here is likewise no evidence that the claimed incapacit" is incurable and permanent. 9oteworth", &odolfo and ,urora initiall" had a blissful marital
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union for several "ears. !he" married in 11E(, and later affirmed the ceremon" in church rites in 11E;, showing love and contentment with one another after a "ear of marriage. !he letter of petitioner dated ,pril 1, 1117 addressed to respondent revealed the harmonious relationship of the couple continued during their marriage for about eight "ears from the time the" married each other. @rom this, it can be inferred that the" were able to faithfull" compl" with their obligations to each other and to their children. ,urora was shown to have taken care of her children and remained faithful to her husband while he was awa". *he even %oined sales activities to augment the famil" income. *he appeared to be a ver" capable woman who traveled a lot and pursued studies here and abroad. It was onl" when &odolfo0s acts of infidelit" were discovered that the marriage started to fail. ,t this %uncture while this 'ourt is convinced that indeed both parties were both found to have ps"chological disorders, nevertheless, there is nothing in the records showing that these disorders are sufficient to declare the marriage void due to ps"chological incapacit". ( . VERONICA CA,ACUNGAN ALCAZAR vs. RE: ALCAZAR G. R. No. 10))#1 O47o6e% 1!* (//" FACTS Ceronica and &e" were married on ,ugust ((, (771. ,fter the wedding the couple lived for five da"s at the residence of the respondent in Occidental .indoro, when the" returned to .anila the respondent did not sta" with the petitioner until the former left for *audi ,rabia few months following their wedding. In abroad the respondent never communicated with the petitioner and the telephone calls of the latter were even re%ected b" the respondent. ,fter one and a haft "ear in abroad the respondent returned to the countr" without even informing the petitioner as to his whereabouts. Ceronica filed an action to annul her marriage with the respondent under article =G >G? of the @amil" 'ode. ,s a ground the petitioner alleged that the respondent is ps"chologicall" incapacitated to compl" his marital obligation. !he lower court dismissed the petition because it was not established that at least one of the spouses is either ph"sicall" or mentall" ill to compl" the marital obligations. ISSUE #hether or not the respondent in ps"chologicall" incapacitated to compl" his marital obligations. RULING etition was dismissed. ,rticle =G>G? of the @amil" 'ode refers to lack of power to copulate. Incapacit" to consummate denotes the permanent inabilit" on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual intercourse. 9on$consummation of a marriage ma" be on the part of the husband or of the wife and ma" be caused b" a ph"sical or structural defect in the anatom" of one of the parties or it ma" be due to chronic illness and inhibitions or fears arising in whole or in part from ps"choph"sical conditions. 9o evidence was presented that respondent was in an" wa" ph"sicall" incapable to consummate his marriage with petitioner. etitioner even admitted during
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her cross$examination that she and respondent had sexual intercourse after their wedding and before respondent left for abroad. !here obviousl" being no ph"sical incapacit" on respondent0s part, then, there is no ground for annulling petitioner0s marriage to respondent. (0. ROSA :A- -ARAS vs. JUSTO J. -ARAS G. R. No. 1)0+() A292s7 (* (//0 FACTS In 11D=, &osa 3ap married <usto <. aras in /indo", 9egros Oriental. !he" had four children. !went"$nine "ears after &osa filed with the &!' of 2umaguete 'it", a complaint for annulment of her marriage with <usto, under ,rticle ;D of the @amil" 'ode. *he alleged that <usto is ps"chologicall" incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as shown b" the following circumstances5 >a? he dissipated her business assets and forged her signature in one mortgage transactionH >b? he lived with a concubine and sired a child with herH >c? he did not give financial support to his childrenH and >d? he has been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a father. &!' rendered a decision upholding the validit" of the marriage on the grounds that <usto did not abandon the con%ugal home as he was forced to leave after &osa posted guards at the gates of their houseH >b? the con%ugal assets were sufficient to support the famil" needs, thus, there was no need for <usto to shell out his limited salar"Hand >c? the charge of infidelit" is unsubstantiated.!he &!' observed that the relationship between the parties started well, negating the existence of ps"chological incapacit" on either part" at the time of the celebration of their marriage. <usto filed an appeal to the 'ourt of ,ppeals in which the latter affirmed the decision rendered b" the &!' on the ground that <usto0s alleged defects or idios"ncracies were sufficientl" explained b" the evidence, therefore, not enough ground to taint the validit" of their marriage. ISSUE #hether or not the totalit" of evidence presented shall be sufficient to sustain a finding of ps"chological incapacit" on the part of <usto to %ustif" the annulment of marriage RULING !he petition was denied. !he grounds raised b" petitioner were insufficient to declare the marriage void due to an incurable ps"chological incapacit". !hese grounds, we must emphasize, do not manifest that he was trul" incognitive of the basic marital covenants that he must assume and discharge as a married person. #hile the" ma" manifest the -gravit"- of his alleged ps"chological incapacit", the" do not necessaril" show Vincurabilit"0, such that while his acts violated the covenants of marriage, the" do not necessaril" show that such acts show an irreparabl" hopeless state of ps"chological incapacit" which prevents him from undertaking the basic obligations of marriage in the future. ,s provided under the law, the root cause of the ps"chological incapacit" must be >a? medicall" or clinicall" identified, >b?
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alleged in the complaint, >c? sufficientl" proven b" experts, and >d? clearl" explained in the decision. ,rticle ;D of the @amil" 'ode re)uires that the incapacit" must be ps"chological $$ not ph"sical, although its manifestations and/or s"mptoms ma" be ph"sical. !he evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentall" or ps"chicall" ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. !he complete facts should allege the ph"sical manifestations, if an", as are indicative of ps"chological incapacit" at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged. 9either should ,rticle ;D be e)uated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in ps"chological incapacit" but on ph"sical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, sexual infidelit", and abandonment. !he evidence presented b" petitioner refers onl" to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void. (+. NILDA V. NAVALES vs. RE:NALDO NAVALES G. R. No. 1 0#(! J23e (0* (//+ FACTS etitioner filed a etition for &eview assailing the decision of the ', S &!', !oledo 'it", 'ebu. It was in 11ED that &e"naldo met 9ilda in a local bar where 9ilda was a waitress. /ecause of his fear that 9ilda ma" be wed to an ,merican, &e"naldo proposed to 9ilda and the" got married in 11EE. &e"naldo is aware that 9ilda has an illegitimate child out of wedlock. !he 1st "ear of their marriage went well until 9ilda began to work when she neglected some of her duties as a wife. *he later worked as a g"m instructor and according to &e"naldo0s allegationsH her %ob makes her flirt with her male clients. *he also drives home with other gu"s even though &e"naldo would be there to fetch her. *he also pro%ected herself as single. ,nd she refused to have a child with &e"naldo because that would onl" destro" her figure. &e"naldo then filed a petition to have their marriage be annulled. 4e presented her cousin as a witness that attested that 9ilda was flirting with other gu"s even with &e"naldo0s presence. &e"naldo also presented the findings of a ps"chologist who concluded that based on 9ilda0s acts, 9ilda is a n"mphomaniac, who has a borderline personalit", a social deviant, an alcoholic, and suffering from anti$social personalit" disorder, among others, which illnesses are incurable and are the causes of 9ilda0s ps"chological incapacit" to perform her marital role as wife to &e"naldo. 9ilda on her part attacked &e"naldo0s allegations. *he said that it is actuall" &e"naldo who is a womanizer and that in fact she has filed a case of concubinage against him which was still pending. *he also said that she onl" needs the %ob in order to support herself because &e"naldo is not supporting her. *he also showed proof that she pro%ected herself as a married woman and that she handles an aerobics class which is exclusive to females onl". !he &!' and the ', ruled in favor of &e"naldo. ISSUE
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#hether or not the marriage between &e"naldo and 9ilda is null and void on the ground of 9ildaMs ps"chological incapacit" RULING 9o, she was not ps"chologicall" incapacitated. !hus, the petition must be granted because there were no other pleadings, motions, or position papers filed b" the ublic rosecutor or Office of the *olicitor General and no contradicting evidence presented b" them before the %udgment was rendered. ,nd even if the *' would consider the case based on the merits, the petition would still be granted. !he acts presented b" &e"naldo are insufficient to establish a ps"chological or mental defect that is serious, incurable or grave as contemplated b" ,rticle ;D of the @amil" 'ode. ,rticle ;D contemplates downright incapacit" or inabilit" to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. .ere 6difficult",8 6refusal8 or 6neglect8 in the performance of marital obligations or 6ill will8 on the part of the spouse is different from 6incapacit"8 rooted on some debilitating ps"chological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelit" or perversion, emotional immaturit" and irresponsibilit", and the like, do not b" themselves warrant a finding of ps"chological incapacit" under ,rticle ;D, as the same ma" onl" be due to a personMs refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some ps"chological illness that is contemplated b" said rule. !he *' also finds the finding of the ps"chological expert to be insufficient to prove the ps"chological incapacit" of 9ilda. !he testimonies presented b" people the expert interviewed were not concretel" established as the fact as to how those people came up with their respective information was not as well shown. !here is no proof as well that 9ilda had had sex with different gu"s P a condition for n"mphomia. !here being doubt as to 9ilda0s ps"chological incapacit" the *' ruled that this case be resolved in favor of the validit" of marriage. (". RE-U,LIC VS COURT OF A--EALS AND MOLINA G. R. No. 1/+0 ! Fe6%2a%1 1!* 1""0 FACTS In 11EG, plaintiff &oridel O. .olina married &e"naldo .olina which union bore a son. ,fter a "ear of marriage, &e"naldo showed signs of immaturit" and irresponsibilit" as a husband and father as he preferred to spend more time with his friends, depended on his parents for assistance, and was never hones with his wife in regard to their finances resulting in fre)uent )uarrel between them. !he &!' granted &oridel petition for declaration of nullit" of her marriage which was affirmed b" the ',. ISSUE #hether or not irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities constitute ps"chological incapacit" RULING !here is no clear showing that ps"chological defect spoken of is incapacit". It appears to more of a difficult", if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some
E;

marital obligations. .ere showing of irreconcilable difference and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes ps"chological incapacit". It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married personsH it is essential that the" must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some ps"chological not ph"sical illness. !he interpretation and application of ,rt. ;D of the @amil" 'ode are hereb" handed down5 1. burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff (. root cause of phs"chological incapacit" must be5a. medicall" or clinicall" identified b.alleged in the complaint c. sufficientl" proven b" experts d.clearl" explained in the decision ;.Incapacit" must exist at the time of marriage =. Incapacit" must be incurable G. Gravit" of illness disables the part" to assume the essential marital obligations. D.!he essential marital obligations are those in ,rticles DE$F1, and ,rts. ((7,((1 and ((G of the @amil" 'ode F.Interpretations of the 9ational ,ppellate .atrimonial !ribunal of the 'atholic 'hurch should be given great respect E. rosecution and *olicitor General must appear as counsel for the *tate. !/. IMELDA ,O,IS VS ISAGANI ,O,IS G. R. No. 1!+#/" J2'1 !1* (/// FACTS etitioner Imelda filed a complaint on bigam" against Isagani /obis. !he" were married on <anuar" (G, 111D. +nknown to her, he had previous marriage with .aria 2ulce <avier on October (1, 11EG without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated. !here was also a third marriage with a certain <ulia *all" 4ernandez. *ometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the %udicial declaration of absolute nullit" of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. &espondent filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case. etitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. *he argued that respondent should have first obtained a %udicial declaration of nullit" of his first marriage before entering into the second marriage in as much as the alleged pre%udicial )uestion %ustif"ing suspension of the bigam" case is no longer a legal truism pursuant to ,rticle =7 of the @amil" 'ode. ISSUE #hether or not the subse)uent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullit" of a previous marriage constitutes a pre%udicial )uestion to a criminal case for bigam" RULING 9o. !here was clear intent on the part of the respondent to invoke the issue of pre%udicial )uestion in order to escape the bigam" case filed against him. #here the law provides that when there are two marriagesH a first marriage and a subse)uent marriage were it not for the presence of the first marriage, the subse)uent marriage could have been valid. arties to a marriage should not be permitted to %udge for themselves its nullit", onl" competent courts having such authorit". rior to such declaration of nullit", the validit" of the first marriage is be"ond )uestion. , part" who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigam". !he lower court erred
E=

in suspending the criminal case for bigam". #hen respondent was indicted for bigam", the fact that he entered into two marriage ceremonies appeared indubitable. It was onl" after he was sued b" petitioner for bigam" that he thought of seeking a %udicial declaration of nullit" of his first marriage. !he obvious intent is that respondent merel" resorted to the civil action as a potential pre%udicial )uestion for the purpose of frustrating or dela"ing his, criminal prosecution. ursuant ,rticle =7 of the @amil" 'ode, respondent, without first having obtained the %udicial declaration of nullit" of the first marriage, can not be said to have validl" entered into the second marriage. !he reason is that, without a %udicial declaration of its nullit", the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. ,n" decision in the civil action for nullit" would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. !hus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a pre%udicial )uestion. !1. VERONICO TENE,RO vs. COURT OF A--EALS G. R. No. 1#/0#+ Fe6%2a%1 1+* (//) FACTS Aetecia ,nca%as filed a complaint for bigam" against Ceronico !enebro. !enebro contracted marriage with ,nca%as on ,pril 17, 1117. !he two lived together continuousl" and without interruption until the latter part of 1111, when !enebro informed ,nca%as that he had been previousl" married to a certain 4ilda Cillare"es in 11ED. etitioner thereafter left the con%ugal dwelling which he shared with ,nca%as, stating that he was going to cohabit with Cillare"es. In 111;, petitioner contracted "et another marriage with a certain 9ilda Cillegas. ,nca%as thereafter filed a complaint for bigam" against petitioner. !enebro countered that his marriage with Cillare"es cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of such. 4e further argued that his second marriage, with ,nca%as, has been declared void ab initio due to ps"chological incapacit". 4ence, he cannot be charged for bigam". ISSUES 1. #hether or not !enebro is guilt" of bigam". (. #hether or not the declaration of the nullit" of !enebroMs second marriage on the ground of ps"chological incapacit" resulted to bigam" as not having been committed RULING 3es. !enebro is guilt" of bigam". +nder ,rticle ;=1 of the &evised enal 'ode, the elements of the crime of /igam" are5 >1? that the offender has been legall" marriedH >(? that the first marriage has not been legall" dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not "et be presumed dead according to the 'ivil 'odeH >;? that he contracts a second or subse)uent marriageH and >=? that the second or subse)uent marriage has all the essential re)uisites for validit". ,s a second or subse)uent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner0s valid marriage to
EG

Cillare"es, petitioner0s marriage to ,nca%as would be null and void ab initio completel" regardless of petitioner0s ps"chological capacit" or incapacit". *ince a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automaticall" void, the nullit" of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liabilit" for bigam". !he law penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subse)uent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. !here is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subse)uent marriage that is null and void purel" because it is a second or subse)uent marriage, and a subse)uent marriage that is null and void on the ground of ps"chological incapacit", at least insofar as criminal liabilit" for bigam" is concerned. .oreover, the declaration of the nullit" of the second marriage on the ground of ps"chological incapacit" is not an indicator that petitioner0s marriage to ,nca%as lacks the essential re)uisites for validit". !he re)uisites for the validit" of a marriage are classified b" the @amil" 'ode into essential and formal. In this case, all the essential and formal re)uisites for the validit" of marriage were satisfied b" petitioner and ,nca%as. !(. VICTORIA JARILLO vs. -EO-LE OF THE -HILI--INES G. R. No. 1 ))!# Se$7e56e% ("* (//" FACTS In11F=, Cictoria <arillo and &afael ,locillo were married in a civil wedding ceremon". ,ppellant Cictoria <arillo thereafter contracted a subse)uent marriage with :mmanuel :bora *antos +" on 9ovember (D, 11F1. In 1111, :mmanuel +" filed against the appellant annulment of marriage. !hereafter, appellant <arillo was charged with bigam". arentheticall", accused$appellant filed against ,locillo, on October G, (777, declaration of nullit" of their marriage. On <ul" 1, (771, the court a )uo finds accused Cictoria *oriano <arillo guilt" be"ond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigam". !he motion for reconsideration was denied b" the same court. On appeal to the ',, petitioner0s conviction was affirmed. In the meantime, petitioner0s 11F= and 11FG marriages to ,locillo was declared null and void ab initio on the ground of ,locillo0s ps"chological incapacit". In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullit" as a ground for the reversal of her conviction. 4owever, the ', denied reconsideration. ISSUE #hether or not the 'ourt of ,ppeals committed reversible in proceeding with the case despite the pendenc" of a case which is pre%udicial to the outcome of the case. RULING It is true that right after the presentation of the prosecution evidence, petitioner moved for suspension of the proceedings on the ground of the pendenc" of the petition for declaration of nullit" of petitioner0s marriages to ,locillo, which, petitioner claimed involved a pre%udicial )uestion. In her appeal, she also asserted that the petition for declaration of nullit" of her marriage to +", initiated b" the latter, was a ground for suspension of the proceedings. !he &!' denied her motion for suspension, while the
ED

', struck down her arguments. etitioner0s conviction of the crime of bigam" must be affirmed. !he subse)uent %udicial declaration of nullit" of petitioner0s two marriages to ,locillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigam". !he moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been %udiciall" declared null and voidH the crime of bigam" was alread" consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioner0s marriage to ,locillo, which had not "et been declared null and void b" a court of competent %urisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. 9either would a %udicial declaration of the nullit" of petitioner0s marriage to +" make an" difference. , plain reading of ,rticle ;=1 of the &evised enal 'ode, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subse)uent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. !!. ARTHUR TE vs. COURT OF A--EALS G. R. No. 1( 0) Nove56e% ("* (/// FACTS ,rthur !e and Ailiana 'hoa were married in civil rites on *eptember 1=, 11EE. !he" did not live together after the marriage although the" would meet each other regularl". On .a" (7, 1117, while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting, petitioner contracted a second marriage with a certain <ulieta *antella. rivate respondent filed an information charging petitioner with bigam" at the &egional !rial 'ourt of Ruezon 'it". .eanwhile, on <ul" (7, 1117, petitioner filed in the &!' of Ruezon 'it" an action for the annulment of his marriage to private respondent on the ground that he was forced to marr" her. 4e alleged that private respondent concealed her pregnanc" b" another man at the time of their marriage and that she was ps"chologicall" incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. On 9ovember E, 1117, private respondent also filed with the rofessional &egulation 'ommission > &'? an administrative case against petitioner and *antella for the revocation of their respective engineering licenses on the ground that the" committed acts of immoralit" b" living together and subse)uentl" marr"ing each other despite their knowledge that at the time of their marriage, petitioner was alread" married to private respondent. etitioner0s motions were denied b" the &!' and confirmed b" the 'ourt of ,ppeals. ISSUE #hether or not the criminal and administrative cases filed against ,rthur !e be suspended pending the civil case for declaration of nullit" of marriage. RULING !he 'ourt of ,ppeals did not err when it ruled that the pendenc" of the civil case for annulment of marriage filed b" petitioner against private respondent did not pose a pre%udicial )uestion which would necessitate that the criminal case for bigam" be suspended until said civil case is terminated. !he outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner0s marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner0s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigam", because all that is re)uired for the charge of bigam" to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. etitioner0s argument that the
EF

nullit" of his marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case before the criminal proceedings could continue, because a declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would necessaril" absolve him from criminal liabilit", is untenable. !he prevailing rule is found in ,rticle =7 of the @amil" 'ode, which was alread" in effect at the time of petitioner0s marriage to private respondent in *eptember 11EE. *aid article states that the absolute nullit" of a previous marriage ma" not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final %udgment declaring such previous marriage void. !hus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a %udicial proceeding. !he concept of pre%udicial )uestion involves a civil and a criminal case. #e have previousl" ruled that there is no pre%udicial )uestion where one case is administrative and the other is civil. !). SALVADOR S. A,UNADO a38 ZENAIDA ,IEAS A,UNADO vs. -EO-LE OF THE -HILI--INES G. R. No. 1#"(1+ Ma%4h !/* (//) FACTS *alvador married 9arcisa ,rceno on *eptember 1E, 11DF. In 11EE, 9arcisa left for <apan to work, while her marriage with *avador still subsisting, the latter contracted a second marriage with Qenaida /iBas before <udge anontongan in *an .ateo , &izal on <anuar" 17, 11E1. #hen she learned that her husband was having an extra$marital affair and has left their con%ugal home, she returned to the hilippines in 111(. ,n annulment case was filed b" *avador against 9arcisa and subse)uentl", a case of bigam" was filed b" 9arcisa against *alvador and Qenaida. !he &!' of .akati granted *alvador a %udicial declaration of nullit" of his marriage with 9arcisa. #hile on .a" 1E, (771, the &!' of *an .ateo , &izal rendered a decision convicting *alvador for bigam" which on appeal, affirmed b" the 'ourt of ,ppeals. ISSUE #hether *alvador contracted a subse)uent marriage with Qenaida while his first marriage with 9arcisa was still subsisting. RULING !he subse)uent marriage was contracted while the first marriage was still subsisting. It should be noted that bigam" can be successfull" prosecuted provided all its elements concur, two of which are a previous marriage and a subse)uent marriage which possesses all the re)uisites for validit". !he subse)uent %udicial declaration of the nullit" of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullit", the crime had alread" been consummated. @or that reason, the petitioner0s assertion that his petition for annulment/declaration of nullit" of marriage was a pre%udicial )uestion, hence, the proceedings in the bigam" case should have been suspended during the pendenc" of the annulment case, cannot be given due course since it would onl" dela" the prosecution of bigam". !he outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner0s marriage to 9arcisa had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner0s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigam", because all that is re)uired for the charge of bigam" to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. !hus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or
EE

voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a %udicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventuall" obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. !#. ANTONIA ARMAS vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO G. R. No. 1! ) 0 A$%&' * (/// FACTS !eodorico 'alisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land, survived b" his wife, .arietta 'alisterio. !eodorico was the second husband of .arietta who had previousl" been married to <ames /ounds on <anuar" 1;, 11=D. <ames /ounds disappeared without a trace on @ebruar" 11, 11=F. !eodorico and .arietta were married eleven "ears later on .a" E, 11GE, without .arietta having secured a court declaration that <ames was presumptivel" dead. ,ntonia ,rmas " 'alisterio, surviving sister of the late !eodorico 'alisterio filed a petition claiming to be the sole surviving heir of !oedorico contending that the marriage between .arietta and !oedorico is null and void being bigamous. *he pra"ed that her son *infroniano '. ,rmas <r., be appointed administrator of the estate, and the inheritance be ad%udicated to her. &!' declared ,ntonia ,rmas as the sole heir of the estate of !eodorico. 'ourt of ,ppeals reversed the decision. etitioner appealed. ', denied motion for reconsideration. ISSUE #hether or not the marriage of spouses !eodorico 'alisterio and .arietta is null and void for being bigamous. RULING !he marriage between the deceased !eodorico and respondent .arietta was solemnized on 7E .a" 11GE. The 'aw &3 <o%4e at that time was the C&v&' Co8e* 3o7 7he Fa5&'1 Co8e which took effect onl" on 7; ,ugust 11EE. aragraph >(? of the law gives exceptions from the above rule. @or the subse)uent marriage referred to in the three exceptional cases therein provided, to be held valid, the spouse present >not the absentee spouse? so contracting the later marriage must have done so in good faith. D /ad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obli)uit" and conscious doing of wrong N it partakes of the nature of fraud, a breach of a known dut" through some motive of interest or ill will. In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent .ariettaMs first husband, <ames #illiam /ounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven "ears before she entered into a second marriage in 11GE with the deceased !eodorico 'alisterio. !his second marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the 'ivil
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'ode, should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a %udicial declaration of presumptive death of <ames /ounds.

17

! . RE-U,LIC OF THE -HILI--INES vs. COURT OF A--EALS G. R. No. 1#" 1) De4e56e% "* (//# FACTS ,lan /. ,legro filed a petition in the &egional !rial 'ourt of 'atbalogan, *amar for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, &osalia >Aea? ,. <ulaton. ,lan and Aea were married on <anuar" (7, 111G in 'atbalogan, *amar. 4e testified that, Aea arrived home late in the evening and alwa"s out of their house. ,lan narrated that, when he reported for work , Aea was still in the house, but when he arrived home later in the da", Aea was nowhere to be found. ,lan went to the house of Aea0s parents, but he was told that she was not there. ,lan sought the help of :aranga 'aptain <uan .agat, who promised to help him locate his wife. 4e also in)uired from his and Aea0s friends of latter whereabouts but to no avail. ,lan left for .anila on ,ugust (F, 111G. 4e failed to find out Aea0s whereabouts despite his repeated talks with <aneth, AeaMs friend . 4e decided to work as a part$time taxi driver so that during his free time he would look for Aea in the malls but still to no avail. 4e returned to 'atbalogan in 111F and again looked for his wife but failed. On <une (7, (771, ,lan reported Aea0s disappearance to the local police station. !he police authorities issued an ,larm 9otice on <ul" =, (771. ,lan also reported Aea0s disappearance to the 9ational /ureau of Investigation >9/I? on <ul" 1, (771. ,fter ,lan rested his case, neither the Office of the rovincial *olicitor General adduced evidence in opposition to the petition. rosecutor nor the

On <anuar" E, (77(, the court rendered %udgment granting the petition. !he O*G appealed the decision to the 'ourt of ,ppeals >',? which rendered %udgment on ,ugust =, (77;, affirming the decision of the &!'. ISSUE #hether or not ,lan /. ,legro failed to prove that he had a well$founded belief that Aea was alread" dead and failed to exercise reasonable and diligent efforts to locate his wife. RULING ,rticle =1 of the @amil" 'ode of the hilippines reads5 ,rt. =1. , marriage contracted b" an" person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subse)uent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive ears and the spouse present had a we''C<o238e8 6e'&e< that the absent spouse was alread" dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger under the circumstances set forth in the
11

provisions of ,rticle ;11 of the 'ivil 'ode, an a"sence of onl sufficient.

two

ears shall "e

!he belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness in)uiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is alread" dead. #hether or not the spouse present acted on a well$founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the in)uiries to be drawn from a great man" circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the in)uiries made b" present spouse. !he respondent did report and seek the help of the local police authorities and the 9/I to locate Aea, but it was onl" an afterthought. 4e did so onl" after the O*G filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the &!'. In sum, the 'ourt finds and so holds that the respondent failed to prove that he had a well$founded belief, before he filed his petition in the &!', that his spouse &osalia >Aea? <ulaton was alread" dead. !0. EDUARDO -. MANUEL vs. -EO-LE OF THE -HILI--INES. G. R. No.1 #+)( Nove56e% ("* (//# FACTS <ul" (E, 11FG, :duardo was married to &ub"lus GaBa. 4e met !ina /. Gandalera in 2agupan 'it" in <anuar" 111D. !ina was then twent" one >(1? "ears old a 'omputer *ecretarial student while :duardo was thirt" nine >;1?. :duardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single. :duardo even brought his parents to /aguio 'it" to meet !ina0s parents, and was assured b" them that their son was still single. !ina and :duardo were married on ,pril ((, 111D. It appeared in their marriage contract that :duardo was 6single.8 !he couple was happ" during the first three "ears of their married life. *ometime in <anuar" (771, :duardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. #orse, he stopped giving financial support. !ina made in)uiries from the 9*O in .anila where she learned that :duardo had been previousl" married. @or his part, :duardo testified that !ina is a G&O and he informed her of his previous marriage to &ub"lus GaBa, but she nevertheless agreed to marr" him. :duardo further testified that he declared he was 6single8 in his marriage contract with !ina because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. :duardo further claimed that he was onl" forced to marr" his first wife because she threatened to commit suicide. &ub"lus was charged with estafa in 11FG and thereafter imprisoned. 4e insisted that he married !ina believing that his first marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from &ub"lus for more than (7 "ears. !he &!' and ', held petitioner guilt" of bigam" under ,rt ;=1 of the & '. ,rticle =1 of the @amil" 'ode should appl". /efore .anuel could lawfull" marr" the private
1(

complainant, there should have been a %udicial declaration of GaBa0s presumptive death as the absent spouse. ISSUE #hether or not the prosecution failed to prove the second element of the felon", i.e., that the marriage has not been legall" dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not "et be presumed dead under the 'ivil 'ode. RULING !he reason wh" bigam" is considered a felon" is to preserve and ensure the %uridical tie of marriage established b" law. !he phrase 6or before the absent spouse had been declared presumptivel" dead b" means of a %udgment rendered in the proper proceedings8 was incorporated in the &evised enal 'ode because the drafters of the law were of the impression that 6in consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption of death after an absence of a number of "ears, the %udicial declaration of presumed death like annulment of marriage should be a %ustification for bigam".8 @or the accused to be held guilt" of bigam", the prosecution is burdened to prove the felon"5 >a? he/she has been legall" marriedH and >b? he/she contracts a subse)uent marriage without the former marriage having been lawfull" dissolved. !he felon" is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subse)uent marriage. !he %udicial declaration of nullit" of a previous marriage is a defense. In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to GaBa in 11FG, and such marriage was not %udiciall" declared a nullit"H hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist. !he prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the private complainant in 111D, long after the effectivit" of the @amil" 'ode. !+. SOCIAL SECURIT: S:STEMS* INC. vs. TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE ,AILON G. R. No. 1 ##)# Ma%4h ()* (// FACTS ,pril (G, 11GG, 'lemente /ailon contracted marriage with ,lice *orosogon. . 2iaz in /arcelona

October 1, 11F7, more than 1G "ears later, 'lemente filed a petition with the &!' to declare ,lice presumptivel" dead, which was granted b" the &!'. ,ugust 1E, 11E;, /ailon contracted another marriage with !eresita <ar)ue the respondent. <anuar" ;7, 11EE, /ailon who was a member and a retiree pensioner died. !eresita filed a claim for funeral benefits and additional death benefits which were granted b" the ***.
1;

'ecilia /ailon 3ap, who claimed to be the daughter of /ailon and :lisa <a"ona contested before *** the release ti !eresita the funeral and death benefits. 'ecilia claimed that /ailon contracted three marriages in his lifetime, the first with ,lice, the second with her mother, and the third with !eresita. :lisa and seven of her children filed claims for death benefits as /ailonMs beneficiaries. *** legal unit recommended the cancellation of pa"ment of death and pension benefit to !eresita. !eresita filed a petition for the restoration of the monthl" pension. *** on its resolution found that the marriage of /ailon to !eresita was void. *** holds that !eresita is not the legitimate spouse and primar" beneficiar" of *** member /ailon. !eresita filed motion for reconsideration having been denied she filed petition for review before ',. ', reversed the order of ***. *** and **' file motion for reconsideration which was denied. ISSUE #hether *** thru **' can validl" declare the marriage between respondent and /ailon null and void. RULING !he *upreme 'ourt ruled in the negative. !he **' is empowered to settle the controvers" with respect to the *** coverage, benefits and contributions, there is no doubt. /ut, in exercising such prerogative, it cannot review or reverse the decision rendered b" court, as it did in this case. !he law does not grant the **' such power. @urthermore, since the marriages involved in this case were contracted prior to the enactment of the @amil" 'ode, the governing law shall be the 'ivil 'ode. +nder the law, an" marriage subse)uentl" contracted b" an" person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with an" person other than the such first spouse shall be illegal unless the first spouse has been absent for seven consecutive "ears at the time of the second marriage, or if the absentee is generall" considered dead an believed to be so b" the spouse present at the time of the second marriage or if the absentee is presumed dead according to ,rticles ;17 and ;11. !he subse)uent marriage shall be valid until declared null and void b" competent court. !hus, where a person has entered two successive marriages, a presumption arises in favor of the validit" of the second marriage, and the burden is on the person attacking the validit" of the second marriage to prove that the first marriage had not been dissolved. It bears noting that the voidable marriage can be assailed onl" b" direct proceeding. ,s such, such marriage can onl" be assailed during the lifetime of the parties and not after the death of either, in which case, the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been valid. +pon the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullif" the marriage between the respondent and /ailon prior to the death of the latter, respondent was rightfull" the dependent spouse of /ailon and, thus, entitled to all the benefits granted b" ***. !". ANGELITA VALDEZ vs. RE-U,LIC OF THE -HILI--INES
1=

G. R. No. 1+/+ !

Se$7e56e% +* (//"

FACTS ,ngelita Caldez and *ofio married on <anuar" 11, 11F1. ,ccording to petitioner, she and *ofio argued constantl" because the latter was unemplo"ed and did not bring home an" mone". In .arch 11F(, *ofio left their con%ugal dwelling. In October 11FG, *ofio showed up at /anca" 1st. 4e and petitioner talked for several hours and the" agreed to separate. !he" executed a document to that effect. !hat was the last time the" saw each other, after that she didnMt hear an" news from *ofio. /elieving that *ofio was alread" dead, petitioner married Cirgilio &e"es on <une (7, 11EG.; *ubse)uentl", however, CirgilioMs application for naturalization filed with the +nited *tates 2epartment of 4omeland *ecurit" was denied because petitionerMs marriage to *ofio was subsisting. 4ence, on .arch (1, (77F, petitioner filed a etition before the &!' seeking the declaration of presumptive death of *ofio. !he &!' rendered its 2ecision on 9ovember 1(, (77F, dismissing the etition for lack of merit. !he &!' held that ,ngelita -was not able to prove the well$grounded belief that her husband *ofio olborosa was alread" dead.etition filed a motion for reconsideration. &!' denied the motion. ISSUE #hether or not &!' erred in appl"ing the provisions of the @amil" 'ode and holding that petitioner needed to prove a 6well$founded belief8 that *ofio was alread" dead. RULING It can be gleaned that, under the 'ivil 'ode, the presumption of death is established b" law and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. *ince death is presumed to have taken place b" the seventh "ear of absence, *ofio is to be presumed dead starting October 11E(. 'onse)uentl", at the time of petitionerMs marriage to Cirgilio, there existed no impediment to petitionerMs capacit" to marr", and the marriage is valid under paragraph ( of ,rticle E; of the 'ivil 'ode. @urther, considering that it is the 'ivil 'ode that applies, proof of -well$founded belief- is not re)uired. etitioner could not have been expected to compl" with this re)uirement since the @amil" 'ode was not "et in effect at the time of her marriage to Cirgilio. !he enactment of the @amil" 'ode in 11EE does not change this conclusion. !he @amil" 'ode itself states5 -,rt. (GD. !his 'ode shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not pre%udice or impair vested or ac)uired rights in accordance with the 'ivil 'ode or other laws.!o retroactivel" appl" the provisions of the @amil" 'ode re)uiring petitioner to exhibit -well$founded belief- will, ultimatel", result in the invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid at the time it was celebrated. *uch a situation would be untenable and would go against the ob%ectives that the @amil" 'ode wishes to achieve. In sum, we hold that the etition must be dismissed since no decree on the presumption of *ofioMs death can be granted under the 'ivil 'ode, the same presumption having arisen b"
1G

operation of law. 4owever, we declare that petitioner was capacitated to marr" Cirgilio at the time their marriage was celebrated in 11EG and, therefore, the said marriage is legal and valid. )/. FEDERICO SUNTA: vs. ISA,EL COJUANGCOCSUNTA: G. R. No. 1!(#() De4e56e% ("* 1"++ FACTS On <ul" 1, 11GE, :milio ,guinaldo *unta" >son of petitioner @ederico *unta"? and Isabel 'o%uangco$*unta" were married. Out of this marriage, three children were born namel"5 .argarita Guadalupe, Isabel ,guinaldo and :milio ,guinaldo. ,fter = "ears, the marriage soured so that in 11D(, Isabel 'o%uangco$*unta" filed a criminal case against her husband :milio allegedl" for parricide and in retaliation, :milio filed before the '@I a complaint for legal separation, charging her, among others, with infidelit" and pra"ing for the custod" and care of their children who were living with their mother. On October ;, 11DF, the trial court rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which reads5 #4:&:@O&:, the marriage celebrated between :milio ,guinaldo *unta" and Isabel 'o%uangco$*unta" on <ul" 1, 11GE is hereb" declared null and void and of no effect as between the parties. It being admitted b" the parties and shown b" the record that the )uestion of the case and custod" of the three children have been the sub%ect of another case between the same parties in another branch of this 'ourt in *pecial roceeding 9o. D=(E, the same cannot be litigated in this case. On <une 1, 11F1, :milio ,guinaldo *unta" predeceased his mother, the decedent 'ristina ,guinaldo$*unta". !he latter is respondent IsabelMs paternal grandmother. !he decedent died on <une =, 1117 without leaving a will. etitioner @ederico is the oppositor to respondent Isabel0s etition for Aetters of ,dministration over the estate of 'ristina *unta". !he decedent is the wife of @ederico and the grandmother of Isabel. !he marriage of Isabel0s parents had previousl" been decalred b" the '@I as 6null and void.8 @ederico anchors his oppostion on this fact, alleging based on ,rt. 11( of the '', that Isabel has no right to succeed b" right of representation as she is an illegitimate child. !he trial court had denied @ederico0s .otion to 2ismiss, hence this petition for certiorari. @ederico contends that, inter alia, that the dispositive portion of the the decision declaring the marriage of Isabel0s parents 6null and void8 be upheld. ISSUES 1. In case of conflict between the bod" of the decision and the dispostive portion thereof, which should prevailL (. #as the marriage of Isabel0s parents a case of a void or voidable marriageL ;. #hether or not Isabel is an legitimate childL
1D

RULING etition dismissed . ,rt. 17 of the 'ivil 'ode states that in case of doubt in the interpretation and application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking bod" intended right and %ustice to prevail. !his is also applicable and binding upon courts in relation to its %udgment. #hile the dispositive portion of the '@I decision states that the marriage be 6declared null and void,8 the bod" had shown that the legal basis was par. ; ,rt. EG of the 'ivil 'ode, which was in effect at the time. ,rt. EG enumerates the causes for which a marriage ma" be annulled. ,s such the conflict between the bod" and the dispositive portion of the decision ma" be reconcilable as noted b" the *upreme 'ourt. !he fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. !he effects of void marriages, with respect to propert" relations of the spouses are provided for under ,rticle 1== of the 'ivil 'ode. 'hildren born of such marriages who are called natural children b" legal fiction have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children under ,rticle E1 irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith. On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside b" final %udgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. <uridicall", the annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totall" wiped out. !he status of children born in voidable marriages is governed b" the second paragraph of ,rticle E1 which provides that5 'hildren conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimateH and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children b" legal fiction. In view thereof, the status of Isabel would be covered b" the second paragraph of ,rticle E1 of the 'ivil 'ode which provides that 6 children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate.8

)1. FILI-INA S: vs. COURT OF A--EALS G. R. No. 1(0( ! A$%&' 1(* (/// FACTS
1F

etitioner @ilipina 3. *" and private respondent @ernando *" contracted marriage on 9ovember 1G, 11F;. /oth were then (( "ears old. !heir union was blessed with two children. On *eptember 1G, 11E;, @ernando left their con%ugal dwelling. *ince then, the spouses lived separatel", and their two children were in the custod" of their mother. On ,ugust =, 111(, @ilipina filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullit" of her marriage to @ernando on the ground of ps"chological incapacit" and cited as manifestations of her husbandMs ps"chological incapacit" the following5 >1? habitual alcoholismH >(? refusal to live with her without fault on her part, choosing to live with his mistress insteadH and >;? refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital act onl" to satisf" himself. .oreover, @ilipina alleges that such ps"chological incapacit" of her husband existed from the time of the celebration of their marriage and became manifest thereafter. !he &!' denied the petition. the trial court. etitioner appealed to ', which affirmed the decision of

!he ', ruled that the testimon" of petitioner concerning respondentMs purported ps"chological incapacit" falls short of the )uantum of evidence re)uired to nullif" a marriage celebrated with all the formal and essential re)uisites of law. .oreover, the 'ourt of ,ppeals held that petitioner failed to show that the alleged ps"chological incapacit" of respondent had existed at the time of the celebration of their marriage in 11F;. It reiterated the finding of the trial court that the coupleMs marital problems surfaced onl" in 11E;, or almost ten "ears from the date of the celebration of their marriage. ,nd prior to their separation in 11E;, the" were living together harmoniousl". 4ence, this appeal b" certiorari wherein petitioner now raises for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage license at the time of its celebration. ,ccording to her, the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage license are different and incongruous. ISSUES 1. #hether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremon"H and (. #hether or not private respondent is ps"chologicall" incapacitated at the time of said marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullit". RULING , marriage license is a formal re)uirementH its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. ,s a rule litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal, as this would contravene the basic rules of fair pla" and %ustice, in a number of instances, the 'ourt has relaxed observance of procedural rules, noting that technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist to protect and promote substantive rights of litigants. 'ertain rules
1E

ought not to be applied with severit" and rigidit" if b" so doing, the ver" reason for their existence would be defeated. 4ence, when substantial %ustice plainl" re)uires, exempting a particular case from the operation of technicalities should not be sub%ect to cavil. !his case re)uires that the court to address the issue of the validit" of the marriage between the parties which petitioner claims is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license, in order to arrive at a %ust resolution of a deepl" seated and violent conflict between the parties. 9ote, however, that the pertinent facts are not disputedH and what is re)uired is a declaration of their effects according to existing law. ieces of evidence on record plainl" and indubitabl" show that on the da" of the marriage ceremon", there was no marriage license. !he remaining issue on the ps"chological incapacit" of private respondent is rendered moot and academic b" the court0s conclusion that the marriage is void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized. 9ote5 4abitual alcoholism, refusal to live with her without fault on her part, choosing to live with his mistress insteadH and refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital act onl" to satisf" one don0t constitute ps"chological incapacit". It falls short of the )uantum of evidence. !he petition is G&,9!:2. !he marriage is declared void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time of celebration. )(. ANTONIA ARMAS vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO G. R. No. 1! ) 0 A$%&' * (/// FACTS !eodorico 'alisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land, survived b" his wife, .arietta 'alisterio. !eodorico was the second husband of .arietta who had previousl" been married to <ames /ounds on <anuar" 1;, 11=D. <ames /ounds disappeared without a trace on @ebruar" 11, 11=F. !eodorico and .arietta were married eleven "ears later on .a" E, 11GE, without .arietta having secured a court declaration that <ames was presumptivel" dead. ,ntonia ,rmas " 'alisterio, surviving sister of the late !eodorico 'alisterio filed a petition claiming to be the sole surviving heir of !oedorico contending that the marriage between .arietta and !oedorico is null and void being bigamous. *he pra"ed that her son *infroniano '. ,rmas <r., be appointed administrator of the estate, and the inheritance be ad%udicated to her. ISSUE #hether or not the petitioner is considered as the compulsor" heir.
11

RULING It is evident that the basic issue focuses on the validit" of the marriage between the deceased !eodorico and respondent .arietta which would be determinative of her right as a surviving spouse. !he con%ugal propert" of !eodorico and .arietta , no evidence having been adduced to indicate another propert" regime between the spouses, pertains to them in common. +pon its dissolution with the death of !eodorico, the propert" should rightl" be divided in two e)ual portions $$ one portion going to the surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of the deceased spouse. )!. OFELIA -. T: vs. COURT OF A--EALS G. R. No. 1(0)/ Nove56e% (0* (/// FACTS rivate respondent seeks for the nullit" of his marriage with herein petitioner on the ground that the" had no marriage license when the" got married. 4e also averred that at the time he married Ofelia . !", he has a subsisting marriage with ,nna .aria &egina Cillanueva. &e"es contracted two marriages. 4is first marriage Cillanueva was on .arch (1, 11FF thru a civil ceremon" and the" had their church wedding on ,ugust (F of the same "ear. rior to the grant for declaration of nullit" for his first marriage, respondent &e"es contracted a subse)uent marriage with herein petitioner, !", on ,pril =, 11F1 in a civil ceremon" and a church wedding on ,pril =, 11E(. It was onl" on ,ugust =, 11E7 wherein the <uvenile and 2omestic &elations 'ourt of Ruezon 'it" declared the marriage of &e"es and Cillanueva as null and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. Aikewise, their church wedding on ,ugust (F, 11FF, was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties. On the other hand, petitioner in her defense, submitted their marriage license GF;1117 issued at &osario , 'avite on ,pril ;, 11F1 so as to disprove the contention of &e"es that their marriage was celebrated without a marriage license. *he likewise presented the court decision rendering private respondent and Cillanueva0s marriage as null and void. ISSUE #hether the decree of nullit" of the first marriage is re)uired before a subse)uent marriage can be entered into validl".

RULING
177

!he marriage between herein petitioner and private respondent was celebrated in 11FF, whereb" the applicable law at that time was ,rticle E; of the 'ivil 'ode. 4owever, as to whether a %udicial declaration of nullit" of a void marriage is necessar", the 'ivil 'ode contains no express provision to that effect. <urisprudence on the matter, however, appears to be conflicting. 9onetheless, since the second marriage of private respondent was entered into 11F1, the 'ourt applied the prevailing rule in the cases of Oda"at vs. ,mante, eople vs. .endoza and eople vs. ,ragon . !he first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for %udicial declaration of its nullit" before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondent0s second marriage to petitioner is valid. .oreover, the 'ourt held that the provisions of the @amil" 'ode cannot be retroactivel" applied to the present case, for to do so would pre%udice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. )). L24&o Mo%&9o vs. -eo$'e o< 7he -h&'&$$&3es G. R. No. 1)#(( Fe6%2a%1 * (//) FACTS Aucio .origo and Aucia /arrete were boardmates for a period of four >=? "ears >from 11F=$11FE?. ,fter that school "ear of 11FF$FE, the" lost contact with each other. *ix "ears after, Aucio .origo receive a card from Aucia /arrete. ,fter an exchange of letters, the" became sweethearts. !he" maintained constant communication. ,fter six "ears of becoming sweethearts, both agreed to get married, thus the" were married. Aucia reported back to her work abroad leaving appellant Aucio behind. ,lmost a "ear after of their marriage, Aucia filed abroad a petition for divorce against petitioner which was granted b" the court. Aucio .origo married .aria <ececha Aumbago. Aater, petitioner filed a complaint for %udicial declaration of nullit" of marriage. !he complaint seek among others, the declaration of nullit" of his marriage with Aucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremon" actuall" took place. etitioner was charged with /igam". !he &!' rendered %udgment against the petitioner guilt" of bigam" discounting petitioner0s claim that his first marriage to Aucia was null and void ab initio and ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremon" is not a defense in a charge of bigam", that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a %udicial declaration of the nullit" of their marriage before the" can be allowed to marr" again and that the court of a countr" were divorce was obtained b" Aucia in which neither of the spouses is domiciled has no %urisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the parties as such, it is not entitled to recognition an"where. .eanwhile on appeal, declaration of nullit" was granted which became final and executor". 2espite declaration of nullit", 'ourt of ,ppeals affirmed the decision of the lower court ruling that the subse)uent declaration of nullit" of Aucio0s marriage to Aucia could not ac)uit Aucio. 4ence, the present petition. ISSUE
171

#hether or not petitioner committed bigam". RULING !he 'ourt ruled that petitioner did not commit bigam" hence, petition is granted. !he first element of bigam" as a crime re)uires that the accused must have been legall" married. In this case, the petitioner was never married to Aucia /arrete as declared in the trial court that the marriage is void ab initio which means that there was no marriage to begin withH and that such declaration of nullit" retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the e"es of the law, never married . !hus, there is no first marriage to speak of. !he contract of marriage is nullH it bears no legal effect. 4ence, petitioner was not married to Aucia at the time he contracted the marriage with .aria <ececha. !he existence and the validit" of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigam", it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. !here is no marriage ceremon" at all was also performed, in the instant case, b" a dul" authorized solemnizing officer. etitioner and Aucia /arrete merel" signed a marriage contract on their own. !he mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no %udicial declaration of nullit". *uch act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibl" valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigam" unless he first secures a %udicial declaration of nullit" before he contracts a subse)uent marriage. !hus, petitioner has not committed bigam".

ii. On Marriages Celebrated Abroad

)#. GRACE GARCIA vs. REDERICD RECIO G. R. No. 1!+!(( O47o6e% (* (//1 FACTS On .a" 1E, 11E1, a decree of divorce was issued b" an ,ustralian famil" court dissolving the marriage of respondent &ederick &ecio, then @ilipino and :ditha *amson, an ,ustralian citizen. 4e then married petitioner Grace Garcia, a @ilipina on <anuar" 1(, 111=. On .arch 111E, petitioner filed a complaint for declaration of 9ullit" of .arriage on the ground of bigam" P that respondent had a subsisting marriage when he married her. In the respondent0s answer, he contended that his first marriage to an ,ustralian citizen had been validl" dissolved b" a divorce decree obtained in ,ustralian in 11E1 thus, he was legall" capacitated to marr" petitioner in 111=. On <ul" F, 111E, while the suit for the declaration of nullit" was pending, respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a famil" court in *"dne", ,ustralia. !he trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in ,ustralia was valid and recognized in the hilippines. !he ,ustralian divorce had ended the marriageH thus, there was no more martial union to nullif" or annul. ISSUES
17(

1. #hether the divorce between respondent and :ditha *amson was proven andH (. #hether respondent was legall" capacitated to marr" petitioner RULING , divorce obtained abroad b" an alien ma" be recognized in our %urisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. 4owever, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take %udicial notice of foreign laws and %udgmentH hence, like an" other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence. !he court a )uo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacit" to remarr" without re)uiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the ,ustralian personal law governing his statusH or at the ver" least, to prove his legal capacit" to contract the second marriage. !he legal capacit" to contract marriage is determined b" the national law of the part" concerned. , dul" authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacit" to marr" on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. !he proof is absent here. ) . WOLFGANG ROEHR vs. MARIA CARMEN RODRIGUEZ G. R. No. 1)(+(" J23e (/* (//! FACTS etitioner #olfgang O. &oehr, a German citizen and resident of German", married private respondent 'armen &odriguez, a @ilipina, on 2ecember 11, 11E7 in 4amburg, German". On ,ugust (E, 111D, respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullit" of marriage. ending trial, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the 'ourt of @irst Instance of 4amburg$/lankenese, promulgated on 2ecember 1D, 111F. 'ustod" of the children was granted to petitioner. On .a" (7, 1111, petitioner filed a .otion to 2ismiss on the ground that the trial court had no %urisdiction over the sub%ect matter of the action as a decree of annulment has alread" been promulgated. .otion to 2ismiss was granted and respondent filed a .otion for artial &econsideration for the custod" of the children and distribution of the properties. etitioner contended that there is nothing to be done an"more in the case as there is alread" a decree of divorce promulgated b" German court.

ISSUES #hether the legal effects of a divorce obtained from a foreign countr" such as support and custod" of the children, can be determined in our courts. RULING ,s a general rule, divorce decrees obtained b" foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our %urisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custod", care and
17;

support of the children, must still be determined b" our courts. /efore our courts can give the effect of res %udicata to a foreign %udgment, such as the award of custod" to petitioner b" the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the %udgment had been given ample opportunit" to do so on grounds allowed under &ule ;1, *ection G7 of the &ules of 'ourt. ,ccordingl", the respondent was not given the opportunit" to challenge the %udgement of the German 'ourt, therefore, legal effects of divorce must be determined in our courts. !he court held that the trial court has %urisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental custod". )0. -AULA T. LLORENTE vs. CA a38 ALICIA F. LLORENTE G. R. No. 1()!01 Nove56e% (!* (/// FACTS Aorenzo Alorente and petitioner aula Alorente were married in 'amarines *ur in @eb ((, 11;F. On 9ovember ;7, 11=;, Aorenzo became a naturalized +* citizen. Aorenzo discovered that petitioner had an adulterous relationship so he filed for divorce with the *uperior 'ourt of the *tate of 'alifornia and on 2ecember =, 11G(, the divorce became final. On <anuar" 1D, 11GE, Aorenzo married ,licia @. Alorente who had no knowledge of the first marriage and the" lived together until his death on <une 11, 11EG. +pon learning of Aorenzo0s death, aula filed a petition for the issuance of letters testamentar" in her favour contending that she is the surviving legitimate spouse. ISSUE #hether the foreign divorce between petitioner aula and the late Aorenzo is valid and if it capacitated him to remarr". RULING 'iting Can 2orn v &omillo, the 'ourt ruled that aliens ma" obtain divorces abroad, provided the" are valid according to their national law. ,lso citing ilapil vs Iba"$ *omera, divorce and its legal effects ma" be recognized in the hilippines in view of the nationalit" principle in our civil law on the status of persons. !he court held that the divorce obtained b" Aorenzo Alorente from his wife aula is valid and recognized in this %urisdiction as a matter of comit".

)+. RE-U,LIC OF THE -HILI--INES vs.CI-RIANO OR,ECIDO III G. R. No. 1#)!+/ O47o6e% #* (//# FACTS 'ipriano Orbecido III married then @ilipina, Aad" ."ros Cillanueva on .a" (=, 11E1. 'ipriano0s wife left for the +* and was naturalized as an ,merican citizen after a few "ears. 4e then learned that his wife obtained a divorce decree and married a certain *tanle". 'ipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authorit" to remarr".
17=

ISSUE #hether the petition for authorit" to remarr" be grantedL RULING #hen 'ipriano0s wife was naturalized as an ,merican citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and 'ipriano. !he naturalized alien wife subse)uentl" obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarr". 'learl", the twin re)uisites for the application of aragraph ( of ,rticle (D are both present in this case. !hus 'ipriano, the 6divorced8 @ilipino spouse, should be allowed to remarr". Aikewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized b" our own courts, the part" pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformit" to the foreign law allowing it.K @urthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarr" as specificall" re)uired in ,rticle (D. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage. )". MARIA RE,ECCA MACA-UGA: ,A:OT vs. COURT OF A--EALS G. R. Nos. 1## !# . 1 !"0" Nove56e% 0* (//+ FACTS Cicente married &ebecca, an ,merican 'itizen on ,pril (7, 11F1, in .andalu"ong 'it". In 111D, &ebecca initiated divorce proceedings in the 2ominican &epublic and on @ebruar" ((, 111D, a decree dissolving their marriage was issued b" the 2ominican court, leaving them to 6remarr" after completing the legal re)uirements8. On .arch (1, (771, &ebecca filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullit" of marriage on the ground of Cicente0s alleged ps"chological incapacit". Cicente filed a .otion to 2ismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred b" the prior %udgment of divorce. &ebecca opposed on the motion to dismiss insisting on her @ilipino citizenship, as affirmed b" the 2O< and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of. Cicente who had in the interim contracted marriage, and &ebecca commenced several criminal complaints against each other one of which is the charge of bigam" against Cicente. !he &!' denied Cicente0s motion to dismiss and declared among other things, that the divorce %udgment invoked b" Cicente is a matter of defense best taken up during actual trial. ', granted Cicente0s motion to dismiss that &ebecca no longer had a legal right in this %urisdiction to have her marriage with Cicente declared void, the union having been previousl" dissolved b" foreign divorce that &ebecca secured as an ,merican citizen. ursuant to the second paragraph of ,rticle (D of the @amil" code, such divorce restored Cicente0s capacit" to contract another marriage. ISSUE #hether the divorce granted b" the foreign court is valid. RULING
17G

'iting Garcia vs &ecio, a foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. !he fact that &ebecca was an ,merican citizen when she secured the divorce and that she presented a dul" authenticated cop" of the decree are, sufficient proofs for the admission of their divorce in our courts. ,s to &ebecca0s citizenship, the court can assume that &ebecca is now a @ilipino citizen but she was not "et a recognized @ilipino citizen when she secured the %udgment of divorce from the 2ominican &epublic. !he court pointed out that the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. It is clear that &ebecca lacks a cause of action. #ith the valid foreign divorce secured b" &ebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her, thus there is no more marriage to be annulled. #/. EDGAR SAN LUIS vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS G. R. Nos. 1!!0)! . 1!)/(" Fe6%2a%1 * (//0 FACTS @elicisimo contracted three marriages in his lifetime. !he first predeceased him and the second, named .err" Aee, was an ,merican citizen who was issued a 2ecree granting ,bsolute 2ivorce. @elicisimo then married respondent @elicidad *agalongos$*an Auis in 'alifornia. 4e lived with her for 1E "ears until his death on 2ecember 1E, 111(. &espondent sought the dissolution of their con%ugal partnership assets and the settlement of @elicisimo0s estate, alleging that she is widow. *he pra"ed that the letters of administration be issued to her. On @ebruar" =, 111=, petitioner &odolfo *an Auis, one of the children b" his first marriage filed a motion to dismiss claiming that the respondent has no legal personalit" to file the petition because she was onl" a mistress of @elicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death was still married to .err" Aee. !he trial court denied the motion to dismiss. +naware of the dismissal, respondent presented the decree of absolute divorce issued b" the *tate of 4awaii to prove that @elicisimo0s marriage to .err" Aee had alread" been dissolved. *he claimed that @elicisimo had a legal capacit" to marr" following the decree of divorce. ISSUE #hether the divorce between @elicisimo and .err" Aee was valid, giving the respondent the legal capacit" to file a petition for letters of administration. RULING !he records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validit" of the divorce obtained b" .err" Aee as well as the marriage of the respondent and @elicisimo under the laws of the +*,. !he presentation solel" of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticit" and due execution must be presented. +nder *ections (= and (G of &ule 1;(, a writing or document ma" be proven as a public or official record of a foreign countr" b" either >1? an official publication or >(? a cop" thereof attested b"
17D

the officer having legal custod" of the document. If the record is not kept in the hilippines, such cop" must be >a? accompanied b" a certificate issued b" the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the hilippine foreign service stationed in the foreign countr" in which the record is kept and >b? authenticated b" the seal of his office. 9evertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personalit" to file the sub%ect petition for letters of administration, as she ma" be considered the co$owner of @elicisimo as regards the properties that were ac)uired through their %oint efforts during their cohabitation.

iii. On Consequences of a Valid Marriage a. O3 Le9a' Se$a%a7&o3

#1. ESTRELLA DE LA CRUZ vs. SEVERINO DE LA CRUZ G. R. No. LC1"# # Ja32a%1 !/* 1" + FACTS !he plaintiff, :strella de la 'ruz and the defendant, *everino de la 'ruz, were married in /acolod 'it" on @ebruar" 1, 11;E. !he defendant started living in .anila in 11GG, although he occasionall" returned to /acolod 'it", sleeping in his office instead of sleeping in the con%ugal dwelling P although in the said "ear, he paid short visits during which the" engaged in brief conversations. ,fter 11GG up to the time of the trial >complaint was filed on <ul" ((, 11GE?, the defendant had never visited the con%ugal abode. In 11=1, she began to suspect the existence of illicit relations between defendant and 9enita 4ernandez. !he defendant denied that he abandoned his wife and famil", averring that he has never failed, even for a single month, to give them financial support. !he defendant denied that he had a mistress. ISSUE 2id the separation of the defendant from the plaintiff constitute abandonment in law that would %ustif" a separation of the con%ugal partnership propertiesL RULING !he word 6abandon8, in its ordinar" sense, means to forsake entirel". #hen referring to desertion of a wife b" a husband, the word has been defined as 6the act of a husband in voluntaril" leaving his wife with intention to forsake her entirel", never to return to her and never to resume his marital duties towards her, or to claim his marital rights. In the case at bar, the court believes that the defendant did not intend to leave his wife and children permanentl". !he record conclusivel" shows that he continued to give support to his famil" despite his absence from the con%ugal home. If there is onl" ph"sical separation between the spouses >and nothing more?, engendered b" the husbandMs leaving the con%ugal abode, but the husband continues to manage the con%ugal properties with the same zeal, industr", and efficienc" as he did
17F

prior to the separation, and religiousl" gives support to his wife and children, as in the case at bar, we are not disposed to grant the wifeMs petition for separation of propert". !his decision ma" appear to condone the husbandMs separation from his wifeH however, the remedies granted to the wife b" articles 1DF and 1FE are not to be construed as condonation of the husbandMs act but are designed to protect the con%ugal partnership from waste and shield the wife from want. !herefore, a denial of the wifeMs pra"er does not impl" a condonation of the husbandMs act but merel" points up the insufficienc" or absence of a cause of action. #(. CARMEN LA-UZ S: vs. EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO G. R. No. LC!/"00 Ja32a%1 !1* 1"0( FACTS On ,ugust 1E, 11G;, 'armen Aapuz filed a petition for legal separation against :ufemio *. :ufemio alleging that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a 'hinese woman. *he pra"ed among others, that :ufemio should be deprived of his share of the con%ugal partnership profits. In :ufemio0s answer to the petition, he counter$claimed a declaration of nullit" ab initio of his marriage with petitioner on the ground of a prior subsisting marriage with Go 4iok. /efore the trial could be completed, petitioner died in a vehicular accident. :ufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on two grounds namel"5 that the petition for legal separation was filed be"ond the one$"ear period provided for in ,rticle 17( of the 'ivil 'odeH and that the death of 'armen abated the action for legal separation. On (D <une 11D1, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased 'armen b" her father, .acario Aapuz. 'ounsel for :ufemio opposed the motion. ISSUES 2oes the death of the plaintiff before final decree in an action for legal separation, abate the actionL RULING !he 'ivil 'ode of the hilippines recognizes this in its ,rticle 177, b" allowing onl" the innocent spouse >and no one else? to claim legal separationH and in its ,rticle 17E, b" providing that the spouses can, b" their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation alread" rendered. /eing personal in character, it follows that the death of one part" to the action causes the death of the action itself $actio personalis moritur cum persona. #hen one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, because the marriage is dissolved. !he heirs cannot even continue the suit, if the death of the spouse takes place during the course of the suit >,rticle (==, *ection ;?. !he action is absolutel" dead. ,s to the petition of respondent$appellee :ufemio for a declaration of nullit" ab initio of his marriage to 'armen Aapuz, it is apparent that such action became moot and
17E

academic upon the death of the latter, and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automaticall" dissolved the )uestioned union. ,n" propert" rights ac)uired b" either part" as a result of ,rticle 1== of the 'ivil 'ode of the hilippines D could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition b" either the appellee or b" the heirs of the appellant. #!. ,ENJAMIN ,UGA:ONG vs. LEONILA GINEZ G. R. No. LC1//!! Ja32a%1 !1* 1"0( FACTS /en%amin /uga"ong, a serviceman in the +nited *tates 9av", was married to defendant Aeonila Ginez on ,ugust (F, 11=1, at ,singan, angasinan, while on furlough leave. Immediatel" after their marriage, the couple lived with their sisters who later moved to *ampaloc, .anila. ,fter some time, or about <ul", 11G1, Aeonila Ginez left the dwelling of her sister$in$law and informed her husband b" letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in ,singan, angasinan, from which place she later moved to 2agupan 'it" to stud" in a local college there. /en%amin soon began receiving letters alleging acs of infidelit" of his wife. On ,ugust 11G(, he went to ,singan to meet with his wife and sta"ed with a cousin for ( nights and 1 da" as husbad and wife. !he next da", /uga"ong tried to verif" the truth of the information he received but instead of answering his )uer", his wife merel" packed up and left, which he took as a confirmation of acts of infidelit" imputed on her. On 9ovember 1E, 11G(, /uga"ong filed a complaint for legel separation against his wife, Ginez, who in an answer, denied the averments of the complaint. !he lower court dismissed the action alleging condonation of the charges of adulter". ISSUE ,ssuming arguendo that truth of the allegations of the commission of 6acts of rank infidelit" amounting to adulter"8, has the act charged been condoned b" the plaintiffL RULING !he act of the plaintiff in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact that she went with him and consented to be brought to the house of his cousin edro /uga"ong and together the" slept there as husband and wife for one da" and one night, and the further fact that in the second night the" again slept together in their house likewise as husband and wife N all these facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a reconciliation between them was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife b" the husband. !he reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to know of the acts of infidelit" amounting to adulter". !he legal separation ma" be claimed onl" b" the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adulter" or concubinage.

171

#). ENRICO L -ACETE vs. GLICERIO CARRIAGA G. R. No. LC#!++/ Ma%4h 10* 1"") FACTS On October (1, 11F1, 'oncepcion ,lanis filed a complaint for the declaration of nullit" of her marriage with :nrico acete as well as legal separation of their propert". *he alleged that acete subse)uentl" contracted a second marriage with 'larita de la 'oncepcion in 9orth 'otabato which she learned of onl" on ,ug 1, 11F1, and that acete fraudulentl" placed several pieces of propert" ac)uired during their marriage to 'larita and other 6dummies8. !he defendants were served summons but the" failed to file a timel" ,nswer. !he court declared the defendants in default and ordered the issuance of a decree of legal separation and declared numerous amounts of propert" as part of the con%ugal properties. ISSUE #hether or not the &!' gravel" abused its discretion in issuing the decree of legal separation. RULING !he default order un)uestionabl" is not legall" sanctioned. !he 'ivil 'ode provides5 ,rt. 171. 69o decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or b" confession of %udgment. In case of non$appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorne" to in)uire whether or not collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorne" shall intervene for the *tate in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.8 !he special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrit" of marriage to possible %eopard" are impelled b" no less than the *tateMs interest in the marriage relation and its avowed intention not to leave the matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone dictate. It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specificall" pra" for legal separation. !hat other remedies, whether principal or incidental, have likewise been sought in the same action cannot dispense, nor excuse compliance, with an" of the statutor" re)uirements afore)uoted.

6. O3 R&9h7s a38 D27&es o< H2s6a38 a38 W&<e

##. ALFONSO LACSON vs. CARMEN SAN JOSECLACSON G. R. No. LC()(#" A292s7 !/* 1" + FACTS ,lfonso Aacson and 'armen *an <ose$Aacson were married on @ebruar" 1=, 11G;. !o them were born four children, all alive.
117

&espondent spouse left the con%ugal home in /acolod 'it", and commenced to reside in .anila. *he filed a complaint docketed as civil case :$777;7 in the <uvenile and 2omestic &elations 'ourt of .anila ><2&'? for custod" of all their children as well as support for them and herself. 4owever, the spouses, thru the assistance of their respective attorne"0s succeeded in reaching an amicable settlement respecting custod" of their children, support, and separation of propert" thus, the" filed a %oint petition dated ,pril (1, 11D;, docketed as special proceeding D1FE of the court of first instance. !he important and pertinent portions of the petition, embod"ing their amicable settlement, read as follows5 4. #etitioners have mutuall agreed upon the dissolution of their con.ugal partnership su".ect to .udicial approval as re5uired " Article (%( of the Civil Code of the #hilippines ? the particular terms and conditions of their mutual agreement "eing as follows@ /a1 !here will "e separation of propert ? petitioner Carmen San ;oseA 9acson here" waiving an and all claims for a share in propert that ma "e held " petitioner Alfonso 9acson since the have ac5uired no propert of an conse5uenceB /c1 !he custod of the two elder children name Enri5ue and Caria !eresa shall "e awarded to petitioner Alfonso 9acson and th custod of the ounger children named 4errard and -amon shall " awarded to petitioner CarmenSan ;oseA 9acsonB /d1 #etitioner Alfonso 9acson shall pa petitioner Carmen San ;oseA 9acson a monthl allowance of #)DD.DD for the support of the children in her custod . @inding the foregoing %oint petition to be 6conformable to law8 the '@I issued an order rendering %udgment approving and incorporating in toto their compromise agreement. !hereafter, respondent spouse filed in the <2&' a motion wherein she alleged that she 6entered into and signed the <oint etition as the onl" means b" which she could have immediate custod" of the minor children who are all below the age of F,8 and thereafter pra"ed that she be considered relieved of the agreement pertaining to the custod" and visitation of her minor children and that since all the children are now in her custod", the said custod" in her favor be confirmed pendent lite8 but the petitioner spouse opposed the said motion and moved to dismiss the complaint based, among other things, on the grounds of res %udicata and lis pendens in which the <2&' issued an order dismissing the case. !he respondent spouse interposed an appeal to the ', wherein she raised, among others, the issue of validit" or legalit" of the compromise agreement in connection onl" with the custod" of their minor children. ', certified the said appeal to the *' since no hearing on the facts was ever held in the court below P no evidence, testimonial or documentar", presented P onl" a )uestion of law tends resolution in the appeal.8

111

!he respondent spouse likewise filed a motion for reconsideration of the compromise %udgment rendered b" the '@I, wherein she also alleged, among others, that she entered into a %oint petition as the onl" means b" which she could have immediate custod" of her minor children and to relieve her from the said agreement. !he petitioner spouse opposed the said motion and filed a motion for execution of the compromised %udgment in which the '@I denied the respondent spouse0s motion for reconsideration and granted the petitioner spouse0s motion for execution. !he respondent spouse interposed an appeal to the ', wherein she likewise )uestioned the validit" or legalit" of her agreement with the petitioner spouse respecting custod" of their children. !he court of ,ppeals also certified the said appeal to the *' since no evidence of an" kind was introduced before the trial court and appellant did not specificall" ask to be allowed to present evidence on her behalf.8 !he respondent spouse also instituted certiorari proceedings before the ', averring that the '@I committed grave abuse of discretion and acted in the excess of %urisdiction in ordering the immediate execution of the compromised %udgment, thus in effect depriving her of the right to appeal. *he pra"ed for >1? the issuance of a writ of preliminar" in%unction en%oining the respondents therein and an" person acting under them from enforcing, b" contempt proceeding and other means, the writ of execution >(? the setting aside, after hearing, of the compromise %udgment and >;? the awarding of the custod" of :nri)ue and .aria !eresa to her, their mother. ,s pra"ed for, the ', issued an ex parte writ of preliminar" in%unction and grant the petition for certiorari and declaring null and void both >a? the compromise %udgment dated ,pril (F, 11D; in so far as it relates to custod" and right of visitation over the two children, :nri)ue and !eresa, and >b? the order dated <une ((, 11D; for execution of said %udgment. !he petitioner spouse moved to reconsider, but his motion for reconsideration was denied b" the ',.

ISSUE #hether the compromise agreement entered into b" the parties and the %udgment of the '@I grounded on the said agreement, are conformable to law. RULING *upreme 'ourt holds that the compromise agreement and the %udgment of the '@I grounded on the said agreement are valid with respect to the separation of propert" of the spouses and the dissolution of the con%ugal partnership. !he law allows separation of propert" of the spouses and the dissolution of their con%ugal partnership provided %udicial sanction is secured beforehand. !hus, the new 'ivil 'ode provides5 6n the a"sence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of propert "etween spouses during the marriages shall not ta+e place save in virtue of a .udicial order. /Art. (%D1

11(

!he hus"and and the wife ma agree upon the dissolution of the con.ugal partnership during the marriage, su".ect to .udicial approval. All the creditors of the hus"and and of the wife, as well as the con.ugal partnership, so that an creditors ma appear at the hearing to safeguard his interest. Epon approval of the petition for dissolution of the con.ugal partnership, the court shall ta+e such measures as ma protect the creditors and other third persons. /Art. (%(, par. 41 In the case at bar, the spouses obtained %udicial imprimatur of their separation of propert" and the dissolution of their con%ugal partnership. It does not appeal that the" have creditors who will be pre%udiced b" the said arrangements. It is likewise undisputed that the court have been separated in fact for at least five "ears P the wife0s residence being in .anila, and the husband0s in the con%ugal home in /acolod 'it". !herefore, inasmuch as the length" separation has supervened between them, the propriet" of severing their financial and proprietar" interests is manifest. 4owever, in so approving the regime of separation of propert" of the spouses and the dissolution of their con%ugal partnership, this court does not thereb" accord recognition to nor legalized the de facto separation of the spouses, which gain in the language of Arro o vs. 7as5ue8 de Arro o , is a state which is abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all concerned. #e would like to douse the monetar" seething emotions of couples who, at the slightest ruffling of domestic tran)uilit" brought about b" mere austerit" of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of language, a want of civil attention and accommodation, even occasional sallies of passion8 without more would be minded to separate from each other. In this %urisdiction, the husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelit", and render mutual help and support >art. 171, new civil code?. !here is therefore, virtue in making it as difficult as possible for married couples impelled b" no better cause than their whims and caprices to abandon each other0s compan". # . CHI MING TSOI vs. CA a38 GINA LAOCTSOI G. R. No. 11"1"/ Ja32a%1 1 * 1""0 FACTS 4erein petitioner 'hi .ing !soi and herein private respondent Gina Aao$!soi got married on .a" ((, 11EE at the .anila 'athedral in Intramuros, .anila. ,fter the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the *outh Cilla .akati, the" went and proceeded to the house of the former0s mother where the slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life. !hereafter, the" went to baguio for four da"s but still no sexual intercourse transpired between then since the petitioner avoided the respondent, from ma" ((, 11EE to march 1G,1111, the parties slept together in the same room and on the same bed but within the said period of time, there was no attempt of an" sexual intercourse between them. In line with the same, the" submitted themselves for medical examinations to a urologist where the respondent was found to be health", normal and still a virgin while that of her husband0s result were kept confidential.
11;

&espondent filed a petition for annulment of their marriage on the ground of s"chological Incapacit". *he insist that petitioner is impotent and is a closet homosexual, moreover, she avers that he onl" married her, a @ilipino citizen, to ac)uire or maintain his residenc" status in the countr" and to publicl" maintain the appearance of a normal man. #ith this, she is not willing to reconcile with her husband. O9 the other hand, petitioner sa"s that he does not want his marriage with his wife to be annulled, while he admits that since their marriage until their separation, there was no sexual contact between them, he alleges that this was due to the avoidance on the part of his wife, that he forced his wife to have sex with him onl" once but he did not continue as she was "oung and that there is still a chance for them to overcome their differences. 'onse)uentl", the trial court rendered a decision declaring their marriage COI2, the same was affirmed on appeal b" the ', and the same goes with that his motion for reconsideration. 4ence, this petition. ISSUE #hether or not etitioner and &espondent0s marriage was validl" decreed to have been COI2 on the ground of s"chological Incapacit". RULING 3es. !he declaration of the parties marriage to be Coid of the ground of ps"chological incapacit" was valid as the refusal of one of the parties to fulfill their essential marital obligation is e)uivalent to ps"chological incapacit". One of the essential marital obligations under the @amil" 'ode is 6 !o procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.8 'onstant non$fulfillment of this obligation will finall" destro" the integrit" or wholeness of the marriage. I9 the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is e)uivalent to ps"chological incapacit". .oreover, neither the trial court nor the respondent court has made a findings on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. !he fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. ,t an" rate, since the action to declare the marriage void ma" be filed b" either part", even the ps"chologicall" incapacitated, the )uestion of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial. It shows that there is absence of empath" between petitioner and private respondent, which is a shared feeling between husband and wife must be experienced not onl" having spontaneous sexual intimac" but a deep sense of spiritual communion. .arital +nion is two$wa" process. ,n expressive interest in each other0s feelings at the time it is needed b" the other can go a long wa" in deepening the marital relationship. .arriage
11=

is definitel" not for children but for two to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution. #0. NANC: GO* e7 a'. vs. COURT OF A--EALS G. R. No. 11)0"1 Ma1 ("* 1"""0 FACTS rivate respondent spouses 4ermogenes and <ane Ong were married on <une F, 11E1, in 2umaguete 'it". !he video coverage of the wedding was provided b" petitioners at the contract price of 1,DG7.77. !hree times thereafter, the newl"weds tried to claim the video tape of their wedding, which the" planned to show to their relatives in the +nited *tates where the" were to spend their hone"moon, and thrice the" failed because the tape was apparentl" not "et processed. !he parties then agreed that the tape would be read" upon private respondent0s return. #hen private respondents came home from their hone"moon, however, the" found out that the tape had been erased b" petitioners and therefore, could no longer be delivered. @urious at the loss the tape which was supposed to be onl" record od their wedding, private respondents a complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioners before the &egional !rial 'ourt declaring defendants ,lex Go and 9anc" Go %ointl" and severall" liable to plaintiffs 4ermogenes Ong and <ane Ong. 2issatisfied with the decision, petitioner elevated the case to the 'ourt of ,ppeals which dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial court0s decision.

ISSUE #hether or not the trial and appellate courts erred in holding the petitioner %ointl" and severall" liable with his wife 9anc" regarding the pecuniar" liabilities imposed. RULING ,ffirmative. +nder ,rticle 11F of the 'ivil 'ode > now ,rticle F; of the @amil" code?, the wife ma" exercise an" profession, occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband. I9 the instant case, we are convinced that it was onl" petitioner 9anc" Go who entered into the contract with private respondent. 'onse)uentl", we rule that she is solel" liable to private respondents for the damages awarded below, pursuant to the principle that contracts produced effect onl" as between the parties who execute them. #+. MILAGROS JOAQUINO vs. LOURDES RE:ES G. R. No. 1#) )# J2'1 1!* (//)
11G

FACTS etitioner .ilagros /. <oa)uino had an illicit affair with the deceased &odolfo ,. &e"es, with whom she bore three >;? children. !he sub%ect propert" located in /f 4omes, arana)ue was bought b" &odolfo &e"es and the petitioner, while in a common$law relationship, through a loan from the 'ommonwealth Insurance compan" pa"able in ten >17? "ears. On <anuar" (;, 11E(, herein respondent Aourdes &e"es filed a complaint for reconve"ance and damages before the '@I of &izal, claiming that as a legitimate spouse of &odolfo &e"es, the sub%ect propert" should be declared part of the con%ugal propert". !he trial court rendered a decision in favor of Aourdes which was affirmed b" the 'ourt of ,ppeals. !he 'ourt of ,ppeals likewise found that the trial court should not have resolved the issue of the filiations and successional rights of petitioner0s children since the complaint was an ordinar" civil action for reconve"ance and damages. 4ence, the present petition where the petitioners avers that the trial court correctl" ruled on the issue of filiations of her children, but erred in finding that the sub%ect propert" was con%ugal. ISSUE 1. #hether or not the sub%ect propert" I con%ugal (. #hether or not the rulings on filiations and successional rights of the petitioner0s children were proper. RULING !he petition is 2enied. ,ll properties ac)uired during the marriage are presumed to be con%ugal, absent an" proof that the same were exclusive properties of the husband or the wife. .atters relating to successional rights of filiations and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisel" for the purpose of determining such rights. 1. 3es, under ,rticle 1=Gof the 'ivil 'ode of the hilippines, a con%ugal partnership of gains >' G? is created upon marriage and last until the legal union is dissolves b" death, annulment, legal separation or %udicial separation of propert". 'on%ugal properties are b" owned in common b" the husband and wife. ,s to what constitute such properties are laid down in ,rticles 1G; of the 'ivil 'ode which provides 5 6 >1? !hat which is ac)uired b" onerous title during the marriages at the expense of the common fund, whether the ac)uisition be for the partnership, or for onl" one spouseH >(? !hat which obtained b" industr", or work, or as a salar" of the spouse, or either of themH >;? the fruits, rents or interest received or due during the marriage, coming from the common propert" or from the exclusive propert" of each spouse.8 .oreover, under ,rticle 1D7 of the 'ode, all the properties of the marriage, unless proven to pertain to husband, or the wife exclusivel", are presumed to belong to the ' G. (. 9o, it has been ruled that matters relating to the rights of filiations and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisel" for
11D

the purpose of determining such rights. *ustaining the appellate court in Aglipa vs. #alang, this court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent0s estate could not be ad%udicated in an ordinar" civil action which, as in this case, was for the recover" of propert". #". ERLINDA A. AGA-A: vs. CARLINA V. -ALANG G. R. No. 11 + J2'1 (+* 1""0 FACTS *ometime on <ul" 1D, 11=1, .iguel alang contracted his first marriage with private respondent 'arlina Callesterol at the zorrubio &oman 'atholic church in angasinan. !he" begot a child named 4erminia alang. , few months after the wedding .iguel left to work in 4awaii and returned in 11G= for a "ear. 4is next visit to the hilippines was in 11D= and during the entire duration of his "ear$long so%ourn he sta"ed in Qambales with his brother, not in angasinan with his wife and child. On <ul" 1G, 11F;, the then D;$"ear old .iguel contracted his second marriage with a 11$"ear old :rlinda ,gapa" herein petitioner. 4owever, two months earlier, on .a" 1F,11F; .iguel and :rlinda, as evidence, of 2eed of *ale, %ointl" purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at *an @elipe, /inalonan angasinan with an area of 17,7E7 s).m. 'onse)uentl", !'! 9o. 171F;D covering said rice land was issued in their names. , house and lot in /inalonan, pangasnan was likewise purchased on *eptember (;, 11FG, allegedl" b" :rlinda as the sole vendee. !'! no. 1=;1(7 covering said propert" was later issued in her name. .iguel and :rlnda0s cohabitation produced a son Tristopher alang born on 2ecember D,11FF. In 1111 .iguel and :rlinda were convicted of concubinage upon 'arlina0s complaint. !wo "ears later, .iguel died. 4erein private respondent 'arlina alang and her daughter 4erminia alang de la 'rus, instituted the case at bar an action for recover" of ownership and possession with damages against :rlinda ,gapa". ISSUE #hether or not :linda0s ownership of the two parcels of land ac)uired during the cohabitation with .iguel is valid. RULING 9o. #hile :rlinda and .iguel contracted a marriage on <ul" 1G, 11F;, said union was patentl" void because the earlier marriage of .iguel and 'arlina was still subsisting and unaffected b" the latter0s de facto separation. +nder ,rticle 1=E, onl" the properties ac)uired b" both of the parties through their actual %oint contribution of mone", propert" or industr" shall be owned b" them in common in proportion to their respective
11F

contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is re)uired b" this provision, in contrast to ,rticle 1=F which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the famil" and household, are regarded as contributions to the ac)uisition of common propert" b" one who has no salar" or income or work or industr". If the actual contribution of the part" is not proved, there will be no co$ownership and no presumption of e)ual shares. /. CIRILA ARCA,A vs. ERLINDA TA,ANCURA VDA. DE ,ATOCAEL G. R. No. 1) +! Nove56e% ((* (//1 FACTS @rancisco 'omille and his wife *ozima .ontallano become the registered owner of Aot 9o. =;F$, located at the corner of 'alle *anta &osa in 2ipolog 'it", Qamboanga del 9orte. ,fter the death of *ozima, @rancisco and his mother$in$law executed a deed of extra%udicial partition with waiver of rights in which the latter waived her share consisting of one$fourth of the propert" to @rancisco. On <ul" (D, 11D1 @rancisco registered the lot in his name with the &egistr" of 2eeds. 4aving no children to take care of him after his retirement, @rancisco asked his niece Aeticia /ellosillo, the latter0s cousin Auzviminda aghacian, and petitioner 'irila ,rcaba, then a widow, to take care of his house, as well as the store inside. 'onflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between @rancisco and 'irila. Aeticia /ellosillo said @rancisco and 'irila were lovers since the" lept with the same room, while :rlinda !abancura, another niece of @rancicsco, claimed that the latter had told her that 'irila was his mistress. On the other hand, 'irila said she was a mere helper who could enter the master0s bedroom onl" when the old man asks her to and that @rancisco in an" case was too old for her. *he denied the" ever had sexual intercourse. , few months before his death, @rancisco executed an instrument denominated 6 2eed of 2onation8 Inter vivos in which he ceded a portion of lot =;F$, consisting of 1G7s).m, together with his house, to 'irila, who accepted the donation in the same instrument. @rancisco left the larger portion of (DEs).m in his name. !he deed stated that the donation was being in consideration of the faithful services 'irila ,rcaba had rendered over the past ten >17? "ears, and later registered b" 'irila as its absolute owner. ISSUE #hether or not the donation inter vivos made b" @rancisco to his common$law wife 'irila is Coid. RULING 3es. In /itangcor vs. !an, we held that the term 6cohabitation8 or 6living together as husband and wife8 means not onl" residing under one roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse. 'ohabitation, of course, means more than sexual intercourse,
11E

especiall" when one of the parties is alread" old and ma" no longer be interested in sex. ,t the ver" least, cohabitation is a public assumption b" a man and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, thereb" holding themselves out to the public as such. *ecret meetings or nights clandestinel" spent together, even if often repeated, do not constitute such kind of cohabitationH the" are merel" meretricious. In this %urisdiction, this court has considered as sufficient proof of common$law relationship the stipulations between the parties, a conviction of concubinage, or the existence of illegitimate children. #here it has been established b" preponderance of evidence that two persons lived together a husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made b" one in favor of the other is void under ,rticle EF of the @amil" 'ode.

4. O3 -%o$e%71 Re'a7&o3s a38 Co34o5&7a37 Sha%e8 O6'&9a7&o3s

1. LILI,ETH SUNGACCHAN* e7 a'. vs. CA* e7 a'. G. R. No. 1 ))/1 J23e (#* (//+ FACTS In 11FF, 'hua and <acinto *ungga formed a partnership to engage in the marketing of li)uefied petroleum gas. @or convenience, the business, pursued under the name, *hellite Gas ,ppliance 'enter >*hellite?, was registered as a sole proprietorship in the name of <acinto, albeit the partnership arrangement called for e)ual sharing of the net profit. ,fter <acinto0s death in 11E1, his widow, petitioner 'ecilia *unga, and married daughter, petitioner Ailibeth *ungga$'han, continued with the business without 'hua0s consent 'hua0s subse)uent repeated demands for accounting and winding up went unheeded, prompting him to file a complaint for =inding up of a partnership Affairs, Accounting, appraisal and -ecover of Shares and Damages with =rit of #reliminar Attachment of the &!' in *indangan, Qamboanga del 9orte. ,fter trial, the &!' rendered %udgment finding for 'hua, as plaintiff a )uo. !he &!'0s decision would subse)uentl" be upheld b" the ',. Cia an Order dated <anuar"1D, (77(, the &!' granted 'hua0s motion for execution. Over a month later, the &!' acting on another motion of 'hua, issued an amended writ of execution. It seems, however, that the amended writ of execution could not be immediatel" implemented, for, in an omnibus motion, 'hua , inter alia, asked the trial court to commission a certified public accountant >' ,? to undertake the accounting work and inventor" of the partnership assets if petitioners refuse to do it within the time set b" the court. 'hua later moved to withdraw his motion and instead ask the admission of an accounting report prepared b" ' , 'her"l ,. Gahuman. In the report under the heading, 'omputation of 'laims,8 'hua0s aggregate claim, arrived at using the
111

compounding$of$interest method, amounted to hp 1=,(FF,;==.1=. *ubse)uentl", the &!' admitted and approved the computation of claims in view of petitioner0s failure and refusal, despite notice, to appear and submit an accounting report on winding uo of the partnership on the schedule hearings. ,fter another length" proceedings, petitioners submitted their own ' ,$certified valuation and accounting report. In it, petitioners limited 'hua0s entitlement from winding up partnership affairs to an aggregate amount of h ;,1G=,F;D.DG onl". 'hua, on the other hand, submitted a new computation, this time appl"ing simple interest on the various items covered b" his claim. +nder this methodolog", 'hua0s aggregate claim went down to h E,F;;,D==.FG. !he &!' issued a &esolution, re%ecting the accounting of report of petitioners submitted, while approving the new computation of claims 'hua submitted. ISSUE #hether or not the absolute communit" of propert" of spouses Ailibeth *unga$'han with her husband 9orberto 'han can be lawfull" made to answer for the liabilit" of Ailibeth *unga$'han. RULING !he records show that spouses *unga$'han and 9orberto were married on @ebruar" =, 111(, or after the affectivit" of the @amil" 'ode on ,ugust ;, 11EE. #ithal, their absolute communit" propert" ma" be held liable for the obligations contracted b" either spouse. *pecificall", ,rt. 1= of said 'ode pertinentl" provides5 ,rt. 1=. !he absolute communit" propert" shall be liable for5 >(? ,ll debts and obligations contracted during the marriage b" the designated administrator$spouse for the benefit of the communit", or b" both spouses, or b" one spouse with the consent of the other. >;? 2ebts and obligations contracted b" either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the famil" ma" have been benefited. ,bsent an" indication otherwise, th use and appropriation b" petitioner *unga$chan of the assets of *hellite even after the business was discontinued on ma" ;7, 111( ma" reasonabl" be considered to have been used for her and her husband0s benefit. (. CORAZON G. RUIZ vs. CA a38 CONSUELO TORRES G. R. No. 1) ")( A$%&' ((* (//! FACTS etitioner &uiz obtained four loans from private respondent 'onsuelo !orres on different occasion. rior to their maturit", the loans were consolidated under one >1? promissor" note dated .arch ((, 111G. !he consolidated loan of FG7,777.77 was secured b" a real estate mortgage and registered in the name of petitioner. !he mortgage was signed b" 'orazon &uiz for herself as an attorne"$in$fact of her husband &ogello. !hereafter, petitioner obtained three >;? more loans from private respondent, under promissor" note. @rom ,pril 111G to .arch 111D, petitioner paid the stipulated
1(7

;O monthl" interest on the FG7,777.77 loan, but after .arch 111D, petitioner was unable to make interest pa"ments. 2ue to petitioner0s failure to pa" the principal loan of FG7,777.77 as well as the interest pa"ment, so private respondent demanded pa"ment thereof. /ut when petitioner failed to pa", private respondent sought the extra$%udicial foreclosure of the aforementioned real estate mortgage. 9ow, the public auction was schedule on Oct. E,111D. One >1? da" before the schedule auction sale, petitioner filed a complaint with the &!' of R', with a pra"er for the issuance of a !&O to en%oin the sheriff from proceeding with the foreclosure sale and to fix her indebtedness to private respondent to F7D,777.77. the trial court granted the pra"er for the issuance of a !&O, and on (1 October, 111D, issued a preliminar" in%unction. In its decision dated .a" 11, 111F, it ordered the 'lerk of court and :x$ Officio *heriff to desist with the foreclosure sale of the sub%ect propert", and it made permanent the writ of preliminar" in%unction. It held that the real estate mortgage is unenforceable because of the lack of participation and signature of petitioner0s husband. It noted that although the sub%ect real estate mortgage stated that petitioner was 6 attorne"$in$fact for herself and her husband, the *pecial ower of ,ttorne" was never presented in the court during trial. !he trial court further held that the promissor" note in )uestion is a unilateral contract of adhesion drafted b" private respondent. It struck down the contract as repugnant to public polic" because it was imposed b" a dominant bargaining part" >private respondent? on a weaker part" >petitioner?. 9evertheless, it held that petitioner still has the obligation to pa" the private respondent. rivate respondent0s motion for reconsideration was denied in an order dated <ul" (1,111F. rivate respondent appealed to the ',. !he appellate court set aside the decision of the trial court. It ruled that the real estate mortgage is valid despite the non$participation of petitioner0s husband in its execution because the land on which it was constituted is paraphernal propert" of petitioner$wife. 'onse)uentl", she ma" encumber the lot without the consent of her husband. It allowed its foreclosure since the loan its secured was not paid. 9onetheless, the appellate court declared as invalid the 17O compounded monthl" interest and the 17O surcharge per month stipulated in the promissor" notes, and o too the 1O compounded monthl" interest stipulated in the promissor" note dated (1 ,pril 111G, for being excessive, ini)uitous, unconscionable, and contrar" to morals. It held that the legal rate of interest of 1(O per annun shall appl" the maturit" dates of the notes until full pa"ment of the entire amount due and that the onl" permissible rate of surcharge is 1O per month, without compounding. ISSUE #hether the real propert" covered b" the sub%ect deed of mortgage dated .arch (7, 111G is paraphernal propert" of petitioner. RULING 3es. !he presumption under ,rticle 11D of the @amil" 'ode that properties ac)uired during the marriage are presumed to be con%ugal cannot appl" in the instant case. /efore such presumption can appl", it must first be established that the propert" was in
1(1

fact ac)uired during the marriage. In other words, proof of ac)uisition during the marriage is a condition sine )ua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of con%ugal ownership. 9o such proof was offered nor presented in the case at bar. !hus, on the basis alone of the certificate of title, it cannot be presumed that said propert" was ac)uired during the marriage and that it is con%ugal propert". *ince there I no showing as to when the propert" in )uestion was ac)uired, the fact that the title is in the name of the wife alone I determinative of its nature as paraphernal, belonging exclusivel" to said spouse. !. JOSE-HINE ,. ,ELCODERO vs. COURT OF A--EALS G. R. No. +" 0 O47o6e% (/* 1""! FACTS *ometime on <ul"(F, 11(F, ala"o /osing married <uliana Oda", with whom he had three >;? children, namel" @lora, !eresita, and Gaido. In 11=D, he left the con%ugal home and he forewith started to live instead with <osefa &ivera with whom he later begot one child, named <osephine /osing, now <osephine /alcodero. !hree "ears later, ,la"o purchased a parcel of land on installment basis from the .agdallena :state, Inc. In the deed he indicated his civil status as married to <osefa &. /osing the common$law wife. In a letter in which he addressed to .agdallena :state, Inc. he authorized the latter to transfer the lot in the name of his wife <osefa &. /osing. !he final deed of sale was executed b" .agdallena :state Inc, on October (=, 11G1. , few da"s later !'! 9o. =EF17 was issued in the name of <osefa /osing. On <une D, 11GE, ,la"o married <osefa even while his prior marriage with <uliana was still subsisting. ,la"o died sometime on .arch 11DF. ,bout three "ears later <osefa and <osephine executed a document of extra %udicial partition and sale of a lot in )uestion, which was there described as 6con%ugal propert" of <osefa and deceased ,la"o. In the deed <osefa0s supposed one$half >1/(? interest as surviving spouse of ,la"o, as well as her Z interest as heir was conve"ed to <osephine for a consideration, thereb" completing for herself, along with her own one$fourth >1/=? interest as the surviving child of ,la"o, a full ownership of propert". ISSUE #hether or not the propert" in )uestion can be reconve"ed. RULING 3es. !he propert" remained as belonging to the con%ugal partnership of ,la"o and his legitimate wife <uliana. +nder both the new 'ivil 'ode >,rticle 1D7? and the old 'ivil 'ode >,rticle 1=7F?, 6all propert" of the marriage is presumed to belong to the con%ugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusivel" to the husband or to the wife.8 !his presumption has not been convincingl" rebutted.

1((

,s regards the propert" relations between common$law spouses, article 1== of the 'ivil 'ode merel" codified the law established through %udicial precedents under the old code >.argaret .axe" vs. ',?. In both regimes, the co$ownership rule had more than once been repudiated when either or both spouses suffered from an impediment to marr" ><eroniza vs. <ose?. !he present provisions under ,rticle 1=F and ,rticle 1=E of the @amil" code did not much deviate from the old rulesH in an" case, its provisions cannot appl" to this case without interdicting prior vested rights>,rticle (GD,@'?. ). MARIANO ADRIANO vs. COURT OF A--EALS G. R. No. 1()11+ Ma%4h (0* (/// FACTS Aucio ,driano, also known as ,mbrocio ,driano, married Gliceria 2orado on October (1,11;;. Out of their lawful marriage, the" had three children, namel" 'elestina, .anolo, and ,ida, private respondents in this case. *ometime in 11=( or prior thereto, Aucio and Gliceria separated and the latter settled in &izal, Aaguna where she died on <une 11, 11DE. ,lso in 11=( or even earlier, Aucio cohabited with Cicenta Cilla, with whom he had eight children. ,ll his children b" Cicenta Cila are the named petitioners in the instant case. On 9ovember ((,11DE, or five months after the death of Gliceria, Aucio married Cicenta. Aucio and Cicenta and their children lived in 'andelaria, Ruezon until spouses separated in 11F(. On October 17, 11E7, Aucio executed a last will and testament disposing of all his properties, and assigning, among others, his second wife Cicenta and all his children b" his first and second marriages as devisees and legatees therein. On @ebruar" 11, 11E1, Aucio died and private respondent 'elestina ,driano, who was instituted in AucioHs will as its executrix, filed a petition for the probate of the will of before the &!' of Aucena 'it". ,fter due hearing and despite the Opposition filed b" Cicenta, the &!' allowed the probate of the will and directed the issuance of letters testamentar" to petitioner$ executrix 'elestina ,driano. #hile the proceedings for settlement of estate were pending before the &!', on ,ugust 1F, 11EE, petitioner0 instituted an action for annulment of Aucio ,driano0s will. In the complaint, plaintiffs$petitioners alleged that before the marriage of Aucio and their mother Cicenta, the two lived together as husband and wife and as such ac)uired properties which became the sub%ect inventor" and administration in *pec. ro. 9o. ===(. laintiffs claimed that the properties be)ueathed in Aucio0s will are undivided 6civil partnership and/or con%ugal properties of Aucio ,driano and Cincenta Cilla,8 and thus, the will sought to be probated should be declared void and ineffective insofar as it disposes of the rightful share or properties of Cicenta. ISSUE
1(;

#hether or not there exist a co$ownership of propert" between Aucio and Cicenta during their period of cohabitation before their marriage. RULING etitioner0s insistence that a co$ownership of properties existed between Aucio and Cicenta during their period of cohabitation before their marriage in 11DE is without lawful basis considering that Aucio0s marriage with Gliceria was still subsisting. !he co$ ownership in ,rticle 1== of the civil code re)uires that the man and woman living together as husband and wife without the benefit marriage must not in an" wa" be incapacitated to marr". 'onsidering that the propert" was ac)uired in 11D=, or while Aucio0s marriage with Gliceria subsisted, such propert" is presumed to be con%ugal unless it be proved that it pertains exclusivel" to the husband or to the wife. !hus, we ruled in #isueFa vs. <eirs of #etra Enating and A5uilino 7illar that the prima pacie presumption that properties ac)uired during the marriage are con%ugal cannot prevail over a court0s specific finding reached in adversarial proceedings to the contrar". !hus, in /alcodero vs. 'ourt of ,ppeal, we held that propert" ac)uired b" a man while living with a common$law wife during the subsistence of his marriage is con%ugal propert", even when the propert" was titled in the name of the common$law wife. In such cases, a constructive trust is deemed to have been created b" operation of ,rticle 1=GD of the 'ivil 'ode over the propert" which lawfull" pertains to the con%ugal partnership of the subsisting marriage.

#. VICENTE VILLARANDA vs. ANA MARIA VILLARANDA G. R. No. 1#!))0 Fe6%2a%1 (!* (//) FACTS Cecente >petitioner? and 4onorio >private respondent? were brothers. 4onorio is the husband of ,na .aria. On <ul" D, 11FD, Cencete and 4onorio executed a deed of exchange. +nder this instrument, Cecente agreed to conve" his D=. (( s). meters to 4onorio in exchange for a G77 s). meters propert" in 'aga"an de Oro. ,fter the execution of the instrument, 4onorio took possession of the D=.(( s). meters land and constructed a building thereon. , "ear later, 4onorio filed with &!' for specific performance against Cecente that 4onorio could not full" use or identif" and delineate his undivided G77 s). meters portion of the propert". 4e asked the court to compel Cecente to do so, as well as to conve" to him the D=.(( s). m. lot in compliance with his obligations under the deed. 2uring the trial, the petitioner argued that the 2eed of :xchange is void as, under the @amil" 'ode, a con%ugal propert" cannot be disposed of without the consent of the other spouse. *ince, 4onorio0s wife did not sign the said deed of exchange, the same is null and void.

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!he &!' ruled in favor of the respondent. certiorari with *'.

etitioner filed a petition for review on

ISSUE #hether or not the contention of petitioner is correct. RULING 9O. !he law which is applicable in the case is the 'ivil 'ode and not the @amil" 'ode as the contract was executed before the effectivit" of the @amil" 'ode. !he law should be applied prospectivel" onl", unless a legislation to give them retroactive effect is expressl" declared or is necessaril" implied from the language used. +nder the 'ivil 'ode Jart. 1DD in relation to art. 1F;K, husband cannot alienate or encumber an" real propert" of the con%ugal partnership without the wife0s consent. ,27 a3 a47&o3 7o a332' o% a'&e3a7e o% e34256e% 5a1 6e &3s7&727e8 61 7he w&<e 82%&39 7he 5a%%&a9e a38 w&7h&3 1/ 1ea%s <%o5 7he 7%a3sa47&o3 ?2es7&o3e8. /ut the lack of consent on her part will not make the husband0s alienation or encumbrance of real propert" of the con%ugal partnership void, but voidable. 4ence, the deed is valid until annulled. . GSIS vs. MELAGROS MONTESCLAROS G. R. No. 1) )") J2'1 1)* (//) FACTS 9icolas is a *angguniang /a"an member. On <ul" 17, 11E;, he got married with .ilagros. On <anuar" =, 11EG, 9icolas filed with the G*I* an application for retirement effective @ebruar" 1E, 11EG. In his application, he designated .ilagros as his sole beneficiar". 4is application was approved b" the G*I* effective <anuar" 1F, 11E=. 4e was granted a lump sum pa"ment of annuit" for the first G "ears and monthl" annuit" thereafter. 4owever, on ,pril ((, 111(, 9icolas died. 4ence, .ilagros filed with G*I* a claim for survivorship pension under 2 11=D. /ut the G*I* denied this claim on the ground that the law J 2 11=DK does not allow a surviving spouse the right to survivorship pension if the marriage was contracted less than ; "ears before the pensioner )ualified for pension. .ilagros filed a special civil action for declarator" relief with the &!'. !he &!' ruled that5 1. .ilagros is eligible for survivorship pension and ordered G*I* to pa" .ilagros the benefits due including interest. !hat under article 11G and 11F of the @amil" 'ode, retirement benefits are propert" ac)uired b" the pensioner through labor, such benefits are belonging to the con%ugal propert"H and (. that the prohibition in section 2 11=D are deemed repealed b" the @amil" 'ode. G*I* appealed to the ',. /ut ', affirmed the decision of the &!'. 4ence, G*I* petition to *'. ISSUE #hether or not the retirement benefits are part of the con%ugal propert".
1(G

RULING 3:*. , widow0s right to receive pension following the demise of her husband is also part of the husband0s contractual compensation. In a pension plan where :: participation is mandator", the prevailing view is that ::s have contractual or vested rights in the pension where the pension is part of the terms of emplo"ment. !he reason for providing retirement benefits is to compensate service to the government. &etirement benefits to government ::s are part of emolument to encourage and retain )ualified ::s in the government service. 0. A:ALA INVESTMENT AND DEV@T COR-. vs. CA G. R. No. 11+!/# Fe6%2a%1 1(* 1""+ FACTS !he private respondent is the executive vice$president of hilippine /looming .ills Inc. > /.I?. !he controvers" started when /.I obtained a loan from ,"ala. ,s suret" of the loan, private respondent made himself %ointl" and solidaril" liable with /.I0s indebtedness to ,"ala. /.I failed to pa" the loan. 4ence, ,"ala filed a case of collection of sum of mone". !he trial court rendered order in favor of ,"ala. 4ence, the con%ugal properties of the private respondent were levied and auctioned. rivate respondent filed an in%unction to en%oin the auction on the ground that said loan did not redound to the benefit of the con%ugal partnership. 4owever, while the case was pending, the public auction was held. !he sub%ect propert" was awarded to ,"ala as the highest bidder. ,nd, a certificate of sale was issued to ,"ala after the expiration of the redemption period. 4ence, ,"ala filed a motion to dismiss the said in%unction case b" private respondent based on moot and academic because of the consummation of the sale. /ut the trial court denied the motion and declared that sale on execution as null and void. ,"ala went to ',. /ut the ', affirmed the trial court0s decision. ,"ala, now petitioner, went to *' and argued5 >1? there is no need to prove that actual benefit redounded to the benefit of the partnershipH >(? that the loan procured b" private respondent was for the advancement and benefit of the con%ugal propert" because emplo"ment of private respondent would be prolong, and his prestige in the corporation would be enhanced and his career would be boosted should /.I survive because of the loan. ISSUE #hether or not petitioner0s contention is correct. RULING 9O. @or con%ugal partnership to be liable * 7he 6e3e<&7 52s7 6e o3e 8&%e47'1 %es2'7&39 <%o5 7he 'oa3. It cannot merel" be a b"$product or a spin$off of the loan itself. !here must be showing of some advantage which clearl" accrued to the welfare of the spouses or benefits to his famil" or that such obligations are productive of some benefit to the famil". 4owever, the petitioner failed to show this.
1(D

!he benefit contemplated b" the exception in article 1((, @' is the benefit derived from the use of the loan. In the case at bar, the loan is a corporate loan extended to /.I and not b" the private respondent or his famil". 4ence, if the mone" or services are given to another person or entit" and the husband acted onl" as a suret" or guarantor, that contract cannot, b" itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the con%ugal partnership. !he contract of loan or services is clearl" for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the suret" or his famil". +. AFREDO CHING vs. COURT OF A--EALS G. R. No. 1() )( Fe6%2a%1 (!* (//) FACTS ,lfredo 'hing is an executive vice$president of hilippine /looming .ills 'omapan", Inc. J /.'IK. ,s a suret" for the loan b" /.'I from ,llied /anking 'orporation J,/'K, he executed a promissor" note. /ut /.'I defaulted in the pa"ment of the loan. 4ence, ,/' filed a complaint with &!' for sum of mone" w&7h $%a1e% <o% a w%&7 o< $%e'&5&3a%1 a77a4h5e37 a9a&3s7 -,MCI and impleaded ,lfredo 'hing as co$defendant in his capacit" as suret". !he &!' granted the pra"er for writ of preliminar" attachment. 4ence, the trial court0s sheriff levied the petitioner 'hings 177,777 shares of 'it"cop stocks which were registered in the name of ,lfredo 'hing. :nacarncion 'hing, assisted b" her husband ,lfredo 'hing, filed a motion to )uash on the lev" of attachment on the 177, 777 shares of 'it"corp stock. *he argued that the said shares were ac)uired using their con%ugal funds, as such it belongs to the con%ugal properties. !hat she has the right to file the motion to )uash as co$owner of said shares. !he &!' ruled in favor of the 'hing0s. !hus, ,/' went to ',. !he ', reversed the &!'0s decision. It ruled that the presumption in article 1D7 in the 9ew 'ivil 'ode shall not appl" if the petitioner spouses failed to prove the source of the mone" used to ac)uire the shares of stocks. 4ence, &!' erred in its ruling as the levied stock belonged to ,lfredo as evidence b" the fact that the said shares were registered in the corporate books of 'it"corp solel" in his name. 4ence, petitioner spouses to *'. !he" averred5 1. !he source of funds in the ac)uisition of the levied shares of stocks is not the controlling factor when invoking the presumption of the con%ugal nature of stocks under article 1D7, (. !hat such presumption subsists even if the propert" is registered onl" in the name of one of the spouses. ISSUE #hether or not petitioners0 contention is correct. RULING
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3:*. ,rticle 1D7 of the 9ew 'ivil 'ode provides that all the properties ac)uired during the marriage are presumed to belong to the con%ugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusivel" to the husband, or to the wife. It is not even necessar" to prove that the properties were ac)uired with funds of the partnership. ,s long as the properties were ac)uired b" the parties during the marriage, the" are presumed to be con%ugal in nature. In fact, even when the manner in which the properties were ac)uired does not appear, the presumption will still appl", and the properties will still be considered con%ugal. !he presumption of the con%ugal nature of the properties ac)uired during the marriage subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactor" and convincing evidence to overcome the same. In this case, the evidence adduced b" the petitioners in the &!' is that the 177,777 shares of stocks in the 'it"corp were issued to and registered in its corporate books in the name of the petitioner$husband when the said corporation was incorporated. !his was done during the subsistence of the marriage of the petitioner$ spouses. !he shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the con%ugal partnership propert" of the petitioners. ". -ROCO-IO VILLANUEVA V. COURT OF A--EALS G. R. No. 1)!(+ A$%&' 1)* (//) FACTS On 11(D, :usebia &etu"a was legall" married with 9icolas &etu"a. 2uring their marriage, the" ac)uired real properties. On 11=G, 9icolas no longer lived with his legitimate famil". Instead, he cohabited with the petitioner acita Cillanueva, wherein, rocopio Cillanueva is their illegitimate son. @rom the time she started living in concubinage with 9icolas, acita Cillanueva has no occupation. 9icolas then was the onl" one who received the income of the )uestioned properties. 9icolas suffered a stroke. 4e could no longer talk and walk. 4ence, rocopio was the one who was receiving the income the )uestioned properties since then. :usebia filed a suit for reconve"ance of said properties. etitioner Cillanueva argued that the )uestioned properties are exclusive properties of 9icolas. /ut the &!' ruled in favor of :usebia. It ruled that the presumption under article 11D of the @amil" 'ode is applicable in the sub%ect properties. !hus the &!' ruled that :usebia had proved that the sub%ect properties are con%ugal in nature and ordered rocopio and acita Cillanueva to transfer the sole administration of con%ugal properties of the spouses :sebia and 9icolas according to article 1(= of the @amil" 'ode. Cillanueva appealed to ',. /ut the ', upheld &!'0s ruling. !he ', ruled that under article 11D of the @amil" 'ode, all propert" ac)uired during the marriage, whether the ac)uisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed con%ugal unless the contrar" is proved. ISSUE #hether or not the sub%ect properties are con%ugal properties of :usebia and 9icolas.
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RULING 3:*. !he @amil" 'ode provisions on con%ugal partnerships govern the propert" relations between 9icolas and :usebia even if the" were married before the effectivit" of @amil" 'ode. ,rticle 17G of the said 'ode explicitl" mandates that the @amil" 'ode shall appl" to con%ugal partnerships established before the @amil" 'ode without pre%udice to vested rights alread" ac)uired under the 'ivil 'ode or other laws. !hus, under the @amil" 'ode, if the properties are ac)uired during the marriage, the presumption is that the" are con%ugal. !he presumption under article 11D of the @amil" 'ode is that all these are con%ugal properties of 9icolas and :usebia. !his presumption under article 11D, which subsists, unless the contrar" is proved, stands as an obstacle to an" claim the petitioners ma" have. 0/. GCTRACTORS vs. CA AND S-S. NARCISO G. R. No. #0)/( Fe6%2a%1 (+* 1"+# FACTS rivate respondent is Auis 9arciso. 4e is the husband of <osefa. 4e is engaged in business as producer and exporter of hilippine mahogan" logs and operates a logging concession. etitioner G$tractors is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of leasing heav" e)uipment such as tractors, bulldozers. 9arciso leased the tractors of the petitioner for the purpose of constructing switch roads and hauling felled tress at the %obsite of 9arciso0s logging concession. 9arciso defaulted in his rental pa"ments. 4ence, petitioner instituted an action against him to collect the said rental with interest. etitioner got a favorable %udgment. /ut 9arciso and G$tractor entered into a compromise. Auis should pa" it b" installment. /ut again, 9arciso failed to pa" it. 4ence, petitioner filed a motion for execution. !he writ of execution was issued. !he sheriff levied the properties of 9arciso. !he properties were awarded to the petitioner. /ut included in the levied properties was the residential land of the spouses. 4ence, <osefa filed a complaint for declaration of nullit" of lev" on execution and auction sale of the alleged con%ugal propert". *he argued that the %udgment against 9arciso is not con%ugal as it did not aid the con%ugal propert". !herefore, their con%ugal propert" cannot be held liable. ISSUE #hether or not the con%ugal partnership is liable for the indebtedness incurred b" the husband in the legitimate pursuit of his career or profession. RULING 9O. <osefa is not correct. !he record shows that 9arciso is a producer and exporter of hilippine .ahogan" logs and that the bulldozers leased to him was used for the construction of switch roads for logging. !herefore, that obligations were contracted in connection with his legitimate business as a producer and exporter in mahogan" logs
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and certainl" benefited the con%ugal partnership. +nder article 1D1 of the 'ivil 'ode, debts contracted b" the husband for an in the exercise of the industr" or profession b" which he contributes to the support of the famil" cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts. If he incurs an indebtedness in the legitimate pursuit of his career or profession or suffers losses in a legitimate business, the con%ugal partnership must e)uall" bear the indebtness and the losses, unless he deliberatel" acted to the pre%udice of his famil". 01. MILAGROS JOAQUIN vs. LOURDE RE:ES G. R. No. 1#) )# J2'1 1!* (//) FACTS Aourdes &e"es is the widow of &odulfo &e"es. /efore &odolfo died, he was lawfull" married to Aourdes. /ut the" separated de facto. &odolfo, despite the subsistence of his previous marriage, cohabited with .ilagros. &odulfo was receiving a monthl" income of 1G, 777 as salar". ,fter his retirement he received ;1G, 711.FE as benefits. /ut this did not go to Aourdes. Instead, the mone" went to his paramour, .ilagros. !he latter, used the said mone" in bu"ing the )uestioned propert". Aourdes sued .ilagrous for reconve"ance of the propert". /ut .ilagros argued that the funds she used to bu" the sub%ect propert" were her own. .ilagros lost in the trial court. *he went to ',. /ut the ', held that the propert" had been paid out of the con%ugal funds of &odolfo and Aourdes because it came from the salaries and earnings of &odolfo. 4ence, petitioner to the *'. ISSUE #hether or not a propert" ac)uired using the salar" and earnings of a husband and the title thereof registered in the name of the husband0s paramour belong to the con%ugal parternship. RULING 3:*. +nder article 1D7, @', all properties of the marriage, unless proven to pertain to the husband or the wife exclusivel", are personall" to belong to the con%ugal partnership of gains >' G?. @or the rebuttable presumption to arise, however, the properties must first be proven to have been ac)uired during the existence of the marriage. +nder article 1=G, 'ICIA 'O2:, a ' G is created upon marriage and lasts until the legal union is dissolved b" 2:,!4, ,99+A.:9!, A:G,A *: ,&,!IO9 or <+2I'I,A *: ,&,!IO9 O@ &O :&!3. 'on%ugal partnership are, b" law, owned in common b" the husband and wife. ,s to what constitute such properties are laid out in article 1G;, @', these are5 1. that which ac)uired b" onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the ac)uisition be for the partnership or for onl" one of the spousesH (. that which is obtained b" the industr", or work, or as salar" of the spouses, or of either of themH ;. the fruits rents or interests received or due during the marriage, coming from the common propert" or from the exclusive propert" of each spouse.
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0(. JADER MANALO vs. S-OUSES CAMAISA G. R. No. 1)0"0+ Ja32a%1 (!* (//( FACTS &espondents, spouses 9orma and :dilberto 'amaisa, advertised in the newspaper for the sale of their 17$door apartment in .akati. etitioner had read it. ,s she was interested in bu"ing the ( properties, she negotiated for the purchase. 4ence, petitioner and :dilberto agreed upon the purchase price. !he pa"ments were to be paid b" installment after a down pa"ment. /ecause the properties were the con%ugal properties of the spouses, :dilberto assured petitioner that his wife would conform and consent to the sale. 4ence, after the contract was formall" signed b" them, petitioner delivered to :dilberto two checks. !he contracts were given to :dilberto for the formal affirming of his wife0s signature. 4owever, when the" met again, 9orma refused to sign the contract. !he" backed out at the contract and the checks were returned to the petitioner. !hus, petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against the respondent. In the trial, petitioner argued that the contract of sale was alread" perfected. 4ence, 9orma should sign the said contract. /ut the &!' dismissed the case. !hus, petitioner went to ',. /ut ', affirmed the &!'. In affirming, it ruled that the sub%ect of the contracts were con%ugal properties and as such, the consent of both spouses is necessar" to give effect to the sale. *ince private respondent 9orma refused to sign the contracts, the sale was never perfected. ,nd, that the authorit" of the court to allow sale or encumbrance of a con%ugal propert" without the consent of the other spouse is applicable onl" in cases where the said spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the con%ugal propert". ISSUE #hether or not the 'ontract to *ell executed between petitioner and respondent spouses had been perfected such that the latter could no longer back out from the agreement. RULING 9O. !he properties sub%ects of the contracts in this case were con%ugal propert". 4ence, for the contracts t sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur. +nder article 1(= of the @amil" 'ode, the disposition of a con%ugal propert" b" the husband as administrator in appropriate cases re)uires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void. In the case at bar, respondent 9orma 'amaisa did not consent her written consent to the sale. /ut art. 1(=, @' should onl" bed resorted to in cases where the spouses who does not give consent is incapacitated. In this case, petitioner failed to allege and prove that
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respondent 9orma was incapacitated to give her consent to the contract. In the absence of such showing of the wife0s incapacit", court authorization cannot be sought. 0!. DAVID AND LORENZA -ELA:O vs. COURT OF A--EALS G. R. No. 1)1!(! J23e +* (//# FACTS 2avid ela"o and Aoreza are husband and wife. !heir con%ugal properties, the two parcels of agricultural land, were conve"ed erez. In the deed of absolute sale, Aerenza signed onl" on the third page in the space provided for witnesses. 4ence, erez0s application for registration of the deed with the office of the &egistr" of 2eeds >&O2? was denied. erez asked Aorenza to sign on the first and second pages of the deed. /ut she refused. 4ence, erez instituted a case against Aorenza for specific performance. !he spouses ela"o, in their answer, invoked article 1DD, @' and argued that there was no marital consent in the conve"ance of said properties as Aoreza did not give her consent. !hat it was %ust a simulated sale. !hat the deed was %ust to make it appear that the lots were sold to him > erez? in order to frighten illegal occupants of the said properties. Aorenza0s signature was intentionall" omitted so that the deed could not be registered. !hus, it was a void conve"ance. 4owever, erez argued that the lots were given to him b" the spouses as a consideration of his services as attorne"$in$fact to make the necessar" representation and negotiation with the illegal occupants therein. !hat after their relationship became sour, ela"o sent a letter to the &O2 re)uesting not to entertain an" transaction concerning the lots title. !he trial court ruled that the conve"ance was null and void as there was no marital consent. erez went to ',. ', reversed the trial court0s ruling and ruled that Aorenza, upon signing as witness to the execution of the deed, had knowledge of the transaction and is deemed to have given the consent to the same. !hus, spouse ela"o went to the *'. ISSUE #hether or not the act of Aorenza in signing in the page for the witness sufficient to constitute consent making the conve"ance of the con%ugal propert" valid. RULING 3:*. Aorenza, b" affixing her signature to the deed of sale on the space provided for witnesses, is deemed to have given the implied consent to the contract of sale. *ale is a consensual contract that is perfected b" mere consent, which ma" either be express or implied. A w&<e@s 4o3se37 7o 7he h2s6a38@s 8&s$os&7&o3 o< 4o3;29a' $%o$e%71 8oes 3o7 a'wa1s have 7o 6e e>$'&4&7 o% se7 <o%7h &3 a31 $a%7&42'a% 8o425e37* so 'o39 as &7 &s show3 61 a47s o< 7he w&<e 7ha7 s24h 4o3se37 o% a$$%ova' was &38ee8 9&ve3. In the case at bar, although it appears on the face of the deed of sale that Aorenza signed onl" as an instrument witness, circumstances leading to the execution of said document point to the fact that Aorenza was full" aware of the sale of their con%ugal propert" and consented to the sale. 0). HOMEOWNERS AND SAVINGS AND LOAN ,AND HHSL,I vs. MIGUELA DAILO
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G. R. No. 1#!+/(

Ma%4h 11* (//#

FACTS &espondent .iguela 2arailo and .arcelino 2ailo were married. !he" did not execute a marriage settlement. 2uring their marriage, the" purchased a house and lot. /ut the absolute sale thereof was executed onl" in favor of .arcelino as vendee to the exclusion of .iguela. .arcelino died. /efore his death, he executed * , in favor of Ailibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner 4*A/ to be secured b" the spouses house and lot. !he said * , was without the knowledge of .iguela. !he loan became mature and it remained outstanding. 4ence, petitioner 4*A/ instituted extra%udicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgage house and lot. , certificate of sale was issued in petitioners favor as the highest bidder. One "ear lapsed but the propert" was not redeemed. !hus, petitioner consolidated the ownership thereof executing an affidavit of consolidation of ownership and a 2eed of ,bsolute *ale. 'laiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the sub%ect propert", which was con%ugal in nature, respondent .iguela instituted with the &!' a civil case for the nullit" of real mortgage and certificate of sale, and the affidavit of consolidation of ownership and for the reconve"ance of consolidation of ownership. !he petitioner moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the house and lot was the exclusive propert" of the late .arcilino. /ut the &!' ruled that the mortgage was void as it was without the consent of the wife.!he ', likewise affirmed the &!'0s decision. It ruled that absence of clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that the sub%ect propert" ac)uired during the marriage of spouses 2ailo belongs to their con%ugal partnership. 4ence, it was void under article 1(= of the @amil" 'ode. 4owever, petitioner 4*A/ to the *' argued that article 1(= of the @amil" 'ode should be read together with article =1; of the 'ivil 'ode that .arcelino had the right to mortgage the said propert" a co$owner.

ISSUE #hether or not the mortgage over the disputed propert" is valid. RULING 9O. !he sale of con%ugal propert" re)uires the consent of both the husband and wife. +nder article 1(=, @amil" 'ode, the absence of the consent of other spouse renders the entire sale null and void of the con%ugal propert" pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. !here is no legal basis to construe article =1; of the 'ivil 'ode as an exception to article 1(= of the @amil" 'ode. &espondent and the late .arcelito 2ailo, were marred before the effectivit" of the @amil" 'ode. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the s"stem of relative communit" or con%ugal partnership of gains governed the propert" relations between respondent and her late husband. /ut with the effectivit" of the @amil" 'ode on ,ugust ;, 11EE, 'on%ugal artnership of Gains in the @amil" 'ode was made applicable to con%ugal partnership of gain alread" established before its
1;;

effectivit" unless vested rights have alread" been ac)uired under the 'ivil 'ode or other laws. !he rules in co$ownership, unlike the absolute communit" of propert" wherein the rules on co$ownership appl" in supplementar" manner, the con%ugal partnership shall be governed b" the rules on contract of partnership in all is not in conflict with what is expressl" determined in the chapter on con%ugal partnership of gains or the spouses in their marriage settlements. !hus, the propert" relations of respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, b" chapter = on 'on%ugal artnership of Gains of the @amil" 'ode, suppletoril", b" the rules on partnership under the 'ivil 'ode. In case of conflict, the @amil" 'ode prevails because the 'ivil 'ode provisions on partnershipJ appl" onl" when the @amil" 'ode is silent on the matter. The 6as&4 es7a6'&she8 <a47 &s 7ha7 82%&39 7he '&<e7&5e* w&7ho27 7he A3ow'e89e a38 4o3se37 o< h&s w&<e* Ma%4e'&3o Da&'o* 4o3s7&727e8 a %ea' es7a7e 5o%79a9e o3 7he s26;e47 $%o$e%71* wh&4h <o%5e8 $a%7 o< 7he&% 4o3;29a' $a%73e%sh&$. ,1 e>$%ess $%ov&s&o3 o< A%7&4'e 1() o< 7he Fa5&'1 Co8e* &3 7he a6se34e o< 4o2%7@s a27ho%&71 o% w%&77e3 4o3se37 o< 7he o7he% s$o2se* a31 8&s$os&7&o3 o% e34256%a34e o< 7he 4o3;29a' $%o$e%71 sha'' 6e vo&8. 0#. JOSEFINA FRANCISCO vs. MASTER IRON WORDS AND CONSTRUCTION COR-. AND ROERTO ALEJO* SHERIFF IV* RTC MADATI CIT: G. R. No. 1#1" 0 Fe6%2a%1 1 * (//# FACTS On <anuar" 1G, 11E;, <osefina 'astillo was onl" (= "ears of age when she and :duardo G. @rancisco were married. :duardo was then emplo"ed as the Cice resident in a private corporation. On ,ugust ;1, 11E=, the Imus &ural /ank Inc. executed a deed of absolute sale for ;(7,777.77 in favor of <osefina 'astillo @rancisco, covering two parcels of residential land with a house then on located at *t. .artin de /orres *t., *an ,ntonio Calle" I, *ucat arana)ue .etro .anila. !he purchase price of the propert" was paid through the /ank b" check with a check no. 77(;;= in the amount of ;(7,777.77 drawn and issued b" the 'ommercial /ank on .anila , for which the Imus /ank issued official receipt no. 1(1=7E on ,ugust ;1, 11E=. !he &egister of 2eeds issued !'! nos. EF1FD and EF1FF in the name of <esefina 'astillo @rancisco married to :duardo G. @rancisco. ISSUE #hether or not the two parcel of residential land belongs to the con%ugal propert" of <osefina and :duardoL HELDJ *ince the sub%ect propert" was ac)uired during the subsistence of the marriage of :duardo and <osefina, under the normal circumstance the same should be presumed to be con%ugal propert".
1;=

,rt. 1== of the 9'' applies onl" to a relationship between a man and woman who are not incapacitated to marr" each other, or to in which the marriage of the parties is void from the ver" beginning, it does not appl" to cohabitation that is adulterous or amounts to concubine for it would be absurd to create a co$ownership when there exist a prior con%ugal partnership, or absolute communit" between the man and his lawful wife. 0 . JESSIE -ISUENA vs. UNATING* e7 a'. G. R. No. 1!(+/! A292s7 !1* 1""" FACTS !he present case is rooted in an action for recover" of possession and ownership of a parcel of land, as well as a sum of mone" and damages. /efore the &!' of &oxas 'it" originall" filed against herein petitioner, b" herein respondents. !he lot in dispute, known as Aot 1(71, 'adastral ((E of the 'adastral of Ivisan, 'apiz, located at /aranga" 'abugao, .unicipalit" of Ivisan , rovince of 'apiz , is a registered land in the name of etra +nating married to ,)uilino Cillar under Original 'ertificate of !itle 9o. 1E=((, containing an area of E;,G;D s)uare meters, more or less. etra +nating died on October 1, 11=E while ,)uilino Cillar died on <anuar" 1=, 11G;. !he spouses had two JlegitimateK children, namel" @elix Cillar and 'atalina Cillar. @elix Cillar died on October (=, 11D(, while 'atalina Cillar died on @ebruar" (1, 11DF. @elix Cillar is represented b" 2olores Cillar /autista, the eldest of his four children while 'atalina Cillar is represented b" *alvador Cillar +pod, the eldest of her three children, all as plaintiffs. 2efendant, <essie isueBa, is the son$in$law of ,gustin 9avarra. laintiffs contend that during the lifetime of the registered owners, etra +nating and ,)uilino Cillar, the" en%o"ed the absolute ownership and possession of Aot 9o. 1(71. 4owever, sometime in 11G7 >after the death of etra +nating on October 1, 11=E? ,)uilino Cillar entered into an oral partnership agreement for ten >17? "ears with ,gustin 9avarra involving the swamp" portion of the lot in )uestion consisting of around four hectares. It was agreed that the area of around three hectares shall further be developed into a fishpond while about a hectare shall be converted into a fishpond with the investment capital of ,gustin 9avarra. !he upland portion of the land was not included in the transaction, hence it remained in the possession of the plaintiffs. #hile alive, ,gustin 9avarra, who managed the partnership, religiousl" gave ,)uilino Cillar and his co$heirs their share. until ,)uilino Cillar died on <anuar" 1=, 11G;. !hereafter, his share in the income of the partnership was delivered b" ,gustin 9avarra to @elix Cillar and 'atalina Cillar. *ince ,gustin 9avarra died in 11GE, @elix and 'atalina Cillar repossessed the land in )uestion. !he" maintained their possession up to the time @elix and 'atalina Cillar died. !hereafter, the children of @elix and 'atalina Cillar continued the possession of their predecessor$ in$interest until the defendant disturbed their possession sometime in 11F=. 2efendant counters that the whole land in dispute was sold b" @elix Cillar and 'atalina Cillar to
1;G

,gustin 9avarra on @ebruar" (, 11=1. !he contract in *panish captioned 6:*'&I!+&, 2: C:9!, ,/*OA+!,8. On 2ecember ;1, 11DE, which was more than ten "ears after the death of ,gustin 9avarra, his heirs executed a 2eed of :xtra <udicial artition and 2eed of *ale of the land in )uestion in favor of the *pouses <essie isueBa and &osalie 9avarra. @rom the time of the sale up to the present, the fishpond portion was in the possession of the spouses <essie isueBa and &osalie 9avarra. 4owever, the upland portion is in the possession of *alvador +pod and 2olores /autista b" mere tolerance of the defendant. On <une (=, 111(, the trial court ruled that since the disputed lot was the con%ugal propert" of *pouses etra +nating and ,)uilino Cillar, its purported sale b" @elix and 'atalina Cillar to ,gustin 9avarra could be considered valid. !he court, however, ruled that its validit" pertained onl" to the share of the late etra +nating, considering that at the time of the sale, ,)uilino Cillar was still alive. It likewise held that the respondents, as heirs of ,)uilino Cillar, were entitled to his one$half share in the disputed lot. /efore the 'ourt of ,ppeals, 2olores /autista and *alvador +pod assailed the trial court0s ruling upholding the validit" of the :scritura de Centa ,bsoluta. <essie isueBa, on the other hand, )uestioned the court0s conclusion that the sub%ect lot was con%ugal. 4e claimed that it was paraphernal, and that the 2eed of *ale transferred the whole lot to ,gustin 9avarra, his predecessor$in$interest. !he appellate court affirmed the trial court0s ruling in toto, holding that the disputed lot belonged to the con%ugal partnership of etra +nating and ,)uilino Cillar. 2efendant further argues that the mention of the name ,)uilino Cillar in the certificate of title is merel" descriptive of the civil status of etra +nating and the same could not convert the propert" into a con%ugal one. !he 'ourt of appeals agree with the lower court when it held that Min the absence of an" evidence of an" s"stem of propert" relation between etra +nating and ,)uilino Cillar, it is presumed that it is one of con%ugal partnership.M /esides, it appears that Aot 1(71 was ac)uired during the marriage of the *pouses etra +nating and ,)uilino Cillar, since the Original 'ertificate of !itle indicates that Aot 1(71 was registered in the name of etra +nating, married to ,)uilino Cillar. !hus, the propert" is presumed con%ugal. ISSUE 2id the 4onorable 'ourt of ,ppeals erred in ruling that Aot 1(71 belongs to the con%ugal JpartnershipK of etra +nating and ,)uilino Cillar.L RULING !he *upreme 'ourt held that both the ', and the &!' held that the disputed lot was con%ugal. &eal propert" ac)uired during marriage is presumed to be con%ugal. *uch
1;D

prima facie presumption, however, can be overturned b" a cadastral court0s specific finding, which has long become final, that the lot in )uestion was paraphernal in character. !he title to the entire propert" shall pass b" operation of law to the bu"er once the seller ac)uires title over it b" hereditar" succession, even if at the time of the execution of the deed of sale, the seller owned onl" a portion of the propert". 4owever, as to the efficac" of the :scritura de Centa ,bsoluta, petitioner and his wife are owners of the disputed lot b" virtue of the 2eed of *ale the" executed, @elix and 'atalina effectivel" transferred to ,gustin 9avarra on @ebruar" =, 11=1, their title over their two$thirds share in the disputed lot. 4owever, the" could not have disposed of their father0s share in the same propert" at the time, as the" were not "et its owners. ,t the most, being the onl" children, the" had an inchoate interest in their father0s share. #hen ,)uilino Cillar died in 11G; without disposing of his one$third share in the disputed propert", @elix and 'atalina0s inchoate interest in it was actualized, because succession vested in them the title to their father0s share and, conse)uentl", to the entire lot. !hus, that title passed to ,gustin 9avarra, pursuant to ,rticle 1=;= of the present 'ivil 'ode, which was alread" in force at the time of ,)uilino0s death in 11G;. 'onse)uentl", upon the death of ,)uilino Cillar, the ownership of the whole of Aot 9o. 1(71 became vested in <essie isueBa and his wife. etition granted. etitioner <essie isueBa and his wife, &osalie 9avarra, are hereb" declared the owners of Aot. 9o. 1(71.

00. S-OUSES ONESIFORO AND ROSARIO ALINAS vs. S-OUSES VICTOR AND ELENA ALINAS G. R. No. 1#+/)/ A$%&' 1)* (//+ FACTS etitioner spouses separated sometime in 11E( with &osario moving to agadian 'it" and Onesiforo moving to .anila. !he" left behind two lots identified as Aot E1D$/$1$, >Aot ,? with a bodega standing on it and Aot E1D$/$1$/ >Aot /? with petitioners0 house. Aot , was mortgaged as securit" for the loan obtained from &ural /ank of Oro)uieta >&/O?, while Aot / was mortgaged to ***. etitioners entrusted said lots to respondents, Cictor being the brother of Onesiforo, with the agreement that an" rentals from the propert" will be remitted to &/O and *** to pa" off the loans. Onesifore alleged that he left blank papers with his signatures to facilitate the administration of said propert". 4owever, sometime in 111;, the two lots were alread" titled on the name of respondent spouses. Aot , have been foreclosed b" &/O and was later purchased b" respondents. Aot / was also foreclosed b" ***, however pursuant to a * , signed b" Onesiforo in favor of Cictor, the latter was able to redeem it. Onesiforo0s name also
1;F

appeared in an ,bsolute 2eed of *ale dated .arch 17, 11E1 selling Aot / to respondent spouses. &ecords also show a notarized document captioned ,greement whereb" petitioner Onesiforo acknowledged that Cictor used his own mone" to redeem Aot / from *** and, thus, Cictor became the owner of said lot and waiving whatever rights, claims, and interest petitioners or his heirs or successors and assigns will or ma" have. ISSUE #hether or not the sale of Aot / b" petitioner spouses to respondent spouses was valid. RULING !he sale was null and void. ,lthough petitioners were married before the enactment of the @amil" 'ode on ,ugust ;, 11EE, the sale in )uestion occurred in 11E1. !hus, their propert" relations are governed b" 'hapter IC on 'on%ugal artnership of Gains of the @amil" 'ode. ,rt. 1(= of the 'ode provides, 6 !he administration and en%o"ment of the con%ugal partnership propert" shall belong to both spouses %ointl". xxx In the event that one spouse in incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the con%ugal properties, the other spouse ma" assume sole powers of administration. !hese powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authorit" of the court or the written authorit" of the other spouse. In the absence of such authorit" or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.xxx8 In 4omeowners *avings S Aoan /ank vs. 2ailo, the court categoricall" stated thus5 6In Guiang vs. ',, it was held that the sale of a con%ugal propert" re)uires the consent of both husband and wife. In appl"ing ,rt. 1(= of the @amil" 'ode, this court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the con%ugal propert" pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale.8 !hus, pursuant to ,rt. 1(= and %urisprudence, the sale of petitioners0 con%ugal propert" made b" petitioner Onesiforo alone is void in its entiret". !he court does not see how appl"ing ,rt. 1(= of the @amil" 'ode would lead to in%ustice or absurdit". It should be noted that respondent spouses were well aware that Aot / is a con%ugal propert" of petitioners. !he" also knew that the disposition being made b" Onesiforo is without the consent of his wife, as the" knew that petitioners had separated and the sale documents do not bear the signature of &osarion. !he fact that Onesiforo had to execute two documents, the 2eed of ,bsolute *ale and a notarized ,greement, reveals that the" had full knowledge of the severe infirmities of the sale. ,s held in 4eirs of ,guilar$ &e"es vs. *pouses .i%ares, 6a purchaser cannot close his e"es to facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith.8 *uch being the case, no in%ustice is being foisted on respondent spouses as the" risked transacting with Onesiforo alone despite their knowledge that the sub%ect propert" is a con%ugal propert". 0+. VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN G.R. No. 1##)/" J23e +* (//0 FACTS
1;E

etitioner and private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful married life and out of which were blessed to have a son. 4owever, their once sugar coated romance turned bitter when petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adulter" against private respondent and the latter0s paramour. 'onse)uentl", both the private respondent and her paramour were convicted of the crime charged. rivate respondent, through counsel, filed a etition for 2eclaration of 9ullit" of .arriage, 2issolution and Ai)uidation of 'on%ugal artnership of Gains and 2amages, imputing ps"chological incapacit" on the part of the petitioner. 2uring the pre$trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a 'O. &O.I*: ,G&::.:9!. !he said 'ompromise ,greement was given %udicial imprimatur b" the respondent %udge in the assailed <udgment on 'ompromise ,greement. 4owever, petitioner filed an Omnibus .otion pra"ing for the repudiation of the 'ompromise ,greement and the reconsideration of the <udgment on 'ompromise ,greement b" the respondent %udge on the grounds that his previous law"er did not intelligentl" and %udiciousl" apprise him of the conse)uential effects of the 'ompromise ,greement. !he respondent <udge denied the aforementioned Omnibus .otion. 2ispleased, petitioner filed a .otion for &econsideration of the aforesaid Order, but the same was denied. !he petitioner filed a etition for Certiorari and rohibition with the ', under &ule DG of the &ules of 'ourt claiming that the &!' committed grave error and abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of %urisdiction !he petitioner argues that the 'ompromise ,greement should not have been given %udicial imprimatur since it is against law and public polic"H that the proceedings where it was approved is null and void, there being no appearance and participation of the *olicitor General or the rovincial rosecutorH that it was timel" repudiatedH and that the respondent, having been convicted of adulter", is therefore dis)ualified from sharing in the con%ugal propert". ISSUE #hether or not a 'ompromise ,greement entered into b" spouses, one of whom was convicted of adulter", giving the convicted spouse a share in the con%ugal propert", valid and legal. RULING !he conviction of adulter" does not carr" the accessor" of civil interdiction. !he crime of adulter" does not carr" the accessor" penalt" of civil interdiction which deprives the person of the rights to manage her propert" and to dispose of such propert" inter vivos. !he 'ompromise ,greement partiall" divided the properties of the con%ugal partnership of gains between the parties and does not deal with the validit" of a marriage or legal separation. It is not among those that are expressl" prohibited b" ,rticle (7;G.
1;1

+nder ,rticle 1=; of the @amil" 'ode, separation of propert" ma" be effected voluntaril" or for sufficient cause, sub%ect to %udicial approval. !he )uestioned 'ompromise ,greement which was %udiciall" approved is exactl" such a separation of propert" allowed under the law. !his conclusion holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullit" of marriage was still pending. 0". ELNA MERCADOCFEHR vs. ,RUNO FEHR G. R. No. 1#(01 O47o6e% (!* (//! FACTS , petition for declaration of nullit" of marriage on the ground of ps"chological incapacit" to compl" with the essential marital obligations under ,rticle ;D of the @amil" 'ode was filed b" petitioner :lna .ercado$@ehr against respondent /runo @ehr before the &egional !rial 'ourt of .akati. !he trial court declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio under ,rticle ;D of the @amil" 'ode and ordered the dissolution of their con%ugal partnership of propert". ISSUE 4ow should the properties ac)uired b" petitioner and respondent be partitionedL RULING In light of these facts, the *upreme 'ourt give more credence to petitioner0s submission that *uite (7= was ac)uired during the parties0 cohabitation. ,ccordingl", under ,rticle 1=F of the @amil" 'ode, said propert" should be governed b" the rules on co$ ownership. !he @amil" 'ode provides5 ,rticle 1=F. #hen a man and a woman who are capacitated to marr" each other, live exclusivel" with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned b" them in e)ual shares and the propert" ac)uired b" both of them through their work or industr" shall be governed b" the rules on co$ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrar", properties ac)uired while the" lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained b" their %oint efforts, work or industr", and shall be owned b" them in e)ual shares. @or purposes of this ,rticle, a part" who did not participate in the ac)uisition b" the other part" of an" propert" shall be deemed to have contributed %ointl" to the ac)uisition thereof if the former0s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of their famil" and of the household. 9either part" can encumber or dispose b" acts inter vivos of his or her share in the propert" ac)uired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. #hen onl" one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the part" in bad faith in the co$ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case
1=7

of default of or waiver b" an" or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. +/. ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ vs. RTC OF QUEZON CIT: G. R. No. 1((0)" J2'1 !1* 1"" FACTS ,ntonio Caldes and 'onsuelo Gomez were married. /egotten during the marriage were five children. In a petition,Caldes sought the declaration of nullit" of the marriage pursuant to ,rticle ;D of the @amil" 'ode. !he court rendered the assailed %udgment, to wit5 >1? 2eclaring their marriage null and void for mutual ps"chological incapacit"H >(? !he three older children shall choose which parent the" would want to sta" with. >;? !o start proceedings on the li)uidation of their common properties as defined b" ,rticle 1=F of the @amil" 'ode, and to compl" with the provisions of ,rticles G7, G1 and G( of the same code. 'onsuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with ,rticles G7, G1 and G( of the @amil" 'ode. *he asserted that the @amil" 'ode contained no provisions on the procedure for the li)uidation of common propert" in -unions without marriage.- arentheticall", during the hearing on the motion, the children filed a %oint affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their father, ,ntonio Caldes, herein petitioner. 4is motion for reconsideration having been denied, she now comes to superiorit" contending that >I? ,rticle 1=F of the @amil" 'ode does not appl" to cases where the parties are ps"chological incapacitated.>II? ,rticles G7, G1 and G( in relation to ,rticles 17( and 1(1 of the @amil" 'ode govern the disposition of the famil" dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void b" reason of the ps"chological incapacit" of the spouses.>III? ,ssuming arguendo that ,rticle 1=F applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the ps"chological incapacit" of a spouse, the same ma" be read consistentl" with ,rticle 1(1. >IC? It is necessar" to determine the parent with whom ma%orit" of the children wish to sta".ISSUE #hat propert" relations should govern with regard to void marriagesL RULING O&2:& ,@@I&.:2. !he court correctl" applied the proper propert" relations with regard to void marriages.
1=1

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the partiesM common propert", the trial court acted neither imprudentl" nor precipitatel"H a court which has %urisdiction to declare the marriage a nullit" must be deemed likewise clothed with authorit" to resolve incidental and conse)uential matters. 9or did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the -famil" home- and all their common propert" in e)ual shares, as well as in concluding that, in the li)uidation and partition of the propert" owned in common b" them, the provisions on co$ownership under the 'ivil 'ode, not ,rticles G7, G1 and G(, in relation to ,rticles 17( and 1(1, of the @amil" 'ode, should aptl" prevail. !he rules set up to govern the li)uidation of either the absolute communit" or the con%ugal partnership of gains, the propert" regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages >in the latter case until the contract is annulled ?,are irrelevant to the li)uidation of the co$ownership that exists between common$law spouses. !he first paragraph of ,rticle G7 of the @amil" 'ode, appl"ing paragraphs >( ?,>; ?,>=? and >G? of ,rticle =;, relates onl", b" its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionall", to void marriages under ,rticle =7 of the 'ode, , the declaration of nullit" of a subse)uent marriage contracted b" a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is %udiciall" declared void. !he latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosoph" and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the ver" beginning and no %udicial decree is necessar" to establish their nullit". In now re)uiring for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullit" b" final %udgment of the previousl" contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do awa" with an" continuing uncertaint" on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of ,rticle =;, in relation to ,rticles =1 and =(, of the @amil" 'ode, on the effects of the termination of a subse)uent marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident propert" relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages >before annulment? and, on the other, between common$law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinar" rules on co$ownership sub%ect to the provision of ,rticle 1=F and ,rticle 1=E of the @amil" 'ode. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it ma" merel" state the obvious, that the provisions of the @amil" 'ode on the -famil" home,- the provisions found in !itle C, 'hapter (, of the @amil" 'ode, remain in force and effect regardless of the propert" regime of the spouses. +1. NENG KDAGUI DADIGUIAL MALANG vs. COROCO: MOSON
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G. R. No. 11"/ )

A292s7 ((* (///

FACTS 4ad%i ,bdula .alang, a .uslim, contracted marriage with ,ida Aimba. !he" begot three sons named 4ad%i .ohammad +l"ssis, 4ad%i Ismael .alindatu and 2atulna, and a daughter named Aawanbai. 4ad%i ,bdula was engaged in tilling the land that was ,ida0s dowr". !hereafter, he bought a parcel of land in *ousa, 'otabato. 4ad%i ,bdula and ,ida alread" had two children when he married for the second time <ubaida Tado. 9o child was born out of his second marriage. #hen ,ida, the first wife, was pregnant with their fourth child, 4ad%i ,bdula divorced her. In 11DG, 4ad%i ,bdula married 9a"o 4. Omar but the" were childless. !hereafter, 4ad%i ,bdula contracted marriage with 4ad%i .abai >.aba"? 4. ,dziz and the" had a daughter named @atima >Tueng?. 9ot long after, 4ad%i ,bdula married three other .uslim women named *aaga, .a"umbai and *abai but he eventuall" divorced them. 4ad%i ,bdula then migrated to !ambunan where, in 11F(, he married petitioner 9eng 6Tagui Tadiguia8 .alang. !he" established residence in 'otabato 'it" but the" were childless. 4ad%i ,bdula ac)uired land in 'otabato 'it". 4e deposited mone" in +nited 'oconut lanters /ank, .etrobank and hilippine 'ommercial and Industrial /ank. On 2ecember 1E, 111;, while he was living with petitioner in, 4ad%i ,bdula died without leaving a will. On <anuar" (1, 111=, petitioner filed with the *hari0a 2istrict 'ourt in 'otabato 'it" a petition for the settlement of his estate with a pra"er that letters of administration be issued in the name of her niece, !arhata Aauban. etitioner claimed in that petition that she was the wife of 4ad%i ,bdulaH that his other legal heirs are his three children named !eng ,bdula, Teto ,bdula and Tueng .alang, and that he left seven >F? parcels of land, five >G? of which are titled in 4ad%i ,bdula0s name 6married to 9eng . .alang,8 and a pick$up %eepne". On @ebruar" F, 111=, the *hari0a 2istrict 'ourt ordered the publication of the petition. ,fter such publication or on .arch 1D, 111=, 4ad%i .ohammad +l"ssis .alang, the eldest son of 4ad%i ,bdula, filed his opposition to the petition. 4e alleged that his father0s surviving heirs are as follows5 >a? <ubaida .alang, surviving spouseH >b? 9a"o .alang, surviving spouseH >c? .aba" .alang, surviving spouseH >d? petitioner 9eng .alang, surviving spouseH >e? oppositor 4ad%i .ohammad +l"ssis .alang who is also known as 6!eng ,bdula,8 sonH >f? 4ad%i Ismael .alindatu .alang, also known as 6Teto ,bdula,8 son, >g? @atima .alang, also known as 6Tueng .alang,8 daughterH >h? 2atulna .alang, son, and >i? Aawanbai .alang, daughter. Oppositor 4ad%i .ohammad +l"ssis .alang alleged that since he and his brother, 4ad%i Ismael .alindatu .alang, had helped their father in his business, then the" were more competent to be administrators of his estate. On .arch ;7, 111=, <ubaida .alang, Ismael .alindatu .alang, 9a"o .alang, @atima .alang, .aba" .alang, 2atulna .alang and Aawanbai .alang filed an opposition to the petition, adopting as their own the written opposition of 4ad%i .ohammad.
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In a .emorandum that petitioner filed with the *hari0a 2istrict 'ourt, she asserted that all of the properties of the decedent located in 'otabato 'it" were con%ugal properties while properties located outside of 'otabato 'it" were exclusive properties of the decedent. !he oppositors contended in their own .emorandum that all the properties left b" 4ad%i ,bdula were his exclusive properties. @irst, 4ad%i ,bdula had no con%ugal partnership with petitioner because his having contracted eight >E? marriages with different .uslim women was in violation of the 'ivil 'ode that provided for a monogamous marriageH a con%ugal partnership presupposes a valid civil marriage, not a bigamous marriage or a common$law relationship. *econd, the decedent adopted a 6complete separation of propert" regime8 in his marital relationsH while his wives <ubaida Tado, 9a"o 4ad%i Omal and .aba" Ganap 4ad%i ,dzis contributed to the decedent0s properties, there is no evidence that petitioner had contributed funds for the ac)uisition of such properties. !hird, the presumption that properties ac)uired during the marriage are con%ugal properties is inapplicable because at the time he ac)uired the properties, the decedent was married to four >=? women. @ourth, the properties are not con%ugal in nature notwithstanding that some of these properties were titled in the name of the decedent 6married to 9eng .alang8 because such description is not conclusive of the con%ugal nature of the propert". @urthermore, because petitioner admitted in her verified petition that the properties belonged 6to the estate of decedent,8 she was estopped from claiming, after formal offer of evidence, that the properties were con%ugal in nature %ust because some of the properties were titled in 4ad%i ,bdula0s name 6married to 9eng .alang.8 @ifth, if it is true that the properties were con%ugal properties, then these should have been registered in the names of both petitioner and the decedent. In its Order of *eptember (D, 111=, the *hari0a 2istrict 'ourt presided b" <udge 'oroco" 2. .oson held that there was no con%ugal partnership of gains between petitioner and the decedent primaril" because the latter married eight times. !he 'ivil 'ode provision on con%ugal partnership cannot be applied if there is more than one wife because 6con%ugal partnership presupposes a valid civil marriage, not a plural marriage or a common$law relationship.8 !he court further found that the decedent was 6the chief, if not the sole, breadwinner of his families8 and that petitioner did not contribute to the properties unlike the other wives named <ubaida, 9a"o and .aba". !he description 6married to 9eng .alang8 in the titles to the real properties is no more than that P$$ the description of the relationship between petitioner and the decedent. *uch description is insufficient to prove that the properties belong to the con%ugal partnership of gains. +nder Islamic law, the regime of propert" relationship is complete separation of propert", in the absence of an" stipulation to the contrar" in the marriage settlements or an" other contract >,rticle ;E, .2. 17E;?. !here being no evidence of such contrar" stipulation or contract, this 'ourt concludes as it had begun, that the properties in )uestion, both real and personal, are not con%ugal, but rather, exclusive propert" of the decedent.
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!hus, the *hari0a 2istrict 'ourt held that the Islamic law should be applied in the distribution of the estate of 4ad%i ,bdula. !he 'ourt ordered that the estate shall pa" the corresponding estate tax, reimburse the funeral expenses and %udicial expensesH that the net estate, consisting of real and personal properties, located in !ala"an, .aguindanao and in 'otabato 'it", be distributed and ad%udicated as follows5 a? <ubaida Tado .alang b? 9a"o Omar .alang c? .abai ,ziz .alang $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ (/D= of the estate $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ (/D= $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ (/D= $ do $ $ do $ $ do $ $ do $ $ do $ $ do $ $ do $ $ do $

d? 9eng 6Tagui Tadiguia8 .alang $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ (/D= e? .ohammad +l"ssis .alang$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$1=/D= f? Ismael .alindatu .alang$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$1=/D= g? 2atulna .alang h? Aawanbai .alang $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ 1=/D= $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ F/D=

i? @atima >Tueng? .alang $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ F/D= !otal$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ D=/D=

Hthat the amount of (G7,777.77 given to 9eng 6Tagui Tadiguia8 .alang b" wa" of advance be charged against her share and if her share is not sufficient, to return the excessH and that the heirs are ordered to submit to this court their ro%ect of artition for approval, not later than three >;? months from receipt of its order. On October =, 111=, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration. !he oppositors ob%ected. On <anuar" 17, 111G, the *hari0a 2istrict 'ourt denied petitioner0s motion for reconsideration. +nsatisfied, petitioner filed a notice of appealwhich she subse)uentl" withdrew. On .arch 1, 111G, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari with preliminar" in%unction and/or restraining order. ISSUE #hether or not the regime of con%ugal partnership of gains governed the propert" relationship of two .uslims who contracted marriage prior to the effectivit" of the 'ode of .uslim ersonal Aaws of the hilippines >hereafter, 6 .2. 17E;8 or 6.uslim 'ode8?. !he )uestion is raised in connection with the settlement of the estate of the decedent. RULING
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!he 'ourt concludes that the record of the case is simpl" inade)uate for purposes of arriving at a fair and complete resolution of the petition. <ustice and accountabilit" dictate a remandH trial must reopen in order to suppl" the factual gaps. In so ordering, the *' deemed it imperative to set out certain guidelines in the interpretation and application of pertinent laws to facilitate the task of respondent court. !he 'ourt identified the following collateral issues5 @irst 'ollateral Issue5 !he Aaw>s? Governing Calidit" of .uslim .arriages 'elebrated /efore the .uslim 'ode ,ll eight marriages of were celebrated during the effectivit" of the 'ivil 'ode which governs the marriages. ,rticle FE of the 'ivil 'ode recognized the right of .uslims to contract marriage in accordance with their customs and rites b" providing that marriages between .ohammedans or pagans who live in the non$'hristian provinces ma" be performed in accordance with their customs, rites or practices. 9o marriage license or formal re)uisites shall be necessar". 9or shall the persons solemnizing these marriages be obliged to compl" with article 1(. 4owever, thirt" "ears after the approval of this 'ode, all marriages performed between .uslims or other non$'hristians shall be solemnized in accordance with the provisions of this 'ode. /ut the resident of the hilippines, upon recommendation of the 'ommissioner of 9ational Integration, ma" at an" time before the expiration of said period, b" proclamation, make an" of said provisions applicable to the .uslims and non$'hristian inhabitants of an" of the non$'hristian provinces. 9otabl", before the expiration of the thirt"$"ear period after which .uslims are en%oined to solemnize their marriages in accordance with the 'ivil 'ode, .2. 17E; or the .uslim 'ode was passed into law. !he enactment of the .uslim 'ode on @ebruar" =, 11FF rendered nugator" the second paragraph of ,rticle FE. *econd and !hird 'ollateral Issues5 !he Calidit" of .uslim .ultiple .arriages 'elebrated /efore the .uslim 'odeH !he :ffect of eople vs. *ubano and eople vs. 2umpo. rior to the enactment of .2. 17E;, there was no law in this %urisdiction which sanctioned multiple marriages. !he onl" law in force governing marriage relations between .uslims and non$.uslims alike was the 'ivil 'ode of 11G7. !he .uslim 'ode provides in respect of acts that transpired prior to its enactment that acts executed prior to the effectivit" of the .uslim 'ode shall be governed b" the laws in force at the time of their execution, and nothing therein except as otherwise specificall" provided, shall affect their validit" or legalit" or operate to extinguish an" right ac)uired or liabilit" incurred thereb". ,n apparent antagonism arises when we consider that what the provisions of the 'ivil 'ode contemplate and nurture is a monogamous marriage. 6/igamous or pol"gamous marriages8 are considered void and inexistent from the time of their performance. !he
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@amil" 'ode which superseded the 'ivil 'ode provisions on marriage emphasizes that a subse)uent marriage celebrated before the registration of the %udgment declaring a prior marriage void shall likewise be void. !hese provisions illustrate that the marital relation perceived b" the 'ivil 'ode is one that is monogamous, and that subse)uent marriages entered into b" a person with others while the first one is subsisting is b" no means countenanced. !hus, when the validit" of .uslim plural marriages celebrated before the enactment of the .uslim 'ode was touched upon in two criminal cases, the 'ourt applied the perspective in the 'ivil 'ode that onl" one valid marriage can exist at an" given time. In eople vs. *ubano, supra, the 'ourt convicted the accused of homicide, not parricide, since $$$ /f1rom the testimon of E"ol Su"ano, father of the deceased, it appears that the defendant has three wives and that the deceased was the last in point of time. Although the practice of pol gam is approved " custom among these nonA Christians, pol gam , however, is not sanctioned " the Carriage 9aw, which merel recogni8es tri"al marriage rituals. !he deceased, under our law, is not thus the lawful wife of the defendant and this precludes conviction for the crime of parricide. In eople vs. 2umpo, supra, .ora 2umpo was prosecuted for bigam" when, legall" married to .oro 4assan, she allegedl" contracted a second marriage with .oro *abdapal. !he 'ourt ac)uitted her on the ground that it was not dul" proved that the alleged second marriage had all the essential re)uisites to make it valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. ,s it appears that the consent of the bride0s father is an indispensable re)uisite to the validit" of a .uslim marriage, and as .ora 2umpo0s father categoricall" affirmed that he did not give his consent to her union with .oro *abdapal, the 'ourt held that such union could not be a marriage otherwise valid were it not for the existence of the first one, and resolved to ac)uit her of the charge of bigam". @ourth 'ollateral Issue5 Aaw>s? Governing 'elebrated /efore the .uslim 'ode ropert" &elations of .uslim .arriages

!he validit" of the marriages in the instant case is determined b" the 'ivil 'ode, we hold that it is the same 'ode that determines and governs the propert" relations of the marriages in this case, for the reason that at the time of the celebration of the marriages in )uestion the 'ivil 'ode was the onl" law on marriage relations, including propert" relations between spouses, whether .uslim or non$.uslim. Inasmuch as the @amil" 'ode makes substantial amendments to the 'ivil 'ode provisions on propert" relations, some of its provisions are also material, particularl" to propert" ac)uired from and after ,ugust ;, 11EE.

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#hich law would govern depends upon5 >1? when the marriages took placeH >(? whether the parties lived together as husband and wifeH and >;? when and how the sub%ect properties were ac)uired. @ollowing are the pertinent provisions of the 'ivil 'ode5 ,rt. 111. !he future spouses ma" in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative communit" of propert", or upon complete separation of propert", or upon an" other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the s"stem of relative communit" or con%ugal partnership of gains as established in this 'ode shall govern the propert" relations between husband and wife. ,rt. 1;G. ,ll propert" brought b" the wife to the marriage, as well as all propert" she ac)uires during the marriage, in accordance with article 1=E, is paraphernal. ,rt. 1;D. !he wife retains the ownership of the paraphernal propert". ,rt. 1=(. /" means of the con%ugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate propert" and the income from their work or industr", and divide e)uall", upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminatel" b" either spouse during the marriage. ,rt. 1=;. ,ll propert" of the con%ugal partnership of gains is owned in common b" the husband and wife, #ith the effectivit" of the @amil" 'ode on ,ugust ;, 11EE, the following provisions of the said 'ode are pertinent5 ,rt. 1=F. #hen a man and a woman who are capacitated to marr" each other live exclusivel" with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned b" them in e)ual shares and the propert" ac)uired b" both of them through their work or industr" shall be governed b" the rules on co$ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrar", properties ac)uired while the" lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained b" their %oint efforts, work or industr", and shall be owned b" them in e)ual shares. @or purposes of this ,rticle, a part" who did not participate in the ac)uisition of the other part" of an" propert" shall be deemed to have contributed %ointl" in the ac)uisition thereof if the former0s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the famil" and of the household. 9either part" can encumber or dispose b" acts inter vivos of his or her share in the propert" ac)uired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of the cohabitation. #hen onl" one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the part" in bad faith in the co$ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In
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case of default or of waiver b" an" or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent part". In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. ,rt. 1=E. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding ,rticle, onl" the properties ac)uired b" both of the parties through their actual %oint contribution of mone", propert", or industr" shall be owned b" them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrar", their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be e)ual. !he same rule and presumption shall appl" to %oint deposits of mone" and evidences of credit. If one of the parties is validl" married to another, his or her share in the co$ownership shall accrue to the absolute communit" or con%ugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the part" who acted in bad faith is not validl" married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding ,rticle. !he foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise appl" even if both parties are in bad faith. @ifth and *ixth 'ollateral Issues5 Aaw>s? on *uccession and 2issolution of ropert" &egimes 4ad%i ,bdula died intestate on 2ecember 1D, 111;. !hus, it is the .uslim 'ode which should determine the identification of the heirs in the order of intestate succession and the respective shares of the heirs. .eanwhile, the status and capacit" to succeed on the part of the individual parties who entered into each and ever" marriage ceremon" will depend upon the law in force at the time of the performance of the marriage rite.!he status and capacit" to succeed of the children will depend upon the law in force at the time of conception or birth of the child. If the child was conceived or born during the period covered b" the governance of the 'ivil 'ode, the 'ivil 'ode provisions on the determination of the legitimac" or illegitimac" of the child would appear to be in point. !he 'ivil 'ode provides5 ,rt. (GG. 'hildren born after one hundred and eight" da"s following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred da"s following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. ,gainst this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the ph"sical impossibilit" of the husband0s having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twent" da"s of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child. !his ph"sical impossibilit" ma" be caused5 >1? /" the impotence of the husbandH

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>(? /" the fact that the husband and wife were living separatel", in such a wa" that access was not possibleH >;? /" the serious illness of the husband. ,rt. (GD. !he child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother ma" have declared against its legitimac" or ma" have been sentenced as an adulteress. If the child was conceived or born during the period covered b" the governance of the .uslim 'ode, i.e., from @ebruar" =, 11FF up to the death of 4ad%i ,bdula on 2ecember 1E, 111;, the .uslim 'ode determines the legitimac" or illegitimac" of the child. +nder the .uslim 'ode5 ,rt. GE. Aegitimac", how established. $$$ Aegitimac" of filiation is established b" the evidence of valid marriage between the father and the mother at the time of the conception of the child. ,rt. G1. Aegitimate children. $$$ >1? 'hildren conceived in lawful wedlock shall be presumed to be legitimate. #hoever claims illegitimac" of or impugns such filiation must prove his allegation. >(? 'hildren born after six months following the consummation of marriage or within two "ears after the dissolution of the marriage shall be presumed to be legitimate. ,gainst this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of ph"sical impossibilit" of access between the parents at or about the time of the conception of the child. ,rt. D7. 'hildren of subse)uent marriage. $$$ *hould the marriage be dissolved and the wife contracts another marriage after the expiration of her Vidda, the child born within six months from the dissolution of the prior marriage shall be presumed to have been conceived during the former marriage, and if born thereafter, during the latter. ,rt. D1. regnanc" after dissolution. $$$ If, after the dissolution of marriage, the wife believes that she is pregnant b" her former husband, she shall, within thirt" da"s from the time she became aware of her pregnanc", notif" the former husband or his heirs of that fact. !he husband or his heirs ma" ask the court to take measures to prevent a simulation of birth. +pon determination of status and capacit" to succeed based on the foregoing provisions, the provisions on legal succession in the .uslim 'ode will appl". +nder ,rticle 117 of the said 'ode, the sharers to an inheritance include5 >a? !he husband, the wifeH >b? !he father, the mother, the grandfather, the grandmotherH
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>c? !he daughter and the son0s daughter in the direct lineH >d? !he full sister, the consanguine sister, the uterine sister and the uterine brother. #hen the wife survives with a legitimate child or a child of the decedent0s son, she is entitled to one$eighth of the hereditar" estateH in the absence of such descendants, she shall inherit one$fourth of the estate. !he respective shares of the other sharers are provided for in ,rticles 11; to 1(( of .2. 17E;. *eventh 'ollateral Issue5 .uslim 2ivorces /efore the :ffectivit" of the .uslim 'ode &.,. ;1= authorized absolute divorce among .uslims residing in non$'hristian provinces, in accordance with .uslim custom, for a period of (7 "ears from <une 1E, 11=1 >the date of approval of &.,. ;1=? to <une 1;, 11D1. !hus, a .uslim divorce under &.,. ;1= is valid if it took place from <une 1E, 11=1 to <une 1;, 11D1. $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ @rom the seven collateral issues that have been discussed, four corollar" issues are identified as to further situate the points of controvers" in the instant case for the guidance of the lower court. 1. #hich of the several marriages was validl" and legall" existing at the time of the opening of the succession of 4ad%i ,bdula when he died in 111;L !he validl" and legall" existing marriage would be that marriage which was celebrated at a time when there was no other subsisting marriage standing undissolved b" a valid divorce or b" death. !his is because all of the marriages were celebrated during the governance of the 'ivil 'ode, under the rules of which onl" one marriage can exist at an" given time. #hether or not the marriage was validl" dissolved b" a .uslim divorce depends upon the time frame and the applicable law. , .uslim divorce under &.,. 9o. ;1= is valid if it took place from <une 1E, 11=1 to <une 1;, 11D1, and void if it took place from <une 1=, 11D1. (. !here being a dispute between the petitioner and the oppositors as regards the heirship of the children begotten from different marriages, who among the surviving children are legitimate and who are illegitimateL !he children conceived and born of a validl" existing marriage as determined b" the first corollar" issue are legitimate. !he fact and time of conception or birth ma" be determined b" proof or presumption depending upon the time frame and the applicable law. ;. #hat properties constituted the estate of 4ad%i ,bdula at the time of his death on 2ecember 1E, 111;L !he estate of 4ad%i ,bdula consists of the following5 a. roperties ac)uired during the existence of a valid marriage as determined b" the first corollar" issue are con%ugal properties and should be li)uidated and divided
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between the spouses under the .uslim 'ode, this being the law in force at the time of 4ad%i ,bdula0s death. b. roperties ac)uired under the conditions prescribed in ,rticle 1== of the 'ivil 'ode during the period ,ugust ;7, 11G7 to ,ugust (, 11EE are con%ugal properties and should be li)uidated and divided between the spouses under the .uslim 'ode. 4owever, the wives other than the lawful wife as determined under the first corollar" issue ma" submit their respective evidence to prove that an" of such propert" is theirs exclusivel". c. roperties ac)uired under the conditions set out in ,rticles 1=F and 1=E of the @amil" 'ode during the period from and after ,ugust ;, 11EE are governed b" the rules on co$ownership. d. roperties ac)uired under conditions not covered b" the preceding paragraphs and obtained from the exclusive efforts or assets of 4ad%i ,bdula are his exclusive properties. =. #ho are the legal heirs of 4ad%i ,bdula, and what are their shares in intestac"L !he following are 4ad%i ,bdula0s legal heirs5 >a? the lawful wife, as determined under the first corollar" issue, and >(? the children, as determined under the second corollar" issue. !he .uslim 'ode, which was alread" in force at the time of 4ad%i ,bdula0s death, will govern the determination of their respective shares. !he evidence in this case is inade)uate to resolve in its entiret" the main, collateral and corollar" issues herein presented and a remand to the lower court is in order. ,ccordingl", evidence should be received to suppl" the following proofs5 >1? the exact dates of the marriages performed in accordance with .uslim rites or practicesH >(? the exact dates of the dissolutions of the marriages terminated b" death or b" divorce in accordance with .uslim rites and practices, thus indicating which marriage resulted in a con%ugal partnership under the criteria prescribed b" the first, second, and third collateral issues and the first corollar" issueH >;? the exact periods of actual cohabitation >6common life8 under a 6common roof8? of each of the marriages during which time the parties lived togetherH >=? the identification of specific properties ac)uired during each of the periods of cohabitation referred to in paragraph ; above, and the manner and source of ac)uisition, indicating %oint or individual effort, thus showing the asset as owned separatel", con%ugall" or in co$ownershipH and >G? the identities of the children >legitimate or illegitimate? begotten from the several unions, the dates of their respective conceptions or births in relation to paragraphs 1 and ( above, thereb" indicating their status as lawful heirs !he decision dated *eptember (D, 111= of the @ifth *hari0a 2istrict 'ourt of 'otabato is *:! ,*I2:, and the petition is &:.,92:2 for the reception of additional evidence and the resolution of the issues of the case based on the guidelines set out. +(. CIRILA ARCA,A vs. ERLINDA TA,ANCURA VDA. DE ,ATOCAEL
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G. R. No. 1)

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Nove56e% ((* (//1

FACTS @rancisco 'omille and his wife Qosima .ontallana became the registered owners of Aot 9o. =;F$, located at /alintawak *t. and &izal ,venue in 2ipolog 'it", Qamboanga del 9orte in <anuar" 11GD. Qosima died in 11E7 hence @rancisco and his mother in law executed a deed of extra%udicial partition with waiver of rights, where the latter waived her share consisting of Z of the propert" in favor of @rancisco. *ince @rancisco do not have an" children to take care of him after his retirement, he asked Aeticia, his niece, Aeticia0s cousin, Auzviminda and 'irila ,rcaba, the petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of @rancisco0s house as well as the store inside. ,ccording to Aeticia, @rancisco and 'irila were lovers since the" slept in the same room. On the other hand, :rlinda !abancura, another niece of @rancisco claimed that the latter told her that 'irila was his mistress. 4owever, 'irila defensed herself that she was a mere helper who could enter the master0s bedroom when @rancisco asked her to and that @rancisco was too old for her. *he denied having sexual intercourse with @rancisco. #hen the nieces got married, 'irila who was then ;= "ear$old widow started working for @rancisco who was FG "ear old widower. !he latter did not pa" him an" wages as househelper though her famil" was provided with food and lodging. @rancisco0s health deteriorated and became bedridden. !abancura testified that @rancisco0s onl" source of income was the rentals from his lot near the public streets. In <anuar" 1111, few months before @rancisco died, he executed a 62eed of 2onation Inter Civos8 where he ceded a portion of Aot =;F$, composed of 1G7 s) m., together with his house to 'irila who accepted the same. !he larger portion of (DE s) m. was left under his name. !his was made in consideration of the 17 "ear of faithful services of the petitioner. ,tt" Aaca"a notarized the deed and was later registered b" 'irila as its absolute owner. In Octoer 1111, @rancisco died and in 111;, the lot received b" 'irila had a market value of GF,17G and assessed value of (E,GG7. !he decedent0s nephews and nieces and his heirs b" intestate succession alleged that 'irila was the common$law wife of @rancisco. ISSUE #hether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed b" @rancisco in ,rcaba0s favor was valid. RULING !he court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein donation is not valid. !he conclusion was based on the testimon" of !abancura and certain documents bearing the signature of 6'irila 'omille8 such as application for business permit, sanitar" permit and the death certificate of @rancisco. ,lso, the fact that 'irila did not demand her wages is an indication that she was not simpl" a caregiver Pemplo"ee.
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'ohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especiall" when one of the parties is alread" old and ma" no longer be interested in sex at the ver" least, cohabitation is a public assumption of men and women holding themselves out to the public as such. 4ence, the deed of donation b" @rancisco in favor of 'irila is void under ,rt. EF of the @amil" 'ode. +!. GUILLERMA TUMLOS vs. MARIO FERNANDEZ G. R. No. 1!0 #/ A$%&' 1(* (/// FACTS .ario and Aourdes @ernandez were plaintiffs in an action for e%ectment filed against Guillerma, Gina and !oto !umlos. In the complaint, spouses @ernandez alleged that the" are the absolute owners of an apartment building that through their tolerance the" allowed the !umlos0 to occup" the apartment for the last F "ears without pa"ment of an" rent. It was agreed that Guillerma will pa" 1,D77 a month while the other defendants promised to pa" 1,777 a month which was not complied with. 2emand was made several times for the defendants to vacate the premises as the" are in need of the propert" for the construction of a new building. 2efendants appealed to &!' that .ario and Guillerma had an amorous relationship and that the" ac)uired the propert" in )uestion as their love nest. It was likewise alleged that the" lived together in the said apartment building with their ( children for about 17 "ears and that Gullerma administered the propert" b" collecting rentals from the lessees until she discovered that .ario deceived her as to the annulment of their marriage. ISSUE #hether or not Guillerma is a co$owner of the said apartment under ,rticle 1=E. RULING *' re%ected the claim that Guillerma and .ario were co$owners of the sub%ect propert". !he claim was not satisfactoril" proven b" Guillerma since there were no other evidence presented to validate it except for the said affidavit. :ven if the allegations of having cohabited with .ario and that she bore him two children were true, the claim of co$ ownership still cannot be accepted. .ario is validl" married with Aourdes hence Guillerma and .ario are not capacitated to marr" each other. !he propert" relation governing their supposed cohabitation is under ,rticle 1=E of the @amil" 'ode. ,ctual contribution is re)uired b" the said provision in contrast to ,rt 1=F which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the famil" and household are regarded as contributions to the ac)uisitions of common propert" b" one who has no salar", income, work or industr". *uch is not included in ,rt 1=E. If actual contribution is not proven then there can be no co$ownership and no presumption of e)ual shares.

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+). EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN vs. ELVIRA CASTILLO G. R. No. 1! +/! J23e 1 * (/// FACTS :usta)uio .allilin <r. and .a. :lvira 'astillo were alleged to be both married and with children but separated from their respective spouses and cohabited in 11F1 while respective marriages still subsist. !he" established *uperfreight 'ustoms /rokerage 'orporation during their union of which petitioner was the resident and 'hairman and respondent as Cice resident and !reasurer. !he" likewise ac)uired real and personal properties which were registered solel" in respondent0s name. 2ue to irreconcilable conflict, the couple separated in 111(. etitioner then demanded his share from respondent in the sub%ect properties but the latter refused alleging that said properties had been registered solel" in her name. @urthermore, respondent denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife because the" were still legall" married at the time of cohabitation. etitioner filed complaint for partition of co$ownership shares while respondent filed a motion for summar" %udgment. !rial court dismissed the former and granted the latter. ISSUE #hether or not petitioner can validl" claim his share in the ac)uired properties registered under the name of the respondent considering the" both have subsisting relationship when the" started living together. RULING !he 'ourt ruled that trial court erred that parties who are not capacitated to marr" each other and were living together could not have owned properties in common. +nder ,rticle 1=E, if the parties are incapacitated to marr" each other, properties ac)uired b" them through their %oint contribution, propert" or industr", shall be owned b" them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrar", is presumed to be e)ual. 4ence, there is co$ownership even though the couples in union are not capacitated to marr" each other. @urthermore, when ', dismissed petitioner0s complaint for partition on grounds of due process and e)uit", his right to prove ownership over the claimed properties was denied. *uch dismissal is un%ustified since both ends ma" be served b" simpl" excluding from the action for partition the properties registered in the name of *teelhouse &ealt" and :loisa 'astillo, not parties in the case. !he case was remanded to lower court for further proceedings. +#. ALFRED FRITZ FRENZEL vs. EDERLINA -. CATITO G. R. No. 1)!"#+ J2'1 11* (//! FACTS etitioner ,lfred @ritz @renzel is an ,ustralian citizen of German descent. 4e is an electrical engineer b" profession, but worked as a pilot with the 9ew Guinea ,irlines. 4e
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arrived in the hilippines in 11F=, started engaging in business in the countr" two "ears thereafter, and married !eresita *antos, a @ilipino citizen. In 11E1, ,lfred and !eresita separated from bed and board without obtaining a divorce. *ometime in @ebruar" 11E;, ,lfred arrived in *"dne", ,ustralia for a vacation. 4e went to TingMs 'ross, a night spot in *"dne", for a massage where he met respondent :derlina 'atito, a @ilipina and a native of /a%ada, 2avao 'it". +nknown to ,lfred, she resided for a time in German" and was married to Tlaus .uller, a German national. *he left German" and tried her luck in *"dne", ,ustralia, where she found emplo"ment as a masseuse in the TingMs 'ross nightclub. ,lfred followed :derlina to the hilippines where the" cohabited together in a common$law relationship. 2uring the period of their common$law relationship, ,lfred ac)uired in the hilippines real and personal properties valued more or less at F(=,777.77. *ince ,lfred knew that as an alien he was dis)ualified from owning lands in the hilippines, he agreed that onl" :derlinaMs name would appear in the deeds of sale as the bu"er of the real properties, as well as in the title covering the same. ,lfred and :derlinaMs relationship deteriorated. ,lfred wrote :derlinaMs father complaining that :derlina had taken all his life savings and because of this, he was virtuall" penniless. 4e further accused the 'atito famil" of ac)uiring for themselves the properties he had purchased with his own mone". 4e demanded the return of all the amounts that :derlina and her famil" had -stolen- and turn over all the properties ac)uired b" him and :derlina during their coverture. ,lfred filed a complaint against :derlina with the &egional !rial 'ourt, 2avao 'it", for specific performance, declaration of ownership of real and personal properties, sum of mone", and damages. !he trial court rendered %udgment in favor of :derlina. ,lfred appealed the decision to the 'ourt of ,ppeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the &!'. 4ence, the present petition. ISSUES #hether or not the rule of 6in pari delicto8 applies in the instant case where an alien petitioner who, knowing the 'onstitutional prohibition against aliens to ac)uire lands in the hilippines, willfull" funded the purchase of real properties in the name of his @ilipina lover who is married to another alien. RULING etitioner answered during an examination before the trial court5 'O+&!5 R. *o "ou understand that "ou are a foreigner that "ou cannot bu" land in the hilippinesL ,. !hat is correct but as she would eventuall" be m" wife that would be owned b" us later on. >tsn, p. G, *eptember ;, 11ED? xxx xxx xxx R. #hat happened after thatL ,. *he said "ou foreigner "ou are using @ilipinos to bu" propert". R. ,nd what did "ou answerL ,5 I said thank "ou ver" much for the propert" I bought because I gave "ou a lot of mone" >tsn, p. 1=, ibid.?.
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!he *upreme 'ourt affirmed the decision of the 'ourt of ,ppeals. ,ccording to the 'ourt, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the constitutional proscription, nor claim that he acted in good faith, let alone assert that he is less guilt" than the respondent. etitioner is full" aware that he was dis)ualified from ac)uiring and owning lands under hilippine law even before he purchased the properties in )uestionH and, to skirt the constitutional prohibition, he had the deed of sale placed under the respondentMs name as the sole vendee thereof. /eing a part" to an illegal contract, petitioner cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal ob%ective carried out because one who loses his mone" or propert" b" knowingl" engaging in a contract or transaction which involves his own moral turpitude ma" not maintain an action for his losses. !o allow petitioner to recover the properties or the mone" used in the purchase of the parcels of land would be subversive of public polic". + . JACINTO SAGUID vs. HON. COURT OF A--EALS* THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT* ,RANCH ")* ,OAC* MARINDUQUE a38 GINA S. RE: G. R. No. 1#/ 11 J23e 1/* (//! FACTS rivate respondent, a married woman but separated de facto from her husband, cohabited with petitioner. !he two were able to ac)uire properties during their cohabitation. *ubse)uentl", the couple decided to separate. rivate respondent filed a complaint for artition and &ecover" of ersonal ropert" with &eceivership against petitioner. !he trial court declared petitioner in default for failure to file a pre$trial brief and decided the case in favor of private respondent. On appeal, the 'ourt of ,ppeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. ISSUE #hat is the propert" regime of private respondent and petitioner who are not capacitated to marr" each other RULING !he 'ourt ruled that since the private respondent and the petitioner were not capacitated to marr" each other because the former >private respondent? was validl" married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter >petitioner?, their propert" regime is governed b" ,rticle 1=E of the @amil" 'ode, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. +nder this regime, onl" the properties ac)uired b" both of the parties through their actual %oint contribution of mone", propert", or industr" shall be owned b" them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. roof of actual contribution is re)uired. In the absence of proof of extent of the partiesM respective contributions, their share shall be presumed e)ual. 4ere, the disputed personal properties were valued at 111,;FG.77, the existence and value of which were not )uestioned b" the petitioner. 4ence, their share therein is e)uivalent to one$half, i.e., GG,DEF.G7 each. !he 'ourt of ,ppeals thus erred in affirming the decision of the
1GF

trial court which granted the reliefs pra"ed for b" private respondent. On the basis of the evidence established, the extent of private respondentMs co$ownership over the disputed house is onl" up to the amount of 11,=1;.77, her proven contribution in the construction thereof. ,nent the personal properties, her participation therein should be limited onl" to the amount of GG,DEF.G7. +0. LU-O ATIENZA vs. :OLANDA DE CASTRO G. R. No. 1 " "+ Nove56e% ("* (// FACTS etitioner Aupo ,tienza, then the resident and General .anager of :nrico *hipping 'orporation and :urasian .aritime 'orporation, hired the services of respondent 3olanda +. 2e 'astro as accountant for the two corporations. !he relationship between Aupo and 3olanda became intimate. 2espite Aupo being a married man, he and 3olanda eventuall" lived together and had two children. 4owever, after the birth of their second child, their relationship turned sour until the" parted wa"s. Aupo filed in the &!' of .akati 'it" a complaint against 3olanda for the %udicial partition between them of a parcel of land with improvements located in /el$,ir *ubdivision, .akati 'it" alleging that the sub%ect propert" was ac)uired during his union with 3olanda as common$law husband and wife, hence the propert" is co$owned b" them and that 3olanda used his exclusive funds and that the title thereto was transferred b" the seller in 3olandaMs name without his knowledge and consent. 4e did not interpose an" ob%ection thereto because at the time, their affair was still thriving. It was onl" after their separation and his receipt of information that 3olanda allowed her new live$in partner to live in the disputed propert", when he demanded his share thereat as a co$owner. In her answer, 3olanda denied AupoMs allegations. ,ccording to her, she ac)uired the same propert" for !wo .illion *ix 4undred !housand esos > (,D77,777.77? using her exclusive funds. *he insisted having bought it thru her own savings and earnings as a businesswoman. ISSUES #hether or not petitioner was able to prove his contribution to the sub%ect propert" he claimed as co$owned b" him and respondent during their adulterous cohabitation under ,rt. 1=E of the @amil" 'odeH >(? #hether or not ,rt. 1=E applies to adulterous cohabitation prior to ,ugust ;, 11EE. RULING !he instant petition is denied. &ather than presenting proof of his actual contribution to the purchase mone" used as consideration for the disputed propert", petitioner diverted the burden imposed upon him to respondent b" painting her as a shrewd and scheming woman without the capacit" to purchase an" propert". 4e presented documents pertaining to the ins and outs of the dollar accounts of :9&I'O and :+&,*I,9, which unfortunatel" failed to prove his actual contribution in the purchase of the said propert". *urmising that
1GE

petitioner is financiall" well heeled than respondent, the court a )uo concluded, sans evidence, that respondent had taken advantage of petitioner. !rue, the mere issuance of a 4e%7&<&4a7e o< 7&7'e in the name of an" person does not foreclose the possibilit" that the real propert" covered thereb" ma" be under co$ ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant ma" onl" be a trustee or that other parties ma" have ac)uired interest subse)uent to the issuance of the certificate of title. 4owever, as alread" stated, petitionerMs evidence in support of his claim is either insufficient or immaterial to warrant the trial courtMs finding that the disputed propert" falls under the purview of ,rticle 1=E of the @amil" 'ode. In contrast to petitionerMs dismal failure to prove his cause, herein respondent was able to present preponderant evidence of her sole ownership. !here can clearl" be no co$ownership when, as here, the respondent sufficientl" established that she derived the funds used to purchase the propert" from her earnings, not onl" as an accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign currenc" trading, mone" lending and %ewelr" retail. *he presented her clientele and the promissor" notes evincing substantial dealings with her clients. *he also presented her bank account statements and bank transactions, which reflect that she had the financial capacit" to pa" the purchase price of the sub%ect propert". ,lthough the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 11E;, or wa" before the effectivit" of the @amil" 'ode on ,ugust ;, 111E, ,rticle 1=E thereof applies because this provision was intended precisel" to fill up the hiatus in ,rticle 1== of the 'ivil 'ode. 1( /efore ,rticle 1=E of the @amil" 'ode was enacted, there was no provision governing propert" relations of couples living in a state of adulter" or concubinage. 4ence, even if the cohabitation or the ac)uisition of the propert" occurred before the @amil" 'ode took effect, ,rticle 1=E governs. ++. ROGER V. NAVARRO vs. HON. JOSE L. ESCO,IDO* e7 a'. G. R. No. 1#!0++ Nove56e% (0* (//" FACTS 9avarro entered a Aease ,greement with Option to urchase with Targo :nterprises pertaining to two >(? motor vehicles. !he Targo :nterprises is owned b" spouses Taren Go and Glenn Go. Glenn Go >not Taren Go? and &oger 9avarro signed the said agreement. 9avarro0s checks bounced for lack of insufficienc" of funds. Taren Go filed two complaints before the &!' for replevin and/or sum of mone" with damages against 9avarro. !he &!' issued the writs of replevin for the seizure of the motor vehicles in 9avarroMs possession. &!' initiall" dismissed the complaints on the ground that the" failed to state a cause of action as Taren Go had no sufficient interest in the case. /ut in resolving the motion for reconsideration of Taren Go, the &!' held that Taren Go had sufficient interest but ordered the inclusion of Glenn Go in the case as re)uired in *ec. =, &ule = of the &O'.

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In the course of his petitions with the ', and *', 9avarro alleged the following5 >1? the two complaints stated no cause of action, since Taren Go was not a part" to the said Aease ,greementsH >(? a complaint which failed to state a cause of action could not be converted into one with a cause of action b" mere amendment or supplemental pleadingH and >;? the inclusion of Glenn Go as co$plaintiff drasticall" changed the theor" of the complaints, to his great pre%udice. ISSUE ,re spouses Taren and Glenn Go real parties in interestL RULING !he petition is denied. ,rticle 17E of the @amil" 'ode provides5 6,rt. 17E. !he con%ugal partnership shall be governed b" the rules on the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressl" determined in this 'hapter or b" the spouses in their marriage settlements8. In this connection, ,rticle 1E11 of the 'ivil 'ode provides that -JaK partner is a co$owner with the other partners of specific partnership propert"-. In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co$owners are real parties in interest. 4owever, pursuant to ,rticle =EF of the 'ivil 'ode and relevant %urisprudence, an" one of them ma" bring an action, an" kind of action, for the recover" of co$owned properties. !herefore, onl" one of the co$owners, namel" the co$owner who filed the suit for the recover" of the co$owned propert", is an indispensable part" thereto. !he other co$owners are not indispensable parties. !he" are not even necessar" parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co$owners. +nder this ruling, either of the spouses Go ma" bring an action against 9avarro to recover possession of the Targo :nterprises$leased vehicles which the" co$own. !his conclusion is consistent with ,rticle 1(= of the @amil" 'ode, supporting as it does the position that either spouse ma" act on behalf of the con%ugal partnership, so long as the" do not dispose of or encumber the propert" in )uestion without the other spouseMs consent. *ince Glenn Go is not strictl" an indispensable part" in the action to recover possession of the leased vehicles, he onl" needs to be impleaded as a pro$forma part" to the suit, based on *ection =, &ule = of the &ules, which states5 6*ection =. *pouses as parties. N 4usband and wife shall sue or be sued %ointl", except as provided b" law.8 +". MAR:WIN AL,ANOCSALES vs. MA:OR RE:NOLAN T. SALES a38 CA G. R. No. 10)+/! J2'1 1!* (//" FACTS .ar"win ,lbano *ales filed a case against her husband, .a"or &e"nolan !. *ales, for the dissolution of the con%ugal partnership and separation of properties. .a"or &e"nolan !. *ales filed a case for the declaration of nullit" of their marriage. !he two cases were consolidated and tried %ointl". !he &!' rendered %udgment declaring the
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marriage of .ar"win and &e"nolan void on the ground of mutual ps"chological incapacit". It also ordered the dissolution of their con%ugal partnership. ,fter the decision became final, .ar"win filed a motion for execution and a manifestation listing her assets with &e"nolan for the purpose of having them partitioned. &e"nolan opposed the motion arguing that the &!' 2ecision had ordered the distribution of their common properties without specif"ing what the" were. 4e also alleged that .ar"win appropriated the rentals of his properties and even disposed one of them without his consent, in violation of ,rticle 1=F of the @amil" 'ode. ,ccordingl", he pra"ed for the deferral of the resolution of the motion for execution, maintaining that no partition of properties can be had until after all the matters he raised are resolved after due notice and hearing. &!' ruled that reception of evidence is no longer necessar" because the parties were legall" married prior to its nullification and the fact that the" begot a son whom the" raised together proved that their connubial relations were more than merel" transient. !he ', ruled in favor of &e"nolan.

RULING !he instant petition is denied. !o emphasize, what is being )uestioned b" respondent was not reall" the 2ecision of the &!' declaring their marriage void ab initio on the ground of mutual ps"chological incapacit", but the Orders of the trial court dividing their common properties in accordance with the proposed pro%ect of partition without the benefit of a hearing. !he issue on the validit" of their marriage has long been settled in the main decision and ma" no longer be the sub%ect of review. Incidentall", however, there were matters of genuine concern that had to be addressed prior to the dissolution of the propert" relations of the parties as a result of the declaration of nullit" of their marriage. ,llegations regarding the collection of rentals without proper accounting, sale of common properties without the husbandMs consent and misappropriation of the proceeds thereof, are factual issues which have to be addressed in order to determine with certaint" the fair and reasonable division and distribution of properties due to each part". !he extent of properties due to respondent is not "et discernible without further presentation of evidence on the incidental matters he had previousl" raised before the &!'. "/. S-OUSES RO,ERTO ,UADO a38 VENUS ,UADO vs. CA* e7 a'. G. R. No. 1)#((( A$%&' ()* (//" FACTS *pouses &oberto and Cenus /uado >petitioners? filed a complaint for damages against :rlinda 9icol >:rlinda?. *aid action originated from :rlinda 9icolMs civil liabilit" arising from the criminal offense of slander filed against her b" petitioners. !he trial court rendered a decision ordering :rlinda to pa" damages commanding :rlinda to pa"
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=7,777.77 in moral damages, attorne"Ms fees and litigation expenses and exemplar" damages and the cost of suit of the plaintiff aside from "our lawful fees. @inding :rlinda 9icolMs personal properties insufficient to satisf" the %udgment, the 2eput" *heriff issued a notice of lev" on real propert" on execution addressed to the &egister of 2eeds. ,lmost a "ear later, &omulo 9icol >respondent?, the husband of :rlinda 9icol, filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminar" in%unction against petitioners and the deput" sheriff alleging that petitioners, connived and directl" levied upon and execute his real propert" without exhausting the personal properties of :rlinda 9icol. ISSUE Is the husband, who was not a part" to the suit but whose con%ugal propert" is being executed on account of the other spouse being the %udgment obligor, considered a -strangerLRULING In determining whether the husband is a stranger to the suit, the character of the propert" must be taken into account. In .ariano v. 'ourt of ,ppeals, which was later adopted in *pouses 'hing v. 'ourt of ,ppeals, this 'ourt held that the husband of the %udgment debtor cannot be deemed a -stranger- to the case prosecuted and ad%udged against his wife for an obligation that has redounded to the benefit of the con%ugal partnership. !here is no dispute that contested propert" is con%ugal in nature. ,rticle 1(( of the @amil" 'ode 1D explicitl" provides that pa"ment of personal debts contracted b" the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the con%ugal partnership except insofar as the" redounded to the benefit of the famil". +nlike in the s"stem of absolute communit" where liabilities incurred b" either spouse b" reason of a crime or )uasi$delict is chargeable to the absolute communit" of propert", in the absence or insufficienc" of the exclusive propert" of the debtor$spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the s"stem of con%ugal partnership of gains. !he con%ugal partnership of gains has no dut" to make advance pa"ments for the liabilit" of the debtor$spouse. arentheticall", b" no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed b" :rlinda redounded to the benefit of the con%ugal partnership. !o reiterate, con%ugal propert" cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted b" one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the con%ugal partnership.

8. O3 S2&39 Fa5&'1 Me56e%s

"1C ROSITO "(. EDWIN N. TRI,IANA vs. LOURDES M. TRI,IANA G. R. No. 1!0!#" Se$7e56e% 1!* (//) FACTS
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etitioner :dwin 9. !ribiana and Aourdes .. !ribiana are husband and wife who have lived together since 111D but formalized their union onl" in 111F. Aourdes filed a petition for habeas corpus before the &egional !rial 'ourt of /acoor, 'avite, claiming that :dwin left their con%ugal home with their daughter, Thriza .ae !ribiana. :dwin has since deprived Aourdes of lawful custod" of Thriza who was then onl" one >1? "ear and four >=? months of age. Aater, it turned out that Thriza was being held b" :dwinMs mother, &osalina !ribiana. :dwin moved to dismiss AourdesM petition on the ground that the petition failed to allege that earnest efforts at a compromise were made before its filing as re)uired b" ,rticle 1G1 of the @amil" 'ode. Aourdes filed her opposition to :dwinMs motion to dismiss claiming that there were prior efforts at a compromise, which failed. Aourdes attached to her opposition a cop" of the 'ertification to @ile ,ction from their /aranga" dated 1 .a" 111E. !he &!' denied :dwinMs motion to dismiss on the ground that the 'ertification to @ile ,ction attached b" Aourdes to her opposition clearl" indicates that the parties attempted to reach a compromise but failed. :dwin then filed with the 'ourt of ,ppeals a petition for prohibition and certiorari under &ule DG. !he appellate court denied :dwinMs petition. 4ence, the present petition. ISSUE #hether or not a 'ertificate to @ile ,ction attached to respondent0s Opposition to the petitioner0s .otion to 2ismiss and not to the respondent0s petition for habeas corpus effectivel" established that there was earnest efforts to settle the controvers" amicabl" and whether or not petitions for habeas corpus are exempt from the baranga" conciliation re)uirement RULING !he *upreme 'ourt dismissed the petition. Aourdes had complied with the condition precedent under ,rticle 1G1 of the @amil" 'ode. #hile it is true that the petition for habeas corpus filed b" Aourdes failed to allege that she resorted to compromise proceedings before filing the petition, however, in her opposition to :dwinMs motion to dismiss, Aourdes attached a /aranga" 'ertification to @ile ,ction dated 1 .a" 111E. :dwin does not dispute the authenticit" of the /aranga" 'ertification and its contents. !he certification effectivel" established that the parties tried to compromise but were unsuccessful in their efforts. !he 'ourt further ruled that the baranga" conciliation re)uirement in *ection =1( of the AG' does not appl" to habeas corpus proceedings where a person is -deprived of personal libert"-. In such a case, *ection =1( expressl" authorizes the parties -to go directl" to court- without need of an" conciliation proceedings. !here is deprivation of personal libert" warranting a petition for habeas corpus where the -rightful custod" of an" person is withheld from the person entitled thereto-. !hus, the 'ourt of ,ppeals did not err when it dismissed :dwinMs contentions on the additional ground that *ection =1( exempts petitions for habeas corpus from the baranga" conciliation re)uirement.

e. O3 Fa5&'1 Ho5e
"!. %os&7o
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"). %os&7o "#. -ERLA G. -ATRICIO vs. MARCELINO G. DARIO III G. R. No. 10/+(" Nove56e% (/* (// FACTS On <ul" G, 11EF, .arcelino C. 2ario died intestate. 4e was survived b" his wife, petitioner erla G. atricio and their two sons, .arcelino .arc 2ario and private respondent .arcelino G. 2ario III. On ,ugust 17, 11EF, petitioner, .arcelino .arc and private respondent, extra%udiciall" settled the estate of .arcelino C. 2ario. !hereafter, petitioner and .arcelino .arc formall" advised private respondent of their intention to partition the sub%ect propert" and terminate the co$ownership. rivate respondent refused to partition the propert" hence petitioner and .arcelino .arc instituted an action for partition before the &egional !rial 'ourt of Ruezon 'it". rivate respondent claims that the sub%ect propert" which is the famil" home dul" constituted b" spouses .arcelino and erla 2ario cannot be partitioned while a minor beneficiar" is still living therein namel", his 1($"ear$old son, who is the grandson of the decedent. 4e argues that as long as the minor is living in the famil" home, the same continues as such until the beneficiar" becomes of age. rivate respondent insists that even after the expiration of ten "ears from the date of death of .arcelino on <ul" G, 11EF, i.e., even after <ul" 111F, the sub%ect propert" continues to be considered as the famil" home considering that his minor son, .arcelino Aorenzo &. 2ario IC, who is a beneficiar" of the said famil" home, still resides in the premises. On the other hand, petitioner alleges that the sub%ect propert" remained as a famil" home of the surviving heirs of the late .arcelino C. 2ario onl" up to <ul" G, 111F, which was the 17th "ear from the date of death of the decedent. etitioner argues that the brothers .arcelino .arc and private respondent .arcelino III were alread" of age at the time of the death of their father, hence there is no more minor beneficiar" to speak of. ISSUE #hether partition of the famil" home is proper where one of the co$owners refuse to accede to such partition on the ground that a minor beneficiar" still resides in the said home. RULING !he law explicitl" provides that occupanc" of the famil" home either b" the owner thereof or b" 6an" of its beneficiaries8 must be actual. !hat which is 6actual8 is something real, or actuall" existing, as opposed to something merel" possible, or to
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something which is presumptive or constructive. ,ctual occupanc", however, need not be b" the owner of the house specificall". &ather, the propert" ma" be occupied b" the 6beneficiaries8 enumerated in ,rticle 1G= of the @amil" 'ode, which ma" include the in$ laws where the famil" home is constituted %ointl" b" the husband and wife. /ut the law definitel" excludes maids and overseers. !he" are not the beneficiaries contemplated b" the 'ode. ,rticle 1G= of the @amil" 'ode enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a famil" home5 >1? !he husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a famil"H and >(? !heir parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the famil" home and who depend upon the head of the famil" for legal support. !o be a beneficiar" of the famil" home, three re)uisites must concur5 >1? the" must be among the relationships enumerated in ,rt. 1G= of the @amil" 'odeH >(? the" live in the famil" homeH and >;? the" are dependent for legal support upon the head of the famil". .oreover, ,rticle 1G1 of the @amil" 'ode provides that the famil" home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the famil" for a period of 17 "ears or for as long as there is a minor beneficiar", and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. !his rule shall appl" regardless of whoever owns the propert" or constituted the famil" home. !he rule in ,rticle 1G1 of the @amil" 'ode ma" thus be expressed in this wise5 If there are beneficiaries who survive and are living in the famil" home, it will continue for 17 "ears, unless at the expiration of 17 "ears, there is still a minor beneficiar", in which case the famil" home continues until that beneficiar" becomes of age. " . JOSE E. HONRADO vs. COURT OF A--EALS* e7 a'. G. R. No. 1 !!! Nove56e% (#* (//# FACTS 2ecember 11, 111F, remium ,gro$Cet roducts, Inc. > remium? filed with the &!' of Ruezon 'it" a complaint for sum of mone" against <ose 4onrado, who was doing business under the name and st"le of <.:. 4onrado :nterprises. remium sought to collect the amount of (=7,FDG.77 representing the total price of veterinar" products purchased on credit b" 4onrado from 9ovember 1E, 111D until <une ;7, 111F. In a separate case and court, *pouses <ose and ,ndrerita 4onrado had filed a petition with the &!' of 'alamba 'it" for the %udicial constitution of the parcel of land registered in 4onrado0s name located in 'alamba, Aaguna, and the house thereon, as their famil" house.

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On @ebruar" (;, 1111, the &!' of Ruezon 'it" rendered %udgment in favor of remium. :ntr" of %udgment was made on ,pril (D, (777. , writ of execution was issued on .arch (1, (771 followed b" the *heriff0s lev"ing on the parcel of land. In the meantime, the &!' of 'alamba 'it" rendered a 2ecision on ,pril (1, (77(, declaring the propert" a famil" home. On .a" ;, (77(, 4onrado filed a .otion to 2eclare roperties :xempt from :xecution under ,rticle 1GG of the @amil" 'ode of the hilippines. It was alleged therein that the propert" is exempt from execution because it is a famil" home which had been constituted as such before he incurred his indebtedness with remium. !he petitioner further asserts that he and his famil" had been occup"ing the propert" as their famil" home as earl" as 111(. +nder ,rticle 1G; of the @amil" 'ode, his house was constituted as a famil" home in that "ear. !hus, even if he failed to contest the lev" on his propert" or move for the lifting thereof, the same cannot be deemed a waiver of his right to claim the exemption of his famil" home. 4e avers that his right cannot be waived, for it would be contrar" to public polic". !he private respondent avers that the petitioner is estopped from claiming that the propert" is exempt from execution and from assailing the lev" of the propert", the sale thereof at public auction and the *eptember 1E, (77( and ,pril 1=, (77; Orders of the &!'. It points out that the petitioner agreed to the lev" and sale of the propert" at public auctionH he even surrendered the ke" to the house and vacated the propert" after it was purchased b" the private respondent at the public auction. ISSUE #hether 4onrado0s failure to assert his claim for exemption of his famil" home from execution at the time of the lev" or within a reasonable time is fatal to his claim. RULING !he petition has no merit. !he petitioner admits to having been notified of the lev" of his propert" and of its sale at public auction. 4owever, he did not bother to ob%ect to the lev" and the pro%ected sale on the ground that the propert" and the house thereon was a famil" home. !he petitioner allowed the sale at public auction to proceed and the *heriff to execute a certificate of sale over the propert" in favor of the private respondent, as the highest bidder. #hile it is true that the famil" home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a famil" residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under ,rticle 1G; of the @amil" 'ode, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the *heriff before the sale of the propert" at public auction. @ailure to do so would estop the part" from later claiming the exemption.

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"0. MAR: JOSE-HINE GOMEZ vs. ROEL STA. INES* e7 a'. G. R. No. 1!(#!0 O47o6e% 1)* (//# FACTS .ar" <osephine and *ocorro Gomez against .arietta dela 'ruz *ta. Ines >.arietta? alleging that the" are the children of the deceased urificacion dela 'ruz Gomez who, during her lifetime, entrusted her rice land to .arietta, for the latter to manage and supervise. !he" further alleged that the" have demanded for an accounting of the produce of said rice land while under the management of .arietta, and for the return of the !'! to the propert", but the latter refused, thus compelling the sisters to file a civil case before the asig &!'. On (= <anuar" 11E1, the trial court rendered %udgment against .arietta. ,fter said %udgment became final and executor", a writ of execution was issued b" the asig &!', b" virtue of which, a parcel of land >with improvements? registered in the name of .arietta dela 'ruz *ta. Ines, was levied upon b" the *heriff to satisf" the damages awarded in the civil case. *aid propert" was sold at a public auction on (G ,ugust 111( to .ar" <osephine as the highest bidder. !he sale was registered with the &egister of 2eeds on *eptember 1F, 111(. On 1( <ul" 111;, a complaint for annulment of said sale was filed before the &!' b" 4inahon *ta. Ines together with 9oel, &oel, and <annette, all named *ta. Ines, husband and children of .arietta, respectivel", against .ar" <osephine and *heriff @laviano /algos, <r. on the ground that said house and lot sold during the public auction is their famil" residence, and is thus exempt from execution under *ection 1(>a?, &ule ;1 of the &ules of 'ourt, and under ,rticle 1GG of the @amil" 'ode. ,ccording to respondents, the house and lot was constituted %ointl" b" 4inahon and .arietta as their famil" home from the time the" occupied the same as a famil" residence in 11F( and that under *ection 1G; of the @amil" 'ode, there is no longer an" need to constitute the said propert" as famil" home, whether %udiciall" or extra%udiciall", because it became such b" operation of law. ISSUE #hether a house and lot ma" be exempted from writ of execution in satisfaction of debts incurred prior to the constitution of the famil" home. RULING +nder ,rticle 1GG of the @amil" 'ode, the famil" home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment except for, among other things, debts incurred prior to the constitution of the famil" home. In the case at bar, the house and lot of respondents was not constituted as a famil" home, whether %udiciall" or extra%udiciall", at the time .arietta incurred her debts. +nder prevailing %urisprudence, it is deemed constituted as such onl" upon the effectivit" of the @amil" 'ode on 7; ,ugust 11EE, thus, the debts were incurred before the constitution of the famil" home. 9either is it correct to sa" that
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the obligation sought to be satisfied b" the lev" of the propert" was incurred onl" upon the issuance of the %udgment in the original case in <anuar" of 11E1. .arietta0s liabilit", which was the basis of the %udgment, arose long before the levied propert" was constituted as a famil" home b" operation of law in ,ugust 11EE. +nder the circumstances, it is clear that the liabilit" incurred b" .arietta falls s)uarel" under one of the instances when a famil" home ma" be the sub%ect of execution, forced sale, or attachment, as provided for b" ,rticle 1GG of the @amil" 'ode, particularl", to answer for debts incurred prior to the constitution of the famil" home.

"+. VILMA G. ARRIOLA vs. JOHN NA,OR C. ARRIOLA G. R. No. 1000/! Ja32a%1 (+* (//+ FACTS <ohn 9abor '. ,rriola >respondent? filed *pecial 'ivil ,ction for %udicial partition of properties of decedent @idel ,rriola against ,nthon" &onald G. ,rriola and Cilma G. ,rriola >petitioners?. &espondent is the son of decedent @idel with his first wife Cictoria '. 'alabia, while petitioner ,nthon" is the son of decedent @idel with his second wife, petitioner Cilma. !he &!' granted the partition of a parcel of land. ,s the parties failed to agree on how to partition among them the land, respondent sought its sale through public auction, and petitioners acceded to it. 4owever, it had to be reset when petitioners refused to include in the auction the house >sub%ect house? standing on the sub%ect land, arguing that there0s no mention of the house in the decision of the &!'. &espondent claims that the sub%ect house was built b" decedent @idel on his exclusive propert". !here is then no dispute that the sub%ect house is part of the estate of the deceased. etitioners add that said house has been their residence for (7 "ears. !he case reaches all the wa" to the *upreme 'ourt, hence this case. ISSUE #hether the sub%ect house should be included in the public auction of the sub%ect land. RULING !he *upreme 'ourt ruled that the sub%ect house is covered b" the %udgment of partition. 4owever, this ruling does not necessaril" countenance the immediate and actual partition of the sub%ect house b" wa" of public auction in view of the suspensive proscription imposed under ,rticle 1G1 of !he @amil" 'ode. !aken together, the averments on record establish that the sub%ect house is a famil" home within the contemplation of the provisions of !he @amil" 'ode, particularl" ,rticles 1G( and 1G;, the automatic constitution of the famil" home from the time of its occupation as a famil" residence, without need an"more for the %udicial or extra%udicial processes. @urthermore, ,rticles 1G( and 1G; specificall" extend the scope of the famil" home not
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%ust to the dwelling structure in which the famil" resides but also to the lot on which it stands. !hus, appl"ing these concepts, the sub%ect house as well as the specific portion of the sub%ect land on which it stands are deemed constituted as a famil" home b" the deceased and petitioner Cilma from the moment the" began occup"ing the same as a famil" residence (7 "ears back. It being settled that the sub%ect house >and the sub%ect lot on which it stands? is the famil" home of the deceased and his heirs, the same is shielded from immediate partition under ,rticle 1G1 of !he @amil" 'ode, vi85 ,rticle 1G1. !he famil" home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the famil" for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiar", and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of hoever o ns the property or constituted the family home.>:mphasis supplied.? ,rticle 1G1 imposes the proscription against the immediate partition of the famil" home regardless of its ownership. !his signifies that even if the famil" home has passed b" succession to the co$ownership of the heirs, or has been willed to an" one of them, this fact alone cannot transform the famil" home into an ordinar" propert", much less dispel the protection cast upon it b" the law. !he rights of the individual co$owner or owner of the famil" home cannot sub%ugate the rights granted under ,rticle 1G1 to the beneficiaries of the famil" home. !he famil" home $$ consisting of the sub%ect house and lot on which it stands $$ cannot be partitioned at this time, even if it has passed to the co$ownership of his heirs, the parties herein. 2ecedent @idel died on .arch 17, (77;. !hus, for 17 "ears from said date or until .arch 17, (71;, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiar" residing therein, the famil" home he constituted cannot be partitioned, much less when no compelling reason exists for the court to otherwise set aside the restriction and order the partition of the propert". 'onse)uentl", its actual and immediate partition cannot be sanctioned until the lapse of a period of 17 "ears from the death of @idel ,rriola, or until .arch 17, (71;. It bears emphasis, however, that in the meantime, there is no obstacle to the immediate public auction of the portion of the sub%ect land, which falls outside the specific area of the famil" home. !he petition was -ARTL: GRANTED and the land was DECLARED part of the co$ ownership of the parties <ohn 9abor '. ,rriola, Cilma G.,rriola and ,nthon" &onald G. ,rriola but EGEM-TED from partition b" public auction within the period provided for in ,rticle 1G1 of the @amil" 'ode.

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<. O3 S7a72s a38 F&'&a7&o3 o< Ch&'8%e3

"". MACADANGDANG vs. COURT OF A--EALS G. R. No. LC)"#)( Se$7e56e% 1(* 1"+/ FACTS !he records show that respondent :lizabeth .e%ias is a married woman, her husband being 'rispin ,nahaw *he allegedl" had intercourse with petitioner ,ntonio .acadangdang sometime in .arch, 11DF. *he also alleges that due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 11DF. On October ;7, 11DF >F months or (17 da"s following the illicit encounter?, she gave birth to a bab" bo" who was named &olando .acadangdang. !he records also disclose that on ,pril (G, 11F(, respondent >then plaintiff? filed a complaint for recognition and support against petitioner >then defendant? with the 'ourt of @irst Instance of 2avao, /ranch I[. !he lower court dismissed the complaint. ,n appeal was made to the 'ourt of ,ppeals which reversed the lower court0s decision. 4ence, petitioner filed this petition on <anuar" 1(, 11F1. ISSUE #hether or not the wife ma" institute an action that would bastardize her child without giving her husband, the legall" presumed father, an opportunit" to be heard. RULING *ince respondent and her husband continued to live in the same province, the fact remains that there was alwa"s the possibilit" of access to each other. ,s has alread" been pointed out, respondentMs self$serving statements were never corroborated nor confirmed b" an" other evidence, more particularl", that of her husband. !he bab" bo" sub%ect of this controvers" was born on October ;7, 11DF, onl" seven >F? months after .arch, 11DF when the -incident- or first illicit intercourse between respondent and petitioner took place, and also, seven months from their separation >if there reall" was a separation?. It must be noted that as of .arch, 11DF, respondent and 'rispin ,nahaw had alread" four childrenH hence, the" had been married "ears before such date. !he birth of &olando came more than one hundred eight" 1E7 da"s following the celebration of the said marriage and before ;77 da"s following the alleged separation between aforenamed spouses. +nder ,rticle (GG of the 'ivil 'ode, the child &olando is conclusivel" presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her husband. !he fact that the child was born a mere seven >F? months after the initial sexual contact between petitioner and respondent is another proof that the said child was not of petitioner since, from indications, he came out as a normal full$term bab".
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!he child &olando is presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her spouse. !his presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there was ph"sical impossibilit" of access between the spouses in the first 1(7 da"s of the ;77 which preceded the birth of the child. !his presumption is actuall" )uasi$conclusive and ma" be rebutted or refuted b" onl" one evidence N the ph"sical impossibilit" of access between husband and wife within the first 1(7 da"s of the ;77 which preceded the birth of the child. !his ph"sical impossibilit" of access ma" be caused b" an" of these5 1. Impotence of the husbandH (. Aiving separatel" in such a wa" that access was impossible and ;. *erious illness of the husband. !he decision of the 'ourt of ,ppeals was reversed. 1//. JINDIE DE JESUS AND JACQUELINE DE JESUS* 5&3o%s* %e$%ese37e8 61 7he&% 5o7he%* CAROLINA DE JESUS vs. THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAM,OA DIZON G. R. No. 1)(+00 O47o6e% (* (//1 FACTS 2anilo /. de <esus and 'arolina ,ves de <esus got married on (; ,ugust 11D=. It was during this marriage that <ac)ueline ,. de <esus and <inkie 'hristie ,. de <esus, herein petitioners, were born, the former on 71 .arch 11F1 and the latter on 7D <ul" 11E(. In a notarized document, dated 7F <une 1111, <uan G. 2izon acknowledged <ac)ueline and <inkie de <esus as being his own illegitimate children b" 'arolina ,ves de <esus. <uan G. 2izon died intestate on 1( .arch 111(, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and some real propert". It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgement that petitioners filed a complaint on 71 <ul" 111; for - artition with Inventor" and ,ccounting- of the 2izon estate with the &egional !rial 'ourt, /ranch EE, of Ruezon 'it". &espondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent <uan G. 2izon, including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder argued that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses 2anilo de <esus and 'arolina de <esus to instead be the illegitimate children of 'arolina de <esus and deceased <uan 2izon. @inding credence in the argument of respondents, the trial court, ultimatel", dismissed the complaint of petitioners for lack of cause of action and for being improper. etitioners assail the order of the trial court in the instant petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE
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#hether recognition as being illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself sufficient to establish their status as such and does not re)uire a separate action for %udicial approval. RULING , scrutin" of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. !he certificates of live birth would also identif" 2anilo de <esus as being their father. !here is perhaps no presumption of the law more firml" established and founded on sounder moralit" and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. this presumption indeed becomes 4o34'2s&ve in the absence of proof that there is ph"sical impossibilit" of access between the spouses during the first 1(7 da"s of the ;77 da"s which immediatel" precedes the birth of the child due to >a? the ph"sical incapacit" of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wifeH >b? the fact the husband and wife are living separatel" in such a wa" that sexual intercourse is not possibleH or >c? serious illness of the husband, which absolutel" prevents sexual intercourse. Ruite remarkabl", upon the expiration of the periods set forth in ,rticle 1F7, and in proper cases ,rticle 1F1, of the @amil" 'ode, the action to impugn the legitimac" of a child would no longer be legall" feasible and the status conferred b" the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable. *uccinctl", in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late <uan G. 2izon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of 2anilo de <esus and 'arolina ,ves de <esus. !his step cannot be aptl" done because the law itself establishes the legitimac" of children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The $%es25$7&o3 o< 'e9&7&5a41 <&>es a 4&v&' s7a72s <o% 7he 4h&'8 6o%3 &3 we8'o4A* a38 o3'1 7he <a7he%*1; o% &3 e>4e$7&o3a' &3s7a34es 7he 'a77e%Fs he&%s* 4a3 4o37es7 &3 a3 a$$%o$%&a7e a47&o3 7he 'e9&7&5a41 o< a 4h&'8 6o%3 7o h&s w&<e. Th2s* &7 &s o3'1 whe3 7he 'e9&7&5a41 o< a 4h&'8 has 6ee3 s244ess<2''1 &5$293e8 7ha7 7he $a7e%3&71 o< 7he h2s6a38 4a3 6e %e;e47e8. !he rule that the written acknowledgement made b" the deceased <uan G. 2izon establishes petitionersM alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validl" invoked to be of an" relevance in this instance. #hether petitioners are indeed the acknowledge illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptl" ad%udicated without an action having been first instituted to impugn their legitimac" as being the children of 2anilo /. de <esus and 'arolina ,ves de <esus born in lawful wedlock. <urisprudence is strongl" settled that the paramount declaration of legitimac" b" law cannot be attacked collaterall". Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother ma" have declared against its legitimac" or ma" have been sentenced as having been an adulteress. !he petition was 2:9I:2.

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1/1. GERARDO ,. CONCE-CION vs. COURT OF A--EALS G. R. No. 1(!)#/ A292s7 !1* (//# FACTS Gerardo 'oncepcion and .a. !heresa ,lmonte were married on 2ecember (1, 11E1. ,lmost a "ear later, on 2ecember E, 1117, .a. !heresa gave birth to <ose Gerardo. !heir relationship turned out to be short$lived, however. On 2ecember 11, 1111, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to .a. !heresa annulled on the ground of bigam". 4e alleged that nine "ears before he married .a. !heresa on 2ecember 17, 11E7, she had married one .ario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled. !he trial court ruled that .a. !heresa0s marriage to .ario was valid and subsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared <ose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. !he custod" of the child was awarded to .a. !heresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. .a. !heresa moved for the reconsideration of the above decision 6I9*O@,& O9A3 as that portion of the decision which granted to the petitioner so$called Vvisitation rights arguing that there was nothing in the law granting 6visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child.8 J *he further maintained that <ose Gerardo0s surname should be changed from 'oncepcion to ,lmonte, her maiden name, following the rule that an illegitimate child shall use the mother0s surname. Gerardo ob%ected until the case reached all the wa" to the *upreme 'ourt, the present case. ISSUE #hether the husband in a second marriage declared to be null and void because of bigam", can impose his surname to their child. RULING !he status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. ,rticle 1D= of the @amil" 'ode is clear. , child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. ,s a guarant" in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimac", ,rticle 1DF of the @amil" 'ode provides5 Article (,'. !he child shall "e considered legitimate although the mother ma have declared against its legitimac or ma have "een sentenced as an adulteress Gerardo invokes ,rticle 1DD >1?>b? of the @amil" 'ode. 4e cannot. 4e has no standing in law to dispute the status of <ose Gerardo. Onl" .a. !heresa0s husband .ario or, in a proper case, his heirs, who can contest the legitimac" of the child <ose Gerardo born to his wife. Impugning the legitimac" of a child is a strictl" personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of 4erardo and Ca. !heresa was void from the ver "eginning, he never "ecame her hus"and and thus never ac5uired an right to impugn the legitimac of her child .
1F;

!he presumption of legitimac" proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularl" during the period of conception. !o overthrow this presumption on the basis of ,rticle 1DD >1?>b? of the @amil" 'ode, it must be shown be"ond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the husband to father the child. *exual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted b" evidence to the contrar". !he presumption is )uasi$conclusive and ma" be refuted onl" b" the evidence of ph"sical impossibilit" of coitus between husband and wife within the first 1(7 da"s of the ;77 da"s which immediatel" preceded the birth of the child. !o rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such as to make marital intimac" impossible. !his ma" take place, for instance, when the" reside in different countries or provinces and the" were never together during the period of conception. Or, the husband was in prison during the period of conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place through the violation of prison regulations. J;=K ublic polic" demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child. Otherwise, the child will be at the merc" of those who ma" be so minded to exploit his defenselessness. .oreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his birth. ,lthough a record of birth or birth certificate ma" be used as primar" evidence of the filiation of a child, as the status of a child is determined b" the law itself, proof of filiation is necessar" onl" when the legitimac" of the child is being )uestioned, or when the status of a child born after ;77 da"s following the termination of marriage is sought to be established. , person0s surname or famil" name identifies the famil" to which he belongs and is passed on from parent to child. 4ence, Gerardo cannot impose his surname on <ose Gerardo who is, in the e"es of the law, not related to him in an" wa". 1/(. JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS vs. FELICIDAD SANDOVAL G. R. No. 10""(( De4e56e% 1 * (//+ FACTS !he parents of <uan and !eofilo 2e 2ios 'arlos left man" parcels of land to the two. #hen !eofilo died, this issue came out. etitioner <uan 2e 2ios 'arlos filed a civil case asserting that the marriage between his late brother !eofilo and respondent @elicidad was a nullit" in view of the absence of the re)uired marriage license. 4e likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent !eofilo 'arlos II.

1F=

On October 1D, 111G, respondents submitted their answer. !he" denied the material averments of petitionerMs complaint. &espondents contended that the dearth of details regarding the re)uisite marriage license did not invalidate @elicidadMs marriage to !eofilo. &espondents declared that !eofilo II was the illegitimate child of the deceased !eofilo 'arlos with another woman. ISSUES #hether a bare allegation that the respondent was adopted from an indigent couple is sufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his putative filiation. RULING +pon !eofiloMs death in 111(, all his propert", rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance are transmitted to his compulsor" heirs. !hese heirs were respondents @elicidad and !eofilo II, as the surviving spouse and child. Indeed, onl" the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes collateral relatives from succeeding to the estate of the decedent. !he presence of legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the deceased precludes succession b" collateral relatives. 'onversel", if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent. If respondent !eofilo II is declared and finall" proven not to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of !eofilo, petitioner would then have a personalit" to seek the nullit" of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent @elicidad. 'learl", the legal personalit" of petitioner to bring the nullit" of marriage case is contingent upon the final declaration that !eofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate son of !eofilo. #e agree with the ', that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, petitionerMs bare allegation that respondent !eofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple is insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his putative filiation. 4owever, #e are not inclined to support its pronouncement that the declaration of respondent @elicidad as to the illegitimate filiation of respondent !eofilo II is more credible. @or the guidance of the appellate court, such declaration of respondent @elicidad should not be afforded credence. #e remind the ', of the guarant" provided b" ,rticle 1DF of the @amil" 'ode to protect the status of legitimac" of a child, to wit5 ,&!I'A: 1DF. !he child shall be considered legitimate although the mother ma" have declared against its legitimac" or ma" have been sentenced as an adulteress. >+nderscoring supplied? It is stressed that @elicidadMs declaration against the legitimate status of !eofilo II is the ver" act that is proscribed b" ,rticle 1DF of the @amil" 'ode. !he language of the law is unmistakable. ,n assertion b" the mother against the legitimac" of her child cannot affect the legitimac" of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage.

1FG

!he case was remanded to the &!' in regard to the action on the status and filiation of respondent !eofilo 'arlos II. 1/!. CAMELO CA,ATANIA vs. COURT OF A--EALS* e7. a' G. R. No. 1()+1) O47o6e% (1* (//) FACTS !his controvers" stemmed from a petition for recognition and support filed b" @lorencia &egodos in behalf of her minor son, private respondent 'amelo &egodos. @lorencia was a maid of the petitioner 'amelo 'abatania. 'abatania brought her to /acolod 'it" where the" checked in at the Cisa"an .otel and had sexual intercourse. 'abatania promised to support @lorencia if she got pregnant. @lorencia claimed she discovered she was carr"ing petitioner0s child (F da"s after their sexual encounter. !he sexual intercourse was repeated in .arch 11E( in *an 'arlos 'it". etitioner 'amelo 'abatania0s version was different. 4e testified that he was a sugar planter and a businessman. *ometime in 2ecember, 11E1, he hired @lorencia as a servant at home. 2uring the course of her emplo"ment, she would often go home to her husband in the afternoon and return to work the following morning. !his displeased petitioner0s wife, hence she was told to look for another %ob. etitioner was therefore surprised when summons was served on him b" @lorencia0s counsel. *he was demanding support for private respondent 'amelo &egodos. etitioner refused, den"ing the alleged paternit". 4e insisted she was alread" pregnant when the" had sex. !he trial court0s finding of a paternal relationship between petitioner and private respondent was based on the testimon" of the child0s mother and -the personal appearance of the child.ISSUE #hether or not there0s a paternal relationship between the child and the herein petitioner for the granting of support. RULING !he fact that @lorencia0s husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though the mother ma" have declared against its legitimac" or ma" have been sentenced as an adulteress. !he presumption of legitimac" does not onl" flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural %ustice and the supposed virtue of the mother. !he presumption is grounded on the polic" to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimac".
1FD

In this age of genetic profiling and deox"ribonucleic acid >29,? anal"sis, the extremel" sub%ective test of ph"sical resemblance or similarit" of features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternit" and filiation before the courts of law. 1/). MARISSA ,ENITEZC,ADUA vs. COURT OF A--EALS G. R. No. 1/# (# Ja32a%1 ()* 1"") FACTS !he facts show that the spouses Cicente /enitez and Isabel 'hipongian owned various properties especiall" in Aaguna >both were alread" dead?. !he fight for administration of CicenteMs estate ensued. On *eptember (=, 1117, private respondents Cictoria /enitez$Airio and @eodor /enitez ,guilar >CicenteMs sister and nephew, respectivel"? instituted *p. roc. pra"ing for the issuance of letters of administration of CicenteMs estate in favor of private respondent ,guilar. !he" alleged, that the decedent is survived b" no other heirs or relatives be the" ascendants or descendants, whether legitimate, illegitimate or legall" adopted and that one .arissa /enitez$/adua who was raised and cared b" them since childhood is, in fact, not related to them b" blood, nor legall" adopted, and is therefore not a legal heir. On 9ovember (, 1117, petitioner opposed the petition. *he >/enitez$/adua? alleged that she is the sole heir of the deceased Cicente /enitez and capable of administering his estate, rel"ing on the applicabilit" of ,rticles 1D=, 1DD, 1F7 and 1F1 of the @amil" 'ode. ISSUE #hether or not the petitioner is a legitimate daughter and sole heir of the deceased spouses. RULING etition has no merit. etitionerMs insistence on the applicabilit" of ,rticles 1D=, 1DD, 1F7 and 1F1 of the @amil" 'ode to the case at bench cannot be sustained. , careful reading of the these articles will show that the" do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. &ather, these articles govern a situation where a husband >or his heirs? denies as his own a child of his wife. !hus, under ,rticle 1DD, it is the hus"and who can impugn the legitimac" of said child b" proving5 >1? it was ph"sicall" impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 1(7 da"s of the ;77 da"s which immediatel" preceded the birth of the childH >(? that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his childH >;? that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification b" either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. ,rticles 1F7 and 1F1 reinforce this reading as the" speak of the prescriptive period within which the hus"and or an of his heirs should file the action
1FF

impugning the legitimac" of said child. 2oubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to appl" these articles to the case at bench. @or the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Cicente are contending that petitioner is not his child b" Isabel. &ather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Cicente and Isabel. 1/#. TEOFISTA ,A,IERA vs. -RESENTACION ,. CATOTAL G. R. No. 1!+)+" J23e 1#* (/// FACTS resentacion /. 'atotal filed with the &egional !rial 'ourt of Aanao del 9orte, /ranch II, Iligan 'it", a petition for the cancellation of the entr" of birth of !eofista /abiera in the 'ivil &egistr" of Iligan 'it". @rom the petition filed, resentacion asserted -that she is the onl" surviving child of the late spouses :ugenio /abiera and 4ermogena 'ariBosa, who died on .a" (D, 111D and <ul" D, 1117 respectivel"H that on *eptember (7, 111D a bab" girl was delivered b" -hilot- in the house of spouses :ugenio and 4ermogena /abiera and without the knowledge of said spouses, @lora Guinto, the mother of the child and a housemaid of spouses :ugenio and 4ermogena /abiera, caused the registration/recording of the facts of birth of her child, b" simulating that she was the child of the spouses :ugenio, then DG "ears old and 4ermogena, then G= "ears old, and made 4ermogena /abiera appear as the mother b" forging her signatureH that petitioner, then 1G "ears old, saw with her own e"es and personall" witnessed @lora Guinto give birth to !eofista Guinto, in their house, assisted b" -hilot-H that the birth certificate of !eofista Guinto is void ab initio, as it was totall" a simulated birth, signature of informant forged. 4ence this petition on the ground that it being an attack on the legitimac" of the respondent as the child of the spouses :ugenio /abiera and 4ermogena 'ariBosa /abiera. ISSUE #hether or not ,rticle 1F1 of the @amil" 'ode on impugnit" of filiation is applicable in this case. RULING ,rticle 1F1 of the @amil" 'ode is not applicable to the present case. , close reading of this provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimac" of his wifeMs child. !he provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. !he present case alleges and shows that 4ermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other words, the pra"er herein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of 4ermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latterMs child at all. Ceril", the present action does not impugn petitionerMs filiation to *pouses :ugenio and 4ermogena /abiera, because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place.
1FE

1/ . WILLIAM LI:AO* JR. vs. JUANITA TANHOTICLI:AO* e7. a'. G. R. No. 1!+" 1 Ma%4h 0*(//( FACTS 'orazon G. Garcia is legall" married to but living separatel" from &amon .. 3ulo for more than ten >17? "ears at the time of the institution of the said civil case. 'orazon cohabited with the late #illiam Ai"ao from 11DG up to the time of #illiam0s untimel" demise on 2ecember (, 11FG. !he" lived together in the compan" of 'orazon0s two >(? children from her subsisting marriage, namel"5:nri)ue and /ernadette, both surnamed 3ulo, !his was with the knowledge of #illiam Ai"ao0s legitimate children, !ita &ose A. !an and Ainda 'hristina Ai"ao$Ortiga, from his subsisting marriage with <uanita !anhoti Ai"ao On <une 1, 11FG, 'orazon gave birth to #illiam Ai"ao, <r. at the 'ardinal *antos .emorial 4ospital . 2uring her three >;? da" sta" at the hospital, #illiam Ai"ao visited and sta"ed with her. ,ll the medical and hospital expenses, food and clothing were paid under the account of #illiam Ai"ao. #illiam Ai"ao even asked his confidential secretar", .rs. Cirginia &odriguez, to secure a cop" of /ill"0s birth certificate. 4e likewise instructed 'orazon to open a bank account for /ill" with the 'onsolidated /ank and !rust 'ompan" and gave weekl" amounts to be deposited therein. #illiam Ai"ao would bring /ill" to the office, introduce him as his good looking son and had their pictures taken together. *ince birth, /ill" had been in continuous possession and en%o"ment of the status of a recognized and/or acknowledged child of #illiam Ai"ao b" the latter0s direct and overt acts. #illiam Ai"ao supported /ill" and paid for his food, clothing and other material needs !he trial court rendered a decision declaring the minor #illiam Ai"ao, <r. as the illegitimate >spurious? son of the deceased #illiam Ai"ao. In ruling for herein petitioner, the trial court said it was convinced b" preponderance of evidence that the deceased #illiam Ai"ao sired #illiam Ai"ao, <r. since the latter was conceived at the time when 'orazon Garcia cohabited with the deceased. !he trial court observed that herein petitioner had been in continuous possession and en%o"ment of the status of a child of the deceased b" direct and overt acts of the latter such as securing the birth certificate of petitioner through his confidential secretar", .rs. Cirginia &odriguezH openl" and publicl" acknowledging petitioner as his sonH providing sustenance and even introducing herein petitioner to his legitimate children. !he 'ourt of ,ppeals, reversed the ruling of the trial court
1F1

ISSUES 1. .a" petitioner impugn his own legitimac" to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father, #illiam Ai"aoL (. 2o the acts of :nri)ue and /ernadette 3ulo, the undisputed children of 'orazon Garcia with &amon 3ulo, in testif"ing for herein petitioner amount to impugnation of the legitimac" of the latterL RULING 1. 9O. +nder the 9ew 'ivil 'ode, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. !he fact that 'orazon Garcia had been living separatel" from her husband, &amon 3ulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. !he presumption of legitimac" of the child, however, is not conclusive and conse)uentl", ma" be overthrown b" evidence to the contrar". ,rticle (GG of the 9ew 'ivil 'ode provides5 ,rticle (GG. 'hildren born after one hundred and eight" da"s following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred da"s following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. ,gainst this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the ph"sical impossibilit" of the husband having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twent" da"s of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child. !his ph"sical impossibilit" ma" be caused5 1? /" the impotence of the husbandH (? /" the fact that husband and wife were living separatel" in such a wa" that access was not possibleH ;? /" the serious illness of the husband. #hile ph"sical impossibilit" for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the legitimac" of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimac" of the child mentioned in ,rticle (GG of the 'ivil 'ode ma" onl" be invoked b" the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under ,rticle (D( of the 'ivil 'ode. Impugning the legitimac" of the child is a strictl" personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directl" confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelit" of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelit" or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is onl" in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimac". Outside of these cases, none $ even his heirs $ can impugn legitimac"H that would amount o an insult to his memor".
1E7

It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated b" 'orazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition b" respondents of petitioner #illiam Ai"ao, <r, as the illegitimate son of the late #illiam Ai"ao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother ma" have declared against its legitimac" or ma" have been sentenced as an adulteress. #e cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that onl" the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimac" of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. !he child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimac" of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mother0s alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimac" is overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternit" of the husband who successfull" defeated the presumption. (. 9o. ,s earlier stated, it is onl" in exceptional cases that the heirs of the husband are allowed to contest the legitimac" of the child. !here is nothing on the records to indicate that &amon 3ulo has alread" passed awa" at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of this proceedings. 9otabl", the case at bar was initiated b" petitioner himself through his mother, 'orazon Garcia, and not through :nri)ue and /ernadette 3ulo. It is settled that the legitimac" of the child can be impugned onl" in a direct action brought for that purpose, b" the proper parties and within the period limited b" law. 1/0. VOLTAIRE AR,OLARIO* e7 a'. vs. COURT OF A--EALS G. R. No. 1("1 ! A$%&' ((* (//! FACTS *pouses ,nselmo and .acaria /alo"o, original owners of controverted Aot ;(;, Ilog 'adastre, had five children. Of the five, ,gueda was the first child, who had two children5 ,ntonio 'olino and Irene 'olinco, the latter predeceasing his three daughters, &uth, Orpha and Goldelina >who with Irene 'olinco are the %es$o38e37s of this case?. *econd was 'atalina, who was married to <uan ,rbolario with whom she had one child named urificacion. urificacion died a spinster without issue. &ecords disclose that decedent urificacionMs father ><uan? cohabited with another woman to whom were born $e7&7&o3e%s* Coltaire, @e, Aucena, :xaltacion and 'arlos >the ,rbolarios? who were all born before 11G1. !hird and fourth were :duardo and Gaudencia who each conve"ed their interests in the lot, respectivel", to their sister ,gueda b" sale and to their two nieces, Irene and urificacion. @ifth and last child was <ulian, who married but died without issue.
1E1

,ll five >who at the time of the filing of this case have alread" died?, executed in 11G1 a notarized declaration of heirship as the onl" heirs of the /alo"o spouses. It is with these foregoing facts that respondents, executed a declaration ad%udicating upon themselves their proportionate or ideal shares in the controverted lot and filed a civil case against the *alha" spouses to recover possession of the portion which the *alha"s claim to have been purchased b" them from urificacion. /efore hearing, the ,rbolarios %oined the *alha"s in contending that the declaration of heirship and partition b" the 'olincos was defective for having excluded them. !he" alleged that the" were intestate heirs of their half sister urificacionH that 'atalina /alo"o died in 117; and that the cohabitation between their father and their natural mother was b" virtue of a valid subse)uent marriage. !he &!' found for the ,rbolarios holding that the" were the brothers and sisters of urificacion. !he ', however, reversed the &!', holding that the union of <uan with the mother of the ,rbolariosM was extramarital, the petitioners having been born before 'atalinaMs death as shown in the 11G1 declaration of heirship and absent proof that the prior union of 'atalina and <uan ,rbolario lawfull" ended before the said "ear. 'onse)uentl", the ', ruled the ,rbolarios as illegitimate siblings of urificacion and thus barred b" ,rticle 11( of the 'ivil 'ode from inheriting intestate from the legitimate children of their father. ISSUE #hether the ,rbolarios were illegitimate siblings of urificacion dis)ualif"ing them from being intestate heirs of the latter under the 'ivil 'ode. RULING etition has no merit. @irst.!he 11G1 declaration reveals that the "ear of 'atalinaMs death was intercalated. @urther, the paragraph )uoted b" petitioners showed a chronological progression in the heirsM "ears of death where 'atalinaMs name came after :duardo /alo"oMs who died in 11=FH so it would be impossible for 'atalina to have died in 117;. *econd. !here is no solid basis for the argument that the marriage of <uan and petitionersM natural mother was valid. :ven granting that 'atalina died in 117;, it does not follow that %ust because a man0s first wife has died, he is conclusivel" married to the woman who bore his children absent a marriage certificate or a generall" accepted proof which is necessar" to establish the marriage as an indisputable fact. !hird. 'lear and substantial evidence is re)uired to support the claim of petitioners that the" were preterited from the 11G1 declaration. ,rtice (D1 of the 9ew 'ivil 'ode provides that there is no presumption of legitimac" or illegitimac" in this %urisdiction and whoever alleges the legitimac" or illegitimac" of a child born after the dissolution of a prior marriage or the separation of spouses must introduce such evidence to prove his
1E(

or her allegation. It is therefore the ,rbolarios, claiming to be born under a validl" contracted subse)uent marriage, who must show proof of their legitimac". /ut the" miserabl" failed to do so. aternit" or filiation, or the lack of it, is a relationship that must be %udiciall" established. It stands to reason that children born within wedlock are legitimate. *ince petitioners failed to prove the fact of marriage between their parents, the" cannot invoke a presumption of legitimac" in their favor. 1/+. MA. THERESEA AL,ERTO vs. COURT OF A--EALS G. R. No. + !" J23e (* 1"") FACTS On *ept. 1E, 11G;, a child named .a. !heresa ,lberto was born out of wedlock to one ,urora Teniva with <uan .. ,lberto as the alleged @ather. On *ept. 1E, 11DF, <uan .. ,lberto dide intestate. 4is widow 3olanda &. ,lberto was appointed as the administratrix of the estate of <uan .. ,lberto. ,fter the Inventor" and ,ppraisal and the ,dministratrix0 ,ccounting were approved on ,ugust 1, 11F7 and on ,pril (1, 11F1 respectivel", the proceedings were ordered closed and terminated. On *eptember 1G, 11FE, .a. !herese ,lberto filed a motion for leave to intervene as oppositor and to re$open the proceedings pra"ing that she be declared to have ac)uired the status of a natural child and as such, entitled to share in the estate of the deceased. !he motion was granted b" the probate court. +pon the presentation b" the parties of their respective evidence during the trial, the probate court was convinced that indeed, .a. !heresa ,lberto had been in continuous possession of the status of a natural child. !hereupon, it rendered a decision compelling the decedent0s heirs and estate to recognize her as a natural daughter and to allow her to participate in the estate proceedings. In her contention in the 'ourt of ,ppeals, the widow raised that the petitioner was not recognized b" the father based on the letter sent b" the mother of petitioner, ,urora &eniva, to the deceased, <uan .. ,lberto , the putative father of the petitioner. !he 'ourt of ,ppeals reversed the decision of the probate court. 4ence this petition. ISSUE #hether or not the estate and heirs of deceased <uan .. ,lberto be ordered to recognize petitioner as the deceased0s natural daughter on the basis of the evidence presented presented b" petitioner to establish her claim that she has been in continuous possession of the status of a natural child. RULING 3:*, the estate and heirs of the deceased can be ordered to recognize the petitioner as the deceased ><uan .. ,lberto0s? daughter as it was not onl" the father that recognized the petitioner but also the siblings and other members of his famil" as provided in ,rt.
1E;

(E; of the 'ivil 'ode. In addition, ,rt. (EG of the 'ivil 'ode states that the action for the recognition of natural children ma" be brought onl" during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except if the father or mother died during the minorit" of the child, in which case the latter ma" file the action before the expiration of four "ears from the attainment of the age of ma%orit". !his fits s)uarel" on the case of the petitioner because she was still a minor when her father died in 11DF, and she reached the age of ma%orit" onl" on *ept. 1E, 11F= and when the action was filed b" the petitioner, it was still three da"s before the time to file action had prescribed. 1/". CASIMIRO MENDOZA vs. CA AND TEO-ISTA T. TUEACAO G. R. No. + !/( Se$7e56e% ()* 1""1 FACTS !his pertains to a case on compulsor" recognition. 'asimiro allegedl" had an extramarital affair with /rigida !oring, who was then single. Out of that relationship, !eopista was born on (7 ,ugust 11;7. !eopista maintains that 'asimiro acknowledged her as his illegitimate child as shared b" her mother to her and b" the following circumstances, to wit5 she addressed him as 6 apa .iro"8H when she got married, he bought a passenger truck and hired her husband to drive it so he could have a livelihoodH he gave the sale proceeds of the truck to her and her husbandH he also allowed her son, Aolito, to build a house on his lot and gave her mone" as well to bu" her own lot from her brother, CicenteH he opened a %oint savings account with her as a co$depositor at the .andaue 'it" branch of the hilippine 'ommercial and Industrial /ank, among others. !eopista presented ; witnesses to corroborate her testimon". Aolito indicated that he believed that 'asimiro is his grandfather because his mother said so and because 'asimiro, among others, authorized him to build a house on his >'asimiro? propert" upon learning that the he lived on a rented lot. !he two other witnesses, Gaudencio and Isaac, 'asimiro0s relatives, likewise reinforced her claim. Gaudencio served as the intermediar" after 'asimiro disclosed to him that he was seeing /rigida. 4e was also tasked several times to deliver mone" to /rigida. Isaac, meanwhile, testified that his father, 4ipolito, 'asimiro0s brother, and his grandmother, /rigida .endoza, 'asimiro0s mother, informed him that the private respondent is the daughter of 'asimiro. Cicente, another illegitimate child of 'asimiro, testified to resist !eopista0s claim alleging that he is the onl" illegitimate child of 'asimiro because !eopista0s father is a carpenter named Ondo" who later fled and he also emphasized that she never visited her alleged father in the hospital when he was confined, among others. !he other witness, <ulieta Ouano, 'asimiro0s niece, corroborated his declaration and posited that she had never met !eopista. !he trial court re%ected !eopista0s claim that she was in continuous possession of the status of a child of her alleged father b" the direct acts of the latter or of his famil" because she never lived with himH her son was onl" allowed to construct a small house
1E=

in his propert"H he never financiall" supported herH and he did not even permit her to use his surname. !he ,ppellate 'ourt reversed, noting that the witnesses presented b" !eopista were disinterested persons with no ax to grind against 'asimiro while the latter0s witnesses were an interested person who stood to lose much of his inheritance should !eopista be declared as an illegitimate child and the testimon" of the other, seemed incredible as that witness lived in the same baranga" as !eopista since birth. ISSUES 2id the trial court err in den"ing !eopista0s claim that she was in open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child of 'asimiroL 2id the testimon" of Isaac sufficientl" prove such filiationL RULING +nder ,rt. (E;>(? of the 'ivil 'ode, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child when the child is in continuous possession of the status of a child of the alleged father b" the direct acts of the latter or of his famil". ,rt. 1F( of the @amil" 'ode states, among others, that legitimate filiation ma" be established b" an" other means allowed b" the &ules of 'ourt and special laws. !he @amil" 'ode also provides in ,rt. 1FG that illegitimate children ma" establish their illegitimate filiation in the same wa" and on the same evidence as legitimate children. In establishing -the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child-, -continuous- does not mean that the concession of status shall continue forever but onl" that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues. It means that the father has treated the child as his own, directl" and not through others, spontaneousl" and without concealment though without publicit" >since the relation is illegitimate?. !here must be a showing of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own, b" continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care. In this case, the trial court correctl" ruled that !eopista was unable to establish such open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child. :ven so, she was able to establish such status b" another method. ,n illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation b" -an" other means allowed b" the &ules of 'ourt and special laws,- according to the 'ivil 'ode, or -b" evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is her father,- according to the @amil" 'ode. *uch evidence ma" consist of his baptismal certificate, a %udicial admission, a famil" /ible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission b" silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under &ule 1;7 of the &ules of 'ourt. !he declaration made b" Isaac is in the nature of a 8e4'a%a7&o3 a6o27 $e8&9%ee as provided for in *ec. ;1, &ule 1;7, &ules of 'ourt. In the case at bar, the mother of 'asimiro and his brother, both of whom had since passed awa", made the declarations about !eopista0s pedigree prior to the time of
1EG

IsaacMs testimon". !he declarations referred to the filiation of !eopista and the paternit" of 'asimiro, which were the ver" issues involved in the complaint for compulsor" recognition. !he declarations were made before the complaint was filed b" !eopista or before the controvers" arose between her and 'asimiro. @inall", the relationship between the declarants and 'asimiro has been established b" evidence other than such declaration, consisting of the extra%udicial partition of the estate of @lorencio .endoza, in which 'asimiro was mentioned as one of his heirs. 'asimiro did not disprove such declarations when he could have done so b" deposition. !aking into account the declarations and the other circumstances, such as, the financial doles made b" 'asimiro to /rigida !oring, the hiring of !eopistaMs husband to drive the passenger truck of 'asimiro, who later sold the vehicle and gave the proceeds of the sale to !eopista and her husband, the permission he gave Aolito to build a house on his land when he knew that the latter was living on a rented lot, and the %oint savings account 'asimiro opened with !eopista, the 'ourt ruled that !eopista has proved that she is the illegitimate daughter of 'asimiro .endoza and is entitled to be recognized as such. 11/. DOROTEA U:GUANGCO vs. COURT OF A--EALS G. R. No. 0 +0! O47o6e% ( * 1"+" FACTS ,polinario +"guangco died intestate in 11FG, leaving his wife, 2orotea, four legitimate children and considerable properties which the" divided among themselves. 'laiming to be an illegitimate son of the deceased and having been left out in the extra%udicial settlement of his estate, Graciano +"guangco filed a complaint for partition against all the petitioners. Graciano admitted that he had none of the documents mentioned in ,rticle (FE to show that he was the illegitimate son of ,polinario. !hese are -the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or >in? an" authentic writing.- 9either could he resort to the provisions of ,rticle (EG because he was alread" an adult when his alleged father died in 11FG, and his claim did not come under the exceptions. ,s stated in ,&!. (EG5 !he action for the recognition of natural children ma" be brought onl" during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases5 >1? If the father or mother died during the minorit" of the child, in which case the latter ma" file the action before the expiration of four "ears from the attainment of his ma%orit"H >(? If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child. In this case, the action must be commenced within four "ears from the finding of the document.
1ED

etitioners argue that the complaint for partition is actuall" an action for recognition as an illegitimate child, which, being alread" barred, is a clear attempt to circumvent the said provisions. !he private respondent insists, on the other hand, that he has a right to show under ,rticle (E; that he is -in continuous possession of the status of a child of his alleged father b" the direct acts of the latter or of his famil".ISSUE #hether rivate &espondent be allowed to prove that he is an illegitimate child of his claimed father, who is alread" dead, in the absence of the documentar" evidence re)uired b" the 'ivil 'ode. RULING !he court ruled that this case must be decided under a new set of rules because the provisions the parties invoked has been superceded b" the @amil" 'ode. +nder the @amil" 'ode, it is provided that5 ,rt. 1FG. Illegitimate children ma" establish their illegitimate filiation in the same wa" and on the same evidence as legitimate children. !he following provision is therefore also available to the private respondent in proving his illegitimate filiation5 ,rt. 1F(. !he filiation of legitimate children is established b" an" of the following5 >1? !he record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final %udgmentH or >(? ,n admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed b" the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved b"5 >1? !he open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate childH or >(? ,n" other means allowed b" the &ules of 'ourt and special laws. rivate respondent has admitted that he has none of the documents, however he insists that he has nevertheless been -in open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child,- which is now also admissible as evidence of filiation. *ince he seeks to prove his filiation under this, his action is now barred because of his alleged fatherMs death in 11FG. ,rticle 1FG provides5 !he action must be brought within the same period specified in ,rticle 1F;, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of ,rticle 1F(, in which case the action ma" be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. It is clear that the private respondent can no longer be allowed at this time to introduce evidence of his open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child or prove his alleged filiation through an" of the means allowed b" the &ules of 'ourt or special laws. !he simple reason is that ,polinario +"guangco is alread" dead and can no longer be heard on the claim of his alleged sonMs illegitimate filiation.
1EF

111. CORITO OCAM-O TA:AG vs. CA a38 EMILIE DA:RIT CU:UGAN G. R. No. "#((" J23e "* 1""( FACTS !his is a petition for recognition and claim of inheritance of an illegitimate child 'had 'u"ugan represented b" his mother and legal guardian :milde 2a"rit 'u"ugan against the administratrix 'orito Ocampo !a"ag of the late ,tt". &icardo Ocampo0s properties. 'u"ugan claims that she and Ocampo had an amorous relationship which bore an illegitimate son named 'had 'u"ugan. 'u"ugan asserts that the "oung 'u"ugan was recognized b" Ocampo and he acted as a putative father during his lifetime as gleaned from indubitable letters and documents. Ocampo died intestate and left several properties in /aguio 'it", ,ngeles 'it" and rovince of ampanga. !he alleged illegitimate child 'u"ugan is survived together with Ocampo0s legitimate children 'orito Ocampo !a"ag, &ivina O. !a"ag, :vita O. @lorendo, @elina Ocampo. 'u"ugan avers that as an illegitimate son of Ocampo the "oung 'u"ugan is entitled for inheritance as one of the surviving heirs. *everal verbal and written demands b" the plaintiff 'u"ugan against defendant Ocampo for the inventor" and accounting of properties, deliver" of the inheritance and support pendent elite but the defendant Ocampo grossl" neglects. Instead, she maintained several affirmative defenses against the claim on the issue of prescription, no legal personalit" to bring the suit and lack of %urisdiction. Ocampo argues that assuming arguendo that the action is one to compel recognition, 'u"ugan0s cause of action has prescribed for the reason that since filiation is sought to be proved b" means of a private handwritten instrument signed b" the parent concerned, then under paragraph (, ,rticle 1FG of the @amil" 'ode, the action to establish filiation of the illegitimate minor child must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged putative father. ISSUES 1. #hether there is still a need for an action to establish illegitimate filiation prior to deliver" of inheritance to an illegitimate childH (. #hether there is a prescriptive period for recognition of a natural child.

RULING !he court ruled citing the case of in /riz vs. /riz, et al., which elucidates that5 !he )uestion whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can an" event maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which, in the opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative, provided alwa"s that the conditions %ustif"ing the %oinder of the two distinct causes of action are present in the particular case. In, other words, there is no absolute necessit" re)uiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seers additional relief in the character of heir. 'ertainl", there is
1EE

nothing so peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to re)uire that a rule should be here applied different from that generall" applicable in other cases. . . !he conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitl" formulated b" this court, is undoubtedl" to some extent supported b" our prior decisions. !hus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact legall" acknowledged, ma" maintain partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his co$heirs . . .H and the same person ma" intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother . . . In neither of these situations has it been thought necessar" for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. !he obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might take b" inheritance are before the courtH and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings. ,s to the issue of prescription, ,rticle 1FG of the @amil" 'ode finds no proper application to the instant case since it will ineluctabl" affect adversel" a right of private respondent and, conse)uentiall", of the mind child she represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of the complaint in court. !he trial court is therefore, correct in appl"ing the provisions of ,rticle (EG of the 'ivil 'ode and in holding that private respondentMs cause of action has not "et prescribed. 11(. FRANCISCO L. JISON vs. COURT OF A--EALS a38 MONINA JISON G. R. No. 1()+#! Fe6%2a%1 ()* 1""+ FACTS In her complaint = filed with the &!' on 1; .arch 11EG, .O9I9, alleged that @&,9'I*'O had been married to a certain Ailia Aopez <ison since 11=7. ,t the end of 11=G or the start of 11=D, however, @&,9'I*'O impregnated :speranza @. ,molar >who was then emplo"ed as the nann" of @&,9'I*'OMs daughter, Aourdes?. ,s a result, .O9I9, was born on D ,ugust 11=D, in 2ingle, Iloilo, and since childhood, had en%o"ed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of @&,9'I*'O b" his acts and that of his famil". .O9I9, further alleged that @&,9'I*'O gave her support and spent for her education, such that she obtained a .asterMs degree, became a certified public accountant >' ,? and eventuall", a 'entral /ank examiner. In view of @&,9'I*'OMs refusal to expressl" recognize her, .O9I9, pra"ed for a %udicial declaration of her illegitimate status and that @&,9'I*'O support and treat her as such. ISSUE #hether or not .O9I9, established her filiation as @&,9'I*'O0* illegitimate daughterL
1E1

RULING !he testimonial evidence offered b" .O9I9,, woven b" her narration of circumstances and events that occurred through the "ears, concerning her relationship with @&,9'I*'O, coupled with the testimonies of her witnesses, overwhelmingl" established the following facts5 1? @&,9'I*'O is .O9I9,Ms father and she was conceived at the time when her mother was in the emplo" of the formerH (? @&,9'I*'O recognized .O9I9, as his child through his overt acts and the 'ourt of ,ppeals took pains to enumerate, thus5 JAKike sending appellant to school, pa"ing for her tuition fees, school uniforms, books, board and lodging at the 'olegio del *agrado de <esus, defra"ing appellantMs hospitalization expenses, providing her with JaK monthl" allowance, pa"ing for the funeral expenses of appellantMs mother, acknowledging appellantMs paternal greetings and calling appellant his -4i%a- or child, instructing his office personnel to give appellantMs monthl" allowance, recommending appellant to use his house in /acolod and pa"ing for her long distance telephone calls, having appellant spend her long distance telephone calls, having appellant spend her vacation in his apartment in .anila and also at his @orbes residence, allowing appellant to use his surname in her scholastic and other records >:xhs Q, ,,, ,,$1 to ,,$G, # S #$G? . . . ;? *uch recognition has been consistentl" shown and manifested throughout the "ears publicl", ;G spontaneousl", continuousl" and in an uninterrupted manner. ;D :ven the affidavit >:xh (? which J@&,9'I*'OK had foisted on the trial court . . . does not hold swa" in the face of J.O9I9,MsK logical explanation that she at first did agree to sign the affidavit which contained untruthful statements. In fact, she promptl" complained to J@&,9'I*'OK who, however explained to her that the affidavit was onl" for the consumption of his spouse . . . ,t an" rate, if J.O9I9,K were not his illegitimate daughter, it would have been uncalled for, if not absurd, for J@&,9'I*'OK of his law"er to have secured J.O9I9,MsK sworn statement . . . On the contrar", in asking J.O9I9,K to sign the said affidavit at the cost of 1G,777. J@&,9'I*'OK clearl" betra"ed his intention to conceal or suppress his paternit" of J.O9I9,K . . . Indeed, if .O9I9, were trul" not @&,9'I*'OMs illegitimate daughter, it would have been unnecessar" for him to have gone to such great lengths in order that .O9I9, denounce her filiation. @or as clearl" established before the trial court and properl" appreciated b" the 'ourt of ,ppeals, .O9I9, had resigned from .iller S 'ruz five >G? months prior to the execution of the sworn statement in )uestion, hence negating @&,9'I*'OMs theor" of the need to )uash rumors circulating within .iller S 'ruz regarding the identit" of .O9I9,Ms father.
117

11!. MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON vs. COMELEC G. R. No. 1 1 !) Ma%4h !* (//) FACTS On ;1 2ecember (77;, respondent &onald ,llan Tell" oe, also known as @ernando oe, <r., filed his certificate of candidac" for the position of resident of the &epublic of the hilippines under the Toalis"on ng 9agkakaisang ilipino >T9 ? art". In his certificate of candidac", @ <, representing himself to be a natural$born citizen of the hilippines, stated his name to be -@ernando <r.,- or -&onald ,llan- oe, his date of birth to be (7 ,ugust 11;1 and his place of birth to be .anila. Cictorino [. @ornier, initiated a petition before the 'ommission on :lections to dis)ualif" @ < and to den" due course or to cancel his certificate of candidac" upon the thesis that @ < made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidac" b" claiming to be a natural$born @ilipino citizen when in truth, according to @ornier, his parents were foreignersH his mother, /essie Telle" oe, was an ,merican, and his father, ,llan oe, was a *panish national, being the son of Aorenzo ou, a *panish sub%ect. Granting, that ,llan @. oe was a @ilipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his @ilipino citizenship to @ <, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. etitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions $ first, ,llan @. oe contracted a prior marriage to a certain aulita Gomez before his marriage to /essie Telle" and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, ,llan @. oe, married /essie Tell" onl" a "ear after the birth of respondent. !he 'O.:A:' dismissed the case for lack of merit. @ornier filed a motion for reconsideration and was denied. 4e brought the case to the *' b" virtue of &ule D=, in relation to &ule DG, of the &evised &ules of 'ourt, pra"ing for a !&O, writ of preliminar" in%unction to en%oin finalit"/execution of 'O.:A:' resolutions. 4is petition was consolidated with !ecson S Celez0 cases, both challenging the %urisdiction of the 'O.:A:' and asserting that, under ,rticle CII, *ection =, paragraph F, of the 11EF 'onstitution, onl" the *upreme 'ourt had original and exclusive %urisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.. ISSUE #hether or not @ < is a natural born @ilipino. RULING *ection (, ,rticle CII, of the 11EF 'onstitution expresses5 -9o person ma" be elected resident unless he is a natu,ral$born citizen of the hilippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least fort" "ears of age on the da" of the election, and a resident of the hilippines for at least ten "ears immediatel" preceding such election.111

!he term -natural$born citizens,- is defined to include -those who are citizens of the hilippines from birth without having to perform an" act to ac)uire or perfect their hilippine citizenship. !he 11;G 'onstitution removed doubts as to whether the %us soli principle would still appl". It adopted %us sanguinis >blood relationship? as basis of @ilipino citizenship. *ec. 1, ,rt. III defined citizens as5 1? citizens of hilippine Islands at time of adoption of 'onstitution, (? those born in the I of foreign parents elected to public office in the I, ;? those whose fathers are citizens of the I, =? !hose whose mothers are citizens of the ma%orit", elect hilippine citizenship. hilippines and upon reaching the age of

G? !hose who are naturalized in accordance with law. !he following facts have been established b" a weight" preponderance of evidence either in the pleadings and the documents attached thereto or from the admissions of the parties, through their counsels, during the oral arguments $ 1. !he parents of @ < were ,llan @. oe and /essie Telle"H (. @ < was born to them on (7 ,ugust 11;1H ;. ,llan @. oe and /essie Telle" were married to each other on 1D *eptember, 11=7H =. !he father of ,llan @. oe was Aorenzo oe, albeit a *panish sub%ect, was not shown to have declared his allegiance to *pain b" virtue of the !reat" of aris and the hilippine /ill of 117(H and G. ,t the time of his death on 11 *eptember 11G=, Aorenzo oe was E= "ears old. !he marriage certificate of Telle" S oe and @ <0s birth certificate are admissible evidence being public documents. Aorenzo oe was born sometime in 1EF7 while & was under *pain. In the absence of an" evidence to the contrar", it will be assumed that his place of residence was his place of residence at the time of his death, which was in *an 'arlos, angasinan. !hus, it will also be assumed that he benefited in the en masse @ilipinization under hil /ill of 117(. resumption would be that he passed on his @ilipino citizenship to his son S later on to his grandson. +nder the 'ivil 'ode of *pain, which was in force in the hilippines from 7E 2ecember 1EE1 up until the da" prior to ;7 ,ugust 11G7 when the 'ivil 'ode of the hilippines took effect, acknowledgment was re)uired to establish filiation or paternit" b" %udicial
11(

>compulsor" done during the lifetime of putative parent? or voluntar" >record of birth, will or public document? means. 9o proof of acknowledgment b" ,llan oe was shown whether voluntar" or %udicial. !he 11G7 'ivil 'ode added additional means of acknowledgment which is legal >acknowledgment of an illegitimate child0s full blood brothers/sisters?. !he @amil" 'ode provides that filiation of legitimate children is established b" a record of birth or public document or private handwritten instrument signed b" parent concerned. In the absence of such, it can be proven b" open S continuous possession of status as legitimate or other means allowed b" &ules of 'ourt S special laws. ,ction ma" be brought b" child during his/her lifetime. *ame provisions appl" to establish illegitimate filiation. &ub" Telle" .angahas0 >/essie Telle"0s sister? declaration might be accepted as proof that ,llan oe recognized his paternal relationship with @ <. *he declared that ,llan lived w/ /essie S their children in one house as one famil". !he provisions of the @amil" 'ode are retroactivel" appliedH ,rticle (GD of the code reads5 -,rt. (GD. !his 'ode shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not pre%udice or impair vested or ac)uired rights in accordance with the 'ivil 'ode or other laws.etitioner @ornier never alleged that ,llan oe was not the father of @ <. /" revolving his case around the illegitimac" of @ <, @ornier effectivel" conceded paternit" or filiation as a non$issue. @or purposes of the citizenship of an illegitimate child whose father is a @ilipino and whose mother is an alien, proof of paternit" or filiation is enough for the child to follow the citizenship of his putative father, as advanced b" @r. <oa)uin /ernas, one of the amici curiae. .aking distinctions between illegitimate S legitimate children and between the illegitimate children of @ilipino fathers and illegitimate children of @ilipino mothers violate the e)ual protection clause of the 'onstitution. !o dis)ualif" an illegitimate child from holding an important public office is to punish him/her for the indiscretion of his/her parents. #hen the law provided that the illegitimate child will take the citizenship of his/her mother, it was done to help the child S not to pre%udice/discriminate against him. ursuant to paragraph ; of *ection 1 of ,rticle IC of the 11;G 'onstitution, which reads5 *ection 1. !he following are citizens of the hilippines5 xxx >;? !hose whose fathers are citizens of the hilippines. !he provision makes no distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children of @ilipino fathers. It is enough that filiation is established or that the child is acknowledged
11;

or recognized b" the father. !hus, whether legitimate or illegitimate, @ < ma" be considered as a natural$born @ilipino citizen. 11). MILAGROS JOAQUINO $e7&7&o3e% vs. LOURDES RE:ES G. R. No. 1#) )# J2'1 1!* (//) FACTS Aourdes &e"es was legall" married to &odolfo &e"es on and the" have four children, namel"5 .ercedes, .anuel, .iriam and &odolfo <r. &odolfo died on *eptember 1(, 11E1. ,t the time of his death, &odolfo &e"es was living with his common$law wife, .ilagros <oa)uino, with whom she begot three >;? children namel"5 <ose &omillo, Imelda .a" and 'harina, all surnamed &e"es. &odolfo0s monthl" salar" at #arner /arnes S 'o. was 1G, 777.77 and upon his retirement from said compan", &odolfo &e"es received a lump sum of ;1G, 711.F1 in full pa"ment. 2uring the common$law relationship of &odolfo and .ilagros <oa)uino and while living together, the" decided to bu" the house and lot. , 2eed of ,bsolute *ale was executed in favor of petitioner and !'! 9o. *$17(1; covering the said propert" was issued in the name of petitioner onl". !o secure the finances with which to pa" the purchase price of the propert", petitioner executed a *pecial ower of ,ttorne" in favor of &odolfo for the latter, to secure a loan from the 'ommonwealth Insurance 'ompan". ,n application for mortgage loan was filed b" &odolfo &e"es with the 'ommonwealth Insurance 'ompan" and a &eal :state .ortgage 'ontract was executed as collateral to the mortgage loan. !he monthl" amortizations were paid b" &odolfo &e"es and after his death, the balance of 171,F1F.D= was paid in full to the 'ommonwealth Insurance b" the hilam Aife Insurance 'o. as insurer of the deceased &odolfo ,. &e"es. On appeal to the ',, petitioner )uestioned the following findings of the trial court5 1? that the house and lot had been paid in full from the proceeds of the loan that &odolfo &e"es obtained from the 'ommonwealth Insurance 'ompan"H (? that his salaries and earnings, which were his and Aourdes0 con%ugal funds, paid for the loan and, hence, the disputed propert" was con%ugalH and ;? that petitioner0s illegitimate children, not having been recognized or acknowledged b" him in an" of the wa"s provided b" law, ac)uired no successional rights to his estate. !he appellate court, however, held that the trial court should not have resolved the issue of the filiation and the successional rights of petitioner0s children. *uch issues, it said, were not properl" cognizable in an ordinar" civil action for reconve"ance and damages and were better ventilated in a probate or special proceeding instituted for the purpose. ISSUE
11=

#hether or not the court can take cognizance of the issue of filiationL RULING Indeed, it has been ruled that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisel" for the purpose of determining such rights. *ustaining the appellate court in ,gapa" v. alang, this 'ourt held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent0s estate could not be ad%udicated in an ordinar" civil action which, as in this case, was for the recover" of propert". 'onsiderations of due process should have likewise deterred the &!' from ruling on the status of petitioner0s children. It is evident from the pleadings of the parties that this issue was not presented in either the original or the *upplemental 'omplaint for reconve"ance of propert" and damagesH that it was not pleaded and specificall" pra"ed for b" petitioner in her ,nswers theretoH and that it was not traversed b" respondents0 &epl" to the *upplemental 'omplaint. 9either did petitioner0s .emorandum, which was submitted to the trial court, raise and discuss this issue. In view thereof, the illegitimate filiation of her children could not have been dul" established b" the proceedings as re)uired b" ,rticle EEF of the 'ivil 'ode. In view of the foregoing reasons, the ', cannot be faulted for tackling the propriet" of the &!'0s ruling on the status of the children of petitioner, though she did not assign this matter as an error. !he general rule $$ that onl" errors assigned ma" be passed upon b" an appellate court P admits of exceptions. :ven unassigned errors ma" be taken up b" such court if the consideration of those errors would be necessar" for arriving at a %ust decision or for serving the interest of %ustice.

11#. ,ELEN SAGAD ANGELES vs. ALELI MCORAZONM ANGELES MAGLA:A G. R. No. 1#!0"+ Se$7e56e% (* (//# FACTS &espondent filed a petition for letters of administration and her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of @rancisco .. ,ngeles >@rancisco, hereinafter?. *he alleges that there is a need to appoint an administrator of @rancisco0s estate and that she >respondent? is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva .ercado, and, together with petitioner, /elen *. ,ngeles, decedent0s wife b" his second marriage, are the surviving heirs of the decedentH and that she has all the )ualifications and none of the dis)ualifications re)uired of an administrator. etitioner opposed the basic petition and pra"ed that she, instead of respondent, be made the administratrix of @rancisco0s estate. ; In support of her opposition and plea, petitioner alleged having married @rancisco on ,ugust F, 11=E before <udge Aucio .. !ianco of the .unicipal 'ourt of &izal, a union which was ratified two >(? months later in religious rites at the Our Aad" of Grace arish in 'aloocan 'it", and that @rancisco represented in their marriage contract that he was single at that time. etitioner also
11G

averred that respondent could not be the daughter of @rancisco for, although she was recorded as @rancisco0s legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed b" him. ressing on, petitioner further alleged that respondent * despite her claim of being the legitimate child of @rancisco and Genoveva .ercado, has not presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced an" acceptable document to prove such union. ,nd evidentl" to debunk respondent0s claim of being the onl" child of @rancisco, petitioner likewise averred that she and @rancisco had, during their marriage, legall" adopted 'oncesa ,. 3amat, et al. etitioner thus urged that she, being the surviving spouse of @rancisco, be declared as possessed of the superior right to the administration of his estate. In her repl" to opposition, respondent alleged, inter alia, that per certification of the appropriate offices, the <anuar" to 2ecember 11;E records of marriages of the 'ivil &egistrar of /acolor, ampanga where the alleged 11;E @rancisco$Genoveva wedding took place, were destro"ed. In the same repl", respondent dismissed as of little conse)uence the adoption adverted to owing to her having interposed with the 'ourt of ,ppeals a petition to nullif" the decree of adoption entered b" the &!' at 'aloocan. :ventuall", in an Order dated <ul" 1(, 1111, 11 the trial court, on its finding that respondent failed to prove her filiation as legitimate child of @rancisco, dismissed the petition. !he !rial 'ourt is hereb" ordered to appoint petitioner$appellant ,leli -'orazon,ngeles as administratrix of the intestate estate of @rancisco ,ngeles. ISSUES #hether or not respondent has sufficientl" established her legitimate filiation with the deceased @rancisco. RULING ,rt. 1F(. !he filiation of legitimate children is established b" an" of the following5 1. !he record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final %udgmentsH or (. ,n admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed b" the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved b"5 1. !he open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate childH or (. ,n" other means allowed b" the &ules of 'ourt and special laws. In the case at bench, other than the self$serving declaration of the petitioner, there is nothing in the record to support petitioner0s claim that she is indeed a legitimate child of the late @rancisco .. ,ngeles and Genoveva 3. .ercado. xxx In other words, @rancisco .. ,ngeles was 3eve% married before or at an"time prior to his marriage to /elen *agad, contrar" to the claim of petitioner that @rancisco .. ,ngeles and Genoveva 3. .ercado were married in 11;E #hile petitioner ma" have submitted certifications to the effect that the records of marriages during the war "ears . . . were totall" destro"ed, no secondar" evidence was presented b" petitioner to prove the existence of the marriage between @rancisco .. ,ngeles and Genoveva 3. .ercado, even as no witness was presented to confirm the celebration of such marriage. 4aving failed to prove that she is the legitimate daughter
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or acknowledged natural child of the late @rancisco .. ,ngeles, petitioner cannot be a real part" in interest in the adoption proceedings, as her consent thereto is not essential or re)uired. @inall", it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. #hen the law speaks of - next of +in-, the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the decedent0s propert", one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters of administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. , separate action will onl" result in a multiplicit" of suits. +pon this consideration, the trial court acted within bounds when it looked into and pass upon the claimed relationship of respondent to the late @rancisco ,ngeles. 11 . JUAN CASTRO AND FELICIANA CASTRO vs. COURT OF A--EALS* CI-RIANO NAVAL AND ,ENITA C. NAVAL G. R. No. LC#/"0)C0# Ma1 !1* 1"+" FACTS In 'ivil 'ase 9o. ;FD( entitled <uan 'astro and @eliciana 'astro v. /enita 'astro, the plaintiffs filed an action for partition of properties against the defendant alleging, among other things that the" are the forced heirs of edro 'astro who died in .a"antoc, !arlac on .a" (F, 11(; >p. D, &ecord on ,ppeal?. In 'ivil 'ase 9o. ;FD; plaintiff .arcelina /autista also filed an action for partition of properties against defendant /enita 'astro 9aval alleging, among other things, that the" are also compulsor" heirs of :usta)uio 'astro who died in .a"antoc, !arlac on ,ugust (=, 11D1 and that the" are entitled to the partition of the properties of said deceased >p. ;(, &ecord on ,ppeal?. !he defendants in their amended answer in both cases allege that /enita 'astro 9aval is the onl" child of the deceased :usta)uio and that said :usta)uio 'astro is the son of edro 'astro, therefore, the complaint for partition has no cause of action >p. (G, &ecord on ,ppeal?. #ith leave of 'ourt, plaintiffs filed their amended complaints whereb" the" converted the original action for partition into an action for )uieting of title. 2efendantMs husband 'ipriano 9aval was forthwith impleaded as part"$defendant >p. ;(, &ecord on ,ppeal?. In the meantime, defendant /enita 9aval filed a petition for appointment as receiver and for preliminar" in%unction in 'ivil 'ase 9o. ;FD(. !he trial court, however, denied said petition for appointment of receiver, but granted the petition for writ of preliminar" in%unction and also ad%udged .arcelina /autista who is the plaintiff in 'ivil 'ase 9o. ;FD( guilt" of contempt and ordering her to pa" a fine of 177. 77 >p. 1F, &ecord on ,ppeal?.
11F

'onsidering that evidence in these incidents of appointing a receiver and preliminar" in%unction as well as the motion for contempt were related to the merits of the case, the parties stipulated that evidence therein be considered as evidence in the trial on the merits. 2uring the pre$trial the parties agreed that the main issue to be resolved in this case is as to whether or not defendant /enita 'astro 9aval is the acknowledged natural child of :usta)uio 'astro. In view of this stipulation, defendant /enita 9aval was allowed to introduce evidence to show that she was indeed the acknowledged natural child of :usta)uio 'astro. !he evidence on record shows that <uan 'astro and @eliciana 'astro, plaintiffs in 'ivil 'ase 9o. ;FD( and :usta)uio 'astro who was alread" dead were the children of the deceased spouses edro 'astro and 'ornelia *antiago. .arcelina /autista, one of the plaintiffs in 'ivil 'ase 9o. ;FD;, is the surviving spouse of the deceased :usta)uio 'astro. :usta)uio 'astro died on ,ugust (;, 11D1 and ricola .aregmen died on *eptember 11, 11(=. It appears that defendant /enita 'astro 9aval, a child of :usta)uio 'astro and ricola .aregmen, was born on .arch (F, 1111 in *an /artolome, !arlac >:xhibit ,?. :usta)uio 'astro, who caused the registration of said birth gave the date indicated in the civil registr" that he was the father. /enita 'astro was later baptized in the &oman 'atholic 'hurch of 'amiling, !arlac, wherein the baptismal certificate appeared that her parents are deceased :usta)uio 'astro and ricola .aregmen >:xhibit '?. #hen :usta)uio 'astro died, pictures were taken wherein the immediate members of the famil" in mourning were present, among whom was /enita 'astro 9aval >:xhibits 2 and 2$1?. On this score, the plaintiffs in their complaint in 'ivil 'ase 9o. ;FD( admitted that defendant /enita '. 9aval is the forced heir of :usta)uio 'astro and a compulsor" heir of :usta)uio 'astro in 'ivil 'ase 9o. ;FD;. !he evidence further shows that ricola .aregmen, the natural mother of /enita '. 9aval who was a resident of .a"antoc, !arlac, was wedded to @elix de .a"a of ,noling 'analing, !arlac against her wishes on .a" (;, 111;. #hile the celebration of the wedding in ,nong, 'amiling, !arlac was going on, the guests soon found out that ricola .aregmen surreptitiousl" left the part" and went to the house of her first cousin /ernarda agarigan at /arrio .alacampa, also in ,noling 'amiling, !arlac, and there she cried that she did not want to get married to @elix de .a"a. !hat evening ricola proceeded to /arrio *an /artolome, .a"antoc, !arlac, where she united with her real sweetheart, :usta)uio 'astro, the father of /enita 'astro 9aval. ,ntonio .aregmen, the brotherM. of ricola .aregmen who was then in the wedding part" learned of the disappearance of his sister. 4e finall" found her living with :usta)uio 'astro. , few da"s later :usta)uio 'astro accompanied b" two persons went to the parents of ricola .aregmen at .a"antoc, !arlac and informed them that ricola was alread" living with him as husband and wife. ricolaMs parents merel" submitted to
11E

their daughterMs wishes, so :usta)uio 'astro and ricola .aregmen lived as husband and wife until the death of ricola on *eptember 11, 11(=. !here is no dispute that :usta)uio 'astro at the time he lived with ricola .aregmen, was a widower, and was, therefore, free to marr" ricola. ,s a result of their cohabitation /enita 'astro 9aval, herein defendant, was born on .arch (F, 1111. ,fter the death of her mother, when she was onl" five "ears old, she continued to live with her father :usta)uio 'astro until his death on ,ugust ((, 11D1 >:xhibit 11?. .oreover, when /enita 'astro 9aval got married to 'ipriano 9aval, it was :usta)uio 'astro who gave her awa" in marriage. :ven after /enitaMs marriage, she was taken care of b" her father. >&ollo, pp. 11$1;?. !he trial court ruled that respondent /enita 'astro 9aval is the acknowledged and recognized child of :usta)uio 'astro and is, therefore, entitled to participate in the partition of the properties left b" him. !hese properties are the sub%ect of the civil cases. ,s stated earlier, the 'ourt of ,ppeals affirmed the trial courtMs decision. ISSUE #hether or not respondent /enita 'astro 9aval is the acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of :usta)uio 'astro. HELD @irst, /enita 'astro 9aval is un)uestionabl" the daughter of the late :usta)uio 'astro who was )ualified to legall" marr" when she was conceived and born. @rom her birth on .arch (F, 1111 until the fatherMs death on ,ugust ((, 11D1 or for =( "ears, /enita lived with her father and en%o"ed the love and care that a parent bestows on an onl" child. !he private respondents, themselves, admitted in their complaint in 'ivil 'ase 9o. ;FD( that /enita is a forced heir of :usta)uio 'astro. *econd, the rule on separating the legitimate from the illegitimate famil" is of no special relevance here because /enita and her mother ricola .aregmen were the onl" immediate famil" of :usta)uio. !here are no legitimate children born of a legitimate wife contesting the inheritance of /enita. !hird, it was :usta)uio himself who had the birth of /enita reported and registered. !here is no indication in the records that :usta)uio should have known in 1111 that apart from reporting the birth of a child, he should also have signed the certificate and seen to it that it was preserved for D7 "ears. Or that he should have taken all legal steps including %udicial action to establish her status as his recognized natural child during the reglementar" period to do so. @ourth, it was :usta)uio who gave awa" /enita during her wedding to 'ipriano 9aval. !he couple continued to live with the father even after the wedding and until the latterMs death. @ifth, the certificate of baptism and the picture of the 'astro famil" during the wake for :usta)uio ma" not be sufficient proof of recognition under the 'ivil 'ode >&e"es v. 'ourt of ,ppeals, supraH eople v. Cilleza. 1(F *'&, ;=1 J11E=KH 'id v. /urnaman, (=
111

*'&, =;= J11DEKH 'apistrano, et al. v. Gabino, E e)uities of this case favoring the petitioner.

hil. 1;G J117FK? but the" add to the

!o remove an" possible doubts about the correctness of the findings and conclusions of the trial court and the 'ourt of ,ppeals, we, therefore, appl" the provision of the @amil" 'ode which states that it shall have retroactive effect since the respondents have no clear vested rights in their favor. !here can be no dispute that /enita 'astro en%o"ed the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child of :usta)uio 'astro and that the action of /enita in defending her status in this case is similar to an -action to claim legitimac"brought during her lifetime. 110. LIGA:A GA-USANCCHUA vs. COURT OF A--EALS a38 -ROS-ERO -ARCON G. R. No. LC) 0) Ma%4h 1#* 1""/ FACTS @elisa Gapusan arcon died intestate and without legitimate issue on ,pril D, 11DD in /acolod 'it". 9either her surviving spouse, rospero arcon, nor her other known relatives N three >;? sisters and a nephew N made an" move to settle her estate %udiciall". It was Aiga"a Gapusan$'hua, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of @elisa Gapusan arcon, who instituted %udicial proceedings for the settlement of the latterMs estate. ,bout a "ear and eight months after @elisaMs demise, or on <anuar" 1G, 11DE, Aiga"a filed with the 'ourt of @irst Instance of 9egros Occidental a petition for the settlement of the estate and for issuance of letters of administration in her favor. *he also sought her designation as *pecial ,dministratrix pending her appointment as regular administratrix. !he court granted Aiga"a0s application and she was designated as the administratrix. !he husband arcon then filed a motion for reconsideration and asked that he be appointed instead alleging that Aiga"aMs exhibits did not constitute conclusive proof of her claimed status of acknowledged natural child, for the reason that in another document, @elisaMs application for membership in 9egros Occidental !eachersM @ederation >9O!@?, merel" named Aiga"a as her -adopted daughter8 and that the same was onl" sold to @elisa when she was %ust an infant. ISSUE #hether or not Aiga"a is indeed a daughter of @elisa and that she could be appointed as administratrix. RULING It is admitted on all sides that no %udicial action or proceeding was ever brought during the lifetime of @elisa to compel her to recognize Aiga"a as her daughter. It is also evident that Aiga"aMs recognition as @elisaMs daughter was not made in a record of birth
(77

or a will, a circumstance which would have made %udicial approval unnecessar", onl" her own consent to the recognition being re)uired. !he acknowledgment was made in authentic writings, and hence, conformabl" with the legal provisions above cited, %udicial approval thereof was needed if the writings had been executed during Aiga"aMs minorit". 10 In other words, the )uestion of whether or not the absence of %udicial approval negated the effect of the writings as a mode of recognition of Aiga"a is dependent upon the latterMs age at the time the writings were made. +pon the foregoing facts and considerations, Aiga"a Gapusan 'hua must be held to be a voluntaril" acknowledged natural child of @elisa Gapusan arcon. *he is therefore entitled, in accordance with ,rticle (E( of the 'ivil 'ode, to bear her motherMs surname, and to receive the hereditar" portion accorded to her b" the 'ode. 11+. ROSENDO HERRERA vs. ROSENDO AL,A* e7 a'. G. R. No. 1)+((/ J23e 1#* (//# FACTS On 1= .a" 111E, then thirteen$"ear$old &osendo ,lba >-respondent-?, represented b" his mother ,rmi ,lba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsor" recognition, support and damages against petitioner. On F ,ugust 111E, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim where he denied that he is the biological father of respondent. etitioner also denied ph"sical contact with respondent0s mother. &espondent filed a motion to direct the taking of 29, paternit" testing to abbreviate the proceedings. !o support the motion, respondent presented the testimon" of *aturnina '. 4alos, h.2. #hen she testified, 2r. 4alos was an ,ssociate rofessor at 2e Aa *alle +niversit" where she taught 'ell /iolog". *he was also head of the +niversit" of the hilippines 9atural *ciences &esearch Institute >-+ $9*&I-?, a 29, anal"sis laborator". *he was a former professor at the +niversit" of the hilippines in 2iliman, Ruezon 'it", where she developed the .olecular /iolog" rogram and taught .olecular /iolog". In her testimon", 2r. 4alos described the process for 29, paternit" testing and asserted that the test had an accurac" rate of 11.1111O in establishing paternit". etitioner opposed 29, paternit" testing and contended that it has not gained acceptabilit". etitioner further argued that 29, paternit" testing violates his right against self$incrimination. the trial court granted respondent0s motion to conduct 29, paternit" testing on petitioner, respondent and ,rmi ,lba. !hus5 I3 v&ew o< 7he <o%e9o&39, the motion of the petitioner is GRANTED and the relevant individuals, namel"5 the petitioner, the minor child, and respondent are directed to undergo DNA $a7e%3&71 7es7&39 in a laborator" of their common choice within a period of thirt" >;7? da"s from receipt of the Order, and to submit the results thereof within a period of ninet" >17? da"s from completion. !he parties are further reminded of the
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hearing set on (= @ebruar" (777 for the reception of other evidence in support of the petition. On (1 9ovember (777, the appellate court issued a decision den"ing the petition and affirming the )uestioned Orders of the trial court. !he appellate court stated that petitioner merel" desires to correct the trial court0s evaluation of evidence. !hus, appeal is an available remed" for an error of %udgment that the court ma" commit in the exercise of its %urisdiction. !he appellate court also stated that the proposed 29, paternit" testing does not violate his right against self$incrimination because the right applies onl" to testimonial compulsion. @inall", the appellate court pointed out that petitioner can still refute a possible adverse result of the 29, paternit" testing. ISSUES #hether or not a 29, test is a valid probative tool in this %urisdiction to determine filiation. etitioner asks for the conditions under which 29, technolog" ma" be integrated into our %udicial s"stem and the prere)uisites for the admissibilit" of 29, test results in a paternit" suit. RULING *ection 1F, ,rticle ; of the 11EF 'onstitution provides that -no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.- etitioner asserts that obtaining samples from him for 29, testing violates his right against self$incrimination. etitioner ignores our earlier pronouncements that the privilege is applicable onl" to testimonial evidence. ,gain, we )uote relevant portions of the trial court0s ; @ebruar" (777 Order with approval5 Obtaining 29, samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in a paternit" case, contrar" to the belief of respondent in this action, will not violate the right against self$incrimination. !his privilege applies onl" to evidence that is *communicative* in essence taken under duress > eople vs. Olvis, 1G= *'&, G1;, 11EF?. !he *upreme 'ourt has ruled that the right against self$incrimination is %ust a prohibition on the use of ph"sical or moral compulsion to extort communication >testimonial evidence? from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from his bod" when it ma" be material. ,s such, a defendant can be re)uired to submit to a test to extract virus from his bod" >as cited in eople vs. Olvis, *upra?H the substance emitting from the bod" of the accused was received as evidence for acts of lasciviousness >+* vs. !an !eng, (; hil. 1=G?H morphine forced out of the mouth was received as proof >+* vs. Ong *iu 4ong, ;D hil. F;G?H an order b" the %udge for the witness to put on pair of pants for size was allowed > eople vs. Otadora, ED hil. (==?H and the court can compel a woman accused of adulter" to submit for pregnanc" test >Cillaflor vs. *ummers, =1 hil. D(?, since the gist of the privilege is the restriction on *testimonial compulsion.*GD !he polic" of the @amil" 'ode to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternit" and filiation of children, especiall" of illegitimate children, is without pre%udice to the right of the putative parent to claim his or her own defenses. GF #here the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through the facilities of modern science and technolog", such
(7(

evidence should be considered sub%ect to the limits established b" the law, rules, and %urisprudence. 11". MA. ,L:TH ,. A,ADILLA vs. JUDGE JOSE C. TA,ILIRAN* JR. A. M. No. MTJC"(C01 O47o6e% (#* 1""# FACTS !he herein administrative case arose from a complaint, dated *eptember E, 111(, filed b" .a. /l"th /. ,badilla, a 'lerk of 'ourt assigned at the sala of respondent, <udge <ose '. !abiliran, <r., of the Eth .unicipal 'ircuit !rial 'ourt, .anukan, Qamboanga del 9orte. &espondent stands charged with - gross immoralit , deceitful conduct, and corruption un"ecoming of a .udge.In her verified complaint, complainant ,badilla, in respect to the charge of gross immoralit" on the part of the respondent, contends that respondent had scandalousl" and publicl" cohabited with a certain riscilla R. /a"ba"an during the existence of his legitimate marriage with !eresita /anzuela. ,dding ignomin" to an ignominious situation, respondent allegedl" shamefacedl" contracted marriage with the said riscilla /a"ba"an on .a" (;, 11ED. 'omplainant claims that this was a bigamous union because of the fact that the respondent was then still ver" much married to !eresita /anzuela. @urthermore, respondent falsel" represented himself as - single- in the marriage contract >:xh. -,-? and dispensed with the re)uirements of a marriage contract b" invoking cohabitation with /a"ba"an for five "ears. Of persuasive effect on the charge of immoralit" is the fact that, earlier, respondentMs wife filed a complaint in the case entitled, !eresita /. !abiliran vs. ,tt". <ose '. !abiliran, <r., 11G *'&, =G1. &espondent stood charged therein for abandoning the famil" home and living with a certain Aeonora illarion with whom he had a son. In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct, complainant claims that respondent caused to be registered as -legitimate-, his three illegitimate children with riscilla /a"ba"an, namel"5 /. !abiliran born on <ul" 1=, 11F7, Cenus /. !abiliran born on *ept. F, 11F1, *aturn /. !abiliran born on *ept. (7, 11FG b" falsel" executing separate affidavits stating that the dela"ed registration was due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight, when in truth and in fact, respondent knew that these children cannot be legall" registered as legitimate. &espondent admits that he indicated in his marriage contract that he was then -single-, but he denied the charge that he acted with deceit or false misrepresentation, claiming that, since there were onl" three words to choose from, namel"5 *ingle, #idow or 2ivorced, he preferred to choose the word -single-, it being the most appropriate. /esides, both he and riscilla executed a %oint affidavit wherein his former marriage to /anzuela was honestl" divulged. ISSUE
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#hether or not the respondent is guilt" of Gross Immoralit" and deceitful misconduct b" contracting a bigamous marriage. RULING /" committing the immoralit" in )uestion, respondent violated the trust reposed on his high office and utterl" failed to live up to the noble ideals and strict standards of moralit" re)uired of the law profession. >Imbing v. !iongson, ((1 *'&, D17?. ,s to respondentMs act of eventuall" marr"ing riscilla /a"ba"an in 11ED, #e are not in a position to determine the legalit" thereof, absent all the facts for a proper determination. *ufficient for Our consideration is the finding of the Investigating <udge, that the said marriage is authorized under ,rt. E; >(? of the 'ivil 'ode. #ith respect to the charge of deceitful conduct, #e hold that the charge has likewise been dul" established. ,n examination of the birth certificates >:xhs. -<-, -A-, S -.-? of respondentMs three illegitimate children with riscilla /a"ba"an clearl" indicate that these children are his legitimate issues. It was respondent who caused the entr" therein. It is important to note that these children, namel", /uenasol, Cenus and *aturn, all surnamed !abiliran, were born in the "ear 11F7, 11F1, and 11FG, respectivel", and prior to the marriage of respondent to riscilla, which was in 11ED. ,s a law"er and a %udge, respondent ought to know that, despite his subse)uent marriage to riscilla, these three children cannot be legitimated nor in an" wa" be considered legitimate since at the time the" were born, there was an existing valid marriage between respondent and his first wife, !eresita /. !abiliran. !he applicable legal provision in the case at bar is ,rticle (D1 of the 'ivil 'ode of the hilippines >&.,. ;ED as amended? which provides5 Art. G,%. 2nl natural children can "e legitimated. Children "orn outside of wedloc+ of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not dis5ualified " an impediment to marr each other, are natural. Aegitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous relations >&amirez vs. Gmur, =( hil. EGG?. !he @amil" 'ode5 >:xecutive Order, 9o. (71?, which took effect on ,ugust ;, 11EE, reiterated the above$mentioned provision thus5 Art. (''. 2nl children conceived and "orn outside of wedloc+ of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not dis5ualified " an impediment to marr each other ma "e legitimated. !he reasons for this limitation are given as follows5 1? !he rationale of legitimation would be destro"edH (? It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rightsH ;? !here will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores changeH =? It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destro" the sanctit" of marriageH G? It will be ver" scandalous, especiall" if the parents marr" man" "ears after the birth of the child. >!he @amil" 'ode, p. (G(, ,licia v. *empio 2i"?.
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It is clear, therefore, that no legal provision, whether old or new, can give refuge to the deceitful actuations of the respondent. It is also erroneous for respondent to state that his first wife !eresita disappeared in 11DD and has not been heard from since then. It appears that on 2ecember E, 11D1, !eresita filed a complaint against respondent entitled, !a"iliran vs. !a"iliran >G.&. 9o. 11GG=G1? which was decided b" this 'ourt in 11E(. In the said case, respondent was sued for abandonment of his famil" home and for living with another woman with whom he allegedl" begot a child. &espondent was, however, exonerated because of the failure of his wife to substantiate the charges. 4owever, respondent was reprimanded for having executed a -2eed of *ettlement of *pouses !o Aive *eparatel" from /ed-, with a stipulation that the" allow each of the other spouse to live with another man or woman as the case ma" be, without the ob%ection and intervention of the other. It was also in the same case where respondent declared that he has onl" two children, namel", &e"nald ,ntonio and <ose III, both surnamed !abiliran, who are his legitimate issues. !hus, his statements in his affidavits marked as :xhs. -.$=- and -O$=- that *aturn and Cenus are his third and second children respectivel", are erroneous, deceitful, misleading and detrimental to his legitimate children. 1(/. MARIA ROSARIO DE SANTOS vs. HON. ADORACION G. ANGELES G. R. No. 1/# 1" De4e56e% 1(* 1""# FACTS On @ebruar" F, 11=1, 2r. ,ntonio de *antos married *ofia /ona, which union was blessed with a daughter, herein petitioner .aria &osario de *antos. ,fter some time, their relationship became strained to the breaking point. !hereafter, ,ntonio fell in love with a fellow doctor, 'onchita !alag, private respondent herein. ,ntonio sought a formal dissolution of his first marriage b" obtaining a divorce decree from a 9evada court in 11=1. Obviousl" aware that said decree was a worthless scrap of paper in our %urisdiction which then, as now, did not recognize divorces, ,ntonio proceeded to !ok"o, <apan in 11G1 to marr" private respondent, with whom he had been cohabiting since his de facto separation from *ofia. !his union produced eleven children. On .arch ;7, 11DF, *ofia died in Guatemala. Aess than a month later, on ,pril (;, 11DF, ,ntonio and private respondent contracted a marriage in !aga"ta" 'it" celebrated under hilippine laws. On .arch E, 11E1, ,ntonio died intestate leaving properties with an estimated value of 1G,777,777.77. On .a" 1G, 11E1, private respondent went to court 1 asking for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor in connection with the settlement of her late husbandMs estate. *he alleged, among other things, that the decedent was survived b" twelve legitimate heirs, namel", herself, their ten surviving children, and petitioner. !here being no opposition, her petition was granted.
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,fter six "ears of protracted intestate proceedings, however, petitioner decided to intervene. !hus, in a motion she filed sometime in 9ovember 11EF, she argued inter alia that private respondentMs children were illegitimate. !his was challenged b" private respondent although the latter admitted during the hearing that all her children were born prior to *ofiaMs death in 11DF. On 9ovember 1=, 1111, after approval of private respondentMs account of her administration, the court a 5uopassed upon petitionerMs motion. !he court, citing the case of Francisco <. !ongo , et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al . >(; *'&, 11 J11E;K?, declared private respondentMs ten children legitimated and thereupon instituted and declared them, along with petitioner and private respondent, as the heirs of ,ntonio de *antos. etitioner sought a reconsideration of said order but this was denied in the courtMs order dated <anuar" 1, 111(. 4ence, she filed the instant petition for certiorari on <une 1D, 111(, contending that since onl" natural children can be legitimized, the trial court mistakenl" declared as legitimated her half brothers and sisters. ISSUE #hether or not natural children b" legal fiction be legitimizedL RULING In the case at bench, there is no )uestion that all the children born to private respondent and deceased ,ntonio de *antos were conceived and born when the latterMs valid marriage to petitionerMs mother was still subsisting. !hat private respondent and the decedent were married abroad after the latter obtained in 9evada, +.*.,. a decree of divorce from his legitimate wife does not change this fact, for a divorce granted abroad was not recognized in this %urisdiction at the time. :videntl", the decedent was aware of this fact, which is wh" he had to have the marriage solemnized in !ok"o, outside of the hilippines. It ma" be added here that he was likewise aware of the nullit" of the !ok"o marriage for after his legitimate, though estranged wife died, he hastil" contracted another marriage with private respondent, this time here in !aga"ta". It must be noted that while ,rticle (D1, which falls under the general heading of - aternit" and @iliation,- specificall" deals with -Aegitimated 'hildren,- ,rticle E1, a provision subsumed under the general title on -.arriage,- deals principall" with void and voidable marriages and secondaril", on the effects of said marriages on their offspring. It creates another categor" of illegitimate children, those who are -conceived or born of marriages which are void from the beginning,- but because there has been a semblance of marriage, the" are classified as -acknowledged natural children- and, accordingl", en%o" the same status, rights and obligations as such kind of children. In the case at bench, the marriage under )uestion is considered -void from the beginning- because bigamous, contracted when a prior valid marriage was still subsisting. It follows that the
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children begotten of such union cannot be considered natural children proper for at the time of their conception, their parents were dis)ualified from marr"ing each other due to the impediment of a prior subsisting marriage. #hat term should then be coined to distinguish them from natural children proper >those -born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not dis)ualified b" an" impediment to marr" each other-?L , legal fiction had to be resorted to, that device contrived b" law to simulate a fact or condition which, strictl" and technicall" speaking, is not what it purports to be. In this case, the term -natural children b" legal fiction- was invented, thus giving rise to another categor" of illegitimate children, clearl" not to be confused with -natural children- as defined under ,rt. (D1 but b" fiction of law to be e)uated with acknowledged natural children and, conse)uentl", en%o"ing the status, rights and obligations of the latter. 2oes this cluster of rights include the right to be legitimatedL +nder the 'ivil 'ode, there exists a hierarch" of children classified on the basis of rights granted b" law, which must be preserved b" strictl" construing the substantive provisions of the law in force. +nder the prevailing 'ivil 'ode >which ma" be considered -old- in light of the new provisions of the @amil" 'ode on - ersons-?, much emphasis is laid on the classification of children visAaAvis their parents, and the corresponding rights the" are entitled to under the law. !hus, the title on - aternit" and @iliation- devotes two whole chapters to legitimate children alone, and one chapter on those deemed b" law to be possessed of the rights of the former, such as legitimated children, because of their compliance with certain re)uisites laid down b" lawH two other chapters deal with illegitimate children composed of recognized natural children, and those other than natural, or spurious, whether recognized or not. !he well$ordered delineation of such distinctions among these groups demonstrates a clear intent on the part of the framers of the 'ivil 'ode to compartmentalize and separate one from the other, for legitimac"/illegitimac" determines the substantive rights accruing to the different categories of children. It must be noted that before said 'ode was enacted, other classes of illegitimate children were recognized, such as, -manceres- or the offspring of prostitutes and the -sacrilegious- or children of those who had received 4ol" Orders. *ubse)uentl", the 'ivil 'ode, in an effort to keep in step with modern times, limited illegitimate filiation to those which are incestuous, adulterous and illicit. ,t the core of the institution of legitimac" held sacrosanct b" *panish tradition and culture, lies the -inviolable social institution- known as marriage. !his union, absent an" formal or substantial defect or of an" vice of consent, is virtuall" adamantine. On the whole, the status of a marriage determines in large part the filiation of its resultant issue. !hus, a child born within a valid marriage is legitimate, while one born outside of wedlock is illegitimate. If, however, the latterMs parents were, at the time of the childMs conception, not legall" barred from marr"ing each other and subse)uentl" do so, the childMs filiation improves as he becomes legitimized and the -legitimated- child
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eventuall" en%o"s all the privileges and rights associated with legitimac". #ithout such marriage, the natural childMs rights depend on whether he is acknowledged or recognized b" his parents, but he does not rise to the level of a legitimate child in the manner that the legitimated child does. , child conceived or born of a marriage which is void a" initio or one which is declared a nullit" is illegitimate since there is no marriage to speak of, but it is the law which accords him the rights of an acknowledged natural child. @inall", there are illegitimate children who are referred to as -spurious- or derisivel" denominated as -bastards- because of their doubtful origins. !here is no marriage N valid or otherwise N which would give an" semblance of legalit" to the childMs existence. 9othing links child to parent aside from the information appearing in the birth certificate. #hen such child is recognized b" one or both parents, he ac)uires certain rights nowhere approaching those of his legitimate counterparts. !he 'ivil 'ode provides three rights which, in var"ing degrees, are en%o"ed b" children, depending on their filiation5 use of surname, succession, and support. Aegitimate children and legitimated children are entitled to all three. !hus, the" -shall principall" use the surname of the father,- ! and shall be entitled to support from their legitimate ascendants and descendants, ) as well as to a legitime consisting of one$half of the hereditar" estate of both parents, # and to other successional rights, such as the right of representation. -!hese rights as effects of legitimac" cannot be renounced.9atural children recognized b" both parents and natural children b" legal fiction shall principall" use the surname of the father. 0 If a natural child is recognized b" onl" one parent, the child shall follow the surname of such recognizing parent. + /oth t"pes of children are entitled to receive support from the parent recognizing them. "!he" also cannot be deprived of their legitime e)uivalent to one$half of that pertaining to each of the legitimate children or descendants of the recognizing parent, to be taken from the free disposable portion of the latterMs estate. &ecognized illegitimate children other than natural, or spurious issues, are, in their minorit", under the parental authorit" of their mothers and, naturall", take the latterMs surname. !he onl" support which the" are entitled to is from the recognizing parent, and their legitime, also to be taken from the free portion, consists of four$fifths of the legitime of an acknowledged natural child or two$fifths that of each legitimate child. It must also be observed that while the legitime of a legitimate child is fairl" secured b" law, the legitime of an" recognized illegitimate child, taken as it is from the free portion of the hereditar" estate which the child shares with the surviving spouse, ma" be reduced if it should exceed said portion. +nrecognized illegitimate children are not entitled to an" of the rights above mentioned.
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!hese distinctions gain more relevance if we were to consider that while a legitimated child ma" en%o" the same successional rights granted to legitimate children, a natural child b" legal fiction cannot rise be"ond that to which an acknowledged natural child is entitled, insofar as his hereditar" rights are concerned. It is thus incongruous to conclude, as private respondent maintains, that petitionerMs half siblings can rise to her level b" the fact of being legitimized, for two reasons5 @irst, the" failed to meet the most important re)uisite of legitimation, that is, that the" be natural children within the meaning of ,rticle (D1H second, natural children b" legal fiction cannot demand that the" be legitimized simpl" because it is one of the rights en%o"ed b" acknowledged natural children. It ma" be argued that legitimation is a right vouchsafed to acknowledged natural children and, therefore, b" the same token, to natural children b" legal fiction. !his conclusion is arrived at through a s"llogism as simple as it is deceptive, which runs as follows5 !he respondentMs children are natural children b" legal fiction. !herefore, the" have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children. ,cknowledged natural children have the right to be legitimated. :rgo, respondentMs children have the right to be legitimated >as in fact the" were -deemed legitimated- b" the subse)uent valid marriage of their parents in the hilippines in 11DF?. !he above line of reasoning follows the :uclidian geometric proposition that things e)ual to the same thing are e)ual to each other. !his ma" hold true in the realm of instructional, as opposed to descriptive science, where the former calls for the application of absolute, mathematical rules with precision but not to the latter, particularl" those which deal with the social sciences where human relationships are central to a stud" whose main concern is not to leave out an"thing of significance. !he former deals with inanimate things, those which a scientist has described as the -dead aspect of nature,- excluding all factors regarded as superfluous to obtaining absolute results and nothing more. It does not concern itself so much with the whole truth as with those aspects or parts onl" through which the inexorable result can be obtained. !o appl" the strict rules of s"llogism, where the basic premise is defective, to the arena of paternit" and filiation, especiall" in the determination of the status and rights of the different kinds of illegitimate children visAaAvis the legitimate ones, is bound to spawn mischief and results never intended b" the framers of the provisions of the law under review. ursued to its logical, undeviating conclusion, it ma" eventuall" be postulated that -adulterous children shall en%o" the status, rights and obligations of legitimate children,(71

a doctrine which no moral philosoph" under our social and cultural milieu can countenance. !his conclusion not onl" presumes that children other than those who are -natural- can be legitimized in the first place, but also grants acknowledged natural children >and, conse)uentl", natural children b" legal fiction? a -right- to be legitimized when no such right exists. Aegitimation is not a -right- which is demandable b" a child. It is a privilege, available onl" to natural children proper, as defined under ,rt. (D1. ,lthough natural children b" legal fiction have the same rights as acknowledged natural children, it is a )uantum leap in the s"llogism to conclude that, therefore, the" likewise have the right to be legitimated, which is not necessaril" so, especiall", as in this case, when the legall" existing marriage between the childrenMs father and his estranged first wife effectivel" barred a -subse)uent marriage- between their parents. !he )uestion that must be confronted next is5 4ow are the offspring of the second union affected b" the first wifeMs death and the ensuing celebration of a valid marriage between her widower and his ostensible second wifeL 9atural children b" legal fiction cannot be legitimized in this fashion. Our archaic law on famil" relations, patterned as it is after *panish 'ivil Aaw, frowns upon illegal relations such that the benefits of legitimation under 'hapter ; of !itle CIII do not extend, nor were the" intended to extend, to natural children b" legal fiction. ,rticle (D1 itself clearl" limits the privilege of legitimation to natural children as defined thereunder. !here was, therefore, from the outset, an intent to exclude children conceived or born out of illicit relations from the purview of the law. ,nother point to be considered is that although natural children can be legitimized, and natural children b" legal fiction en%o" the rights of acknowledged natural children, this does not necessaril" lead to the conclusion that natural children b" legal fiction can likewise be legitimized. ,s has been pointed out, much more is involved here than the mere privilege to be legitimized. !he rights of other children, like the petitioner in the case at bench, ma" be adversel" affected as her testamentar" share ma" well be reduced in the event that her ten surviving half siblings should be placed on par with her, when each of them is rightfull" entitled to onl" half of her share. !he provisions of law invoked b" private respondent are couched in simple and unmistakable language, not at all sub%ect to interpretation, and the" all point to the correctness of petitionerMs claim. If it should be asserted that we now trench on a gra" area of law that calls for interpretation, or a lacuna that cries for filling up, then we have to pierce the shroud unintentionall" created b" the letter of the law and expose its spirit as evincing intent, in this case one which decidedl" favors legitimac" over illegitimac". !he hierarch" of children so painstakingl" erected b" law and the corresponding gradation of their rights ma" conceivabl" be shattered b" elevating natural children b" legal fiction who are incontestabl" illegitimate children to the level of natural children proper, whose filiation would otherwise be legitimate had their parents blessed their union with a valid marriage.
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@inall", attention must be drawn to the fact that this case has been decided under the provisions of the 'ivil 'ode, not the @amil" 'ode which now recognizes onl" two classes of children5 legitimate and illegitimate. -9atural children b" legal fiction- are nothing if not pure fiction. 1(1. MA. CRISTINA TORRES ,RAZA* e7 a'. vs. THE CIT: CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMA:LAN CIT:* NEGROS OCCIDENTAL* e7 a'. G. R. No. 1+110) De4e56e% )* (//" FACTS etitioner .a. 'ristina !orres >.a. 'ristina? and ablo *icad /raza, <r. > ablo?, also known as - ablito *icad /raza,- were married on <anuar" =, 11FE. !he union bore .a. 'ristina0s co$petitioners aolo <osef and <anelle ,nn on .a" E, 11FE and <une F, 11E;, respectivel", and Gian 'arlo on <une =, 11E7. ablo died on ,pril 1G, (77( in a vehicular accident in /andung, #est <ava, Indonesia. 2uring the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the hilippines, respondent Aucille !itular >Aucille? began introducing her co$respondent minor atrick ,lvin !itular /raza > atrick? as her and abloMs son. .a. 'ristina thereupon made in)uiries in the course of which she obtained atrickMs birth certificate from the Aocal 'ivil &egistrar of 4imama"lan 'it". In the annotation and remarks portion, it was written5 ,nnotation/&emark JA4A3ow'e89e Ns&4O 61 7he <a7he% -a6'&7o ,%a=a o3 Ja32a%1 1!* s 1""0M &emarks 5 Le9&7&5a7e8 61 v&%72e o< s26se?2e37 5a%%&a9e o< $a%e37s o3 A$%&' ((* 1""+a7 Ma3&'a. 4enceforth, the child shall be known as -a7%&4A A'v&3 T&72'a% ,%a=a .a. 'ristina likewise obtained a cop" F of a marriage contract showing that ablo and Aucille were married on ,pril ((, 111E, drawing her and her co$petitioners to file on 2ecember (;, (77G before the &egional !rial 'ourt of 4imama"lan 'it", 9egros Occidental a petition to correct the entries in the birth record of atrick in the Aocal 'ivil &egister. 'ontending that atrick could not have been legitimated b" the supposed marriage between Aucille and ablo, said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage between .a. 'ristina and ablo, petitioners pra"ed for >1? the correction of the entries in atrickMs birth record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name -/raza-H (? a directive to Aeon, 'ecilia and Aucille, all surnamed !itular, as guardians of the minor atrick, to su"mit #aric+ to D$A testing to determine his paternit" and filiationH and ;? the declaration of nullit" of the legitimation of atrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the declaration of the marriage of 9ucille and #a"lo as "igamous . On atrick0s .otion to 2ismiss for Aack of <urisdiction, the trial court, b" Order 1 of *eptember D, (77F, dismissed the petition without pre%udice, it holding that in a special
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proceeding for correction of entr", the court, which is not acting as a famil" court under the @amil" 'ode, has no %urisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Aucille and ablo, impugn the legitimac" of atrick, and order atrick to be sub%ected to a 29, test, hence, the controvers" should be ventilated in an ordinar" adversarial action. ISSUE #hether or not the petitioner0s main cause of action is for the correction of birth records and that the rest of the pra"ers are merel" incidental thereto. atrick0s

RULING etitioners0 position does not lie. !heir cause of action is actuall" to seek the declaration of ablo and Aucille0s marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn atrick0s legitimac", which causes of action are governed not b" &ule 17E but b" ,... 9o. 7($11$ 17$*' which took effect on .arch 1G, (77;, and ,rt. 1F1 of the @amil" 'ode, respectivel", hence, the petition should be filed in a @amil" 'ourt as expressl" provided in said 'ode. It is well to emphasize that, doctrinall", validit" of marriages as well as legitimac" and filiation can be )uestioned onl" in a direct action seasonabl" filed b" the proper part", and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a 5uo.

9. O3 7he Use o< S2%3a5es

1((. ELAINE A. MOORE vs. RE-U,LIC OF THE -HILI--INES G. R. No. LC1+)/0 J23e ( * 1" ! FACTS :laine ,. .oore filed a petition before the 'ourt of @irst Instance of &izal pra"ing that her child b" a former marriage, #illiam .ichael Celarde, be permitted to change his name so as to read #illiam .ichael Celarde .oore. ,fter publishing the petition as re)uired b" law, trial was held during which the parties submitted a stipulation of facts. !hereafter, the trial court issued an order den"ing the petition whereupon petitioner interposed the present appeal. etitioner is an ,merican citizen formerl" married to <oseph . Celarde, also an ,merican citizen, out of whose wedlock a child b" the name of #illiam .ichael Celarde was born. !his child, now 1= "ears old, was born on <anuar" 11, 11=F at Aos ,ngeles, 'alifornia, +.*.,. !he marriage of petitioner to Celarde was subse)uentl" dissolved b" a decree of divorce issued b" the *uperior 'ourt of the *tate of 'alifornia on .a" ;1, 11=1. ,fter said decree became final, petitioner contracted a second marriage with 2on '. .oore on *eptember (1, 11GD at Aos ,ngeles, 'alifornia, +.*.,., and thereafter the minor lived continuousl" with the spouses up to the present time. 4e was supported b" .oore
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who has alwa"s treated him with love and affection as if he were his true father. In view of this harmonious relation it is petitionerMs desire that the minor be able to use the name .oore after his famil" name Celarde. ISSUES 1. #hether under our laws a minor ma" be permitted to adopt and use the surname of the second husband of his mother. (. #hether %ustifiable reasons exist to allow such change of nameH and whether petitioner, as mother of the minor, has the authorit" or personalit" to ask for such a change. RULING ,nent the first issue, the government sustains a negative stand for the reason that our laws do not authorize a legitimate child to use the surname of a person who is not his father, for, as a matter of fact, ,rticle ;D= of 'ivil 'ode specificall" provides that legitimate children shall principall" use the surname of their father. .ention is also made of ,rticle ;D1 of the same 'ode which provides that in case of annulment of avoidable marriage the children conceived before the annulment she principall" use the surname of the father, and considering b" analog" the effect of a decree of divorce, it concluded that the children who are conceived before such a decree should also be understood as carr"ing the surname of the real father, which, in this case, is Celarde. #e find tenable this observation of governmentMs counsel. Indeed, if a child born out of a lawful wedlock be allowed to bear the surname of the second husband of the mother, should the first husband die or be separated b" a decree of divorce, there ma" result a confusion to his real paternit". In the long run the change ma" redound to the pre%udice of the child in the communit". #hile the purpose which ma" have animated petitioner is plausible and ma" run along the feeling of cordialit" and spiritual relationship that pervades among the members of the .oore famil", our hand is deferred b" a legal barrier which we cannot at present overlook or brush aside. ,nother factor to be reckoned with is the fact that the child concerned is still a minor who for the present cannot fathom what would be his feeling when he comes to mature age. ,n" wa", if the time comes, he ma" decide the matter for himself and take such action as our law ma" permit. @or the present we deem the action taken b" petitioner premature. 1(!. IN REJ DIONESIO AND ,OM,I RO,ERTO DIVINAGRACIA vs. RE-U,LIC OF THE -HILI--INES* e7 a'. G. R. No. LC###!+ Ma%4h 1#* 1"+( FACTS
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Qosima 9aldoza was married to 2ionesio 2ivinagracia on .a" ;7, 11F7. !he" begot two children named 2ionesio, <r. and /ombi &oberto who were born on October (;, 11F7 and <ul" ((, 11F;, respectivel". QosimaMs husband left her after she confronted him with his previous marriage with another woman. 4e never returned to the con%ugal abode. 4e allegedl" swindled 'ongressman .aglana in the sum of G7,777.77, one Galagar in the sum of 17,777.77 also :lo" Gallentes and other persons. !he classmates of 2ionesio, <r. and /ombi &oberto allegedl" teased them about their father being a swindler. !wo criminal cases for estafa were filed in court against the father. 2esirous of obliterating an" connection between her two minor children and their scapegrace father, Qosima, on ,ugust 17, 11FE, filed in the 'ourt of @irst Instance of /ohol a petition wherein she pra"ed that the surname of her two children be changed from 2ivinagracia to 9aldoza, her surname >*pecial roceeding 9o. FDE?. ,fter due publication and hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition. !he trial court did not consider as sufficient grounds for change of surname the circumstances that the childrenMs father was a swindler, that he had abandoned them and that his marriage to Qosima was a second marriage which, however, had not been annulled nor declared bigamous. It reasoned that the childrenMs adoption of their motherMs surname would give a false impression of famil" relationship. @rom that decision, Qosima 9aldoza appealed to this 'ourt under &epublic ,ct 9o. G==7. ,ppellantMs seven assignments of error ma" be reduced to the )uestion of whether there is a %ustification for the two children to drop their fatherMs surname and use their motherMs surname onl". !he minors 2ionesio, <r. and /ombi &oberto, who are presumabl" legitimate, are supposed to bear principall" the surname 2ivinagracia, their fatherMs surname >,rt. ;D=, 'ivil 'ode?. !o allow them, at their motherMs behest, to bear onl" their motherMs surname >which the" are entitled to use together with their fatherMs surname? and to discard altogether their fatherMs surname thus removing the primaAfacie evidence of their paternal provenance or ancestr", is a serious matter in which, ordinaril", the minors and their father should be consulted. !he motherMs desire should not be the sole consideration. ISSUE #hether or not two minors should be allowed to discontinue using their fatherMs surname and should use onl" their motherMs surname. RULING !he change of name is allowed onl" when there are proper and reasonable causes for such change >*ec. G, &ule 17;, &ules of 'ourt?. #here, as in this case, the petitioners
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are minors, the courts should take into account whether the change of name would redound their welfare or would pre%udice them. #here the petitioner, a legitimate daughter of a @ilipino mother and a <apanese, elected hilippine citizenship, and her older brother and sister were using their motherMs surname, and the petitioner felt embarrassed in using her <apanese fatherMs surname >Oshita? because of the ill$feeling harbored b" some @ilipinos against the <apanese, and there was no showing that her desire to use the maternal surname >/artolome? was motivated b" an" fraudulent purpose or that the change of surname would pre%udice public interest, her petition to change her surname from Oshita to /artolome was granted >Oshita vs. &epublic, A$(11E7, .arch ;1, 11DF, 11 *'&, F77?. #here the petitionerMs name in the civil registr" is .aria :strella Ceronica rimitiva 2uterte, 2uterte being the surname of her father @ilomeno, who was married to her mother, :strella ,lfon, but the petitioner since infanc" has used the name :strella *. ,lfon, particularl" in the school and voting records, there is reasonable ground for allowing her to change her surname from 2uterte to ,lfon. *uch a change would avoid confusion >,lfon vs. &epublic, G.&. 9o. G1(71, .a" (1, 11E7,1F *'&, EGE?. !he instant case is easil" distinguishable from the 2shita and A6fon cases where the petitioners were alread" of age. #e hold that the trial court did not err in den"ing the petition for change of name. !he reasons adduced for eliminating the fatherMs surname are not substantial enough to %ustif" the petition. !o allow the change of surname would cause confusion as to the minorsM parentage and might create the impression that the minors are illegitimate since the" would carr" the maternal surname onl". !hat would be inconsistent with their legitimate status as indicated in their birth records >:xh. ' and 2?. ,s was said in that 6n re :pstein (77 9.3.*. E1F, -the child should, and in the course of time must, know of his parentage. - If, when he full" appreciates the circumstances and is capable of selecting a name for himself, he wants to use his motherMs surname onl" and to avoid using his fatherMs surname, then he should be the one to appl" for a change of surname. *ee ,nno., G; ,A&(d 11=. 1(). IN REJ DOLORES GEMORA -ADILLA vs. RE-U,LIC OF THE -HILI--INES G. R. No. LC(+(0) A$%&' !/* 1"+( FACTS !his is an appeal b" the *tate from the decision of the 'ourt of @irst Instance of ampanga perfected before the effectivit" of &epublic ,ct 9o. G==7 N granting the petition of 2olores Gemora for change of surname of her minor children5 .ichael, ,bigail, &afael, Gabriel and ,nnabelle, from -'opuaco- or -'o- to - adilla-.

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2olores Gemora and Cincent 'o, a 'hinese national, were married on .a" G, 11G=. !his matrimonial union begot five children, namel"5 .ichael 'opuaco, ,bigail 'opuaco, &afael 'opuaco, Gabriel 'opuaco, and ,nnabelle 'o. *ometime in 9ovember 11D7, Cincent 'o left the con%ugal abode in 'aloocan 'it" and has since never returned to, or even visited, his famil". It is alleged that he was a fugitive from %ustice, having been charged with several offenses of estafa before the 'ourt of @irst Instance of .anila and the 'it" 'ourt of 'aloocan 'it". /ecause of his continuous absence, the 'ourt of @irst Instance of ampanga, on petition of 2olores Gemora, issued an order dated 2ecember (1, 11D= in *p. roc. 9o. 1FFD, declaring Cincent 'o as an absentee. On October ;7, 11DG, 2olores Gemora contracted a second marriage with *gt. :dward adilla, an ,mericas serviceman stationed at 'lark ,ir /ase, ,ngeles 'it". !he five minor children, who had been living with said spouses, were generousl" supported b" adilla and were treated b" him with affection as if the" were his own children. !his harmonious relation existing between said minors and their stepfather prompted 2olores Gemora to file the instant petition for change of the minorsM surname from -'opuaco- or -'o- to - adilla-, which petition was granted b" the lower court after due notice and hearing. ISSUE #hether or not a child could use a surname of a man not his father.

RULING #e find merit in the contention of the *olicitor General that our laws do not authorize legitimate children to adopt the surname of a person who is not their father. *aid minors are the legitimate children of Cincent 'oH and ,rticle ;D= of the 'ivil 'ode explicitl" provides that -legitimate children ... shall principall" use the surname of their father.!o allow said minors to adopt the surname of their motherMs second husband, who is not their father, could result in confusion in their paternit". It could also create the suspicion that said minors, who were born during the coverture of their mother with her first husband, were in fact sired b" :dward adilla, thus bringing their legitimate status into discredit. !he case before +s is not of first impression. In Coore vs. -epu"lic, a case involving the same factual melieu, #e held that5 Our laws do not authorize a legitimate child to use the surname of a person who is not his father. ,rticle ;D= of the 'ivil 'ode specificall" provides that legitimate children shall principall" use the surname of their father, and ,rticle ;D1 of the same 'ode provides
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that in case of annulment of a voidable marriage the children conceived before the annulment shall principall" use the surname of the father, and considering b" analog" the effect of a decree of divorce, it is correctl" concluded that the children who are conceived before such a decree should also be understood as carr"ing the surname of the real father. If a child born out of a lawful wedlock be allowed to bear the surname of the second husband of the mother, should the first husband die or be separated b" a decree of divorce, there ma" result a confusion as to his real paternit". In the long run the change ma" redound to the pre%udice of the child in the communit". #hile the purpose which ma" have animated petitioner, the minorMs mother, is plausible and ma" run along the feeling of cordialit" and spiritual relationship that pervades among the members of the famil" of her second husband, there is a legal barrier which cannot at present be overlooked or brushed aside. ,part from the legal obstacles discussed above, #e consider the instant action taken b" petitioner in behalf of her minor children to be premature. Indeed, the matter of change of their surname should better be left to the %udgment and discretion of the children themselves when the" reach the age of maturit". If in their adulthood the" want to change their surname, then the" themselves or an" of them ma" take such appropriate action as the law ma" permit.

1(#. HATIMA C. :ASIN vs. SHARI@A DISTRICT COURT G. &. 9o. 1=1ED Fe6%2a%1 (!* 1""# FACTS !he summar" case filed b" the petitioner, a divorcee, to resume the use of her maiden name was denied b" the *hari0a 'ourt, holding that said petition needed to go through a %udicial process under &ule 17; of the &ules of 'ourt on change of name. RULING &ule 17; of the &ules of 'ourt should not be applied to %udicial confirmation of the right of a divorcee woman to reuse her maiden name and surname. , woman marr"ing a man is not re)uired to seek %udicial authorit" to use her husband0s name. In the same wa", when the marriage ties no longer exists, in case of death or divorce, as authorized in the .uslim 'ode, the widow/divorcee need not seek %udicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to reuse her maiden name. :ven under the 'ivil 'ode, the use of the husband0s surname during the marriage >,rt. ;F7?, after annulment of the marriage >,rt ;F1?, and after the death of the husband >,rt. ;F;?, is permissive and not obligator", except in the case of legal separation >,rt. ;F(?. !hus, the Court
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ruled that women need not undergo a special proceeding to change her name "ac+ to her maiden name after a divorce. 1( . CONSTANCIA TOLENTINO vs. COURT OF A--EALS AND CONSUELO DAVID G. R. No. LC)1)(0 JUNE 1/* 1"++ FACTS !his case is a petition to review the decision of the 'ourt of ,ppeals. On @ebruar" E, 11;1, respondent 'onsuelo 2avid married ,rturo !olentiono. !hat on *eptember 1G, 11=;, said marriage was dissolved and terminated pursuant to the law enforced during the <apanese occupation b" a decree of absolute divorce on the ground of desertion and abandonment b" the wife for at least three >;? continuous "ears. ,fter obtaining the divorced decree, ,rturo !olentino married ilar ,dorable but the latter died soon after the said marriage. ,rturo !olentino, then contracted another marriage with 'onstancia !olentino on ,pril (1, 11=G, the herein present legal wife of ,rturo !olentino to whom he had three >;? children. 'onsuelo 2avid on the other hand, continues using the surname !olentino even after the divorce decree was obtained even up to the filing of the instant complaint. *he contended that the usage of !olentino surname was authorized b" the famil" of ,rturo, particularl" his brothers and sisters. !he !rial 'ourt however, ruled that 'onsuelo 2avid should discontinue her usage of the surname !olentino, which ruling was reversed b" the 'ourt of ,ppeals in its decision. ISSUES 1. #hether or not petitioner0s cause of action alread" prescribed. (. #hether or not, the petitioner an exclude b" in%unction 'onsuelo 2avid from using the surname of her former husband from whom she was divorced. RULING ,rticle 11G7 of the 'ivil 'ode states that the time of prescription of all kinds of actions, when there is no special provision which ordain otherwise, shall be counted from the da" the" ma" be brought. ,rticle 11=1 further provides for the period of prescription which is five >G? "ears from the right of action accrues. !hus the action of petitioner has long prescribed because she ac)uired knowledge that 'onsuelo 2avid was still using the surname !olentino in 11G1. /ut the filing of instant complaint was onl" lodged on 9ovember (;, 11F1, (7 "ears after she ac)uired the knowledge. On the principal issue of whether or not a divorced woman ma" continue using the surname of her former husband, hilippine law is understandabl" silent. #e have no provisions for divorce in our laws and conse)uentl", the use of surnames b" a divorced wife is not provided for. It is significant to note that *enator !olentino himself in his
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commentar" on ,rt. ;F7 of the 'ivil 'ode states that -the wife cannot claim an exclusive right to use the husbandMs surname. *he cannot be prevented from using itH but neither can she restrain others from using it.- ,rt. ;F1 is not applicable to the case at bar because ,rt. ;F1 speaks of annulment while the case before us refers to absolute divorce where there is a severance of valid marriage ties. !he private respondent has established that to grant the in%unction to the petitioner would be an act of serious dislocation to her. *he has given proof that she entered into contracts with third persons, ac)uired properties and entered into other legal relations using the surname !olentino. !he petitioner, on the other hand, has failed to show that she would suffer an" legal in%ur" or deprivation of legal rights inasmuch as she can use her husbandMs surname and be full" protected in case the respondent uses the surname !olentino for illegal purposes. !he court thus rule that the use of the surname !olentino does not impinge on the rights of the petitioner. 'onsidering the circumstances of this petition, the age of the respondent who ma" be seriousl" pre%udiced at this stage of her life, having to resort to further legal procedures in reconstituting documents and altering legal transactions where she used the surname !olentino, and the effects on the private respondent who, while still not remarried, will have to use a surname different from the surnames of her own children, we find it %ust and e)uitable to leave things as the" are, there being no actual legal in%ur" to the petitioner save a deep hurt to her feelings which is not a basis for in%unctive relief. 1(0. ZENAIDA F. DA-AR ALIAS ZENAIDA D. ,IASCAN vs. GLORIA LOZANO ,IASCAN AND MARIO ,IASCAN G. R. No. 1)1++/ Se$7e56e% (0* (//) FACTS !his is a petition for review on certiorari under &ule =G of the &ules of 'ourt from the 2ecision1 of the 'ourt of ,ppeals >',? in ',$G.&. 'C$ 9o. GF;7D reversing the 2ecision( of the &egional !rial 'ourt >&!'? of 'aloocan 'it", /ranch 1(7, in 'ivil 'ase 9o. '$1D1E= and its &esolution; den"ing the motion for the reconsideration thereof. *ometime in 11DD, *pouses Gloria and .ario /iascan were married b" civil rights in Ruezon 'it". !he" have four >=? children. .ario /iascan, worked in *audi ,rabia as an overseas contract worker from 11FF to 11E1. It was in 11F1 when he met Qenaida 2apar, who was then a domestic helper and become .ario0s lover resulting to the latter0s failure to send support to his famil". Qenaida returned to the hilippines in 11E1. !hereafter, .ario0s returned to the countr". 4e %oined Qenaida and both live together in a rented house in ag$asa *ubdivision, Calenzuela, .etro .anila. !he" opened a %oint account with the hilippine 9ational /ank > 9/?. Aater, .ario returned to *audi ,rabia while Qenaida was left behind and was working in a garment factor". .ario then sent his earnings to Qenaida to their 9/
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%oint account. Qenaida0s relatives also sent her mone" to the same account she has with .ario. On <ul" E, 11EG, a contract to sell was executed b" and between *tate Aand Investment 'orporation, on the one hand, and -*ps. .ario .. /iascan/ S Qenaida 2. /iascan,- on the other, over a parcel of land consisting of 1G7 s)uare meters, described as Aot 11, /lock (, 9arra *t., 4illcrest Cillage, 'amarin &oad, 9ovaliches, 'aloocan 'it" for 1FF,1E1.77. , 2eed of *ale was, thereafter, executed in favor of the -*ps. .ario .. /iascan and Qenaida 2. /iascan8 to which the issuance of a !ransfer 'ertificate of !itle >!'!? was based. . !hereafter, on .a" ;, 111;, the &!' of 'aloocan 'it" rendered its 2ecision1= in 'ivil 'ase 9o. '$(G1, declaring that Qenaida was a co$owner of the sub%ect lot but which decision was reversed b" the 'ourt of ,ppeals. 4ence the filing of the instant petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE #hether or not there Qenaida 2apar is a co$owner of the propert" purchased b" her and .ario and if there was usurpation on the part of Qenaida in using .ario /iascan0s surname. RULING !he trial court ruled that the law on co$ownership governed the propert" relations of .ario and Qenaida, who were living in an adulterous relationship or in a state of concubinage at the time the house and lot in )uestion was ac)uired. !he trial court further explained that under ,rticle 1=E of the @amil" 'ode, properties ac)uired b" both of the parties through their actual %oint contribution of mone" shall be owned in common in proportion to their respective contributions, and in the event that the amount of such contributions could not be determined, as in the present case, the" shall be presumed to be e)ual. !he trial court concluded that the shares of .ario and Qenaida as described in !'! 9o. (7F11F was in accordance with the sharing prescribed in ,rticle 1=E. ,s such, there was no legal basis to order the reconve"ance of the one$half share of the petitioner in favor of Gloria /iascan. !he usurpation of name under ,rticle ;FF of the 'ivil 'ode implies some in%ur" to the interests of the owner of the name. It consists in the possibilit" of confusion of identit" between the owner and the usurper, and exists when a person designates himself b" another name. !he elements are as follows5 >1? there is an actual use of another0s name b" the defendantH >(? the use is unauthorizedH and >;? the use of another0s name is to designate personalit" or identif" a person. 9one of the foregoing exist in the case at bar. &espondent Gloria /iascan did not claim that the petitioner ever attempted to impersonate her. .ario /iascan allowed the petitioner to use his surname. It would appear that the ver" first time that Qenaida 2apar0s name had the surname /iascan was when defendant .ario /iascan had executed the affidavit of undertaking in connection with his emplo"ment in *audi ,rabia, wherein he designated as his beneficiar" Qenaida 2apar /iascan.

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1(+. ELISEA LA-ERAL vs. RE-U,LIC OF THE -HILI--INES G. R. No. 1+//+ O47o6e% !/* 1" ( FACTS !he petitioner, a bona fide resident of /aguio 'it", was married with .r. :nri)ue &. *antamaria on .arch 11;1. 4owever, a decree of legal separation was later on issued to the spouses. ,side from that, she ceased to live with :nri)ue. 2uring their marriage, she naturall" uses :lisea A. *antamaria. *he filed this petition to be permitted to resume in using her maiden name :lisea Aaperal. !his was opposed b" the 'it" ,ttorne" of /aguio on the ground that it violates ,rt. ;F( of the 'ivil 'ode. *he was claiming that continuing to use her married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual li)uidation of the con%ugal assets. ISSUE #hether or not, &ule 17; which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the specific provision of ,rt. ;F( of the 'ivil 'ode with regard to married woman legall" separated from his husband. RULING In legal separation, the married status is unaffected b" the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. !he finding that petitioner0s continued use of her husband surname ma" cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis. It must be considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 11GE, necessitate that the con%ugal partnership between her and :nri)ue had automaticall" been dissolved and li)uidated. 4ence, there could be no more occasions for an eventual li)uidation of the con%ugal assets. @urthermore, appl"ing &ule 17; is not a sufficient ground to %ustif" a change of the name of :lisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an eas" circumvention of the mandator" provision of ,rt. ;F(. 1(". MA. AMELITA VILLAROSA vs. HRET* e7 a'. G. R. No. 1)!!#1 Se$7e56e% 1)* (/// FACTS !his case is an election protest filed b" private respondent &icardo C. Ruintos >hereafter R+I9!O*? against petitioner ,melita '. Cillarosa >hereafter CIAA,&O*,? before the 4ouse of &epresentatives :lectoral !ribunal >hereafter 4&:!?. CIAA,&O*, and R+I9!O* were the onl" candidates for the office of &epresentative of the Aone Aegislative 2istrict of Occidental .indoro in the 11 .a" 111E s"nchronized national and local elections. On (F .a" 111E the rovincial /oard of 'anvassers proclaimed CIAA,&O*, as the winning candidate with a margin of ;,7;( votes. On = <une 111E R+I9!O* filed an election protest against CIAA,&O*, contesting the results of the election in all the EE( precincts in the eleven municipalities of Occidental
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.indoro on the following grounds5 >1? the ballots were misread and counted in favor of protesteeH >(? there was rampant substitute voting, i.e., persons other than the registered voters votedH >;? violence and intimidation were committed b" protestee and her followers against known supporters of protestant to enhance protestee0s candidac"H =? previousl" prepared ballots for the protestee were deposited in the ballot boxesH and >G? illiterate .ang"an voters voting for protestant were assisted b" self$appointed assistors of protestee, who wrote 6<!C8 on the ballots contrar" to the instruction of said illiterate voters. Ruintos contested the proclaimation of ,melita Cillarosa whether 6<!C8 vote should be counted in favour of Cillarosa. <!C is the nickname of Cillarosa0s husband who is the incumbent representative of Occidental .indoro. ISSUE #hether or not 6<!C8 vote should be counted in favour Cillarosa when said acron"m is the nickname of Cillarosa0s husband. RULING @rom all the foregoing, bad faith or malice on the part of CIAA,&O*, was evident when, in her certificate of candidac" and campaign materials, she appropriated the initials or nickname of her husband, the incumbent &epresentative of the district in )uestion whom she wanted to succeed in office. *he tried to make a mocker" of a process whose credibilit" is essential in preserving democrac". $ullus commodum potest de in.uria sua propia. 9o one should be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong. 4owsoever viewed, public respondent 4&:! did not commit an" abuse of discretion in holding that the onl" issue for its determination was whether 6<!C8 votes or variations thereof should be counted in favor of CIAA,&O*, and in ruling that such votes are stra" votes. 1!/. JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ AND MINOR CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ KAQUINO*L e7 a'. vs. RONALD -AUL S. GRACIA G. R. No. 1000(+ J2'1 !1* (//" FACTS <enie *an <uan 2ela 'ruz, herein referred to as petitioner, cohabited with 'hristian 2omini)ue *to. !omas ,)uino, without the benefit of marriage. 2uring the period of the said cohabitation, petitioner got pregnant. ,lmost two months before the birth of their first born child, 'hristian 2omini)ue ,)uino died. #hen their child, 'hristian 2ela 'ruz ,)uino, co$petitioner was born, petitioner applied for registration of the child0s birth using 2omini)ue0s surname ,)uino with the Office of the 'it" &egistrar, ,ntipolo 'it", attaching among others the live birth of the child, an affidavit to use the surname of the father, an affidavit of acknowledgment executed b" 2omini)ue0s father and an autobiograph" written b" 2omini)ue0s own handwriting which autobiograph" did not bear 2omini)ue0s signature and which application for registration under the surname ,)uino was denied b" respondent &onal aul Gracia in his capacit" as the 'ivil &egistrar of ,ntipolo 'it", hence this petition.
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ISSUE #hether or not an unsigned autobiograph" personall" written b" 2omini)ue >deceased? constitutes an admission of paternit" in a 6private handwritten instrument8 that would warrant permission for the child to use the surname of the deceased father. RULING !he court via etition for &eview on 'ertiorari ruled in the affirmative. ,rticle 1FD of the @amil" 'ode, as amended, does not, indeed explicitl" state that the private handwritten instrument acknowledging the child0s paternit" must be signed b" the putative father. @urthermore, ,rticle 1FG, @amil" 'ode states that illegitimate children ma" establish their illegitimate affiliation in the same wa" and on the same evidence as legitimate children. ,rticle 1F( states that filiation of legitimate children ma" be established b" the record of birth appearing in the civil registrar or final %udgment or secondl" b" means of an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed b" the parent concern.

h. O3 A8o$7&o3 o< Ch&'8%e3

1!1. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADO-TION OF STE-HANIE NATH: ASTORGA GARCIA G. R. No. 1)+!11 Ma%4h !1* (//# FACTS On ,ugust ;1, (777, 4onorato /. 'atindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child *tephanie 9ath" ,storga Garcia. 4e alleged therein, among others, that *tephanie was born on <une (D, 111=H that her mother is Gemma ,storga GarciaH that *tephanie has been using her mother0s middle name and surnameH and that he is now a widower and )ualified to be her adopting parent. 4e pra"ed that *tephanie0s middle name ,storga be changed to 6Garcia,8 her mother0s surname, and that her surname 6Garcia8 be changed to 6'atindig,8 his surname. ,fter careful consideration of the trial court, herein petition for adoption was granted and ursuant to ,rticle 1E1 of the @amil" 'ode of the hilippines, the minor shall be known as *!: 4,9I: 9,!43 ',!I92IG. On ,pril (7, (771, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration pra"ing that *tephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother >G,&'I,? as her middle name. On .a" (E, (771, the trial court denied petitioner0s motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or %urisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name. 4ence, the present petition
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ISSUE #hether or not, an illegitimate child ma" use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subse)uentl" adopted b" her natural father. RULING !here is no law regulating the use of a middle name. ,rticle 1FD of the @amil" 'ode, as amended b" &epublic ,ct 9o. 1(GG, otherwise known as 6,n ,ct ,llowing Illegitimate 'hildren !o +se !he *urname Of !heir @ather,8 is silent as to what middle name a child ma" use. /eing a legitimate child b" virtue of her adoption, *tephanie is entitled to all the rights provided b" law to a legitimate child, without discrimination of an" kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother. !his is consistent with the intention of the members of the 'ivil 'ode and @amil" Aaw 'ommittees. In fact, it is a @ilipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediatel" precede the surname of the father. ,dditionall", as aptl" stated b" both parties, *tephanie0s continued use of her mother0s surname >Garcia? as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage.

1!(. RE-U,LIC OF THE -HILI--INES vs. COURT OF A--EALS . S-S. JAMES ANTHON: HUGHES AND LENITA MA,UNA: HUGHES G. R. No. 1//+!# O47o6e% ( * 1""! FACTS <ames ,nthon" 4ughes, an ,merican married Aenita .abuha" 4ughes, a @ilipina, who was later naturalized as +* 'itizen. *ometime in 1117, *pouses 4ughes filed a petition to adopt three minor children who are minor niece and nephews of Aenita, in the person of .a. 'ecilia, 9eil, .ario, all surnamed .abuna" who lived with them even prior to filing of petition. !he minors as well as their parents consented to the adoption. !he &egional !rial 'ourt of ,ngeles 'it" granted the petition, which decision was also later affirmed b" the 'ourt of ,ppeals, hence the filing of this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE #hether or not the spouses 4ughes can legall" adopt the children. RULING !he court ruled that <ames ,nthon" 4ughes cannot adopt. +nder article 1E= of the famil" code, <ames being an alien cannot adopt and he is not under the exceptions provided for in the law. Aenita on the other hand cannot also adopt being barred under article 1EG which states among others that she and her husband must %ointl" adopt the children not being their illegitimate or legitimate children. <ames cannot be a nominal part". It must be noted that adoption creates a status that is closel" assimilated to the legitimate paternit" and filiation with corresponding rights and duties that necessaril"
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flow from adoption such as exercise of parental authorit", use of surname of adopter b" adoptee, support and successional rights. 1!!. IN REJ -ETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAMEJ JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG vs. CE,U CIT: CIVIL REGISTRAR G. R. No. 1#"" Ma%4h !/* (//# FACTS etitioner <ulian Ain 'arulasan #ang, a minor, represented b" his mother ,nna Aisa #ang, filed a petition dated 11 *eptember (77( for change of name and/or correction/cancellation of entr" in the 'ivil &egistr" of <ulian Ain 'arulasan #ang. etitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from <ulian Ain 'arulasan #ang to <ulian Ain #ang. etitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle name as this would help him to ad%ust more easil" to and integrate himself into *ingaporean societ". ISSUE 2oes the law allow one to drop the middle name from his registered name on the cause mentionedL RULING !he touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be Vproper and reasonable cause0 for which the change is sought. !o %ustif" a re)uest for change of name, petitioner must show not onl" some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be pre%udiced b" the use of his true and official name. ,mong the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are5 >a? when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremel" difficult to write or pronounceH >b? when the change results as a legal conse)uence, as in legitimationH >c? when the change will avoid confusionH >d? when one has continuousl" used and been known since childhood b" a @ilipino name, and was unaware of alien parentageH >e? a sincere desire to adopt a @ilipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without pre%udicing an"bod"H and >f? when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would pre%udice public interest. 1!). ISA,ELITA LAHOM vs. JOSE MELVIN SI,ULO G. R. No. 1)!"+" J2'1 1)* (//! FACTS 2r. 2iosdado Aahom and his wife Isabelita Aahom, herein referred to as petitioner adopted her nephew <ose .elvin *ibulo at the age of two. !he adoption decree was granted on G .a" 11F(. 4owever, due to sad turn of events, .rs. Aahom after the death of her husband commence the filing of a petition to rescind the decree of adoption a 2ecember of 1111, before &!' /ranch (( of 9aga 'it", contending among others that
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respondent refused to use his adopted surname and instead used his surname *ibulo, disregarding the feelings of herein petitioner. @urthermore, respondent remained callous and utterl" indifferent towards petitioner and his insensible attitude strained their 6parent$child8 relationship which caused the petitioner to suffer wounded feelings. &espondent on the other hand moved for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that the trial court had no %urisdiction over the case and that petitioner had no cause of action in view of the effectivit" of &epublic ,ct 9o. EGG( on .arch ((, 111E. !he &egional !rial 'ourt, having been designated as a @amil" 'ourt has %urisdiction to tr" this instant case. ,s to the matter of no cause of action, the court )uoted ,rt. CI, *ection 11 of &.,. 9o. EGG( which deleted the right of an adopter to rescind an adoption earlier granted under the @amil" 'ode, thus there is lack of cause of action on petitioner0s part. @urthermore, the action to rescind the decree of adoption has long prescribed as provided for under section G, &ule 177 of the &evised &ules of 'ourt. !herefore, etitioner0s etition to rescind the decree of adoption against respondent is hereb" dismissed, hence the filing of this petition for review on certiorari under &ule =G. ISSUES 1. #hether or not the sub%ect adoption decreed on G .a" 11F(, ma" still be revoked or rescinded b" an adopter after the effectivit" of &. ,. 9o. EGG(L (. #hether or not the adopter0s action prescribedL RULING !he court ruled in the affirmative. &epublic ,ct 9o. EGG( which took effect on (( .arch 111E, secured the rights and privileges of the adopted. .ost importantl" it affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child, not onl" in his new famil" but in the societ" as well. !he new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created b" adoption. In the instant case, it was months after the effectivit" of &.,. 9o. EGG( that herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 11FG which law has alread" been abrogated and repealed. 4ence, the action for rescission of the adoption decree could no longer be pursued. @uthermore, the action to set aside the adoption is sub%ect to the five$"ear bar rule under &ule 177 of the &ules of 'ourt and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. 1!#. HER,ERT CANG vs. COURT OF A--EALS a38 S-S. RONALD a38 MARIA CLARA CLAVANO G. R. No. 1/#!/+ Se$7e56e% (#* 1""+ FACTS 4erbert and ,nna .arie 'ang were husband and wife who have three children. Aater, the spouses were legall" separated and the court awarded the custod" of the children to ,nna .arie. 4erbert, on the other hand, went to the +nited *tates and got naturalized as an ,merican citizen but continuousl" supported his children as re)uired b" the court.
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Aater on, ,nna .arie entrusted the custod" of the children to her childless brother and sister$in$law. !he latter filed a special proceedings for the adoption of the children. Onl" ,nna .arie0s consent was attached to the petition without including 4erbert0s consent. *he submits that his consent is not necessar" because the latter has abandoned the children. +pon learning such fact, 4erbert immediatel" sent a telegram manifesting his opposition to the adoption proceedings. 4e presented as evidence the letters of the children to him showing their love and affection and the certification of +* banks showing that even prior to the petition for adoption, he had deposited amounts for the benefit of the children. 9otwithstanding the opposition, the lower court issued the decree of adoption in favor of ,nna .arie0s brother and ruled that 4erbert0s written consent is not necessar" based on the findings that he had abandoned the children. +pon appeal, the 'ourt of ,ppeals affirmed the decision. ISSUE #hether or not petitioner had abandoned his children as to warrant dispensation of his consent to their adoption. RULING #hile parental authorit" ma" be waived, as in law it ma" be sub%ect to a compromise, there was no factual finding in the legal separation case that petitioner was such an irresponsible person that he should be deprived of custod" of his children or that there are grounds under the law that could deprive him of parental authorit". In fact, in the legal separation case, the court thereafter ordered the transfer of custod" over the children from ,nna .arie back to petitioner. !he order was not implemented because of ,nna .arieMs motion for reconsideration thereon. !he law is clear that either parent ma" lose parental authorit" over the child onl" for a valid reason. 9o such reason was established in the legal separation case. In the instant case for adoption, the issue is whether or not petitioner had abandoned his children as to warrant dispensation of his consent to their adoption. 2eprivation of parental authorit" is one of the effects of a decree of adoption. /ut there cannot be a valid decree of adoption in this case precisel" because, the finding of the court a )uo on the issue of petitionerMs abandonment of his famil" was based on a misappreciation that was tantamount to non$appreciation, of facts on record. *ince the incorporation of the law concerning adoption in the 'ivil 'ode, there has been a pronounced trend to place emphasis in adoption proceedings, not so much on the need of childless couples for a child, as on the paramount interest, of a child who needs the love and care of parents. ,fter the passage of the 'hild and 3outh #elfare 'ode and the @amil" 'ode, the discernible trend has impelled the enactment of &epublic ,ct 9o. E7=; on Intercountr", ,doptionand &epublic ,ct 9o. EGG( establishing the rules on the domestic adoption of @ilipino children.
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!he case at bar applies the relevant provisions of policies in the -2omestic ,doption ,ct of 111E. +nderl"ing the policies and precepts in international conventions and the domestic statutes with respect to children is the overriding principle that all actuations should be in the best interests of the child. !his is not, however, to be implemented in derogation of the primar" right of the parent or parents to exercise parental authorit" over him. !he rights of parents visAHAvis that of their children are not antithetical to each other, as in fact, the" must be respected and harmonized to the fullest extent possible. Teith, 'harmaine and <oseph ,nthon" have all grown up. Teith and 'harmaine are now of legal age while <oseph ,nthon" is approaching eighteen, the age of ma%orit". @or sure, the" shall be endowed with the discretion to lead lives independent of their parents. !his is not to state that this case has been rendered moot and academic, for their welfare and best interests regarding their adoption, must be determined as of the time that the petition for adoption was filed. *aid petition must be denied as it was filed without the re)uired consent of their father who, b" law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them. 1! . IN REJ -ETITION FOR ADO-TION OF MICHELLE -. LIM* MONINA -. LIM G. R. Nos. 1 +""(C"! Ma1 (1* (//" FACTS etitioner is an optometrist b" profession. *he married rimo Aim >Aim?. !he" were childless. .inor children,were entrusted to them b" a certain Aucia ,"uban >,"uban? because their parents were unknown. !he couple was so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Aim registered the children to make it appear that the" were the children0s parents. !he " name the children .ichelle . Aim >.ichelle? and .ichael <ude . Aim >.ichael?. .ichelle was barel" eleven da"s old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. *he was born on 1G .arch 11FF. .ichael was 11 da"s old when ,"uban brought him to petitioner0s clinic. 4is date of birth is 1 ,ugust 11E;. !he spouses reared and cared for the children as if the" were their own. !he" sent the children to exclusive schools. !he" used the surname -Aim- in all their school records and documents. +nfortunatel", Aim died. etitioner married ,ngel Olario >Olario?, an ,merican citizen. etitioner decided to adopt the children b" availing of the amnest" given under &epublic ,ct 9o. EGG(D >&, EGG(? to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. !hus, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of .ichelle and .ichael before the trial court. ,t the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, .ichelle was (G "ears old and alread" married, while .ichael was 1E "ears and seven months old. .ichelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption and so is .ichael who also gave his consent to his adoption. In the 'ertification issued b" the 2epartment of *ocial #elfare and 2evelopment >2*#2?, .ichelle was considered as an abandoned child and the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown. !he 2*#2 issued a similar 'ertification for .ichael. !he trial court rendered %udgment dismissing the petitions. !he trial court ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition %ointl" with her new husband. !he trial court ruled that %oint adoption b" the
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husband and the wife is mandator" citing *ection F>c?, ,rticle III of &, EGG( and ,rticle 1EG of the @amil" 'ode. ISSUE #hether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singl" adopt. RULING !he law is clear. !here is no room for ambiguit". etitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must %ointl" adopt. *ince the petitions for adoption were filed onl" b" petitioner herself, without %oining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in den"ing the petitions for adoption on this ground. 9either does petitioner fall under an" of the three exceptions enumerated in *ection F. @irst, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. *econd, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. ,nd third, petitioner and Olario are not legall" separated from each other. !he fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his ,ffidavit of 'onsent does not suffice. !here are certain re)uirements that Olario must compl" being an ,merican citizen. 4e must meet the )ualifications set forth in *ection F of &, EGG( such as5 >1? he must prove that his countr" has diplomatic relations with the &epublic of the hilippinesH >(? he must have been living in the hilippines for at least three continuous "ears prior to the filing of the application for adoptionH >;? he must maintain such residenc" until the adoption decree is enteredH >=? he has legal capacit" to adopt in his own countr"H and >G? the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter0s countr" as the latter0s adopted child. 9one of these )ualifications were shown and proved during the trial. !hese re)uirements on residenc" and certification of the alien0s )ualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to *ection F. !he children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinit" or affinit" of petitioner or of Olario. 9either are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner. etitioner contends that %oint parental authorit" is not an"more necessar" since the children have been emancipated having reached the age of ma%orit". !his is untenable. arental authorit" includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficienc" and the development of their moral, mental and ph"sical character and well$being. !he father and the mother shall %ointl" exercise parental authorit" over the persons of their common children. :ven the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authorit" over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or propert" of the children. It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation N that is, when he attains the age of ma%orit" or 1E "ears of age1D N emancipation terminates parental authorit" over the person and propert" of the child, who shall then be )ualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. 4owever, parental authorit" is merel" %ust one of the effects of legal adoption.

&. O3 S2$$o%7
1!0. -ERLA -ATRICIO vs. MARCELINO DARIO III. e7 a'. G. R. No. 10/+(" Nove56e% (/* (//
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FACTS .arcelino 2ario died intestate and leaving a parcel of land with residential house and pre$ school building. 4e was survived b" his wife erla atricio, the petitioner and sons namel", .arcelino .arc 2ario and herein respondent, .arcelino 2ario IIII who has a minor child named as .arcelino Aorenzo 2ario IC living with them. !hereafter, the heirs agreed to extra%udiciall" settled the estate of the deceased and accordingl", the !ransfer 'ertificate !itle was issued in the names of the herein parties. !he petitioner and .arcelino .arc then asked the respondent to partition the propert" left but respondent refused to do so. ,s such, petitioner and .arcelino .arc filed an action for partition before &egional !rial 'ourt >&!'?. &espondent asserted that the famil" home cannot be partitioned while his minor son who is the grandson of the decedent is still living therein. 4e insisted that as long as his son is living in the famil" home, the same continues as such until the beneficiar" becomes of age. etitioner, on the other hand, alleged that the propert" remained as famil" home of the surviving heirs of the decedent onl" up to the 17th "ear from the death of the latter. *he argued that since the children of the decedent were alread" of age at the time of the death of their father, there is no minor beneficiar" to speak of. &!' rendered its decision ordering that the propert" be divided5 =/D for the petitioner and 1/D for .arcelino .arc as well as for the respondent. &espondent appealed the decision of &!' to the 'ourt of ,ppeals >',? which was denied b" the latter. 4owever, on .otion for &econsideration, the ', dismissed the complaint for partition contending that the famil" home should continue despite the death of the one or both of the spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiar" thereof. !he ', considered .arcelino Aorenzo as the minor beneficiar" of the famil" home. 4ence, the present recourse. ISSUES 1. #hether the famil" home be partitioned despite the refusal of the respondent on the ground that a minor beneficiar" still resides in the said homeL (. #hether .arcelino Aorenzo can be considered as a beneficiar" of the famil" homeL RULING 1. !he *upreme 'ourt ruled in the affirmative. !he @amil" 'ode provides that the famil" home shall continue despite the death of the one or both of the spouses or of the unmarried head of the famil" for a period of 17 "ears or for as long as there is a minor beneficiar", and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reason therefore. !his rule shall appl" regardless of whoever owns the propert" or constituted the famil" home. ,s such, if there are beneficiaries who survive and are living in the famil" home, it will continue for 17 "ears, unless at the expiration of 17
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"ears, there is still a minor beneficiar", in which case the famil" home continues until the beneficiar" becomes of age. !he minor child of the respondent is not considered as the beneficiar" of the famil" home as to bar its partition for reasons subse)uentl" explain in the next paragraph. !hus, the sub%ect propert" could be partitioned since there are no longer minor beneficiaries of the famil" home and no persons can be compelled to sta" in a co$ ownership indefinitel". (. ,nent to the (nd issue, the *upreme 'ourt ruled in the negative. !he @amil" 'ode provides that the beneficiaries of the famil" home are5 husband and wife, or unmarried person who is the head of the famil"H and the parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters whether legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the famil" home and who depend upon the head of the famil" for legal support. !hus, it is re)uired inorder for the descendant to become a beneficiar" of the famil" home that he is living in the famil" home and he is dependent for legal support upon the head of the famil". In the instant case, although, .arcelino Aorenzo is the descendant of the decedent and living in the propert" in issue, he is not dependent for support upon the decedent or the head of the famil" because the legal support he needed is given b" his father, the herein respondent. !hus, not all the re)uisites are present inorder for .arcelino Aorenzo to be treated as minor beneficiar" of the famil" home. 'onse)uentl", the propert" in issue could be partitioned since .arcelino Aorenzo is not among the beneficiaries of the famil" home. 1!+. CARMEN QUIMIGUING vs. FELIG ICAO G. R. No. LC( 0"# J2'1 !1* 1"0/ FACTS 'armen Ruimiguing, assisted b" her parents, filed a complaint for support and damages against @elix Icao in the 'ourt of @irst Instance of Qamboanga del 9orte. *he averred that the parties were neighbors in 2apitan 'it", and had close and confidential relationsH that Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times b" force and intimidation, and without her consentH that as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied b" defendant, and plaintiff had to stop stud"ing. 4ence, she claimed support at 1(7.77 per month, damages and attorne"Ms fees. Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the child had been bornH and after hearing arguments, the trial %udge sustained defendantMs motion and dismissed the complaint. !hereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a bab" girlH but the court, sustaining defendantMs ob%ection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of action. #herefore, the plaintiff appealed directl" to this 'ourt.
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ISSUE #hether or not an unborn child is entitled to support or damagesL RULING , conceived child, although as "et unborn, is given b" law a provisional personalit" of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitl" provided in ,rticle =7 of the 'ivil 'ode of the hilippines. !he unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularl" of the defendant$appellee even if the said child is onl" -en ventre de sa mereH- %ust as a conceived child, even if as "et unborn, ma" receive donations as prescribed b" ,rticle F=( of the same 'ode, and its being ignored b" the parent in his testament ma" result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentar" heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the testator ,rticle EG=, 'ivil 'ode?. , married man to force a woman not his wife to "ield to his lust constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused. 6,n" person who wilfull" causes loss or in%ur" to another in a manner that is contrar" to morals, good customs or public polic" shall compensate the latter for the damage>,rticle (1, 'ivil 'ode?.8 @urthermore, under paragraph ; of ,rt. ((11 moral damages ma" be recovered in cases of seduction, abduction, rape and other lascivious acts. Independentl" of the right to *upport of the child she was carr"ing, plaintiff herself had a cause of action for damages under the terms of the complaintH and the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was doubl" in error. 1!". CECILIO MENDOZA vs. COURT OF A--EALS a38 LUISA MENDOZA G. R. No. LC(!1/( A$%&' (0* 1" 0 FACTS 'ecilio and Auisa were marriedH the former went to +nited *tate to pursue his studies, 'ecilio also works in a hospital and he was earning \(77 a month. !he wife filed an action for support against the husband on the ground that she was neglected and abandoned without means of sustenance taking into consideration that she is also pregnant. !he husband filed a motion to dismiss for failure to observed earnest effort toward a compromise before filing a complaint against member of a famil" under ,rt ((( of the civil code >now article 1G1 @amil" 'ode?. ISSUE #hether or not support ma" be sub%ect of a valid compromise. RULING
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, future support cannot be a sub%ect of a valid compromise this is an exception to the general rule that 6no suit between members of the famil" shall prosper unless earnest efforts toward a compromise have been previousl" exerted.8 1)/. FELICIANO SANCHEZ vs. FRANCISCO ZULUETA G. R. No. )# 1 Ma1 1 * 1"!" FACTS In civil case of the 'ourt of @irst Instance of 'avite, wherein <osefa 2iego and .ario *anchez are plaintiffs and @eliciano *anchez is defendant, the plaintiffs ask that the defendant be sentenced to pa" them a monthl" allowance for support. !he complaint alleges that the plaintiffs are the wife and child, respectivel", of the defendantH that the latter, since 11;(, refused and still refuses to support the plaintiffsH that the latter have no means of subsistence, while the defendant receives from the +nited *tates ,rm" a monthl" pension of 1F=.(7H that the defendant abandoned the plaintiffs without an" %ustifiable cause and now refuses to allow them to live with him.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrar" chanrobles virtual law librar" !he defendant alleges, as special defense, that the plaintiff <osefa 2iego abandoned without his knowledge or consent and committed adulter" which she had a child as a result of the illicit relations, which is the other plaintiff .ario *anchez. !he lower court granted the pra"er of the plaintiff b" wa" of allowance pendente lite, In opposition to his petition, the defendant alleged that .ario *anchez is not his legitimate child but is the adulterous child and he asked for an oppurtunit" to adduce evidence in support of this defense. !he court, without acceding to this petition of the defendant to adduce evidence, favorabl" acted upon the application of the plaintiffs and ordered the defendant to pa" a monthl" allowance pendente lite. In view of these facts, the defendant filed a petition for prohibition before the 'ourt of ,ppeals against the %udge of the 'ourt of @irst Instance and the plaintiffs. !he 'ourt of ,ppeals denied the petition, and from this resolution, the defendant comes to this court on certiorari. ISSUES 1. #hether the 'ourt of ,ppeals committed grave abuse of discretion in not allowing the defendant to present evidenceL (. #hether or not the proof of adulterous child is a valid ground not to give supportL RULING !he *upreme 'ourt ruled that the 'ourt of ,ppeals erred in not allowing the defendant to present his evidence for the purpose of determining whether it is sufficient prima facie to overcome the application. ,dulter" on the part of the wife is a valid defense against an action for support. 'onse)uentl", as to the child, it is also a defense that it is the fruit of such adulterous relations, for in that case, it would not be the child of the defendant and, hence, would not be entitled to support as such. /ut as this defense should be
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established, and not merel" alleged, it would be unavailing if proof thereof is not permitted. It is not of course necessar" to go full" into the merits of the case, it being sufficient the court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence which it ma" deem sufficient to enable it to %ustl" resolve the application, one wa" or the other, in view of the merel" provisional character of the resolution to be entered. !he failure to accompan" the opposition therewith did not %ustif" the court in ignoring said opposition, %ust because of this omission, inasmuch as an opportunit" to present evidence has been asked. It ma" be that the defendant could not get hold of affidavits in support of his opposition, but he ma" have on hand other evidence of greater weight. If the defendant has a valid defense which calls for proof, and he asks for an opportunit" to present evidence, it is error to den" him this opportunit".al law librar" !he decision rendered b" the 'ourt ,ppeals is reversed, and it is ordered that the petitioner be given an opportunit" to present evidence in support of his defense against the application for support pendente lite, to the extent which the court determine, without special pronouncement as to the costs. 1)1. MARIA QUINTANA vs. GELASIO LERMA G. R. No. LC0)( Fe6%2a%1 #* 1"1! FACTS !his is an appeal from a %udgment in favor of the plaintiff for a sum of mone" due upon a contract between the plaintiff and defendant husband and wife, for support. !he action is b" a wife against her husband for support. It is based upon a written contract. !he evidence shows that the parties were lawfull" married in 1171 and that in @ebruar", 117G, the" entered into a written agreement of separation whereb" each renounced certain rights as against the other and divided the con%ugal propert" between them, the defendant undertaking in consideration of the premises to pa" the plaintiff within the first three da"s of each month the sum of (7 for her support and maintenance. In the original answer, the defendant set up as a special defense that the wife had forfeited her right to support b" committing adulter". !his allegation was stricken out b" the court on motion, upon the ground that under the provisions of article 1G( of the 'ivil 'ode the commission of adulter" is not recognized as a ground upon which the obligation to support ceases. 9otwithstanding that such special defense was stricken out b" order of the court, the defendant, after plaintiff had filed an amended complaint, inserted the same defense in his answer to the amended complaint. !he court upon the trial, however, refused to recognize such defense or to permit an" evidence to be introduced in support thereof, to which the defendant dul" excepted. ISSUE
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Is the the special defense of the defendant that the wife had forfeited her right to support b" committing adulter" tenableL RULING ,rticle 1=;( of the 'ivil 'ode provides5 -In default of express declarations in the marriage contract, the separation of the propert" of the consorts, during marriage, shall onl" take place b" virtue of a %udicial decree, except in the case provided b" article G7.+nder this article the agreement in suit is void. !he wife, however, has a right of action against her husband for support under the provisions of the 'ivil 'ode and, although the contract in )uestion is void, her right of action does not for that reason fail. !he special defense of adulter" set up b" the defendant in his answer both to the original and the amended complaint is a good defense, and if properl" proved and sustained will defeat the action. !he %udgment of the court below is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial, with instructions to permit the interposition of the special defense of adulter" and such amendments of the complaint and answer as ma" be necessar" to carr" this %udgment into effect. 1)(. JOSE LAM vs. ADRIANA CHUA G. R. No. 1!1(+ Ma%4h 1+* (//) FACTS ,driana 'hua filed a petition for declaration of nullit" of marriage against <ose Aam.,driana pra"ed that the marriage between her and <ose be declared null and void but she failed to claim and pra" for the support of their child, <ohn aul. /ased on the allegations and evidence presented b" the petitioner, the court >&!'? granted the petition and ruled that the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent was null and void for being bigamous b" nature. <ose filed a .otion for &econsideration thereof but onl" insofar as the decision awarded monthl" support to his son in the amount of (7,777.77. 4e argued that there was alread" a provision for support of the child as embodied in the decision dated @ebruar" (E, 111= of the .akati &!' wherein he and ,driana agreed to contribute (G7,777.77 each to a common fund for the benefit of the child. On ,ugust ((, 111G, the asa" &!' issued an Order den"ing <ose Aam0s motion for reconsideration ruling that the compromise agreement entered into b" the parties and approved b" the .akati &!' before the marriage was declared null and void ab initio b" the asa" &!', is of no moment and cannot limit and/or affect the support ordered b" the latter court.
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!he 'ourt of ,ppeals affirmed the decision rendered b" &!'. ISSUE #hether or not, the compromise agreement between petitioner and respondent where the" bound themselves to contribute the amount of two hundred fift" thousand pesos >p(G7,777.77? to a common fund for the benefit of their child does not bar the trial court in annulment case to again award support in favor of the child. RULING !he asa" &!' and the 'ourt of ,ppeals are both correct insofar as the" ruled that the amount of support is b" no means permanent. In ,dvincula vs. ,dvincula, we held that another action for support could be filed again b" the same plaintiff notwithstanding the fact that the previous case for support filed against the same defendant was dismissed. #e further held in said case that5 . . .8<udgment for support does not become final. !he right to support is of such nature that its allowance is essentiall" provisionalH for during the entire period that a need" part" is entitled to support, his or her alimon" ma" be modified or altered, in accordance with his increased or decreased needs, and with the means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as sub%ect to final determination.8 !hus, there is no merit to the claim of <ose that the compromise agreement between him and ,driana, as approved b" the .akati &!' and embodied in its decision dated @ebruar" (E, 111= in the case for voluntar" dissolution of con%ugal partnership of gains, is a bar to an" further award of support in favor of their child <ohn aul. !he provision for a common fund for the benefit of their child <ohn aul, as embodied in the compromise agreement between herein parties which had been approved b" the .akati &!', cannot be considered final and res %udicata since an" %udgment for support is alwa"s sub%ect to modification, depending upon the needs of the child and the capabilities of the parents to give support. 1)!. DOLORES MONTEFALCON* e7 a'. vs. RONNIE S. VASQUEZ G. R. No. 1 #/1 J23e 10* (//+ FACTS In 1111, petitioner 2olores . .ontefalcon filed a 'omplaint J=K for acknowledgment and support against respondent &onnie *. Cas)uez before the &!' of 9aga 'it". . ,lleging that her son Aaurence is the illegitimate child of Cas)uez, she pra"ed that Cas)uez be obliged to give support to co$petitioner Aaurence .ontefalcon, whose certificate of live birth he signed as father.JGK ,ccording to petitioners, Cas)uez onl" gave a total of 11,777 as support for Aaurence since Aaurence was born in 111;. Cas)uez allegedl" also refused to give him regular school allowance despite repeated demands. etitioner 2olores added that she and Cas)uez are not legall" married, and that Cas)uez has his own famil".
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, sheriff tried to serve the summons and complaint on Cas)uez in ,ro$aldao, 9abua, 'amarines *ur. Cas)uezMs grandfather received them as Cas)uez was in .anila. Cas)uezMs mother returned the documents to the clerk of court, who informed the court of the non$service of summons. etitioners then filed a motion to declare Cas)uez in default. !he court denied it for lack of proper service of summons. In (777, the court issued an alias summons on Cas)uez at -17 Int. resident Garcia *t., Qone D, *ignal Cillage, !aguig, .etro .anila- upon petitionersM motion. ,lbeit a !aguig deput" sheriff served it b" substituted service on Cas)uezMs caretaker &a)uel /e%er, the sheriffMs return incorrectl" stated -Aazaroas Cas)uezMs surname. On petitionersM motion, the trial court declared Cas)uez in default for failure to file an answer despite the substituted service of summons. Cas)uez was furnished with court orders and notices of the proceedings at his last known address, but these were returned as he had allegedl" moved to another place and left no new address In (771, the court granted petitionersM pra"ers, explaining that the" had no ill$motive and that 2olores gave a truthful testimon". !he court added that Cas)uez admitted the truth of the allegations b" his silence. It further explained that AaurenceMs certificate of live birth, being a public document, is irrefutabl" a prima facie evidence of illegitimate filiation. In the same "ear, Cas)uez surfaced. 4e filed a notice of appeal to which petitioners opposed. ,ppeal was granted b" the court. J1;K /efore the appellate court, he argued that the trial court erred in tr"ing and deciding the case as it -never- ac)uired %urisdiction over his person, as well as in awarding G,777$per$month support, which was allegedl" -excessive and exorbitant.- !he appellate court noted that the service of summons on Cas)uez was -defective- as there was no explanation of impossibilit" of personal service. ISSUES 1. #hether there is a valid substituted service of summons on Cas)uez to clothe the trial court with %urisdiction over his person. (. #hether he is obliged to give support to co$petitioner Aaurence. RULING roof of prior attempts at personal service ma" have been submitted b" the plaintiff during the hearing of an" incident assailing the validit" of the substituted service J(=K had Cas)uez surfaced when the case was heard. In fact, he was declared in default. It was onl" when a %udgment against him was rendered b" the trial court that he )uestioned the validit" of service of summons before the appellate court. *uch failure to appear, and then later to )uestion the courtMs %urisdiction over his person, should not be taken against herein petitioners.
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/etween Cas)uezMs self$serving assertion that he onl" came to know of the case when his mother told him about the trial courtMs decision and the sheriffMs return on the substituted service which carries a presumption of regularit", the latter is undoubtedl" deserving of more faith and credit. !he sheriffMs certificate of service of summons isprima facie evidence of the facts set out in it. +nder ,rticle 11G >=?.of the @amil" 'ode, a parent is obliged to support his illegitimate child. !he amount is variable. !here is no final %udgment thereof as it shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient.It ma" be reduced or increased proportionatel" according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support. *upport comprises ever"thing indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacit" of the famil". .+nder the premises, the award of G,777 monthl" support to Aaurence is reasonable, and not excessive nor exorbitant. In sum, we rule that the 'ourt of ,ppeals erred in invalidating the substituted service of summons and remanding the case. ,s there was valid substituted service of summons under the circumstances of this case, the lower court ac)uired %urisdiction over his person and correctl" ordered him to pa" past and present monthl" support to his illegitimate child as well as attorne"Ms fees and litigation expenses to petitioners. #4:&:@O&:, the petition is G&,9!:2. 1)). EDWARD V. LACSON vs. MAOWEE DA,AN LACSON G. R. No. 1#/ )) A292s7 (+* (// FACTS etitioner husband left the con%ugal home. *ince their separation, wife did not ask the husband for support, rel"ing initiall" on a note of commitment b" the husband to give support. #ife, in behalf of her two daughters, filed a complaint against husband for support &!' when first child was about to graduate from college. 4usband contends that his lack of regular income and the unproductivit" of the land he inherited, not his neglect, accounted for his failure at times to give regular support. etitioner claims that he should not be made to pa" support in arrears, since no previous extra%udicial nor %udicial demand have been made b" the respondents. ISSUE #hether or not the husband is liable for support. RULING *' held that re)uisite demand for support appears to have been alread" been made through the note that husband left in his wife ,sking one to compl" with his obligation to support owing to the urgenc" of the situation is no less than a demand because it came b" wa" of a re)uest or plea. ,n" third person ma"
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furnish support to a need" individual with the right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support. ,mount of support which those related b" marriage and famil" relationship is generall" obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient.

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