This article was downloaded by: [Professor Jim Parry] On: 27 July 2012, At: 09:57 Publisher: Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Sport in Society: Cultures, Commerce, Media, Politics

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fcss20

The power of sport in peacemaking and peacekeeping

Jim Parry
a a

Faculty of Physical Education and Sport, Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic Version of record first published: 27 Jul 2012

To cite this article: Jim Parry (2012): The power of sport in peacemaking and peacekeeping, Sport in Society: Cultures, Commerce, Media, Politics, DOI:10.1080/17430437.2012.708280 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17430437.2012.708280

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

Sport in Society iFirst article, 2012, 113

The power of sport in peacemaking and peacekeeping

Jim Parry*
Faculty of Physical Education and Sport, Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic This paper argues that sport is not about conict but competition; not about violence but controlled aggression; neither is it amoral and value-free but is itself a moral enterprise. The paper provides an analysis of the internal values and the internal logic of sport, which combine to make peace via their isomorphism with political liberalism, especially the liberal idea of the contract to contest, and its emphasis on equality, respect, mutuality and other human rights values. It is not only just sports popularity, but also this peacemaking capacity of sport, which informs its peacekeeping potential.

Downloaded by [Professor Jim Parry] at 09:57 27 July 2012

Introduction This paper provides an analysis of the internal values and the internal logic of sport, which combine to make peace via their isomorphism with political liberalism, especially the liberal idea of the contract to contest, and its emphasis on equality, respect, mutuality and other human rights values. It is this peacemaking capacity of sport that informs its peacekeeping potential. In doing so, I will be taking a contrary view to those who think that sport itself is a form of violent conict, and so is antithetical to peace promotion; and those who think that sport has no (intrinsic) values. So, to begin with, we must clear the ground by identifying and rectifying three important mistakes, all expressed in the previous sentence, which have led to confusion and obstructed our vision of the nature of sport. Three important mistakes Conict and competition The rst mistake is the failure to distinguish between conict and competition. Kvalsund draws attention to what he sees as the dangers of using sport for peace-building purposes. He says:
Sport, in its traditional form, is not a conict preventative instrument. On the contrary, the nature of sport is exactly the opposite: a physical contest between people or teams with different goals.1

To begin with, this description of sport is contentious. Contestants do not have different goals (if this means aims). Because of the rule-structures of sport, we all have the same aims otherwise we could not compete. Of course, I am trying to score at this end, and you at that end but we both are trying to score under the same rules. The important point here is that Kvalsunds misleading denition leads him to confuse competition with

*Email: s.j.parry@leeds.ac.uk
ISSN 1743-0437 print/ISSN 1743-0445 online q 2012 Taylor & Francis http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17430437.2012.708280 http://www.tandfonline.com

J. Parry

conict and they are very different, as I explain below. Furthermore, Kvalsund believes that we shall need highly trained operatives in the eld to make good the moral shortcomings of traditional sport. On this account of sport, its very nature provides two massive problems for peacekeepers: they take the risk of pouring oil on the ames of conict, by imitating war games, and they must accept the huge expense of compensatory provision. This leaves it totally unexplained as to why international agencies would think to employ such a awed and inappropriate instrument to the task of peace building. Why choose sport, when its nature, according to Kvalsund, is exactly the opposite to the task? Why choose sport, when it therefore requires such a level of externally provided resources to mitigate its shortcomings? The answer, of course, is that those agencies understand that sporting competition is something quite different from conict. The historical transition from conict to sporting competition may be illustrated with the example of the mythical origins of the Olympic Games. The myth of Pelops, one of the many myths that seek to explain the origin of the Olympic Games, tells the story of the fall of Oenomaus, King of Pisa, who challenged all suitors for his daughter Hippodamea to a chariot race. During the race, he would kill each of his adversaries and then place their heads among his trophies. Naturally, this discouraged young men from seeking his daughters hand, until the arrival of Pelops. He was both fortunate, because Hippodamea fell in love with him at rst sight, and also clever, because he realized what was going on. He conspired with Oenomaus charioteer, Myrtilus, and during the race managed to throw Oenomaus from his chariot to his death. Pelops won both Hippodamea and the kingdom, but he killed Myrtilus for his treason. To appease the Gods for his murderous wrongdoing, so the myth goes, Pelops established the Olympic Games.2 The myth of Pelops echoes down to the twentieth century, when George Orwell described modern sport as war minus the shooting,3 and Chris Chataway, an Olympic athlete, co-authored a book called War Without Weapons.4 The earlier form of contest was that of mortal combat, in which the triumph of the victor meant the death of the adversary. In the Olympic Games, however, contest took on the nobler form of rule-governed and disciplined athletic competition. The lesson of the myth is that the chariot race between Pelops and Oenomaus was to be the last deadly incident in the sacred site of Olympia. The propensity for murder was civilised and became the drive for victory on the athletic eld. This shift from primitive mortal combat to fair and peaceful competition constitutes the starting point of the Olympic Games. Now, we do not have to believe in the myth to be able to appreciate its point: sport is not war. Even in boxing, which seems to permit violence, it is only limited and carefully circumscribed assaults that are permitted. So, for example, a boxer cannot be hit when down, or under the belt, or with a rabbit-punch, or between rounds. He cannot be kicked or head butted or elbowed, or hit with weighted gloves or set upon by more than one opponent. Such considerations indicate the distinctions between boxing and streetghting. The crucial difference is that boxing is a rule-governed contest, and so has certain values built into it. Boxing is a competition but not unarmed conict, never mind armed mortal combat. But there is a further feature of rule-governed competition, such as in sport: the constitutive rules of the sport prescribe modes of cooperation without which the activity cannot proceed. And good competition arises out of the relative equality of participants. That is to say: sport is not to be characterized as a conict to establish superiority. The foundational values of competitive sport include cooperation and equality, which provide the context for competitive activity.

Downloaded by [Professor Jim Parry] at 09:57 27 July 2012

Sport in Society

Oft-quoted examples of people ghting over sport (such as hooligans outside the stadium, or armies on the battleeld) are irrelevant to the above points. People ght over love and religion, too but the fact that love (or religion, or sport) can be the occasion for conict tells us nothing about the intrinsic character of love (or religion, or sport).

Violence and aggression The second mistake is the failure to distinguish between violence and aggression. For example, in a recent article on sport, peacekeeping and the prevention of violent conict, Schwery and Eggenberger-Argote write:
. . . aggression is dened as behavior which aims to injure or harm the opponent. There is a distinction between hostile and instrumental aggression: the former primarily aims at injuring the opponent, whereas the latter type serves in achieving a sporting goal (e.g. winning points). Different studies have demonstrated that sports activity may very well lead to a channeling of aggression and that there is a negative correlation between the amount of training and the tendency to use violence.5

Downloaded by [Professor Jim Parry] at 09:57 27 July 2012

Here, aggression is confusingly dened as aiming to injure or harm, which is surely false. I can be aggressive without seeking to harm. Then, the distinction between hostile and instrumental aggression seems to concede this point, suggesting that instrumental aggression does not seek harm. But this is false, too, for I either may or may not aim to harm someone whilst achieving my sporting goal. Finally, the notion of violence belatedly enters the picture from nowhere, without explanation or denition. A simple and much clearer distinction might go as follows: aggression involves forceful assertion in achieving ones ends, while violence involves the intention to harm or injure.6 Thus, it is quite possible to be aggressive without being violent. A player can be both forceful and vigorous without seeking to injure or harm anyone. Violence, however, is centrally to do with intentional harm or injury to others, as well as attempts to harm, recklessness as to harm, and negligence. All team sports recognize this simple distinction, and so have developed rules against violence but not (of course) against aggression. Most team sports just are exercises in controlled aggression. Take the example of boxing again, which seems to license violence. Certainly, it permits aggressive assaults and attempts to hurt. But hurt is not harm. If the boxer aims to hurt but not to cause lasting harm or injury, then he is not being violent in the sense that warfare is. A further distinction will help us here, between violent acts and acts of violence.7 Any action (e.g. killing or kissing someone) can be done more or less violently. So boxing, along with most sports, is violent in the sense that it consists of many violent acts i.e. actions performed violently (vigorously). However, an act of violence is one that intends harm or injury, whether or not it is actually performed violently (and there are many ways of doing harm gently). Boxing as a sport, while employing violent actions, should not permit acts of violence it should not be about trying to, or having to, put the opponent in hospital in order to win. (This is the moral objection to some forms of gladiatorial boxing, such as prize-ghting.8) Nevertheless, it might well be objected that what is wrong with competitive sport is that it encourages aggression and seeing the other as an opponent, an enemy. However, I would rather suggest that aggression in sport presents opportunities for moral education and moral development. When playing sport we exercise our potential for aggression, and we may also be tempted by the attractions of violence in pursuit of our aims. I have argued elsewhere9 that sport and games can function as laboratories for value experiments, in which we are put in the position of having to act, time and time again, sometimes in haste,

J. Parry

under pressure or provocation, either to prevent something or to achieve something, under a structure of rules.10 I believe that the impetus and opportunity for values education here is tremendous. The questions are: how do we come to terms with our own behaviour and dispositions, motivations and propensities? Is there a route from the potentially risky confrontation that sport sometimes is, to the development of a self with greater moral resolution? And, more generally, is there a possibility for peace and the non-violent conduct of human affairs? As Nissiotis said:
[T]his is the ethical challenge that faces humanity: how to harness the creative and motivating forces of aggression into the service of humanity. . . . Sport in Olympic practice is one of the most powerful events transforming aggressiveness to competition as emulation. Sports life moves on the demarcation line between aggressiveness and violence. It is a risky affair . . . Citius-altius-fortius is a dangerous enterprise on the threshold of power as aggression, violence and domination. But this is, precisely, the immense value of Olympic sports: they challenge people to react, to pass the test of power . . . 11

Downloaded by [Professor Jim Parry] at 09:57 27 July 2012

So the claim is that the competitive sports situation challenges individuals to develop and use their power and aggressiveness; but not, nally, to use this power to control and subjugate the other. Sport may produce more assertive and aggressive people, but less violent people, as it acts in society as an agent of moral change.

Intrinsic value The third mistake is to think that, because sport can be used in the service of different values, it has no values of its own. For example, Sugden atly asserts: . . . it is my considered view that in and of itself sport is of no intrinsic value.12 Instead, he thinks, the values are inserted into it by contextual social forces. However, consider these different claims: (i) sport may be used instrumentally in the service of different values; (ii) sport may or may not be played morally; (iii) sport is without values of its own (without intrinsic value). My view is that neither (i) nor (ii), even if true, entails (iii). I think that there is something special about sport in virtue of which it is an excellent tool for peace. The moral that these writers wish to draw is that it is all in the method it is how we teach sport that is important, not what we teach. Now, of course method is extremely important, but its not everything. If methods were all, and sport had no intrinsic value, why are not those methods being employed in basket-weaving for peace, instead of football? Now, Im not against basket-weaving, which could be very useful, but I think that sport is more so and not simply because of its popularity (see below), but because of its ethical basis. In fact, its very popularity is also to be explained with reference to its intrinsically moral nature. This is a very old argument. Bailey13 argued against the traditional view that games provide a secure avenue to value education that games are in themselves characterbuilding. His view that it is possible to play games effectively either morally or not is surely incontrovertible see (ii) above. Aspins14 counter-arguments that the constitutive rules of games enshrine moral values, and that games are collaborative enterprises which ipso facto entail that sport offers opportunities for learning about values seem equally sound see (iii) above. It seems to me that everyone is right here since (ii) does not entail (iii). Games are, in part, constructed out of values, but this does not guarantee that

Sport in Society

they will be played morally. So I am with Meakin:15 games provide opportunities for the presentation of values. But they are only capable of presenting these opportunities because they themselves have intrinsic values. Why use sport? So sport is not about conict but competition; not about violence but controlled aggression; neither is it amoral and value-free but is itself a moral enterprise. Only for those who think differently (those who make one of the above three mistakes) does the question arise: why would sport be used? If sport has bad values (violence and conict) or if it has no values of its own, why is it that peace activists seek to use sport (and not something else) in the service of their aims? An unsatisfactory answer (which is often given) might be that sport is popular people like it. However, people also like drugs (with a 30% increase in opiate and cocaine use in the last 10 years) and gambling (with a massive increase in sports-related gambling), but such popularity is not necessarily a good thing. Secondly, this makes it sound as though we could just as well use some other medium, such as art, lm, dance, chess, hulahooping, or Pokemon-collecting so long as it was popular enough. So a larger claim gets made, such as that of Kvalsund, who asserts: Sport is indisputably the most popular leisure activity in the world . . . .16 However, it is not at all clear how this claim might be validated. For a start, it is an empirical claim that would require investigation, and I have never seen any such evidence offered. But, more importantly, it would require an operational denition of sport, which would doubtless be highly contentious (e.g. the Council of Europe denition,17 which is simply hopeless). If we have to play the guessing game, my own hypothesis would be that The Arts would beat sport in the popularity stakes. Again, the problem of denition arises, but if we think of poem, play, story, lm, book, dance in all its forms, music and song, painting and the visual arts, sculpture and the plastic arts, photography, etc., my bet would be that more people in the world (well, probably everyone who ever lived) has engaged in (or been touched by) the arts but not quite so many in and by sport. If popularity was the driver, we should see a similar movement The Arts for Peace and Development. I can see many virtues in such a movement, especially with regard to inter-cultural understanding, but I do not think the Arts could be anywhere near as successful as sport, and this is not because of popularity but because of the kind of thing sport is. Arts tend to be culturally specic (hence their utility for cross-cultural understanding), but modern sports tend to be less so. Despite their often local origins, they tend to be universalisable. This is one of the features which makes them modern sports.18 And, anyway, some kind of popularity contest is not a good indicator of the appropriateness of sport to the task of peacekeeping. Of course, the more popular the better, since prior familiarity may well assist introduction and dissemination. So popularity is useful but it cannot be a justication. It does not explain why sport is popular, and why it can be so effective in carrying peace-worthy meanings and potentials. We need a better account of sport, which will explain its nature, its potential social roles and its popularity. Fair play and the logic of sport The moral concept of fair play Fair play is fundamental to the whole enterprise of sport and to an understanding of sport as a social practice. It is partly a moral and partly a logical notion referring to a complex set

Downloaded by [Professor Jim Parry] at 09:57 27 July 2012

J. Parry

of features emerging from principled engagement in competitive sporting activity, and three related moral meanings are often distinguished as follows: (i) Fair play is primarily a virtue of rule-adherence, which is a duty upon all contestants to abide by the rules of the competition; since, by their participation, they are deemed to have entered into a contract to contest. This is partly a moral notion, but it is also the basis of the logical character of fair play (see Fair Play as a Logical Requirement Section). (ii) Fair play may also include a commitment to contesting in the spirit of sport, such as may lead to supererogatory actions (i.e. good actions over and above those strictly required by the rules). (iii) Fair play may also sometimes refer to a general attitude towards sport (and even life itself) involving respect for others, modesty in victory, serenity in defeat and generosity aimed at creating warm and lasting human relations.19

Downloaded by [Professor Jim Parry] at 09:57 27 July 2012

Competitive sport and inclusive goods Although there is perhaps a distinction to be drawn between recreative and competitive sport, it is the latter with which we are here concerned, and its dening feature has often been seen as raising problems of value. It has been argued that since competitive games are necessarily competitive, they are merely ways of beating other people and are therefore centrally to do with the morally dubious demonstration of superiority over others. However, it seems to me that although competitive games are ways of testing ones abilities against anothers they are not merely that. While it is true that competitive games are contests, which entails competition with a view to establishing a winner and a loser (i.e. superiority in respect of the games required abilities), this does not entail that we have to have winning as our overriding concern. Rather, it is possible to play to win, while valuing above all, for example, the opportunity to exercise speed, strength, determination and skill. The inescapably competitive nature of the contest does not impose upon us a win at all costs attitude, nor a superiorist mentality. The criticism seems to be that the nature of competitive sport commits us to the priority of exclusive goods if I win the competition, no one else can. But this is simply not true as a full account of what sport is. There are many inclusive goods in competitive sports, in which we need to cooperate to produce mutual outcomes. For example, unless we are mutually striving (both trying our best to win) it is difcult to produce a good contest, which is what we both want. The nature and value of a good contest Fraleigh20 approaches this issue via an analysis of the logical requirements for a good contest. First, there is a presupposition of equality of opportunity to contest (equality under the rules), without which the game could not allow the expression of those characteristic skills and abilities called into play by the rules. Relative ability in regard to just those skills and abilities can only be demonstrated when all other variables are strictly controlled, so as to permit equality of opportunity to contest. Second, no contest could exist without the opponent, which would seem to require at least the minimum respect due to a facilitator to one whose own level of performance is a major contributor to the very possibilities for excellence and satisfaction open to oneself in that category of endeavour chosen by both. Third, although it is clearly possible to break the rules, to do so alters the conditions of the

Sport in Society

Downloaded by [Professor Jim Parry] at 09:57 27 July 2012

contest, so that a range of abilities not specied by the rules comes into play. A good contest will maintain the framework which secures the integrity of the contest, and this requires rules adherence and fair play. Fourth, a knowledge of relative abilities is also a necessary outcome, and this might be seen as superiorist. But Reddiford21 reminds us that you win some, you lose some; and so to make the game the occasion for marking up superiorities and inferiorities is a short-term and self-defeating attitude. We play to produce an outcome favourable to ourselves, of course, but we do not allow the actual outcome to be of persisting importance. Humility and generosity are at least as likely an accompaniment to a demonstration of ones relative abilities as overweening pride and conceit. I would add, fth, that in games there is a simple right and wrong, easily enforceable by a clearly identied authority. At the same time, there is some possibility of differing interpretation and judgement. In playing games, we learn how to follow explicit rules, how to bend them and evade them, and how to operate within a system of penalties and consequences, both ofcial and unofcial. Games are laboratories for value experiments. We are put in the position of having to act, time and time again, sometimes in haste, under pressure or provocation, either to prevent something or to achieve something, under a structure of rules. So, such an analysis presents us with a clear set of values which are either presupposed by, or are necessary outcomes of, the good contest. This seems to me a clear demonstration of the moral basis of sport. Fair play as a logical requirement However, it often goes unnoticed that the primary nature of fair play in sport is not as a moral requirement as rule-adherence, acknowledgement of the spirit of sport, or trying to be a fair-minded person in general. Rather, its main signicance is as a logically necessary feature of successful engagement. We have already seen, in Fraleighs account, how difcult it is to state what sport is, without relying on moral notions. Sport is institutionalized (suggesting some lawful authority), it is a contest (suggesting a contract to contest), it is rule-governed (entailing equality and obligation) and it requires cooperative co-facilitators (which suggest mutual respect). Such an account may begin to indicate the logico-moral basis of sport and thus suggest arguments that may be raised against cheating or other rule-breaking. For we may ask how cheating relates to the practice of sport; and whether one can have a successful sports practice in which cheating regularly occurs. Obviously, the answer depends on the kind and level of cheating involved but the primary wrong in (say) doping or unlawful violence lies in simple rule-breaking. This is because the rules function as a kind of precompetition agreement which species both an athletes eligibility to compete and also his rights, duties and responsibilities under the agreed rules. What is wrong with doping, for example, is the secretive attempt to evade or subvert such a contract to contest, which describes the right of athletes to compete against non-dopers, describes the duties and responsibilities of athletes not to dope and pre-determines a dopers non-eligibility to compete. To freely choose to be accepted into a community of practice entails an obligation to duly respect the rules of the practice (or institution) as its lawful authority. To subvert such a contract to contest threatens the moral basis of sport, jeopardizes the integrity of the sporting community and erodes public support and trust. It is because it is impossible to get a game of football going, or keep a competition going, unless the participants have

J. Parry

some grasp on these notions, that sport is an excellent vehicle for the introduction and maintenance of moral and political values. Freedom, responsibility, equality, justice and respect all these are to be found in the rule-based practices of sport. Liberalism and sport isomorphism And this is not just an accident. It is often noticed that modern sport emerged at a particular historic juncture, in the heyday of political liberalism in Europe in the last third of the nineteenth century. This is the basis of the leftist critique of sport as a mirror of liberal capitalism. The decreasing popularity of such analyses since 1989 has left open the eld for liberal accounts, including rights-based accounts, of both sport and politics. Sugden22 appeals to a seemingly (and allegedly) universal agreement that validates a human rights agenda for sport for development and peace (SDP) but this makes ethics both contingent (on actual agreements . . . ) and opportunistic ( . . . that just happen to be in place at the moment). There is more to human rights theory than that involving arguments for the justication of political liberalism and, along with it, human rights theory. The liberal state sees itself as deliberately not choosing any particular conception of the Good Life for its citizens to follow. Rather, it sees itself as neutral between alternative conceptions of the Good to be found in most modern liberal democracies. In this, it sharply distinguishes itself from illiberal states, which embody and enforce one view of the Good Life. Rather than promoting one culture over another, it sees itself as tolerant and multicultural. Citizens can choose their own version of the Good and pursue their own aims and values, independently of the state. In such a state, attention to multicultural ideals such as recognition, toleration, respect and equal status for all cultures will become increasingly important. Multiculturalism is a fact nowadays for most Western societies, and it requires a political society to recognize the equal standing of all stable and viable communities existing in a society. It outlaws discrimination against groups and individuals on the grounds of ethnicity, race, nationality, religion, class, gender or sexual preference. However, some of these communities may be authoritarian, illiberal and oppressive so the question arises: does multiculturalism apply equally to all communities, or only to liberal ones? Rawls23 attempts to draw guidelines for a Law of Peoples acceptable to members of both liberal and illiberal cultures, by introducing the notion of reasonable societies. These societies, though they may be illiberal, nevertheless follow certain core principles: Peace (pursuing their ends through diplomacy and trade). Common Good (a conception of justice). Consultation (a reasonable hierarchy thereof). Responsibility (citizens recognize their obligations and play a part in social life). Freedom (some freedom of conscience/thought). Reasonable societies, even illiberal ones, could agree to a Law of Peoples based on such a thin liberalism as this and this could be seen very positively: as offering learning experiences both ways, as each culture learns from the other. But multiculturalism has its limits, and those limits are drawn by the universalistic claims of thin liberalism, supported by some form of human rights theory. As Hollis says, liberal societies . . . must ght for at least a minimalist, procedural thesis about freedom, justice, equality and individual rights.24 In the short term, in the interests of peace and development (or of political or economic gain), such basic moral commitments may be temporarily diluted or shelved but they are the inalienable bedrock of the possibility of a global multiculturalism. There are limits to

Downloaded by [Professor Jim Parry] at 09:57 27 July 2012

Sport in Society

toleration. Liberal democracy is (still) an exclusionary system some cultures are beyond the pale. Against this, it is often objected that liberalism is an historical project, and that universalism is a western project and thus ethnocentric. This makes it sound as though there is no justicatory argument for liberalism, although a very important element of liberal thinking, part of the liberal project, is the claim that liberalism expresses a kind of truth about human beings and the human condition; that it is the best mode of social organization for the benet of all citizens of the world. The arguments advanced for liberalism claim that it is the system within which individuals can nd maximal freedom for self-development and maximal choice of lifestyle, and through which communities can progress along their own chosen path of development in peace and fruitful concord with other communities. Incidentally, it often goes without full acknowledgement that the ideology of peacekeeping is invariably liberal in tenor. To work towards peace involves mediating between parties with divergent values. To do so, and to avoid a debilitating relativism, will require reference to a set of supra-community values, and we can detect a background set of universalistic, liberal and democratic values at work within peacekeeping organizations: an emphasis on human rights, equal access, equal opportunity, equal treatment, minority rights, informed consent, mutual acceptance and tolerance, respect for local cultures, etc. But we have to remain self-aware and self-critical. Just because some community claims the status of a liberal democracy does not automatically mean that they are the good guys. Our judgements of their goals and their actions contribute to our assessments of the quality of a particular democracy. Is it behaving in anti-liberal ways? Is it being perverted or exploited? What are its disadvantages, and how can they be ameliorated? Where does it need improvement? Is a majority being oppressive and if so do we need special minority group rights? So we hope to see critical liberal democracies, striving towards ideals expressed in terms of human rights and peaceful coexistence. Since they are human creations, they will be imperfect and they will make mistakes. But at least, if they are as good as their word, they should be working towards the good of their peoples, in service of a set of defensible moral principles. The idea of sport isomorphism is that the structures and values of sport echo those of political liberalism. So sport is a metaphor for (or a lived experiment in) those values: freedom, responsibility, equality, justice, respect, etc. The role of the liberal state is to hold the ring that is to enforce the values of thin liberalism so as to provide a set of neutral conditions of order and the rule of law so that negotiations can proceed between conicting and competing interests without political violence. Isomorphically, the role of the referee is to enforce the rules so as to provide an equal playing-eld so that the mutual contesting of skills between competitors can proceed without violence. It is a salient fact that no liberal democracy has ever declared war on another. The promotion of the values of liberal democracy is itself a peacemaking and peacekeeping strategy. And so, to identify, recognize and promote the intrinsic values of sport, which are isomorphic with the values of liberal democracy, is to provide a vehicle for peacemaking and peacekeeping that, far from being value-free, is crafted for the purpose. Sport and universalism The SDP movement seeks to achieve its ends through the medium of sport, and so it cannot escape the requirement to provide an account of sport which reveals both its nature and its

Downloaded by [Professor Jim Parry] at 09:57 27 July 2012

10

J. Parry

ethical potential. Although sports are widely considered to be pleasurable, which in part explains their popularity, their likelihood of gaining wide acceptance lies rather in their intrinsic value, which transcends the simply hedonic or relative good. Their ability to furnish us with pleasurable experiences depends upon our prior recognition in them of opportunities for the development and expression of valued human excellences. They are widely considered to present such opportunities because, even when in local instantiations, their object is to challenge our common human propensities and abilities. As we saw above, it is difcult even to state the characteristics of sport without relying on terms that carry ethical import, and such meanings must apply across the world of sports participation. Without agreement on rule-adherence, the authority of the referee and the central shared values of the activity, there could be no sport. The rst task of an International Federation, for example, is to clarify rules and harmonize understandings so as to facilitate the universal practice of its sport. The thin values underpinning the rule structures of sport, acceptance of which by all participants is a precondition of the continuing existence of sporting competition, support at the educational and cultural levels initiatives for peace that might take a more obviously political form. Children (and others) who are brought into sporting practices, and who are aware of international competitions such as the Olympic Games and the World Cup, are thereby becoming aware of the possibilities of international cooperation, mutual respect, mutual valuing and the resolution of conict under agreed rules. It is not a surprise that there is an emerging relationship between sports organizations, including the Olympic Movement and the United Nations, which are global organizations facing similar problems in regard to universality and particularity. The general problem faced by both is how they are to operate at a global (universal) level while there exist such apparently intractable differences at the particular level. Some seek to resolve such difculties in the sports world by speaking of sport as a universal language; but this seems to me to under-represent the case. Not just sport, but sports organizations, including the IOC, seek to be universal in their values: mutual recognition and respect, tolerance, solidarity, equity, anti-discrimination, peace, multiculturalism, etc. This is a quite specic set of values, which are at once a set of universal general principles; but which also require differential interpretation in different cultures stated in general terms while interpreted in the particular. This search for universal representations at the interpersonal and political level of our common humanity seems to me to be the essence of the optimism and hope of various forms of humanism and internationalism. I believe that sport has made an enormous contribution to modern society over the past hundred years or so, and that there is a strong case for sport as an efcient means to these ends. The very idea of a closed society is under threat everywhere the people are no longer reliant on restricted and controlled forms of information. The Internet, satellite TV, and global forms of commerce and communication are all contributing to a democratization of information, and the extensive migration of people across continents is producing a new cosmopolitanism. It will require increasingly high-levels of dogmatism, authoritarianism, isolationism and extremism to sustain closed, exclusivist societies. Their life is limited. This, at any rate, has to be our hope, and the hope of any kind of peaceful internationalism based on the idea of individual freedom and human rights. Our engagement and commitment to the development of global forms of cultural expression such as sport, and through them to the development of peace and international understanding, is one way that we as individuals can express our commitments, ideals and hopes for the future of the world.

Downloaded by [Professor Jim Parry] at 09:57 27 July 2012

Sport in Society

11

I hope to have demonstrated that the requirements upon us to play fairly are not simply requirements to play morally. They are also requirements to acknowledge the internal logic of the practices we call sports, without which participation is just impossible. A further suggestion is that this internal logic is founded on values that are isomorphic with political liberalism, including the ideas of social contract, equality before the law, justice, toleration and mutual respect. Conclusion sports peacekeeping potential Of course, sport is not a cure-all, and if sport programmes can be useful in peace-building, then they must be implemented as part of a wider set of peace-building strategies. I have tried to argue that the very nature of sport lends itself to the task of interpersonal understanding and respect, and that the nature of cooperative striving in rule-governed competition can lead towards civilized and peaceful resolutions. I have claimed that it is this peacemaking capacity of sport that informs its peacekeeping potential. Potentials, however, are not always realized. Of course, it is possible to exploit and manipulate a social institution towards vested interests. In the case of sport, for example, this is what the amateurism/professionalism debate is all about: whether the external interests of business and proteering have changed the very nature of sport; or whether they have perverted the nature of sport; or whether their aims are inimical to sport. Or take marriage, as another example of a social institution. The ceremony (which might vary considerably according to context) announces certain values and draws certain promises. It thereby has the potential for principled partnerships. But of course no one claims that marriage cannot be used for other purposes: to seal the friendship of kings, to secure access to a familys wealth, to gain citizenship, to display a trophy wife, etc. And of course no one claims that because people sometimes have these external interests, it follows that marriage has no intrinsic values. Similarly, sport can be used to earn money, promote a nation, inate egos, bully the weak, vaunt victory, disparage the loser and so on. But this does not mean that sport has no (intrinsic) values. To argue that sport has peacemaking capacity and peacekeeping potential is to argue that it has a certain intrinsic form and intrinsic values, which lend themselves to those tasks. This is why sport is promoted (instrumentally) by peacekeepers, even if they do not particularly like sport themselves. A shallow appreciation of sport would see its popularity. A deeper understanding of sport would try to explain why it is universally popular as a mode of mutual expression of our common humanity. Only if we can give some account of the nature and intrinsic values of sport will we be in a position to identify and promote those values which are the bedrock of its peacekeeping potential. Acknowledgements
This paper was written with support from a Research Grant from the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports MSM 0021620864, Czech Republic; and institutional support PRVOUK P39.

Downloaded by [Professor Jim Parry] at 09:57 27 July 2012

Notes
1 2 3 4

Kvalsund, Sport and Peace Building, 11. Palaeologis, The Institution of the Truce. Quoted in Goodhart and Chataway, War Without Weapons, 19. Goodhart and Chataway, War Without Weapons.

12
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

J. Parry
Schwery and Eggenberger-Argote, Sport as a Cure; Jarvis, Sport Psychology, 56. See Parry, Aggression and Violence, 207 8. Parry, Aggression and Violence, 212; Harris, Violence and Responsibility, Chapter 1. Parry, Aggression and Violence, 2212. Parry, Values in Physical Education. Parry, Values in Physical Education, 144 5. Nissiotis, Psychological and Sociological Motives for Violence in Sport, 106 8. Sugden, Sport Intervention in Divided Societies, 6. Bailey, Games, Winning and Education. Aspin, Games Winning and Education. Meakin, Moral Values and Physical Education. Kvalsund, Sport and Peace Building, 5. The Council of Europes The European Sports Charter 2001 says: Sport means all forms of physical activity which, through casual or organised participation, aim at expressing or improving physical tness and well-being, forming social relationships or obtaining results in competition at all levels. Such a denition is impossibly wide, since it includes walking to work, sunbathing, sex and line-dancing as sports. Whereas Guttman, From Ritual to Record, 15 55, offers seven characteristics of modern sport, I would suggest that universalisability underlies them, or is a consequence of them see Parry, The Idea of the Record, 204. Borotra, Olympism and Fair Play, 84. Fraleigh, Right Actions in Sport, 41 6. Reddiford, Playing to Win, 115. Sugden, Sport Intervention in Divided Societies, 8. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, passim. Hollis, Is Universalism Ethnocentric?, 42.

Downloaded by [Professor Jim Parry] at 09:57 27 July 2012

18

19 20 21 22 23 24

References
Aspin, D.N. Games Winning and Education Some Further Comments. Cambridge Journal of Education 5, no. 1 (1975): 51 61. Bailey, C. Games, Winning and Education. In Physical Education An Integrating Force, edited by I.K. Glaister, 24 30, A.T.C.D.E. Conference Report 1974. Borotra, J. Olympism and Fair Play. International Olympic Academy, Report of the Twenty-Third Session, edited by IOC 84 94. Lausanne: 1985. Council of Europe. The European Sports Charter (revised). Brussels: http://www.sportdevelopment. info/index.php?optioncom_content&view article&id 87:council-of-europe-2001-theeuropean-sports-charterrevised-brussels-council-of-europe-&catid59&Itemid82 Council of Europe, 2001. Fraleigh, W. Right Actions in Sport: Ethics for Contestants. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics Publishers, 1984. Goodhart, P., and C. Chataway. War Without Weapons. London: WH Allen, 1968. Guttman, A. From Ritual to Record: The Nature of Modern Sports. New York: Columbia University Press, 1978. Harris, J. Violence and Responsibility. London: Routledge & KP, 1982. Hollis, M. Is Universalism Ethnocentric?. In Multicultural Questions, edited by S. Lukes and C. Joppke, 27 43. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Jarvis, M. Sport Psychology. London: Routledge, 2002. Kvalsund, P. Sport and Peace Building. Retrieved online on 6 April 2011 from http://www.toolkits portdevelopment.org/html/resources/E0/E034DC82-E2BB-4827-AC8B-E7D1BDFCB288/ Sport%20and%20Peace%20paper%20Pelle%20 Kvalsund.pdf. Meakin, D.C. Moral Values and Physical Education. Physical Education Review 5, no. 1 (1982): 62 82. Nissiotis, N. Psychological and Sociological Motives for Violence in Sport. International Olympic Academy, Report of the Twenty-Third Session, edited by IOC 95 108. Lausanne: 1985. Palaeologis, C. The Institution of the Truce in the Ancient Olympic Games. Report of the Fifth Summer Session of the International Olympic Academy, edited by Hellenic Olympic Committee: 203 10. Athens: Hellenic Olympic Committee, 1965.

Sport in Society

13

Parry, J. Values in Physical Education. In Values Across the Curriculum, edited by P. Tomlinson and M. Quinton, 134 57. London: Falmer Press, 1986. Parry, J. Violence and Aggression in Contemporary Sport. In Ethics and Sport, edited by M.J. McNamee and S.J. Parry, 205 24. London: Routledge, 1998. Parry, J. The Idea of the Record. Sport in History 26, no. 2 (2006): 197 214. Rawls, J. The Law of Peoples. In On Human Rights, edited by S. Shute and S. Hurley, 41 82. New York: Basic Books, 1993. Reddiford, G. Playing to Win. Physical Education Review 5, no. 2 (1982): 107 15. Schwery, R., and N. Eggenberger-Argote. Sport as a Cure to Mitigate Negative Syndromes of Anomie and to Prevent Violent Conicts. ICSSPE Bulletin, no. 40 (January 2004). Retrieved online on 6 April 2011 from http://www.icsspe.org/bulletin/drucken_a4b0b691.php.html. Sugden, J. Sport Intervention in Divided Societies: Pragmatic Realism and a Human Rights Approach. Play Fair! The ofcial publication of the European Fair Play Movement 17, no. Academic Supplement, no. 7 (2008-2, 2009-1): 6 8.

Downloaded by [Professor Jim Parry] at 09:57 27 July 2012