G.R. No. L-48834, People v.

Marquez, 153 SCRA 700

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC DECISION September 14, 1987 G.R. No. L-48834 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs. ABELARDO MARQUEZ Y MARTINEZ, defendant. PADILLA, J.:Before the Court, on automatic review, is the decision * of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Ninth (9th) Judicial District, Branch X-Gumaca, convicting the accused Abelardo Marquez of the crime of rape with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Eva Alva, in the amount of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) and to pay the costs. 1 Padilla, J.: Before the Court, on automatic review, is the decision * of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Ninth (9th) Judicial District, Branch X-Gumaca, convicting the accused Abelardo Marquez of the crime of rape with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Eva Alva, in the amount of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) and to pay the costs. 1 The prosecution's version of the case, as summarized by the court a quo, is as follows:

FOR THE PROSECUTION That at about 1:00 P.M. of September 16, 1975, while the victim Eva Alva, a six year old girl, was with her brother, Gerardo, playing with other children on the seashore of Bo. Balubad, Atimonan, Quezon, the accused, Abelardo Marquez, approached Eva and took her with him towards the "Cotralco" compound, purportedly for Eva to watch or guard his banca near there; that about 5:00 P.M., the father of Eva, Geminiano Alva, came home from work and finding Eva not at home, started to look for her; that at about 6:00 P.M., Geminiano came upon the accused and asked him of the whereabouts of Eva; that after accompanying Geminiano to his house, the accused did not help anymore in looking for Eva and instead, ran away; that at about 7:00 P.M. of September 16, 1975, the body of Eva Alva was found floating in an abandoned toilet inside the "Cotralco" compound; that the Necropsy Report on the victim made at 11:36 P.M., September 16,1975 shows the following findings: "POST-MORTEM FINDINGS 1. Slight abrasion both zygomatic arch; 2. Wound lacerated 3/4 inch in length located at the fourchet down to the perineum 3. Vaginal opening, admits the thumb of the head wound is fresh and bleeds upon manipulation." I ; that the cause of death was "asphyxia" or suffocation; that she was raped before she died; that the probable time of death was more or less 7 to 9 hours before the autopsy was made; that on September 22, 1975, the accused surrendered to the barrio captain of Balubad, who brought him to the police authorities of Atimonan; that during the police investigation, the accused admitted raping and killing Eva Alva; that the voluntary admission of guilt by the accused was reduced to writing and duly sworn to before the then Municipal Judge of Atimonan, Honorable Manuel A. Roman. 2 On the other hand, the accused's version of the case, also as summarized by the court a quo, is as follows: FOR THE ACCUSED For the defense, the accused himself, Abelardo Marquez, Mariano Villareal and Efren Albea testified. From their testimonies, the version of the defense follows: That around 12:00 noon of September 16, 1975, the accused, together with Efren Albea left Barrio Balubad, Atimonan for Gumaca to buy paint; that after buying paint and having

merienda at Gumaca, they returned to Bo. Balubad arriving there at about 2:30 P.M. of the same date; that without Efren Albea leaving his side, the accused then played "mahjong" until 6:00 P.M. when Geminiano Alva came and asked for Eva Alva; that Geminiano Alva requested the accused in looking for the child and they looked for her in her house and at the seashore; that failing to find the child, the accused went home; that later, Geminiano went to the house of the accused and in an angry voice, called for the accused to come down and talk with him; that fearing Geminiano who had a bolo with him, the accused went out of his house and hid in the mountain until September 22, 1975 when he surrenderED to the Barrio Captain of Balubad, Mariano Villareal; that the barrio captain summoned a policeman and thereafter, the accused was brought to the municipal jail; that during the night, Patrolman Angel Francia investigated the accused for three times; that on the third time, Patrolman Angel Francia prepared an affidavit and told the accused to sign the same; that the accused fearing the way the policeman looked at him and without reading the contents of the affidavit affixed his signature thereto; that thereafter, the accused was placed back in jail and was not bothered in his sleep anymore during that night; that before the accused signed his affidavit, he was not told of his rights as an accused; that on April 21, 1976, the accused executed an affidavit before Fiscal Refazo stating therein that the reason why he signed his previous affidavit was for fear of being manhandled and that he was forced to admit the crime because he was told that should he refuse, he will be hanged; that when the accused subscribed to the truth of his earlier affidavit, Judge Roman did not read the contents thereof to him and was just told to raise his right hand; that the accused did not rape nor kill the victim as he was then in Gumaca at the time of the incident in question. 3 From the evidence adduced, both testimonial and documentary, the court a quo arrived at its version of the case, to wit: Premised on all the foregoing considerations, it is the finding of this Court that in the early afternoon of September 16, 1975, the accused Abelardo Marquez, asked Eva Alba who was then playing with other children, to go with him and guard his banca near the "Cotralco" at Bo. Balubad, Atimonan, Quezon; that Eva Alba knowing the accused, went with him; that reaching the compound of the "Cotralco," the accused decided to have carnal knowledge of her; that Eva Alba obviously pained by the rape being perpetrated on her, cried and shouted; that the accused, to prevent people from hearing her, covered her mouth and continued to rape her; that continuing to rape her, the accused found that she was no longer breathing as she suffocated; that the accused then carried her body and placed the same in an unfinished toilet pit near where

the rape was committed; that thereafter, the accused left the place and proceeded to Gumaca where he bought paint for his banca; that returning to Bo. Balubad, he played "mahjong" at Mang Eton and pretended nothing happened; that early that night of the same day, Geminiano Alba asked him of the whereabouts of Eva and requested him to look for her; that the accused went with him and pretended to look for her; that feeling he was strongly suspected after the body was discovered, the accused hid in the mountain, but unable to contain his guilt, surrendered to the Barrio Captain six days later; and that during the police investigation, fully aware of all his rights as an accused voluntarily executed and subscribed to his affidavit dated September 22, 1975. 4 After trial, as afore-stated, the trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, as defined and punished under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. He was sentenced accordingly. Accused raises the following assignment of errors: 1. that the court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged; and 2. the court erred when it finds the extrajudicial confession of the accused as admissible in evidence. 5 In support of the first assignment of error, accused contends that he could not be held guilty of the crime charged, as there was no single eyewitness to the commission of the crime. 6 After a thorough examination of the records of the case, the Court finds no reversible error committed by the trial court in finding the accused guilty of the crime charged. While there may be no eyewitness (except the accused himself) to the actual commission of this heinous crime perpetrated on a six (6) year old girl, there is however more than ample evidence clearly and unmistakably linking the accused as the author of the crime. Accused was the last person seen with the victim, Eva Alva. He was positively Identified by the prosecution witnesses Gerardo Alva and Sotero Ricafort. Gerardo Alva testified that at around

one o'clock in the afternoon of 16 September 1975, while he was playing with other children, including his sister Eva Alva, on the seashore of Bo. Balubad, Atimonan, accused approached his sister and told her to go with him to watch or guard his banca near the "Cotralco" compound. The testimony 7 of the nine year old witness, Gerardo Alva, reads: Q. Do you know Abelardo Marquez? A. Yes, sir. Q. Point him in Court. A. Yes, sir (Witness pointing to a person in the accused stand who, when asked of his name responded to be Abelardo Marquez), Q. Before your sister died on September 16, 1975, at about one o'clock of September 16, 1975, you and your sister Eva, together with other children of barrio Balubad are playing in the seashore, is it not? A. Yes, sir. We were playing. Q. And while you were playing there, you saw the accused Abelardo Marquez approached your sister Eva? A. Yes, sir. Q. And what did Abelardo do when he approached your sister? A. He accompanied her. "Isinama po." Q. Where did they go? A. Near the Cotralco, sir.

Q. After they have gone to the Cotralco, did you join your sister? A. Yes, sir, but he told me to return. I joined but I was ordered to return. Q. Who ordered you to return? A. Abelardo, sir. Q. And from that time on, you did not see your sister Eva alive anymore? A. No, sir. Another prosecution witness, Sotero Ricafort, also Identified the accused as the person whom he saw talking to the victim Eva Alva in the afternoon of 16 September 1975, and after which, he saw the accused and the victim going towards the direction of the "Cotralco." At about six o'clock in the evening of the same day, 16 September 1975, he learned that Eva Alva was dead. 8 Both prosecution witnesses testified that they saw the accused with the victim Eva Alva going to the direction of the "Cotralco" compound. The body of Eva Alva was found floating in an abandoned toilet pit inside the "Cotralco" compound. It was also established that the victim probably died seven (7) to nine (9) hours before the autopsy was made, which was about the same time that the victim was seen with the accused before her disappearance. Accused interposed the defense of alibi. The trial court correctly rejected his defense. The court said: "... the place of the incident is not of such distance as to preclude the accused from being in Gumaca and yet be in that place of the incident at the probable time of death of the victim. Especially so in this case where the accused also admitted that he was back in Bo. Balubad, Atimonan from Gumaca at about 2:30 P.M. of the same day, which time is also within the probable time of death of the victim as per Exhibit "A" for the prosecution (Necropsy Report Medico-Legal) ... " 9

Well settled is the rule that for alibi to prosper, it must be established by positive, clear and satisfactory evidence. The accused must show not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but that he must likewise demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its commission. 10 Moreover, flight is evidence of guilt. On direct examination, accused admitted hiding in the mountains for six (6) days after the death of Eva Alva, or until 22 September 1975. when he surrendered to the Barrio Captain of Balubad. 11 Accused questions the credibility of pro petition witnesses Sotero Ricafort and Ceferino Nieva claiming certain allegedly material contradictions and inconsistencies in their testimonies. The alleged contradictions and inconsistencies pointed out by the accused in the affidavit and testimony in court of said witnesses refer to minor details which do not destroy the credibility of the witnesses. On the contrary, they indicate that the witnesses were telling the truth and not previously rehearsed. 12 On the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of the accused, let it be noted that the preliminary questions of the police investigator informing the accused of his rights and his answers thereto, read as follows: 1. Tanong: Ito ba ay iyong nalalaman? Sagot: Opo, nalalaman ko po. 2. T: Bago ka magbigay ng salaysay sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay nalalaman mo ba na ikaw ay may karapatang manahimik at huwag sumagot sa ano mang tanong sa iyo at ang lahat ng iyong sasabihin sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaaring gamitin laban o panig sa iyo sa alin mang Hukuman? S: Nalalaman ko po, ngunit handa po akong magbigay ng salaysay sa pagsisiyasat na ito. 3. T: T: Nalalaman mo rin ba na ikaw ay may layang magkaroon ng manananggol sa pagsisiyasat na ito.

S: Nalalaman ko po, ngunit hindi ko na po kailangan sa ngayon ang manananggol at sa Hukuman na lamang kung kailangan pa. 4. T: T: Kung ikaw ay bigyan ko ng manananggol sa ngayon? S: Sa Hukuman na po. 13 The foregoing questions by the police investigator and the answers given thereto by the accused, satisfy, in our mind, the requirement under the 1973 Constitution then enforced, 14 that the accused be appraised of his constitutional right to remain silent and to counsel. Such questions substantially transmitted meaningful information to the accused regarding his aforesaid constitutional rights, as distinguished from a mere ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. 15 There was compliance with People v. Duhan where the Court said: ... As a rule, therefore, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution. He is not only. duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical terms, e.g., what the person under interrogation may or may not do, and in a language the subject fairly understands. (See People vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312; People v. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2.) In other words, the right of a person under interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the person has been "informed" of his rights. Now, since the right "to be informed" implies comprehension, the degree of explanation required will necessarily vary, depending upon the education, intelligence and other relevant personal circumstances of the person under investigation. Suffice it to say that a simpler and more lucid explanation is needed where the subject is unlettered. 16 We, therefore, agree with the trial court when it held in reference to accused's extra-judicial confession, thus:

... What is primarily important is whether or not said affidavit of confession was voluntarily executed by the accused and sworn to by and with the accused fully aware of all his rights. Aside from the presumption of regularity in the performance of the duties of public officers, the evidence for the prosecution, as well as the admission of the accused that he did appear before the said Judge and swore to the truth of the affidavit wherein it was clearly stated that beforehand, he had been informed of his rights as an accused, more than amply show that the law and jurisprudence on the taking of extrajudicial confession had been followed substantially. 17 It is clear that the accused in this case waived his right to counsel before making his extrajudicial confession. However, this waiver, according to a number of decisions 18 of the Court, to be valid, must be made with the assistance of counsel, otherwise, the extrajudicial confession would be inadmissible in evidence. 19 Even if we do not, however, consider the accused's extrajudicial confession, the judgment of conviction stands as the evidence, testimonial and documentary (exclusive of the extrajudicial confession) abundantly establish accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The crime committed by the accused is rape with homicide punishable by death under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Rep. Act No. 4111. Under the 1987 Constitution, 20 however, the penalty of death is abolished. 21 The penalty imposed by the trial court should, therefore, be reduced to reclusion perpetua. WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby affirmed with the modification that the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Eva Alva, in the amount of P30,000.00 and to pay the costs. SO ORDERED. Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur. Footnotes

* Penned by Judge Conrado R. Antona. 1 Decision, p. 7. 2 Rollo, pp. 5-6. 3 Rollo, pp. 6-7. 4 Rollo, p. 9. 5 Appellant's Brief, p. 1. 6 Appellant's Brief, p. 4. 7 TSN, 24 November 1976, pp. 4-5. 8 TSN, 24 November 1976, pp. 14-15. 9 Decision, p. 4. 10 People vs. Conrado, 145 SCRA 250, 255. 11 TSN, 8 November 1977, pp. 5-6. 12 People v. Abigan, 144 SCRA 130,136. People vs. Natipravat, 145 SCRA 483, 493. 13 Original Folder of Exhibits, p. 5. 14 Sec. 20, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,

intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. 15 People v. Albofera and Laurian, G.R. No. 69377 20 July 1987. 16 142 SCRA 100, 107. 17 Rollo, Decision, p. 9. 18 Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, G.R. No. 61016, 26 April 1983, 121 SCRA 538; People vs. Albofera, et. al., G. R. No. 69377, 20 July 1987. Some members of the Court have their reservations on the ruling that waiver of the right to ' counsel must at all times be made with the assistance of counsel for the admissibility of an extra-judicial confession made without assistance of counsel. The writer of this opinion shares the same reservations in reference to the 1973 Constitution. As stated in his concurring opinion in People vs. Marco Polo y Fullante G.R. No. 72899, 30 January 1987, the waiver of the right to counsel, made in the absence of counsel, may be valid in the light of the facts of each case. 19 This is now the rule under Section 12 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly requires that the waiver of the right to counsel be in writing and made in the presence of counsel, otherwise, the extra-judicial confession is inadmissible (Section 12 (3), Article III). 20 Sec. 19 (1), Article III. 21 A case like the one at bar argues strongly for the restoration of the death penalty.

G.R. No. L-26344, Hawaiian-Philippine Company v. Asociacion de Hacenderos de Silay-Saravia Inc. et al., 151 SCRA 306
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

DECISION

June 30, 1987

G.R. No. L-26344 HAWAIIAN-PHILIPPINE COMPANY, appellant, vs. ASOCIACION DE HACENDEROS DE SILAY-SARAVIA, INC., ARSENIO J. JISON, CONRADO MANALANSAN, in his capacity as Acting Administrator, Sugar Quota Administration, RENATO MALIJAN, LETICIA GOLEZ ARANETA, FELIX GOLEZ, TRINIDAD SONORA, JULIAN F. GONZAGA, ROMEO S. GAMBOA, AQUILES V. ASCALON, PEDRO M. SAJO, BENJAMIN SAJO, FRANCISCO SAJO, JR., JOSE H. TANPINCO, POMPEYO H. LOPEZ, SERAFIN R. GAMBOA, EDILBERTO L. GOLEZ, GREGORIO V. ASCALON, SEVERINO DE LA CRUZ, JULIO JAVELOSA, NIMFA JAVELOSA SOLINAP, NATIVIDAD JUNTADO, OSCAR LEDESMA, CIRIO LOCSIN, GUILLERMO LOCSIN, CESAR D. CUAYCONG, JOSE D. CUAYCONG, JESUS D. CUAYCONG, EDUARDO LEDESMA, GENARO G. LEDESMA, FRANCISCA M. VDA. DE LOCSIN, RAMONA M. SOLATORIO, JESUS JALBUENA, VICTORINO FERMIN, MONTSERRAT G. VDA. DE HECHANOVA, LORETO SOLINAP, FELIX LEDESMA, ARSENIO J. JISON, FERNANDO JALBUENA, DOMINADOR C. HERNAEZ, HONORATO GAMBOA, ADRIANO L. LOCSIN, AGUINALDO S. GAMBOA, JOSE L. GOLEZ, DOROTEO S. HUGO, MANUEL S. HOFILENA, JOSEFA LACSON, ROMEO G. LACSON, GREGORIO M. SAJO, PABLO L. JISON, LUIS GAMBOA,CONCEPCION A. DE GAMBOA, AUGUSTO H. SEVERINO, TARCILA VDA. DE ARSAGON, JOSEFINA T. VDA. D E LACSON, LADISLAO SAJO, CARLOS J. JALANDONI, AQUILES SAJO,

ANTONIO C. SANCHEZ, BENJAMIN L. LOCSIN, SERAFIN L. GOLEZ, ROMEO S. LEDESMA, SALVADOR J. ASCALON, MARCELINO PAVIERA, FERNANDO SOBERANO, JOSE MA. LOCSIN, JOSE C. LOCSIN, GERMAN L. UNSON, FERNANDO F. GONZAGA, EDGARDO O. LEDESMA, ALICIA SAJO MELLIZAR, ALFREDO L. NAVAS, BENJAMIN J. BAUTISTA, RODOLFO N. PISON, NATALIO G. VELEZ, AND FRANCISCO Q. MARAVILLA, RAMIRO L. GOLEZ, appellees. ASOCIACION DE HACENDEROS DE SILAY-SARAVIA, INC ET AL., appellants, vs.

, J.:

These are appeals taken by both parties from a decision of the then Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch II) in Civil Case No. 50760, * entitled, "HAWAIIAN-PHILIPPINE COMPANY v. ASOCIACION DE HACENDEROS DE SILAY-SARAVIA, INC., et al.", which upheld the constitutionality of Republic Acts Nos. 809, 1825 and 1072, as well as from its Order dated February 11, 1966, denying the separate motions for reconsideration filed by both parties.

Hawaiian-Philippine Company, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Central) is a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines. It owns and operates a sugar mill situated at Silay-Hawaiian Central, in the Silay-Saravia Mill District, Negros Occidental.

Asociacion de Hacenderos de Silay-Saravia, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the Association) is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines and is the bargaining representative of some sugar cane planters.

A plantation is adherent by virtue of sugar cane being delivered therefrom to a mill regardless of contract relations between the mill company and the plantation owner and/or any other person cultivating sugar cane on the plantation (Act 4166, Sec. 1, par. 4 [c]).

The facts of this case are as follows:

On March 30, 1953, Central and the association, acting in behalf of the individual sugarcane planters of the Silay-Saravia District adherent to the petitioner, entered into a memorandum

agreement (Joint Record on Appeal, Vol.' I, pp. 35-36) wherein it was agreed that: (a) the period of the individual milling contract shall cover twelve (12) crops up to and including the 1963-1964 crop; (b) the sharing of the sugar and molasses between the Planter and the Mill for the first six sugar crops will be 63% for the Planter and 37% for the Mill and from the seventh crop (1958-1959) up to and including the twelfth crop, (1963-1964) 36 1/2% for the Planter and 63 1/2% for the Mill; and (c) in the event that the total production for any one crop reaches 1,200,000 piculs or more, the sharing will be 64% for the Planter and 36% for the Mill.

It was also agreed that the Central recognizes the Asociacion de Hacenderos de Silay-Saravia or its successors in interest as the sole agent of the planters of the Silay-Saravia Mill District and that the mill binds itself not to enter into milling contracts with any individual planter except through the Asociacion de Hacenderos de Silay-Saravia.

In 1961, the Association made it known to the petitioner that respondents Jison, et al., wanted to open negotiations for a new milling contract. Central was at first reluctant to enter into any negotiation because the milling contract had still three (3) years to run, but finally acceded to the wishes of the Association, et al. In the course of the negotiations, the Association acting for the sugar planters adherent to Central, demanded a new milling contract on the basis of 70% participation for the planters and 30% for the sugar mill, and eventual purchase by the Association, et al. of the Central. At first, Central made it known to the Association et al that its majority stockholders were not willing to sell. Later, however, Central made a counter offer and expressed willingness to sell for $14,000,000.00. The planters finally agreed on the price of $14,000,000 which is well above their original offer of P30,000,000. However, they could not agree on the terms of payment and the negotiations finally collapsed. In April, 1962, the Association et al. pressed its demand for a 70-30 participation and eventual purchase of the Central and made it known to Central that unless the sale pushed through, the planters would purchase and install a new mill in the SilaySaravia District to be operated by the sugar planters. Thereafter, the Association et al organized the Agricultural Industrial Development Company of Silay-Saravia District to be operated by the sugar planters with the primary purpose of establishing and operating a sugar mill and the utilization of its by-products, as well as the acquisition and maintenance and operation of such equipment to carry out its purposes. A 15-year milling contract starting from the 1964-1965 crop between the Agricultural Industrial Development Company of the Silay-Saravia and the planters was prepared and the latter negotiated for the purchase of a sugar mill abroad. The planters then addressed a letter dated May 14, 1962 to the Acting Administrator of the Sugar Quota Administration informing him

of their intention to construct and operate their own central. The Sugar Quota Administrator endorsed the said letter to the Philippine Sugar Association for its comment and recommendation CFI Joint Record on Appeal, pp. 831-833). However, before the Philippine Sugar Association could give its comment, Civil Case No. 50760, for Declaratory Relief, was filed by petitioner HawaiianPhilippine Company, Inc. against the Asociacion de Hacenderos de Silay-Saravia, Inc., Arsenio J. Jison and other individual sugar cane planter adherent to the Central members of respondent Association in the Court of First Instance of Manila on June 20, 1962, later amended on July 27, 1962, praying for judgment: (1) Declaring Section 1 and related ones of Republic Act No. 809 and Section 4 and concordant ones of Republic Act No. 1825 unconstitutional and hence, null and void; (2) In any event, defining the rights and obligations of Central and Arsenio J. Jison, et al. and other sugar cane planters similarly situated under the statutory provisions herein referred to, more particularly declaring that, under said provisions: (a) the sugar cane planter or plantation owner is not the owner of the totality of the sugar production allowance or quota; (b) the sugar production allowance, or sugar production coefficient (totality of the quota as to each plantation) is indivisible and intransferable except as a whole and with the consent of both mill and plantation owner or planter; (c) the plantation owner or sugar cane planters can not establish a new central in a district where there is a milling contract in force and the existing central can satisfactorily meet the milling needs of planters therein; (d) the plantation owner or sugar cane planter can not transfer the production allowance and coefficient or quota to a central which did not produce sugar during the pre-war years specified under Philippine and American sugar quota legislations; (e) the plantation owner or sugar cane planter can not transfer the quota to any other central, so long as the existing central in the district is willing to grant him the sharing participations establish under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 809 in the absence of a written milling contract, assuming the constitutionality and effectiveness of said Act (Amended Petition, Joint Record on Appeal, Vol. 1, pp. 116-117). Still later on February 10, 1964, the petition was further amended reiterating the above prayer and praying further that Section 9 of Act 4166 as amended by Section 3 of R.A. 1072 be declared constitutional and that it has not been modified, repealed or replaced by Section 4 or any other provision of R.A. 1825 (Ibid, pp. 457-458).

On July 30, 1965, the lower court rendered its Decision declaring the constitutionality of the assailed laws. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that Sections 1 and 2, Republic Act 809, Section 4, Republic Act 1825, and Section 3, Republic Act 1072, are valid and constitutional; that

the respondent planters cannot transfer their export sugar, or "A" and "AA" sugar to a central which did not produce sugar in 1940; and that the respondent planters cannot transfer their export quota, or "A " and " AA " sugar to any other central as long as the petitioner is willing to grant them the participations provided for in Section 1, Republic Act 809 in the absence of a milling contract, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

(Joint Records on Appeal, Vol. II, p. 873)

Both parties moved for the reconsideration of the above decision. With the denial of the Motion, both parties appealed.

In brief, Central as appellant raised the following issues: (1) Constitutionality of: Sections 1, 4 and 9 of Republic Act 809, Sections 4 and 5 of Republic Act 1825 and Section 3 of Republic Act 1072 amending Section 9 of Act 4166, for being violative of the constitutional guarantees against impairment of the freedom of contracts, denial of equal protection of the laws, taking of private property for public use without due process and without just compensation and impairment of vested rights and (2) validity of: aforesaid laws for being violative of treaty commitments previously entered into by the Govemment of the Republic of the Philippines.

On the other hand, the Association et al as appellants raised as their main issue: whether or not planters whose 1953 memorandum agreement or milling contract with petitioner has already expired with the 1963-64 Crop and have no new milling contract with Central, may validly adhere their plantations to their own central and thereby transfer the quotas attached to such plantations to the new central without the consent of petitioner Hawaiian Philippines.

As incidents thereto, the Association et al raised the following qqqig issues: (a) whether or not they as planters may transfer their export and domestic quotas despite Central's willingness to give them the participation under Republic Act 809; (b) whether or not the planters in the absence of, or upon termination of written milling contracts, establish and operate their own central, adhere their plantation thereto and transfer their quotas to the same without the consent of the old Central; (c) whether or not the export production allowance which may be transferred from one mill district to

another under Section 4 of Republic Act 1825 includes not only the planter marketing allotment but also the mill marketing allotment and (d) whether or not Central, in entering into a memorandum agreement where it is required to tear down its railway tracks within two years after the expiration of the agreement, waived its absolute right to mill the planters sugarcane.

The main issue raised by Central in this case is the constitutionality of the sugar laws above enumerated.

The question of constitutionality of Republic Act 809 was laid to rest in the case of Asociacion de Agricultores de Talisay-Silay, Inc. vs. Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. (88 SCRA 294 [1979]) where the Supreme Court squarely ruled that:

Republic Act 809 is a social justice and police power measure for the promotion of labor conditions in sugar plantations, hence whatever rational degree of constraint it exerts on freedom of contract and existing contractual obligations is constitutionally permissible.

Anent the indictment that Republic Act 809 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution, the Supreme Court in ruling in favor of the constitutionality of the law, upheld the standard used by the legislature which is the amount of production in each district.

Republic Act 1825 and Republic Act 1072 amending Act 4166 covering as they do the same subject, i.e. sugar production partake of the same nature as Republic Act 809 and for the same reasons as above stated, cannot be considered constitutionally objectionable.

In fact, the Supreme Court ruled in Lutz v. Araneta (52 O.G. p. 1997 Nos. 4-6 [1956]) as follows:

This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that sugar production is one of the great industries of our nation, sugar occupying a leading position among its export products, that it gives employment to thousands of laborers in field and factories, that it is a great source of the state's wealth, is one of the important sources of foreign-exchange needed by our government, and is thus pivotal in the plans of a regime committed to a policy of currency stability. Its promotion, protection and advancement therefore, redounds greatly to the general welfare. Hence it was competent for the legislature to find that the general welfare demanded that the sugar industry should be stabilized in

turn, and in the wide field of its police power, the lawmaking body could provide that the distribution of benefits therefrombereadjustedamongitscomponents. ...

Once it is conceded as it must, that the protection and promotion of the sugar industry is a matter of public concern it follows that the legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection and expedient for its promotion. Here the legislative discretion must be allowed full play, subject only to the test of reasonableness.

Republic Act 1825, Section 4 refers to the transfer of export production allowances (quota) from one mill district to another which may be done under two conditions, namely: (a) when there is no milling contract between the planter and miller or when said contract shall have expired; and (b) when the mill of the district in which the land of the planter lies is not willing to give him the participation laid down in Section one of Republic Act Numbered Eight hundred nine regarding the division of shares between the sugar mill and plantation owner.

On the other hand, Section 9 of Act 4166 as amended by Republic Act 1072 refers to the transfer of domestic quotas which may be done under the sole condition of absence or expiration of a milling contract.

It is Central's view that aforesaid legislations are a deprivation of its vested rights without due process of law and without just compensation as well as a denial of equal protection of the laws. It claims that it has property rights in the sugar production allowance or quota appertaining to the Silay-Saravia Milling District which had become vested long before Republic Act 1825 went into effect.

This is not correct. There is no vested right in sugar quotas, because they depend on future contingencies.

And even granting that quotas can be considered as vested rights, it is beyond dispute that they, like any property rights, are subject to the regulation and control of the State under its police power. In recognition of this power of the State, the Supreme Court in Suarez v. Mt. Arayat Sugar Co., (96 Phil. 722) held that in case the central and the planter cannot agree on the disposition of the quota, it

is within the competence of the Sugar Quota Administrator, now the Sugar Quota Board, to reallocate the quota without compensation.

In case the mill and the planters cannot agree, as in the case at bar, no plausible reason can be found why the State cannot legislate and provide the sharing system that will prevent an impasse which is disastrous to the sugar industry.

Likewise, there can be no argument, that in the absence of a milling contract or the expiration of one, planters may transfer their quotas for domestic sugar to the AID SISA Mill established by them even without the consent of Central.

On the other hand, the Association et al's contention that as planters they can adhere their plantations with their corresponding quotas to the new central they established in the same district, despite Central's willingness to give them the participation provided in Republic Act 809, is untenable. To allow this would be less than fair, eminently less than just.

Finally, the memorandum agreement between the Mill and the plantation owners where the former is required to tear down its railway tracks after the expiration of the agreement cannot be taken as a waiver of its absolute right to mill the planters' sugarcane. Nowhere has it been shown that Central had abandoned its right and obligation to mill the sugarcane of the planters. On the contrary, it has manifested that it would abide by the terms of the agreed sharing basis, if the Court finds the same valid and enforceable.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court RESOLVED to DISMISS both appeals, and to AFFIRM the assailed decision.

Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, C.J., and Fernan, JJ., took no part. Footnotes * Penned by Judge Jose N. Leuterio.

G.R. No. L-17389, People v. Miranda, 5 SCRA 1067

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC August 31, 1962 G.R. No. L-17389 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MAMERTO S. MIRANDA, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Mamerto S. Miranda for and in his own behalf as defendant-appellant.

PAREDES, J.: Mamerto S. Miranda was charged before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City with the crime of Estafa, Thru Falsification of Commercial Documents, under the provisions of article 315, in relation to article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds that the evidence presented by the prosecution fails to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt; it failed to show that the accused had taken advantage of his position and abuse the confidence reposed on him by the complaining witnesses; and it also failed to show that the complaining spouses were made to sign all the papers and documents pertaining to the loan inducement and representation

exercised on their persons the accused. However, the Court also finds that while the complaining witness Mariano Mojica, at least, was fully aware the second loan of P2,000.00, the said amount was not received by the spouses but was retained by the accused under an arrangement made by him and Mojica. Therefore the Courtacquits the accused from the charge contained in the information up a reasonable doubt but finds him civilly liable for the proceed of the loan of P2,000.00 contracted by the complaining spouses from the Rural Bank of Novaliches, together with all expenses incident thereto, and he is hereby ordered to pay the said amount for the purpose of discharging the said obligation with the Rural Bank of Novaliches. The bond for the provisional liberty of the accused is hereby cancelled; with costs de oficio. Accused Miranda appealed from the above decision, assailing that portion ordering him to pay the sum of P2,000.00. There are no questions of fact involved. In his brief, appellant contends that the civil liability which is included in the criminal action as provided for in Section 1, Rule 107 of the Rules, is that arising from and as a consequence of the criminal act. Since the court had acquitted the appellant, on the principal ground that the money had been received or retained by accused-appellant pursuant to an arrangement between the latter an the offended party Mojica, in order to conceal the transaction from the other offended party, Mrs. Mojica, it was improper and unwarranted to impose civil liability in same criminal action. The position of the appellant is sustained by the Solicitor General who, in his brief, recommended that the portion of the decision ordering the appellant to pay or making him liable for the sum of P2,000.00, be set aside. The issue involved in this case has been passed upon by Us in several cases. Thus, in the identical case of People v. Pantig, We said The appellant argues that the civil liability which is included in the criminal action is that arising from and as consequence of the criminal act, and that since the defendant appellant was acquitted in the criminal case, no civil liability arising from the criminal charge could be imposed upon him. xxxxxxxxx

The trial court found as a fact that the sum of P1,200.00 ordered to be paid in the judgment of acquittal was received by the defendant-appellant as loan. This finding is inconsistent with the existence of the criminal act charged in the information. The liability of the defendant for the return of the amount so received arises from a civil contract, not from a criminal act, and may not be enforced in the criminal case." (G.R. No. L-8325, Oct. 25, 1955). (See also MRR Co. vs. Baltazar, 49 O.G. 3874; Pueblo v. Abellara, 69 Phil. 623; People v. Maago 69 Phil. 496). In the present case, instead of a loan, the appellant retained the money because of an arrangement with Mr. Mojica, heretofore mentioned. Verily, the findings of the trial court on the matter of civil liability is inconsistent with the nonexistence of the criminal act charged in the information (Peo v. Pantig, supra). IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, that portion of the decision appealed from, which orders the defendant-appellant Mamerto S. Miranda to pay the sum of P2,000.00 to the complaining spouses, is hereby set aside, reserving to the offended parties the right to institute the corresponding civil action for the recovery of the said amount. No costs. Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Concepcion, Labrador, Barrera, Reyes, J.B.L., Regala, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., concur. Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.