Artha and Ruta in Lankavatara Sutra, Etc - Luigi

BSRV 27.2 (2010) 139176 doi: 10.1558/bsrv.v27i2.
139
Buddhist Studies Review ISSN (print) 0256-2897 Buddhist Studies Review ISSN (online) 1747-9681
Meaning without Words: The Contrast between Artha and Ruta in Mahyna Stras
LIGEIA LUGLI
SOAS, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
ligeialugli@hotmail.com
ABSTRACT This paper explores the contrast between words (ruta) and meaning (artha) as it emerges from those Mahyna stras that discuss the issue most extensively. For these texts artha is out of the reach of language. Some declare it inexpressible, some view words and meaning as mutually exclusive, while still others warn of verbalization as a danger to the realization of artha. Their concerns do not spring from semantics, but derive from their conception of reality as sameness. Keywords Mahyna, artha, meaning, language, sameness. Semantics is of little concern to Mahyna stras. Still, they do, occasionally, discuss the relationship between words (ruta, vyajana) and meaning (artha).1
1. It is dicult to give a precise translation of ruta and artha. Both are polysemic. Ruta usually designates sound and is sometimes a substitute for vyajana (letter) in the arthapratisaraa (See Edgerton 1953, sub voce ruta). However, the Lakvatras denition of ruta widens its purview. Ruta, here, is a combination of sound and discriminative conceptualization (vikalpa). This denition clearly points to language in general, rather than to sound and letters only (see infra note 29). As for artha, no English term covers the width of its semantic spectrum. In Sanskrit artha denotes a variety of concepts ranging from purpose, spiritual goal, wealth, material objects, their mental representation and meaning. Texts switch freely from one sense to the other. The Lakvatra, for one, uses it to express purpose (see for instance Tokiwa 57/ Nanjio 55; Tokiwa 85/Nanjio 73; Tokiwa 99/Nanjio 79), to indicate external objects ( Tokiwa 324/Nanjio 224; Tokiwa 205/Nanjio 150), to denote the object of knowledge (Tokiwa 235/Nanjio 169; Tokiwa 237/Nanjio 170) and to designate meaning (Tokiwa 91/Nanjio 77; Tokiwa 112/ Nanjio 87; Tokiwa 147/Nanjio 112; Tokiwa 205/Nanjio 150; Tokiwa 288/Nanjio 201). Context usually fends o ambiguities between these four senses (for an interesting exception see infra note 56). When artha occurs within expositions of arthapratisaraa or arthapratisavid and is discussed in relation to verbalization, the texts leave little doubt about its denotation. It clearly indicates meaning. Still, even within this limited semantic spectrum interpretative diculties often arise. It is in most cases impossible to establish whether stras intend artha as the object referent of an expression, the content of a text or, more generally, the spirit of a
Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011, 1 Chelsea Manor Studios, Flood Street, London SW3 5SR
140
Meaning without Words
Not that they intend to establish a clear theory of signication, or elucidate how understanding derives from verbal cognition. Quite the opposite. The stras message is, broadly speaking, that meaning cannot be accessed through words. Artha, they hold, is inexpressible and words only create confusion about it. Disconcerting within linguistics, this stance is best understood in the context of Mahyna philosophy at large. Concepts like emptiness (nyat) or sameness (samat) play a signicant role in the formation of the ruta/artha divide. To t the Mahyna ideological framework, the canonical distinction between words and meaning, exemplied by the twofold injunction to rely on meaning and not on letters (arthapratisaraa), undergoes signicant reinterpretation. Several stras divest the word/meaning polarity of its original pragmatical value, adapt it to the Mahyna view of reality and eventually transform it into a sharp opposition. Three quarters of the stras that quote the arthapratisaraa, for instance, hold meaning to be verbally inexpressible.2 The stras I analyse for this paper include the Akayamatinirdea, Anavataptangarjaparipcch, Brahmavieacintparipcch, Jnloklakra, Kuala mlaparigraha, Lakvatra, Mahynopadea, Ratnakaraa, Sgaramatiparipcch, Samdhirja, Sadhinirmocana, Sarvapuyasamuccayasamdhi, Suvikrntadevaputraparipcch, Tathgatamahkarunirdea, Tathgatasagti and Vikurvarjaparipcch. As is often the case with Indian Mahyna literature, working on such sources poses a number of problems. These stras most probably originated in different times and places.3 Little is known about most of them, as many have remained unexplored to date. Their relative chronology, in particular, dees investigation for absence of reliable evidence. The difculties posed by such paucity of information, however, can be overcome to a degree. The homogeneity
teaching. This has at least three causes. First, arthas polysemy allows for seamless switching between the concept of abstract meaning and substantial object referent. Second, the realist view of meaning permeating Indian thought up to the close of the rst millennium CE (see infra page 153) together with the stras scarce interest in semantics apparently led to the assumption that the meaning of verbal expression corresponds to an object referent, even in cases where no such referent exists (see infra notes 55, 60, 62). Finally, a good deal of ambiguity is intentionally crafted and stems from the stras inclination to equivocate on words for rhetorical or hermeneutical purposes. I have identied twelve stras containing the full formula of the arthapratisaraa (i.e. including the negative injunction not to rely on letters): the Akayamatinirdea, Anavataptangarjaparipcch, Brahmavieacintparipcch, Buddhasagti, Kualamlaparigraha, Lakvatra, Mahynopadea, Sgaramatiparipcch, Sarvapuyasamuccayasamdhi, Tathgatamahkarunirdea, Vikurvarjaparipcch and Vimalakrtinirdea. Of these the Buddhasagti, Lakvatra, Sarvapuyasamuccayasamdhi and Vimalakrtinirdea do not dene artha as inexpressible. The Lakvatra, however, clearly indicates that artha cannot be accessed through words (see infra note 40). It must be noted that, strictly speaking, the arthapratisaraa does not appear in the Kualamlaparigraha. I have, nonetheless, included this stra in the list because it contains a paraphrased version of the formula (see infra note 17). The only temporal coordinate for most Mahyna stras is the date of their rst Chinese translation. This serves as terminus ante quem. In the case of our sources it ranges from the rst translation of Brahmavieacintparipcch in 286 CE to the Jnloklakra in 506 CE (see Lancaster and Park 1979). The usefulness of such indication, however, is minimal. The dates of the translation provide no clues to the period of the actual production of the texts in India. Moreover, the dates themselves are unreliable. For most of our sources (including the Brahmavieacintparipcch), the earliest translation is attributed to Dharmaraka, whose corpus is ill-dened. Many of the works attributed to him are possibly the output of later and less famous translators (see Nattier 2008, 89).
2.
3.
Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011
Ligeia Lugli
141
of the texts content makes up for the lack of spatio-temporal coordinates. The stras I consider here display a consistent set of ideas about words, meaning and, more generally, reality. They all equate the Ultimate with undistinguished sameness.4 Apart from the Tathgatasagti, they agree that words do not convey artha.5 In many, the ruta/artha divide contrasts the plurality of words with the singularity of meaning.6 Most link artha to reality.7 Several consider it to be undifferentiated.8 Finally, they often hold reality to be inexpressible (anabhilpya, brjod du med pa).9 Since the general ideas that mould these stras are virtually identical, I treat variations as different pieces of the same puzzle. This hypothesis allows me to use information gathered from different texts to make sense of an otherwise cryptic tenet, that meaning must not be understood through words.
THE RUTA/ARTHA CONTRAST

The contrast between meaning and words takes two forms in our sources. Most of the stras considered here declare meaning to be inexpressible10 and establish a relation of mutual exclusivity between words and artha.11 Thus, they dismiss
4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. See infra notes 8083. See infra notes 1011. See infra notes 4953. See infra notes 64, 6772. See infra notes 40; 4951; 71; 8890. See infra notes 9798, 100104. Akayamatinirdea, mdo sde, Ma, 149b1, Braarvig 1988, 178: see infra note 19; Anavataptangarjaparipcch, mdo sde, Pha, 225a6: Among meanings, the meaning inexpressible by words is the meaning. (gang don de dag la don ces tshig gis brjod du med pa di ni don ces byao ||); Jnloklakra, Study Group 2004, 8890: see infra note 104; Mahynopadea, mdo sde, Ba, 272b7: Reverend riputra, truth is not explainable; the Dharma is freedom from attachment; meaning is verbally inexpressible. (btsun pa shA rii bu bden pa ni bsnyad du med pao || chos ni dod chags dang bral bao || don ni brjod du med pao ||); Sgaramatiparipcch, mdo sde, Pha, 49b750a1: Sgaramati, the fact that the Buddhas, the Blessed Ones, after becoming enlightened about the inexpressible Dharma, make it known and perceptible to other beings and to all other individuals by expressing the inexpressible meaning is very dicult. (blo gros rgya mtsho sangs rgyas bcom ldan das gang dag brjod du med pai chos mngon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas nas kyang sems can gzhan dag dang gang zag gzhan rnams la brjod du med pai don de brjod pas rnam par rig par byed cing go bar byed pa ni de bas kyang ches dka ba mdzad pao ||); Samdhirja, XXXII, 3 and 5, Vaidya (1961), 195: see infra note 51; Sarvapuyasamuccayasamdhi, mdo sde, Na, 102b67: see infra note 20; Suvikrntadevaputraparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 104b2: see infra note 67; Tathgatamahkarunirdea, mdo sde, Pa, 181a3: see infra note 68; Vikurvarjaparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 198a3: see infra note 22. 11. Brahmavieacintparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 76b34: see infra note 18; Kualamlaparigraha, mdo sde, Nga, 120a16: see infra note 17. Ratnakaraa, mdo sde, Ja, 252a2: Majur said: Reverend Subhti, what is called meaning is the meaning which is verbally inexpressible. Here, meaning does not correspond to what is meaning for those who engage in a verbally expressible meaning. (jam dpal gyis smras pa | btsun pa rab byor don ces bya ba ni brjod du med pai don to || de la gang dag brjod du yod pai don la spyod pa de dag gi don ni don ma yin te |). Outside our usual sources, the Bodhisattvagocaropyaviayavikurvanirdea also contains a passage illustrating that meaning and words are mutually exclusive: Reverend riputra, meaning is verbally inexpressible. What verbally expresses that is a denition. Meaning cannot be articulated verbally. What verbally expresses that is a denition. Meaning cannot be declared. What declares that is a denition. Meaning is immovable, unfathomable, undierentiated, free from conceptualizations, it is not an object, unsubstantial, ungraspable, unweaving, immaterial, unsupported and completely transcendent from the support of the path of words. (Bod
142
language as inefcacious in conveying meaning. Other texts, by contrast, omit reference to inexpressibility, but depict ruta as a veritable obstacle in the quest for the teachings artha.12 Attempts to derive meaning from words, they assert, would result in deep misunderstanding and eventually unpleasant rebirths.13 Arthapratisaraa serves frequently to polarize words and meaning. Traditional explanations of this formula, however, are of no avail. The canonical injunction rely on meaning, do not rely on letters (arthapratiaraena bhavitavya na vyajanapratiaraena)14 does not imply that words are not suitable to express artha. On the contrary, it aims to emphasize the importance of understanding content over text memorization.15 Thus, artha enjoys a pragmatical didactical value. A quick glance at the use of arthapratisaraa in our sources reveals that, generally, their intent diverges from the original spirit of the formula.16 The
hisattvagocaropyaviayavikurvanirdea, mdo sde, Pa, 132a6b1: btsun pa sha ra dwa tii bu don zhes bya ba ni brjod du med pao || de brjod pa gang yin pa de ni rnam par nges pa zhes byao || don zhes bya ba ni smra med pao || de smra ba gang yin pa de ni rnam par nges par zhes byao || don zhe bya ba ni smos su med pao || de smos pa gang yin pa de ni rnam par nges pa zhes byao || don zhes bya ba ni g.yo ba med pa | bsam pa med pa | spros pa med pa | brtags pa med pa | rnam par bsgrubs pa med pa | dngos po med pa | rdzas med pa | rang dzin pa med pa | dpa rlabs med pa | gzung ba med pa | gnas med pa | gnas kyi tshig gi lam thams cad las yang dag par das pao ||.) Lakvatra, Tokiwa 278/Nanjio 194195: see infra note 24; Sadhinirmocana, mdo sde, Ca, 48b12, Lamotte 1935, 147: see infra note 53. Tokiwa 212214/Nanjio 154156: see infra note 29; Sadhinirmocana, mdo sde, Ca, 21a23, Lamotte 1935, 77: see infra note 61. The exact wording diers from text to text. The Lakvatra reads: arthapratiaraena mahmate bodhisattvena mahsattvena bhavitavya na vyajanapratiaraena (Tokiwa 278/Nanjio 194). Tibetan renditions also present variations, ranging, for instance, from: don la rton pa yin gyi tshig bru la rton pa ma yin (Vikurvarjaparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 184a7), to: bcom ldan das don la rton pa lags kyi tshig bru la ma lags te | (Sgaramatiparipcch, mdo sde, Pha, 99a3), or: don la rton pa yi ge la ma rton cig (Brahmavieacintparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 76b34). The need to emphasise meaning over words has several reasons, but this would transcend the scope of my study here. Suce it to say that it can be linked to, at least, four issues. First, the emphasis on artha encourages the pratictioner to engage intellectually with the teaching. It, thus, opposes the Vedic idea that the sacred words should be trusted out of faith, without investigating the soteriological ecacy of their message (see McDermott 1984, 24 and Clooney 1987, 672673). This emerges, for instance, from the Klma section of the Aguttara Nikya and the Tevijja-sutta (see Aguttara Nikya I 189; Dgha Nikya I 235253). The former exhorts not to accept doctrines on the basis of the traditions to which they belong, or the master who proclaims them. The Tevijja-sutta dismisses the Vedas as mere words which are not related to any actual experience. It rhetorically asks how people could say that those texts lead to union with Brahm when in fact nobody has ever encountered Brahm by following them. Second, superiority of sense over letters is related to the injunction of teaching the Dharma in dierent dialects and using dierent expressions depending on the audience. This practice allows for words to be altered in order to clarify meaning. Again, this contrasts with the Mmsakas emphasis on preserving the sacred words unchanged, no matter how cryptic their meaning might be (see Lopez 1995, 37). Third, arthapratisaraa is also directed at monks who focus excessively on erudition. Targeting this kind of practitioners, the Dhammavihrinsutta draws a neat distinction between a monk who simply studies the Dhamma in order to achieve scholarly mastery over its various divisions, and a monk who abides in the Dhamma, understanding and practising its meaning (Aguttara Nikya III 8687). Fourth, as Lamotte notes, arthapratisaraa aims to discourage the memorization of texts for the purpose of using learned quotation to prevail in debates and quarrels (Lamotte 1949, 346). This attitude is illustrated, in addition to the sources quoted by Lamotte, also in the Alagaddupama-sutta (Majjhima Nikya I 130142). The Tathgatamahkarunirdea and Mahynopadea constitute the only exceptions. In the
12. 13. 14.
15.
16.
Ligeia Lugli
143
Kualamlaparigraha, for instance, draws inspiration from arthapratisaraa to depict words and meaning as mutually exclusive:
radvatputra, grasp (bsdu ba) the meaning correctly! How should one grasp it? By grasping meaning, not by grasping letters. radvatputra, ordinary folk conform to letters, wise people conform to meaning. radvatputra, what are letters? The term letters is synonym for the basis of syllables, the basis of information, the basis of verbal expression. Letters, radvatputra, are what is knowable, cognizable, comprehensible, verbal expressions, descriptions, designations []. radvatputra, what is meaning? [] radvatputra, meaning is what is not verbally expressible. radvatputra, if meaning were as ordinary folk grasp it, it would be words and not meaning. radvatputra, thus, meaning cannot be verbally expressed.17
The Brahmavieacintparipcch does the same:

Meaning is not verbally expressible; as long as something is verbally expressed it is not meaning. Having understood the tathgatas double injunction Rely on meaning, do not rely on words!, [he] did not say anything.18
The Akayamatinirdea, again, quotes the formula to demonstrate arthas inexpressibility:

In short, the teaching [consisting] of the 84,000 collections of doctrines correspond to letters. The meaning that is inexpressible through any beings language, syllable or letter corresponds to meaning. In this regard it is said: Rely on meaning, do not rely on letters.19
former arthapratisaraa serves to establish the preliminary value of words and the ultimate importance of meaning: To grasp all that is heard constitutes the basis of wisdom. To rely on meaning constitutes the active expression (las) of understanding. (mdo sde, Pa, 234b4: thos pa thams cad dzin pa ni shes rab kyi rtsa bao || don la rton pa ni shes rab kyi las so ||). The Mahynopadea interprets arthapratisaraa as a remedy for peoples attachment to words: After being taught arthapratisaraa in regard to attachment to letters and divisive discrimination, [a person] is completely liberated. (mdo sde, Ba, 288b12: yi ge dang rnam par rtog pa la chags zhen pa la don la rton pa bstan nas yongs su thar bar byed do ||). 17. Kualamlaparigraha, mdo sde, Nga, 120a16: sha radwa tii bu don phyin ci ma log par yang dag par sdus shig | gang gis yang dag par bsdu bar bya zhe na | don yang dag par bsdu bas yin gyi tshig bru yang dag par bsdu bas ni ma yin te | sha ra dwa tii bu byis pa rnams ni tshig brui rjes su brang ba yin gyi | mkhas pa rnams ni don gyi rjes su brang ba yin no || sha ra dwa tii bu tshig bru yang gang zhe na | sha ra dwa tii bu yi gei gzhi dang | rnam par rig byed kyi gzhi dang | mngon par brjod pai gzhi jug pai tshig bla dgas ni tshig bru zhes bya ste | shes byaam | rnam par shes byaam | yongs su shes bya gang ci yang rung ste | mngon par brjod pa dang | nges par brjod pa dang | gdags pa dang | [] sha ra dwa tii bu de ni tshig bru zhes byao || sha ra dwa tii bu de la don gang zhe na | [] sha ra dwa tii bu brjod du med pa ni don zhes bya ba ste | sha ra dwa tii bu gang di don zhes bya ba ji ltar byis pa rnams kyis bzung ba bzhin yin na ni tshig brur gyur gyi don ma yi par gyur ro || sha ra dwa tii bu de lta bas na don ni brjod du mi nus pao ||. 18. Brahmavieacintparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 76b34: don ni brjod du med pa ste | ji tsam du brjod pa de tsam du don med pao || don la rton pa yi ge la ma rton cig ces de gnyis de bzhin gshegs pa des bskul bar rig nas cang mi smra bar gyur to ||. 19. Akayamatinirdea, mdo sde, Ma, 149a7149b1, Braarvig 1988, 178: mdor na gang chos kyi phung po brgyad khri bzhi stong bstan pa di ni tshig bru zhes byao || gang sems can thams cad kyi skad dang | yi ge dang | tshig brus brjod du med pai don | de ni don te | di ni don la rton gyi tshig bru la mi rton pa zhes byao ||. The Sgaramatiparipcch also connects arthapratisaraa with arthas inexpressibility: The bodhisattva Sucintitrtha said: Blessed One, [one should] rely on meaning, not on letters; Blessed One, this is the true accomplishment of [the bodhisattva]: when a bodhisattva grasps the 84,000 collections of doctrines through the understanding that penetrates mean-
144
The Suvikrntadevaputraparipcch uses arthapratisaraa to connect meaning and inexpressibility in yet another way. It equates reliance on artha with knowledge that everything is ultimately inexpressible.20 As a consequence, it praises bodhisattvas who do not follow words at all:
The divine being asked: Majur, what constitutes bodhisattvas who rely on meaning? Majur replied: Divine being, when bodhisattvas know that all constituent factors (chos thams cad, *sarvadharma) are verbally inexpressible they are bodhisattvas who rely on meaning. [] The divine being asked: Majur, what constitutes bodhisattvas who speak according to the Buddhas teachings? Majur replied: Divine being, when bodhisattvas do not rely in any way on words they are bodhisattvas who speak according to the Buddhas teachings.21
The Vikurvarjaparipcch emphasizes the need to abstain from reliance on words in order to grasp the inexpressible meaning:
What is knowledge of meaning (don so so yang dag par rig pa) here? It is to rely on the meaning of the letters taught, and not to rely on the letters. Meaning is to view all constituent factors as they really are. Meaning is verbally inexpressible. Meaning cannot be forgotten (brjed ngas pa med), it coincides with absence of verbal diversity (tshig bru tha dad pa med pa nyid) and isolation from past or future utterances. People should not rely on meaning illuminated [by] letters [].22
The Lakvatra,23 nally, holds that reliance on words precludes realization:

ing and, despite teaching, does not move away from the inexpressible true meaning . (mdo sde, Pha, 99a24: byang chub sems dpa don legs sems kyis gsol pa | bcom ldan das don la rton pa lags kyi tshig bru la ma lags te |bcom ldan das byang chub sems dpa gang don gyi rjes su zhugs pai blos chos kyi phung po brgyad khri bzhi stong kun tu dzin pa dang ston par bgyid kyang yang dag pai don brjod du ma mchis pa de las kyang mi g.yo ba di ni dei sgrub pa yang dag pa lags so ||). The Sarvapuyasamuccayasamdhi expresses a similar idea: Again, what is free from the support of letters is meaning and this meaning is the meaning that is not verbally expressible. When [a bodhisattva] relies on meaning there is no dharma whatsoever, no meaning whatsoever. (mdo sde, Na, 102b67: yang tshig bru dmigs su med pa de ni don yin la | don de yang brjod du med pai don yin no || don la rton pa la ni chos kyang ci yang med do || don kyang ci yang med do ||). Later in the text, arthapratisaraa is connected with the problem of reication: see infra note 58. Suvikrntadevaputraparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 110b5111a2: lhai bus smras pa | jam dpal ji ltar na byang chub sems dpa sems dpa chen po thos pas don la rton pa rnams yin | jam dpal gyis smras pa | lhai bu gang gi tshe byang chub sems dpa sems dpa chen po rnams chos thams cad brjod du med par shes par byed pa de lta na lhai bu byang chub sems dpa sems dpa chen po thos pas don la rton pa rnams yin no | [] lhai bus smras pa | jam dpal ji ltar na byang chub sems dpa sems dpa chen po sangs rgyas bcom ldan das rnams kyis gsungs pa bzhin du smra ba rnams yin | jam dpal gyis smras pa | lhai bu gang gi tshe byang chub sems dpa sems dpa chen po rnams sgra thams cad la rten par mi byed pa de lta na lhai bu byang chub sems dpa sems dpa chen po sangs rgyas bcom ldan das rnams kyis gsungs pa bzhin du smra ba rnams yin no ||. The Brahmavieacintparipcch establishes a similar connection between detachment from language and adherence to Buddhist teachings: When [people] do not pursue letters then [they] act according to the precepts [] when [people] do not collect letters then [they] act according to the precepts. (mdo sde, Ba, 64a24: gang yi gei rjes su mi snyegs na de ltar na bka bzhin du byed pa yin no || [] gang tshig rnams dang thun par mi byed na | de ltar na bka bzhin byed pa yin no ||). Vikurvarjaparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 198a2-4: de la don so so yang dag par rig pa gang zhe na | tshig bru bshad pa thams cad don nyid la rton pa yin gyi tshig bru la rton pa ma yin pa ste | don ces bya ba ni chos thams cad yang dag pa nyid du du shes pao || don ces bya ba ni di lta ste | brjod du med pao || brjed ngas pa med cing tshig bru tha dad pa med pa nyid dang | sngon gyi mtha dang | phyi mai mthai sgra las dben pa nyid dang | de ni don ces byao || tshig bru gsal bai don la ni brten par mi bya [] ||. My translations of extracts from the Lakvatra are mostly based on Nanjios and Tokiwas
20.
21.
22.
23.
Ligeia Lugli
A bodhisattva should rely on meaning and should not rely on words. Respectable men and women (kulaputro v kuladuhit) who follow the letters remove themselves from paramrtha and do not help others realize [it].24
145
All these extracts establish an unbridgeable gulf between words and meaning. But no stra spells out the reason for this divide. They do, however, provide several clues that might help understand their position. The richest source is the Lakvatra. This is the only text to discuss the issue repeatedly and at length. It is, hence, the best point of departure for our investigation.
RUTA AND ARTHA IN THE LAKVATRA

The Lakvatra contains the most articulate discussion of the contrast between ruta and artha. Unlike other sources, it acknowledges a correlation between words and meaning. Yet, the stra deplores the common practice to understand artha through words. Infernal rebirth and uninterrupted sasric experience await those who indulge in such mistake. Artha, it holds, must be realized in secluded meditation, not through verbal understanding:
Mahmati, what is language (ruta) here? Language is the combination of discriminative conceptualization, speech and letters (vgakaravikalpasamyoga) which is issued from teeth, jaw, palate, tongue, lips and throat and is caused by the karmic mutual traces (vsan) of talking and discriminative conceptualization (vikalpa).25 Then again, Mahmati, what is meaning (artha)? A bodhisattva skilled in meaning is [a bodhisattva] who advances on the path of meaning (arthalakaagati) through the stages (bhmi) and other different states (sthnntaraviea) which
Sanskrit editions. Both pose signicant philological problems, but are the only complete editions available to date. A thorough analysis of their shortcomings would transcend the scope of this paper. Hence, I limit philological discussions to cases where textual diculties aect my argument. On these occasions I consult also the Chinese and Tibetan versions (Taish 670, 671, 672; mdo sde, Ca, 192a284b) as well as Yasuis proposed emendations to Nanjio (Yasui 1976, 336346). When divergences between Tokiwa and Nanjio are minor or not signicant for my study I report both versions without comments. I place the reading that I adopt in the main body of the Sanskrit quotation; the other appears in square brackets. In most cases, I follow Nanjios edition. Tokiwas emendations usually consist of reconstructions which, although ingenious, are solely based on Guabhadras translation. There are, however, occasions where Tokiwas reading is substantiated by textual evidence (see infra notes 34, 40) or is overwhelmingly preferable on contextual grounds (see infra notes 24, 25, 78). 24. Lakvatra, Tokiwa 278/Nanjio 194195: arthapratiaraena mahmate bodhisattvena mahsattvena bhavitavya na vyajanapratiaraena / vyajannusr mahmate kulaputro v kuladuhit v svtmna ca nayati paramrtht [Nanjio (195 note 2): parmrthn] par ca nvabodhayati /. See also Tokiwa 323324/Nanjio 223224: infra note 69. 25. Here I follow Tokiwas edition. Tokiwa proposes to emend Nanjios vgakarasayogavikalpa with vgakaravikalpasayoga. Tokiwa bases this emendation only on Guabhadras rendition of the compound as (see Tokiwa, 212 note 87; and Taish 670 500b23). Both Bodhirucis and the Tibetan versions support Nanjios vgakarasayogavikalpa (Taish 671 543c16: ; mdo sde, Ca, 116b3: tshig dang yi ger phrad pai rnam par rtog pa yin te). The context, however, corroborates Tokiwas interpretation. According to Nanjios edition, the text would dene ruta as vikalpa and would describe vikalpa, in turn, as issued from teeth, jaw, palate, tongue, lips and throat (vgakarasayogavikalpa dantahanutlujihva uhapuavinista). This contradicts the stras denition of vikalpa. The Lakvatra holds vikalpa necessary to assign names (see infra notes 110, 113). It is unlikely that it coincides with ruta here. Moreover, vikalpa is a mental activity. It is not related to the speech organs. It is, therefore, preferable to follow Tokiwa here and read vgakaravikalpasayoga.
146

are the scope of ones inner path (svapratytmagatigocara). [This happens] once [the bodhisattva] has entered the road to the city of nirva through his own understanding, following the attainment of the reversion of the basis for karmic traces (vsanrayaparvtti). Moreover, Mahmati, a bodhisattva skilled in language and meaning considers language to be neither the same nor different from meaning; and meaning [to be neither the same nor different] from language. If, Mahmati, language was different from meaning, the manifestation of meaning would be brought about without language; meaning [instead] is accessed through language like a treasure [is found] with a lamp. Like a man, Mahmati, after taking a lamp would look at a treasure [and think] This is my treasure, with such form and in this place, so, Mahmati, bodhisattvas who are free from speech and discriminative conceptualization (vgvikalpa) enter the inner path [to realization] with the lamp of speech, discriminative conceptualization and language (vgvikalparutapradpena).26 Moreover, Mahmati, because of the attachment based on clinging to the meaning of [expressions like] [all dharmas are]27 undestroyed, unoriginated, naturally extinguished, triple vehicle, single vehicle, mind, inherent essence (svabhva) and so forth, as it [emerges from] language (yathruta), one falls into the views of reication and detraction (samroppavdadi). [...] Having discriminated (vikalpitv) reality (dharmat)28 as it [emerges from] language (yathruta) they reify (samropenti) [it]; and because of that reication, they fall into infernal dwellings.29
26. Tokiwa omits the sentence adyath mahmate kacideva purua pradpa ghtv dhanamavalokayedida me dhanamevavidhamasminpradea iti evameva mahmate vgvikalparutapradpena bodhisattv mahsattv vgvikalparahit svapratytmryagatimanupravianti because it does not appear in Guabhadras version (see Tokiwa, 213 note 95). All other redactions include this sentence (see Taish 671 543c28544a01; Taish 672 610a20610a22; mdo sde, Ca, 116b6117a1). 27. The following set of three adjectives display plural endings. The noun they refer to, however, is left unexpressed. A parallel passage from the Sadhinirmocana suggests that the implicit noun probably is sarvadharma (Sadhinirmocana, mdo sde, Ca, 21a2, Lamotte 1935, 77: see infra note 61). 28. Tokiwa (214) emends Nanjios reading samropenti dharmatm (156) with samropayanti dharmn. He thus shifts the object of reication from reality to constituent factors. Tokiwas emendation is based on Guabhadras and Bodhirucis Chinese rendition of the phrase with (see Tokiwa, 214 note 97; Taish 671 544a08; Taish 670 500c09). Nanjios reading is preferable, because samropenti is lectio dicilior. The sentence in question occurs in a verse and the Middle Indic form of the denominative in -eti (or -ati in some variant readings) occurs only in the stras verses. In prose parts only the sanskritized form -ayati is attested. For metric reasons, to keep samropenti implies maintaining also dharmatm instead of dharmn. This reading is also supported by the Tibetan (mdo sde, Ca, 117a3: chos nyid la yang sgro dogs te ||). 29. Tokiwa 212214/Nanjio 154156: tatra ruta mahmate katamad yaduta vgakaravikalpasayogo [Nanjio: vgakarasayogavikalpa] dantahanutlujihvauhapuavinista parasparajalpavikalpav sanhetuko rutam ity ucyate / tatrrtha punar mahmate katamo yaduta rtacintbhvanmayy prajayaiko rahogato nirvapuragmimrga svabuddhy vsanrayaparvttiprvaka svapraty tmagatigocarabhmisthnntaravierthalakaagati pravicrayan bodhisattvo mahsattvorthakualo bhavati // punar aparam mahmate rutrthakualo bodhisattvo mahsattvo rutam arthd nnyan [Nanjio: anyan] nnanyad iti samanupayati artha ca rutt / yadi ca punar mahmate rutam arthd anyad syd arutrthbhivyaktihetuka syt sa crtho rutennupraviyate pradpeneva dhanam [Tokiwa: rpam] / tadyath mahmate kacideva purua pradpa ghtv dhanamavalokayedida me dhanamevavidhamasminpradea iti evameva mahmate vgvikalparutapradpena bodhisattv mahsattv vgvikalparahit svapratytmryagatimanupravianti // punar apara mahmate aniruddh anutpann praktiparinirvts triyna ekayna ca [Nanjio: paca-] citta svabhvdiu yathrutrthbhinivea prattybhiniveata samroppavdadipatito bhavati / [] yathruta vikalpitv samropenti dharmatm [Tokiwa: samropayanti dharmn] / te ca vai tatsamaropt patanti naraklaye //.
Ligeia Lugli
147
The simile of the lamp is, perhaps, the only concession to the value of language in the entire text. More frequently, the Lakvatra links verbalization to the illusory aspect of reality (parikalpitasvabhva), holds it responsible for the unfolding of sasra and generally insists on the pitfalls of reliance on ruta.30 Here, the main consequence of interpreting artha through ruta is reication (samropa). Elsewhere,31 the stra forecasts worse outcomes for such practice. Widening the gap between words and meaning, the Lakvatra warns that attempts to access artha through language would preclude understanding of the ultimate. Its discussion opens with the synonymy of anutpdnirodha (the non-arising and non-perishing of all constituent factors) and the tathgata. Non-arising and non-perishing, we are told, is one of the innumerable words that designate the Buddha. This observation develops into a reection on the scope and nature of meaning:
Mahmati, non-arising is a synonym for the tathgata. Mahmati, it is like [the names] Indra, akra and Pudara; hand, palm, extremity; body, physique, physical structure; earth, ground, soil; or air, sky, atmosphere. Many words are discriminated (vikalpita) as synonymous expressions for each of these entities (bhva). But it is not that the entities are many because the names are many; nor is it that they have no essence (svabhva) [at all]. So, Mahmati, I also come within the range of hearing of ordinary folk in the world with innumerable hundreds of thousands of names (tribhir nmsakhyeyaatasahasrair). With these [names] they talk about me. But they do not know that these [names] are synonyms for the tathgata. Some people know me as the tathgata. Some call me [] moon (soma), sun (bhskara), Rma, Vysa, uka, Indra, Bali or Varua. Others call me non-arising and nonperishing, emptiness, truth, reality, reality-limit (bhtakoi), dharmadhtu, nirva [].32 [Common people] are not skilled in the meaning of words and in the science of language (nirukti); they do not discern the designations [properly]. They do not know how to understand [the teachings] by themselves. As they are attached to the recitations of the words of the teachings, they conceptualize non-arising and non-perishing as inexistence; not as [just] another name, expression or synonym for the tathgata, [as with] Indra, akra and Pudara. They do not apply themselves to the consolidation of the method of personal realization33 (svanayap
30. See, for instance, Tokiwa 35/Nanjio 40; Tokiwa 92/Nanjio 76; Tokiwa 113/Nanjio 87; Tokiwa 324/Nanjio 223; Tokiwa 326/Nanjio 225. 31. Tokiwa 270282/Nanjio 191197. 32. Tokiwa omits ukamindra bali (see Tokiwa 279 note 39). 33. I interpret svanaya as a short form for svasiddhantanaya. This claries the sense of the sentence. My interpretation is supported by the occurrence of svasiddhantanaya in a similar passage from the same stra: Further, Mahmati, ordinary folk who dance the wicked dance of self discrimination because of beginningless dierentiation (prapaca) are not skilled in the teaching about the method of personal realization (svasiddhntanaya). They stick to the [apparent] characteristics of external entities which are [merely] a vision of their own mind. They stick to the verbal teachings (deanpha) which are [merely] an expedient (upya). They do not thoroughly consider the personal realization (svasiddhnta) which is free from the method of the four assertions (ctukoi). (Tokiwa 238 Nanjio 171: punar aparam mahmate blaptagjan andi klaprapacadauhulyasvaprativikalpannake ntyanta svasiddhntanayadeanym akual s vacittadyabhyabhvalakabhinivi upyadeanpham abhiniviante na svasiddhntanaya ctukoikanayaviuddha prativibhvayanti /). Tokiwa translates svanayapratyavasthnanihm with: they are not acquainted with their own directive principles (Tokiwa, 2003 translation, 364). Suzuki appears to interpret svanaya as meaning self standing truth (Suzuki 1999b, 166: They have no condence in the texts where the self-standing truth is revealed, since in their study of all things follow mere words as expressed in the texts [...]).
148

ratyavasthnanihm),34 because for all dharmas35 they follow the meaning derived from the words of the recited [texts] (yathrutrthapha). So these deluded people say: As the words are, so is meaning: meaning is not different from words. Why? Since meaning is incorporeal, it is not different from words: words coincide with meaning. Their understanding is immature because they do not know the nature (svabhva) of words. They do not know that meaning does not arise and perish as words do (yath rutam utpannapradhvasy artho nutpannapradhvas). Mahmati, words are included within the scope of letters. Meaning is not included within the scope of letters (ruta mahmate akarapatitam artho nakarapatita). Since it is neither existent nor inexistent, [meaning] is unborn and incorporeal. The tathgatas, Mahmati, do not teach a Dharma that is included within the scope of letters. [...]. A bodhisattva should rely on meaning and should not rely on words. Respectable men and women (kulaputro v kuladuhit) who follow the letters remove themselves from paramrtha and do not make others realize [it]. [] Reality (tattva), here, means suchness (tathtvam), unfailingness, reality, absence of effort and abandonment, extinction of all differentiations (sarvaprapacopaama). So, respectable men and women should not be skilled in adhering to the meaning derived from words (yathrutrthbhinivea) because reality is devoid of letters. They should not look at the nger: Mahmati, it is if a person indicates something to someone with a nger and that one would turn to look at the ngertip. Just so, like children, ordinary folk once they have become xated to [the meaning] derived from words [a practice that is like] xating the ngertip(yathrutgulygrbhinivebhinivi) will keep doing so all the time and will not reach paramrtha after abandoning the meaning derived from ngertip-like words. []. Meaning, Mahmati, is isolated (vivikta)36
34. I follow Tokiwas reading nihm instead of Nanjios pham. Nihm ts the context better and is supported by Guabhadras and the Tibetan versions (See Tokiwa, 275 note 43). 35. The stra is probably playing here with the polysemy of the term dharma. Reference to Indras various names leads one to think that dharmas indicate entities. The subsequent allusion to textual recitation, instead, calls for interpreting dharmas as doctrines. 36. Vivikta is a dicult term. Despite its ubiquity in Mahyna stras, its technical meaning and philosophical implications remain obscure. Here, it is contrasted with connection, sabaddha (artha vivikto [...] ruta vikalpasabaddha). It is, hence, likely to mean absence of connection: isolation. But it is certain to carry also a more profound connotation. Some Mahyna stras hold vivikta to be quasi-synonym of nya (see, for instance, Suvikrntadevaputraparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 134b6135a6: The divine being said: Majur, what is the dierence between emptiness and isolation (bden pa nyid, *viviktat)? Majur replied: Divine being, what is the dierence between space and space? The divine being said: Majur, there is no difference at all. Majur: Divine being, in the same way, there is also no dierence at all between emptiness and isolation. lhai bus smras pa | jam dpal stong pa nyid dang dben pa nyid la tha dad du bya ba ci yod | jam dpal gyis smras pa | lhai bu nam mkha dang nam mkha la tha dad du bya ba ci yod | lhai bus smras pa | jam dpal tha dad du bya ba chung zad kyang med do || jam dpal gyis smras pa | lhai bu de bzhin du stong pa nyid dang | dben pa nyid la yang tha dad du bya ba chung zad kyang med do ||; Ratnakaraa, mdo sde, Ja, 250b25: see infra note 92). Conceptual proximity to emptiness explains why vivikta often appears as an attribute for the ultimate status of all constituent factors (see, for instance, Sarvapuyasamuccayasamdhi, mdo sde, Na, 102b7-103a3: see infra note 75; Brahmavieacintparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 32b3; Dharmasagti, mdo sde, Zha, 47b2; Ratnolkadhra, mdo sde, Pa, 43a35; Sgaramatiparipcch, mdo sde, Pha, 47a2; Sarvadharmapravttinirdea, mdo sde, Ma, 281b7282a1). The stras do not, however, spell out the reason why vivikta would be similar to nya. Conze suggests that isolation accounts for dharmas unorigination (and hence for their emptiness): A dharma is called empty when one considers that it has no properties, isolated when one considers that it has no relations to other dharmas. As, isolated, dharmas cannot act on each other, and, therefore, they are not made or produced. (Conze 1953, 123). Zacchetti, in contrast, highlights the connection between vivikta and tranquillity (anta) (Zacchetti 2005, 331332 note 36). Much more work
Ligeia Lugli
and the cause of nirva;37 words are connected with discriminative conceptualization (vikalpa) and bring about sasra (ruta vikalpasabaddha sasrvhaka).38 Meaning is attained through the company of learned people. Learned people are skilled in meaning, not in words. Here, to be skilled in meaning is to [hold] a view that is not inuenced by the philosophers doctrines (trthakaravda). When a person ruins neither himself nor others (svaya ca na patati parca na ptayati), then that person is learned in the true meaning. Therefore, aspirants to meaning join those [learned people skilled in meaning];39 seekers of reality steer clear of the opposite, [that is of] those who adhere to the meaning derived from words.40
149
needs to be done to clarify the meaning of this dicult term. 37. The Lakvatra denes nirva as cessation of discriminating mental cognition (Tokiwa 166/ Nanjio 126: vikalpasya monovijnasya vyvttir nirvam it[i]; see also Tokiwa 128/Nanjio 98; Tokiwa 259/Nanjio 185; Tokiwa 305306/Nanjio 212). It repeatedly identies the causes of nirva with the reversion (parvtti) of cognition (Tokiwa 67/Nanjio 6162; Tokiwa 285-286/ Nanjio 200) and with tathgatagarbha (Tokiwa 341/Nanjio 236; Tokiwa 351/Nanjio 242). These two concepts coalesce. Tathgatagarbha emerges only when vijnaparvtti occurs. When cognition functions normally, the tathgatagarbha takes the form of layavijna (Tokiwa 317319/Nanjio 220221). Artha as the cause of nirva, here, suggests that it coincides with reversion of cognition and tathgatagarbha. 38. Tokiwa proposes to read ruta vikalpasabaddha vikalpa sasrvhaka instead of ruta vikalpasabaddha sasrvhakam, following Guabhadras rendition of the phrase as (see Tokiwa, 281, note 63). I doubt that such interpolation is needed. Nanjios reading is supported by the other Chinese and Tibetan translations and does not pose problems of interpretation (see Taish 672 616b01: ; mdo sde, Ca, 134a1: sgra ni rnam par rtog pa dang brel pa ste | khor ba thob par byed do |. Bodhirucis version diers from the Sanskrit but still shows that ruta is the subject of the entire sentence: see Taish 671 0552a05: ). 39. The compound bahurutyrthakaualy is added in Tokiwas edition (see Tokiwa, 282 note 65). 40. Lakvatra, Tokiwa 272281/Nanjio, 192197: so nutpdas tathgatasyaitan mahmate paryyavacanam / tadyath mahmate indra akra pudara hasta kara pis tanur deha arra pthiv bhmir vasaudhar kham kam gaganam ityevam dyn bhvnm ekaikasya bhvasya bhava paryyavcak abd bhavanti vikalpit na cai nmabahutvd bhvabahutva vikalpyate na ca svabhvo na bhavati / eva mahmate aham api sahy lokadhtau tribhir nmsakhyeyaatasahasrair blan ravavabhsam gacchmi tai cbhilapanti m na ca prajnanti tathgatasyaite nmaparyy iti / tatra kecin mahmate tathgatam iti m saprajnanti / kecitsvayabhuvamity [] soma bhskara rma vysa ukamindra bali varuam iti caike sajnanti / apare nirodhnutpda [Tokiwa: nirodham anutpda] nyat satyat bhtat bhtakoi dharmadhtu [Tokiwa: dharmasvabhva] nirva [] iti caieke sajnanti / [] padrthaniruktyakual abhinnasaj na svanaya prajnanti deanrutaphbhinivi anirodhnutpdam abhva kalpayiyanti na ca tathgatanmapadaparyyntara indraakrapuradara [Tokiwa: paryyntara prajnanti indraakrapuradara iveti] na svanayapratyavasthnanihm [Nanjio: pham] adhimokanti yathrutrthaphnusritvt sarvadharmm / eva ca mahmate vakyanti te mohapuru yathruta evrtho nanyo rtho rutd iti / tat kasya hetor yadutrthasyarratvd rutd anyo rtho na bhavati / ki tu rutam evrtha iti rutasvabhvparijnd avidagdhabuddhaya / na tv eva jsyanti mahmate yath rutam utpannapradhvasy artho nutpannapradhvas / ruta mahmate akarapatitam artho nakarapatita / bhvbhvavivarjitatvd ajanmarram / na ca mahmate tathgat akarapatita dharma deayanti / [] arthapratiaraena mahmate bodhisattvena mahsattvena bhavitavya na vyajanapratiaraena / vyajannusr mahmate kulaputro v kuladuhit v svtmna ca nayati paramrtht [Nanjio (195 note 2): parmrthn] par ca nvabodhayati / [] tatra tathtvam ananyathtva tattvam [Tokiwa: tathtvam] anyhniryhalakaa sarvaprapacopaama tattvam [Tokiwa: tathtvam] ityucyate / tena na mahmate kulaputrea v kuladuhitr v yathrutrthbhiniveakualena [Tokiwa: yathrutagrahbhiniveena] bhavitavyam / nirakaratvt tattvasya / na cgulipraksakena bhavitavyam / tadyath mahmate aguly kacit kasyacit kicid darayet sa cgulyagram eva pratisared vkitum evam eva mahmate blajty iva blapthagjanavarg ya thrutgulyagrbhinivebhinivi eva kla kariyanti na yathrutgulyagrrtha [Tokiwa: yathrutgulyagra] hitv paramrtham [Tokiwa: parmatattvrtham] gamiyanti / [] artho [Tokiwa:
150
The text identies three issues that separate meaning from words. First, there is a discrepancy in nature. Words are subject to arising and perishing; meaning transcends both.41 Second, there is a discrepancy in substance. Meaning is different from words, as the moon from the ngertip. This may be related to the abhidharmic discussion about the inexpressibility of referents. Words, the argument goes, do not manifest objects, otherwise to utter re would burn the speakers mouth.42 Similarly, our stra states that one should not rely on words because reality is devoid of letters (nirakaratvt tattvasya). It does not mean that reality is ineffable, but that it is not contained in words.43 Third, ruta and artha differ in the effect they cause. Language brings about sasra, meaning causes nirva. Clearly, meaning and words are not homologous. This, however, does not explain why ruta fails to convey artha. Nor does it account for the adverse consequences of deriving meaning from words. Context reveals the main reason for the ruta/artha divide. The discussion of words and meaning serves to highlight the synonymy of a variety of words with the term tathgata. This synonymy is not intuitive. The individual meanings of the expressions deemed to designate the tathgata differ signicantly. Synonyms include disparate nouns, including sameness (samat), Vysa, sun (bhskara) and moon (soma). The heterogeneity of the list indicates perhaps that all words are synonymous with the term tathgata. This, however, is uncertain. The list draws mainly on religious terminology. It comprises appellations for spiritual leaders, names of deities and doctrinal concepts. The stra might, therefore, seek to establish the tathgata as the universal referent for terms that pertain to the spiritual sphere only; not for words that cover other semantic elds. On the other hand, the list does not aim to be exhaustive. The designations for the tathgata are held to be innumerable. Thus, any word could indicate the tathgata. In either case, it posits that innumerable different designations converge into one single artha. The conventional referent of each term, the stra holds, is not the real
tattvrtho] mahmate vivikto nirvahetu / ruta vikalpasabaddha sasrvhakam [Tokiwa: vikalpa sasrvhaka] / arthaca [Tokiwa: tattvrthaca] mahmate bahurutn sakllabhyate / bhurutya ca nma mahmate yaduta arthakaualya na rutakaualyam / tatrrthakaualya yatsarvatrthakaravdsasa daranam yad svaya ca na patati parca na ptayati / eva satyarthe mahmate bhurutya bhavati / tasmd arthakmena te [Tokiwa: bahurutyrthakaualy] sevany ato vipart ye yathrutrthbhinivis [Tokiwa: yathrutbhinivis] te varjanys tattvnvei //. 41. Lakvatra, Tokiwa 275276/Nanjio 193194: na tv eva jsyanti mahmate yath rutam utpannapradhvasy artho nutpannapradhvas / ruta mahmate akarapatitam artho nakarapatita / bhvbhvavivarjitatvd ajanmarram /. The stra makes the same point in the discussion of paramrtha: Moreover, Mahmati, verbalization is originated and destroyed, unsteady, dependently originated from causes and conditions. Mahmati, what is dependently originated from causes and conditions does not shed light on the ultimate (paramrtha). (Tokiwa 113/Nanjio 87: vacana punar mahmate utpannapradhvasi capala paraspara pratyayahetusamutpanna yacca mahmate paraspara pratyayahetusamutpanna tat paramrtha noddyotayati [Nanjio: nodbhvatyati] /). 42. For a discussion of the issue in abhidharmic context and references to the Abhidharmvatra, Mahvibhastra and Nyynusra see Dhammajoti 2007a, 406; Cox 1995, 381, 401 notes 23 and 26. 43. The same idea emerges from a passage on paramrtha: Neither verbalization nor what is expressed by verbalization is the ultimate (paramrtha) (Tokiwa 113/Nanjio 87: na mahmate vacana paramrtha na ca yad vacanenbhilapyate sa paramrtha /).
Ligeia Lugli
151
meaning. It is merely the meaning derived from words, the yathrutrtha. The use of the expression yathrutrtha in the Lakvatra allows us to clarify the distinction between meaning derived from words and real artha. Two features consistently accompany this expression in the stra. First, it is loaded with a negative denotation. Second, it is usually associated with plurality.44 In the section on fetters (sadhi), for instance, adhesion to meaning derived from words (yathrutrthbhinivea) triggers attachment to all sorts of diverse notions.45 In the passage on the denition of ruta and artha, fondness for yathrutrtha preludes to reication (samropa) of a multitude of doctrinal terms.46 In our extract, meaning derived from words produces the illusion that different terms have different referents and thus hinders understanding of their synonymy with tathgata. A clear pattern emerges from these three examples. To derive artha from ruta induces people to believe that terminological diversity corresponds to ontological multiplicity. Lexical variety, thus, is the key to the ruta/artha contrast here. Verbal abundance obstructs access to the single true artha shared by a multiplicity of terms. Abstention from the common practice of understanding artha through ruta leads to realization of the fundamental identity of words and reveals their true meaning.47
MULTIFARIOUS WORDS, UNIQUE MEANING

The proposition that the plurality of words veils the singularity of meaning might, at rst, seem far fetched. The idea that all words share a unique referent sounds preposterous. Verbal communication owes its efciency to words ability to designate different objects. Textual evidence, however, supports this interpretation. Several stras point to a tension between the illusory plurality expressed through words and the singularity of artha. The Sarvapuyasamuccayasamdhi, for instance, holds that terminological diversity masks the sameness of the underlying referent:
Nryaa said: Master (rigs kyi bu), what is the distinction between the common peoples qualities (chos rnams) and the Buddhas qualities? Are they different? Vimalatejas said: In names they are different, in artha (don)48 they are not
44. The section on the simile of the sands of the Ganges constitutes the only exception. Here, yathrutrthagrahaa refers to the erroneous practice of interpreting metaphors literally (see Tokiwa 331332/Nanjio 229). 45. Tokiwa 221224/Nanjio 160162. 46. Tokiwa 213/Nanjio 155: see supra note 29. 47. Lamotte describes a similar tendency to reduce dierent terms to one meaning in the Pli suttas (Lamotte 1949, 344). Two fundamental dierences must, however, be noted. First, the suttas usually state that in one sense both meaning and words dier, but in another way meaning is the same and only the words are dierent (see, for instance, the Mahvedallasutta, Majjhima Nikya I 297: Atthi kho [] pariyyo ya pariyya gamma ime dhamm nnah ceva nnbyajan ca atthi ca kho [...] pariyyo yam payya gamma ime dhamm ekah byajanam eva nna. See also Cox 1995, 382, 402 notes 3031). Thus, there is no particular contrast between the singularity of meaning and the plurality of words. Second, the abundance of verbal expression is not, to my knowledge, considered an obstruction to the understanding of meaning. 48. For a discussion of the sense of the term artha in this passage see infra note 74.
152
different.49
For the Vikurvarjaparipcch, meaning does not emerge from the variety of words; it springs from understanding their sameness:
People must not rely on the meaning indicated by words. On the contrary, the sameness of words is what constitutes meaning: this is what is called knowledge of meaning (don so so yang dag par rig pa).50
The Samdhirja establishes that the diversity represented in language is misleading since all words spoken by the Buddha share the same inexpressible artha:
Many inconceivable constituent factors are shown through language; a person who adheres to language would not know allusive speech. [] The discourses that I have spoken in the thousand worlds have a single meaning [expressed] in various words; [this meaning] cannot be verbally proclaimed.51
The Akayamatinirdea contrasts the plurality of doctrines indicated by words with the single doctrine realized through meaning:
Letters are what verbally expresses qualities and benets of nirva. Meaning is what naturally does not discriminate (rnam par rtog, *vi kp) between all the qualities of nirva. Letters teach the doctrinal vehicles (theg pa) in terms of dierentiation. Meaning does not divide the dharmadhtu; it constitutes access to the single vehicle.52
The Sadhinirmocana, nally, links lexical diversity and meaning derived from words with reication and conceptualization of plurality:
Avalokitevara, in the rvakayna, I taught the inherent essence (ngo bo nyid, *svabhva) of the various constituent factors, namely the ve aggregates, the
49. Sarvapuyasamuccayasamdhi, mdo sde, Na, 102b12: sred med kyi bus smras pa | rigs kyi bu so soi skye boi chos rnams dang | sangs rgyas kyi chos rnams la khyad par ni ci zhig yod | tha dad du dbye ba ni ci zhig yod | dri ma med pai gzi brjid kyis smras pa | ming la ni tha dad du dbye ba yod kyi don la ni tha dad du ni dbye ba med do ||. Outside our usual sources, the same idea is expressed in the Ratnagotravibhga: Therefore, riputra, the realm of beings (sattvadhtu) and the body of Dharma (dharmakya) are not dierent from each other. The realm of beings is just the body of the Dharma and the body of Dharma is just the realm of beings. These two are non-dual in meaning; they are dierentianted merely in letters. (Ratnagotravibhga, Johnston 1950, 41: tasmcchriputra nnya sattvadhturnnyo dharmakya / sattvadhtureva dharmakya / dharmakya eva sattvadhtu / advayametadarthena / vyajanamtrabheda iti /). 50. Vikurvarjaparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 198a4: tshig bru gsal bai don la ni brten par mi byai || gang tshig bru mnyam pa de ni don yin te | de ni don so so yang dag par rig pa zhes byao ||. See also mdo sde, Ba, 198a2-4: see supra note 22. 51. Samdhirja, XXXII, 3 and 5, Vaidya 1961, 195: bahavo cintiy dharm ye abdena prakit / yastatra niviecchabde sadhbhya na jnati // [] lokadhtusahasreu ye may stra bhit / nnvyajana ekrth na akya parikrtitum //. See also Samdhirja, XII, 3, Vaidya 1961, 76: [The intelligent bodhisattva] knows all constituent factors to possess a single artha and emptiness to consist of unicity. Artha is not manifold, [the bodhisattva] is trained in the single artha of these [constituent factors]. (ekrtha sarvadharmn prajnati ca nyat sa ekam / nnrthu nsti te ekrthe ikito bhavati //). 52. Akayamatinirdea, mdo sde, Ma, 148b23, Braarvig 1988, 176-177: tshig bru zhes bya ba ni gang mya ngan las das pai yon tan dang phan yon brjod pao || don ces bya ba ni gang rang bzhin gyis mya ngan las das pai chos thams cad la rnam par mi rtog pao || tshig bru zhes bya ba ni gang theg pa ji ltar rnam par bzhag pa bzhin du ston pao || don ces bya ba ni gang chos kyi dbyings dbyer med cing tshul gcig pa la jug pa zhes byao ||.
Ligeia Lugli
six internal and the six external sense faculties, and so on. In the Mahyna I have taught these same constituent factors as the dharmadhtu (chos kyi dbyings). Therefore, I do not say that the vehicles are multifarious. Those who discriminatively conceptualize about meaning according to words in some cases reify, in some cases detract, but [always] discriminatively conceptualize (rnam par rtog par byed) the vehicles as multifarious.53
153
These extracts agree with the Lakvatra. First, they show that a contrast between semantic singularity and verbal plurality catalyses the opposition of artha and ruta. The Vikurvarjaparpcch and Samdhirja support the idea that the variety of conventional words referents hinders realization of artha. The Akayamatinirdea and Sarvapuyasamuccayasamdhi highlight the correlation between the ruta/artha divide and the polarity of differentiation/undifferentiation. Second, the Sadhinirmocana conrms that meaning derived from words leads to the reication of a multitude of concepts. Careful consideration of the ontological implications of artha reveals that these issues are closely connected.
FROM SEMANTICS TO ONTOLOGY

The shift from semantics to ontology is not as abrupt as it might appear. Our stras are the product of a culture permeated by semantic realism, where words stand for object-referents. It is generally agreed that, irrespective of sectarian afliation, Indian philosophy up to the end of the rst millennium CE held verbal expressions to be referential.54 Our sources do not explicitly discuss such theory. From their scattered references it emerges that they regard this as the commonly accepted, but erroneous, interpretation of meaning. Ubiquitous emphasis on the purely nominal nature of designated objects attests to the stras preoccupation with realist semantics. The Brahmavieacintparipcchs explanation of nirva as mere name (nmamtra), for one, implies the assumption that ordinary people consider words to designate substantial referents:
Even if a person were to run in the ten directions calling the name of space, he would not nd space. Even if a person were to move within space he would not see it. Why? What is called space is only a name. Master, in the same manner, these monks, too, search for nirva as something substantial. Although they exert in nirva, they neither see nor realize it. Why? Master, nirva is only a name. Just like space, even though it is referred to as space, is inapprehensible; in the same way nirva, even though it is referred to as nirva, is inapprehensible.55
53. Sadhinirmocana, mdo sde, Ca, 48b12, Lamotte 1935, 147: spyan ras gzigs dbang phyug ngas nyan thos kyi theg par chos sna tshogs kyi ngo bo nyid di lta ste | phung po lnga dang | nang gi skye mched drug dang | phyi rol gyi skye mched drug dang | de dag la sogs pa gang dag bstan pa de dag nyid ngas theg pa chen por chos kyi dbyings tshul gcig par bstan pas bshad de | dei phyir nga ni theg pa tha dad par mi smrao || de la gang dag don la sgra ji bzhin kho nar rnam par rtog pa kha cig ni sgro dogs par byed | kha cig ni skur pa debs par byed cing theg pa tha dad pa nyid du rnam par rtog par yang byed de |. 54. See Sideritis 1986, 82; Ganeri 1995, and 2006, 912. 55. Brahmavieacintparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 34a25: phyogs dang phyogs mtshams su rgyug cing ji tsam nas nam mkhai ming nas brjod kyang nam mkha mi rnyed do || de nam mkha de nyid kyi nang nas gro yang de mi mthong ngo || de cii phyir zhe na | gang nam mkha zhes bya ba di ni ming tsam mo | rigs kyi bu de bzhin du dge slong di dag kyang mya ngan las das pa dngos por tshol te | mya ngan las das pa de nyid la rnam par spyod kyang de mi mthong khong du mi chud do || de cii phyir zhe na | rigs kyi bu gang mya ngan las das pa zhes bya ba de ni ming tsam mo || ji ltar nam mkha nam mkha zhes
154
The Lakvatra, again, clearly presupposes realist semantics:

Here, Mahmati, what is discrimination of verbal expression (abhilpa)? It is to adhere to the charm of various sounds and songs. This Mahmati is discrimination of verbal expression. What is discrimination of what is verbally expressed (abhidheya)? It is to discriminate that any verbally expressed object possesses an essence (svabhva) which is to be attained through noble wisdom, [and that] expressions develop grounded in that [essence]. []. What is the discrimination of object-referents (artha)?56 [It is] verbal articulation (abhilpa) of the perceptual sphere (viaya)
brjod kyang gzung du med pa de bzhin du mya ngan las das pa mya ngan las das pa zhes brjod pa yang gzung du med pao || Cf. Tathgatamahkarunirdea, mdo sde, Pa, 179a37, Jnloklakra, Study Group 2004, 118: see infra note 62. 56. The meaning of artha is not self-evident here. Its polysemy calls for extreme caution in interpretation. Discrepancies in the various redactions testify to the confusion that its ambiguity can generate. The Sanskrit reads: tatra arthavikalpa katama yaduta suvararpyavividharatnrthaviaybhilpa. The Tibetan renders arthavikalpa with discrimination of riches (nor la rnam par rtog pa) and denes it as speaking of precious objects (mdo sde, Ca, 106b56: de la nor la rnam par rtog pa gang zhe na | di lta ste | gser dang | dngul dang | nor rin po che rnam pa mang poi yul brjod pao ||). Guabhadra and iknanda also interpret arthavikalpa as discrimination of riches (, ) and gloss it as desire (;) for valuables (Taish 670 496b2122: ; Taish 672 606b1: ). Bodhirucis rendering of arthavikalpa with suggests that he did not consider artha to mean wealth. Still, he identies it with desire () for costly objects (Taish 671 539a78: ). On the basis of Guabhadras rendition , Tokiwa replaces abhilpa with abhila and transates: What is the discrimination of wealth? By that I mean desiring gold, silver, various precious things and objects of concern (Tokiwa 2003 translation, 221). Suzuki similarly writes: What is the discrimination of property? It is to desire a state of wealth such as gold, silver, and various precious stones (Suzuki 1999b, 128). Tokiwas emendation of abhilpa with abhila has some advantages. First, it renders the sentence very clear. Second, the compound viaybhila is attested elsewhere in the stra whereas viaybhilpa occurs only in this passage (see Tokiwa 119/Nanjio 90, Tokiwa 343/Nanjio 237). Tokiwas interpretation, however, also shows some severe weaknesses. To begin with, abhila is lectio facilior. No scribe would write abhilpa, or brjod pa, if the text at their disposal plainly speaks of desire for wealth. Second, Tokiwas interpretation clashes with the context. Despite its proximity to the Tibetan and Chinese, the rendition of arthavikalpa with discrimination of wealth unrelated to the stras discussion of vikal-pa. The list of discriminations is meant to be a detailed analysis of the parikalpitasvabhva (See Tokiwa 169/Nanjio 128: atra mahmate katamat parikalpitasvabhvaprabhedanayalakaa yaduta abhilapavikalpo [...]). This is a fairly common subject in Yogcra literature. A similar analysis occurs, for instance, in the Mahynasagraha: Through name [people] grasp [the object], [then] they apprehend [its] features in the paratantrasvabhva and cling to it through opinions (lta ba, *di). With [such] opinions [they] stick to [the object]. [They] articulate speech through discriminations and conventionally speak of [the object] with the four conventional assertions, like I see [it] and so on. [Finally, they] misconstruct (kun tu rtog, *parikp) [reality] by superimposing existence onto the inexistent object (don, *artha). (Lamotte 1973, 32: mi gis dmigs pa da | gan gyi dba gi go bo id la der mtshan mar dzin pa da | lta bas de la mon par en pa da | rnam par rtog pa rnams kyis ag kun nas slo ba da | mtho ba la sogs pa tha sad bi po dag gis tha sad dogs pa da | med pai don la yod do es sgro dogs pas kun tu rtog go ||. See also Mahynastralakra XI, 3839, Lvi 1907, 64). This excerpt parallels the rst half of the Lakvatras list of vikalpas. Like Mahynasagraha, our stra starts with verbalization and moves to conceptualization of verbalized objects, identication of their characteristics, erroneous attribution of svabhva to them and dis about them. Arthavikalpa is positioned between discrimination of the objects features (lakaavikalpa) and discrimination of its essence (svabhvavikalpa). Desire for riches is not the most obvious link between the two. The sequence of vikalpas becomes much smoother if we interpret artha as object-referent. Once they have acquired familiarity with verbal expressions
Ligeia Lugli
as objects (artha) [like] gold, silver, or various gems.57
155
The belief that words are indexed to the essence (svabhva) of things explains the connection between reliance on words and reication (samropa).58 Reication
(abhilpa), people assume the expressed objects (abhidheya) to be endowed with svabhva. Thinking thus that the expressed objects exist, ordinary folk recognize the features of these objects. This leads them to distinguish the various objects-referents of verbal expressions (artha) and, eventually, to reify such referents as ontologically grounded entities through svabhvavikalpa. How exactly the discrimination of object referents occurs is unclear. The Lakvatras denition of arthavikalpa consist of a single, lengthy compound. Such clusters typically entail syntactical ambiguity. In our case, this is aggravated by lexical vagueness. The pivot of the sentence is viaya. Tokiwa renders it with objects of concern. Although listed in the dictionary, this sense is not attested in the Lakvatra. In our stra, viaya usually functions as a generic term denoting a eld of application. Context determines the particular scope to which it refers. In compounds, viaya typically stays in either genitive or appositional relation with the preceding term. The genitive relation appears in clusters like vijnnaviaya (Tokiwa 32/Nanjio 38, Tokiwa 37/Nanjio 42), tathgataviaya (Tokiwa 323/ Nanjio 223), or vicitrapadaviaya (Tokiwa 164/Nanjio 124). In these cases viaya respectively denotes the object of perceptual cognitions (vijna), the content of the tathgatas knowledge, or the referents indicated by words. The appositional relation occurs in compounds like rpdiviaya, or tathgatagarbhlayavijnaviaya. Here, viaya indicates the content of a certain scope. In rpdiviaya, form constitutes the scope of vijna; in tathgatagarbhlayavijnaviaya the identity between tathgatagarbha and lyavijna is the scope of the tathgatas knowledge (Tokiwa 323/Nanjio 223: tathgataviaya eva tathgatagarbha layavijnaviayas). In other words, rpdiviaya and tathgatagarbhlayavijnaviaya spell out the content of vijnnaviaya and tathgataviaya. In our sentence, viaya is compounded with artha. Arthaviaya might function as the appositional counterpart of vicitrapadaviaya. For, object referents indeed constitute the scope of words. This interpretation is denitely possible. It sounds, however, tautological. Discrimination of referents would be dened as verbal articulation of the sphere which consists of referents, such as gold silver and gems. A more signicative interpretation would arise if one were to understand viaya as perceptual datum. When neither genitive nor appositional relations explicitly qualify viaya, it usually refers to the scope of sensorial vijnas (see Tokiwa 35/Nanjio 40; Tokiwa 37/ Nanjio 42; Tokiwa 38/Nanjio 42; Tokiwa 103/Nanjio 80; Tokiwa 129/Nanjio 99; Tokiwa 171/ Nanjio 130; Tokiwa 184/Nanjio 136; Tokiwa 200/Nanjio 147; Tokiwa 243/Nanjio 174; Tokiwa 248/Nanjio 178; Tokiwa 250/Nanjio 180; Tokiwa 254/Nanjio 183). In our sentence, we can isolate viaya from artha and interpret it as perceptual datum. This is the option I adopt in my translation. It has the great advantage of tting well in both the immediate context of the list and the wider frame of the stra. Most importantly, it is attuned to the Lakvatras tenet of cittamtra. Perceived phenomena, the stra holds, are illusory. Verbalization and discrimination are the only cause of their emergence within the perceptual sphere (see for instance Tokiwa 163/Nanjio 123: [A bodhisattva] sees that the threefold world is devoid of the elements by seeing through realization that [all] is nothing but a vision of ones mind that [all] is nothing but names and discrimination because external entities do not exist, that is to say, this [world] is nothing but a discrimination of the vision of ones own mind. eva prativipayan nma vikalpamtra svacittadyamtrvabodhd bhyabhvbhvn nma cittadyavikalpamtramida yaduta traidhtuka mahbhtabhautikarahita prativipayati). 57. Lakvatra, Tokiwa 169/Nanjio 128: tatra mahmate abhilpavikalpa katamad yaduta vicitrasvaragta-mdhurybhinivea ea mahmate abhilpavikalpa / tatra mahmate abhidheyavikalpa katamad yadutsti tat- [Tokiwa: yat-] -kicidabhidheyavastusvabhvakam ryajnagatigamya yadritybhilpa pravartata iti vikalpayati / [] / tatra arthavikalpa katamad yaduta suvararpyavividharatnrthaviaybhilpa [Tokiwa: -abhila] /. 58. See Sarvapuyasamuccayasamdhi, mdo sde, Na, 103b12: Vimalatejas, the tathgatas teaching Rely on meaning, not on words serves the beings who are not skilled in meaning, who are involved in duality, who do not know the meaning because, lacking even skill in words, reify words. It is for them that the tathgata taught: Rely on meaning and not on words. (dri ma med pai gzi brjid de bzhin gshegs pas don la rton par byai tshig bru la ma yin zhes gsungs
156
is generally understood as the attribution of essence to ultimately empty, or essenceless, objects.59 The view that names are grounded in their referents svabhva tricks ordinary speakers to erroneously conceptualize ultimately empty phenomena as real entities. The Lakvatra is well aware of the problem:
Mahmati asked: Is it not, Blessed One, that all entities (sarvabhva) exist because verbal expressions are ontologically grounded (sadbhva)? If, Blessed One, there was no entity, verbal expressions would not arise. Hence, it is because linguistic expressions are ontologically grounded that all entities exist. The Blessed One answered: Linguistic expressions are made even for objects that do not exist. In the world there are designations for hares horns or turtles hair. [Still,] Mahmati, these [expressions] designate neither existent nor inexistent [objects]. What you say Mahmati, that all entities (sarvabhva) exist because linguistic expressions are ontologically grounded, is a fallacious statement. [] Space, hares horns and sons of barren women, although indeed inexistent, are verbally expressed. Conceptualizations about entities are just so.60
Belief that words correspond to an essence also causes the opposite error, the nihilistic approach of detraction (apavda). This is of even greater concern to Mahyna stras, since it may spring from their own teachings on emptiness, if taken literally.61 To fend off this misinterpretation, the Tathgatamahkarunirdea and Jnloklakra explain that no constituent factor corresponds to the term emptiness:
The term emptiness is a synonym for what is inapprehensible (anbhinivea, mngon par zhen pa med) and ungraspable. Although no constituent factor called emptiness ultimately exists, emptiness is verbally expressed. Just as space is inexpressible, despite the fact that [we] call space space; so emptiness too, Majur, is inexpressible despite the fact that [we] call emptiness emptiness. To conventionally designate what is nameless through names gives access to all constituent factors. A name does not exist anywhere at all. In the same way, the constituent factor expressed through a name does not exist anywhere at all. Thus, the tathgata understands all factors: he knows them to be unoriginated since the beginning, undestroyed, featureless, mindless, thoughtless, removed from cognipa de ni | sems can di dag don la mi mkhas shing gnyis la spyod pa dang | tshig bru laang mi mkhas pas tshig bru la sgro dogs shing don mi shes pai phyir de dag la don la rton par byai tshig bru la ma yin zhes de bzhin gshegs pas gsungs te |; Lakvatra, Tokiwa 214/Nanjio 156: see supra note 29; Sadhinirmocana, mdo sde, Ca, 48b12, Lamotte 1935, 147: see supra note 53. 59. For a textual denition of samropa, see Lakvatra, Tokiwa 82-84/Nanjio 70-72. For a scholarly discussion and further references see Tanji 2000. 60. Tokiwa 136-137/Nanjio 104-106: punar api mahmatir ha / nanu bhagavannabhilpasadbhvt santi sarvabhv / yadi punar bhagavan bhv na syur abhilpo na pravartate ca tasmd abhilpdbhvd bhagavan santi sarvabhv / bhagavn ha / asatm api mahmate bhvnm abhilpa kriyate yaduta aaviakrmaromabandhyaputrdn loke do [Nanjio: do] bhilpa te ca mahmate na bhv nbhv abhilpyante ca / tad yad avocas tva mahmate abhilpasadbhvt santi sarvabhv iti sa hi vda praha / [] ka- [Tokiwa: ka] -aaga ca bandhyy putra eva ca / asanto hy abhilapyante tath bhveu kalpan //. 61. See, for instance, Sadhinirmocana, mdo sde, Ca, 21a23, Lamotte 1935, 77: They adhere to the literal meaning of the doctrine [that teaches:] All constituent factors are unoriginated, undestroyed, originally pacied, naturally extinguished and on the basis of these [expressions] hold a nihilistic view about all constituent factors and regard the characteristics as inexistent. (chos di dag thams cad ni ma skyes pa kho nao || ma gags pa kho nao || gzod ma nas zhi ba kho nao || rang bzhin gyis yongs su mya ngan las das pa kho nao zhes chos kyi don la sgra ji bzhin kho nar mngon par zhen par byed de | de dag gzhi des na chos thams cad la med par lta ba dang | mtshan nyid med par lta ba thob par gyur te |).
Ligeia Lugli
tion, without letters, speechless.62
157
Excessive concern about reication of referents has its own drawbacks. In the absence of a linguistic theory replacing semantic realism, to assert that names are not grounded in any referent is tantamount to declaring them meaningless. This problem surfaces in the Lakvatra and Sadhinirmocana. The former resolves the tension between non-referentiality and meaninglessness with a form of semantic middle way. It proposes that Buddhist terms, like non-arising, are neither name[s] for an entity nor meaningless expression[s].63 The Sadhinirmocana directly addresses and purportedly solves the problem of the need for words to be grounded in real referents:
Master, conditioned is a word taught by the teacher. A word taught by the teacher is a conventional expression arisen from conceptualization. A conventional expression arisen from conceptualization is not the conditioned because conventional expressions for the various imagined things do not exist at all. [] [Since] there is no designation without an object, what then is the object? It is what is realized to be inexpressible through the noble vision and noble knowledge of noble people. The name conditioned is taught for the sake of making [others] realize the real essence (chos nyid, *dharmat) which is inexpressible . 64
62. This excerpt constitutes one of the several portions shared by these two stras. Tathgatamahkarunirdea, mdo sde, Pa, 179a37: gang stong pa zhe bya ba de ni mngon par zhen pa ma med cing dzin pa med pa i tshig bla dgas so || di la don dam par gang stong pa zhes bya bai chos gang yang dmigs su med kyang stong pa zhes kyang brjod do || ji ltar nam mkha la nam mkha zhes rjod kyang nam mkha ni brjod par bya ba ma yin pa de bzhin du stong pa la stong pa zhes rjod kyang stong pa ni brjod par bya ba ma yin no || di lta ste | ming med pa la ming du tha snyad dogs pa de ni chos thams cad la jug pao || ji ltar ming yul na gnas pa ma yin | phyogs na gnas pa ma yin pa de bzhin du ming gang gis chos gang brjod pai chos de yang yul na gnas pa ma yin | phyogs na gnas pa ma yin no || de ltar de bzhin gshegs pas chos de dag thams cad mkhyen te | gzod ma nas ma skyes pa dang | ma gags pa dang | mtshan nyid med pa dang | sems dang | yi dang | rnam par shes pa dang bral ba dang | yi ge med pa dang | sgra med par shes so ||; Jnloklakra Study Group 2004, 118: yat punar ucyate / majur nyam iti / anabhiniveagrhasyaitad adhivacana / na punar atra majur paramrthata / kacid dharma upalabhyate / ya nyam ity ucyate / yath majurr kasam [sic] ka ity ucyate / avacanyam kam evam eva majur [sic] nyam nyam ity ucyate / avacanyeu nyeu pravea / [] / namn yo dharmo bhilapynte so pi dharma na deastho na pradeastho evam ete majur [sic] sarvvadharms [sic] tathgatena jt dita evjt nutpann aniruddh / alaka cittamanovijnpagat / anakar / agho /. Tibetan (Study Group 2004, 118; mdo sde, Ga, 295b4296a1): jam dpal stong pa nyid ces bya ba gang yin pa de ni mngon par zhen pa med pa dang | dzin pa med pai tshig bla dgas yin te | jam dpal de la ni don dam par na gang stong pa zhes bya bai chos gang yang dmigs su med do || jam dpal di lta ste dper na | nam mkha nam mkha zhes brjod kyang nam mkha ni brjod par bya ba ma yin no || jam dpal de bzhin du stong pa stong pa zhes brjod kyang stong pa ni brjod par bya ba ma yin te | chos thams cad kyis jug pa ni de lta bu yin no || jam dpal chos thams cad ni ming med pa yin na | de dag la ming gis rjod par byed de | jam dpal ming ni yul na gnas pa ma yin | phyogs na gnas pa ma yin no || jam dpal ji ltar ming yul na gnas pa ma yin || phyogs na gnas pa ma yin pa de bzhin du ming gang gis chos gang rjod par byed pai chos de yang | yul na gnas pa ma yin | phyogs na gnas pa ma yin no || jam dpal de bzhin gshegs pas ni chos de dag thams cad de ltar gzod ma nyid nas ma skyes pa ma byung ba | ma gags pa | mtshan nyid med pa | sems dang yid dang rnam par shes pa dang bral ba | yi ge med pa | sgra med par shes so ||. 63. Lakvatra, Tokiwa 288/Nanjio 201: Is non-arising [the same as] inexistence []? Please explain to me whether this is the name for an entity or is a meaningless expression (nirarthakam) [instead]. Non-arising is not [the same as] inexistence []. It is not a name for an entity nor is it a meaningless expression. (ki abhvo hy anutpda [] / atha bhvasya nmeda nirartha v bravhi me // na cbhvo hy anutpdo [] / na ca bhvasya nmeda na ca nma nirarthakam //). 64. Sadhinirmocana, mdo sde, Ca, 3a6b3, Lamotte 1935, 3536: rigs kyi bu dus byas zhes bya ba de
158
Dharmat is, thus, the ultimate referent of conventional designations. It is the real artha that words cannot convey. Other stras do not formulate the question of reference quite as explicitly.65 Most, however, appear to agree with the Sadhinirmocana. They identify artha with reality, or knowledge of it, as it ultimately is.66 Like the Sadhinirmocana, the Jnloklakra and Suvikrntadevaputraparipcch gloss artha with dharmat.67 The Tathgatamahkarunirdea denes it as paramrtha.68 The Lakvatra uses artha interchangeably with tattva.69 The Vikurvarjaparipcch equates artha with knowledge of dharmas as they really are.70 Finally, the Akayamatinirdea,
65.
66. 67.
68.
69.
70.
ang ston pas btags pai tshig yin te | ston pas btags pai tshig gang yin pa de ni | kun tu rtog pa las byung ba tha snyad du brjod pa yin la | kun tu rtog pa las byung ba tha snyad du brjod pa gang yin pa de ni kun tu rtog pa sna tshogs kyi tha snyad du brjod pa gtan yongs su ma grub pai phyir dus byas ma yin no || [] brjod pa ni dngos po med pa can yang ma yin te | dngos po de yang gang zhe na | phags pa rnams kyi phags pai shes pa dang | phags pai mthong bas brjod du med par mngon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas pa gang yin pa ste | brjod du med pai chos nyid de nyid mngon par rdzogs par rtogs par bya bai phyir dus byas zhes ming du btags so ||. For the role of the inexpressible essence as support of verbal expressions in this passage, see Takahashi 1999, 31. It does not surprise that the Sadhinirmocana devotes extraordinary attention to the issue of reference. In its striving for a balance between semantic realism and nominalism, Yogcra postulates the necessity of an ultimately real referent for words. Outside our usual sources, the Tattvrthapaala of the Bodhisattvabhmi contains interesting material about this (see Takahashi 2005, 98-106 Wogihara 1930-1936, 4550). For an overview of the problem and further references see Buescher 2008, 186200, Dealeanu 2006, 162167, 174176 and Takemura 1995, 297-305. Some texts do not mention such identity, including the Anavataprangarjaparipcch, Kualamlaparigraha, Ratnakaraa, Samdhirja and Tathgatasagti. Jnloklakra, Study Group 2004, 90: That which is dharmat, that is the meaning. (y ca dharmat so rtha). Suvikrntadevaputraparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 104b2: Dharmat is the supreme meaning, it is verbally inexpressible (chos nyid di ni don mchog yin te brjod du med ||). Tathgatamahkarunirdea, mdo sde, Pa, 181a3: The Ultimate (don dam pa, *paramrtha) is the undeled meaning. The undeled meaning is the inexpressible meaning. (don dam pa gang yin pa de gang zag med pai don to || gang zag med pai don gang yin pa de brjod du med pai don to ||). In its explanation of tathgatagarbha, the Lakvatra reiterates that bodhisattvas should not take meaning literally. To make this point the stra uses the simile of the ngertip and the moon which appears also in the section on ruta and artha. Here, however, the moon stands for tattva rather than for artha: Mahmati, the tathgatagarbha as layavijna is the scope of tathgatas as well as of subtle-minded bodhisattvas, like you, who rely on meaning (arthapratiaran). It is not [the scope] of rvakas, pratyekabuddhas and philosophers who stick to teachings literally (yathruta). Therefore Mahmati, you and the other bodhisattvas should exert yourselves in realizing the tathgatagarbha as layavijna which is the scope of all tathgatas; you should not be satised with mere hearing. [...] Just as a child grasps the ngertips instead of the moon, in the same way a person fond of letters does not know my reality (tattva). (Tokiwa 323324/Nanjio 223224: mahmate tathgataviaya eva tathgatagarbhlayavijna[Tokiwa: gocara] -viayas tvatsadn ca skmanipuamatibuddhiprabhedakn [Tokiwa: skmanipuabuddhn] bodhisattvn mahsattvnm arthapratiaran no tu yathru tadeanphbhinivin sarvnyatrthyarvakapratyekabuddhnm [Tokiwa omits no buddhnm] / tasmttarhi mahmate tvaynyaica bodhisattvair mahsattvai sarvatathgataviaye smis tathgatagarbhlayavijnaparijne yoga karayo na rutamtrasatuairbhavitavyam // [] agulyagra yath blo na ghti nikaram / tath hyakarasasaktas [Tokiwa: samsakts] tattva na vetti mmakam //). Vikurvarjaparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 198a3: see supra note 22.
Ligeia Lugli
159
together with the Mahynopadea and Sarvapuyasamuccayasamdhi, suggests that artha coincides with the real nature of constituent factors:71
All constituent factors are completely empty; a referent (don, *artha) which is empty constitutes the meaning (don). All constituent factors are completely devoid of distinctive features; a referent which is devoid of distinctive features constitutes the meaning. All constituent factors are completely aimless; a referent which is aimless constitutes the meaning [...]. Knowledge of meaning (don so so yang dag par rig pa, *arthapratisavid) consists of knowing constituent factors in this way.72
The reference to arthapratisavid here help us gauge arthas ontological value. Arthapratisavid is traditionally paired with knowledge of Dharma (dharmapratisavid). Originally dharmapratisavid signied textual knowledge of the doctrine, while arthapratisavid corresponded to knowledge of its meaning. The term dharma, however, is polysemic. It designates both doctrine and constituents factors. The compound dharmapratisavid reects this ambiguity. In addition to knowledge of Dharma, it also indicates knowledge of dharmas. In this sense, dharmapratisavid consists of awareness of the sameness of all constituents factors. 73 This shift affects the semantic spectrum of arthapratisavid as well. When dharmapratisavid refers to mastery of the doctrine, arthapratisavid, predictably, corresponds to knowledge of the meaning of the doctrine. When dharmapratisavid is concerned with the constituent factors, the interpretation of arthapratisavid is more complex. It cannot correspond to knowledge of the meaning of constituent factors, since, strictly speaking, constituent factors do not possess meaning. Instead, arthapratisavid appears to indicate knowledge of the real nature of dharmas.74 In this case, artha clearly transcends semantics. It is not,
71. Mahynopadea, mdo sde, Ba, 270b4: All constituent factors are sameness: the meaning which is undierentiated and without diversication is the meaning. (chos thams cad mnyam pa nyid de tha mi dad cing sna tshogs med pai don ni don to ||). Sarvapuyasamuccayasamdhi, mdo sde, Na, 102b12: see supra note 49. 72. Akayamatinirdea, mdo sde, Ma, 145b37, Braarvig 1988, 169170: chos thams cad ni ma lus par stong pa ste | gang stong pai don | de ni don no || chos thams cad ni ma lus par mtshan ma med pa ste | gang mtshan ma med pai don | de ni don no || chos thams cad ni ma lus par smon pa med pa ste | gang smon pa med pai don de ni don no || [] | gang di lta bui chos rnams rtog pa | de ni don so so yang dag par rig pa zhes byao ||. 73. This applies only to the context of Mahyna stras. In abhidhammic texts dhammapaisambhid, when linked to dhammas, designates the knowledge of the dierent constituent of realities and their peculiar characteristics. This idea of dhammapaisambhid as knowledge distinguishing the various dhammas is in sharp contrast with texts like the Vikurvarjaparipcch or Sgarangarjaparipcch where dharmapratisavid is dened as knowledge of the non-dierentiation of the dharmadhtu (Vikurvarjaparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 198a6; Sagarangarjaparipcch, mdo sde, Pha, 137a23: see infra note 75). For the shifting meaning of dharmapratisavid and arthapratisavid, see Deleanu 2006, 566568 note 257. 74. A passage that highlights this sense of artha occurs in the Sarvapuyasamuccayasamdhi: Nryaa said: Vimalatejas, what is the artha of common peoples dharmas? Vimalatejas said: Since their artha is inexistent, they cannot be analysed and discriminated. Nryaa said: Vimalatejas, what is eliminated and what attained through the artha? Vimalatejas said: Nryaa, through artha the dharmas of common people are eliminated and the dharmas of the Buddha are attained. Nryaa said: Vimalatejas, what is the artha of the Buddhas dharmas? Vimalatejas said: Nryaa, the artha of the Buddhas dharmas is not dichotomic. (mdo sde, Na, 102b24: sred med kyi bus smras pa | dri ma med pai gzi brjid so soi skye boi chos rnams kyi don gang yin | dri ma med pai gzi brjid kyis smras pa | dei don ni med pa las yongs su brtags pa dang | rnam par rtog pa med pao || sred med kyi bus smras pa | dri ma med pai gzi
160
however, completely severed from the sphere of language. The two pratisavids retain a link to the dimension of verbalization even when they refer to constituent factors.75 This brings about a threefold relation between words, constituent factors and artha. The commentary to the Akayamatinirdea passage helps us understand the situation:
brjid don gyis ni ci zhig sel bar byed | ci zhig ni sgrub par byed | dri ma med pai gzi brjid kyis smras pa | sred med kyi bu don gyis ni so soi skye boi chos rnams sel bar byed do || sangs rgyas kyi chos rnams ni sgrub par byed do || sred med kyi bus smras pa | dri ma med pai gzi brjid sangs rgyas kyi chos rnams kyi don gang yin | dri ma med pai gzi brjid kyis smras pa | sred med kyi bu sangs rgyas kyi chos rnams kyi don ni gnyis su dbyer med pao ||). In abhidhammic context, knowledge of the attha of dhammas refers to knowing the function carried out by the various dhammas (see Ronkin 2005, 88). It is doubtful that such interpretation can be applied to the Sarvapuyasamuccayasamdhi. Here artha eliminates the common peoples dharmas; it is improbable that it indicates a function of these very dharmas. In this text, artha apparently refers to the essence of the constituent factors which, despite their apparent dierence, characterizes both the Buddha and ordinary people. However, further investigation is needed to establish the exact meaning of artha in this passage. 75. As it is often the case with Mahyna stras, this relation is not xed. In the Sgarangarjaparipcch, for instance, dharmapratisavid refers to knowledge of dharmadhtu, but the arthapratisavid is linked with the meaning of words: All letters and all words are the Buddhas teachings. To access the meaning of such words constitutes the bodhisattvas arthapratisavid (don so so yang dag par rig pa). All letters and all words are the Buddhas teachings. Here, to know that the dharmadhtu is undierentiated and of a single avour constitutes the bodhisattvas dharmapratisavid (chos so so yang dag par rig pa). (mdo sde, Pha, 137a13: de lta bas na yi ge thams cad dang | tshig thams cad ni sangs rgyas kyi gsung yin te | de lta bui tshig gi don de la jug pa gang yin pa di ni byang chub sems dpai don so so yang dag par rig pa zhes byao || yi ge thams cad dang | tshig thams cad ni sangs rgyas kyi gsung yin te | de la chos kyi dbyings dbyer med cing ro gcig par shes pa gang yin pa di ni byang chub sems dpai chos so so yang dag par rig pa zhes byao ||). In the Vikurvarjaparipcch, the relationship between the pratisavids is even more intricate. Here dharmapratisavid refers to both doctrine and constituent factors, while arthapratisavid is linked to knowledge of both meaning of the teachings and reality: What is the dharmapratisavid? To rely on the Dharma and not on what is not the Dharma. (mdo sde, Ba, 198a5: de la chos so so yang dag par rig pa gang zhe na | de chos la rton pa yin gyi chos ma yin pa la mi rton te |), Dharmapratisavid is that which [] does not dierentiate the characteristics of dharmadhtu. (Vikurvarjaparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 198a6: chos so so yang dag par rig pa zhes bya ba ni [] chos kyi dbyings kyi mtshan nyid tha dad par yang mi byed pa gang yin pao ||), Here what is the arthapratisavid? To rely on the meaning of all the teachings [expressed in] letters, but not to rely on letters; what is called meaning is to think of all dharmas as reality. (mdo sde, Ba, 198a23: de la don so so yang dag par rig pa gang zhe na | tshig bru bshad pa thams cad don nyid la rton pa yin gyi tshig bru la rton pa ma yin pa ste | don ces bya ba ni chos thams cad yang dag pa nyid du du shes pao ||). The Sarvapuyasamuccayasamdhi establishes a similar relationship between the artha- and the dharma-pratisaraas. Here, to rely on artha is equated with reliance on the constituent factors as they really are: [Vimalatejas said:] When [a bodhisattva] relies on artha, there is no dharma whatsoever, no artha whatsoever. Why? Because all dharmas are verbally inexpressible, groundless, not established anywhere and with all supports extinguished. [] Nryaa said: Son of good family, is reliance on meaning synonymous with reliance on all dharmas? Vimalatejas said: It is. All dharmas are empty, all dharmas are isolated; Nryaa to rely on artha means to rely on all dharmas as empty and as isolated as they are. (mdo sde, Na, 102b7103a3: don la rton pa la ni chos kyang ci yang med do || don kyang ci yang med do || de cii phyir zhe na | chos thams cad ni brjod du med pa dang | ya ma brla dang | yul na mi gnas pa dang | phyogs na mi gnas pa dang | gang kho na na gnas pa de kho nar gags pai phyir ro || [] sred med kyi bus smras pa | rigs kyi bu gang don la rton pa de chos thams cad la rton pai rnam grangs yod dam | dri ma med pai gzi brjid kyis smras pa | sred med kyi bu yod de | di ltar chos thams cad ni stong pa | chos thams cad ni dben pa ste | de dag ni chos thams cad ji ltar stong pa de kho na bzhin du de la rton to || ji ltar dben pa de kho na bzhin du de la rton to || sred med kyi bu de ltar na gang don la rton pa de ni chos thams cad la rton to ||).
Ligeia Lugli
Here, it is as if artha (don) and dharma (chos) were without difference. However, artha should be known as that which is indicated and understood; dharma is to be known as that which thus indicates and makes understood. Also, dharmas are the various objects mentioned below by names [such as] conditioned and unconditioned and so on. Artha consists of analyzing and understanding their meaning. Furthermore, correct knowledge of the characteristics of all dharmas corresponds to knowledge of artha (don so so yang dag par rig pa, *arthapratisavid). Knowledge of the respective names of each of these dharmas corresponds to knowledge of dharmas (chos so so yang dag par rig pa, *dharmapratisavid).76
161
Words are indexed to dharmas as they appear. Artha constitutes dharmas as they really are.77 This observation is pivotal to unveil the logic that governs the opposition of words and meaning. It explains the contrast between lexical diversity and semantic uniformity. Language mirrors the seeming variety of objects that informs unenlightened perception. Such plurality is the hallmark of illusion. The Lakvatra untiringly reiterates that phenomenal diversity is unreal, nothing but a vision of the mind (svacittadyamtra, cittamtra).78 Despite their
76. Akayamatinirdeak, mdo grel, Ci, 209a36, Braarvig 1989, 514: dir don dang chos nyid bye brag med par dra mod kyi | don ni bstan cing rtog pai yul lta bur rig par byao | chos ni ston cing rtog par byed pa lta bur rig par byao || yang na chos ni dus byas dang dus ma byas la sogs pai ming gis og nas smos pa rnams la byao || don ni de nyid kyi don yongs su dpyod cing bye brag tu dbye ba la byao || yang na chos thams cad kyi mtshan nyid phyin ci ma log par rtogs pa ni don so so yang dag par rig pao | chos de dang de dag gi ming gang dang gang yin pa shes pa ni chos so so yang dag par rig pao ||. 77. Cf. Freeman 1991, 112. 78. The Lakvatras treatment of the concept of diversity deserves a study in its own right. Suce it here to outline the issue briey. The stra consistently associates diversity with illusion and erroneous conceptualization (see, for instance, Tokiwa 287/Nanjio 200201; Tokiwa 207/Nanjio 152; Tokiwa 207208/Nanjio 152; Tokiwa 172173/Nanjio 131). It explains that dierentiation is unreal and appears because the karmic traces (vsan) of previous conceptualizations (Tokiwa 3132/Nanjio 3738). Such vsans activate mental and sensorial cognition (vijna), which mistakenly perceive the mind (citta) as a plurality of external objects. When such cognition ceases, diversity disappears (Tokiwa 168/Nanjio 127: Just like waves do not arise in a calm ocean, in the same way, once cognition is extinguished, multifariousness does not arise. yath ke mahoghe taragm asabhava / tath vijnaniruddhe vaicitryam [Nanjio: vijnavaicitrya niruddha] na pravartate //). Persistence of the belief that a variety of external objects exist derives from ignorance that all perceived objects are only mind, cittamtra (Tokiwa 116/Nanjio 90: Mahmati, ordinary folk divisively conceptualize adhering to various external things [] because they do not realize [that these things are] only a manifestation (dya) of ones own mind. svacittadyamtrnavabodhnmahm ate blapthagjan bhyavicitrabhvbhiniveena [] vikalpayanti /). The concept of cittamtra is linked to the ultimate absence of diversity in dierent ways, which reect the varied philosophical implications of this term (the philosophical ambivalence of cittamtra and its cognate compound svacittadyamtra in the Lakvatra are explored in Kan 1980). In a sense, the assimilation of the worlds diversity to cittamtra signals that perceived plurality is a mere mental construction, an unreal conceptualization: The threefold world [] dened as (upanibaddha) the various forms and appearances [that constitute] the threefold world is only ones own mind (Tokiwa 100/Nanjio 80: svacittamtramida traidhtukam [] traidhtukavicitrarpopacropanibaddha). With this denotation, the compound cittamtra is almost synonymous with prajaptimtra and vikalpamtra. The semantic proximity of these terms clearly emerges from comparison of the stras denitions of threefold world: cittamanomanovijnamtra traidhtuka (Tokiwa 306/Nanjio 212); prajaptimtrtribhava (Tokiwa 234/Nanjio 168); vikalpamtra tribhava (Tokiwa 261/Nanjio 186).* Vikalpamtra is especially close to cittamtra because discrimination (vikalpa) itself is dened as cittacaitta (see infra note 113). Discrimination is also responsible for the conceptualization of plurality (Tokiwa 172/Nanjio 131: What is conceptualized is the appearance of diversity that is discrim-
162
nominal multiplicity, all constituent factors share the same nature. They all are equally empty, featureless and so on.79 The Suvikrntadevaputraparipcch and Akayamatinirdea repeatedly arm that the dharmadhtu is undistinguished.80 The
inated in the the dependent [nature] (paratantra). kalpita hi vicitrbha paratantre vikalpyate //). The role of vikalpa in the emergence of unreal dierentiation provides a link between the denition of the world as cittamtra and the idea that perceived diversity amounts to erroneous discrimination (Cf. Sutton 1991, 200). Reduction of all apparent objects to mind-only connects cittamtra to ultimate absence of multiplicity in yet another sense. Diversication is illusory because what is conceptualized as diverse is in reality a single entity: the mind. The stra denies the existence of external objects (Tokiwa 261/Nanjio 186: The threefold world is only divisive conceptualization, external objects do not exist. vikalpamtra tribhava bhyamartha na vidyate /). It claries that the eld of application of sensorial cognition corresponds to the mind (Tokiwa 32/Nanjio 38: The support [of manifestation] consists of the discriminations made in the eld of application of sensorial cognition which consists of the manifestation (dya) of ones own mind. yadlambana svacittadyavijnaviaye vikalp). Finally, despite its seeming diversity, citta itself is ultimately undierentiated. It is fused together with layavijna which is the polluted aspect of tathgatagarbha and constitutes the real foundation of experience (Tokiwa 167/Nanjio 127: The totality of the mind develops as an undivided body with layavijna as cause and support. [It develops thus] because of adhesion to the perceptual sphere that is a manifestation of ones own mind. [Mind and layavijna] are mutually caused: Mahmati, they arise and unfold, propelled by the perceptual sphere which is a manifestation of the mind, just like waves in the ocean. abhinnaarralakaam layavijnahetvlambana svacittadyaviaybhinivec cittakalpa pravartatenyonyahetuka / udadhitarag iva mahmate svacittadyaviayapavanerit pravartante nivartante ca /). * The denition of tribhava as vijaptimtra also occurs in the text, but only in the Sagthakam section. For a discussion of the relationship between these terms in the Lakvatra see Kan 1980. 79. Our sources unanimously regard all constituent factors to be the same and, hence, to share the same characteristics. However, the set of qualities explicitly attributed to all dharmas varies from text to text. Besides emptiness and featurelessness, frequent attributes qualifying all factors include unorigination and unsubstantiality (see, for instance, Anavataptangarjaparipcch, mdo sde, Pha, 247a7; Jnloklakra, Study Group 2004, 116; Lakvatra, Tokiwa 231/ Nanjio 166; Sgaramatiparipcch, mdo sde, Pha, 56b7; Sadhinirmocana, mdo sde, Ca, 16b2; Sarvapuyasamuccayasamdhi, mdo sde, Na, 109a1; Suvikrntadevaputraparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 133b3; Tathgatamahkarunirdea, mdo sde, Pa, 220b5; Tathgatasagti, mdo sde, Dza, 260a6; Vikurvarjaparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 183b7). 80. Suvikrntadevaputraparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 103b7104a1: Since they know that the dharmadhtu is undierentiated, they understand the illusoriness of all delements. (chos kyi dbyings dbyer med pa shes par bya bai phyir nyon mongs pa thams cad la sgyu ma lta bur so sor rtog pa); 124a7b1: He courses in knowledge of the Dharma because the dharmadhtu is undierentiated (chos kyi dbyings dbyer med pai phyir chos so so yang dag par rig pa la spyod pa); Akayamatinirdea, mdo sde, Ma, 114a12, Braarvig 1988, 89: To think that the dharmadhtu is undierentiated corresponds to wisdom (gang chos kyi dbyings dbyer med par bsam gtan byed pa | di ni dei shes rab bo ||); 121b7122a4, Braarvig 1988, 110: The dharmadhtu, sattvadhtu, the realm of space and the realm of all constituent factors are the same. Why are they the same? Because they are the same in regard to emptiness; they are the same in being featureless; they are the same in being aimless, they are the same in being unconditioned, they are the same in being unborn, they are the same in being unoriginated, they are the same in being unsubstantial, all constituent factors are the same in being undierentiated, they are the same in being unobstructed; being like the space and being like the realm of nirva they are the same. (chos kyi dbyings dang | sems can gyi khams dang | nam mkhai khams dang | chos thams cad kyi khams de ni mtshungs so || de cii phyir de mtshungs zhe na | stong pa nyid du mtshungs pas na de ni mtshungs so || mtshan ma med par mtshungs pa dang | smon pa med par mtshungs pa dang | mngon par du mi byed par mtshungs pa dang | skye ba med par mtshungs pa dang | byung ba med par mtshungs pa dang | dngos po med par mtshungs pa dang | chos thams cad tha dad pa med par mtshungs pa dang | sgrib pa med par mtshungs pa dang | nam mkhai khams su mtshungs pa dang | mya ngan las das pai dbyings su mtshungs pas | de dag mtshungs pao ||).
Ligeia Lugli
163
Brahmavieacintparipcch identies dharmat with undierentiated dharmas.81 The Sadhinirmocana equates reality with space-like sameness. 82 Others posit that all constituent factors are equal.83 Our sources unanimously hold dierentiation to be illusory. Perceived diversity emerges from apprehension of unreal distinctive features (nimitta). People distinguish earth from water, for example, by contrastively dierentiating the formers solidity from the latters uidity. Stras concur that such features, together with the objects that they characterize, are ultimately
81. Brahmavieacintparipcch: He said: Brahma, of what is dharmat a synonym? He answered: Majur, dharmat is a synonym for constituent factors that are unconditioned and undifferentiated. (mdo sde, Ba, 77b56: smras pa | tshangs pa chos nyid ces bya ba di gang gi tshig bla dags yin | smras pa | jam dpal chos nyid ces bya ba ni dus ma byas dang bye brag med par gyur pai chos rnams kyi tshig bla dags so ||). 82. Sadhinirmocana, mdo sde, Ca, 11b712a2, Lamotte 1935, 53: Subhti, for instance, space [pervades] in the varieties of form and dierent characteristics, [but] has no distinctive features, no discriminative conceptualization, no becoming. It has a single avour everywhere. Subhti, ultimate reality is to be viewed in the same way: it has a single avour everywhere in the constituent factors that possess diverse distinctive features. Then the Blessed One said these verses: Ultimate reality displays no multiplicity; the characteristic of the Buddhas speech is possession of a single avour, those who imagine multiplicity in that are ignorant people abiding in the idea of self. (rab byor di lta ste dper na | nam mkha ni gzugs kyi rnam pa sna tshogs du ma mtshan nyid tha dad pa la mtshan ma med pa rnam par rtog pa med pa gyur ba med pa ste | thams cad du ro gcig pai mtshan nyid yin no || rab byor de bzhin du don dam pa ang mtshan nyid tha dad pai chos rnams la thams cad du ro gcig pai mtshan nyid yin par blta bar byao || de nas bcom ldan das kyis dei tshe tshigs su bcad pa di dag bka stsal to || don dam de ni tha dad ma yin te || kun tu ro gcig mtshan nyid sangs rgyas gsung || de la gang dag tha dad kun rtog pa || de dag nga rgyal gnas pa rmongs pa yin ||). 83. See, for instance, Anavataptangrjaparipcch, mdo sde, Pha, 215a7: The purity of all constituent factors is understood through the purity of space. All constituent factors are equal on account of the purity which is the purity of the space. (nam mkhai khams rnam par dag pas chos thams cad rnam par dag par rjes su rtogs te | di ltar nam mkha rnam par dag pai rnam par dag pa dis chos thams cad mnyam mo ||); Kualamlaparigraha, mdo sde, Nga, 216a6: Sthiramati, all constituent factors, being of a single avour, display the distinctive sign of the ocean. (brtan pai blo gros chos thams cad ni ro gcig pai phyir rgya mtshoi rgyas btab pa yin no ||); Sgaramatiparipcch, mdo sde, Pha, 22a2: All constituent factors are sameness (chos rnams thams cad mnyam nyid); Samdhirja, Vaidya 1961, 79: Youth, how is this samdhi explained? It is [explained] as the sameness and equality of all constituent factors. (tatra kumra katama samdhinirdea ? y yathvattat sarvadharm samat aviamat /); Sarvapuyasamuccayasamdhi, mdo sde, Na, 95a6: Sameness gives access to all constituent factors, because they are of a single avour. (mnyam pa nyid ni chos thams cad kyi sgo ste | ro gcig pai phyir ro ||); Tathgatamahkarunirdea, mdo sde, Pa, 179a23: All constituent factors are devoid of duality, not dichotomized, devoid of characteristics, nameless, featureless, causeless, motionless and unoriginated. (chos thams cad ni gnyis su med pa | gnyis su dbyer med pa | mtshan nyid med pa | ming med pa | mtshan ma med pa | rgyu ba med pa | rab tu rgyu ba med pa | kun tu byung ba med pao ||); Tathgatasagti, mdo sde, Dza, 259a6: see infra note 108; Vikurvarjaparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 195a6b1: What is the path? [] Since all constituent factors are undierentiated the path is sameness. (de la lam gang zhe na | [] chos thams cad tha dad pa med pai phyir lam mnyam pa nyid do ||). The same stra also arms: Those who abide in sameness do not go astray, go away or move away from the dharmat. (mdo sde, Ba, 180b12: gang dag mnyam pa nyid la gnas pa dag ni chos nyid las mi g.yos | rnam par mi g.yo | gro bar mi byed | mi gro bar mi byed do ||); 181a23: Enlightenment with respect to the sameness of form is perfect enlightenment, the enlightenment with respect to the sameness of feeling, perception, volition and sensorial cognition is the perfect enlightenment. (gzugs mnyam pa nyid du mngon par rdzogs par byang chub pa ni byang chub mngon par rdzogs par byang chub pao || tshor ba dang | du shes dang | du byed rnams dang | rnam par shes pa mnyam pa nyid du mngon par rdzogs par byang chub pa ni byang chub mngon par rdzogs par byang chub pao ||).
164
inexistent. The Lakvatra views nimittas to be a product of the mind.84 It regards them as the source of the conceptualized aspect of reality (parikalpitasvabhva) and of the perpetuation of sasric experience.85 The Anavataptangarjaparipcch, Brahmavieacintparipcch, Mahynopadea and Vikurvarjaparipcch too hold nimittas to be conceptual fabrications which arise from vikalpa.86 They all refute the existence of the various features that inform perception of diversity. Reality, they arm is featureless; it consists of undistinguished sameness.87 On account of its identity with the Ultimate, artha too consists of undierentiated equality. The Tathgatasagti, for instance, emphasizes the intrinsic undierentiation of artha: Artha is inherently empty, it constitutes what is inherently undierentiated (rang bzhin gyis dbyer med pa). It is empty in all respects and inherently undierentiated.88 The Jnloklakra glosses artha as the undistinguishedness
84. Tokiwa 172/Nanjio 130: Distinctive features are wicked, they are a fetter [and] arise from the mind. (nimitta dauhulyam aya* [Tokiwa: dauhulyam ida] bandhana cittasabhavam /). Cf. Vinicayasagrahas distinction between the external fetter of distinctive features, nimittabandhana, and the internal fetter of wickedness, dauhulyabhadhana (see Schmithausen 2007, 198). *Nanjio 130 note 17. 85. Tokiwa 76/Nanjio 67: Here, Mahmati, the conceptualized nature arises from distinctive features. (tatra mahmate parikalpitasvabhvo nimittt pravartate /); Tokiwa 285/Nanjio 200: Again, distinctive features are not benecial because they cause rebirth. (nimitta [Tokiwa: nimittadarana] punarjanmahetutvdareya /). 86. They arm that featurelessness derives from absence of vikalpa. They thus imply that vikalpa actively fabricates nimittas. Anavataptangarjaparipcch, mdo sde, Pha, 214a56: Here, the path of the threefold [gates of] liberation is emptiness because all objects are abandoned; it is featureless because conceptualization, discrimination (rnam par rtog pa, *vikalpa), imagination, distinctive features and all discriminations are abandoned. (de la rnam par thar pa gsum gyi lam ni dmigs pa thams cad spang bai phyir stong pa nyid dang | rtog pa dang | rnam par rtog pa dang | yongs su rtog pa dang | mtshan ma dang | rnam par rtog pa thams cad spang bai phyir mtshan ma med pa); Brahmavieacintparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 56b34: All constituent factors are featureless because they are free from conceptualization and discrimination. (rtog pa dang rnam par rtog pa dang bral bas chos thams cad mtshan ma med pao ||); Mahynopadea, mdo sde, Ba, 269b7: The meaning which is featureless because all conceptualizations and discriminations are abandoned is the [real] meaning. (rtog pa dang rnam par rtog pa thams cad spang bai phyir mtshan ma med pai don ni don to ||); Vikurvarjaparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 195b3: The path is featureless because all discriminations between features have been abandoned. (lam de ni mtshan mar rnam par rtog pa thams cad spangs pai phyir mtshan ma med pao). For a Yogcra explanation of the mutual causation of nimitta and vikalpa see Vinicayasagraha, Kramer 2005, 72, Takahashi 2005, 125: see infra note 114. 87. See, for instance, Brahmavieacintparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 75a6: All constituent factors possess a featureless essence. (chos thams cad ni mtshan ma med pai rang bzhin can te); Ratnkara, mdo sde, Tha, 281a2: All constituent factors possess single characteristic: to be free from and without characteristics. (thams cad chos zhes bya ba mtshan nyid gcig | mtshan nyid bral zhing mtshan nyid med pa ste ||); Sgaramatiparipcch, mdo sde, Pha, 76b45: Sgaramati, all constituent factors possess the dening features (phyag rgyas btab pa) of featurelessness because they are removed from substantiality and diversication. (blo gros rgya mtsho chos thams cad ni dmigs pa tha dad pa dang bral bai phyir mtshan ma med pai phyag rgyas btab pao ||); Vikurvarjaparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 198a67: The only characteristic of the dharmadhtu is absence of characteristics. (chos kyi dbyings ni mtshan nyid med par mtshan nyid gcig pa). 88. Tathgatasagti, mdo sde, Dza, 249b7250a1: don ces bya ba ni rang bzhin gyis stong pa ste | gang rang bzhin gyis dbyer med pao || rnam pa thams cad du rang bzhin gyis stong zhing dbyer med de |.
Ligeia Lugli
165
in all dharmas89 and equates it with sameness itself (y ca samat so rta).90 The assimilation of artha with reality, hence, involves that meaning is both single and undierentiated. Uniqueness and undistinguishedness affect arthas relationship with language. They create a twofold tension between words and meaning. First, the plurality of words hinders realization of the singularity of artha. Misled by the variety of designations, ordinary people reify a multitude of entities and fail to understand their common empty nature. This accounts only partially for the ruta/ artha contrast. For, samropa derives from the speakers ignorance; it is not a aw inherent in language.91 Second, being inherently divisive, language is incapable of expressing what is undifferentiated, to wit, both reality and artha. Stras frequently emphasize that words project diversity on the Ultimates sameness. The Brahmavieacintparipcch, for one, contrasts such conventional distinctions with undifferentiated dharmat:
He said: Brahma, what is the difference between compounded and uncompounded constituent factors? He answered: Majur, the difference between compounded and uncompounded constituent factors is a verbal convention (tha snyad). Why? It is through verbal conventions that it is taught this is compounded, this is uncompounded. The dharmat of what is compounded is [the same as] the dharmat of what is uncompounded: there is no difference in dharmat.92
The polarity of dierentiation and undierentiation also characterizes the relation between words and meaning. The Lakvatra contrasts true artha with the multifarious yathrutrtha.93 The Sarvapuyasamuccayasamdhi and Akayamatinirdea oppose linguistic diversication to undierentiated artha.94 The Vikurvarjaparipcch denes the inexpressible artha as absence of verbal dif89. Jnloklakra, Study Group 2004, 90: sarvvadharmev [sic] asabhedrtha ca. 90. Ibid. 91. The Lakvatra, for instance, introduces the possibility of speech free from samropa. It describes the tathgatas teachings as nstyastisamroppavdavinirmukt (see Tokiwa 125/ Nanjio 96). 92. Brahmavieacintparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 77b45: smras pa | tshangs pa dus byas dang | dus ma byas kyi chos rnams la tha dad du bya ba ci yod | smras pa | jam dpal dus byas dang | dus ma byas kyi chos rnams la tha dad du bya ba ni tha snyad do || de cii phyir zhe na | tha snyad kyis di ni dus byas so|| di ni dus ma byas so zhes bstan to || yang dus byas kyi chos nyid gang yin pa de ni dus ma byas kyi chos nyid kyang de yin te | chos nyid la tha dad du bya ba med do ||. The Ratnakaraa also stresses the merely nominal dierence of Buddhist terminology, although it does not spell out the sameness of their meaning: Subhti said: Majur, are the causes of emptiness and isolation dierent? Majur said: Venerable Subhti, what do you think: are the causes of gold and silver dierent? Subhti: Majur [their] names and designations are dierent. Majur: Venerable Subhti, it is like this, emptiness and isolation amount to names and designations only. Wise people do not cling to names and designations; ordinary folk do. (mdo sde, Ja, 250b25: rab byor gyis smras pa | jam dpal stong pa nyid dang | dben pa nyid la tha dad du bya ba ci yod | jam dpal gyis smras pa | btsun pa rab byor di ji snyam du sems | gser dang sa le sbram la tha dad du bya ba yod dam | rab byor gyis smras pa | jam dpal ming du btags pa la ni tha dad pa yod do || jam dpal gyis smras pa | btsun pa rab byor de bzhin du di lta ste | stong pa nyid dang | dpen pa nyid di ni ming dang brda tsam du zad de | ming dang brda la ni mkhas pa rnams mngon par zhen pa med kyi | byis pa rnams mngon par zhes to ||). 93. See supra notes 29 and 40. 94. See supra notes 49 and 52.
166
ferentiation.95 The antithesis between sameness and diversity encapsulates the incompatibility of language and meaning.
SAMENESS AND INEXPRESSIBILITY

Sameness dees verbal articulation. This emerges quite clearly from accounts of inexpressibility. In our sources, inexpressibility consistently appears alongside two attributes, non-apprehensibility and undistinguishedness. The former is the most frequent. It encompasses concepts such as non-origination (anutpda), ungraspability (anupalambha, anupalabdha) and essencelessness (nisvabhva). The Lakvatra closely connects the absence of essence with inexpressibility.96 The Vikurvarjaparipcch, Mahynopadea, Kualamlaparigraha and Jnloklakra link inexpressibility with the idea of unorigination and unsubstantiality.97 Finally, the Anavataptangarjaparipcch, Tathgatamahkarunirdea
95. See supra note 22. 96. Lakvatra, Tokiwa 153/Nanjio 116: The essence of the things distinguished by the intellect is not ascertained, therefore they are taught to be inexpressible (anabhilpya) and devoid of essence. (buddhy vivecyamnn svabhvo nvadhryate / tasmd anabhilpys te nisvabhv ca deit). In another passage, the Lakvatra explains the connection between non-substantiality and inexpressibility. It links inexpressibility with the unreal aspect of the world (parikalpitasvabhva): Again, Mahmati, what is the inexpressible emptiness of all constituent factors? It is that all constituent factors are inexpressible and empty because the parikalpitasvabhva is inexpressible. Therefore, it is called inexpressible emptiness. (Tokiwa 88/Nanjio 75: sarvadharmanirabhilpyanyat punar mahmate katam yaduta parikalpita svabhvnabhilpyatvn nirabhilpyany [Tokiwa: nirabhilpy] sarvadharm / tenocyate [Tokiwa: sarvadharma-] nirabhilpyanyateti //). 97. Vikurvarjaparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 185a6b1: Vikurvarja, the term dharma is synonym with dharmadhtu (chos kyi dbyings). Vikurvarja, the term dharmadhtu is synonym with the sphere of what is unborn, Vikurvarja, the term unborn is synonym with unoriginated. Vikurvarja, the term unoriginated is synonym with inexpressible. [] All constituent factors are without words and inexpressible in words. (rnam par phrul pai rgyal po chos zhes bya ba de ni chos kyi dbyings kyi tshig bla dgas so || rnam par phrul pai rgyal po chos kyi dbyings zhes bya ba de ni skye ba med pai dbyings kyi tshig bla dgas so || rnam par phrul pai rgyal po skye ba med pa zhes bya ba de ni byung ba med pai tshig bla dgas so || rnam par phrul pai rgyal po byung ba med pa zhes bya ba de ni brjod du med pai tshig bla dgas so || [] chos thams cad ni tshig med pa tshig tu brjod pa med pao ||). Mahynopadea, mdo sde, Ba, 290b46: What is unoriginated and undestroyed since the beginning is inexpressible in the three times. What is inexpressible in the three times is the essence of unsubstantial things (dngos po med pai ngo bo nyid). What is the essence of unsubstantial things is not measurable, it completely transcends measure. (gdod ma nyid nas ma skyes ma byung ba gang yin pa de ni dus gsum du brjod du med do || dus gsum du brjod du med pa gang yin pa de ni dngos po med pai ngo bo nyid do || dngos po med pai ngo bo nyid gang yin pa de ni bgrang ba med cing bgrang ba las shin tu das pao || bgrang ba med cing bglang ba las shin tu das pa gang yin pa de ni don dam pao || don dam pa gang min pa de ni sangs rgyas kyi bka yang dag pao ||); Kualamlaparigraha, mdo sde, Nga, 121b6: Wherever there is nirva there are not support-objects at all. Although it is called nirva, nirva is inexpressible. (gang der mya ngan das gyur na || de la chos dmigs yongs med de || mya ngan das zhes de brjod kyang || mya ngan das ni brjod du med ||); Jnloklakra, Study Group 2004, 110-112: Majur, realization of body and mind is called enlightenment according to linguistic conventions, but not according to the ultimate. Why? Because enlightenment is not linguistically expressible in terms of body, mind, constituent factor[s], non-constituent factor[s] (adharmea), real or unreal, truth or non-truth. Enlightenment, Majur, is not linguistically expressible in terms of anything (sarvadharmai).* Why? Because, Majur, enlightenment does not possess any basis which could undergo verbalization (nabodhi kicit sthna yena ca vyavahra gacchet). Since, Majur, the basis which is space is uncompounded, unoriginated, undestroyed and inexpressible, so enlightenment too is uncompounded, baseless, unoriginated,
Ligeia Lugli
167
and, again, the Jnloklakra associate the impossibility to verbalize paramrtha with the idea of non-apprehension.98 Prima facie, this could be taken to signal that inexpressibility results from inexistence. Such interpretation, however, is difcult to apply to our sources. It ill ts passages where inexpressibility qualies concepts like dharmat or tathat. For, the texts do not completely reject the ontic value of such aspects of reality.99 The second attribute paired with anabhilpya leads to a more convincing explanation. Undistinguishedness appears in the sources in two distinct forms: lack of distinctive features (nimitta) and sameness. These two concepts are closely connected. In the absence of nimitta individuals cannot be distinguished; they all merge into undifferentiated sameness. Featurelessness and sameness hold nonetheless a slightly different relationship to inexpressibility. The former causes inexpressibility, the latter constitutes what is inexpressible. The connection between the absence of nimitta and inexpressibility is well documented. Several stras list featurelessness together with transcendence from verbalization.100 Others, more signicantly, highlight a causal link between the two. The Tathgatamahkarunirdea, for instance, holds namelessness to be a consequence of featurelessness.101 The Samdhirja regards the Buddhas cosmic body as inexpressible because of its space-like lack of charundestroyed and inexpressible. Since, Majur, when one enquires into reality [one nds out that it] is not expressible in terms of any constituent factor, so when one enquires into real enlightenment too [one nds out that it] is not expressible in terms of anything. (yo majurr [sic] eva kyasya cittasya cvabodha / ayam ucyate majurr bodhi vyavahram updy na puna paramrthata / tat kasmd dhetor na majurr bodhi kyena v cittena v dharmea va adharmea va bhtena v / abhtena v satyena v m v vacany avacany majurr bodhi /* sarvadharmai tat kasmd dheto na majurr [sic] bodhi kicit sthna yena ca vyavahra gacchet / yath majurr kasthnam asaskta anutpannam aniruddha vacanya tath majurr [sic] bodhi asaskit asthn anutpann aniruddh avacany yath majurr bhta parigaveyama / sarvvadharmair [sic] avacanya / evam eva majurr [sic] bodhi bht parigaveyam sarvvadharmair [sic] avacany). * The pause must be moved after sarvadharmai (mdo sde, Ga, 294b4: byang chub ni chos thams cad kyis brjod par bya ba ma yin pa ste |; Taish 357 0246a05: ). 98. Anavataptangarjaparipcch, mdo sde, Pha, 239a7b1: Tathat and what conforms to tathat are not subject to arising and perishing. What is neither arisen nor perished is not subject to grasping, quarrel, debate, teaching, [or] verbal expression. (de bzhin nyid ji lta ba dang | de bzhin nyid gang yin pa de la chos thams cad kyi skye ba med | gag pa med do || gang mi skye mi gag pa de la dzin pa med | thab pa med | rtsod pa med | bstan pa med | shin tu brjod pa med do ||). Tathgatamahkarunirdea, mdo sde, Pa, 179a37 and Jnloklakra, Study Group 2004, 118: see supra note 62. 99. See, for instance, Anavataptangarjaparipcch, mdo sde, Pha, 239a7b1: see supra note 98; Samdhirja, XXII, 21, Vaidya 1961, 145: see infra note 102; Sadhinirmocana, mdo sde, Ca, 3a6b3, Lamotte 1935, 35-36: see supra note 64; Suvikrntadevaputraparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 104b2: see supra note 67. 100. See, for instance, Kualamlaparigraha, mdo sde, Nga, 216a3-4: Sthiramati, here, the gates of Dharma are a basis and support; they thoughtless, featureless, eortless, pure, completely pure, puried, inexpressible, without letters, unsayable, unteacheable. (brtan pai blo gros de la chos kyi sgo zhes bya ba ni gnas dang gzhin rnams yin te | de dag ni sems pa med pa | mtshan ma med pa | rtsol ba med pa | dag pa | rnam par dag pa | yongs su dag pa | brjod du med pa | yi ge med pa | yi ge las rnam par log pa | bstan du med pa dag yin no ||); Tathgatamahkarunirdea, mdo sde, Pa, 179a23: see supra note 83. Cf. infra note 115. 101. Tathgatamahkarunirdea, mdo sde, Pa, 221a3: Since they are without distinctive features, all constituent factors are nameless. (mtshan ma med pai phyir chos thams cad ni ming med pao ||). See also infra note 116.
168
acteristics.102 Space itself, indistinct and equal everywhere, is often associated with anabhilpya. In the Tathgatamahkarunirdea and Jnloklakra space represents what is inexpressible by denition.103 In its sameness nothing can be singled out or named. Hence, what is undistinguished is not subject to verbal articulation.104 Indeed, what lacks distinctive features cannot be identied at all. Absence of nimitta precludes the possibility of distinguishing and apprehending any object as an individual entity. Non-apprehensibility and undistinguishedness are, thus, ultimately the same.105 A handful of stras conrms this equation. The Suvikrntadevaputraparipcch explains that the Dharma is undifferentiated because it is thoroughly unoriginated.106 The Anavataptangarjaparipcch estab102. Samdhirja, XXII, 21, Vaidya 1961, 145: Without characteristics and without distinctive features, like space, my body is inexpressible. (alakao nirnimitto yathaiva gagana tath / kyo nirabhilpyo me). 103. Tathgatamahkarunirdea, mdo sde, Pa, 179a37 and Jnloklakra, Study Group 2004, 118: see supra note 62. 104. See, for instance, Jnloklakra, Study Group 2004, 8890: Enlightenment is sameness; sameness is tathat. All constituent factors, be they compounded or uncompounded, are established in tathat. Tathta is where there is no [distinction between] compounded or uncompounded, [where there is] no dualistic designation [at all]; where there is no [distinction between] compounded and uncompounded, [where there is] no dualistic designation [at all], that is tathat. [] Tathat is synonymous with meaning of reality (tattvrtha). This reality is suchness (tathtva). Suchness is just so: tathat and self are non-dual, not a dichotomy (advaidhkra). The non-dual artha is enlightenment and the artha which corresponds to realization. Artha is knowledge which gives access to the three gates of liberation in all doctrinal teachings. Knowledge consists of entering the sameness of all constituent factors in the three times. The undivided artha of all constituent factors is the artha; it is wordless (aruta), unspeakable, verbally inexpressible and outside the sphere of verbalization (vyhrasamucchinna). (y bodhi / s samat y samat s tathat tathtpratihit ca sarvvadharm [sic] sasktsaskt ca y ca tathat na tattra saskta nsaskta / na dvayaprajapti / yatra na saskta nsaskta na dvayaprajapti / s tathat / [] / tathat nmocyate / tatvrthdhivacanam [sic] etat tatvam [sic] ucyate / tathtva tathatvam [sic] ucyate / tathaiva tathat ctm cdvayam etad advaidhkra /* ya cdvayrtha sa bodhi cvabodhrtha / artha ucyate / trivimokamukhapravea jna / sarvvadharmanirddeeu [sic] jnam ucyate / tryadhvasamatvatra sarvvadharmev [sic] asabhedrtha ca / sarvvadharm [sic] / ayam ucyate artha / aruto nabhilpya / adhyhra / vyavhrasamucchinna /**). * Comparison with the Tibetan and Dharmarucis versions reveals that punctuation is probably misplaced here: mdo sde, Ga, 291a45: de bzhin nyid ces bya ba de ni de kho nai don gyi tshig bla dgas yin no || de kho na zhes bya ba ni de bzhin nyid kho nao || de bzhin nyid de kho na ni de bzhin nyid do || de bzhin nyid dang bdag de ni gnyis su med de gnyis su byar med do ||; Taish 357 244c2728: Adjusted to the phrasing of the translations, the Sanskrit sentence would read: tathat nmocyate tatvrthdhivacanam / etat tatvam ucyate tathtva / tathatvam ucyate tathaiva tathat ctm cdvayam etad advaidhkra / ya cdvayrtha sa bodhi cvabodhrtha /. ** Again, punctuation is dubious. Adjusted to the Tibetan, the text would read: artha ucyate trivimokamukha pravea jna sarvvadharmanirddeeu / jnam ucyate tryadhvasamatvatra sarvvadharmev / asabhedrtha ca sarvvasharm ayam ucyate artha / aruto nabhilpya adhyhra vyavhrasamucchinna // (Cf. mdo sde, Ga, 291a57: don ces bya ba ni chos bstan pa thams cad la rnam par thar bai sgo gsum du jug pa shes pao || shes pa zhes bya ba ni chos thams cad la dus gsum mnyam pa nyid du jug pao || chos thams cad kyi dbyer med pai don de ni don ces bya ste | don ni sgra med pa | don ni sgra med pa | brjod du med pa | tha snyad med pa tha snyad yang dag par chad pa yin no ||). 105. For a very dierent interpretation of the relationship between inexpressibility and nonapprehensibility, see Takahashi 1999 and 2000. 106. Suvikrntadevaputraparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 114b1: chos di ni yang dag par ma byung bai phyir
Ligeia Lugli
169
lishes an identity between non-origination and sameness.107 The Tathgatasagti, too, glosses non-apprehensibility as sameness: Blessed One, there is no accumulation of sameness; Blessed One, it is so because the sameness of all dharmas cannot be grasped.108 The same stra also connects non-apprehensibility with lack of nimitta:
Ungraspability corresponds to the fact that all constituent factors are without distinctive features. Great King, why are they without distinctive features? Great King, all constituent factors are seless. What is seless cannot be dened.109
Thus, non-apprensibility and undistinguishedness are both rooted in sameness. This means that, irrespective of association with either attribute, inexpressibility springs from sameness. The Lakvatra explains why this is so. Linguistic articulation, it holds, depends on two factors: perception of distinctive features (nimitta) and activation of discriminative conceptualization (vikalpa):
Mahmati, through discriminative conceptualization names are uttered; discriminative conceptualization functions through indicating the distinctive features (nimittavyajakam) [which identify] a thing as that thing and not another (idam evam ida nnyatheti), [and] by calling it [accordingly] elephant, horse, pedestrian, woman, man, and so on.110
Here, discriminative conceptualization apprehends unreal specic characteristics in the indistinct perceptual datum; then, it isolates the object that seemingly displays them; and nally, it compares these features with the characteristics that are peculiar to other objects. In this way, vikalpa contrastively denes each thing by distinguishing it from the rest.111 Nimittas are crucial to this process:
Here, Mahmati, a distinctive feature is what appears as the characteristic of a shape, gure, peculiar mark, appearance, form and so forth. A name is a designation such as jar and so on made for a certain distinctive feature (tasmin nimitte ghadisajktakam) [to indicate that a thing] is precisely that [thing] and not something else (evam ida nnyatheti). Mahmati, vikalpa, which is designated as mind and mental contents (cittacaittasaabdita), is [the faculty] through which [a person] articulates the name that indicates the distinctive features (nimittbhivyajaka) [which identify] [a thing] as that very same thing112 (sama
dbyer med pa yin no |. 107. Anavataptangarjaparipcch, mdo sde, Pha, 235b2: The non-origination of all constituent factors is synonym with sameness. (chos thams cad skye ba med pa zhes bya ba de ni mnyam pa nyid kyi tshig bla dags so ||). 108. Tathgatasagti, mdo sde, Dza, 259a6: bcom ldan das mnyam pa nyid kyi tshogs ma mchis pai slad du ste | bcom ldan das chos thams cad kyi mnyam pa nyid ni mi dmigs pa lags pai slad duo ||. 109. Tathgatasagti, mdo sde, Dza, 243a1-2: gzung bar bya ba ma yin pa zhes bya ba ni chos thams cad mtshan ma med pao || rgyal po chen po cii phyir mtshan ma med ce na | rgyal po chen po chos thams cad ni bdag med pa ste | gang dag bdag med pa de dag ni bstan du med pao. 110. Tokiwa 327/Nanjio 226: tatra vikalpa punar mahmate yena nma samudrayati / nimittavyajakam idam evam ida nnyatheti hastyavarathapadtistrpurudisajaka tad vikalpa pravartate /. 111. Cf. Williams 1980, 27. 112. Both Nanjio and Tokiwa read nimittbhivyajaka samadharmeti v. The phrase samadharmeti v poses some problems. The stra does not reveal either the value of v or the identity indicated by sama. Tokiwa construes it as a disjunctive and translates: indicating a sign as the
170
dharmeti v).113
Not all stras are quite as explicit in positing the need of nimitta and vikalpa for verbalization. Nevertheless, this connection is fairly widespread.114 Stras often assosame thing or not (Tokiwa 2003 translation, 424). The absence of a negative particle and the position of iti, however, would discourage such interpretation. It seems more likely that v stands here for eva (see Edgerton 1953, sub voce v). However it is dicult to reach a rm conclusion since this ambiguity probably springs from textual corruption. The denition of vikalpa at Tokiwa 327/Nanjio 226 (see supra note 110) contains a very similar sentence, but reads idam evam ida nnyatheti, instead of samadharmeti v. Chinese and Tibetan renditions do not display anything similar to samadharma. iknanda omits to spell out what is ascertained by vikalpa through recognition of nimitta (Taish 16n0672 0620c09: ). Guabhadra, Bodhiruci and the Tibetan version, instead, add concrete examples of objects individuated and named by vikalpa (Taish 16n0670 0511b1516: ; Taish 16n0671 0558a01113: ; mdo sde, Ca, 146a 7b1: blo gros chen po gang gis bde ba zheam | go cha zhes ming de brjod cing mtshan ma gsal bar byed pa sems dang sems las byung bar bsgrags pa de ni rnam par rtog pao ||). According to the Chinese recensions, vikalpa discerns objects, animals, etc. These examples are clear and t the context well. Less so the Tibetan pleasure or armour (bde ba zheam | go cha). Since it is lectio dicilior and diers remarkably from all other versions, the Tibetan may be closer to the original text. Perhaps on this basis, Yasui proposes to emend dharmeti with varmeti, which would correspond to the Tibetan go cha (Yasui 1976, 342). However, despite this philological conundrum, the overall sense of the sentence remains intelligible. 113. Tokiwa 330/Nanjio 228: tatramahmate nimitta yat sasthnkti vieakra rpdilakaa dyate tan nimittam / yat tasmin nimitte ghadisajktakam evam ida nnyatheti tan nma / yena tan nma samudrayati nimittbhivyajaka samadharmeti v sa mahmate cittacaittasaabdito vikalpa /. Cf. Tokiwa 326/Nanjio 226. 114. Scholars have long accepted the connection between vikalpa and verbalization (see Ruegg, 1971; Sharma 1991; Williams 1980). Such connection is well documented in Abhidharmic texts (see Cox 1995, 164165 for references to Nyynusra and Dhammajoti 2007, 105107 for references to Abhidharmadpa and *Abhidharmvatraprakara []. In our sources, however, evidence of a relationship linking vikalpa with language is extremely scarce and of minimal signicance. The Tathgatamahkarunirdea implies that normal linguistic activity comes to an end with the cessation of divisive conceptualization. But it arms that the tathgata speaks without engaging in vikalpa (mdo sde, Pa, 212b1). The Mahynopadea associates adhesion to letters with adhesion to vikalpa (mdo sde, Ba, 288b12). A few texts, nally, use vikalpa to report thoughts verbatim. This might be taken to signal that vikalpa is very close to discursive thought. However, the reported thoughts are highly discriminative in content. They thus appear to constitute primarily an example of the divisive nature of vikalpa, not of its necessary involvement in language (see, for instance, Anavataptangarjaparipcch, mdo sde, Pha, 214a45: [The bodhisattva practising the path of equanimity] does not engage in divisive conceptualizations like this [person] performs [his duties]; this [one] does not; this person teaches; this [one] does not; this [person] is worthy of oers, this [one] is not. dii ni byao || dii ni mi byao || di la ni bshad do || di la ni mi bshad do || di ni sbyin gnas so || di ni sbyin gnas ma yin no zhes de rnam par rtog pa la mi spyod de |; Jnloklakra, Study Group 2004, 60: Majur, the sun disk of the tathgatas knowledge does not divisively conceptualize: I shall teach the supreme Dharma for this being; for this one I shall not teach. He does not divisively conceptualize: This being is predisposed to the supreme [Dharma], this one is predisposed to an intermediate [teaching], this [other] is predisposed to the rvakayna; this being is inclined towards what is wholesome, this [other] is inferior [and] is inclined towards what is untrue. na punar majurs tathgatasryamaalasyaiva bhavati / asyhan satvasyodra dharman deayiymi / asya na deayiymti / na tasyaiva vikalpo bhavati / ayam udrdhimuktika satva / aya [sic] madhydhimuktita / ayam rvakayndhimuktita / aya kualaya / aya hno mithyaya iti /). The Lakvatras explicit denition of vikalpa as conditio sine qua non for verbal articulation is exceptional among our sources. It appears to be a fruit of the stras own elaboration of the pacadharma system (i.e. the Yogcra categoriza-
Ligeia Lugli
171
ciate nimitta with verbalization.115 Many link inexpressibility with lack of nimitta.116 Several treatises establish features as prerequisite for verbalization.117 Numerous texts also agree that nimitta constitutes the eld of application of vikalpa.118
tion of ve modalities of apprehension of reality. See Funahashi 1972, Kramer 2005, Suganuma 1967 and Takahashi 2005, 3447). The ve dharmas include nma, nimitta and vikalpa. As one would expect, texts expounding the pacadharma pay close attention to the relationship between language, features and divisive conceptualization. Other texts discussing the ve dharmas diverge from the Lakvatra in their denition of vikalpa. Our stra holds divisive conceptualization responsible for the attribution of names to features. The Ghanavyha and Vinicayasagraha link vikalpa to nimittas only; not to the naming process. The latter text, however, holds features and divisive conceptualization to be mutually caused. Hence it accepts that vikalpa contributes, to some extent, to the emergence of names (Ghanavyha, mdo sde, Cha, 17a2: Names arise because of distinctive features, they have distinctive feature as condition for arising; divisive conceptualization, too, arises from distinctive features. ming ni mtshan mai mthu las byung || mtshan ma rkyen las byung ba ste || mtshan ma las kyang rnam rtog byung ||; Vinicayasagraha, Kramer 2005, 72, Takahashi 2005, 125: From where should one explain distinctive features to arise? Reply: They arise from [previous] distinctive features and from previous divisive conceptualization. [...] From where should one explain divisive conceptualization to arise? Reply: They arise from [previous] divisive conceptualization and from distinctive features. rgyu mtshan gang las rab tu skye bar brjod par bya zhe na | smras pa | rgyu mtshan las rab tu skye ba dang | sngon gyi rnam par rtog pa las rab tu skye ba yin no || [] rnam par rtog pa gang las rab tu skye bar brjod par bya zhe na | smras pa | rnam par rtog pa las rab tu skye ba dang | rgyu mtshan las rab tu skye ba yin no ||). The Ghanavyha and Vinicayasagraha do agree with the Lakvatra in regard to the relationship between nimittas and names and nimittas and vikalpa. The three texts unanimously consider names to be based on nimittas (Ghanavyha, mdo sde, Cha, 16a4: Names arise through the force of distinctive features. mtshan mai mthu las ming byung ste; 42a6: Names are based on distinctive features. mtshan ma la ni ming rten te ||; Vinicayasagraha, Kramer 2005, 69 Takahashi 2005, 121: What is a distinctive feature? In brief, it is the object on which verbal expressions are based. What is a name? It is a designation for a certain distinctive feature. rgyu mtshan gang zhe na | mdor bsdu na | mngon par brjod pai tshig gi gzhii gnas su gyur pai dngos po gang yin pao || ming gang zhe na | rgyu mtshan de nyid la tshig bla dags gang yin pao ||). They also concur that vikalpa depends on nimittas (Ghanavyha, mdo sde, Cha, 42a56: Names are based on distinctive features; divisive conceptualization is established in [these] two. mtshan ma la ni ming rten te || gnyis la rnam par rtog pa gnas ||; Vinicayasagraha, Kramer 2005, 74 Takahashi 2005, 128: What is the characteristic of divisive conceptualization? Reply: To have distinctive features as eld of application. rnam par rtog pai mtshan nyid gang zhe na | smras pa | rgyu mtshan spyod yul pai mtshan nyid do ||). The discrepancy within the pacadharma discussion is consistent with the rest of our sources: the need for nimitta in verbalization appears to be widely accepted; the role of vikalpa in linguistic articulation is rarely, if ever, highlighted. 115. See, for instance, Buddhapiaka, mdo sde, Dza, 16a3, 16a7b3; Ghanavyha, mdo sde, Cha, 16a4, 17a2; Kualamlaparigraha, mdo sde, Nga, 216a3-4; Suvikrntadevaputraparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 118a34; Tathgatamahkarunirdea, mdo sde, Pa, 224b2. 116. See, for instance, Buddhapiaka, mdo sde, Dza, 3a5; Samdhirja, XXII, 21, Vaidya 1961, 145; Tathgatamahkarunirdea, mdo sde, Pa, 221a3. 117.Works as diverse as the Vinicayasagraha, Madhyntavibhgaik, Abhidharmadpa, Abhidharmvatraprakaraa and Mahprajpramitstra agree that the process of naming depends of the identication of nimittas (Vinicayasagraha, Kramer 2005, 69; for reference to the other texts see Yokoyama 1976, 9295). 118. See, for instance, Brahmavieacintparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 75a6; Dharmasagti, mdo sde, Zha, 80b4; Ghanavyha, mdo sde, Cha, 16a45; Mahynopadea, mdo sde, Ba, 288b4; Sgaramatiparipcch, mdo sde, Pha, 68a34. Some texts attribute the apprehension of distinctive features to saj. See Dhammajoti 2007b, 107108 for reference to Abhidharmvatraprakara () and Triatikvijaptibhya; Yokoyama 1976, 107 note 2 for reference to Abhidharmakoabhya, Abhisamylakrlokaprajpramitvykhy, Madhyntavibhgaik and Triik; Williams 1980 for further references and discussion of the
172
Dependence on nimitta and vikalpa affects rutas relationship with artha in two ways. First, it renders language incapable to express artha. Artha displays no features and transcends discrimination. 119 Hence, it does not full the requirements for linguistic articulation. Second, the involvement of nimitta and vikalpa in verbalization implies that language inevitably adulterates artha. Distinctive features and divisive conceptualization are the root of illusory diversity. As the product of these two, language necessarily involves plurality and differentiation.120
CONCLUSIONS
It is not possible to establish conclusively the reasons that led to the artha/ruta contrast. First, we lack explicit textual explanation of this polarity. Second, the references to this topic are fragmentary and scattered over many texts. Yet, those texts that discuss the opposition of words and meaning show signicant consistency in interpretation. Out of sixteen, fteen hold meaning to be inaccessible through words.121 Nine equate artha with reality.122 They all identify reality
role of saj in discerning nimittas and verbalizing. 119. Anavataptangarjaparipcch, mdo sde, Pha, 224b56: What lacks distinctive features (mtshan ma, *nimitta) is meaning. There discriminative conceptualization (rnam par rtog pa, *vikalpa) does not develop. (gang mtshan ma med pa ni don te | de la rnam par rtog pa rjes su rgyas par mi byed do |); Ratnakaraa, mdo sde, Ja, 251b57: Subhti said: Majur, the meaning is impossible to discriminate. Majur: replied So there distinctive features (mtshan ma) do not arise at all. (rab byor gyis smras pa | jam dpal don de ni brtag mi nus pao || jam dpal gyis smras pa | di ltar der mtshan ma kun du mi byung ngo ||). 120. See, for instance, Tathgatasagti, mdo sde, Dza, 248b35: [The Buddha said]: What is speech? Majur, speech is the diverse support. [Majur] said: Blessed One, what is the meaning of the expression diverse support? He replied: Majur, diverse support is the apprehension [characteristic] of speech: the apprehension of distinctive features and the apprehension of person; [i.e.] the apprehension of everything. [Majur] said: Blessed One, why is it the apprehension of everything? He replied: Because it is the apprehension of both. He said: Why is it the apprehension of both? [The other] replied: [Because] it is the apprehension of self and other. (smra ba gang zhe na | jam dpal smra ba ni gnas tha dad pa zhes byao || gsol pa | bcom ldan das gnas tha dad pa zhes bgyi bai tshig gi don gang lags | bka stsal pa | jam dpal gnas tha dad pa zhes bya ba ni smra ba dzin pai dzin pa ste | mtshan mar dzin pao || srog tu dzin pao || thams cad dzin pao || gsol pa | bcom ldan das cii slad du thams cad dzin pa lags | bka stsal pa | gnyi ga dzin pa yin pai phyir ro || gsol pa | cii slad du gnyi ga dzin pa lags | bka stsal pa | bdag tu dzin pa dang | gzhan du dzin pa ste). 121. Akayamatinirdea, mdo sde, Ma, 149b1, Braarvig 1988, 178: see supra note 19; Anavataptangarjaparipcch, mdo sde, Pha, 225a6: see supra note 10; Brahmavieacintparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 76b34: see supra note 18; Jnloklakra, Study Group 2004, 90: see supra note 67; Kualamlaparigraha, mdo sde, Nga, 120a16: see supra note 17; Lakvatra, Tokiwa 212214/Nanjio 154156: see supra note 29, Tokiwa 272281/Nanjio, 192197: see supra note 40; Mahynopadea, mdo sde, Ba, 272b7: see supra note 10; Ratnakaraa, mdo sde, Ja, 252a2: see supra note 11; Sgaramatiparipcch, mdo sde, Pha, 49b750a1: see supra note 10; Samdhirja, XXXII, 3 and 5, Vaidya 1961, 195: see supra note 51; Sadhinirmocana, mdo sde, Ca, 48b12, Lamotte 1935, 147: see supra note 53; Sarvapuyasamuccayasamdhi, mdo sde, Na, 102b67: see supra note 20; Suvikrntadevaputraparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 104b2: see supra note 67; Tathgatamahkarunirdea, mdo sde, Pa, 181a3: see supra note 68; Vikurvarjaparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 198a3: see supra note 22. 122. Akayamatinirdea, mdo sde, Ma, 145b37, Braarvig 1988, 169-170: see supra note 72; Jnloklakra, Study Group 2004, 90: see supra note 67; Mahynopadea, mdo sde, Ba, 270b4: see supra note 71; Sadhinirmocana, mdo sde, Ca, 3a6b3, Lamotte 1935, 3536: see supra note 64; Sarvapuyasamuccayasamdhi, mdo sde, Na, 102b12: see supra note 49; Suvikrntadevaputraparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 104b2: see supra note 67;
Ligeia Lugli
173
with featureless sameness and, more or less explicitly, dismiss diversity as illusory.123 Half hold artha to be undifferentiated.124 Half, again, indicate that language involves differentiation.125 About a third, nally, contrast the plurality of words with the singularity of meaning.126 Apart from their statistical value, these gures help us to approximate the thinking behind the artha/ruta contrast. They highlight a recurrent parallel between artha, reality and undifferentiation, on the one hand, with words, illusion and differentiation, on the other hand. Artha coincides with the ultimate and dees verbalization because of its sameness. Words pertain to the sphere of illusion on account of their diversity. This interpretation rests on two facts. First, our sources systematically link inexpressibility with sameness. Second, they show that verbal articulation depends on apprehension of unreal distinctive features. Ruta, hence, ineluctably portrays the plurality of unenlightened perception. Undifferentiated artha can only emerge without words.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Ulrich Pagel for his support during my PhD research and his untiring patience in reading through drafts of this paper. I also acknowledge that this research has been supported by AHRC.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
(References to Pali texts are to the Pali Text Society editions) Barclay, W.F. 1975. On Words and Meaning: The Attitude toward Discourse in the Lakvatra Stra. Numen 22 (1): 7079. Barber, A.W, ed. 1991. The Tibetan Tripitaka. sDe dge (Derge) bKa gyur. Taipei: SMC Publishing Inc. Braarvig, J. 19881989. Akayamatinirdeastra. 2 vols. Oslo: Solum.
Tathgatamahkarunirdea, mdo sde, Pa, 181a3: ibidem; Vikurvarjaparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 198a3: ibidem. The Lakvatra also refers to the assimilation of artha with reality, but indirectly: see supra note 69. 123. See supra notes 7883. 124. Akayamatinirdea, mdo sde, Ma, 148b23, Braarvig 1988, 176-177: supra note 52; Jnloklakra, Study Group 2004, 90: see supra notes 67, 89; Lakvatra, Tokiwa 272281/ Nanjio, 192197: see supra note 40; Mahynopadea, mdo sde, Ba, 270b4: see supra note 71; Samdhirja, XXXII, 3 and 5, Vaidya 1961, 195 and XII, 3, Vaidya 1961, 76: see supra note 51; Sarvapuyasamuccayasamdhi, mdo sde, Na, 102b12: see supra note 49; Tathgatasagti, mdo sde, Dza, 249b7250a1: see supra note 87; Vikurvarjaparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 198a2-4: see supra notes 22 and 50. 125. Akayamatinirdea, mdo sde, Ma, 148b23, Braarvig 1988, 176177: ibidem; Brahma vieacintparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 77b45: see supra note 92; Lakvatra, Tokiwa 327/Nanjio 226: see supra note 110, Tokiwa 330/Nanjio 228: see supra note 113; Ratnakaraa, mdo sde, Ja, 250b25: see supra note 92; Sadhinirmocana, mdo sde, Ca, 48b12, Lamotte 1935, 147: see supra note 53; Sarvapuyasamuccayasamdhi, mdo sde, Na, 102b12: ibidem; Tathgatasagti, mdo sde, Dza, 248b35: see supra note 120; Vikurvarjaparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 198a2-4: see supra note 22. 126. Akayamatinirdea, mdo sde, Ma, 148b23, Braarvig 1988, 176177: ibidem; Lakvatra, Tokiwa 272281 Nanjio, 192197: see supra note 40; Samdhirja, XII, 3, Vaidya 1961, 76 and XXXII, 3 and 5, Vaidya 1961, 195: see supra note 51; Sarvapuyasamuccayasamdhi, mdo sde, Na, 102b12: ibidem; Vikurvarjaparipcch, mdo sde, Ba, 198a24: see supra notes 22 and 50.
174
Buescher, H. 2008. The Inception of Yogcra-Vijnavda. Wien: Verlag der sterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Cabezon, J. I. 1981. The Concepts of Truth and Meaning in the Buddhist Scriptures. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 4(1): 723. . 1994. Buddhism and Language: A Study of Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism. New York: State University of New York Press. Clooney, F. X. 1987. Why the Veda has no Author: Language as Ritual in Early Mms and Postmodern Theology. Journal of the American Academy of Religion 55(4): 659684. doi:10.1093/jaarel/LV.4.659 Conze, E. 1953. The Ontology of the Prajpramit. Philosophy East and West 3(2): 117129. doi:10.2307/1397258 Cox, C. 1995. Disputed Dharmas: Early Theories on Existence. An annotated translation of the Section on Factors Dissociated from Thought from Saghabhadras Nyynusra. Tky: International Institute for Buddhist Studies. De La Valle Poussin, L. 1938. Buddhica. Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 3(2): 137160. Deleanu, F. 2006. The Chapter on Mundane Path (Laukikamrga) in the rvakabhmi: A Trilingual Edition (Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese) Annotated Translation and Introductory Study. 2 vols. Tky: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies. Dhammajoti, K. L. 2007a. Sarvstivda Abhidharma. Hong Kong: Centre of Buddhist Studies. . 2007b. Abhidharma Doctrines and Controversies on Perception. Hong Kong: Centre of Buddhist Studies. Edgerton, F. 1953. Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Freeman, Ch. E. 1991. Savti, Vyavahra and Paramrtha in the Akayamatinirdea and its Commentary by Vasubandhu. The Buddhist Forum 2: 97114. Funahashi, N. . 1972. goh to sansh ni tsuite . Indogaku Bukkygaku Kenky 21(1): 371376. Ganeri, J. 2006. ArthaMeaning. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Hamlin, E. 1983. Discourse in the Lakvatra-Stra. Journal of Indian Philosophy 11: 267313. Jaini, P.S. 1959. The Vaibhika Theory of Words and Meanings. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 22: 95107. doi:10.1017/S0041977X00076151 Johnston, E.H. 1950. The Ratnagotravibhga Mahyanottatantrastra. Patna: Bihar Research Society. Kan, E. . 1980. rygaky ni okeruyuishin. Indogaku Bukkygaku Kenky 29(1): 282285. Kramer, J. 2005. Kategorien der Wirklichkeit im frhen Yogcra. Wiesbaden: Dr Ludwig Reichert Verlag. Lamotte, E. 1935. Sadhinirmocana-stra: Lexplication des mystres. Louvain: Bureaux du Recueil. .1947. La critique d authenticit dans le bouddhisme. In India Antiqua, edited by Kern Institute, 213222. Leiden: Brill. .1949. La critique d interprtation dans le bouddhisme. Annuaire de lInstitut de Philologie et d Histoire Orientales et Slaves 9: 341361. .1973. La somme du grand vhicule dAsaga (Mahynasagraha). Louvain: Institute Orientaliste Louvain-la-Neuve. Lancaster, L. and S. Park. 1979. The Korean Buddhist Canon: A Descriptive Catalogue.
Ligeia Lugli
175
Berkeley: University of California Press. Lvi, S. 1907. Mahyna-strlakra: Expos de la doctrine du grand vhicule. Paris: Librairie Honor Champion. Lopez, D.S. Jr. 1988. On the Interpretation of the Mahyna Stras. In Buddhist Hermeneutics, edited by D.S. Lopez Jr., 4770. Honolulu: Hawaii University Press. .1995. Authority and Orality in the Mahyna. Numen 42(2): 2147. doi:10.1163/1568527952598800 Matthews, P.H. 2007. The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Linguistics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. McDermott, J. P. 1984. Scripture as the Word of the Buddha. Numen 31(1): 2239. doi:10.1163/156852784X00086 Nanjio, B. ed. 1923. The Lakvatra Stra. Kyto: tani University Press. Nattier, J. 2008. A Guide to the earliest Chinese Buddhist Translations: Texts from the Eastern Han Dong Han and Three Kingdoms San Guo Periods. Tokyo : International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology. Noriaki, A. . 2002. Yuishiki shis ni okeru zeki to songen ni tsuite: sanshsetsu no kakawari wo chshin toshite : . Indogaku Bukkygaku Kenky 54(2): 10221018. Ronkin, N. 2005. Early Buddhist Metaphysics: The Making of a Philosophical Tradition. London: Routledge-Curzon. Ruegg, D. S. 1989. Allusiveness and Obliqueness in Buddhist Texts: Sadh, Sadhi, Sadhy and Abhisadhi. In Dialectes dans les Littratures Indo-Aryennes, edited by C. Caillat, 295328. Paris: Collge de France. Schmithausen, L. 2007. Alayavijana: On the Origin and the Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogcra Philosophy. 2 vols. Tky: International Institute for Buddhist Studies. Sharma, T.R. 1991. Analysis of Word and Meaning in Mdhyamika Philosophy. Indologica Taurinensia 1718: 310332. Sideritis, M. 1986. The Sense-Reference Distinction in Indian Philosophy of Language. Synthese 89(1): 81106. doi:10.1007/BF01988288 Study Group on Buddhist Sanskrit Literature of The Institute for Comprehensive Study of Buddhism, ed. 2004. Jnloklakra: Transliterated Text Collated with Tibetan and Chinese Translations. Tky: Taish University Press, Suganuma, A. 1967. The Five Dharmas in the Lakvatrastra, Indogaku Bukkygaku Kenky 15(2): 963956. Sutton, F.G. 1991. Existence and Enlightenment in the Lakvatra stra: a Study in the Ontology and Epistemology of the Yogcra School of Mahyna Buddhism. Albany: State University of New York Press. Suzuki, D.T. 1999a. Studies in the Lakvatrastra. Delhi: Motilal Barnasidass (rst published London 1930). . trans. 1999b. The Lakvatrastra: A Mahyna Text. Delhi: Motilal Barnasidass (rst published London 1932). Takahashi, K. . 1999. daijron ni mirareru anabhilpya no yrei to bosatsuji no shiskeisei to kanren ni tsuite anabhilpya . Indo tetsugaku bukky gakky 6(3): 3164. . 2000. nimangosen ju hannya ni okeru k fukatoku fukasestu
176
.!Indo tetsugaku bukky gakky 7 (3): 4189. . ed. 2005. bosatsuji shinjitsugi hon kara!shkecchakubunchbosatsuji heno shis tenkai: vastu gainen wo chshin toshite vastu .!Tky: Sankibo. Takemura, M. . 1995. yuishiki sanshsetsu no kenky . Tky: Shunjsha . Tanji, T. 2000. On Samropa. In Wisdom, Compassion and the Search for Understanding, edited by J.A. Silk, 347368. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Tokiwa, G., ed. 2003. The Lakvatra-Ratna-Stram Sarva-Buddha-Pravacana-Hdayam. Restored from the Lakvatra Stra edited by Dr. Bunyu Nanjio, tani University Press, Kyto, 1923, Revised with Annotations According to the Guabhadra Chinese Version by Gishin Tokiwa. saka. . trans. 2003. A Jewel Scripture of Mahyna Thought and Practice. saka. Vaidya, P.L., ed. 1961. Buddhist Sanskrit Texts No. 2: Samdhirjastra. Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute. . ed. 1960. Buddhist Sanskrit Texts No. 4: Aashasrik Prajpramit. Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute. Wang, Y. 2001. Buddhism and Deconstruction: Towards a Comparative Semiotics. Richmond: Curzon. Williams, P. M. 1980. Language and Construction in the Madhyamaka. Journal of Indian Philosophy 8: 145. doi:10.1007/BF02539785 Wogihara, U. ed. 19301936. Bodhisattvabhmi: A Statement of the Whole Course of the Bodhisattva (Being Fifteenth Section of Yogcrabhmi). Tky. Yasui, K. . 1976. Bonbun wayaku nyrygaky . Kyto: Hzkan . Yokoyama, K. . 1976. Nimitta (s) ni tsuite nimitta (). Bukkygaku 1: 88111. Zacchetti, S. 2005. In Praise of Light: A Critical Synoptic Edition with an Annotated Translation of Chapters 1-3 of Dharmarakas Guang zan jing , Being the Earliest Chinese Translation of the Larger Prajpramit. Tky: The International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology.

Artha and Ruta in Lankavatara Sutra, Etc - Luigi

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Artha and Ruta in Lankavatara Sutra, Etc - Luigi

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

BSRV 27.2 (2010) 139176 doi: 10.1558/bsrv.v27i2.

Meaning without Words

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

THE RUTA/ARTHA CONTRAST

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

Meaning without Words

12. 13. 14.

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

The Brahmavieacintparipcch does the same:

The Akayamatinirdea, again, quotes the formula to demonstrate arthas inexpressibility:

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

Meaning without Words

The Lakvatra,23 nally, holds that reliance on words precludes realization:

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

RUTA AND ARTHA IN THE LAKVATRA

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

Meaning without Words

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

Meaning without Words

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

Meaning without Words

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

MULTIFARIOUS WORDS, UNIQUE MEANING

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

Meaning without Words

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

FROM SEMANTICS TO ONTOLOGY

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

Meaning without Words

The Lakvatra, again, clearly presupposes realist semantics:

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

Meaning without Words

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

Meaning without Words

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

Meaning without Words

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

Meaning without Words

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

Meaning without Words

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

Meaning without Words

SAMENESS AND INEXPRESSIBILITY

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

Meaning without Words

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

Meaning without Words

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

Meaning without Words

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011

Meaning without Words

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2011