RULE 16, SEC. 1 ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, vs. CA, 1996 FACTS: Ekman & Company Inc.

obtained a loan in the amount of P5,700,000.00 from Allied Banking Corporation. Ekman & Company Inc. executed a promissory note, secured by US$750,000.00 deposited in the HSBC. The transaction involves what is called in banking parlance as a back-to-back loan. In 1982, Allied Bank files a complaint for sum of money against Ekman & Co. in the RTC of Makati where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 649. Allied Bank alleged that after applying Ekman & Co.s dollar deposit to its indebtedness, there remained a balance exclusive of interest and other charges owing to it but despite demands made, the amount had not been paid. In 1984, Ekman & Co. itself had filed a complaint against Allied Bank for accounting. The case was also filed in the RTC Makati where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 7500. Subsequently, Allied Bank moved to dismiss civil case No. 7500 citing the pendency of its action in civil case No. 649. Its motion was denied by the court. Allied Bank filed its Answer and then a pre-trial conference was held then hearing began in the case (civil case no. 7500). However, Allied Bank filed a petition for certiorari in the CA questioning the denial of its motion to dismiss civil case no. 7500. Allied Bank moved for the suspension of the proceeding in the case. The CA rendered its decision by dismissing the petition of Allied Bank and ordering the trial court to proceed with the hearing of Civil Case No. 7500. Allied Bank in this case contends that Civil Case No. 7500 should be dismissed because of the pendency of another case between the same parties for the same cause of action or, in the alternative, that the two cases should be consolidated. It therefore prays that the decision of the CA be reversed. ISSUE: WON Civil Case No. 7500 should be dismissed because of the pendency of the other case, Civil Case No. 649. HELD: NO. It would be more in keeping with the demands of equity if the cases are simply ordered consolidated so that evidence

presented in Civil Case No. 7500 will not have to be presented in Civil Case No. 649 again. RATIO: The pendency of a case as a ground for the dismissal of actions, like res judicata, is based on the policy against multiplicity of suits. Since in the most cases the actions are not filed at the same time, but one after the other, the question is which one should be dismissed. The rule in general is that it should be the later case. This rule, however, is not absolute. Indeed, as noted in Teodoro v. Mirasol, "the Rules do not require as a ground for dismissal of a complaint that there is a prior pending action. They provide that there is a prior pending action, not a pending prior action." It may happen, therefore, that the first case may have to be dismissed. For example, the first action was filed in anticipation of the filling of the later action and the purpose is to preempt the later suit or provide a basis for seeking the dismissal of the second action. Even if this is not the purpose for the filing of the first action, it may nevertheless be dismissed if the later action is the more appropriate vehicle for the ventilation of the issues between the parties. The rule on litis pendentia does not require that the later case should yield to the earlier case. What is required merely is that there be another pending action, not a prior pending action. Given, therefore, the pendency of the actions, the following are the relevant considerations in determining which action should be dismissed: (1) the date of filing, with preference generally given to the first action filed to be retained; (2) whether the action sought to be dismissed was filed merely to preempt the later action or to anticipate its filing and lay the basis for its dismissal; and (3) whether the action is the appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues between the parties. The fact that one case was already partly should not justify the refusal of the trial judge in consolidating the same with the other case because the evidence already submitted by the plaintiffs in the first case could be submitted as part of the evidence in the second case, without further need of retaking the testimonies of the witnesses, in view of the fact that both cases involve as hereinbefore stated the same parties, the same subject matter and the same issues.

RULE 16, SEC. 1 FIL-ESTATE GOLF vs. NAVARRO, 2007 FACTS: Felicidad Navarro filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and Recovery of Ownership and Possession with Damages against Carmona Realty Development Corporation (CRDC), Layos, Paular, Diaz, Logarta, Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Inc. and the Registrar of the Registry of Deeds, Cavite. Navarro alleged that she is the registered owner of two parcels of land covered by TCTs. In her Complaint, she stated that through the fraudulent and deceitful misrepresentations of Layos, Paular, Diaz, and Logarta, her TCTs were cancelled and new titles were issued in the name of CRDC. The two parcels of land are now claimed and developed by Fil-Estate. Instead of filing an answer, Fil-Estate filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the action had prescribed and that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because respondent did not pay the correct amount of docket fees. The trial court issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss, stating that the docket fees had been fully paid as certified by the clerk of court. The trial court likewise denied the motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: WON the motion to dismiss filed by Fil-Estate based on prescription and lack of jurisdiction based on the incorrect payment of docket fees, is proper. HELD: NO. In the case at bar, Fil-Estate alleged that Navarro filed the complaint only after 11 years had elapsed since the discovery of the alleged fraud which is deemed to have taken place when the Register of Deeds issued the new title. Therefore, Fil-Estate asserts that the action has already prescribed since Under Art. 1391, an action to nullify a contract based on fraud should be filed within 4 years from the discovery of the fraud. On the other hand, Navarro impugns the validity of the deed of sale for lack of consent. She alleged that she is an illiterate widow and about 96 years old when Layos, Paular, Diaz, and Logarta convinced respondent to hand over the titles to her properties allegedly to obtain sugar quota from the Canlubang Sugar Estate. Taking advantage of Navarros advanced age and illiteracy, Layos, Paular, Diaz, and Logarta subsequently convinced respondent to affix her thumbmark

on a document which turned out to be a deed of absolute sale in favor of CRDC. In effect, navarro is impugning the validity of the deed of sale because even though she affixed her thumbmark on the document, she was unaware that the document was a deed of sale. Thus, Navarros complaint for cancellation of title alleged as basis the nullity of the deed of sale because of the absence of respondents consent. If this is the case, then the complaint filed has not yet prescribed since under Article 1410, an action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. Prescription as a ground for a motion to dismiss is adequate when the complaint on its face shows that the action has already prescribed. This is not the case here. Contrary to FilEstates contention, it is not apparent from the complaint that the action has already prescribed. In this case, the issue of prescription hinges on the determination of whether the sale of the parcels of land is voidable or void. The issue of prescription in this case is best ventilated in a full blown proceeding before the trial court where both parties can substantiate their claims. The trial court is in the best position to ascertain the credibility of both parties. Thus, if the trial court finds that the deed of sale is void, then the action for the declaration of the contracts nullity is imprescriptible. Indeed, the Court has held in a number of cases that an action for reconveyance of property based on a void contract does not prescribe. However, if the trial court finds that the deed of sale is merely voidable, then the action would have already prescribed. On the issue of the payment of docket fees, it is beyond dispute that Navarro paid the full amount of docket fees as assessed by the Clerk of Court of the RTC where they filed the complaint. Similarly, in this case, Navarro paid the full amount of docket fees assessed by the clerk of court. Since she paid the docket fees, then the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case. In fact, even though the payment of the prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment at the time of filing does not automatically result in the dismissal of the case provided the docket fees are paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. However, Fil-Estate is correct that since the case is a real action involving cancellation of titles and reconveyance of properties, then under Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the computation of the docket fees should be based on the assessed or estimated value of the property. Thus, the clerk of court should reassess the docket fees based on the assessed or estimated value of the property to determine the correct docket fees to be paid by Navarro.

RULE 16, SEC. 1 Sps. TIRONA vs. JUDGE ALEJO, 2001 FACTS: Tirona et al., sued Luis Nuez and Juanito Ignacio separately, before the MTC of Valenzuela. The suit was docketed as a Civil Cases for ejectment. Tirona et al., claimed to be owners of various fishpond lots. They alleged, among others that: Nuez and Ignacio, unlawfully operated and used Tirona et al., fishpond, despite their demands to vacate the same. Tirona et al., prayed that the court order Nuez and Ignacio to vacate and surrender possession of the fishpond to them. Nuez and Ignacio admitted in their answers that Tirona et al., owned the fishponds, but denied the other allegations. Nuez raised the affirmative defense that: Tirona et al., action was premature in view of the pendency of a complaint he filed with the DARAB, where the issue of possession in the concept of tenancy is the same as that raised by Tirona et al., in the Civil Case for ejectment. They therefore moved that the ejectment suit be dismissed. The cases were later dismissed by the MeTC. The RTC also dismissed the civil cases when raised on appeal. ISSUE: WON the pendency of the DARAB case barred the filing of the civil case for ejectment. HELD: YES. Under Rule 16, Section 1, litis pendentia or pendency of another action is a ground for the dismissal of the second action. In the motions to dismiss filed by Nunez ang Ignacio in the civil case, the pendency of the DARAB case was one of the grounds relied upon in seeking the dismissal of both actions. For litis of the grounds relied upon in seeking the dismissal of both actions. For litis pendentia to lie, the following requisites must be satisfied: 1. 2. 3. 4. Identity of parties or representation in both cases; Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for ; The relief must be founded on the same facts and the same basis; and Identity of the two preceding particulars should be such that any judgment, which may be rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata on the action under consideration.

The requisites of litis pendentia are present in the case at bar. Thus, the pendency of the DARAB case served as a bar for the filing of the civil case. For one, the parties in the DARAB case and in the forcible entry cases filed with the MeTC are the same. Also, there is identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for. The properties that Nunez and Ignacio seeks to recover possession of in the DARAB case form part of the properties from which Sps. Tirona et al see the ejectment of Nunez and Ignacio. evident and logical conclusion then is that any decision that may be rendered in the DARAB case regarding the question of possession will also resolve the question of possession in the forcible entry cases. Undergirding the principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same subject matter and for the same cause of action. This theory is founded on the public policy that the same matter should not be subject of controversy in court more than once in order that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided, for the sake of the stability in the rights and status of persons. In fact, the MeTC recognized this doctrine when it dismissed the civil cases to avoid a possibility of two contradictory decisions on the question of possession emanating from the DARAB and the trial court. In turn, the RTC was correct in finding that the issue of possession was inextricably intertwined with the agrarian dispute, an issue which was beyond the jurisdiction and competence of the inferior court to settle. In so doing, the RTC deferred to the primary jurisdiction and administrative expertise of the DARAB to settle agrarian cases. Thus, the SC concluded that under the concept of litis pendentia, the pendency of the DARAB Case served as a bar to the filing of Civil Cases for ejectment.

RULE 16, SEC. 1 ALICE VITANGCOL and NORBERTO VITANGCOL vs. NEW VISTA PROPERTIES, INC., MARIA ALIPIT, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CALAMBA, LAGUNA, and the CA, 2009 RATIO: Lack of cause of action is, however, not a ground for a dismissal of the complaint through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, for the determination of a lack of cause of action can only be made during and/or after trial. What is dismissible via that mode is failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion may be made on the ground "that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action." The rule is that in a motion to dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the truth of the material allegations of the ultimate facts contained in the plaintiffs complaint. When a motion to dismiss is grounded on the failure to state a cause of action, a ruling thereon should, as rule, be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint. However, this principle of hypothetical admission admits of exceptions. Among others, there is no hypothetical admission of conclusions or interpretations of law which are false; legally impossible facts; facts inadmissible in evidence; facts which appear by record or document included in the pleadings to be unfounded; allegations which the court will take judicial notice are not true; and where the motion to dismiss was heard with submission of evidence which discloses facts sufficient to defeat the claim. In a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the focus is on the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations. The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint constituting a cause of action lies on whether or not the court, admitting the facts alleged, could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. And to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, it must be shown that the claim for relief in the complaint does not exist, rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain.