Third Division

SUPREMP COURT THIRD DlVISION

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LITO CORPUZ,
Petitioner,

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Recehvd by:

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G.R. No. 180016

. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

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Respondent.

COMMENT
(On the Petition for Review onCertiorari dated November S, 2007)

Respondent People of the Philippines, by counsel, in compliance with this Honorable Court's Resolution dated January 21, 2008, 1 respectfully states:

NATURE OF THE PETITION

This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals' Decision dated March 22, 2007, affirming with modification the Judgment dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding petitioner Lita Corpuz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
Copy received by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on February 29, 2008. On March 7, 2007, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment praying that it be given an additional period of sixty (60) days from March 10, 2008 or until May 9, 2008 within which to file the required comment. Hence, this Comment is being filed within the period prayed for.
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ENT Lito Corpuz vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 180016

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crime of estafa, as well as the Resolution dated September 5, 2007, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

RELEVANT ANTECEDENTS

Sometime in 1990, Danilo Tangcoy met petitioner at the Admiral Roya le Casino in Olongapo City. Both were employed as
1.

collection agents of JBL Incorporated, a loan and financing company. Aside from being an agent, Tangcoy was also engaged in the business of buying and selling jewelry.

On May 2, 1991, petitioner inquired from Tangcoy if he had any jewelry for sale. At that time, Tangcoy had with him several

pieces of jewelry which he bought in Thailand: (1) an 18k diamond men's ring worth P45,000.00; (2) a 2-baht 22k ladies' bracelet worth P12,000.00; (3) a 3-baht 22k men's bracelet worth P25,000.00; and (4) a 2-baht 22k men's bracelet worth P16,000.00. The total value of the jewelry was P98,000.00. 2

Petitioner told Tangcoy that he was interested to sell the jewelry. They agreed that petitioner will sell the jewelry on

commission within sixty (60) days. Upon the lapse of such period,

TSN, December 17, 1992, pp. 5-6.

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petitioner shall remit the sale proceeds to Tangcoy or return the jewelry, if unsold. 3

On July 5, 1991, after the lapse of the 60-day period, Tangcoy waited for petitioner to pay remit the sale proceeds or return the jewelry, but petitioner failed to do so. 4

After constantly searching for petitioner, Tangcoy finally located him after two (2) months. Petitioner promised to pay for the jewelry but failed to do so. 5

Petitioner was then charged before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 75, Olongapo City with the crime of estafa, in an Information which reads:

That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July, 1991, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, after having received from one Danilo Tangcoy, one men's diamond ring, 18 k worth P45,000.00; one (1) three baht men's bracelet, 22k worth P25,000.00; one two-baht men's necklace, 22k worth P16,000.00; and one (1) two-baht ladie's bracelet, 22 k worth P12,000.00, or in the total amount of Ninety Eight Thousand Pesos (98,000.00), Philippine Currency, under the express obligation on the part of said accused to remit the proceeds of the sale of the said items or to return the same, if not sold, but said accused, once in possession of the said items, with intent to defraud, and with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, and far from complying with his aforestated obligation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
3
4

Id., pp. 6-7. Id., pp. 9-10. 5 Id., p. 10.

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C0 MMENT Lita Corpuz vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 180016

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feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the aforesaid jewelries or the proceeds of sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, the accused failed and refused to return the said items or to remit the amount of Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos (P98,000.00) Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy in the aforementioned amount. CONTRARY TO LAW. 6

Upon arraignment, with assistance of counsel, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

On July 30, 2004, after trial on the merits, the trial court rendered Judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for four (4) years and two (2) months as minimum to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months as maximum.7

Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. On March 22, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a

Decision affirming with modification (as to the penalty) the trial court's judgment. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the said decision, but the motion was denied in a Resolution dated September

5, 2007.
Hence, this appeal.
6 7

Judgment, July 30, 2001, p. 1.

Id., p. 5.

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Lita Corpuz vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 180016

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ISSUES
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT'S WERE RULING THAT THE EXHIBITS ADMISSIBLE.

II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THE INFORMATION WAS NOT FATALLY DEFECTIVE.

III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT DEMAND TO REMIT THE SALE PROCEEDS OR RETURN THE JEWELRY WAS SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED.

i.

IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT PETITIONER'S GUILT WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

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ARGUMENTS

The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to object to their admissibility during trial.

Petitioner contends that Exhibit "A" (receipt dated May 2, 1991) and its sub-markings were improperly admitted, as they consisted of mere photocopies, the originals of which were never presented or the reason for their loss or destruction explained. 8

As the Court of Appeals aptly explained:

xxx Such argument is untenable. An examination of the records discloses that [petitioner] did not object to the admissibility of the said document at the time it was identified and marked in court as well as testified upon by the private complainant. Neither did he raise such objection in his Comment to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence. Instead, [petitioner] admitted having signed the same. As such, any objection to its admissibility is deemed waived. 9

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It has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that

objections to the admissibility of evidence must be made at the proper time, otherwise, it be deemed waived. documentary evidence, the proper time is In the case of when from the

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Petition, November 5, 2007, p. 7. 9 Decision, March 22, 2007, p. 5. (citations omitted)

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..,..COMMENT
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presentation of the proof, the inadmissibility of the evidence may be inferred. 10

The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently stated the designation of the offense and the acts complained of.

Petitioner contends that the Information was defective because it did not specify the period within which petitioner was supposed to remit the sale proceeds of the jewelry or return the same. He

theorizes that such period is material in determining if he is indeed criminally liable for breaching his obligation to pay for or return the jewelry. 11

Petitioner's contention has no merit.

An information is sufficient where it clearly states the designation of the offense by the statute and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. 12 Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court also provides that a complaint or information is sufficient if it states: (1) the name of the accused; (2) the designation of the offense by the statute; (3) the acts or
10 11

Abrenica vs. Gonda, Supra note 6. 12 People vs. Rita, 247 SCRA 484 (1995).

lCOMMENT

Lito Corpuz vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 180016

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omissions complained of as constituting the offense; (4) the name of the offended party; (5) the approximate time of the commission of the offense; and (6) the place wherein the offense was committed.

That the information did not specify the period within which petitioner was supposed to remit the sale proceeds of the jewelry or return the same was immaterial. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out: xxx The gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph l(b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the [offended party]. Thus, aside from the fact that the date of the commission thereof is not an essential element of the crime herein charged, the failure of the prosecution to specify the exact date does not render the Information ipso facto defective. Moreover, the said date is also near the due date within which [petitioner] should have delivered the proceeds or returned the said jewelries as testified upon by Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance with the rules. [Petitioner], therefore, cannot not be allowed to claim that he was not properly apprised on the charges proffered against him. 13

The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged.

The third and fourth issues being interrelated, respondent begs leave to discuss them jointly.
13

Supra note 7, p. 7. (citations omitted)

COMMENT
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Petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, 14 particularly since all the elements of estafa were not sufficiently established. 15

Petitioner's contention has no merit.

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The elements of estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the RPC are:

t'f
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(1)

That money, goods, or other personal property be

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received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same;

(2)

That there be misappropriation or conversion of such

money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt;

(3)

That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to

the prejudice of another; and

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(4)

That there is a demand made by the offended party to

the offender. 16

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LAw 742 (2006).

14

is Id.,
16

Supra note 6, p. 11. p. 9.

REYES, THE REVISED PENAL CooE: CRIMINAL

2 Luis B.

COMMENT Lito Corpuz vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 180016

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In the present case, the record shows that Tangcoy entrusted to petitioner four pieces of jewelry with a total value of P98,000.00 to be sold on commission within 60 days, with an obligation to remit the sale proceeds or return the jewelry, if unsold. failed to do either, to Tangcoy's prejudice. 17 However, petitioner

Moreover, petitioner's contention that no demand was made on ' him was belied by the record. Tangcoy testified that he was able to locate petitioner after two months of searching, whereby petitioner promised to pay Tangcoy the value of the jewelry. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly held that demand need not be formal, and even a query as to the whereabouts of the money is tantamount to a demand. 18

PRAYER WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed

that the instant petition dated November 5, 2007 be DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Makati City for the City of Manila, May 5, 2008.

17 18

Supra note 2, pp. 6-10 and 17. Supra note 7, p. 8 citing Lee vs. People, G.R. No. 157781, April 11, 2005.

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COMMENT Lita Corpuz vs. People of the Philippines

122

G.R. No. 180016

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DEVANADERA
Solici or General Roll No. 268 , IBP Lifetime No. 05084

-----

REX

PASCUAL

Solicitor General Roll No. 38914; IBP Lifetime No. 01997 MCLE Exemption No. II-000714, 12-13-06

Associate Solicitor Roll No. 49132; IBP No. 748851, 04-11-08 MCLE Compliance No. II-0001867, 03-15-07

OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

134 Amorsolo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City Tel. No. 818-63-81; Fax No. 813-45-85 E-mail: docket@osg.gov.ph

COPY FURNISHED:

. . Atty. Nini D. Corpuz

. Counsel for Petitioner < Mezzanine, Viacrusis Bldg. : Rizal Avenue, Olongapo City

EXPLANATION
(Under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure)

The foregoing Comment will be filed personally with this Honorable Court, while a copy thereof thereof will be served to counsel for petitioner by registered mail due to distance and lack of manpower to effect personal service.

z
Associate Solicitor

INSTRUCTION)

. llCBOF"THECLERKOrCC:nJ"' (.n. El'l sANC 1itJ:CE1VED

sUPRltMPl COURT

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NCING P 0 ESS

.NSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGt:....

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Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, Appointed Amicus Curiae Soft copy submitted August 16, 2013

Introductory remarks
I want to start out with an insightful quotation from reme Court Chief Justice Warren Burger who .said: "The methods by which we enforce our criminai . been c_alled the fl!easure qbur c1vl11zat1on may nghtly be 1udged." (highlights supplied)

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, I had made this quotation in protest against vigilante justice ulting in what has been euphemistically called "extra-legal cutionsldisappearances" that is even now still rampaging not only in vao but also the rest of the country. The dubious claim of the police :a "shoot-out" in Atimonan, which the Court of Appeals concluded to . a "rub-out"; or the alleged attempted rescue of the Ozamis hold-up bery group, resulting in the killing of the two suspects while in police stody, resulting in a criminal charge against the police escorts, make 1 2 ' i's quotation relevant today. . For this case, the question raised by the subject of this opinion is .'ether that measure of civilization may be used to evaluate the ( icial penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals based on legislated tandards set in December 8, 1930, when the Revised Penal Code was p'proved as Act No. 3815, almost 83 years ago.

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II. Constitutional rights of a criminal defendant.

In a survey that I had made several years ago, which I admit is ss than exhaustive 3 , I found out that challenges to the constitutional ghts of those who get snared in the criminal process are gncentrated on those that violate their rights guaranteed by the Bill of ,jghts. They all relate to the earlier stages of the criminal process, at is, crime investigation by the police, the issuance of an arrest , rrant, warrantless arrest and seizure, preliminary investigation by a agistrate or prosecuting officer, arraignment, and trial. These rights
he Notice of Resolution appointing Professor Tadiar as an amicus curiae was PDl,July 17, 2013, front page captioned "De Lima mad over slay of robbery gang 'aders"

Rights of the Accused, Proceedings of Symposia, Vol. 1, 1996, Institute of Human ights, U.P. Law Center.

''are: right to due process4 guarantee against unreasonable search and 7 seizure, 5 privacy of communication 6 , freedom of speech , freedom of worship 8 , liberty of abode 9 , right to be informed of right to remain 12 11 . silent and to counsel 10 , right to bail , presumption of innocence , 15 'speedy trial 13 , habeas corpus 14 , right against self-incrimination , right against double jeopardy 16 . All of these rights pertain to stages of the criminal process up to conviction. The challenges that may be raised at the last stage of the riminal process involve only the actual sentence imposed or the barrying out of the sentence. The constitutional protection at this final stage relate to the following provisions: Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment imposed, (2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee, or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities shall be dealt with by law. 17 The last sub-section does not raise any constitutional issue ntil after a law has been passed. It is not, therefore, self-executory ntil after legislation has been enacted to give those rights.

II.

The case at bar

Corpuz vs. People of the Philippines, 18 is unique in the sense t.hat petitioner does not challenge any stage of the criminal process hat led to his conviction of the crime of estafa by abuse of ponfidence under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code. What h.e poses a question on, that is, is the penalty imposed on him for the P98,000,00 worth of jewelry that were entrusted to him for sale on ommission on May 2, 1991 which he failed to remit the proceeds of ny sale that he may have made or return the jewelry to the private
iSec. 1, Article III, Bill of Rights, Constitution :Sec. 2, ibid ,Sec. 3, id 'sec. 4 id
. :sec. 5, id Sec. 6, id .osec.12 (1) to (4), id 1Sec. 13, id ;2 Sec. 14, id
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id Sec. 15, id

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Sec. 21, id ]Article III, Bill of Rights, 1987 Constitution G.R. No. 180016

mplainant, Danilo Tangcoy, valid in light of the drastic eterioration of the peso from the date when the legislature set the .,,enalty based on its value in 1930 to the date of its imposition by the ourt of Appeals in 2012? The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando City imposed upon Corpuz a sentence of an indeterminate i,enalty of imprisonment from 4 years and 2 months of prision "qrreccional, medium period as minimum to 14 years and 8 months freclusion temporal, as maximum. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed conviction but modified the penalty to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, fo:.a years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus an incremental penalty ."f.one year for each additional P10,000.00 for a total maximum of 15 ears.
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The statutory penalty where the amount involved is in excess of .22,000.00 is an incremental penalty that would result in added ''rison time of one ear for each additional P1 o 000.00 but the total enal shall not exceed 20 ears. For Cor uz seven ears and six onths ?and % ears P98 000.00 - P22 000.00= 76 000 divided . 10 were added. However, the six months penalty was not , posed as the P6,000.00 on top of P70,000.00 did not amount to ,10,000.00 to warrant another year. ;, The standard of monetary value as basis for computation of .:enalties was fixed by the legislature at the time the Revised Penal pde was approved as Act No. 3815 on December 8, 1930 (not 932 as stated in the court Resolution).

. Considering the present value of the peso, it is contended that ne proscription against "cruel, degrading or inhuman punishmenf' , above, under Article Ill, Sec 19 (1) of the Constitution has .een violated in imposing the incremental penalty in excess of 22,000.00, which is considered disproportionate and excessively arsh. It is also argued that the equal protection of the laws under ection 1, of the Bill of Rights has been violated since under the enalty structure of Article 315 (1) (b), a penalty imposed for estafa of mall sums of money may be the same as that imposed for homicide.
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omplainant, Danilo Tangcoy, valid in light of the drastic eterioration of the peso from the date when the legislature set the enalty based on its value in 1930 to the date of its imposition by the Court of Appeals in 2012? The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando City (Pampanga) imposed upon Corpuz a sentence of an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from 4 years and 2 months of prision . orreccional, medium period as minimum to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed conviction but modified the penalty to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus an incremental penalty 'f one year for each additional P10,000.00 for a total maximum of 15 The statutory penalty where the amount involved is in excess of .P22,000.00 is an incremental penalty that would result in added prison time of one year for each additional P10,000.00; but the total /penalty shall not exceed 20 years. For Corpuz . seven years and six :months (?and % years) [P98,000.00 - P22,000.00= 76,000 divided by 1O] were added. However, the six months penalty was not imposed as the P6,000.00 on top of P70,000.00 did not amount to P10,000.00 to warrant another year.
1

The standard of monetary value as basis for computation of penalties was fixed by the legislature at the time the Revised Penal Code was approved as Act No. 3815 on December 8, 1930 (not 1932 as stated in the court Resolution). Considering the present value of the peso, it is contended that the proscription against "cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment' quoted above, under Article Ill, Sec 19 (1) of the Constitution has .been violated in imposing the incremental penalty in excess of P22,000.00, which is considered disproportionate and excessively harsh. It is also argued that the equal protection of the laws under Section 1, of the Bill of Rights has been violated since under the enalty structure of Article 315 (1) (b), a penalty imposed for estafa of mall sums of money may be the same as that imposed for homicide.

Ill.

Historical Antecedents.
Our Constitutional protection 19 against "cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment" is essentially borrowed from the ath Amendment to the U.S. Constitution which proscribes: "Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted".

From a cursory comparison, it is immediately plain that our 1987 .Constitution had dropped the term "unusual' found in the US. Constitution and substituted it with degrading, or inhuman 20 21 .punishment". This is an amendment of the 1935 and 1973 'constitutions, which are exact copies of the US. ath Amendment of cruel and unusual punishment.
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A less than exhaustive survey of Philippine jurisprudence shows .that lawyers practicing criminal law have brought questions on cruel :punishments to the Supreme Court only when the penalties imposed were death and life imprisonment. In not a single case was the 'onstitutionality of a lesser penalty imposed challenged on this ground.
v. United States (1910)

This was the state of the court's Eighth Amendment \irisprudence when it decided the pivotal case of Weems v. United fates (1910), a criminal case from the Philippine Islands, which was hen an American territo . Weems was a United States Coast Guard official who was convicted of falsifying public documents, and was entenced to fifteen years imprisonment "at hard and painful labor." 'iHe was compelled to "always carry a chain at the ankle, hanging .from the wrists," and was prohibited from receiving any "assistance whatsoever from without the institution." In addition, certain '.accessory penalties" were imposed on Weems. He was deprived of 11 rights of parental authority, marital authority, and property transfer. :finally, Weems was prohibited from voting or holding public office, and was subject to lifetime surveillance. Weems' crime was causing to be entered on public documents payments to employees as wages of 208 and 408 pesos respectively, when 'such payments had not been made.
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:, In an opinion written by Justice Joseph McKenna, the court :found that the punishments imposed on Weems were cruel and 'unusual.
9 Section

19 (1), Article III, 1987, Philippine Constitution Article IV, Section 1 (19) 1935 Constitution IV, Section 21, 1973 Constitution

Justice McKenna noted that "Such penalties for such offenses amaze those who formed their conception of the relation of a state to even its offending citizens from the practice of the American commonwealths, and believe that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense." (Underscoring supplied) He concluded that a broader reading was required because "Time works changes. brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore, a principle to be vital, must be capable of wider apRlication than the mischief which ave it birth. This is particularly true of constitutions... In the application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but of what may be." Relying on the writings . f some of the commentators, he also observed that "The clause of the Constitution, in the opinion of learned commentators, be therefore progressive. and is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." (highlights supplied).

, 2. Zenon Reyes v. People of the Philippines and Sandiganbayan 22 quotes from the foregoing case of Weems v. nited States, particularly those quoted with highlights above. It cited Echegaray v. Executive Secretary where the Court adopted the American view that what is cruel and unusual is not fastened to the .obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes by humane justice and must draw its meaning from the standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 'society. Despite making this quotation with seeming approval, Justice Ruben T. Reyes refused to declare the penalty imposed as unconstitutional as a cruel and unusual punishment. What he did was merely to lighten the penalty with mitigating circumstances that would ighten the penalty to two degrees lower than that imposed. V. Need to refer to U.S. jurisprudence
Thus, it becomes necessary to make reference, but not for eference, to US. Jurisprudence to know what the views are on this issue in that foreign jurisdiction where the Philippines derived this ponstitutional provision. U.S. authors have asserted that the ath Amendment may be in . the process of "being revived and filled with new content as a constitutional means of dealing with inappropriate legislative punishment" (highlights supplied) 23 "The (8th) Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark
:22 G.R.No.
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164763, February 12, 2008. Kadish & Paulsen, Criminal Law and Its Processes, 1969, pp. 122-123.

the progress of a maturing society." (highlights supplied) 24

The need for re-examination is pointed out by the quotation 'ade at the outset of this opinion {from U.S.C.J., Warren Burger) so hat we can measure the quality of our civilization at the present time. hall we make that determination on the appropriateness of the egislative penalties based on the standards set 83 years If so, oes it not mean that our civilization has stagnated with no dvancement during this very lengthy period that constitutes the . reatest strides in our country's modernization? Modern legislation has abandoned the archaic mode of setting . fixed monetary value as basis for penalty being now fully eonscious of the inevitable fluctuations in currency values along with he passage of time. Thus, fines are now based on the minimum 'age earned by the convict rather than setting it at P6,000 or P200 s Article 26 does in classifying penalties of fine as afflictive, orreccional or light.
VI. The evolving status of the Philippines

There was no Philippine nation until 1898 when the different ibes under village chiefs or datus in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao "nited to rebel against Spanish sectarian rule. That is the reason for celebrating Philippine Independence Day on July 12, 1898. The first Philippine Republic passed the Malolos Constitution. This day marks the birth of the Philippine Nation. When the Philippine Legislature enacted the Revised Penal Code as Act No. 3815, it did so as a Philippine Commission in the . United States as its Territory. At thattime, a Filipino did not need a passport or a visa to enter the United States. Commonwealth status was achieved only in 1935. During that .period, laws passed by Congress was designated as C.A. ,(Commonwealth Act) . .. Laws passed after the Philippines regained its independence in 1946 were designated as R.P.
VII. Valuation of the Philippine Peso

There are at least two ways for determining the value of the peso for any given year that I know of - (1) one is its value in relation ..to the US dollar and the other is (2) according to the consumer's price index.
24 Trop

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v, Dulles, 356 US (1957), cited in fn 15

In 1930, the peso was pegged to the US currency at the rate of P2.00 to $1.00. In 1962, President Diosdado Macapagal devalued he peso by 100/o for a new rate of P4.00 to $1.00. Later, a floating ate was decided by President Ferdinand Marcos, through Prime inister and Secretary of Finance Cesar Virata, to reach a dizzying ate of +80: 1. Presently, the rate has now in 2013 reached a value of ' P43.00 to $1.00. 25

First way.- Using this currency standard, the value of the . hilippine peso in relation to the US$, as to the amounts set for the egislative imposed penalties under RPC Article 315 (1) (b) would be s follows:

. RIGINAL VALUE PH IL. Peso 1930 .P200.00 1$2= P6, 000. 00/$2= P10 000. 001$2= P12,000.00/$2= P22,000.00/$2=
1
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US$1: P2/$1: P43 1930 2013 $100.00x P43= $3,000.00xP43= $5,000.00x P43= $6,000.00 x P43= $11,000.00x P43=

INFLATED VALUE 2013 P4,300.00 P129,000.00 P215,000.00 P258,000.00 P473,000.00

Using the inflated value in the above table, the penalties for stafa under RPC Article 315 (1) (b) would be as follows: 4.) Below P4,300.00, arresto mayor, maximum. 3.) Above P4,300.00 up to P129,000.00, arresto mayor, max., to prision correccional, 2.) Over P129,000.00 up to P258,000.00, prision correccional, .minimum and medium periods. ,. 1.) Over P258,000.00 up to P473,000.00, prision correccional, max to prision mayor, minimum period. ADDITIONAL PENALTY FOR EXCEEDING P473,000.00 One year for each additional P215,000.00 in excess of P473,000.00. Utilizing the foregoing table of penalties, it would be difficult for pne who defalcates billions of pesos, as Janet Lim Napoles (JLN) to
See Manuel Almario,'s column, The economics of poverty, PDI July 20, 2013

make out a constitutional issue of cruel punishment or denial of equal r rotection of the laws.

Second way.- The other way to valuate the Philippine Peso for 1,930 and 2013, is to use the consumer price index for those years. I not aware that any office was issuing a consumer price index as early as 1930 but I presume that in 2013, the National Statistics Office did. According to the SC Resolution, in 1957, (when the first official statistics were issued) the NSO valued the Philippine Peso at P95.83. It is not stated what standard was used by the NSO in making this currency valuation. It is not known by what standards the NSO made this valuation.

am

VIII. Instances of needed currency adjustments

1. R.A. No. 878, the general arbitration law, was approved on June 19, 1953. Section 21 sets the fees in arbitration at P50.00/day "unless the parties agree otherwise in writing prior to the arbitration." That could refer to ad hoc arbitration but for institutional arbitration, like CIAC the fees are a percentage of the total sum In dispute. That amount is the total of claims and counterclaims made by the parties. A schedule of fees is made so that the fees of the arbitrators are set at 2o/o of the sum in dispute for the first million up to P257,500.00 + .05% in excess of P100 million. As thus set up, a construction arbitrator could get paid as much as a million pesos for a single case. The Rules of Court was promulgated in 1964. Sec. 2, Rule 74 authorizes "Summary settlement of estates of small value" which does not exceed P10,000.00. On October 1, 2008, 44 years a later (2008 - 1964) the Supreme Court promulgated the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims. It defines small claims as not exceeding P100,000.00. This author opined that an inferential amendment may have been made arising from currency devaluation. 26

2.

IX. Instances of attitudinal changes ansmg from "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society"

Summary Procedures, G.1, Benchbook for Trial Courts (Revised and Expanded) , Volume I, 2011.

26

1. Homosexuality , For a long, long time, homosexuality was considered a crime. lrlthe middle east, stories still abound that homosexualty is a cause 'dr "honor killing" of those who had dishonored the family by brothers ,, ho are sheltered by those who culturally are in sympathy with such . edieval tradition. It is also considered justified to have a lesbian orcibly raped to cure her of her sexual orientation. ,, Now, attitude toward homosexuality has changed with the realization that homosexuality is not sexual preference alone but is he product of genes over which there is no control. Thus, in a ' rejection where the world's population is proportionately reduced to 00 people, it has been determined that 89 will be heterosexual and 1 will be homosexual. 2. Gay marriage In 2013, many States in the United States have legalized gay marriages. The US. Supreme Court, this year, made a landmark ecision that struck down Federal law granting benefits only to onventionally married couples between a man and a woman. In 27 US. v. Windsor, two women got married in Canada. One of them ied and left to the other their conjugal properties. The IRS was poised to charge the surviving spouse an amount of about $300,000.00 for death taxes that would not have been taxable in a :pustomary marriage between a man and a woman. Justice Kennedy said the DOMA 28 provision denying federal ibenefits to legally married same-sex couples relegates those . arriages to second-class status in violation of the equal protection . lause and "it humiliates tens of thousands of children now being raised by same-sex couples." Thus, it annulled the DOMA provision for couples that were married in states that legally allows it on the ground of denial of equal protection of the laws clause. 3.Death penalty For large parts of the world, capital punishment is now treated as barbaric and unjustified even for the very worst riminals. As early as 1965, only 12 countries had completely abolished the death penalty, while a further 11 had abolished it for ordinary crimes in peacetime. According to Amnesty International, a human-rights group which monitors the death enalty worldwide and has long campaigned for its abolition, 68 , ountries have done away with it for all crimes and 14 for
27 Windsor v.
.20

U.S., June, 2013 Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)

10

inary crimes, while another 23 have ended it in practiceher having executed no one for at least ten years or having an international commitment to suspend further At 105, the number of countries which have ended capital nishment in law or practice now exceeds the 90 that retain it, d most of these have moratoriums on executions.
1

:effective, outdated and wrong capital punishment

There seems to be a variety of reasons for this attitudinal ange. In Western Europe, Canada and Australia political elites 'pparently lost faith in the death penalty as a just or effective rime-fighting tool. High-profile miscarriages of justice persuaded 'any judges, lawyers and politicians that courts, no matter how 'reful, could never avoid executing some innocent people. The seemed too grave for a punishment of dubious value. "In 'ost western countries the death penalty had come to be flicted relatively rarely, and there was always a great deal of ublic concern about any particular decision," explains Roger :. ood, a professor of criminology at Oxford University and author f "The Death Penalty: A Worldwide Perspective" (Oxford . niversity Press; 1996). As he sees it, capital punishment "came o be seen as an anachronism, and in conflict with human ;ghts. ,,29

sk

4.Life sentence for minors.

In Graham v. Florida (2010), the U.S. Supreme Court, by a . ote of 5 to 4, ruled that the Eighth Amendment on cruel and unusual punishment does not permit sentences of life without possibility of parole for minors who commit non-homicide crimes. Chief Justice Roberts concurred on the narrower grounds that a proportionality eview made the sentence unconstitutional 30
VI. ISSUES 1. May the power of judicial review be exercised to pass upon a constitutional issue that has not been squarely raised? Is there a need to modify the penalty imposed on Petitioner Corpuz to adjust to present values from the

2.

The Economist > Google search, Cruel and Unusual Punishment

29
30

11

date it was approved by the Legislature on December 8, 1930? 3. May the incremental penalty imposed in 1930 by the RPC based on the excess of P22,000.00 be declared unconstitutional for being disproportionate and excessively harsh in relation to the present value of the peso?

}Cl. The power of judicial review

May the power of judicial review be exercised to pass upon a constitutional issue that has not been squarely raised?

The power of judicial review was first established in the United States by the landmark case of Marbury v. Madison decided in 1803 - more than 200 years ago - by Chief Justice John Marshall. It is instructive to recall that this case was originated by a petition filed by the Petitioner Justice of the Peace William Marbury against James Madison as Secretary of State 31 for mandamus to compel the issuance of his commission in order to perform the duties of the position to which he was appointed by President Adams. The following disquisition of Justice Marshall is insightful of the essence of the power of judicial review:
"The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government ls to afford that protection. The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It wlll certainly cease . to deserve this high appellation, lf the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal (underscores supplied) "The constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States in one supreme court, and such inferior courts as congress shall, from time to time, ordain and establish. This power ls expressly extended to all cases arising under the laws of the United States; and consequently, ln some form, may be exercised over the present
31

5 us 137 (1803)

12

case; because the right claimed is given by a Jaw of the United States.
"So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the Jaw and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the Jaw, disregarding the constitution; or conformab/y to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. (Underscores supplied)

"If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply. "Those then who controvert the principle that the constitution is to be considered, in court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the constitution, and see only the law. "This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions. It would declare that an act, which, according to the principles and theory of our government, is entirely void; is yet, in practice, completely obligatory. It would declare, that if the legislature shall do what is expressly forbidden, such act, notwithstanding the express prohibition, is in reality effectual. It would be giving to the legislature a practical and real omnipotence, with the same breath which professes to restrict their powers within narrow limits. It is prescribing limits, and declaring that those limits may be passed at pleasure." Marbury then goes on to declare that Section 13 of the :;,Judiciary Act is unconstitutional.

13

A commentator 32 observed, however, that the power of judicial review was only judicially fashioned and not mentioned in the u.s Constitution. An examination of the 1987 Constitution shows that it grants review power to the Supreme Court "over petitions for certiorari, irohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus." Th is is e only instance where the power of judicial review is expressly . entioned in the Philippine Constitution but restricted it to those xpressly mentioned therein. Thus, the observation made at the outset by the American commentator - that this is a judicially 'fashioned power that is not expressly granted by the Constitution continues to be valid today even for the Philippines outside of those expressly enumerated.
''1'

The power of judicial review has been adopted and practiced y the Philippine Supreme Court throughout its short existence. It seems that no serious challenge has ever been raised against the xercise of this power, which is generally accepted. Nevertheless, n the case at bar, the power of judicial review is within the cases xpressly mentioned in the Constitution.
Under what circumstances may the power of judicial review be exercised by the Court?

From the following examples, such circumstances may be .. educed. The statutory provision must have been cited by a party o the case; or it is inextricably linked to the principal issue raised.

1. Constitutionality of Article 5, RPC

.. It is suggested by the opposition to reconsideration that the .remedy for excessive penalty, expressly provided for by Article 5 of the RPC, be resorted to. Said provision states: Art. 5. Second paragraph. "... the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and injury caused by the offense." (Bold type supplied)

i 32 Warren "Mickey" Michelson, Google blog, April 2013

14

. The antiquatedness of this provision, that is surprisingly sought to be resurrected by the oppositors, is shown by the following 'observations: I recall that as late as 1969 there was an Office of Judicial Supervisor in the Department of Justice then headed by Judge Eulalia ,"Tang Aliong", Pichay who lorded it, although benignly, over all judges in the Philippines who brought whatever problems, even minor ones, they were confronted with. It is not with a bit of irony that I also recall that in 1968, when I then applied for a study leave to pursue a scholarship for a masters degree in Harvard Law School without any cost to the government, it as denied by Secretary of Justice Makasiar who curtly doused the mbition of a lowly Justice of the Peace with the cutting phrase "What ill a JP do with a Harvard education?" I had to ask for a deferment of my scholarship for a year.
1

Fortunately for me, when U. P. Law Dean Vicente Abad Santos ,became Secretary of Justice, he readily granted my application as his ormer UP law student for a study leave of absence from my position as a then judge of the provincial capital municipal court of San 'Fernando, La Union where I had been promoted. No one ever raised any question pertaining to that administrative matter on the independence of the judiciary that has been glaringly violated during that very lengthy period of more than thirty (30) years between the restoration of Philippine Independence . hen the United States withdrew its sovereignty in 1946 up to 1987,. after the EDSA Revolution. It was only after that People Power revolution that the judiciary finally asserted its own independence from the executive branch of government. . The Constitutions of 1935, 1973, 1986 Freedom Constitution, and 1987, established a democratic and republican state. Section 5 of the Revised Penal Code clearly shows the )subservience of the judiciary to the Executive Branch and its lack 0f independence. It violates the bedrock principle of a democratic and ::republican government that its three branches are co-equal and . independent of each other, as well as the principle of checks and ,:balances.
1

It is, therefore, my considered opinion that the foregoing :questionable statutory provision may outrightly be struck down as 'unconstitutional in the present petition by the power of judicial review.

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.lorn the foregoing example, it may be deduced that the 1ohable statute (Article 5, RPC) must have been cited by a party .fs:.ease, the opponents to a reconsideration) .
. Constitutionality of Article 39, RPC.

questionable statutory provision is the subsidiary 'i .. set b Article 39 fixed at the rate of P2.50 for each da , "''Cito rules providing outer limits to said additional penalty. Said provides that "if the convict has no property with which to liabilities (of reparation, indemnification and fine) "allbe subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one ''Peach P2. 50"
',,','

paragraph 1 clarifies the meaning of subsidiary penalty by <'}stating that the convict "shall remain under confinement" until ecuniary liability is satisfied "but his subsidiary imprisonment J;J'f,ot exceed one-third of the term of his sentence of prision d'cional, arresto and fine" but "in no case shall it continue for "Vthan one year''. ' hese should also be now subjected to a close re-examination . ., pie calculation would show that the one-year subsidiary penalty 'sed by Article 39, paragraph 1 of the RPC would liquidate a Qiary civil liability of the convict amounting to only P912.50!
,,

otherwise, a convict who owes pecuniary civil liabilities by the court amounting to only P912.50 will have to remain for one whole year of 365 days! This additional penalty . "frisoned 'J ,' . unts to a cruel and inhumane punishment akin to being risoned for an indebtedness which is roscribed in the Bill of ''hts 33
t

,:.1,'

,\;;\ Can any person entertain any reasonable doubt that in 2013 .Gh.subsidiary imprisonment of up to one whole year based on the Jue of currency in 1930, would indeed be cruel, degrading and .yman punishment?
,,.:.1

Although not directly put in issue in the case at bar, unlike jcle 5 of the RPC discussed earlier, its close kinship to the hcipal issue based on currency values, is immediately apparent. It .'therefore, also my considered opinion that Article 39 of the RPC be struck down as unconstitutional for its imposition of a cruel .... n.ishment that has long been outdated by currency devaluation. Thus, the condition for the exercise of the power of judicial view is that the questionable statute must be closely intertwined
;Section 20, Article III, 1987 Constitution

16

i.th the principal issue of the case, that is the disproportionateness f:.fhe penalty imposed based on a devalued currency. Even more blatantly is the violation of Article 39 of the RPC of equal protection clause. For while those who can afford it can 'scape subsidiary imprisonment by paying off the imposed pecuniary 0,bilities, it is only the poor who will bear the burden. It is a law that iscriminates against the poor which constitutes a sizable ment of 27.9/o of the population of the Philippines. 34 Relatedly, in one reported case a country in the Western emisphere passed a law that outlawed in vitro fertilization as being 'olative of the right to life from conception. The Supreme Court ruck down that law as unconstitutional for contravening the equal ''otection of law clause. For while the wealthy can afford to get IVF atment for infertility in places where it is legal, the poor are denied 'at privilege of foreign travel. Article 5 and Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code are both 'Qconstitutional and, therefore, poses the quandary envisaged by .hief Justice Marshall. The judge must make a choice of whether to phold the supremacy of the Constitution or enforce these statutory 'fovisions despite their being unconstitutional. The court must etermine which of these conflictin rules overns the case. This of the ve essence of udicial du . Thus, it is imperative for )s Supreme Court to declare through its power of judicial review at these statutory provisions are unconstitutional.
XII. Need to modify penalty.

'.

Is there a need to modify the penalty imposed on Petitioner Corpuz to adjust to present values from the date it was approved by the Legislature on December B, 1930? . The discussion of the first issue above, led to the considered 'pinion that the power of judicial review may be exercised only in where there is an incompatibility between the Constitution a questioned statutory provision, eg., Articles 5 and 39 of the evised Penal Code. , Petitioner contends that the value of the Philippine Peso In .1957 as per the National Statistics Office is that the P1 .00 in 1930 ' ould be "equivalent to P98.83". "It may be assumed from this, that

H Findings of the National Statistical Coordination Board, cited by Columnist ::.conrado de Quiroz, PDI, August 8, 2013.

17

Pt.DO in 1932 cannot have a value lower than P100.00 today. ,..Js refore, it is argued that the P98,000.00 value of what Corpuz had frauded complainant Tangcoy in 1991 would be equivalent only to ao.oo. Accordingly, such adjustment in value would necessarily \er the penalty meted out to the Petitioner only to a light penalty of months and 1 day, as minimum, to 2 years and 4 months as aximum. This would make the reduced penalty being asked for, obationable. "The opposite view, however, is that such adjustment for Jation amounts to judicial legislation ... "36

The key words used in the foregoing quotations are uivalent to", "value", and "inflation." "Value" relates to the netary worth of something. "Devalue" is to reduce the official lue of a currency by economics. "Inflation" is a general increase in 'ices and fall in purchasing value of money 37 Corpuz argues from a devalued peso in 1957 (and 1991 at the . e of the transaction) when P100.00 is the equivalent of P1 .oo in 930. Thus, P980.00 pesos valued in 1930 could purchase the valued in 1991. This would seem to imply the decreased )'rchasing power of the peso during those relevant periods. The term "inflation" would imply consideration of the rchasing power of the peso at its inflated rate and the rresponding increase in prices of goods. The error of making such mathematical equivalence is /pparent. In 1930, P1 .oo could purchase goods worth P100.00 in .957 and presumably also in 1991 when Tangcoy entrusted the welry to Corpuz. Ergo, the P98,000.00 value would be P980.00. his equation however, does not consider the per capita income fthe populations in 1930, 1991, or 2013.

'

In 1959, when I was appointed a Justice of the Peace by Carlos P. Garcia, a position that was part-time service with ree law practice, I was given a monthly salary of P200.00, or an nnual salary of P2,400. 00. Assuming that free law practice gives e the equivalent of my salary, my income in 1959 would be P400.00 a month, or an annual income of P4,800.00.
'1'.',

NOTICE of Resolution dated July 16, 2013, received on August 18, Second paragraph, page 2. }Ibid, third paragraph. ? Oxford dictionary

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From the earlier table based on currency fluctuation of the peso ::relation to the US dollar38 , the P100.00 value in 1930 would be the 'uivalent of P2, 150.00 in 2013. In 2013, a gross income of P3 illion for higher middle class would not be unusual.

concededly there may be a need to make arising from the depreciation of the peso or from :s inflationary value, it is my considered opinion that the forum r making this adjustment should not be in the Supreme Court. he medium for making this adjustment should not be through he exercise by the Supreme Court of its power of judicial eview. This is not the situation envisaged by Chief Justice Marshall rere the penalty imposed in 1930 is unconstitutional in 1991 at the 1me of the transaction or 2012 at the time of penalty imposition by he Court of Appeals.
The point of the opposition that this is a matter that is better left .the legislature to decide is persuasive. The Supreme Court does '()t have the time or the resources that the Congress has to hold :ecessary public hearings on what prevailing monetary standard hould be used to set appropriate penalties of estafa depending on e amount defalcated.

While

A possibility may be for the legislature to use the daily inimum wage at the time of defraudation, the average annual .come or GDP per capita income 39, or some such other flexible tandard. At the time of penalty imposition, this would require the LJ,dge to take into consideration the different minimum wages set for ,be National Capital Region (NCR), as well as the Regional ariations. Utilizing any of such standards that are not set at a fixed onetary value, would certainly be beyond the power of judicial ::view, which is confined only to declaring unconstitutional the set by law based on the value of currency in 1930.
The foregoing is surely as persuasive a reason that may be r ued for den in the exercise of udicial review in this situation.

9 1970 ..

)ee page 7 of this paper . GDP per capita was $250.00; in 2010, US 2,215.00 cited by PDI Columnist Ielito F. Habito, August 13, 2013. Multiplied by P43.00 the GDP per capita income ould translate to Pl0,750.00.

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XIII. Constitutionality of incremental penalty

May the incremental penalty imposed in 1930 by the Revised Penal Code (RPG) based on the excess of P22, 000. 00 be declared unconstitutional for being disproportionate and excessively harsh in relation to the present value of the peso?
' As earlier calculated 40 , the incremental penalty based on the mounts in excess of P22,000.00 is pegged at 1 year for each dditional P10,000.00 would be seven (7) years [P98,000.00 76,000 divided by 1O].
'>

. As applied by the Court of Appeals, the incremental penalty inposed on petitioner Corpuz is 7 years on top of the 8 years of 'fincipal penalty of prision mayor, as maximum.
'!1'

This additional penalty 7 years that the Court of Appeals ad imposed, would amount to 87.5% of the principal penalty of l'. :years that it had modified the sentence imposed by the egional Trial Court of San Fernando City (Pampanga). This alculation does not consider the devalued or inflated value of the eso at the time of the imposition. And there is no need to do so in 'rder to determine the constitutionality of that increased penalty.
1

Adding a penalty of almost double that of the principal enalty is assuredly a disproportionate and unduly harsh punishment fom an assessment viewed from a more refined sense of decency rising from an "evolving standards of decency that mark the rogress of a maturing society".

In the hierarchy of democratic values that we cherish, the ,ights to life and liberty are in the topmost tier. The right to property occupies a lesser value. It is by reason of these distinctions in cultural values that for arbitration, the rules on "vidence are not as strictly enforced as those in judicial proceedings '':here life and liberty may be at risk of loss or deprivation. In contrast, or arbitration proceedings, only property may be lost. Property may . ventually be earned or recovered.
.. Should the sum defalcated have amounted to an additional fifty thousand pesos, or P150,000.00, the total incarceration would be 20 ears, or reclusion temporal. That is the same penalty imposed by , rticle 249 for Homicide. That would equate the value of property ith that of life and liberty. That equation is shocking to our

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. ocratic hierarchy of values that we have developed over the "rs which would place the value of life and liberty above that of 'erty. : To spend an additional seven years, on top of the 8 years posed as principal penalty for failing to return jewelry that he was to sell on commission is surely shocking to our more ped sensibilities arising from our progress as a maturi7 society.

ed..