Cognitive film semiotics and enlightened empiricism1

REBECCA E. MILLER

The concepts of linguistics can be applied to the semiotics of the cinema only with the greatest caution. On the other hand, the methods of linguistics . . . provide the semiotics of the cinema with a constant and precious aid in establishing units that, though they are still very approximate, are liable over time (and, one hopes, through the work of many scholars) to become progressively rened. Christian Metz

Since the 1980s, the dominant trend in North American lm theory has been to abandon much of the work done in semiotics in favor of a cognitive approach to the study of lm. This entails employing a scientic methodology to discover our cognitive understanding of lm, including our production, means of perceiving and interpretation of it (see Joseph Andersons The Reality of Illusion; David Bordwells Narration in the Fiction Film; Edward Branigans Narrative Comprehension and Film; Gregory Curries Image and Mind; Torben Grodals Moving Pictures; Per Perssons Understanding Cinema; Murray Smiths Engaging Characters; Greg M. Smiths Film Structure and the Emotion System; and Ed Tans Emotion and the Structure of Narrative Film). Cognitive lm theory seeks to explicate the mental processes and knowledge that underlie a viewers capacity to perceive and understand lm. Cognitive lm theory views lm semiotics as an irreconcilable and obsolete theory of how we understand lm. In his book titled The Cognitive Semiotics of Film, Warren Buckland makes a claim that lm semiotics and cognitive lm theory may converge to form a more comprehensive lm theory, namely cognitive lm semiotics. Bucklands cognitive lm semiotics places dual emphasis on the grammar-like structures of lm semiotics and the cognitive processes underlying our understanding of lm, and it aims to model the actual
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mental activities (intuitive knowledge) involved in making/understanding lmic texts (Buckland 2000: 19). Buckland argues that the linguistic theory of Noam Chomsky denes the central doctrines of this convergent eld, and constructs his study around compiling and integrating the work of other scholars who have appealed to certain elements of Chomskyan linguistics as well as other elds of inquiry such as pragmatics and enunciation theory. According to Buckland, the value of this eld of study lies in the fact that it has expanded into a new framework, embracing new theories which help to overcome the problem of a structural linguisticsbased lm semiotics, while providing a more comprehensive account of the underlying mechanisms involved in our production and interpretation of lmic structures. Thus, the primary aim of his study is to move lm theory into the cognitive realm while retaining a metric such as Metzs grande syntagmatique in order to posit that the convergence of these two domains will ultimately lead to a better theory of lm. In a response to two critical examinations of his work, Buckland clearly states his intentions with regard to the work of Chomsky and its applicability to lm theory: I am convinced that any future development of a cognitive semiotic lm theory should refer to Chomsky, for I agree with Thomas Sebeoks statement that [t]he compatibility of Chomskys theory with semiotic views of symbolic function remains to be explored, but will probably nd its explanation when both can be integrated into the fabric of a more comprehensive cognitive science (Buckland 2001). The purpose of this paper will be to further explore the possibility that Chomskys work should serve as a reference for the domain of cognitive lm semiotics. It is my contention that the fundamental concepts underlying Chomskys work are not thoroughly examined in Bucklands book and that, once Chomskyan linguistics is outlined on a broader conceptual level, it will become evident that using his work as an analog to cognitive lm semiotics will prove highly problematic. Ultimately, this paper will argue in favor of considering research possibilities in other methodologies in linguistics, and more specically those of Enlightened Empiricism, to serve as a reference and/or analog to the work being done in the realm of cognitive lm semiotics. The structure of this paper will be as follows: I will outline Bucklands argument and his appeal to Michel Colins work as it pertains to Chomskyan linguistics; I will attempt to outline the fundamental components of Chomskys work in linguistics demonstrating the problems that arise when applying it to a theory of lm; I will refer to the work of Fiona Cowie as a model for considering alternative methodologies in linguistics; and nally, I will examine the applicability of the doctrines of Enlightened Empiricism to the concept of cognitive lm semiotics.

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Many scholars have extended the work of semiotics beyond Metzs structuralist account into the realm of Chomskys cognitive approach. Buckland (2000) presents a compilation of these theories in which semioticians have ventured into the realm of cognitive science. Buckland argues that these theories come together to constitute another, more evolved form of semiotic lm theory which pertains to aspects of cognitive lm theory. He argues that these cognitive lm semioticians, who place dual emphasis on semiotics and cognitive science, form a dierent school of thought than most North American cognitivists who have abandoned Metzs structural semiotics (Buckland 2000: 4). He further contends that Chomskyan linguistics, particularly in its study of competence, has dened the central doctrines of cognitive lm semiotics (Buckland 2000: 18). Thus, this area of study places dual emphasis on the grammatical semiotic structures and on the cognitive processes underlying our understanding of lm, and the work of Chomsky is believed to be its quintessential object of inquiry. Bucklands theoretical construct is valuable in that it encourages scholars to attempt a dierent conceptual approach to lm theory which incorporates the work of many theoreticians over a long period of time. The very notion of convergence, rather than obsolescence or exclusion, is one that carries great potential in searching for a comprehensive account of lmic structures and our understanding of them. However, Bucklands contention that Chomskys linguistic theory will serve as a counterpart according to which a lmic theory may arise is, in my view, problematic and potentially destructive to any theory of convergence if one is to be posited. The fth chapter of Bucklands book, titled All in the Mind?: The Cognitive Status of Film Grammar, provides a thorough explanation of the work of Michel Colin and his revision of Metzs grande syntagmatique according to Chomskys transformational generative grammar. This is the section of Bucklands book which most directly appeals to the work of Chomsky. As we will see, the diculties encountered in Colins localized application of Chomskys computational TGG to a theory of lmic discourse are the rst signs of incongruity and incompatibility in drawing a cogent analogy. Thus, when a theory such as Colins is further embedded into a theory of convergence such as Bucklands, the gaps in the analogy only seem to widen, resulting in a more problematic conceptual endeavor. In order to fully understand Bucklands objective in this chapter, it is rst necessary to examine the primary theory to which he appeals, namely that of Michel Colin.

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The work of Colin: From structuralism to a cognitively real lmic grammar Leaving behind the Metzian structuralist approach to constructing a grammar of lm, Colin (1985) addressed the semiotic question according to the work of Chomskys linguistic competence, which is a speakerhearers knowledge of his or her language (Chomsky 1965: 4). Instead of abandoning the concepts underlying the grande syntagmatique, Colin set out to reassess the metric proposed by Metz and recontextualize it to pertain to real structures present in the minds of lmmakers and spectators, thereby carrying the semiotic discourse into a dierent methodological realm, namely that of cognitive lm theory. Colin was concerned with describing the relationship of natural language to lmic discourse, where linguistic competency would be an explicit part of a theory of lmic discourse. Thus, for Colin, the production and interpretation of lmic messages implied the pre-existence of a Chomskyan linguistic competence (OLeary 1999: 24). Colin examined Chomskys cognitive approach to constructing a grammar in order to construct what he considered to be a descriptively adequate metric of lmic competence, or a model of what one knows when one knows certain lmic conventions. He suggested that one could get to the bottom of the linguistic metaphor by applying the transformational generative rules of Chomskys linguistic competence to the set of lmic discourse. In his study, Colin considered very specic elements of TGG such as deep structure versus surface structure and the precise transformational rules of Standard Theory governing their manifestation. He then developed a slightly revised metric of the underlying features dening Metzs grande syntagmatique, suggesting that its primary aim was to identify the fundamental selectional features that combine to form syntagmatic types in a model of Generative Semantics.

Problems with Colins approach and their implications on Bucklands theory Colins approach of applying the rules of Chomskys grammar to Metzs semiotic metric raises several problems, many of which Colin acknowledges in his work. First, Colin admits that TGG was not constructed to explain discourse, thereby making its application to the domain of lm problematic insofar as there is no guarantee that its rules will apply to anything but language (Colin 1985: 17). Second, Colin states that the ap de plication of the grammar ne pourra se faire que sur un nombre limite nome ` nes (Colin 1985: 21) and that his conceptual construct, mis en phe

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ne rative et transformationelle des faits place ic i en vue dune analyse ge tend pas tenir compte de lensemble des de veloppements lmique ne pre ne rative (Colin 1985: 221). Although by stating this, de la grammaire ge Colin seems to issue a valid disclaimer, this does appear to be a somewhat ad-hoc approach to drawing an analogy, in which only the relevant concepts, in this case very specic and localized rules and structures of TGG, are applied for the purpose of the description of lmic discourse in a theory of Generative Semantics. Finally, I would argue that the most problematic element of Colins theory is the notion that we must presuppose the existence of a linguistic competence in order to posit the ability to produce and interpret lmic messages. This aspect of Colins theory posits a type of implicational relationship between the possession of a capacity for language and the subsequent ability to discern lmic conventions. In other words, Colin suggests that features of lmic syntagmata can be produced and understood only because they are ltered through the language faculty in the brain. Whereas the approach undertaken by Colin may appear to be relatively unproblematic at the localized level of the application of Chomskyan transformational and generative rules to lmic discourse, it proves highly problematic when one takes into account the fact that Chomskys theory extends far beyond the precise structures and transformational and generative rules underlying his grammar to much more fundamental concepts regarding the language faculty as a whole. Chomskys TGG is a mere component of a grammar which performs a very specic function in a highly specialized language faculty. The omission of the more fundamental concepts of Chomskys theory may have been overlooked in isolated revisions of Metzs grande syntagmatique such as Colins, but the scarcity of their appearance in Bucklands account of cognitive lm semiotics represents, in my view, a major conceptual oversight and results in a less plausible theory of convergence. Colin failed to thoroughly examine the nature of Chomskys language faculty as a more universal concept, the fundamental properties of the Universal Grammar, and its innate, domain-specic status in the mind/ brain. Similarly, Bucklands analysis of Chomskyan linguistics and its relevance to cognitive lm semiotics uses the work of Colin and other scholars with similar approaches who touch on very specic grammatical elements of TGG. Bucklands assessment of the more universal properties that Chomsky attributes to the language faculty, such as innateness and domain specicity, is limited to one statement about generative grammar: that it purports to depict exactly what one knows when one hears a language: that is, what has been learned, as supplemented by innate principles. UG [universal grammar] is a characterization of these innate, biologically determined principles, which

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constitute one component of the human mind- the language faculty (Buckland 2000: 21). It is my contention that the evaluation of those fundamental aspects of Chomskys theory that were overlooked in the process of drawing the language-lm analogy, especially innateness and domain specicity, is crucial to understanding the transition from semiotics to cognitive lm theory, especially if the two elds are to converge in an eventual cognitive lm semiotics. The following section will provide a more comprehensive outline of the language faculty as it is characterized by the Chomskyan methods of linguistics.

Chomskyan linguistics The Chomskyan language faculty merits considerably more discussion in Bucklands work if its grammar is to be a model for the convergence of semiotics and cognitive lm theory. The Chomskyan theory goes beyond rules of TGG to much more fundamental, overarching concepts about the nature of the language faculty itself. A closer examination of Chomskyan linguistics will allow us to better understand the reasoning behind using his work as the analogical theory of convergence for semiotics and cognitive lm theory. However, a broader conceptual perspective of his work, in which TGG is contextualized as a specic, localized element of the computational linguistic system within the Chomskyan language faculty, will also demonstrate the extent to which the application of TGG to lmic discourse is problematic. This will force us to reconsider Bucklands contention that Chomskyan linguistics per se should serve as the analog for a theory of convergence in cognitive lm semiotics.

From structuralism to a cognitively real grammar Philosophical studies of language have traditionally presented themselves as pertaining to what Chomsky refers to as E-languages, where E means extensional and externalized (Chomsky 1996: 559). The term E-language takes language to be a set of objects which is external to the mind or brain (Chomsky 1996: 559). According to Chomsky, such a proposal entails dening grammar as a formal system . . . that enumerates or generates the set chosen to be the language, clearly an innite set for which we seek a nite representation (Chomsky 1996: 560). However, he claims, this view raises numerous problems: the set is not well dened, there is uncertainty about the choice of a grammar, and it is unclear

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what the properties of the sets constituting E-languages are (Chomsky 1996: 560561). Chomskys greatest criticism of E-language is that it treats language as an artifact with no status in an eventual science of language (Chomsky 1996: 561). Chomsky coined the term E-language in order to dierentiate what he considers to be a philosophical error, a misinterpretation of a senseless concept that holds no relevance in natural science (Chomsky 1996: 562), from what he believes to be a linguistic approach to the study of the I-language. I-language refers to the notion of an intensional and internalized language and posits a grammar which purports to describe . . . a system represented in the mind/ brain (Chomsky 1996: 562). Under this denition of language, a grammar is considered to be the theory of an I-language, a real entity that exists in the mind, and is considered to be the focus of linguistic study. Clearly, then, for Chomsky, linguistics is a cognitive enterprise: it is the study of the development of a certain faculty of the mind, a mental organ (Chomsky 1980: 4), rather than the analysis of language according to the taxonomic procedures of structuralism. Here, it is evident why a theory such as that of Chomsky facilitated the move from Metzs structuralist approach to Colins attempt at a cognitive approach. To posit Chomsky as the analog to a theory of convergence in cognitive lm semiotics simply because his linguistic theory is a metric-based cognitive enterprise might prove to be valid. However, to posit his theory as an analog for convergence because its principles and rules, such as those of TGG, should prove applicable to the study of cognitive lm semiotics is, in my mind, mistaken.

Characterizing the Chomskyan language faculty Chomsky denes linguistics as that part of psychology that focuses its attention on one specic cognitive domain and one faculty of the mind, the language faculty (Chomsky 1980: 4). Thus, Chomsky views linguistics as a branch of psychology insofar as it is concerned with human capacities to act and to interpret experience, and with mental structures that underlie these capacities and their exercise (Chomsky 1980: 4). Contrary to the behaviorist notion that knowledge is merely a system of dispositions, Chomsky contends that knowing a language implies being in a certain mental state and having a certain mental structure, including a system of rules and principles that generate and relate various types of mental representations (Chomsky 1980: 48). Cowie (1999) provides a very detailed account of the underlying principles of Chomskyan linguistics. She describes Chomskyan Nativism as

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being based in ve core claims: the rst of these claims is (R) or representationalism, which posits that explaining language mastery and acquisition requires the postulation of contentful mental states and processes involving their manipulation; (B), or biological boundedness, suggests that in virtue of the inborn structure of the human mind, there are constraints on the space of thinkable thoughts (Cowie 1999: 154); (DS), domain specicity, is the claim that learning a language requires that the learners thoughts about language be constrained by principles specic to the linguistic domain; the fourth claim is (I), that the constraints on learners thoughts during language learning are in some manner innately encoded (Cowie 1999: 155); and nally, there is the claim (U), that the constraints and principles specied in (DS) as being required for language learning are to be identied with the principles of the Universal Grammar (Cowie 1999: 157). These ve core claims constitute Chomskys conception of the language faculty. The Universal Grammar is the system of principles that specify what it is to be a human language; (a system which is) a component of the mind/ brain prior to the acquisition of a particular language (Chomsky 1996: 562). The Universal Grammar is a representation of the initial state of the language faculty. As outlined above, it is a cognitively real, innate, task-specic language acquisition device which is triggered, brute-causally, by primary linguistic data in order to establish the Ilanguage, or linguistic competence, which represents what one knows when one knows a specic language. The I-language is a cognitively real entity, and the grammar is the theory of the I-language.

Problems drawing analogies between Chomskyan linguistics and cognitive lm semiotics Chomsky is clearly interested in modeling the system of the mind, the mental structure that underlies the human capacity for language. He views the language faculty, the number faculty, and others like these as mental organs. He believes that the mind is modular in structure and that, while the various subsystems of the mind may interact, each is highly specialized (Chomsky 1980: 89). For example, Chomsky dierentiates what he calls the computational aspects of language, or rules which form syntactic constructions as well as phonological or semantic patterns, from the conceptual system, which is a system of object-reference and thematic relations. He suggests that perhaps the two systems are quite dierently represented in the mind and brain, and perhaps that the latter should not strictly speaking be assigned to the language faculty at all but

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rather considered as part of some other faculty that provides common sense understanding of the world in which we live (Chomsky 1980: 55). The Chomskyan linguist is only concerned with the I-language whose grammar is the generative procedure explained by transformational and generative rules. It is the computational system of the mind, as opposed to the more general conceptual system. The I-language represents linguistic competence, or what one knows when one knows a language. It is acquired from a biologically endowed metric which is triggered by primary linguistic data during the critical period of child development. Chomsky himself states that one must exercise caution in attempting to draw comparisons between the language faculty and other systems of the mind: Even an account of knowledge of language that is overowing with insights is unlikely to contribute directly to the study of factors that enter into our understanding of the visual world, or conversely. This is not to deny, of course, that these systems interact and may share some general properties. But we should remain open to the possibility even the strong likelihood that they are organized in quite dierent ways. . . . It would be surprising indeed if we were to nd that the principles governing [the language faculty] are operative in other cognitive systems, although there may be certain loose analogies (Chomsky 1980: 27, 44). Chomsky states: I still can think of no way to undertake the study of mind except by investigating the specic character of particular systems, such as the language faculty. The principles cannot be expected to carry over, but the results attained and the mode of successful inquiry may prove suggestive elsewhere (Chomsky 1980: 27). This seems to imply that the Chomskyan language faculty is the highly specialized computational system of language per se, and that the properties of this language faculty, especially the conjunction of the claims for innateness and domain specicity, essentially make it impossible to draw an analogy with other faculties of the mind simply because he is dealing with an inborn, task-specic faculty, and one which is, by denition, unlike any other.

Considering alternative methodologies in linguistics Mirko Petric summarizes the argument from the previous section in his statement that [a]lthough the cognitive content of Chomskys theories is indisputable, they are in themselves still rmly language-centered and not quite compatible with the postulates and analytical procedures of what we have associated with the term cognitive lm studies over the past two decades (Petric 2001). The inapplicability of the rules of the Chomskyan language faculty per se to a hypothetical notion of

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convergence in cognitive lm semiotics should not necessarily result in the discontinuation of the theorization of the latter. The methodologies to which cognitive lm semioticians apply in search of an analog simply need to be revised. As stated above, Bucklands work is extremely valuable insofar as it proposes Chomskys linguistic theory as a model which, although in and of itself does not necessarily provide a cogent analogy, forces us to examine the properties of Chomskys theory in more depth and with more precision. In fact, this is an undertaking which is already occurring in the linguistic realm and, as we will see, may prove valuable to the convergence of semiotics and cognitive lm theory as well. In her book, Cowie examines the long-standing debate of nativism in concept acquisition and its importance as one of the principles underlying Chomskyan linguistics. In fact, part of Cowies objective in presenting Chomskys language faculty as being based in the ve core claims outlined above is that she contends that there are many dierent avenues to explore if one is to consider these core claims as separate entities, dierent combinations of which would provide a much more diverse and extensive body of research possibilities in understanding the language faculty. This deconstruction of the Chomskyan language faculty results in the discussion of two issues in cognitivism that have been the cause of much disagreement among scholars of various camps throughout history. These issues are as follows: the question of a modular model of the mind versus a generalized learning mechanism; and the question of whether concepts are innately encoded versus empirically learned through hypothesis testing. Cowie traces the history of the nativism-empiricism debate in a detailed and systematic way that would be impossible to recreate in this paper. There are, however, certain fundamental points that she makes concerning both viewpoints on concept acquisition, and the implications they have on the architectural model of the mind they adopt. An examination of these issues will lead to varying methodologies in linguistics which, in turn, may provide insight into a theory of convergence in cognitive lm semiotics.

Empiricism versus nativism, and domain specicity versus generalized learning mechanisms Cowie outlines three basic points that constitute the theory of empiricism in concept acquisition. First, the empiricist believes that the mind is structured such that one can acquire primitive concepts, for example red, directly from sense experience, and then proceed to combine these concepts and abstract from them more complex ideas and beliefs. This may occur

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due to what the empiricist believes to be an inborn ability to register, manipulate, and interpret sensory information (Cowie 1999: 29). Thus, according to the empiricist, primitive ideas are acquired in a sensory, brute-causal manner. Second, the learning strategies of the mind can be characterized as general, such that all concepts are either primitive or derived by generalized methods of reasoning, such as induction, regardless of the types of concepts to which they are applied (Cowie 1999: 29). Finally, under the notion of empiricism, the acquisition of beliefs is considered to be an explicable phenomenon, and one that functions according to natural-scientic principles (Cowie 1999: 30). The nativist theory of concept acquisition is opposed to that of empiricism in two fundamental ways. First, while both nativists and empiricists agree that the mind has the capacity to register and interpret sensory experience, nativists contend that since learning tasks require special kinds of skill, the mind must contain special-purpose, or task-specic, learning mechanisms in addition to those that empiricists allow (Cowie 1999: 30). In other words, whereas empiricists posit a generalized learning mechanism, nativists argue in favor of modularity or domain specicity of our innate faculties. They use arguments from the poverty of the stimulus to support this point of view. The poverty of the stimulus argument suggests the existence of a gap between what the world provides in the way of sensory experience and what one comes to know, thus stating that what is in our minds . . . is richer than what could be learned from experience and therefore what is in our minds must be innate (Cowie 1999: 31). Second, the nativist diers from the empiricist in the ways outlined by the Impossibility Argument put forth by philosophers such as Leibniz and Descartes. In an extreme fashion, Leibniz argues that all the thoughts and actions of our soul come to it from its own depths and could not be given to it by the senses (Cowie 1999: 31). Similarly, Descartes argues that experience cannot cause ideas and that all ideas are therefore necessarily innate. Thus, nativism in its most extreme form does not allow for the explicability of concept acquisition, and suggests, rather, that it will remain an enigma. Jerry Fodors Standard Argument in favor of the nativist model of language acquisition provides a comprehensive account of the dierences between empiricism and nativism. Fodor states that empiricism can provide no explanation for the acquisition of primitive concepts, but rather explains only the learning of complex concepts. According to Fodor, complex concepts are ones which are denitional by nature and contain internal structure. These concepts can be empirically learned, through the inductive process of formulating and testing hypotheses about the content of these concepts. But this rational-causal learning process can

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be applied only to the formulation of complex concepts. Primitive concepts, on the other hand, are innately encoded, and it is through the triggering of certain available concepts through sensory input that these primitive concepts are brute-causally acquired. Fodor continues on to argue that the principles of language are acquired similarly to primitive concepts, according to the same nativist brute-causal mechanism (Fodor 1981: 273).

Deconstructing Chomsky in search of other research possibilities It is clear from the above discussion of the evolution of the nativismempiricism debate that the two issues of modularity versus generalized learning mechanisms and innately encoded versus empirically learned acquisition devices are highly integral and overlapping issues. By deconstructing the Chomskyan language faculty into the ve core claims (R), (B), (DS), (I), and (U) as outlined above, Cowie intends to consider these claims as separate entities and thereby create dierent combinations of them to provide a much more diverse and extensive body of research toward understanding the language faculty. In so doing, Cowie essentially breaks down the assumption that the conjunction of (I) and (DS) necessarily entails (U) or, for that matter, that (I) necessarily entails (DS). For example, Cowie argues in favor of a weak nativist position which supports all claims of Chomskyan Nativism, namely (R), (B), (DS), and (I), with the exception of (U). Thus, according to a weak nativist, there may exist a domain-specic, innately encoded language-learning mechanism, whose structure is other than that which Chomsky proposes with his Universal Grammar (Cowie 1999: 249). Cowie also outlines an argument for what she calls Enlightened Empiricism which constitutes the claims (R), (B), and (DS), but which rejects the notion that the principles of Chomskys Universal Grammar are innately encoded in the mind. As such, the enlightened empiricist believes that whereas there may be some domain-specic learning mechanism, the knowledge therein is attained by means of empirical testing from external data (Cowie 1999: 159). Regardless of the validity of these claims as they apply to language, their individual consideration, when applied to the study of the nature of lmic structures in the mind, may help to clarify certain conceptual aspects of the language-lm metaphor, further inquire as to Chomskys relevance per se to such a theory of lm, and thereby achieve a better understanding of the transition from semiotics to cognitive lm theory. What might we say, then, about the principles of lm, its structure and conventions? Are these concepts primitive or complex? Are they innately

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encoded and acquired by triggering or rather empirically learned through the inductive process of hypothesis testing? Are they domain-specic or part of a generalized learning mechanism, and is there a metric underlying their structure? As we will see in the next section, it is my contention that the enterprise of cognitive lm semiotics will most likely nd its linguistic analog in the concepts underlying Enlightened Empiricism.

Cognitive lm semiotics as viewed from a dierent methodological perspective The primary arguments in favor of the claim for innateness, and domain specicity therein, of the Chomskyan language faculty are those of the poverty of the stimulus and the Logical Problem. As outlined above, the poverty of the stimulus argument states that what is in our minds is far richer than that which could possibly be derived from the primary linguistic data to which we are exposed in the process of language acquisition. The Logical Problem of language acquisition arises because of the absence of negative evidence in the primary linguistic data. It essentially questions how learners of a language can universally make judgments of grammaticality versus ungrammaticality despite the fact that there is no explicit negative evidence provided in their early exposure to language. This conundrum is also explained in Chomskyan linguistics by the advocacy of (I) and (DS) (Cowie 1999: 206). Again, regardless of the validity of these arguments in favor of these claims in explaining the language faculty, there is reason, in drawing a cogent methodological analogy, to question how and why these arguments might or might not apply to a potential mental faculty for producing and understanding lmic structure.

How and why lm is not like a language Despite Metzs contention that lm is like a language and his theorization of the grande syntagmatique to support this argument, a signicant portion of his work leading up to this point is committed to demonstrating the numerous ways in which lm is not like a language at all. He states that shots are innite in number and therefore are unlike words and rather like statements; he points out that shots are the creation of lmmakers, unlike words; the shot is semantically indeterminate, and whereas there is a simple and direct correspondence of words to the meanings they signify, the same cannot be said for shots. From these types of incongruities, Metz concludes that the shot is like a sentence (Metz 1968b: 79).

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This conclusion leads to other discrepancies between the system of language and that of lmic conventions. The cinema has no minimal units. In fact, Currie argues, cinematic images are not conventional signs, except insofar as they are representations (Currie 1995: 117). An important distinguishing point must be made between the literal meaning of a sentence, which is derived from conventions, and the meaning of an utterance of that sentence, which is not conventional but rather only productive (Currie 1995: 127). Because lm is like discourse, lmic interpretation requires applying nonconventional rules of rationality for their comprehension. It is not possible to identify any set of conventions that function to confer meaning on cinematic images in anything like the way in which conventions confer (literal) meaning on language (Currie 1995: 130). Thus, the meaning of a cinematic image is nonatomic and nonrecursive, and this is a fundamental disanalogy between language and any pictorial mode of representation (Currie 1995: 130). We are clearly dealing with two systems that dier in very crucial ways, and there is no reason to believe that mental structures for one task will be similar in any interesting way to other such structures or that a structure used for one purpose will turn out to be used for others (Currie 1995: 116). In other words, there is no reason to believe that the conventional structures of the computational language faculty, derived by the rules of TGG, will prove applicable to our understanding of the nonconventional meaning naturally generated by cinematic images. There may be reason to believe, however, that although lm itself is not conventional, its interpretation is inuenced by convention, and that lm images are like language only in the sense that one cannot combine shots by a fade and mean whatever one likes, but is rather limited by the conventional use to which the fade and other devices are put (Currie 1995: 136).

In favor of enlightened empiricism What can we say, then, regarding these lmic devices, our acquisition of the ability to decipher meaning in them, and their status in the mind/ brain? The issues raised by Curries arguments outlined above and his point that interpreting lm is about calculating intentions leads me to believe that interpreting lm is precisely that interpreting signs, by means of an empirical process of induction. Whereas simple vision, or even language acquisition, may be a brute-causally triggered phenomenon, interpreting lmic signs is a higher-order mental activity, and one that involves understanding complex concepts by means of rational-causal hypothesis testing. Contrary to language acquisition, the ability to learn to interpret

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lm is not temporally restricted to a critical period of brain development. Whereas the argument from the poverty of the stimulus states that there is a gap between the mental language faculty and that which is provided by the primary linguistic data, the content of a hypothetical lmic mental faculty is not necessarily richer than what the system provides in actual practice. Unlike the universality in judgments of grammaticality among speakers of a language, there is no guaranteed universality in our judgments concerning the interpretation of a lm. Learning to understand and interpret lm is an empirical process, and one that is often explicit at that. It is a process of viewing and reviewing, applying hypotheses from one lm to the devices used in another. It requires thought and often discussion, the positing of theories and the revision of them. It is an inductive process, empirically learned, not innately encoded. The next logical question to be posed is, if we accept that lmic conventions are learned by empirical means, does this necessarily entail their constituting a non-modular theory of the mind? In other words, if the system for understanding lmic structures is not innately encoded, does it follow that it cannot exist in the mind as a domain-specic faculty? According to Cowies analysis of concept and language acquisition, the claim for innateness does not necessarily imply the claim for domain specicity. An instance of this type of relationship appeared in her account of Enlightened Empiricism in language acquisition which adopted the claims (R), (B), and (DS) while rejecting (I) and (U). What, then, about the conventions underlying lmic representation? It has been argued by many scholars since the inception of cinema that lm is an art form that is distinct from any other. A weak version of the Specicity thesis, for example, states that a medium is dened in part by features that are specic to it. It is my contention that lm is, in fact, a unique system of signs and it is the combination of features drawn from many mental organs or faculties of the mind, including the visual system, aural system, the language faculty, and even the conceptual system, that distinguish it from all other forms of representation. It is my further contention that the conventions employed to distinguish lm from other forms of representation are ones that are not innately encoded, but must be learned through a process of hypothesis testing. Thus, I am arguing that we should conduct our research in cognitive lm semiotics according to the principles of Enlightened Empiricism: as a biologically bounded system of representation whose domain-specic, distinguishing features are not xed in advance by the learning device, but are rather empirically learned. Here, as in Enlightened Empiricism, one may posit a generalized learning mechanism for lm, and yet grant that at any given time, except t 0, a learners choice of theories will be conditioned by the prior knowledge he or she

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has gleaned from experience (Cowie 1999: 238). Therein lies the empirical process of learning the domain-specic features of lmic representation.

Toward reaching a conclusion It has been my contention that, contrary to what Buckland suggests, the work of Chomsky is unlikely to be an eective analog for the work being done in cognitive lm semiotics. The reason for this lies in the fact that the conjunction of the various components constituting the Chomskyan language faculty necessarily make his theory specic to language. I would therefore argue that further research in cognitive lm semiotics should consider seeking its analog in the theories underlying Enlightened Empiricism. This will allow lm to maintain the domain-specic status it deserves, while still accepting the likelihood that it is a high-order system of complex concepts that is empirically learned via a rational-causal process of induction. Scholars who proceed to posit or reevaluate an underlying metric of lmic structure should do so according to these principles. Thus, instead of seeking a metric which describes an innately encoded lmic faculty or one which draws only upon concepts that are specic to language, further research should look to nd the structure of lm as it arises from the inductive process which involves the interplay of many faculties of the mind.

Notes
1. Thanks to Richard Allen and Warren Buckland for their comments on an earlier draft of this essay.

References
Bordwell, David (1985). Narration in the Fiction Film. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Buckland, Warren (2001). Black cats, dark rooms, and paper tigers: A reply to Petric and Grodal. Film-Philosophy 5 (13). (2000). The Cognitive Semiotics of Film. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Carroll, John M. (1980). Toward a Structural Psychology of Cinema. The Hague: Mouton Publishers. Chomsky, Noam (1965). Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (1980). Rules and Representations. New York: Columbia University Press. (1996). Language and problems of knowledge. In The Philosophy of Language, A. P. Martinich (ed.). Toronto: Oxford University Press.

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gome ` nes a ` une se miologie ge ne rative du Colin, Michel (1985). Langue, Film, Discours: Prole lm. Paris: Klincksieck. Cowie, Fiona (1999). Whats Within: Nativism Reconsidered. New York: Oxford University Press. Currie, Gregory (1995). Image and Mind: Film, Philosophy, and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fodor, Jerry A. (1981). Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. Cambridge: Bradford Books. Metz, Christian (1968a). Some points in the semiotics of the cinema. In Film Theory and Criticism, Leo Braudy and Marshall Cohen (eds.), 6875. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (1968b). Problems of denotation in the ction lm. In Film Theory and Criticism, Leo Braudy and Marshall Cohen (eds.), 7589. Oxford: Oxford University Press. OLeary, Brian Eugene (1999). Michel Colins Generative Semiology: A Post-Metzian Phase of Linguistics in Film Theory. Ann Arbor: UMI Dissertation Services, Bell Howell Co. Petric, Mirko (2001). Both Semiotics and Cognitivism? Film-Philosophy 5 (13). Stam, Robert; Burgoyne, Robert; and Flitterman-Lewis, Sandy (1992). Cine-Semiology. In New Vocabularies in Film Semiotics, 2868. New York: Routledge. Rebecca E. Miller is a graduate student at New York University 3rebeccamiller4@yahoo. com4. Her principal research interests are lm dialogue, issues in subtitling and dubbing, semiotics, and voice-over narration.