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1 1NC Competitiveness Kritik

The 1AC is a s ave to the o!ic o" competitiveness and the notions o" American e#ceptiona ism that under ie it $ the impact is !enocide and imperia vio ence %h&te ' (Dave Whyte, Reader in Sociology, the Department of Sociology, Social Policy and Criminology, the University of
Liverpool, Mar et Patriotism and the !War on "error!#, Social $%stice, &ol' (), *o' (+), pgs' ,-./,,-, $S"0R, http1++222'3stor'org+sta4le+5.678)769 :t is do%4tf%l 2hether neoconservatism represents a 4rea from neoli4eralism that is significant eno%gh to disting%ish the t2o perspectives 2ithin the po2er 4loc' ;n intrinsic incompati4ility is not e<pressed if, for e<ample, the ideal of the (laisse=/faire9 state is concept%ali=ed differently in Chicago School economic theory (in 2hich the state>s proper role is red%ced to maintaining a r%dimentary system of r%les that can g%arantee access to !free! mar ets9 and Stra%ssian political philosophy (2hich stresses the re?%irement of a nationally cohesive a%thoritarian state/led 4y a 4eneficial tyranny/that m%st esta4lish a solid moral order and ens%re the defense of Western civili=ation9' "he relationship 4et2een the t2o positions is revealing in that the chief intellect%als identified 2ith the neocons (e'g', @rancis @% %yama, Sam%el P' A%ntington, Ro4ert Bagan, and William Bristol9, tho%gh they fre?%ently disagree in p%4lic on matters of philosophy and policy, are %nited 4y their enth%siasm for neoli4eral economics' Civing contin%ity to the U'S' r%ling class is a 4elief in a neoli4eral mar et standard of civili=ation and in the leading role of the U'S' in sec%ring this standard of civili=ation, 4y force if necessary' "he more 4r%tal and coercive form of capitalist r%le that is c%rrently 4eing reconfig%red, then, is less concerned 2ith li4eral tropes of prosperity, representation, and freedom than 2ith asserting a %niversal (neoli4eral9 mar et standard of civili=ation' Since the 4irth of the U'S' state, the central legitimating myth has 4een the ass%mption that the U'S' had adopted the mantle of the g%ardian of Western civili=ation' The !enocides o" indi!enous popu ations that ena( ed )uropean co oni*ation o" the Americas, partic%larly in *orth ;merica, +ere committed +ith re"erence to a ,chosen peop e, m&tho o!& derived "rom the Christian -i( e. Centra to this m&tho o!& is the idea that the ../. inherited "rom the )uropeans the !uardianship o" %estern civi i*ation' ;s ;min (5--)1 7(9 notes, !thereafter, the United States e<tended to the 2hole planet its pro3ect of reali=ing the 2or that >Cod> had commanded it to carry o%t'! "he chosen/people myth formed the 4asis of the Manifest Destiny doctrineD it 2as partic%larly infl%ential in the post/World War :: period, especially in Ceorge Bennan>s 2ritings' Recent neocon te<ts e<press this vie2, 4y contrasting the 2illingness 2ith 2hich the U'S' defends Western civili=ation 2ith the spinelessness of !old! E%rope (see Bagan, 5--(9' "he core legitimating narrative for U'S' imperialism, then, is the claim that the U'S' is %ni?%ely placed to g%arantee peace and sta4ility, and to provide leadership for the 2ea , 4ac 2ard, 2ay2ard rest of the 2orldD this !chosen people! myth allo2s the U'S' to sta e claims to glo4al economic leadership and ;merican e<ceptionalism (Said, ,..(1 ()(/().9' "he program first set o%t 4y the neocon press%re gro%p/the Pro3ect for the *e2 ;merican Cent%ry/has no2 4een f%lly reali=ed in ;fghanistan and :ra? and has ta en ;merican e<ceptionalism to ne2 heights' see ing to %se a f%ll complement of diplomatic, political, and military efforts to preserve and e<tend !an international order friendly to o%r sec%rity, o%r prosperity, and o%r principles,!5 the program represents a profo%ndly nationalist stance that e<presses U'S' preemptive strategy in terms derived from a !chosen people! myth' Legitimacy for U'S' glo4al hegemony at this 3%nct%re is 4ased %pon a patriotism that reasserts the U'S' as the g%ardian of Western civili=ation' "2o feat%res of hegemonic r%le, the economy and nationhood, characteri=e the political moment at the heart of the :mperi%m that is often !4lamed! %pon a neocon ca4al' :t is the neoli4eral economic doctrine, 2edded to a strengthening of patriotic allegiances to the United States' This moment o" po itica eadership in the ../. invokes o&a t& to the nation0state as an e#p icit means o" stren!thenin! a particu ar "orm o" market capita ism and uses the market to stren!then a e!iance to particu ar & vio ent and authoritarian "orms o" state po+er ' :t see s a commitment to s%pporting the coercive responses of national states and the %ninterr%pted progress of the glo4al mar et as t2in 4%l2ar s against terrorism'

1ore speci"ica & $ the 2uest "or economic competitiveness makes "ascism and +ar inevita( e Kien e 10 (E4erhard Bienle, Lect%rer in Middle East Politics at University of London and Chair of its Center for *ear and Middle
Eastern St%dies, Clo4al competitiveness, the erosion of chec s and 4alances, and the demise of li4eral democracy, ,- May, http1++222'opendemocracy'net+glo4al/competitiveness/erosion/of/chec s/and/4alances/and/demise/of/li4eral/democracy9 Ultimately, therefore, the search for competitiveness challenges li4eral democracy in t2o analytically separate 2ays that in practice of co%rse may reinforce each other' @irst, as a totalitarian principle that s%43%gates all other val%es and 4y definition erodes a variety of li4erties and the chec s and 4alances that are co/termin%s 2ith li4eral democracyD second, as a principle that, 2hilst it holds the promise for a 4etter life, sim%ltaneo%sly threatens the prosperity and s%rvival of the 2ea er

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competitorsD it f%els ideologies and practices that are a%thoritarian and even totalitarian in the classical sense' ;s a matter of co%rse, these practices and ideologies are no less hostile to chec s and 4alances' *%mero%s a%thoritarian regimes aro%nd the 2orld, today and in the past, have 4een the res%lt of attempts to catch %p and compete 2ith economically more s%ccessf%l states' *ineteenth cent%ry Pr%ssia, the 4%rea%cratic a%thoritarian regimes in mid "2entieth cent%ry Latin ;merica and more recently :ra? %nder Saddam A%ssein are telling e<amples, even tho%gh they differ 2idely as far as restrictions to li4erties are concerned' "he E%ropean fascisms of the ,.5-s, (-s and )-s 2ere partly moved 4y the same perception of comparative 2ea ness, tho%gh com4ined 2ith and transformed into e<treme pro3ects of domination, s%43%gation and annihilation'

3ote ne!ative to resist the usa!e o" competitiveness as a means o" structurin! the ! o(a econom& $ on & re4ection o" said "ramin! can pro( emati*e the he!emonic nature o" competitiveness discourse 5ou!ner 6 ("ore @o%gner, ;ssistant Professor of :nternational Relations at the Fil ent University, "he state, international
competitiveness and neoli4eral glo4alisation1 is there a f%t%re 4eyond G the competition stateHI, Revie2 of :nternational St%dies (5--79, (59 "he 4asic idea informing this article has 4een that the transgression of something that is c%rrently conceived as a given Gfact of lifeH can 4e facilitated 4y sho2ing 4oth that 2hat is, has not al2ays 4een and, in conse?%ence, need not al2ays 4e in the f%t%reD and that 2hat is, is internal not to an %nchanging nat%re, 4%t rather to politics or relations of po2er' :n accordance 2ith this, the article has sho2ed that the pro4lem of international competitiveness has a ?%ite speciJc history of emergence and transformation internal to state and glo4al forms of governance, and that the disco%rse of international competitiveness is c%rrently at the centre not only of ho2 state a%thorities cond%ct their 4%siness, 4%t also ho2 their cond%ct is shaped and manip%lated 4y other actors in the 2orld political economy' "he 4roader signiJcance of this (re9pro4lematisation of the pro4lem of international competitiveness lies in its potential contri4%tion to the opening %p of a space of possi4ility for the state to 4ecome something other than a competitive entity' :n this connection, the iss%e at sta e today is not so m%ch the a4sence of state conceptions that someho2 r%n co%nter to the neoli4eral one of the state as a competitive entity, as the hegemonic position of the neoli4eral pro4lem and disco%rse of competitiveness as s%ch' :f the latter is left %nchallenged, as is the case in m%ch of the competition state literat%re, then alternative state conceptions 2ill %navoida4ly 4e assessed in terms of international competitiveness and, in conse?%ence, stand little chance of prevailing in any 4%t distorted and marginal 2ays' 8( ;gainst this 4ac gro%nd, the historisation and politicisation of the pro4lem of international competitiveness provided in this article can contri4%te 4oth to ma e the concept of international competitiveness fall from its c%rrent grace, and increase peopleHs receptivity to 4oth e<isting and prospective alternatives to the neoli4eral conception of the state' With regard to the prospect of the state 4ecoming something other than a competitve entity, an opening might also follo2 from ho2 the state has 4een sho2n to 4e constit%ted as a three/headed troll that is competitive, disciplined and sovereign 2ithin the conte<t of contemporary eorts at neoli4eral glo4al governance' ;s sovereign entities, states retain the option to p%t an end to capital mo4ility, and there4y 4oth reverse the po2er relationship that c%rrently characterises their relations 2ith transnational capital, and deny non/state actors the opport%nity to act %pon and manip%late their cond%ct at a distance' "he ey point to note, ho2ever, is that the hegemony of neoli4eralism as a rationality of government has led states to practice sovereignty in a 2ay that eectively s%43ects them to s%ch e<ternal discipline and governance K this, 4y engaging in eorts to constit%te a glo4al mar etplace' Moreover, neoli4eral glo4al governance is considered s%ch a precio%s %nderta ing today that state a%thorities have vol%ntarily, if not proactively, adapted to it 4y 4oth e<ercising a high degree of self/discipline, and acting on themselves and their pop%lations as competitors in a glo4al mar et for investment' While an %nderstanding of the state as an e<ternally disciplined entity has the potential to stim%late pop%lar opposition and resistance to contemporary forms of neoli4eral glo4al governance K in part, 4eca%se many people simply do not appreciate 4eing forced to do things that they other2ise 2o%ld not 2ant to do K this %nderstanding seems at present to 4e m%ch less prevalent in the pop%lar imagination than the one of the state as a competitive entity' Civen 4oth the seemingly ahistorical and apolitical nat%re of the pro4lem of international competitiveness, and ho2 the ?%est for improved competitiveness can rather easily 4e represented as part of a positive national pro3ect, this sit%ation can 4e claimed to inhi4it the emergence of more 4roadly/4ased pop%lar resistance' 8) ;gainst this 4ac gro%nd, the (re9pro4lematisation of the pro4lem of international competitiveness provided in this article can contri4%te to delegitimise attempts to rally people 4ehind national competitiveness pro3ects, and provide additional stim%l%s to pop%lar opposition and resistance to contemporary e orts to constit%te a glo4al mar etplace' 8L

2NC A ternative
7e"usa o" the a""irmative8s "ramin! a o+s "or di""erent understandin!s o" the ! o(a econom& to (e

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deve oped 5ou!ner 6 ("ore @o%gner, ;ssistant Professor of :nternational Relations at the Fil ent University, "he state, international
competitiveness and neoli4eral glo4alisation1 is there a f%t%re 4eyond G the competition stateHI, Revie2 of :nternational St%dies (5--79, (59
"he 4asic idea informing this article has 4een that the transgression of something that is c%rrently conceived as a given G fact of lifeH can 4e facilitated 4y sho2ing 4oth that 2hat is, has not al2ays 4een and, in conse?%ence, need not al2ays 4e in the f%t%reD and that 2hat is, is internal not to an %nchanging nat%re, 4%t rather to politics or relations of po2er' :n accordance 2ith this, the article has sho2ed that the pro4lem of international competitiveness has a ?%ite speciJc history of emergence and transformation internal to state and glo4al forms of governance , and that the

disco%rse of international competitiveness is c%rrently at the centre not only of ho2 state a%thorities cond%ct their 4%siness, 4%t also ho2 their cond%ct is shaped and manip%lated 4y other actors in the 2orld political economy' "he 4roader signiJcance of this (re9pro4lematisation of the pro4lem of international competitiveness lies in its potential contri4%tion to the opening %p of a space of possi4ility for the state to 4ecome something other than a competitive entity ' :n this connection, the iss%e at sta e today is not so m%ch the a4sence of state conceptions that someho2 r%n co%nter to the neoli4eral one of the state as a competitive entity, as the hegemonic position of the neoli4eral pro4lem and disco%rse of competitiveness as s%ch' :f the latter is left %nchallenged, as is the case in m%ch of the competition state literat%re, then alternative state conceptions 2ill %navoida4ly 4e assessed in terms of international competitiveness and, in conse?%ence, stand little chance of prevailing in any 4%t distorted and marginal 2ays '8( ;gainst this 4ac gro%nd, the historisation and politicisation of the pro4lem of international competitiveness provided in this article can contri4%te 4oth to ma e the concept of international competitiveness fall from its c%rrent grace, and increase peopleHs receptivity to 4oth e<isting and prospective alternatives to the neoli4eral conception of the state' With regard to the prospect of the state 4ecoming something other than a competitve entity, an opening might also follo2
from ho2 the state has 4een sho2n to 4e constit%ted as a three/headed troll that is competitive, disciplined and sovereign 2ithin the conte<t of contemporary efforts at neoli4eral glo4al governance' ;s sovereign entities, states retain the option to p%t an end to capital mo4ility, and there4y 4oth reverse the po2er relationship that c%rrently characterises their relations 2ith transnational capital, and deny non/state actors the opport%nity to act %pon and manip%late their cond%ct at a distance' "he ey point to note, ho2ever, is that the hegemony of neoli4eralism as a rationality of government has led states to practice sovereignty in a 2ay that effectively s%43ects them to s%ch e<ternal discipline and governance K this, 4y engaging in efforts to constit%te a glo4al mar etplace' Moreover, neoli4eral glo4al governance is considered s%ch a precio%s %nderta ing today that state a%thorities have vol%ntarily, if not proactively, adapted to it 4y 4oth e<ercising a high degree of self/discipline, and acting on themselves and their pop%lations as competitors in a glo4al mar et for investment' While an %nderstanding of the state as an e<ternally disciplined entity has the potential to stim%late pop%lar opposition and resistance to contemporary forms of neoli4eral glo4al governance K in part, 4eca%se many people simply do not appreciate 4eing forced to do things that they other2ise 2o%ld not 2ant to do K this %nderstanding seems at present to 4e m%ch less prevalent in the pop%lar imagination than the one of the state as a competitive entity' Civen 4oth the seemingly ahistorical and apolitical nat%re of the pro4lem of international competitiveness, and ho2 the ?%est for improved competitiveness can rather easily 4e represented as part of a positive national pro3ect, this sit%ation can 4e claimed to inhi4it the emergence of more 4roadly/4ased pop%lar resistance'8) ;gainst this 4ac gro%nd, the (re9pro4lematisation of the pro4lem of international

competitiveness provided in this article can contri4%te to delegitimise attempts to rally people 4ehind national competitiveness pro3ects, and provide additional stim%l%s to pop%lar opposition and resistance to contemporary efforts to constit%te a glo4al mar etplace'8L

9eads to an e imination o" the competitiveness pro( em 5ou!ner (;ssistant Professor of :nternational Relations at the Fil ent University9 6
("ore, "he state, international competitiveness and neoli4eral glo4alisation1 is there a f%t%re 4eyond G the competition stateHI, Revie2 of :nternational St%dies (5--79, (59

While s%ch crisis tendencies might event%ally lead to the stateHs reconstit%tion as a non/competition state, the present article 2ill follo2 a dierent trac in an attempt to contri4%te to the opening %p of a space for the state to 4ecome something other than a competitive entity' 7ather than en!a!in! direct & +ith the competition state: it +i en!a!e critica & +ith the !overnmenta pro( em that consumes and ener!ises it K namely the pro4lem of international competitiveness' :f it is the case, as Peter Dic en has claimed, that G ;a<s on! as the concept o" nationa =. . .> competitiveness remains in currenc& then no sin! e state is ike & to opt out8:26 then a critica =re>pro( emisation o" internationa competitiveness as a !overnmenta pro( em mi!ht contri(ute to the re2uired deva uation o" the concept and: su(se2uent &: to a de0competitivisation o" the state. "he emergence of G international competitivenessH as a governmental pro4lem There is nothin! natura : !iven or se "0evident in internationa competitiveness (ein! a ke& pro( em in contemporar& re?ections on state !overnance ' More f%ndamentally, 2hat constit%tes a pro4lem is in itself never given, as nothing can 4e claimed to constit%te a pro4lem in and of itself' :n order for something to constit%te a pro4lem, it %navoida4ly has to 4e constit%ted as s%ch 4y some4ody' :n other 2ords, a pro4lem can 4est 4e conceived as a prod%ct of pro4lematisation K that is, the practice in and thro%gh 2hich something is rendered pro4lematic or constit%ted as a pro4lem' To ta k a(out a !overnmenta pro( em: then: (ecomes a 2uestion o" somethin! (ein! constituted as a pro( em +ithin re?ections on ho+ to

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!overn' Moreover, and 2ith reference to Michel @o%ca%ltHs 2or on governmentality, it can 4e claimed 2ith *i olas Rose and Peter Miller that !overnment can itse " (e conceived as a @ pro( emati*in! activit&8 $ this in the sense that @ it poses the o( i!ations o" ru ers in terms o" the pro( ems the& seek to address8 '56

2NC Turns Case

Competitiveness discourse makes the econom& unsustaina( e $ i!nores oca markets and income ine2ua it& -risto+ @A
(School of City and Regional Planning, Cardiff University9 (Cillian, EveryoneHs a G2innerH1 pro4lematising the disco%rse of regional competitiveness, $o%rnal of Economic Ceography L (5--L9 pp' 58LK(-)9

"a ing a 4roader perspective on regional development processes again highlights the limits of policy approaches predicated %pon the dominant regional competitiveness disco%rse' ;dopting the relational perspective 2o%ld imply that the pro4lems of less prospero%s or 2ea er regions may 4e e<plained 4y their relationships 2ith prospero%s, core regions rather than simply reMecting deJciencies in the performance of their Jrms or the environments 2ithin 2hich they operate' Ao2ever, the competitiveness discourse esche+s consideration o" the re ations (et+een re!ions: "ocusin! on & on the imperative o" (ui din! capacit& +ithin re!ions ' "he responsi4ility for developing competitive Jrms and prospero%s regions is th%s placed Jrmly 2ith instit%tional actors and comm%nities 2ithin regions, 2ho are therefore also seen as c%lpa4le 2here competitive performance is seen to have slipped' Competitiveness ea!ue ta( es are inevita( & seductive "or re!iona deve opment a!encies and the media keen to a(sor( @2uick and dirt&8 comparative measures o" re!iona economic per"ormance ' Ao2ever, they clearly carry the inherent danger of stigmatising lagging regions as failing 4eca%se of their o2n deJciencies, 2hen the pro4lems may lie in part in 4roader str%ct%res' "he policy conse?%ences are also clear' "he res%lt is an overarching foc%s on 4%ilding instit%tional str%ct%res s%ch as RD;s, to the neglect of a more active interregional policy that might aim to 4oth redistri4%te reso%rces 4et2een regions and control gro2th in the core 2ith e?%al if not greater impact (see C%m4ers et al', 5--(9' The dominant discourse a so eads to an emphasis upon a re ative & narro+ route to re!iona prosperit&: i!norin! the potentia "or !ro+th and deve opment to (e achieved throu!h more diverse avenues. The re!iona competitiveness discourse i!nores the possi(i it& that re!iona prosperit& mi!ht (e achieved (&, for e<ample: the deve opment o" Brms servin! oca and nationa markets and not 4ust internationa ones: or (& the deve opment o" communit& or socia enterprises +hich meet (roader socia and environ0 menta as +e as economic o(4ectives ' ;s a conse?%ence, policies tend to prioritise rather narro2, private/sector orientated agendas at the e<pense of 4roader regeneration initiatives, a criticism recently levelled at the English RD;s (*iven, 5--)9' :ndeed : the discourse on re!iona competitiveness "ai s to address the 2uestion o" sustaina(i it& or the possi4ility that the o%tcomes of relying on a strategy 4ased %pon internationally competitive Jrms may not necessarily 4e desira4le' The modern socioeconomic s&stem has to achieve not on & a sustaina( e (a ance o" pa&ments or a(so ute eve o" income per"ormance: (ut a so a num(er o" other (asic socia o(4ectives: nota( & some de!ree o" income redistri(ution and at east a (asic eve o" hea th care (Lle2ellyn, ,..79' C" these are not met: then over the on!er term the situation +ou d a most certain & not (e sustaina( e' :f the aim is to increase average earnings in the long/ term, for e<ample, it is only logical that improving competitiveness sho%ld involve alleviating poverty Npersistent poverty 2ill Ghold 4ac H efforts to enhance competitiveness (Airmis, 5--59' The current discourse o" re!iona competitiveness does not: ho+ever: e#hi(it an& concern +ith the structure: (eneBciaries and dura(i it& o" improved Brm competitiveness '

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1 Cmpact $ )conom&
Competition state "rame+ork makes the ! o(a econom& unsustaina( e $ de(t "or !ro+th. /o vin! ine2ua it& is ke& to an& economic recover& Da an @98
(Professor of :nternational Political Economy at the University of Firmingham9 (Ronen, L%ring F%ffaloes and the Came of :nd%strial S%4sidies1 ; Criti?%e of *ational Competitive Policies in the Era of the Competition State, Clo4al Society1 $o%rnal of :nterdisciplinary :nternational Relations, Sep.8, &ol' ,5, :ss%e (9

Ct appears to me that there are stron! !rounds to (e ieve that the !ro+in! !ap (et+een the rich and poor +ithin each and ever& countr& is inked direct & to the structure o" the ! o(a econom& in the era o" the ,competition state!' Ao2ever: since !ro+in! po arisation comes into con" ict +ith some o" the centra aims o" the competition state (& ne!ative & a""ectin! socia and po itica sta(i it& +hich is so essentia in the current (eaut& contests (et+een states: it adds an additiona component to the risin! costs o" the competition state: e#acer(atin! "urther its interna contradictions ' Competition State and De4t Regressive ta<ation and gro2ing polarisation affects negatively the vast ma3ority of the pop%lation>s income' "his raises a serio%s ?%estion1 +here is the demand "or !oods and services supposed to come "romE 0r, to 4e more e<act, 2here is the demand for 2age goods going to come fromIO8)P ;nd if there is indeed a crisis or at least f%ndamental change in the nat%re of demand in the 0ECD core, then 2hat role does the !competition state! have to play in itI "he changing nat%re of cons%mer demand in 0ECD co%ntries, partic%larly in light of the slo2 rate of recovery in cons%mer confidence in the ,..-s, is 4eginning to 4e disc%ssed in earnest'O8LP "he arg%ment is familiar that Beynesian fine/t%ning policies 2ere a4o%t the synchronisation of 2age and prod%ctivity rises so that glo4al demand ept %p 2ith increasing prod%ction'O87P Lipiet= arg%es that neoli4eralism has failed to provide a ne2 mode of reg%lation and synchronisation of glo4al demand and s%pply' Witho%t ris ing an in?%iry into the comple< and intricate ?%estion of the nat%re of demand in a glo4alised economy, : 2o%ld simply li e to ta e note of a 2ell/ no2n arg%ment among financial e<perts, namely that the last three decades 2ere a period characterised 4y the progressive loosening of credit controls, on the one hand, complemented (not s%rprisingly9 4y rising de4t, individ%al, corporate and glo4al, on the other' ;ltho%gh one sho%ld contin%e treating de4t on a case/4y/case 4asis, the overa pro( em o" inde(tedness cannot (e dissociated "rom the (roader tendencies o" the competition state era' Cro2ing individ%al, national and corporate de4t has ept cons%mption higher than it 2o%ld have 4een other2ise' The ,de(t "or !ro+th, s&ndrome: e#perienced durin! the 1980s in the ./A: the .K and ater on in Fapan contri(uted to the risin! perception o" risk and vo ati it& in the "inancia markets +hich is (e ieved to (e the principa cause o" the 198901994 +or d recession ' Concl%sion "his paper does not p%rport to 4e a policy proposal and sho%ld not 4e read as an arg%ment for or against national ind%strial policies and+or state intervention' "he central message of this paper is that there is a mar ed difference 4et2een the dynamics of economic gro2th in an integrated glo4al mar et and the dynamics of economic gro2th of a mar et politically divided among nationstates' "his may appear self/evident' Unfort%nately, c%rrent de4ates are ca%ght %p 4et2een t2o e?%ally %nhelpf%l and e<treme positions' 0n the one hand, the pro/glo4alisation literat%re on the 2hole tends to ignore the central significance of the state' 0n the other hand, there is a res%rgence of state/centric literat%re 2hich maintains that glo4alisation is, 4y and large, a myth' ;s a conse?%ence, the st%dy of the dynamics of glo4alisation 2ithin the frame2or of a politically divided 2orld, 2hich is a more realistic ass%mption, is, 4y and large, neglected' ;t the same time, the de4ate over national ind%strial policy and the role of the state in the field of economic development sho2s little inclination to incl%de the competitive inter/state dynamics into its models' Conse?%ently, it is often ass%med that competitive ind%strial policy can simply 4e replicated from one state to another 2itho%t m%ch diffic%lty' "he %nderlying pro4lem is that there is a contradiction 4et2een t2o capacities of the state1 from the early ,.(-s on2ard, the state has taken upon itse " the ro e o" providin! a sta( e 4uridica : po itica : socia and increasin! & economic environment "or accumu ation ' "o do so it had t%rned, in effect, into a gigantic redistri4%tive mechanism' F%t as the state gre2 it also t%rned into a po2erf%l economic actor in its o2n right' The pro( em is that the state as an economic actor competes over resources +ith the (usinesses +hich: in its other capacit& as provider o" sta( e economic and socia environment: it is supposed to support ' :n sho%ldering the social costs of prod%ction 2ith an ageing pop%lation inevita4ly p%ts greater demand on the state 2hich translate, in one form or another, into higher ta<ation and hence lo2er corporate profit' F%t i" the state seeks to imit its direct economic impact and ,ro (ack the "rontiers o" the state,: then the environment o" accumu ation is eventua & dama!ed. There is no o(vious route out o" this 2uandar& e#cept oneG increase the eve o" e#ports so that !overnment revenues dra+ on a ar!er pie and hence ta# does not have to rise to

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such a proportion' "his is the sol%tion that $apan and other e<port/led economies 2ere a4le to p%rs%e %ntil very recently' Whether this option is still open is a matter of de4ate 2hich cannot 4e disc%ssed here' Another radica so ution +hich is serious & de(ated su!!ests an a(andonment o" the universa commitment "or hea th and education' @or all intents and p%rposes, 4et2een ,- and 5-Q of the pop%lation of many of the 0ECD co%ntries are no2 4eing neglected and may even 4e a4andoned to their fate' F%t this strategy renders the !?%ality of life! of the other 8-Q hideo%s and raises the pro4lem of social e<cl%sion 2hich the EU and the US; in different 2ays are, not s%rprisingly, concerned 2ith' "he second and related contradiction stems from the ina4ility of the state, in practice, to 2ithdra2 gently from the economy' "he enormo%s centralising po2ers of the state inevita4ly dra2 interest gro%ps> attentions' Co%pled 2ith the need of politicians to get elected, and to 4e seen to 4e doing something for their constit%encies, a po2erf%l coc tail of social interests ens%res that the redistri4%tive mechanism of the state 2ill remain engaged in the p%rs%it of 4etter economic performances' Whatever theory or ideology may prescri4e, on the gro%nd, so to spea , governments ceaselessly see a role and inevita4ly employ their fiscal and economic po2ers' "hey em%late each other, they adopt each others !models! and they innovate' "he state remains, ho2ever, f%lly engaged in the economy' "he error of the national ind%strial policy de4ate is that this aspect of competition 4et2een states is not ta en into acco%nt' :n more recent policy st%dies the lessons are 4eginning to 4e learned, and the calls on reso%rces are far more modest' Ao2ever, as the esca atin! eve s o" s+eeteners and so on demonstrate: even prudent po ic& proposa s are ike & in practice to esca ate into an unhe p"u competitive !ame' "his paper has pointed o%t these central contradictions, 4%t also so%ght to demonstrate that these are already 2ith %sH that there is a comp e# ine o" causa it& inkin! the contradictor& po ic& o" the ,competition states, +ith the ,de(t "or !ro+th, s&ndrome e#perienced in the 1980s: +hich in itse " is not unre ated to the !ro+in! income po arit& e#perienced +ithin the competitive states. The imp ication o" this ar!ument is that income distri(ution must (e p aced at the heart o" an& attempt at economic recover&. "he pro4lem, ho2ever, is that redistri4%tion might erode the competitive position and s%rely stim%late capital flight' "he only alternative open to 0ECD states is to adopt the tenets of financial orthodo<y, 2hich contri4%ted to the crisis in the first place' Ultimately, the %nderlying pro4lem is that the very vision of a transnational 2orld economy s%stained 4y a responsi4le !system of states! is %ntena4le' This vision o" so0ca ed ,em(edded i(era ism,;8'< enshrined in the -retton %oods institutions and other mu ti atera a!reements +as to (e!in +ith an unsatis"actor& compromise: on the one hand: assertin! the primac& o" domestic economic po ic& and: at the same time: demandin! responsi(i it& o" each nation to the communit& o" nations. /uch a vision +as inherent & contradictor&'

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Competitiveness discourse mo(i i*es popu ations "or economic +ar"are -risto+ 4 (Cillian Fristo2, Senior Lect%rer in Econ' Ceography R Cardiff U, EveryoneHs a G2inner,H#$o%rnal of Economic
Ceography L'(, pages 58L/(-)9 Ultimately, the lang%age of competitiveness is the lang%age of the 4%siness comm%nity' "h%s, critical to %nderstanding the po2er of the disco%rse is firstly, %nderstanding the appeal and significance of the disco%rse to 4%siness interests and, secondly, e<ploring their role in infl%encing the ideas of regional and national policy elites' Part of the all%re of the disco%rse of competitiveness for the 4%siness comm%nity is its seeming comprehensi4ility' F%siness leaders feel that they already %nderstand the 4asics of 2hat competitiveness means and th%s it offers them the gain of apparent sophistication 2itho%t the pain of grasping something comple< and ne2' @%rthermore, competitive images are e<citing and their acco%trements of G4attlesH, G2arsH and GracesH have an int%itive appeal to 4%sinesses familiar 2ith the cycle of gro2th, s%rvival and sometimes collapse (Br%gman, ,..749' "he climate of glo4alisation and the t%rn to2ards neo/li4eral, capitalist forms of reg%lation has empo2ered 4%siness interests and created a demand for ne2 concepts and models of development 2hich offer g%idance on ho2 economies can innovate and prosper in the face of increasing competition for investment and reso%rces' Clo4al policy elites of governmental and corporate instit%tions, 2ho share the same neo/li4eral consens%s, have played a critical role in promoting 4oth the disco%rse of national and regional competitiveness, and of competitiveness policies 2hich they thin are good for them (s%ch as s%pportive instit%tions and f%nding for research and development agendas9' :n the EU, for e<ample, the E%ropean Ro%nd "a4le of :nd%strialists played a prominent role in ens%ring that the Commission>s ,..( White Paper placed the p%rs%it of international competitiveness (and th%s the s%pport of 4%siness9, on an e?%al footing 2ith 3o4 creation and social cohesion o43ectives (Lovering, ,..8D Falanya et al', 5---9' "his disco%rse rapidly spread and competitiveness policies 2ere transferred thro%gh glo4al policy net2or s as large ?%asi/governmental organisations s%ch as the 0ECD and World Fan p%shed the national and, s%4se?%ently, the regional competitiveness agenda %pon national governments (Peet, 5--(9' Part of the appeal of the regional competitiveness disco%rse for policy/ ma ers is that li e the disco%rse of glo4alisation, it presents a relatively str%ct%red set of ideas, often in the form of implicit and sedimented ass%mptions, %pon 2hich they can dra2 in form%lating strategy and, indeed, in legitimating strategy p%rs%ed for ?%ite distinct ends (Aay and Rosamond, 5--59' "h%s, the disco%rse clearly dovetails 2ith disc%ssions a4o%t the appropriate level at 2hich economic governance sho%ld 4e e<ercised and fits in 2ell 2ith a gro2ing trend to2ards the decentralised, G4ottom/%pH approaches to economic development policy and a foc%s on the indigeno%s potential of regions' @or e<ample, in the UB1Gthe Covernment 4elieves that a s%ccessf%l regional and s%4/regional economic policy m%st 4e 4ased on 4%ilding the indigeno%s strengths in each locality, region and co%nty' "he 4est mechanisms for achieving this are li ely to 4e 4ased in the regions themselvesH (AM "reas%ry, 5--,a, vi9' "he devol%tion of po2ers and responsi4ilities to regional instit%tions, 2hether democratic or more narro2ly administrative, is given added to%r de force 2hen accompanied 4y the arg%ments contained 2ithin the regional competitiveness disco%rse' "here is clear political capital to 4e gained from highlighting endogeno%s capacities to shape economic processes, not least 4eca%se it helps generate the sense of regional identity that motivates economic actors and instit%tions to2ards a common regional p%rpose (Rosamond, 5--59' @%rthermore, the regional competitiveness disco%rse points to a clear set of agendas for policy action over 2hich regional instit%tions have some potential for leverageNagendas s%ch as the development of %niversity/4%siness relationships and strong innovation net2or s' "his provides policy/ma ers 2ith the a4ility to point to the e<istence of seemingly sec%re paths to prosperity, as reinforced 4y the s%ccesses of e<emplar regions' :n this 2ay, the disco%rse of regional competitiveness helps to provide a 2ay of constit%ting regions as legitimate agents of economic governance' "he lang%age of regional competitiveness also fits in very neatly 2ith the ideological shift to the G"hird WayH pop%larised most nota4ly 4y the *e2 La4o%r government in the UB' "his promotes the reconstr%ction of the state rather than its shrin age (as %nder neo/li4eral mar et imperatives9 or e<pansion (as %nder traditional socialist systems of mass state intervention9' Significantly, this philosophy sees state economic competencies as 4eing restricted to the a4ility to intervene in line 2ith perceived microeconomic or s%pply/side imperatives rather than active macroeconomic, demand/side interventionNan agenda that is th%s clearly in t%ne 2ith the disco%rse aro%nd competitiveness' "he attractiveness of the competitiveness disco%rse may also 4e partly a prod%ct of the po2er of pse%do/scientific, mathematised nat%re of the economics discipline and the 4%siness strategy literat%re from 2hich it emanates' "his creates an innate impartiality and technicality for the mar et o%tcomes (s%ch as competitiveness9 it descri4es (Schoen4erger, ,..89' P%4lic policy in developed co%ntries e<periencing the mar etisation of the state, is increasingly driven 4y managerialism 2hich emphasises the improved performance and efficiency of the state' "his managerialism is fo%nded %pon economistic and rationalistic ass%mptions 2hich incl%de an emphasis %pon meas%ring performance in the conte<t of a planning system driven 4y o43ectives and targets (Sanderson, 5--,9' "he res%lt is an increasing re?%irement for people, places and organisations to 4e acco%nta4le and for their

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performance and s%ccess to 4e meas%red and assessed' :n this emerging eval%ative state, performance tends to 4e scr%tinised thro%gh a variety of means, 2ith partic%lar emphasis placed %pon o%tp%t indicators' "his provides not only a means of lending legitimacy to the instit%tional environment, 4%t also some sense of e<actit%de and certainty, partic%larly for central governments 2ho are th%s a4le to retain some Gtop/do2nH, mechanical sense that things are someho2 %nder their control (Foyle, 5--,9' "he evol%tionary, Gs%rvival of the fittestH 4asis of the regional competitiveness disco%rse clearly resonates 2ith this eval%ative c%lt%re' "he disco%rse of competitiveness strongly appeals to the strat%m of policy ma ers and analysts 2ho can %se it to 3%stify 2hat they are doing and+or to find o%t ho2 2ell they are doing it relative to their GrivalsH' "his helps e<plain the interest in trying to meas%re regional competitiveness and the development of composite indices and leag%e ta4les' :t also helps e<plain 2hy partic%lar elements of the disco%rse have ass%med partic%lar significanceNo%tp%t indicators of firm performance are m%ch easier to compare and ran on a single a<is than are indicators relating to instit%tional 4ehavio%r, for e<ample' "his in t%rn points to a central parado< in meas%res of regional competitiveness' "he ey ingredients of firm competitiveness and regional prosperity are increasingly perceived as lying 2ith assets s%ch as no2ledge and information 2hich are, 4y definition, intangi4le or at least diffic%lt to meas%re 2ith any degree of acc%racy' "he o4session 2ith performance meas%rement and the tendency to red%ce comple< varia4les to one, easily digesti4le n%m4er 4rings a G ind of 4lindnessH 2ith it as to 2hat is really important (Foyle, 5--,, 7-9Nin this case, ho2 to improve regional prosperity' "h%s 2hile a composite inde< n%m4er of regional competitiveness 2ill attract 2idespread attention in the media and amongst policy/ma ers and development agencies, the diffic%lty presented 4y s%ch a meas%re is in no2ing 2hat e<actly needs to 4e targeted for appropriate remedial action' ;ll of this s%ggests that regional competitiveness is more than simply the ling%istic e<pression of po2erf%l e<ogeno%s interests' :t has also 4ecome rhetoric' :n other 2ords, regional competitiveness is deployed in a strategic and pers%asive 2ay, often in con3%nction 2ith other disco%rses (nota4ly glo4alisation9 to legitimate specific policy initiatives and co%rses of action' "he rhetoric of regional competitiveness serves a %sef%l political p%rpose in that it is easier to 3%stify change or the adoption of a partic%lar co%rse of policy action 4y reference to some e<ternal threat that ma es change seem inevita4le' :t is m%ch easier for e<ample, for politicians to arg%e for the removal of s%pply/side rigidities and fle<i4le hire/and/fire 2or place r%les 4y s%ggesting that there is no alternative and that 3o4s 2o%ld 4e lost any2ay if prod%ctivity improvement 2as not achieved' "h%s, Gthe lang%age of e<ternal competitiveness'''provides a rosy glo2 of shared endeavo%r and shared enemies 2hich can %nite captains of ind%stry and representatives of the shop floor in the same 4ig tentH ("%rner, 5--,, )-9' :n this sense it is a disco%rse 2hich provides some shared sense of meaning and a means of legitimising neo/li4eralism rather than a material foc%s on the act%al improvement of economic 2elfare'

Cmpact $ %armin!
The ! o(a +ar "or ta ent is a (ad "rame "or ! o(a +armin!0 ocks in economic nationa ism and prevents cooperative so utions to pro( ems +hi e ensurin! economic co apse
Roos (@ello2 (Climate S Energy Policy9 at "he Frea
thro%gh :nstit%teD M';' :nternational ;ffairs from Sciences Po Paris and an MSc :nternational Political Economy from the London School of Economics9 10 ($erome, "he Specter of Economic *ationalism, $%ne ,-, http1++4rea thro%ghgen'org+4log+5-,-+-7+theTspecterTofTeconomicTnation'shtml9

Many self/proclaimed e<perts in the U'S', ranging from @areed Ua aria to "homas @riedman, have ta en to co%ching their advocacy for a clean/energy economy in terms of innovation, gro2th and competitiveness' Playing into the self/deprecating sense of doom that has pervaded ;merican society in the face of ;sia>s recent challenge to U'S' economic hegemony, s%ch a narrative is li ely to register m%ch more po2erf%lly 2ith an increasingly cynical electorate than the environmentalist >politics of limits>' What most commentators fail to appreciate, ho2ever, is that this rene+ed "ocus on !ro+th and competitiveness is not on & mis eadin! the ;merican p%4lic, it a so poses a pro"ound threat to the +or d econom& and the (i ions of people 2ho are still stru!! in! to make their +a& out o" povert&' The specter o" economic nationa ism ooms ar!e (ehind the desperate attempt to re"rame the c imate crisis in terms o" innovation and competiveness' Late last year, @areed Ua aria compared ;merica>s glo4al rep%tation to !a star that still loo s 4right in the farthest reaches of the %niverse 4%t has 4%rned o%t at the core'! F%siness2ee reported an ;merican CE0 as saying that !the rest of the 2orld is che2ing %s alive,! in concl%sion to 2hich it arg%ed that the >might> of the U'S' man%fact%ring sector has eroded to that of a developing co%ntry' "homas @riedman, in the meantime, is 2ondering 2ho is asleep no2, and has 4eg%n p%4licly fantasi=ing 2hat the U'S' might loo li e if it co%ld 4e China for a day' ;cross the 4oard, the o4session 2ith the ;sian rise to po2er, and in partic%lar the Chinese challenge to U'S' hegemony (2hich at times 4orders on sinopho4ic tendencies9, has gone hand/in/hand 2ith loss of self/esteem and a pervasive sense that everything in the U'S' is going do2nhill' "he concl%sion of most ;mericans is straightfor2ard1 !2e>re not good eno%gh'! "he

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sol%tion of most self/proclaimed e<perts is 3%st as simple1 !2e need to 4ecome 4etter at st%ff'! "his vie2 is not only very self/deprecating / it is %tterly misleading as 2ell' ;merica today finds itself in the middle of possi4ly the most significant economic transformation in its yo%ng history1 the transition to a clean/energy, post/ind%strial economy' To 4ud!e the so idit& o" that econom& on the (asis o" outdated concepts ike manu"acturin! productivit& entirely misses the point. %ith the advent o" the kno+ ed!e econom& and the net2or society, the ver& nature o" +ea th creation +as radica & a tered ' "he f%t%re 2ell/4eing of U'S' citi=ens no longer hinges on technological advances alone' A%man and social capital, rather than the physical capital that %nderpinned the @ordist assem4ly lines, have 4ecome the cr%cial determinants of post/ind%strial 2ealth creation' Aence, the ey investments of the f%t%re 2ill 4e in ed%cation, not in man%fact%ring' /ure & +e need an un"athoma( e amount o" so ar pane s, 2ind mills and e ectric vehic es to (rid!e the transition to a s%staina4le economy and avert the +orst e""ects o" c imate chan!e' "here is a very po2erf%l arg%ment to 4e made for epic government investment in these sectors, partic%larly on the level of infrastr%ct%re (thin smart s%per grids and pl%g/in recharge depots, for e<ample9' -ut +h& does the ../. necessarily have to en!a!e in a "ierce competitive stru!! e to !ain dominance over these sectors: i" it mi!ht as +e et others deve op those techno o!ies at cheaper costE ;ltho%gh the U'S' may have fallen 4ehind in terms of prod%cing the physical solar panels, 2indmills and hy4rid vehicles, it is still light years ahead of China in terms of personal freedoms and h%man 2ell/ 4eing, as 2ell as ecological concern' /ince the u timate end of o%r political and economic system shou d (e to improve human +e 0(ein!: and !ro+th is on & a means to+ards achievin! this end: +hat does it matter i" +e !ro+ a 4it ess rapid & re ative to deve opin! countries and o%r o2n gro2th record of the past si< decades, as on! as our eve s o" +e 0(ein! remain relatively sta( e over timeI :n other 2ords, 2hat does it matter if China prod%ces the solar panelsI @or the climate, it only matters that 2e act%ally start 4%ying them' @or the U'S' economy, it matters that the government invest in h%man and social capital thro%gh ed%cation, as 2ell as in the infrastr%ct%re necessary to spearhead the green economy' Wo%ld it not 4e a m%ch more logical division of la4or if 2e fo%nd a 4alance 4et2een ;sia doing most of the man%fact%ring, and the West contin%ing to e<pand on its no2ledge economyI "here are t2o gro%ps of people 2ho 2o%ld strongly disagree here' @irst of all, the 2ealthy ind%strialists 2ho failed to adapt to changing mar ets / most nota4ly the ;merican car ind%stry / 2ill find their factories either o%tso%rced to foreign co%ntries or ta en over 4y foreign firms, so they have a great sta e in a p%4lic pro3ect to revamp ;merica>s flailing man%fact%ring sector' Secondly, the 2or ers in those factories 2ho are laid off over time and find themselves %na4le to find a ne2 3o4 in a different sector also have a strong interest in promoting the idea of >green collar 3o4s>' *o2 2hat pundits li e Ua aria and @riedman are doing, is "or!in! an unho & a iance +ith these "ai ed industria ists and aid0o"" +orkers, in order to come to a corporatist, neo/ mercantilist compromise that +ou d see the creation o" a heavi & !overnment0su(sidi*ed ../. manu"acturin! sector stea in! 4o(s (ack "rom China and other co%ntries in the developing 2orld' This has nothin! to do +ith pro!ressive c imate po itics. Ct is economic nationa ism' Unli e the doomsday theories of those 2ho li e to e?%ate China>s rise 2ith ;merica>s inevita4le do2nfall, the tr%th is that there is still more than eno%gh money to go ro%nd in the United States, and this is %nli ely to change anytime soon' ;merican ann%al CDP per capita sits at V)7,)--, compared to China>s V7,7-- (ad3%sted for p%rchasing po2er parity9' Wet 2e someho2 have the conceit to challenge this poor co%ntry>s rise to modernity as a f%ndamental threat to o%r >innovative edge>I World2ide, 4illions of people are noc in> on modernity>s door, and all 2e can thin of is ho2 to %se massive p%4lic investments in green/tech to slam the door sh%t 3%st 2hen they are a4o%t to come inI 7ather than sta!in! a ne+ ! o(a competition +ith Chinese +orkers "or on!0 ost manu"acturin! 4o(s: Americans +ou d do +e to sta!e a competition +ith their o+n e ites in demandin! a hea thier sense o" redistri(utive 4ustice and more investment in pu( ic education' "his 2ay, 2or ers 2ho lose their 3o4s d%e to o%tso%rcing fall into a social safety net rather than into a43ect poverty, and they can 4e directly retrained to ta e %p positions in more economically relevant sectors' A more e#pansive socia s&stem that shifts money from the ;merican aristocracy to the ;merican people seems a ot "airer than a form of economic nationalism that shifts 3o4s from poor ;sians to relatively rich ;mericans' :t also seems to 4e the only 2ay to create the m%ch needed economic 4reathing space for o%r 4rothers and sisters in the developing 2orld to catch %p, 2hile sim%ltaneo%sly allo2ing %s to solve the climate crisis in the most cost effective 2ay'

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Competitiveness makes environmenta and economic co apse and resource +ars inevita( e -risto+ @10
(School of City S Regional Planning, Cardiff University9 (Cillian, Resilient regions1 re/GplaceHing regional competitiveness, Cam4ridge $o%rnal of Regions, Economy and Society 5-,-, (, ,L(K,769

:n recent years, regional development strategies have 4een s%43%gated to the hegemonic disco%rse of competitiveness, s%ch that the %ltimate o43ective for all regional development policy/ma ers and practitioners has 4ecome the creation of economic advantage thro%gh s%perior prod%ctivity performance, or the attraction of ne2 Jrms and la4o%r (Fristo2, 5--L9' ; ma3or conse?%ence is the developing G%4i?%itiJcationH of regional development strategies (Fristo2, 5--LD Mas ell and Malm4erg, ,...9' "his reMects the stat%s of competitiveness as a ey disc%rsive constr%ct ($essop, 5--89 that has ac?%ired h%gely signiJcant rhetorical po2er for certain interests intent on reinforcing capitalist relations (Fristo2, 5--LD @o%gner, 5--79' :ndeed, the competitiveness he!emon& is such that man& po icies previo%sly considered on & indirect & re evant to un"ettered economic !ro+th tend to (e hi4acked in support o" competitiveness a!endas (for e<ample Raco, 5--8D also Dannestam, 5--89' "his paper 2ill arg%e, ho2ever, that a particu ar & narro+ discourse o" @competitiveness8 has (een constructed that has a num(er o" ne!ative connotations "or the GresilienceH of regions' Resilience is deJned as the regionHs a(i it& to e#perience positive economic success that is socia & inc usive: +orks +ithin environmenta imits and +hich can ride ! o(a economic punches (;sh4y et al', 5--.9' ;s s%ch, resilience clearly resonates 2ith literat%res on s%staina4ility, localisation and diversiJcation, and the developing %nderstanding of regions as intrinsically diverse entities 2ith evol%tionary and conte<t/speciJc development tra3ectories (Aayter, 5--)9' :n contrast, the dominant discourse o" competitiveness is @p ace ess8 and increasin! & associated +ith ! o(a ised: !ro+th0Brst and environmenta & ma i!n a!endas (A%dson, 5--L9' Ao2ever, this paper 2ill arg%e that the relationships 4et2een competitiveness and resilience are more comple< than might at Jrst appear' Using insights from the C%lt%ral Political Economy (CPE9 approach, 2hich foc%ses on %nderstanding the constr%ction, development and spread of hegemonic policy disco%rses, the paper 2ill arg%e that the dominant disco%rse of competitiveness %sed in regional development policy is narro2ly constr%cted and is th%s insensitive to contingencies of place and the more n%anced role of competition 2ithin economies' "his leads to pro4lems of resilience that can 4e partly overcome 2ith the development of a more conte<t%alised approach to competitiveness' "he paper is no2 str%ct%red as follo2s' :t 4egins 4y e<amining the developing %nderstanding of resilience in the theorising and policy disco%rse aro%nd regional development' :t then descri4es the CPE approach and %tilises its frame2or to e<plain 4oth ho2 a narro2 conception of competitiveness has come to dominate regional development policy and ho2 resilience inter/plays in s%4tle and comple< 2ays 2ith competitiveness and its emerging criti?%e' "he paper then proceeds to ill%strate 2hat resilience means for regional development Jrstly, 2ith reference to the "ransition "o2ns concept, and then 4y developing a typology of regional strategies to sho2 the different characteristics of policy approaches 4ased on competitiveness and resilience' Regional resilience Resilience is rapidly emerging as an idea 2hose time has come in policy disco%rses aro%nd localities and regions, 2here it is developing 2idespread appeal o2ing to the pec%liarly po2erf%l com4ination of transformative press%res from 4elo2, and vario%s catalytic, crisis/ind%ced imperatives for change from a4ove' :t feat%res strongly in policy disco%rses aro%nd environmental management and s%staina4le development (see A%dson, 5--8a9, 4%t has also more recently emerged in relation to emergency and disaster planning 2ith, for e<ample GRegional Resilience "eamsH esta4lished in the English regions to s%pport and co/ordinate civil protection activities aro%nd vario%s emergency sit%ations s%ch as the threat of a s2ine M% pandemic' "he disco%rse of resilience is also ta ing hold in disc%ssions aro%nd desira4le local and regional development activities and strategies' "he recent glo4al Gcredit cr%nchH and the accompanying in/crease in livelihood insec%rity has highlighted the advantages of those local and regional economies that have greater GresilienceH 4y virt%e of 4eing less dependent %pon glo4ally footloose activities, hav/ing greater economic diversity, and+or having a de/termination to prioritise and effect more signiJcant str%ct%ral change (;sh4y et al, 5--.D Lar in and Cooper, 5--.9' :ndeed, resi ience "eatures particu ar stron! & in the GgreyH literat%re spa2ned 4y thin tan s, cons%l/tancies and environmental interest gro%ps around the conse2uences o" the ! o(a recession: catastrophic c imate chan!e and the arriva o" the era o" peak oi "or oca ities and re!ions +ith a its imp ications "or the on!evit& o" car(on0"ue ed economies , cheap, long/ distance transport and ! o(a trade. This popu ar & a(e ed @trip e crunch8 (*e2 Economics @o%ndation, 5--89 has po+er0"u & i uminated the potentia & disastrous materia conse2uences o" the voracious !ro+th imperative at the heart o" neo i(era ism and competitiveness: (oth in the "orm o" resource constraints

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=especia & "ood securit&> and in the ina(i it& o" the current s&stem to mana!e ! o(a Bnancia and eco o!ica sustaina(i it&. :n so doing, it appears to 4e galvinising previo%sly disparate, fract%red de4ates a4o%t the merits of the c%rrent system, and challenging p%4lic and political opinion to develop a ne2, glo4al concern 2ith fr%gality, egalitarianism and localism (see, for e<ample $ac son, 5--.D *e2 Economics @o%ndation, 5--89'

Cmpact $ )nvironmenta Co apse

Competitiveness ensures environmenta co apse0 renders costs environmenta e#terna ities to !ro+th and economic !ain -risto+ @10
(School of City S Regional Planning, Cardiff University9 (Cillian, Resilient regions1 re/GplaceHing regional competitiveness, Cam4ridge $o%rnal of Regions, Economy and Society 5-,-, (, ,L(K,769

"he placelessness of the competitiveness disco%rse also has other signiJcant implicationsNimplications 2hich directly threaten the resilience of regions' The discourse o" de0conte#tua ised competitiveness "ai s to address the ?%estion of s%staina4ility or the environmenta costs o" ! o(a & mo(i e Brms and resources (Fristo2 and Wells, 5--LD A%dson, 5--8a9' :n fact, the pursuit o" this notion o" competitiveness +orks to constrain the possi(i it& o" deve opin! more positive po icies in re ation to the environment. ;s P%rcell (5--., ,)L9 o4serves, @@a po it& that va ues the environment, for e<ample, mi!ht "ee it cannot make a stron! environmenta po ic& (e'g' signing on to Byoto9 (ecause it +ou d make the area ess competitive. "he neo/ li4eral claim is that competition is a ?%estion of life and deathHH' Regions feel they m%st 4e competitive or die' Strategies 4ased on more s%staina4le development approaches then loo very optional in the face of the competitive and glo4al str%ggle for s%rvival' This re?ects the economica & reductionist conception o" deve opment that ies at the heart o" the competitiveness discourse' "he disco%rse foc%ses on the narro2ly microeconomic and emphasises the efJciency of individ%al Jrms' Ct also vie+s the production process in a inear "ashion +here(& @end o" pipe8 +astes are %ltimately to (e disposed o" as @e#terna ities8 (A%dson, 5--L9' Similarly, the discourse deBnes the @environment8 in terms o" the microeconomic (usiness environment , th%s i!norin! the (roader eco o!ica and material imits and capacities o" a re!ion. This creates short0termist, gro2th/Jrst approaches to deve opment creatin! scenarios +here(& a re!ion (ecomes competitive toda& (& dep etin! and den%ding its ph&sica environment: there4y imitin! its competitiveness "or tomorro+ (Fristo2 and Wells, 5--L9'

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7hetoric o" economic competition is misin"ormed and dan!erous $ resu ts in seria po ic& "ai ure and threatens the internationa economic s&stem Kru!man @94(Pa%l Ro4in Br%gman is an ;merican economist, Professor of Economics and :nternational ;ffairs at the
Woodro2 Wilson School of P%4lic and :nternational ;ffairs at Princeton University, Competiveness1 ; Dangero%s 04session#, http1++222'%cema'ed%'ar+%+agaletto+ r%gmanTcompetitiveness'pdf9 C%ess 2hatI Delors didnHt confront the pro4lems of either the 2elfare state or the EMS' Ae e<plained that the root ca%se of E%ropean %nemployment as a lac of competitiveness 2ith the United States and $apan and that the sol%tion 2as a program of investment in infrastr%ct%re and high technology' :t 2as a disappointing evasion, 4%t not a s%rprising one' ;fter all, the rhetoric of competitivenessNthe vie2 that, in the 2ords of President Clinton, each nation is li e a 4ig corporation competing in the glo4al mar etplace#Nhas 4ecome pervasive among opinion leaders thro%gho%t the 2orld' People 2ho 4elieve themselves to 4e sophisticated a4o%t the s%43ect ta e it for granted that the economic pro4lem facing any modern nation is essentially one of competing on 2orld mar etsNthat the United States and $apan are competitors in the same sense that Coca/Cola competes 2ith PepsiNand are %na2are that anyone might serio%sly ?%estion that proposition' Every fe2 months a ne2 4est/seller 2arns the ;merican p%4lic of the dire conse?%ences of losing the race# for the 5,st cent%ry' ; 2hole ind%stry of co%ncils on competitiveness, geo/economists# and managed trade theorists has spr%ng %p in Washington' Many of these people, having diagnosed ;mericaHs economic pro4lems in m%ch the same terms as Delors did E%ropeHs, are no2 in the highest reaches of the Clinton administration form%lating economic and trade policy for the United States' So Delors 2as %sing a lang%age that 2as not only convenient 4%t comforta4le for him and a 2ide a%dience on 4oth sides of the ;tlantic' Unfort%nately, his diagnosis 2as deeply misleading as a g%ide to 2hat ails E%rope, and similar diagnoses in the United States are e?%ally misleading' "he idea that a co%ntryHs economic fort%nes are largely determined 4y its s%ccess on 2orld mar ets is a hypothesis, not a necessary tr%thD and as a practical, empirical matter, that hypothesis is flatly 2rong' "hat is, it is simply not the case that the 2orldHs leading nations are to any important degree in economic competition 2ith each other, or that any of their ma3or economic pro4lems can 4e attri4%ted to fail%res to compete on 2orld mar ets' "he gro2ing o4session in most advanced nations 2ith international competitiveness sho%ld 4e seen, not as a 2ell/fo%nded concern, 4%t as a vie2 held in the face of over2helming contrary evidence' ;nd yet it is clearly a vie2 that people very m%ch 2ant to holdNa desire to 4elieve that is reflected in a remar a4le tendency of those 2ho preach the doctrine of competitiveness to s%pport their case 2ith careless, fla2ed arithmetic' "his article ma es three points' @irst, it arg%es that concerns a4o%t competitiveness are, as an empirical matter, almost completely %nfo%nded' Second, it tries to e<plain 2hy defining the economic pro4lem as one of international competition is nonetheless so attractive to so many people' @inally, it arg%es that the o4session 2ith competitiveness is not only 2rong 4%t dangero%s, s e2ing domestic politics and threatening the international economic system' "his last iss%e is, of co%rse, the most conse?%ential from the standpoint of p%4lic policy' "hin ing in terms of competitiveness leads, directly and indirectly, to 4ad economic policies on a 2ide range of iss%es, domestic and foreign, 2hether it 4e in healthcare or trade'

And it turns the entire case $ usin! competitiveness rhetoric as a 4usti"ication spi s over "rom the a""8s po ic&: ki in! the e""ectiveness o" an& re ated po icies: economic or other+ise Kru!man @94(Pa%l Ro4in Br%gman is an ;merican economist, Professor of Economics and :nternational ;ffairs at the
Woodro2 Wilson School of P%4lic and :nternational ;ffairs at Princeton University, Competiveness1 ; Dangero%s 04session#, http1++222'%cema'ed%'ar+%+agaletto+ r%gmanTcompetitiveness'pdf9 Perhaps the most serio%s ris from o4session 2ith competitiveness, ho2ever, is its s%4tle indirect effect on the ?%ality of economic disc%ssion and policyma ing' :f top government officials are strongly committed to a partic%lar economic doctrine, their commitment inevita4ly sets the tone for policy/ma ing on all iss%es, even those 2hich may seem to have nothing to do 2ith that doctrine' ;nd if an economic doctrine is flatly, completely and demonstra4ly 2rong, the insistence that disc%ssion adhere to that doctrine inevita4ly 4l%rs the foc%s and diminishes the ?%ality of policy disc%ssion across a 4road range of iss%es, incl%ding some that are very far from trade policy per se' Consider, for e<ample, the iss%e of health care reform, %ndo%4tedly the most important economic initiative of the Clinton administration, almost s%rely an order of magnit%de more important to U'S'

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living standards than anything that might 4e done a4o%t trade policy (%nless the United States provo es a f%ll/ 4lo2n trade 2ar9' Since health care is an iss%e 2ith fe2 direct international lin ages, one might have e<pected it to 4e largely ins%lated from any distortions of policy res%lting from misg%ided concerns a4o%t competitiveness' F%t the administration placed the development of the health care plan in the hands of :ra Maga=iner, the same Maga=iner 2ho so conspic%o%sly failed to do his home2or in arg%ing for government promotion of high val%e/ added ind%stries' Maga=inerHs prior 2ritings and cons%lting on economic policy foc%sed almost entirely on the iss%e of international competition, his vie2s on 2hich may 4e s%mmari=ed 4y the titles of his ,..- 4oo , "he Silent War' Ais appointment reflected many factors, of co%rse, not least his long personal friendship 2ith the first co%ple' Still, it 2as not irrelevant that in an administration committed to the ideology of competitiveness Maga=iner, 2ho has consistently recommended that national ind%strial policies 4e 4ased on the corporate strategy concepts he learned d%ring his years at the Foston Cons%lting Cro%p, 2as regarded as an economic policy e<pert' We might also note the %n%s%al process 4y 2hich the health care reform 2as developed' :n spite of the h%ge si=e of the tas force, recogni=ed e<perts in the health care field 2ere almost completely a4sent, nota4ly tho%gh not e<cl%sively economists speciali=ing in health care, incl%ding economists 2ith impecca4le li4eral credentials li e Aenry ;aron of the Froo ings :nstit%tion' ;gain, this may have reflected a n%m4er of factors, 4%t it is pro4a4ly not irrelevant that anyone 2ho, li e Maga=iner, is strongly committed to the ideology of competitiveness is 4o%nd to have professional economists nota4ly %nsympathetic in the pastNand to 4e %n2illing to deal 2ith them on any other iss%e' "o ma e a harsh 4%t not entirely %n3%stified analogy, a government 2edded to the ideology of competitiveness is as %nli ely to ma e good economic policy as a government committed to creationism is to ma e good science policy, even in the areas that have no direct relationship to the theory of evol%tion'

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Can8t inte!rate economic competitiveness into socia movements "rom (e o+ $ makes co0optation inev. Toronto Communit& (ui din! a iances prove A ah+a a (doctoral st%dent at Wor University9 6
(;hmed, Wea policies for strong neigh4o%rhoodsI Relay X,(, Septem4er+0cto4er9

As it is "irm & !rounded in discourses around economic competitiveness that "avour the c ass interests o" the ! o(a e ites 2ithin the "oronto City S%mmit ;lliance, it is dou(t"u +hether this civi 0societ& coa ition can provide the space "or the articu ation o" radica c aims "or socia trans"ormation. The s&stematic su(ordination o" socia and po itica issues under the economic imperatives o" ! o(a i*ed capita 0ism makes this K one co%ld arg%e K out0ri!ht impossi( e' "he integration of comm%nity/4ased organi=ations into the ne2 governance str%ct%res of the post/@ordist city opens %p real opport%nities for the inp%t of progressive policy proposals' Iiven the overa "rame+ork o" economic competitiveness in +hich the ana &sis is situated: ho+ever: co0optation is ike & i" not imminent'

The perms third +a& $ even +hen attemptin! to accomp ish no( e !oa s o" socia 4ustice $ a +a&s !et su(ordinated to market driven o!ic 1itche (Prof of Ceography R University of Washington9 6
(Batharyne, !*eoli4eral governmentality in the E%ropean Union1 ed%cation, training, and technologies of citi=enship! Environment and Planning D1 Society and Space 5)((9 (8. K )-69

0verall ho2ever, a (road0(ased socia democratic pro4ect is osin! !round to a neo i(era one invo vin! a comp e# mi# o" Jthird +a&K t&pe c aims to "airness: socia 4ustice, social cohesion and open# government, accompanied (& a sharp institutiona transition to a more market0driven o!ic. The third +a& rhetoric seems to promote a !ent er: "airer !overnment throu!h partnerships and various methods o" decentra i*ed decision0 makin!: (ut in e""ect these chan!es act to increase (oth individua and re!iona competition: devo ve responsi(i it& to speci"ic @a!ents8 and to "urther undermine +e "arist princip es o" redistri(ution and responsi(i it& (Walters and Aaahr, 5--L9'

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Cross0discip inar& studies prove cooperation is the natura and most e""ective method o" human interaction -enk er: 2011:
Wochai Fen ler (y4en lerRla2'harvard'ed%9 is the $ac *' and Lillian R' Fer man Professor for Entreprene%rial Legal St%dies at Aarvard La2 School and the codirector of the Fer man Center for :nternet and Society at Aarvard University' Ae is the a%thor of "he Peng%in and the Leviathan1 Ao2 Cooperation "ri%mphs over Self/:nterest (Cro2n F%siness, ;%g%st 5-,,9, "he Unselfish Cene' Fy1 Fen ler, Wochai, Aarvard F%siness Revie2, --,68-,5, $%l+;%g5-,,, &ol' 8., :ss%e 6+8, EFSC0 SP0"L:CA" 0* C0LL;F0R;":0* We are more cooperative and less selfish than most people 4elieve' 0rgani=ations sho%ld help %s em4race o%r colla4orative sentiments :* ,.67, evol%tionary 4iologist Richard Da2 ins 2rote in "he Selfish Cene, !:f yo% 2ish, as : do, to 4%ild a society in 2hich individ%als cooperate genero%sly and %nselfishly to2ards a common good, yo% can e<pect little help from 4iological nat%re' Let %s try to teach generosity and altr%ism, 4eca%se 2e are 4orn selfish'! Fy 5--7, the tide had started to t%rn' Aarvard University mathematical 4iologist Martin *o2a co%ld declare, in an overvie2 of the evol%tion of cooperation in Science maga=ine, !Perhaps the most remar a4le aspect of evol%tion is its a4ility to generate cooperation in a competitive 2orld' "h%s, 2e might add >nat%ral cooperation> as a third f%ndamental principle of evol%tion 4eside m%tation and nat%ral selection'! Why is this deep/rooted 4elief a4o%t h%man selfishness 4eginning to changeI "o some e<tent, the ans2er is specific to evol%tionary 4iology' F%t similar ideas challenging the notion that people are 4orn selfish have s%rfaced in several other fields, s%ch as psychology, sociology, political science, and e<perimental economics' "ogether, these ideas are tracing a ne2 intellect%al arc in the disciplines concerned 2ith h%man action and motivation' Until the late ,.8-s, o%r %nderstanding of 2hat made people tic 2as mar ed 4y the rise of an ever more precisely defined model of self/interested rationality//the rational actor theory//2hich provided the 4asis for thin ing a4o%t h%man 4ehavior, instit%tions, and organi=ations' ;ss%ming that 2e are %niformly rational and concerned only 2ith advancing o%r material interests provided good eno%gh predictions a4o%t o%r 4ehavior//or so 2e tho%ght//and convinced %s that 2e are 4est off designing systems as tho%gh 2e are selfish creat%res' Moreover, people 2ho don>t cooperate can r%in things for everyone, so to save o%rselves from freeloaders 2e 4%ilt systems 4y ass%ming the 2orst of everyone' *o2here are the ass%mptions a4o%t the effective harnessing of self/interest, and the terri4le conse?%ences, e<pressed more clearly than in former @ederal Reserve chairman ;lan Creenspan>s 5--8 testimony to the U'S' Senate after the collapse of the 4an ing and credit system' !"hose of %s 2ho have loo ed to the self/interest of lending instit%tions to protect shareholders> e?%ity//myself, especially//are in a state of shoc ed dis4elief,! Creenspan said' !:>ve 4een going for )- years or more 2ith very considera4le evidence that it 2as 2or ing e<ceptionally 2ell'! "he 2idespread conviction a4o%t the po2er of self/interest is 4ased on t2o long/standing, partly erroneo%s, and opposing ass%mptions a4o%t getting people to cooperate' 0ne of them inspired the philosopher "homas Ao44es>s Leviathan in ,7L,1 A%mans are f%ndamentally and %niversally selfish, and governments m%st control them so that they don>t destroy one another in the shortsighted p%rs%it of self/interest' "he second is ;dam Smith>s alternative sol%tion1 the invisi4le hand' Smith>s ,667 4oo , "he Wealth of *ations, arg%ed that 4eca%se h%mans are self/interested and their decision ma ing is driven 4y the rational 2eighing of costs and 4enefits, their actions in a free mar et tend to serve the common good' "ho%gh their prescriptions are very different, 4oth the Leviathan and the invisi4le hand have the same starting point1 a 4elief in h%man ind>s selfishness' Models of self/interested rationality increasingly came to 4e seen as %niversally correct and applica4le across an ever/e<panding range of h%man practices' Economics 4ecame the primary medi%m of e<pression' @or e<ample, *o4el la%reate Cary Fec er arg%ed in ,.78 that the calc%l%s of criminals is 4est %nderstood as a set of rational trade/offs 4et2een the 4enefits of crime and the costs of p%nishment, disco%nted 4y the pro4a4ility of detection' :mposing harsher p%nishments and increasing police enforcement, people concl%ded, are the o4vio%s 2ays to tac le crime' "he same year, Carrett Aardin descri4ed the tragedy of the commons//the para4le a4o%t farmers 2ho shared a piece of land 2ith no restrictions on the n%m4er of cattle each co%ld gra=e on it' "hey ept letting more cattle gra=e on the commons %ntil the grass 2as gone, leaving nothing for anyone' *o one stopped gra=ing animals, Aardin arg%ed, for fear of losing o%t to the other farmers, 2ho 2o%ld contin%e overe<ploiting the commons' "he concl%sion 2as that as self/interested actors, h%man 4eings 2ill inevita4ly destroy shared reso%rces %nless the latter are s%43ect either to reg%lation or to property rights' Li e 4iology, ho2ever, the discipline of economics has changed over the years' :n 5--., Elinor 0strom 2as a2arded the *o4el Pri=e in economics for sho2ing ho2 commons can//and do//s%stain themselves for cent%ries as 2ell/f%nctioning systems' "he most stri ing e<ample is in Spain, 2here tho%sands of farmers have

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4een managing their access to 2ater thro%gh self/reg%lated irrigation districts for more than five cent%ries' "o ta e another e<ample, 6LQ of U'S' cities 2ith pop%lations of more than L-,--- have s%ccessf%lly adopted some version of comm%nity policing, 2hich red%ces crime not 4y imposing harsher penalties 4%t 4y h%mani=ing the interactions of the police 2ith local comm%nities' 0vercoming o%r ass%mptions a4o%t self/interest is critical to diagnose the ris s that ne2 4%siness rivals pose' :n ,..., t2o e<perts sho2ed ho2 Microsoft>s entry into the encyclopedia mar et 2ith Encarta sym4oli=ed the transformation made possi4le 4y net2or ed information economics' Aere 2as a ma3or player leveraging a po2erf%l position, gained 4y early/mover advantages and net2or effects, to 4%ndle a prod%ct and distri4%te it 2idely at a lo2 cost' Fritannica>s l%m4ering (5/vol%me, m%lti/tho%sand/dollar offering didn>t stand a chance' "en years later, Fritannica had 4een p%shed to a different model//4%t not 4y Encarta' Microsoft stopped prod%cing Encarta in 5--. 4eca%se of competition from a 4%siness model that is inconceiva4le according to the 4elief in self/interested rationality1 Wi ipedia' :f yo% feel that Wi ipedia//the seventh or eighth most traffic ed 2e4site, 2ith more than (-- million visitors a month//is %ni?%e, as Uagat>s ho2 the %ser/ generated Welp has affected its mar et or @odor 2hat it thin s a4o%t "rip;dvisor' "he rise of open so%rce soft2are is an e<ample of the same dynamic' @or more than ,L years, companies have %sed open so%rce ;pache soft2are for mission/critical 2e4 applications, 2ith Microsoft>s server soft2are trailing a distant second' Companies s%ch as Coogle, @ace4oo , and Craigslist have also fo%nd 2ays to 4ecome profita4le 4y engaging people' 0%r old models of h%man 4ehavior did not//co%ld not//predict that' "he 2ay these organi=ations 2or flies in the face of the ass%mption that h%man 4eings are selfish creat%res' @or decades, economists, politicians, legislators, e<ec%tives, and engineers have 4%ilt systems and organi=ations aro%nd incentives, re2ards, and p%nishments to get people to achieve p%4lic, corporate, and comm%nity goals' :f yo% 2ant employees to 2or harder, incorporate pay for performance and monitor their res%lts more closely' :f yo% 2ant e<ec%tives to do 2hat>s right for shareholders, pay them in stoc ' :f yo% 2ant doctors to loo after patients 4etter, threaten them 2ith malpractice s%its' Wet, all aro%nd %s, 2e see people cooperating and 2or ing in colla4oration, doing the right thing, 4ehaving fairly, acting genero%sly, caring a4o%t their gro%p or team, and trying to 4ehave li e decent people 2ho reciprocate indness 2ith indness' "he adoption of cooperative systems in many fields has 4een paralleled 4y a rene2ed interest in the mechanics of cooperation among researchers in the social and 4ehavioral sciences' "hro%gh the 2or of many scientists, 2e have 4eg%n to see evidence across several disciplines that people are in fact more cooperative and selfless//or 4ehave far less selfishly//than 2e have ass%med' Perhaps h%man ind is not so inherently selfish after all' Do=ens of field st%dies have identified cooperative systems, many of 2hich are more sta4le and effective than incentive/4ased ones' Evol%tionary 4iologists and psychologists have fo%nd ne%ral and possi4ly genetic evidence of a h%man predisposition to cooperate, 2hich : shall descri4e 4elo2' ;fter years of arg%ments to the contrary, there is gro2ing evidence that evol%tion may favor people 2ho cooperate and societies that incl%de s%ch individ%als' :n fact, a distinct pattern has emerged' :n e<periments a4o%t cooperative 4ehavior, a large minority of people//a4o%t (-Q//4ehave as tho%gh they are selfish, as 2e commonly ass%me' Ao2ever, L-Q systematically and predicta4ly 4ehave cooperatively' Some of them cooperate conditionallyD they treat indness 2ith indness and meanness 2ith meanness' 0thers cooperate %nconditionally, even 2hen it comes at a personal cost' ("he remaining 5-Q are %npredicta4le, sometimes choosing to cooperate and other times ref%sing to do so'9 :n no society e<amined %nder controlled conditions have the ma3ority of people consistently 4ehaved selfishly' "hat>s perhaps 2hy %sing controls or carrots and stic s to motivate people isn>t effective' We need systems that rely on engagement, comm%nication, and a sense of common p%rpose and identity' Most organi=ations 2o%ld 4e 4etter off helping %s to engage and em4race o%r colla4orative, genero%s sentiments than ass%ming that 2e are driven p%rely 4y self/interest' :n fact, systems 4ased on self/interest, s%ch as material re2ards and p%nishment, often lead to less prod%ctivity than an approach oriented to2ard o%r social motivations' "he challenge 2e face today is to 4%ild ne2 models 4ased on fresh ass%mptions a4o%t h%man 4ehavior that can help %s design 4etter systems' "he image of h%manity this shift re?%ires 2ill allo2 %s to hold a more 4enevolent model of 2ho 2e are as h%man 4eings' *o, 2e are not all Mother "eresaD if 2e 2ere, 2e 2o%ldn>t have heard of her' Ao2ever, a ma3ority of h%man 4eings are more 2illing to 4e cooperative, tr%st2orthy, and genero%s than the dominant model has permitted %s to ass%me' :f 2e recogni=e that, 2e can 4%ild efficient systems 4y relying on o%r 4etter selves rather than optimi=ing for o%r 2orst' We can do 4etter'

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