Antonio Carpio vs Executive Secretary

In 1990, RA 6975 entitled AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES was passed. Carpio, as a member of the bar and a defender of the Constitution, assailed the constitutionality of the said law for he figured that it only interferes with the control power of the president. He advances the view that RA 6975 weakened the National Police Commission by limiting its power to administrative control over the PNP thus, control remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the NPC and the PNP were placed. ISSUE: Whether or not the president abdicated its control power over the PNP and NPC by virtue of RA 6975. HELD: The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency. As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members. Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person on the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. Thus, and in short, the Presidents power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department. Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under the assailed Act, the funding of the PNP being in large part subsidized by the national government.

Sarmiento III vs Mison and Carague

FACTS: Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the Secretary of the Department of Budget, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento assailed the appointments as unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by CoA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment is valid.

RULING: Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing Salvador Mison, without submitting his nomination to the CoA for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.

Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the President shall appoint: 1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors, other public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers with the consent and confirmation of the CoA. 2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law; 3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint; 4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.

2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

Salvacion Monsanto vs Deputy Exec Sec Fulgencio Factoran

Monsanto was the Asst Treasurer of Calbayug City. She was charged for the crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents. She was found guilty and was sentenced to jail. She was however granted pardon by Marcos. She then wrote a letter to the Minister of Finance for her to be reinstated to her former position since it was still vacant. She was also requesting for back pays. The Minister of Finance referred the issue to the Office of the President and Factoran denied Monsantos request averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position. Also, Monsanto avers that by reason of the pardon, she should no longer be compelled to answer for the civil liabilities brought about by her acts. ISSUE: Whether or not Monsanto should be reinstated to her former post. HELD: A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required. This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits. On the other hand, civil liability arising from crime is governed by the RPC. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioners civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.

Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secretary

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On 25 July 1987, Cory issued EO 284 which allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The CLU excepted this EO

averring that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Art 7 other than those provided in the Constitution; CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8. ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional. HELD: Sec 13, Art 7 provides: Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitutions manifest intent and the peoples understanding thereof. In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

LUEGO vs CSC Facts: Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Solon. The appointment was described as permanent but the CSC approved it as temporary, subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and another employee.

Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and, accordingly directed that the latter be appointed to said position in place of the petitioner whose appointment is revoked. Hence, the private respondent was so appointed to the position by Mayor Duterte, the new mayor. The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, questions the order and the validity of the respondents appointment. Issue: WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement. Held: No. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and call it temporary. Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall have inter alia the power to approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service .and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or required qualifications. The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the CSC Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the CSC Laws. CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person was better qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.

LABO VS. COMELEC, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011

GR No. 86564, August 1, 1989 (Constitutional Law Loss of Citizenship) FACTS: Herein petitioner, claiming for recognition as a Philippine citizen is a mayor-elect who, through his marriage with an Australian national, was naturalized and took an oath of allegiance as an Australian citizen. Said marriage was found to be bigamous and therefore was annulled. Petitioner claims that his naturalization made him only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was divested of his Philippine citizenship.

HELD: Yes, because Commonwealth Act No. 63 clearly stated that Philippine citizenship may be lost through naturalization in a foreign country; express renunciation of citizenship; and by oath of allegiance to a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner.

Antonia Yee vs Director of Public Schools

Antonia Yee is a civil service eligible serving as as a regular public school teacher having passed the required teachers examination. Antonia Yee has since been serving as a public school teacher in Buhang Elementary School, Buhang Hamtic, Antique. In 1957, she married a Chinese citizen, Ng Foo. In the same year, Yee received notice that she is being terminated from her job by reason of her marriage, and subsequent loss of citizenship. Yee then filed a Petition for Mandamus to compel the Director of Public Schools to reinstate her. ISSUE: Whether or not Yee should be reinstated. HELD: No. She was validly removed from her position as a public school teacher because she lost her Filipino citizenship when she married Ng Foo. The law provides that persons qualified to serve in classified public service must be Filipino citizens. A public school is qualified under public service. Further, it is so provided that an applicant for the civil service examination must be a Filipino citizen; that requirement subsists even after such applicant had passed the exam.

FELIPE TAYKO vs. NICOLAS CAPISTRANOG.R. No. L-30188, October 2, 1928OSTRAND, J.:THE CASE: This is a petition for a writ of prohibition enjoining the respondent judge from making cognizance of certain civil and criminal election cases in which the petitioners are parties. THEFACTS: The petitioners allege that Capistrano was appointed judge of the CFI of Oriental Negros, to hold officeduring good behavior and until he should reach the age of 65 years; that he now has reached that agea n d , t h e r e f o r e , u n d e r t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f s e c t i o n 1 4 8 o f t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i v e C o d e a s a m e n d e d , i s disqualified from acting as a judge of the Court of First Instance.The petitioners further allege that in view of the many election protests and criminal cases for violationof the election law filed in the CFI of Oriental Negros arising in the from the last election, de la Costawas duly designated and acted as auxiliary judge. There was an understanding that de la Costa wouldhear and take cognizance of all election protests and criminal actions then pending or to filed arising from the said last general election, and that Capistrano would try and hear the ordinary cases pending. Notwithstanding the understanding, Capistrano tried and is still trying to take cognizance of theelection protests an criminal actions in said court; declared in open court that he will try the criminalc a s e s f o r t h e r e a s o n t h a t d e l a C o s t a r e f u s e d t o t r y t h e s a m e o n t h e

g r o u n d t h a t t h e p r e l i m i n a r yi n v e s t i g a t i o n s w e r e h e l d b e f o r e h i m , w h e n , i n t r u t h a n d i n f a c t , t h e d l a C o s t a d i d n o t m a k e t h e statement imputed to him and was and is still willing to try the election protests and criminal cases for violation of the election law pending in the court.Additionally that Capistrano, in spite of the fact that he was holding and is now pretending to hold theoffice of judge took great interest and active part in the filing of criminal charges against the petitionersto the unjustifiable extent of appointing a deputy fiscal, who then filed the proper informations, whenthe provincial fiscal refused to file criminal charges against the petitioners for violation of the electionlaw for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain the sameFinally, that Capistrano is neither a judge de jure nor de facto , but that he continues to hold the office of judge and pretends to be duly qualified and acting judge of the said province; and that he has tried, andcontinues to try, to act as such judge. Hence this petition. THE ISSUE: Whether or not Capistrano, upon reaching the age of 65, can still continue public office? Is heconsidered a de facto judge? THE RULING: Briefly defined, a de facto judge is one who exercises the duties of a judicial office under color of an appointment or election thereto (Brown vs. O'Connell, 36 Conn., 432). He differs, on the one hand, from a mere usurper who undertakes to act officially without any color of right, and on the other hand, from a judge de jure who is in all respects legally appointed and qualified and whose term of office has not expired (State vs. Carroll, 38 Conn., 449; Denny vs. Matton, 2 Allen [Mass.], 361; VanSlyke vs. Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 39 Wis., 390).Apart from any constitutional or statutory regulation on the subject there seems to be a generalrule of law that an incumbent of an office will hold over after the conclusion of his term until the elction and qualification of a successor (22 R. C. L., pp. 554-5). When a judge in good faith remains inoffice after his title has ended, he is a de facto officer (Sheehan's Case, 122 Mass., 445)

Salvador Laurel vs Aniano Desierto (April 2002)

In 1991, then President Corazon Aquino a Committee or the preparation of the National Centennial Celebration in 1998. When President Fidel Ramos took over, he reconstituted the said Committee as the National Centennial Commission (NCC). Salvador Laurel was appointed as the chairperson. Subsequently, the Centennial Exposition Project was constructed at the Clark Special Economic Zone.

After the centennial celebration, then Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng, in a privilege speech, exposed certain anomalies in the said Centennial Exposition Project. This eventually led to the filing of graft and corrupt practices charges against Laurel. The graft charges were referred to then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto. Laurel questioned the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman as he averred that the NCC is not a public office; that Laurel is not a public officer hence he cannot be charged with graft cases and the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction. Laurel avers that a public office is defined as follows: A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer. From the above definition, Laurel insists that he is not a public officer because:
1. He was not delegated any sovereign functions; 2. He did not receive any compensation as chairman of NCC; 3. His office has no security of tenure because the NCC is an ad hoc body which is coterminous upon the happening of the 1998 Centennial Celebration.

ISSUE: Whether or not Salvador Laurel is a public officer. HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled:
1. Laurels office was delegated with sovereign functions. Based on the executive issuances which constituted and reconstituted the NCC, as well as various executive orders, it can be seen that the NCC was given executive functions, to wit: promote economic development particularly in Central Luzon to attract investors to mitigate the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, among others. Promotion of industrialization and full employment is a fundamental state policy. 2. Even if Laurel did not receive any compensation it must be remembered that a salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of the position. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good. Hence, the office of Laurel as NCC Chairman may be characterized as an honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative office or an office of profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation or fees are attached. But it is a public office, nonetheless. 3. NCC being defined as an ad hoc body is of no moment. The true test, regardless of the designation by the creating law, is that if a duty be a continuing one, which is defined by rules prescribed by the government and not by contract, which an individual is appointed by government to perform, who enters on the duties pertaining to his station without any contract defining them, if those duties continue though the person be changed, it seems very difficult to distinguish such a charge or employment from an office of the person who performs the duties from an officer.

Rodriguez v. Tan G.R. No. L-3913 August 7, 1952 Bautista Angelo, J. FACTS: Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr. claims that on December 30, 1947, Carlos Tan usurped theoffice of Senator of the Philippines, and from that date until December 1949, he continuouslycollected the salaries, emoluments and privileges attendant to that office amounting toP18,400; that protest having been filed by Rodriguez against Tan, the Senate Electoral Tribunal on December 16, 1949, rendered judgment declaring Rodriguez to have been dulyelected to the office; and that by reason of such usurpation, Rodriguez suffered damages inthe amount of P35,524.55 for expenses he incurred in prosecuting the protest. Can Tan, whohas been proclaimed, took the oath of office, and discharged the duties of Senator, beordered to reimburse the salaries and emoluments he has received during his incumbencyto Rodriguez who has been legally declared elected by the Senate Electoral Tribunal? HELD: Tan acted as a de facto officer during the time he held the office of Senator. He wasone of the candidates of the Liberal Party in the elections of November 11, 1947, and wasproclaimed as one of those who had been elected by the Commission on Elections, and thereafter he took the oath of office and immediately entered into the performance of theduties of the position. Having been thus duly proclaimed as Senator and having assumed office as required by law, it cannot be disputed that Tan is entitled to the compensation,e m o l u m e n t s a n d a l l o w a n c e s w h i c h o u r Constitution provides for the position (article VI, section 14, 1935 Const.). The petition must fail.

Monroy vs CA
Posted on March 5, 2013

20 SCRA 621 1973 FACTS Monroy was the incumbent mayor of Navotas, Rizal when on September 15, 1961, his certificate of candidacy as representative of the first district of Rizal in the forthcoming elections was filed with the COMELEC. On September 18, Monroy filed a letter withdrawing said certificate of candidacy. However, on September 21, 1961, R, then vice-mayor of Navotas, took his oath of office on the theory that Monroy has forfeited the said office upon his filing of the certificate of candidacy in question.

ISSUES Whether R is entitled to the salary of the office from September 21, 1961 up to the time he can reassume said office? HELD Yes. De facto officer liable to reimburse salaries received to rightful incumbent General Rule: The rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from a de facto officer the salary received by the latter during during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he entered into the office in good faith and under color of title. The possession of the title of office is decisive. A de facto officer not having good title takes the salaries at his risk and must account to the de jure officer the amount of salary he received during his wrongful tenure. Where a mayor withdrew his certificate of candidacy for Congressman and then reassumed the position, thus preventing the vice-mayor from discharging the duties of the position of mayor, the mayor should reimburse to the vice-mayor, as the rightful occupant of the position of mayor, the salaries which he had received. The Rodriguez ruling that reimbursement should not be made is not applicable since it involved a duly proclaimed elective official who was later ousted. The de facto doctrine was formulated for the protection of the public and individuals who get involved in the official acts of persons discharging the duties of an office without being lawful officers. The withdrawal of the certifiate of candidacy does not restore Monroy to his former position. It does not render the withdrawal void ab initio. Once filed, the permanent legal effects produced thereby remain even if the certificate itself be subsequently withdrawn.
MENZON vs. PETILLA (1991) Motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Court dated August 28, 1990 which initially denied the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by then Acting Vice-Governor of Leyte, Aurelio D. Menzon. FACTS: On February 16, 1988, by virtue of the fact that no Governor had been proclaimed in the province of Leyte, the Secretary of Local Government Luis Santos designated the Vice-Governor, Leopoldo E. Petilla as Acting Governor of Leyte. On March 25, 1988 the petitioner Aurelio D. Menzon, a senior member of the SangguniangPanlalawigan was also designated by Secretary Luis Santos to act as the Vice-Governor for the province of Leyte. The petitioner took his oath of office before Senator Alberto Romulo on March 29, 1988. theSangguniangPanlalawigan, in a special session held on July 7, 1989, issued Resolution No. 505 where it held invalid the appointment of the petitioner as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte. the Regional Director of the Department of Local Government, Region 8, ResurreccionSalvatierra, on July 17, 1989, wrote a letter addressed to the Acting-Governor of Leyte, Leopoldo E. Petilla, requesting the latter to correct previous actions which may have tended to discredit the validity of Atty. Aurelio Menzon's designation as acting vice-governor, including the payment of his salary as Acting Vice-Governor. Despite these letters of request, the Acting Governor and the SangguniangPanlalawigan, refused to correct Resolution No. 505 and correspondingly to pay the petitioner the emoluments attached to the Office of Vice-Governor. Thus, on November 12, 1989, the petitioner filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and mandamus. SUPREME COURT RULING: 1) Whether or not there was a vacancy? The law on Public Officers is clear on the matter. There is no vacancy whenever the office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. A sensucontrario, there is a vacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at present the duties of the office. Applying the definition of vacancy

to this case, it can be readily seen that the office of the Vice-Governor was left vacant when the duly elected Vice-Governor LeopoldoPetilla was appointed Acting Governor. In the eyes of the law, the office to which he was elected was left barren of a legally qualified person to exercise the duties of the office of the Vice-Governor. There is no satisfactory showing that LeopoldoPetilla, notwithstanding his succession to the Office of the Governor, continued to simultaneously exercise the duties of the Vice-Governor. The nature of the duties of a Provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge them. More so when the vacancy is for an extended period. 2) Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government has the authority to make temporary appointments? The Local Government Code is silent on the mode of succession in the event of a temporary vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor. However, the silence of the law must not be understood to convey that a remedy in law is wanting. The circumstances of the case reveal that there is indeed a necessity for the appointment of an acting Vice-Governor. For about two years after the governatorial elections, there had been no de jure permanent Governor for the province of Leyte, Governor AdelinaLarrazabal. The two-year interregnum which would result from the respondents' view of the law is disfavored as it would cause disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services to the people and in the proper management of the affairs of the local government of Leyte. It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the President is empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive positions, we see no cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly applied in the present case. In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or absent, etc., the management of governmental affairs to that extent, may be hampered. The appointment of the petitioner, moreover, is in full accord with the intent behind the Local Government Code. There is no question that Section 49 in connection with Section 52 of the Local Government Code shows clearly the intent to provide for continuity in the performance of the duties of the ViceGovernor. Section 49:In case a permanent vacancy arises when a Vice-Governor assumes the Office of the Governor, . . . refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntary resigns or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office the sangguniangpanlalawigan . . . member who obtained the highest number of votes in the election immediately preceding, . . . shall assume the office for the unexpired term of the Vice-Governor. . . .