Review article On bringing Mikhail Bakhtin into the social sciences*

ANTHONY WALL

One exciting aspect of the continuing boom in Bakhtin Studies is the serious move, engaged in by many social thinkers, to move Bakhtin's philosophy of culture out from under the shadow of the Humanities disciplines per se and into a broadly conceived set of questions belonging more properly to the Social Sciences, or better yet, to the `Human Sciences'. Whereas it must be understood from the start that the social side of Bakhtin's thinking is attracting ever increasing interest from researchers working in virtually every discipline in the Humanities and Social Sciences spectrum, the following article will concentrate most of its energy on exploring three specic publications in the Social Sciences that discuss Bakhtin in terms of his `social' thinking. That renewed interest in Bakhtin's `extra-humanistic disciplinarity' would be arising, with greater and greater frequency, and at this particular point of time, is of course welcome news for those who have been interested in the semiotic angle of his cultural thinking. To begin with, like `cultural studies', `semiotics' is a `discipline' that is deeply involved in questions of what it means to participate in one particular `disciplinary' point of view as opposed to another. Moreover, both cultural studies and semiotics are `non-disciplines' in the sense that they both have interdisciplinarity at their very core. Although few humanists have ever attempted for very long, or with very much success, to provide convincing arguments as to why Bakhtin should be kept exclusively for humanities disciplines, it is particularly instructive at the present time to review some of the arguments being used to nudge Bakhtin toward the social sciences, arguments that are themselves steeped in clearly visible disciplinary territoriality. It is precisely these arguments, along with others, that will
*Marilia Amorim, Dialogisme et alterite dans les sciences humaines. Paris: L'Harmattan, 1996. Beth Brait (ed.), Bakhtin, dialogismo e construc a o do sentido. Campinas: Editora da Universidade de Campinas, 1997. Michael Meyerfeld Bell and Michael Gardiner (eds.), Bakhtin and the Human Sciences. London: Sage Publications, 1998. Semiotica 1331/4 (2001), 169201 00371998/01/0133 0169 # Walter de Gruyter

170 A. Wall be examined in the following review article as the case is examined as to why it would now seem desirable to transfer Bakhtin from the Humanities into the Human Sciences fold. I nd the very existence of some of these arguments both puzzling and troubling. If, on the one hand, one wishes to argue that it is appropriate at the present time to consider Bakhtin from other disciplinary perspectives than those through which he has been considered up until now (using the argument that the issues explored by Bakhtin go well beyond the narrow purview of any one of those [humanistic] disciplines with which he has hitherto been studied or understood), it is unproductive even contradictory to claim, on the other hand, that there is a more `appropriate' disciplinarity that of the Social Sciences or some other disciplinary conguration for studying him than that with which he has been explained up until now. Further, Bakhtin was himself keenly interested in broadly conceived issues of epistemology and in how disciplinarity per se aects our ability to know either other people or the world at large, a disciplinary inuence that exerts its power according to the tendency of forcing us to view things in one way as opposed to another. Bakhtin goes to great lengths to distinguish between those ways of knowing that are based on texts or voices and those that are not (see Bakhtin 1986: 107). In this context, the term of `human sciences' was consciously used by the Russian cultural philosopher to designate those disciplinary congurations and purviews of the rst sort, i.e., the ones that deal with voices, whereas the label of the `natural sciences' is reserved for designating those disciplinary outlooks that do not ever need to confront voices, or to worry about the potential ability of those voices to answer back and to confound every and anything that had just been said about them. And even though it is clear in Bakhtin's mind, to a certain extent at least, what the dierences are between these two broadly conceived epistemological cultures, it is also clear for us that, in his own practice as he moves from philosophy to biology or from physics to literary analysis, he does not harbor any belief in hard-set and impenetrable boundaries that would hermetically seal one broad disciplinary grouping o from the other. A Brazilian `Bakhtin' living in France If the to-and-fro movement between the `human sciences' and the `natural sciences' is already engaged in throughout Bakhtin's personal writing and research, it seems highly unlikely that, within the human sciences themselves, a clear distinction between the humanities and the social sciences is

Mikhail Bakhtin 171 even conceivable for Bakhtin. In their own particular ways, the three recently published books on Bakhtin under review in the present article all explore issues and problems associated with a currently discernible trend consisting of examining Bakhtin almost exclusively from a Social Sciences perspective. An interesting, as well as passionate, contribution in this regard is Marilia Amorim's Dialogisme et alterite dans les sciences humaines, a book that looks in detail at the ways in which Bakhtin's theories of culture can be adopted for interventionist methods of education and pedagogy. Amorim is particularly interested, for example, in problems related to the public instruction of immigrant groups and in ways, during the educational and research processes, of letting their voices be heard so that the contributions they wish to express are valued. `Research in the human sciences', she writes, `consists in this intriguing movement entailed by wanting to be a host in the other's home country, a shift in the direction of the other that contains the claim to be able both to welcome and to translate the other's otherness' (p. 158, my translation).1 Amorim relies in an innovative fashion on both Freud (1963 [1914]) and Benveniste (1966, 1974), as she describes the importance of an `inversed you' (a tu inverse, as she writes in French) that, at one and the same time, both speaks in the place of one's `object' of research and will always and inevitably say something other than what that `object' wanted to say. Instead of representing a public contest between an `I' and a `he/she', the pedagogical methods she advocates rely on a conception of the human voice that is construed in terms of the lateral movements a given researcher's voice creates in the very utterance situation in which this researcher must function. For, above all, Amorim speaks of the dialogic situation of utterances not only as she encounters them face to face along with others inhabiting the same pedagogical situation that she does, but also, and almost more importantly for her, in her role of writing about the pedagogical encounters which form the basis of her `objects of study'. The voice of that other `you' is therefore not only a dynamic force in the unfolding of any pedagogical situation; in addition, that voice continues to exert its dynamism in the dicult encounters that the researcher must engage in while reporting on what has been discovered. There can never be perfect transposition of the subject's voice into the words used by the researcher to express that subject's point of view. It is this inherent diculty in dealing with the impossibility of an adequate dialogue between the subject and the writer of research that makes research in the area of the human sciences so interesting. `It is precisely in those situations where we recognize the impossibility of dialogue, those situations where we admit there will always be a loss of meaning in communication, that we are able to construct an object and to produce knowledge about human beings' (p. 22).2

172 A. Wall In other epistemological words, knowledge in the human sciences is constituted out of the necessary and inevitable blockages of communicative transparency. It is not as if we could wish these blockages away or learn with time how to override them because, without this fundamental loss of meaning as the voice moves from one human being toward the next, there would quite simply be no possibility for human science at all. This is why the researcher in the human sciences not only inuences the subjects/objects of his or her cognitive enterprise, but is also aected in return by the very enterprise of which he or she is supposed to be the ultimate author and authority. The author is `altered' by that which is authored, by the otherness that is contained in what needs to be authored. Amorim proposes to use the word `alteration' in a positive sense, not one in which someone purposely manipulates the results of one's research for the purposes of a greater cause, and certainly not one that the French verb `alterer' suggests, i.e., change for the worse. Rather and this is the central point of Amorim's dialogic framework alteration must be understood in a productive sense, that is, the production of an alterity, a becoming-other that involves recognition, and not a wishing away, of the presence of otherness within oneself. For Amorim's study, communication always and inevitably entails imperfect translation, the incomplete passage between two universes, whether the latter `be two cultures or two theoretical systems' (p. 26):
If the universe of signs is the site where both the possibility and the impossibility of encounters are played out, it is also within the sign that we are able to oversee the eects created by contacts between dierent universes. Throughout history, the gulfs separating universes have been crossed and signs have mutually transformed one another. Although in those places where earlier we saw just one universe, we can now see another, there is also a permanent eect of illusion that must be taken into account, one that forces us to ask: is this cultural acclimatization or appropriation? And since we are dealing with signs, we can only look in the direction of the utterance act by asking whether these transformations are the result of the other's inuence or rather of the other's power, in other words, who the beneciary will be of this transformed cultural object. (p. 34)3

The questions posed by Amorim's study into the appropriate ways of writing about encounters with others naturally take on philosophicalanthropological dimensions. She deftly uses not only thinkers such as Tzvetan Todorov (1982) who have used Bakhtin to move in just such a direction, but she also turns in the direction of other important thinkers vi-Strauss (1968), Francis Aergan (1987), and Victor such as Claude Le Segalen (1978 [1918]). Throughout Amorim's study, a central aspect of her enquiry is the emphasis she places, from several theoretical points

Mikhail Bakhtin 173 of view, on the transformative powers, as well as on the dangers, inherent in all dialogically constituted encounters. There are, of course, other anthropological writers interested in Bakhtin who deserve to be mentioned here. One of these is Emily Schultz. I mention Emily Schultz's Dialogue at the Margins: Whorf, Bakhtin and Linguistic Relativity, a book that is complementary to Amorim's, because both Schultz and Amorim independently point to a number of interesting connections and dierences between, on the one hand, the `Bakhtin'4 that human scientists are formulating with increasing frequency and, on the other, the purely humanist `Bakhtins'. What we have here are two sorts of `Bakhtins' that are oftentimes dicult to compare point by point mainly because many of the possible points of comparison are peripheral. It seems fair to say that works such as Schultz' and Amorim's show us the necessity of going beyond peripheral points of comparison even though, up until recently at least, such points have unfortunately provided the sole basis of most comparisons that have been available to those interested in developing the methodological and epistemological possibilities of Bakhtin's thinking. In turn, it is also instructive to juxtapose complementary visions of Bakhtin, especially when both come from similar disciplinary points of view. A combination of Schultz and Amorim oers some interesting points of observation in this regard. Beginning with a thorough examination in which the linguistic theories of Benjamin Whorf are seen to converge in several key ways with those of Mikhail Bakhtin, particularly in their commonly held conceptions of how languages shape our conceptual worlds, Schultz goes on to show, in a thought-provoking way, how it is that the languages Bakhtin uses to do his thinking, what Schultz refers to as his `artistic prose', must in the end be studied not only in terms of the ways in which it shapes Bakhtin's particular reading of Dostoevsky but also, and no doubt more importantly, in terms of how it inuences Bakhtin's own thinking about culture in general. That is, Bakhtin makes such a strong case for studying how the artistry of Dostoevsky's prose provides invaluable insights into what and how he thinks about grand philosophical questions in general that it is dicult not to adopt the same `artistic' approach for reading Bakhtin himself, i.e., to study the artistry of his own prose. Schultz writes:
In particular, we will focus on that form of writing in which, according to Bakhtin, an author is most free to exploit the multiple resources of grammar and genre in pursuit of his own ends, namely artistic (or novelistic) prose. While presenting sophisticated views about the ways language can be used, Bakhtin provides at the same time a series of literary-critical tools which may be used to analyze what an actual author, such as Whorf (or Bakhtin himself ), is up to in a particular text. (1990: 26)

174 A. Wall Like Amorim, Schultz is interested in translation, not only the inevitably imperfect translation from the perspective of one's subjects to that of one's own writing, but also in the ways that practitioners of social philosophy can relate to believers in hard-core empiricism, and how unilingual speakers of one language can relate, through images for example, to unilingual speakers of another totally foreign language. There are various ways in which images in one language can be transmitted to speakers of another. One must not forget in this regard that languages not only convey images in what they say but that they also contain images because of the very expressive means that they adopt. Through Schultz's reading of Whorf done through the eyes of Bakhtin, we not only see many things that a strict theory of linguistic determinism can never see, but we also see why languages are never hopelessly cut o from one another, even ones that appear to be utterly dierent in relation to one another. Schultz is keenly aware of the problems awaiting attempts to translate from one language or worldview to another: even though languages inhabit separate realms, as it were, it is not necessary, for their translation, to presuppose the classical idea of a neutral context of usage or, even worse, the mysticallytainted notion of the superior God's eye view of meaning. For one thing, there can be no such neutral language on earth, and for supporting such a claim, Amorim here in total convergence with Schultz quotes from Bakhtin's famous Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics: `When a member of a speaking collective comes upon a word, it is not as a neutral word of language, not as a word free from the aspirations and evaluations of others, uninhabited by others' voices' (Bakhtin 1984: 202 quoted in Amorim, p. 97). For both Schultz and Amorim, translation results in self-awareness, the ability and willingness to recognize more than what one was prepared to see before the encounter with the other: `Critical self-consciousness and its chief product, a fully developed surplus of vision, not just for a few, but for all this is the kind of ``more'' which Whorf kept trying to urge his readers to see' (Schultz 1990: 152). By recognizing the otherness of the other's discourse, one is much more likely to understand something profound and moving from it even at the risk of treating it as unalterably foreign than if one simply imposes one's own pre-established categories for understanding upon the language of the other, while claiming at the same time to be objective. The major dierence between Schultz and Amorim, in their respective uses of Bakhtin for understanding intercultural translation and alteration, is that, for Amorim, this dialogue of dierences nds its ultimate importance in the fact that dierentiation is also part of what each one of us becomes as the result of dialogue. Alteration is part of what it means to live dialogically.

Mikhail Bakhtin 175 Translation therefore `occurs' for Amorim more radically than it does for Schultz. In addition to the types of intra-psychic translation that she studies using psychoanalysis, Amorim is also interested in `alterity as alteration', a process that occurs at the level of the body, both in the body as language and in language as a body. The bodily nature of this alteration has to do, once again, with the utterance of alterity, with the fact that the representation of otherness is itself an occurrence or an event, one where the utterer, the utterance, the interlocutor, and all who come into contact with the act itself are constantly displaced or moved. Amorim adopts the image of choreography to describe what she means with respect to the methodology she must adopt for her own writing. `[I]n a polyphonic approach', she writes, `the word becomes a gesture, because of its relational character. Discursive space is reconstructed according to the relationship between places' (p. 92).5 Part of this displacement has to do with the observation that, in Bakhtinian terms, the production of an utterance is also, and to varying degrees, the production of a quotation. `The possibility of quotation is specic to humanity. Reporting, reproducing, recounting to some third party that which someone else told me but that I did not see myself, this is an activity that structures my humanity' (p. 75).6 This is where Amorim sees a role for Bakhtin's carnival: as that semiotic setting where there is maximum visibility aorded to the fact that discourse not only involves at least two voices, but also two bodies. `Double-bodied and not only double-voiced, the discourse of the carnival always refers to the body' (p. 116).7 As such, the processes that produce alterity and that constantly appear in the form of dialogue and quotation are therefore understood as the basis of a fundamental characteristic of human meaning-making. `There is no language without the presence of someone else to whom I can speak, and this other is someone who speaks and who responds, no language therefore without the possibility of saying what mile Benveniste (1966 and someone else has said' (p. 76).8 Drawing on E 1974) and D-R. Dufour (1990), Amorim goes so far as to postulate that the discourses of the human sciences, even in their written form, must do justice to the active presence of voices within their very texture. Whereas the utterer of scientic discourse must try to speak as an `I' who is not really a `person' in this interactive sense that is to say that there is not supposed to be any `you' in scientic discourse the writer of `human scientic' prose is not allowed to make do without the `other' who is both in front of the utterer and in the utterer. Studying in France, and writing and working in Rio de Janeiro, Marilia Amorim represents, to a large extent, the cultural make-up of many Brazilian intellectuals, both in the social sciences and the humanities, who are increasingly becoming interested in the ideas and work of

176 A. Wall Mikhail Bakhtin. There are many other Brazilian Bakhtinians with a similar intercultural background in theory. One of the most important scholars in this group is Beth Brait whose work, virtually unknown outside of Brazil, vibrates with the energy of a `Bakhtin Scholar' who knows several intellectual traditions, including a largely French-language theoretical apparatus that is combined with a predominantly Brazilian focus. In Anglo-Saxon terms, Brait is neither a `true' humanist nor a `real' social scientist: rather, she `truly' works within the `human sciences' in the broadest and most positive sense of the term. Her methodology combines discourse analysis, literary analysis, semiotics, and sociolinguistics; her elds of study include, for example, the notion of characters (Brait 1985), the discursive functioning of irony (1996), cultural problems of orality (1991), and dialogue (1994). In many ways, Brait is one of many versatile Brazilian intellectuals such as Boris Schnaiderman (1982, 1983), Carlos Luiz Fiorin Alberto Faraco (1980), Diana Luz Pessoa de Barros and Jose (l994), Cristova o Tezza (1996), Eduardo Pen uela Can izal (1996, 1998), and many others who, in the space of the last ten years, have turned Bakhtin not so long ago (in the early 1990s) considered to be a gure who was `still largely unknown' in Brazil (Faraco 1996: 207) into a cultural icon of sorts whose centenary sparked a urry of colloquia and publications, and who now commands signicant coverage in journal publications virtually every time that a new book on Bakhtin appears either in Brazil or in other countries (see Tezza 1998 and Pompeu 1998). Brait herself organized one of these interdisciplinary conferences, in November 1995, to commemorate the 100th anniversary of Bakhtin's birth and she subsequently published a large volume, using revised contributions from that conference, in 1997. It is to parts of this volume to which I now turn. `Bakhtin' is alive and well and living in Brazil Beth Brait's collection of essays, Bakhtin, dialogismo e construc ao do sentido [Bakhtin, Dialogism and the Construction of Meaning], is dedicated to Boris Schnaiderman, a scholar who is arguably the rst Brazilian intellectual to pursue Bakhtin's body of works in a systematic fashion (Schnaiderman 1982, 1983). Her 385-page volume contains contributions from twenty-seven dierent scholars whose disciplinary bases include literary studies, linguistics, philosophy, psychology, anthropology, and translation studies. The contributions that lean towards the `social sciences' side of the volume will provide the focus of the remarks that follow. In general, we can say that they all straddle the border between the

Mikhail Bakhtin 177 humanities and the social sciences in ways that are both similar to, and dierent from, what we saw in Marilia Amorim's recent book. They reect the importance, found in much recent Brazilian work in the area of cultural semiotics, that is attached to various aspects of the voice in oral culture just as they stress the epistemological work that the voice carries out, in Bakhtin's thinking, in providing a watershed between the human sciences and the natural sciences. This distinguishing feature of the voice was an aspect of Bakhtin's thought that Tzvetan Todorov stressed with much force in his widely read study (Todorov 1984: 1722). This point about the importance of the voice in the text is taken up in the contribution written by Diana Luz Pessoa de Barros (pp. 2738)9 where the author stresses the connections between a rst fact that Bakhtin sees the text as the central object of the human sciences and a second fact that the text contains a voice that is silent. This complex silence gives perhaps the best reason for the dual conception of dialogism that we often nd in Bakhtin's thinking: dialogue between human beings and dialogue between juxtaposed discourses, an ambiguous understanding that also explains why the voices that Bakhtin claims to hear everywhere are indeed nowhere to be heard in empirical reality. Both the object and the method of the human sciences, as Bakhtin sees them, can thereby be said to be dialogic in this ambiguous sense: `In the treatment he gives in his writing to the text as the object of the human sciences, Bakhtin is already pointing toward two dierent conceptions of the dialogical principle, to one of dialogue as it occurs between interlocutors and to one of dialogue as it occurs between discourses' (p. 28).10 Indeed, it would therefore seem that the very object of the human sciences is itself something that is subject to the same ambiguous dialogical method that Bakhtin derives from his own observations on that object. Indeed, Pessoa de Barros sees the same type of impossible univocality as did Marilia Amorim: for the Humans Sciences to be something at all, in order that they might be understood in their epistemological specicity, they have to recognize a basic contradiction at their very heart, the fact that the subject of knowledge cannot be anything without becoming, at the same time, an object of knowledge, and it is in this viciously circular logic that the human sciences are born. `The subject of knowledge provides an interpretative and comprehensive act in face of the other subject instead of simply seeking to know an object' (p. 29).11 A signicant part of these contradictions in both the material studied by Bakhtin and in the methodologies he uses to do his investigations can be found, according to Eni Puccinelli Orlandi (pp. 3948),12 in the fact that the Russian philosopher works simultaneously with language, literature and societal structures (p. 40). Bringing several theses into

178 A. Wall focus developed by Franc oise Gadet and Michel Pe cheux (1981), Orlandi is interested in pursuing what Bakhtin's theories of discourse can tell us about the material side of language. She therefore asks about the relationship between, on the one hand, language in general and, on the other, a particular language in a particular socio-political setting. The specic revolutionary setting in which the young Bakhtin himself lived and worked as he theorized cultural languages in general led him to see how meanings can be produced from non-meaning. What Orlandi does in relation to Bakhtin is in eect what Amorim does in relation to her own work: she states that it is not enough to think and write about cultural theory because, in addition, it is necessary to think and write about what it means to think and write about cultural theory from within the particular standpoint in culture that one occupies when writing. For Orlandi, following Pe cheux, there is a necessary metaphorical relationship between a politically charged revolutionary atmosphere and popular forms of cultural expression, just as there is a necessary relationship between popular culture and the shapes a given cultural theory can take on since it is born in that same culture. The precise contours that Bakhtin's use of popular culture takes on in his work on Rabelais (Bakhtin 1968) are therefore no coincidence, as popular forms of cultural expression form the indispensable link between political life and cultural theory. This explains why language, as the most obvious means of cultural expression, sometimes tries to pass as if it were itself the whole reality of which it is but one part. Patrick Dahlet (pp. 5987)13 completes some of Orlandi's proposals by turning more specically to the relationships Bakhtin himself establishes between verbal interaction and social interaction. Relying heavily on the work of Jacqueline Authier-Revuz (1994), who has produced some remarkably original work in reading Bakhtin from a psycho-sociolinguistic point of view, and on that of the eminent French sociolinguist Antoine Culioli (1990), Dahlet starts from the principle according to which the sign, in a Bakhtinian framework, has to be seen as an instrument of action: `the sign is for action' (p. 59).14 Dahlet's principle point of departure among Bakhtinian texts is Voloshinov's and Bakhtin's Marxism and the Philosophy of Language (1973), which he takes care to situate in the then contemporary philosophical context of neoKantian philosophy. The most important upshot that Dahlet sees for Bakhtin's theory of the utterance is a new theory of subjectivity, a dynamic subjectivity that emerges in and through linguistic (inter-)action: `in Bakhtin's work, we encounter a description that oscillates between a foundation for the discursive subject's discontinuity and the dislocation of its discursive surfaces, processes that occur under the eect of psycho-sociological factors' (p. 60).15 Dahlet searches for an operational

Mikhail Bakhtin 179 denition of polyphony, one that is capable of dealing with the fact that subjectivity and interlocution are two inextricably intertwined dimensions not only of social reality but also of the ways speaking human beings experience that reality. In this context, a subject is not only constituted by the force exerted by the other, but more precisely by the many eorts the -vis subject will inevitably exert in order to create a sense of dierence vis-a those powerful forms of subjectivity displayed by others. According to Beth Brait (pp. 91104),16 Bakhtin is precisely the type of cultural theoretician whose broad understanding of language is able to cope with the multifarious dimensions of human communication in society. It is well-known that `linguistic' terms such as `meaning' and `signication' are at best highly ambiguous, and it is only in a rich theory of human meaning that we are able to deal with the multiple dimensions of this ambiguity. As a point of departure, all of the dimensions going into these ambiguities need to be taken into consideration in an ongoing attempt at explanation. Part of the richness of Bakhtin's point of view can be seen in the fact that it leads us to study both real life and aesthetic situations, both philosophical-ethical issues and matters of everyday life, both `hard' theoretical issues in linguistics and `softer' aspects of literary thinking, but never does Bakhtin see any of these as separate from all the other realms, and, instead, he views them all as indispensable and equally important dimensions and this, despite their contradictory relation -vis one another in human language and communication. As ships vis-a Brait writes:
The concept of language that emanates from the works of this Russian thinker commits itself neither to a propensity for linguistics nor to one for literary theory, but it is rather indicative of a vision of the world which, precisely because it seeks out the forms through which meaning is constructed and instituted, manifests itself through the way it approaches linguistic/discursive issues, through its theory of literature, its philosophy and its theology as a semiotics of culture which assembles a vast combination of interrelated dimensions that have, as of yet, not all been drawn out. (p. 92)17

It is precisely his strong appreciation of the untapped richness of so many domains of human meaning that, in turn, makes Bakhtin's own work so rich in and of itself. For Brait, then, Bakhtin's multiple attempts to get close to how the heterogeneity of meaning can be represented constitute an important thread that runs through all his thinking. In this perspective, Toward a Philosophy of the Act (Bakhtin 1993) can be seen as a fundamental text in which questions of philosophy and literary analysis are inextricably intertwined. The intimate connections of this particular early text with other Bakhtinian writings such as Problems of

180 A. Wall Dostoevsky's Poetics (Bakhtin 1984), The Formal Method in Literary Studies (Medvedev and Bakhtin 1978), or even Marxism and the Philosophy of Language (Volos inov and Bakhtin 1973) all suggest that the fundamental role that Toward a Philosophy of the Act plays in Bakhtin's nascent thinking especially as a starting point in which questions of language are dealt with in all their multidimensional complexity cannot be overstated. Similar points about the complex nature of Bakhtin's notion of meaning are brought up in Luiz Francisco nica Graciela Zoppi-Fontana Dias' article (pp. 105113)18 and by Mo (pp. 115127).19 Further, in this same context of Bakhtin's ideas of language, one highly original contribution should be pointed out that is useful for understanding irony in use from a Bakhtinian perspective (pp. 129138). In her text, Maria L lias Dias de Castro20 uses the richness of Bakhtin's ideas on `language in use' to demonstrate the necessity of linking society and language together in any adequate explanation of language as discourse. This she does by concentrating on how a popular Brazilian journalist, Apar cio Torelly (known as Aporelly), both uses and misuses Portuguese-language proverbs in order to create irony, relying on sillon a series of discursive devices that Dias de Castro, in reference to Gre and Maingueneau (1984), calls linguistic `highjacking'. These articles are some of the more important ones among the twentyseven pieces published in Brait's recent volume on Bakhtin. But it is certainly not true to say that Brait's collection contains exclusively studies that deal with linguistic theory or with discourse analysis. Signicantly, there are a number of authoritative contributions in this volume that hail from other disciplines in the human sciences, elds of study such as psychology and ethical philosophy. Of the latter, it is important to point out Irene Machado's contribution on the body-sign in a theory ronique Dahlet's study of the body-voice of ideology (pp. 141158),21 Ve relations in a conceptualization of intonation, voice, and rhythm (pp. 263279),22 Helena Nagamine Branda o's study of writing and the psychoanalytical consequences, for subjectivity, of multiplying and dyna Camargo Costa's mizing points of reference (pp. 281290),23 and Ina provocative discussion of the early Bakhtin's `neo-Kantian Marxism' (pp. 293302),24 a piece which contains a stimulating discussion of some essential points made in Bakhtin's dicult `The problem of content, material, and form in verbal art' (Bakhtin 1990: 257325). Of the many original essays of this volume that do not exactly t neatly into the elds of linguistic theory or of discourse analysis, two contributions written by accomplished psychologists stand out for a number of reasons. I refer here to Maria Teresa de Assunc a o Freitas' powerful contribution entitled `In Bakhtin's and Vygotsky's texts: A possible

Mikhail Bakhtin 181 dialogue' (pp. 311330)25 as well as to Solange Jobim e Souza's no-lessstimulating `Mikhail Bakhtin and Walter Benjamin: Polyphony, allegory and the concept of truth in the discourse of contemporary science' (pp. 331348).26 As these two texts constitute, in my opinion, the two most exciting pieces found in Brait's Bakhtin volume, and since they both are solid contributions to what, throughout this review, has been called the `human sciences', it is worthwhile discussing them in some detail here. In a contribution that, for many methodological reasons, is quite dierent in nature from the ground-breaking work done by Janette Friedrich (1993) on Bakhtin and the psychological theories of ideology in his time, Freitas builds on some of her own published work on Bakhtin in the eld of educational psychology (1994a, 1994b) in order to draw out many of the most productive aspects of Bakhtin's notions of time. Beginning with a preliminary comparison between Bakhtin and Walter Benjamin, Freitas stresses the idea of time as eventness, as a spark from the past which, under the appropriate conditions, can be protably ignited for use in the present. Using this rst comparison between Bakhtin and Benjamin, something more than one author has done in recent years (see for example Crapanzano 1995: 137150), Freitas moves to her main concern, that of learning how the dierences and similarities between Bakhtin and Vygotsky are informative for the contemporary reader. The most productive aspect of Freitas' overarching comparison in this article between Bakhtin and Vygotsky is that she manages to enter into deep dimensions of their respective theoretical principles, or even of their theoretical worldviews. This is not the common type of study on Bakhtin that consists mainly of a comparative content-analysis of Bakhtin and x: `The possibility of these similarities [between Bakhtin and Vygotsky] is linked to two basic points: the dialectical method and their vision of the human sciences' (p. 314).27 Referring to the important psychological work done by Solange Jobim e Souza (1994) in the eld of child psychology, work that was also accomplished with the help of Bakhtin's theories of subjectivity, Freitas stresses the interrelational foundations that the psychological notion of the subject must necessarily contain: `The subject is constituted by relations' (p. 316).28 It is this interrelational foundation that leads us to believe that, within this way of looking at human subjectivity, there lies the potential of an entirely new epistemological framework for the human sciences in general. Her explanation of the importance of subjective interrelationality goes as follows: `This new perspective enables the construction of a theory of the human sciences that goes beyond the parameters of objective knowledge and of neutrality that are specic to the exact sciences.' (p. 316).29 Basing part of her thinking on the Brazilian educational psychologist Sonia Kramer

182 A. Wall (1993), Freitas suggests that the most striking lesson that a methodological juxtaposition of Bakhtin and Vygotsky gives us is that they point us in the direction of `another way of doing science' (p. 317), `uma forma outra' that of course implicates another way of knowing and stresses creative ways of apprehending the (social) world. After all, both Bakhtin and Vygotsky had a thoroughly interdisciplinary education. Their ways of restructuring our notions of subjectivity are intimately linked to their respective familiarity with the methods of artistic creativity. Here, language is at the very heart of any such creative restructuring, and a conceptual framework is born whereby `the sign seen as a social product takes on a generative and organizing function in psychological processes' (p. 318).30 A reading of Bakhtin's `Author and hero in aesthetic activity' (1990: 4256) as well as Volos inov's and Bakhtin's Marxism and the Philosophy of Language is instructive in this regard. In a way that is similar to A. Silvestri's and G. Blanck's comparative reading of Bakhtin and Vygotsky (Silvestri and Blanck 1993), Freitas is attracted by the enabling possibilities that interrelational notions of subjectivity entail. In such a framework, learning, for example, will always imply the multiple ways in which the objective interactions at work in a given social environment are adapted by an individual for his or her own intrapsychological needs. Such an observation has, of course, enormous importance for educational psychology because here it is less important to understand what precisely growing children can or cannot do on their own than it is to understand how well particular children are able to interact with, and to learn from, others. The main dierence that Freitas sees between Bakhtin and Vygotsky has to do with the larger social scope with which Bakhtin conceptualizes the interactive dimensions involved in the socialization of individual children who make their way toward adult subjecthood. One sees, therefore, to what extent it is true to say that the questions Freitas asks as a consequence of her own comparison of Bakhtin and Vygotsky entail a perspective that takes in methodologies coming from a number of human sciences disciplines. This is the fascinating aspect of her contrastive study. Another accomplished pscyhologist interested both in Bakhtin and in the links that can be forged with Walter Benjamin's psychological thought is Solange Jobim e Souza whose contrastive piece on Bakhtin and Benjamin is also included in Beth Brait's volume. In a captivating contrapuntal juxtaposition of selected quotations from Bakhtin's and Benjamin's notations on methodology, Jobim e Souza wishes to draw out the epistemological implications that can be developed for those theories of subjectivity that are steeped in the problematics of time. The rst lesson that Jobim e Souza draws is that the development of human

Mikhail Bakhtin 183 subjectivity does not in any way follow any strict linear sequence in its movement through time. This she shows through a discussion of Bakhtin's and Benjamin's descriptions of `truth', something they both see as being constructed in a peculiar temporal unfolding: `This progressive conquest of truth, as it occurs in the dialogue of ideas expanding in both space and time, challenges the human sciences to construct a new understanding of themselves' (p. 332).31 Stated in psycho-semiotic terms, Jobim e Souza concludes that subjectivity and historicity must therefore be `re-signed' or even `re-signied', a project that not only has to take Benjaminian `ashes' of time into detailed account but also one that allows for various processes whereby small fragments are released from encompassing larger contexts. The central role that must be given to language in such a new and creative paradigm of truth is played out with particular cogency with respect to an understanding of human subjectivity. The complexity of human existence is such that it will always be greater than the questions that any one academic discipline can ever hope to generate for its comprehension. This unfathomable richness of the questions that must be asked accounts for the strong stylistic varieties that one nds in both Bakhtin's and Benjamin's writing. In a sense, then, both writers are following a parallel trajectory in their quest for understanding the temporal qualities of truth: in Bakhtin's case it comes to an exploration of dialogue, in Benjamin's case it is a matter of exploiting the resources of `authorized quotation'. Both are interested in seeing the ways in which heterogeneous elements come together and constantly rub against one another in human existence. Jobim e Souza writes:
Our [two] authors give credence to the idea that the human sciences can and must assume both a commitment and a responsibility for developing a new concept of truth, thus preserving a worthy role for language, that of transmitting and revealing the permanent tension that exists between cognition and truth in the sphere of human and social knowing. (p. 336)32

In this same context they also claim stating here a point we saw at the heart of the epistemological discussions proposed by Marilia Amorim that the tension between knowledge and truth is something that is absolutely necessary for the human sciences. A basic feature of this human truth is that it cannot be simply `taught', an observation which of course complicates the issue as to whether or not truth in the human sciences can ever be `transmitted'. This impossibility derives in turn from the irreducible singularity of the living `objects' of the human sciences. In the case of Bakhtin and Benjamin, the methods of dialogue and quotation are always `indirect' methods. They always imply what Dias de Castro calls linguistic `highjacking'. What we have here is a way of

184 A. Wall thinking that renounces all forms of perfect predictability in an eort to account for the necessary irregularities of all things human. Knowledge in the domain of the human sciences therefore cannot follow a straight and narrow path; like subjectivity, it grows creatively, often producing loops that allow the past to become a permanently mutating basis for the future. `If, for Bakhtin, truth can be found in the dialogic relationship between texts, both written and spoken ones, in Benjamin's case truth is expressed by actual objects, things, gestures, etc. All these are constituted in the signs of a much wider historical and cultural situation' (p. 341).33 Every subject, like every thing, speaks through the traces it contains from elsewhere. Both similar to and dierent from what the American social scientist Stanley Aronowitz terms as Bakhtin's belief in the overall unity of culture involving all disciplinary denitions of truth (Aronowitz 1995: 126), here the particularity of the mode of knowing is not so much in the text that the human sciences have, as their mission, to study, but rather in the individual make-up of the human scientist as a human subject. In Jobim de Souza's thinking, as in Freitas', language must be considered as the vehicle of knowledge, and especially as a vehicle that has an irreducibly double character as both a rational and a sensual phenomenon. The Anglo-American `Bakhtin' and his relations to the human sciences These descriptions of two recent Brazilian publications on Bakhtin, one written in French and the other in Portuguese, set the stage for a discussion of an important English-language publication that also deals with many issues related to the thorny question of what is the appropriate, or most productive, disciplinary aliation for a thinker as complicated as Mikhail Bakhtin. I have already briey alluded to the contribution written in this domain by Stanley Aronowitz, a social scientist who, after Michael Gardiner's ground-breaking monograph The Dialogics of Critique: M.M. Bakhtin and the Theory of Ideology (1992), was early to sense the enormous diculties in dening with any precision what it was in Bakhtin's work that can make him both attractive and repulsive to social scientists in search of new paradigms for apprehending the intricacies of human behavior. Gardiner is the co-editor, along with Michael Mayerfeld Bell, of a stimulating collection of essays written, for the most part, by `unconventional' social scientists, researchers intent on correcting the perceived situation in Anglo-American academia where, for whatever reasons, `[d]isciplines like sociology, philosophy, political science, and so forth have been slow to recognize the potential of Bakhtin's

Mikhail Bakhtin 185 ideas' (p. 2). In many respects, Bell's and Gardiner's collection represents a highly useful anthology that raises a number of issues that are both explicitly and implicitly related to Bakhtin's (extra-)disciplinarity. Given the tenor of the two books just reviewed, it therefore becomes interesting to look seriously at the question of whether or not there is presently a dearth of social-scientic thinking on Bakhtin's work. Two preliminary points are in order for the launching of such a discussion: (1) it is not clear, in the statement quoted above, where (i.e., in what language) such a shortage is apparent, and (2) it is unclear to what the `and so forth' at the end of Gardiner's and Bell's list of excluded disciplines is supposed to refer exactly. On the rst point, it is both true and not true that there has been little work published in English on Bakhtin that involves thinking done from the perspective of the social sciences. It is certainly the case that the rst twenty years or more of Bakhtin Studies were dominated by researchers working in the Humanities (mainly in Russian Studies, English Studies, and French Studies from the angle of literary criticism). But it is also true that the present landscape in English-language Bakhtin Studies has changed radically in the past ve years or so. It has now reached a maturity of sorts where, more and more often, important pieces are being published on Bakhtin by people outside the three `core' disciplines in literary studies. To a certain extent, then, Bell's and Gardiner's collection of essays is less, as they explicitly want it to be, a cure for the present woeful situation of Bakhtin in the Social Sciences than it is a symptom of an increasingly signicant movement in the eld of Bakhtin Studies: a healthy opening-up of the very disciplinary borders that a thinker such as Bakhtin was himself wont to put into question on a sustained basis. For some time now, this widening of the disciplinary horizons has been going on, and at a particularly healthy clip, not only in the `eld' of feminist studies where several signicant publications such as Dale Bauer's Feminism, Bakhtin, and the Dialogic (Bauer 1991), the more recent book edited by Karen Horne and Helen Wussow (1994) and some important `contextualizing' work by Peter Hitchcock (1993) have already appeared, but also in a number of other traditional `social sciences' disciplines such as geography (see Shields 1991). Part of the sea change in the focus of international Bakhtin Studies that can be clearly observed in recent works published in English came with a shift from the over-concentration, engaged in by literary scholars, on the concept of carnival to other Bakhtinian concepts but even then, i.e., in relation to carnival, writers such as Peter Stallybrass and Allon White (in Stallybrass and White [1986] and White [1993]) had, even before the advent of the `social scientic Bakhtin' that many are just now recognizing, had signicantly and forcefully provided a highly useful

186 A. Wall model for moving even the carnivalistic Bakhtin out from the sole realm of literary studies and into that of a broader society-based inquiry. And, as was only too clear in the work of literary theorists such as Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson (1990), the notion of carnival itself is a rich enough concept to spawn a lot of controversial commentaries that can be useful for a reading of Bakhtin that is destined to consider `social scientic' questions. My second point, or rather my second question, has to do with what disciplines the label `human sciences' is supposed to include, or perhaps (stated in a dierent way) to exclude. It is in this context that a number of provocative issues arise. For example, Bell's and Gardiner's volume of fourteen texts contains mainly contributions written by sociologists, with several contributions delving into dicult questions of philosophy, political theory, and psychology. Two other contributions are written by researchers working in literary studies. The `type' of `human sciences' contained in this volume contrasts sharply, in disciplinary terms, with the mix of contributions contained in the recent volumes produced by Beth Brait (1997), Amy Mandelker (1995), Caryl Emerson (1999), or Faraco, Tezza and de Castro (1996), all of which have just as strong claims as Bell and Gardiner about having provided a sampling of Bakhtin Studies that is representative of the `human sciences' broadly conceived. Part of the disciplinary choices that Bell and Gardiner make are perfectly understandable and they readily admit that their volume `is not comprehensive, far from it' (p. 7). They do, however, state the following as their aim in producing their volume:
The goal of the present collection is to provide a focal point for some of the diverse new scholarship that is beginning to emerge on Bakhtin from a wide range of disciplines, and to extend the concept of `dialogue' from linguistic communication in the narrow sense to a multiplicity of dierent social, cultural, and ecological phenomena. It is our feeling that this volume will help to full a pressing need to resituate and foreground Bakhtinian problematics vis-a-vis the current debate over the nature and direction of critical inquiry in the human sciences, and to extend his ideas into new research domains. (p. 7)

That dialogue has hitherto been studied only in the `narrow' sense is clearly contradicted by the existence of a collection of essays published some ve years ago by Alfred Arteaga (1994), one that is dedicated to a wide range of social issues related to language and dialogue. The claim regarding a narrow linguistic focus further suggests that philosophy is among those `human sciences' that will allow us to study Bakhtin in a much wider way than has previously been the case. The question remains, of course, as to `which type' of philosophy Gardiner and Bell have in mind because,

Mikhail Bakhtin 187 as they rightly point out, Russian-language philosophy has long been interested in Bakhtin. The whole issue of whether or not philosophy has been one of those human scientic disciplines neglected by Englishlanguage scholarship is further complicated by the fact that none of the writers represented in this volume, which is explicitly dedicated to expanding Bakhtin's human scientic base, would want to claim to be a professional philosopher. As Bell and Gardiner see it, the goal of establishing a clearly identiable `human scientic Bakhtin' must rst and foremost include the desire to go beyond much of the `supercial appropriation of Bakhtinian tropes or neologisms' (p. 7) that are too much a part of the `humanistic Bakhtin' they wish to correct. The desire thereby becomes one to move toward a more properly `human scientic Bakhtin' through `serious philosophical engagement with his core ideas and a sustained reection on their implications for contemporary theoretical practice' (p. 7). One can also argue that, in working toward this lofty goal of nding the appropriate `human sciences' mix for Bakhtin Studies, it is not always useful to ignore much of what has already been done outside the particular band of disciplines in which one is interested. In other words, it would not be desirable, when re-inventing Bakhtin for the purposes of the human sciences, to reinvent the entire Bakhtinian wheel all over again. Several contributions meet head on the ambitious goals announced in the introductory text of this book. The opening contribution written by John Shotter and Michael Billig is an interesting text on a number of issues related to social psychology. Their article entitled `A Bakhtinian psychology: From out of the heads of individuals and into the dialogues between them' (pp. 1329) provides a well-informed discussion of what it means to move discussions of the mind from a perspective directed solely at the articially isolated individual toward one that stresses the ways in which people must be considered, psychologically speaking, `as living bodies in a society with a culture and a history, rather than as isolated inanimate mechanisms' (p. 13). Shotter's and Billig's perspective thus moves into a discussion of the `little, eeting details' that are intricate pieces, never to be minimized and never to be ignored, of what it means, in the large picture puzzle of dynamic reality, to participate in the everyday world as social creatures. The authors are thus much more interested in studying human acts as they unfold, moment by moment, than in viewing `humanity' as something that is the result of any number of xed mental states or structures. Shotter and Billig thus consider themselves to be `discursive and rhetorical psychologists' whose primary objective consists in relocating those topics such as memory and attitudes that are `traditionally assumed to be hidden, ``inner'' processes occurring inside

188 A. Wall individuals, in the outward communicative activities occurring between them, in just the way pregured by Bakhtin' (p. 17). The act of speaking is just one type of everyday action that is not adequately described as the simple expression of something that is already in the head since it belongs rather to a complex social rhetoric, one whereby what is explicitly said hides all that has not yet been said (`how the routines of saying accomplish routines of not-saying', [p. 21]) and where the temporal unfolding of behavior (p. 26) forms the basis for the unrepeatability of any human individuality. Two other contributions that merit mention from the very outset are Courtney Bender's interesting contribution on `Bakhtinian perspectives on ``everyday life'' sociology' (pp. 181195) and Barry Sandywell's `The shock of the old: Mikhail Bakhtin's contribution to the theory of time and alterity' (pp. 196213). Using Bakhtin's Toward a Philosophy of the Act (1993) as her point of departure, Courtney is able, rst, to set o the philosophical vision outlined in Bakhtin's early text against similar ideas formulated in early twentieth century European philosophy by neoKantians and by Bergson. The central criticism levelled by Bakhtin against such conceptualizations of the individual in the everyday world is that they `strip individuals of their unique positions within everyday life, making them ``pretenders'' who speak with alibis rather than from their own unique, responsible positions' (p. 181). However, Courtney's main comparisons between Bakhtin and other thinkers on the everyday involve less such thinkers who were Bakhtin's contemporaries than they involve our own contemporaries, in the persons of Alfred Schutz, George Herbert Mead, Thomas Luckmann, and Peter Berger. Bakhtin is thereby contrasted with pragmatic, phenomenologist, and interactionist theorizations of the everyday, conceptualizations that fall short of Bakhtin's demands for a way of thinking that will not fall prey to the temptation to construct a `schizophrenic self who shuttles back and forth between meaningful thoughts and non-meaningful acts' (p. 184). Explicitly quoting several times from Toward a Philosophy of the Act and relying on Morson and Emerson (1990) for a number of her observations, Courtney sketches out what Bakhtin's theory of the everyday looks like given his `career-long disdain of institutions' (p. 189) and the fact that he `concentrates solely on individuals making meaning and existing without alibis or roles that take over their unique positions' (p. 189). Courtney sees an individualist stance in Bakhtin which helps us to account for his strong criticism `of the separation of theoretical thinking and everyday action' (p. 191). One need not agree with this individualistic reading of Toward a Philosophy of the Act in order to appreciate the clarity of thought and the useful ways of contrasting Bakhtin's ways of seeing everyday life

Mikhail Bakhtin 189 with several currents of thinking that continue to exert a strong inuence in sociological circles. In many respects, Courtney's piece demonstrates a number of intellectual qualities that are most desirable of any `Bakhtin' of the Human Sciences: the ability to engage critically with contemporary currents of thinking and to show how Bakhtin's thinking can be said to enter into a dialogue of great time with contemporary thinkers. Another interesting contribution in Bell's and Gardiner's volume that is able to hold out a similar promise is Barry Sandywell's piece on time and the everyday (pp. 196213). Sandywell is interested in pursuing what he calls the notion of `heterology' or an `ethics of alterity', something he proposes to do by taking into account Bakhtin's thinking on speech genres and by inserting the latter into a `chronotopic organization of meaning' (p. 196). In other words, what Sandywell proposes is an `ethical vision of heteroglossia' (p. 197) if, by the latter phrase, we understand `the idea that every culture exhibits the material and temporal traces of another's speech in another's language' (p. 197). Human existence can thus be conceptualized as a constantly dicult navigation between dierent fragments and temporalities created by self-other relationships unfolding in time and space. In a fashion that is similar to what we earlier saw in Marilia Amorim's use of Bakhtin, alterity is seen as a productive concept. Sandywell, however, stresses a dimension of alterity that is much less part of Amorim's viewpoint: the temporal dimension of alterity. The role that temporality plays in the unfolding of creative processes is absolutely essential: `without temporality, no alterity; without alterity, no dierence; without dierence, no meaning; without meaning, no world' (p. 199). Interpretation and meaning-making in the everyday, as everywhere else, necessarily involve `agonistic processes' where each and every `form of exchange between self and other presupposes heteroglossial time as its concrete medium' (p. 199). Human acts of meaning-making thus entail encounters between competing temporalities: those of the presently unfolding utterance, those of the acts against which the presently unfolding act must be projected, those of the interpreters who will appear in the future. Sandywell explains that Bakhtin provides a framework of understanding `[w]here ``coming-to-be'' (stanovlenie) takes precedence over ``being'' (bytie)' and furthermore where `the category of time becomes a placeholder for acts of possible interpretation, a eld of transformations in which the world is made to signify in dierent ways' (p. 200). In other words, no temporality of the lived world, neither present, past nor future, is a passive receptacle where pre-established signications can simply be projected. Even the past becomes a virtual storehouse of virtually realizable meaning acts, since `each strong act of interpretive revision reexively alters the past and changes the conditions for

190 A. Wall further interpretation' (p. 201). Bakhtin's notion of time is, according to Sandywell, `a dialogically mediated construction that is inseparable from a society's general communicative and interactional strategies' (p. 205). Demonstrating critical familiarity with a number of texts written on Bakhtin, especially in relation to problems of time and space, Sandywell provides a most useful conceptualization of how the unfolding of time in Bakhtin's thinking must be brought into careful connections with his conceptualization of dialogue, thus giving us a number of important insights into how Bakhtin conceptualizes the very possibility of human creativity in the everyday world. Sandywell and Bender are relative newcomers in the `eld' of Bakhtin Studies. Their studies provide excellent examples of the fruitful exchanges that are now emerging as researchers from the social sciences add their voices to the work that has been done elsewhere and otherwise concerning some of the most fundamental notions of Bakhtin's overall thinking. Shotter and particularly Billig, on the other hand, are not exactly newcomers as they have been vigorously pursuing their line of thinking on Bakhtin for a number of years, and in a number of publications, both in journals and in books, ever since, at least, the late eighties and early nineties. Their use of Bakhtin, which can be found throughout their published work, is evident in such works as Shotter (1992) and Billig (1991, 1997) and can not really be described as `new and emerging'. Their approach to issues aecting psychology is both stunningly adventuresome and disconcerting. It is stunning in its cogent introduction of a number of fundamental Bakhtinian ideas to social psychology; it is disconcerting in the ways it seems to ignore what has been done elsewhere in Bakhtinian psychology, not even mentioning works written in other languages such as Fernandez-Zoila (1981, 1982a, 1982b), Friedrich (1993), Silvestri and Blanck (1993) and Jobim e Souza (1994) and also failing to take into account existing English-language work that deals with Bakhtin and psychology in general (Dore 1989, 1990) or with Bakhtin and Vygotsky (such as Emerson 1983; Wertsch 1991), while virtually ignoring the Freudianism book published under Volos inov's name (1976). These failures to deal with already existing works that are directly related to their study is part of what I refer to above as reinventing the Bakhtinian wheel. This criticism, peripheral in the case of Shotter and Billig, is not intended to suggest that there is not very much original scholarship published in the impressive volume produced by Bell and Gardiner or that there are not really very many new ideas to emerge in the `human scientic Bakhtin' that they are rightfully advocating. Not only are there a number of texts containing a wealth of information about the social

Mikhail Bakhtin 191 side of many of Bakhtin's frequently commentated notions such as the carnival (this is the principal merit of the richly documented article on the carnivalesque written by Hwa Jol Jung [pp. 95111]) but there are also contributions, such as the piece on Kant by Greg Nielsen (pp. 214230) that discuss ideas in the Bakhtinian corpus that are truly not very well known by most readers of Bakhtin. The point made here has to do with the existence of contributions that purport to create a `Human Scientic Bakhtin' from scratch and that thereby fail to engage with earlier work, often published by people working in other `humanistic' disciplines, that deals with the exact same sorts of central theoretical issues. These are the types of contributions that detract from the overall high quality of Bell's and Gardiner's collection of essays, a high level of scholarship that is apparent despite some editorial problems having to do with poor transcriptions of quotations and titles, a frustratingly incomplete index, and inconsistency in the actual editions of Bakhtin's works referred to throughout the volume. One example of this type of work that detracts from the overall quality consists in comparing Pierre Bourdieu and Bakhtin (pp. 163180) but at the same time ignoring virtually everything that has been written on Bakhtin, including those precise works such as Jeremy Lane's (available since 1995 in synopsis form in Makhlin 1995: 9196 and printed in its full version in 1997 in Adlam, Falconer, Makhlin, and Renfrew 1997: 329346), and that very Bourdieusian text, Ce que parler veut dire (1982), that is only partially translated in Bourdieu, Thompson, and Raymond (1991), in which there is a sustained discussion on Bourdieu's part of Bakhtin's principle notions of language, power and ideology. In fact, the text on Bakhtin and Bourdieu does not discuss a single text authored by Bourdieu that was translated into English after 1991 nor does it mention any of the important work, in French or in English, written on Bourdieu since that time, thus sidestepping most of the fundamental issues brought forward in such basic works as Jenkins (1992) or Calhoun, Lipuma, and Postone (1993), and much of which can be readily seen in a more recent text such as Shusterman (1999). The central problem of such a situation in which contributions on Bakhtin in the Human Sciences appear ready to redo Bakhtin from scratch consists precisely in this: they contradict what Michael Mayerfeld Bell would want dialogic studies of culture to do, i.e., to follow the principle according to which `it is considerate to consider what others have to say, as well as better scholarship' (p. 57). Despite assurances to the contrary, this volume provides some new examples of what Bell and Gardiner derogatively refer to as the `add Bakhtin and mix mentality that sometimes prevails in the existing

192 A. Wall academic milieu' (p. 7). Besides the `Bakhtin and Bourdieu' mix already mentioned, there is also a `Bakhtin and Mannheim' piece whose usefulness will be mainly for readers who already know Mannheim but do not know Bakhtin, whereas most of the readers of Bell and Gardiner's volume would presumably be people who already know Bakhtin but do not know Mannheim. This type of comparison contrasts starkly with the type of contrastive study of Bakhtin and Vygotsky engaged in by Maria Teresa de Assunc a o Freitas, as discussed above. The main point of dierence lies in the divergent strategies employed by the respective authors. Whereas Freitas was interested in drawing out the methodological lessons that can be attained by contrasting two similar-minded thinkers dealing with inner speech, the Mannheim-Bakhtin comparison is not self-evident in and of itself and much time has to be spent just in justifying the `selective' comparison that is about to be made. Part of the problem seems to be related to the methodology of comparisons: whereas Freitas' and Jobim e Souza's comparative studies are methodologically innovative, the Mannheim-Bakhtin study does not seem to have examined the many dierent types of comparisons that already exist between Bakhtin and some other thinker, a task that is necessary in order to avoid the danger of superciality in relation both to Bakhtin and to the other signicant writer. Ironically enough, at the very moment that this new volume purports to move Bakhtin from the strict connes of the Humanities into the broader disciplinary possibilities of the Human Sciences, or at least into the particular part of the `Human Sciences' represented in this volume, two of the most original pieces of work published in this book are written by researchers working in English literature departments, i.e., from one of those core humanistic disciplines that were supposed to have cordoned o `Bakhtin' from the `real' issues in the rst place. One of these pieces is Peter Hitchcock's `The grotesque of the body electric' (pp. 7894). The other is Michael Bernard-Donals' `Knowing the subaltern: Bakhtin, carnival and the other voice of the human sciences' (pp. 112127). Neither of these authors can be said to be `new and emerging' and both are authors of signicant books on Bakhtin. In his contribution, Hitchcock explores the problematic issues of boundaries, not in relation to disciplinarity as we have been doing here, but in terms of the relation of the human body to itself. Reecting on what must have been both the meaning and the pain for Bakhtin in the loss of his leg, Hitchcock suggests that losing a leg in physical terms also allowed for a number of gains in intellectual terms: it allowed Bakhtin in particular to gain hyper-sensitivity to the issue of where an individual's body actually `ends' (it is impossible to ignore the pain of one's phantom limb) and provided him, in real-life terms, with the vital

Mikhail Bakhtin 193 resource without which much of what he thought and wrote would have never come to be: time. `Bakhtin, a consummate theorist of the body', Hitchcock writes, `begins with the unconsummated nature of his own tissue, a body that for most of his life painfully reminded him of its eshly imperfections' (p. 78). Using crutches or a stick for the rest of his life after the amputation of his right leg, Bakhtin is led, in Hitchcock's thinking, to a way of understanding individuality that stresses prosthesis and images of incompleteness. In the contemporary context, this aspect of Bakhtin's thinking is useful for reecting on the social meaning of our current fascination with articial body parts and cyborgs. Just as the melancholia of loss can be read in Bakhtin's life trajectory as an ultimately productive episode, one that turns incompleteness into productive reections on the ways in which the individual body is inserted into the social world of politics and human interaction, so too can contemporary xations on the cyborg, as symptoms of a deep-lying incompleteness, become the launching site for an understanding of the multifarious ways in which forms of hybridity can be enlisted in projects that purport to undo unnecessary or restrictive boundaries. Here Hitchcock refers extensively to Donna Haraway (1991): `For Bakhtin, as for Haraway, the body does not end with the skin. The cyborg exists in Bakhtin to the extent that becoming is the very ground of augmentation and reconstruction' (p. 84). The body does its work of becoming in a grotesque framework: it `constantly contradicts the pretensions and ideologies of perfection in its defecation, sneezing, farting, belching, and bleeding' (p. 85). As such, and through its constant display of its own imperfections, the grotesque body can be understood, in semiotic terms, not as a pure negativity, but rather as a `warning about any system of thought that renders the body either abstract or easily perfectible' (p. 85). Such admonitions allow Hitchcock to claim that one of the most striking aspects of Bakhtin's work on Rabelais (Bakhtin 1968) is not so much the notion of the carnival itself, as has most often been the case in readings of Bakhtin's work, but rather the ways in which the intellectual work accomplished in this study draw our attention to the very material and bodily conditions under which the Rabelais study came to be in the rst place: in the context of an incomplete body struggling to survive and to be recognized. `The dismembered body in pain is the mise-en-scene of a social paroxysm about what counts as equally human' (p. 90). The body in pain is an irreducibly unique body, one that, in the face of desires for perfect reproduction and serial eciency, oer the antidote of dierence and disjunction. Michael Bernard-Donals' text on the impossible voices of politically dominated others oers us another productive reading of how Bakhtin's

194 A. Wall cultural-philosophical ideas can draw out interesting possibilities for formulating contestatory or critical modes of social thinking. Beginning with a reading of Mario Vargas-Llosa's The Storyteller (1989), and drawing heavily upon Gayatri Spivak's (1994) work on the `subaltern', Bernard-Donals provides an informative Bakhtinian explanation of what it would mean to write that which literally, because of the silence imposed by marginalization, cannot ever be written. This `impossible contradiction' pointed out by Bernard-Donals forms the crux of the Rabelais book (Bakhtin 1968), as Bakhtin performs the contradictions of expressing marginality in ways that are dierent from, but at the same time similar to, the problematics, discussed by Spivak, of giving voices to whose who by denitiation can have no voice. In BernardDonal's reading of the Rabelais book, the importance of carnival is that it allows us to `imagine', and thereby to understand, what semiotic forms `excess' can assume. `Carnival acts as a wedge that potentially opens up a space in which we are apt to catch a glimpse of excess' (p. 118). Following a line of explanation parallel to Shotter and Billig, BernardDonals believes that everyday meanings in our lives not only include `what we speak and name, but also what we cannot speak (or refuse to speak)' (p. 118). A signicant part of the carnival's excess is precisely ne of that which cannot be said explicitly, its physical mise-en-sce performative enactments that t disruptively into everyday practices of meaning-making and create the conditions for a signicant semiotic awakening. Laughter is just one of the semiotic-cultural forms that excess can assume in such a setting. Excess is the force that erupts in a way that is similar, in terms of Walter Benjamin's conception of history, to the eruptions of other times, in our presently unfolding time; it is a force that allows us to gain at least a glimpse of the stultifying powers of forgetting that lead us to ignore the material conditions that perform the texts by which we see our own identities. Bernard-Donals expresses his reading of carnival as follows:
If we put this back into the terms of writing on carnival (or on authorship, or on parody), the location or point of origin is the moment of impossibility of speech. It is the location in time and space at which the speaker recognizes that she cannot predict or understand the voice of the other, and that, paradoxically, she cannot see herself as the other does. At that moment she misspeaks, says the wrong thing, says what she does not mean and thereby produces a word, an eect, that disturbs the context of the situation while at the same time (re)constructs it. If we push this far enough, every utterance, every word, is potentially parodic because every utterance is directed at what we think our interlocutor or what we ourselves, if we were able to say our name, our `I' might say. (p. 122)

Mikhail Bakhtin 195 This is why there is a certain fragility at the heart of what we claim to be, an un-centered `I' that wants to be something, but tends to forget an essential part of itself in the very movement of trying to give expression to itself. In this sense, there are unspoken parts of our own and of the other's world, parts that we share in common. These are aspects whose commonality consists in the fact that both can never be spoken for in all their fullness. The inclusion of the articles by Hitchcock and Bernard-Donals in this collection smartly assembled by Bell and Gardiner points, I believe, to two interesting facts as far as the issue of Bakhtin in the Human Sciences is concerned. First, it would seem to indicate that the notion of Human Sciences is a lot trickier than one might imagine when one sets out `to enlist Bakhtinian ideas for the project of developing genuinely post-Cartesian human sciences' (p. 7). The Human Sciences are much more than any subset of academic disciplines that we might wish to place in them but they are also much less than a totalizing set of questions, forced as they are to adopt a certain humility in the face of their necessary incompleteness (Bouveresse 1998: 64). The general diculty of understanding in any xed fashion that which should be (and that which should not be) properly included in the Human Sciences is complicated by the cultural-linguistic fact that the term `Human Sciences' is rather foreign to the Anglo-Saxon academic environment. The second observation that I draw from the disciplinary mix included in Bell's and Gardiner's volume on Bakhtin in the Human Sciences is that it is not exactly productive to adopt an exclusionary stance in our ways of developing a wide enough spectrum of disciplinary congurations in order to read Bakhtin as being part of the Human Sciences. That is to say, it is not productive to cut the Humanities o from the Social Sciences or to cut the Social Sciences o from the Humanities. The interdisciplinary mixes of other recent Bakhtin collections show that the `literary' side of Bakhtin is just as powerful as his `social' side, and that neither of these `sides' can be fruitfully understood in isolation from one another. It is not as if the `literary' side of Bakhtin constituted something `to be overcome', as it were, not something that was merely an illusion accruing from a one-sided reading of Bakhtin as compared to a much more complete `Bakhtin' oered by other disciplines. The frequency of interdisciplinary interventions in the eld of Bakhtin Studies on an international scale, volumes ranging from Luzatti, Beacco et al.'s collection entitled Le Dialogique (1997), to Caryl Emerson's Critical Essays on Mikhail Bakhtin (1999) and, including such texts as Faraco, n Alvarado Tezza, and de Castro's Dialogos com Bakhtin (1996), Ramo and Lauro Zavala's Voces en el umbral (1997), and the special issue of the Montreal journal Recherches semiotiques/Semiotic Inquiry (1998) on `Bakhtin and the future of signs', are all instructive in this regard, just

196 A. Wall as the Beth Brait collection under review here. It would be a shame if the Social Scientists did not `want' to read the Humanist material simply because it was humanist stu, just as it is not acceptable for Humanists to refuse to read Social Scientic material simply because it comes from the Social Sciences. Even a predominantly humanist collection such as Catherine Depretto's recent collection (1997) has things to oer to the human scientist just as Bell's and Gardiner's predominantly Social Scientic Bakhtin has much to oer to the humanist. The splitting o of the human sciences into the humanities and the social sciences, perpetuated in the name of widening the spectrum of disciplines in Bakhtin Studies to include other hitherto underrepresented ones, can unfortunately reinforce a condition that I once referred to as `chatter', one in which no one in a given disciplinary environment seems to want to know `what all the other people are talking about' when they are talking about their own particular `Bakhtin' to the exclusion of other `Bakhtins'; it can result in an undesirable situation where `the Bakhtins we are producing are growing further and further apart' (Wall 1998: 198). In the context of the justiable need to look at the rich social thinking that is both explicitly and implicitly present in Bakhtin's writing, it is problematic to claim that humanist publications on Bakhtin have nothing `social' about them, or nothing useful to say about Bakhtin's social thinking. That Humanistic studies can usefully contribute to a study of the social `Bakhtin' is a fact that is easily Belleau (1990), Jean Peytard attested by such humanist authors as Andre (1995), or by the recent contribution to Bakhtin Studies written by Maroussia Hajdukowski-Ahmed (1998). Whatever or whoever the `Bakhtin' is that is the `ttest' for the widest possible spectrum of human scientic disciplines, this `Bakhtin' has to be one that does not deploy strategies of exclusion in the name of widening the legitimate disciplinary breadth of the research we might wish to employ while doing our work in the name of Bakhtin.

Notes
te 1. `la recherche en sciences humaines consiste en ce curieux mouvement de vouloir etre ho placement vers l'autre qui contient la pre tention de pouvoir dans le pays de l'autre. De rite '. accueillir et traduire son alte cise ment la ou de dialogue est reconnue, la ou 2. `C'est pre l'impossibilite on admet qu'il y aura toujours une perte de sens dans la communication que se construit un objet et qu'un savoir sur l'humain peut se produire'. et l'impossibilite de la rencontre, 3. `Si l'univers des signes est le lieu ou se joue la possibilite rier les eets de contact entre die rents univers. c'est aussi dans le signe qu'on peut ve ciproquement. Au long de l'histoire, l'ab me se franchit et les signes se transforment re

Mikhail Bakhtin 197

ou La il y avait l'un, on verra l'autre, mais un eet permanent de trompe-l'oeil posera toujours la question: acculturation ou appropriation? Et puisqu'il s'agit de signes, la de l'e nonciation: dans le fait de subir une question ne pourra se chercher que du co te qui s'adresse l'objet culturel transformation par l'inuence ou la force de l'autre, a ?' transforme I shall sometimes be putting quotation marks around Bakhtin's name to indicate the dierence between the theoretical author whom many humanist and social scientists are discussing and the mythical character who is sometimes created in these discussions. On this point, and other related issues, see Peter Hitchcock (1998). tant donne son caracte re `dans une approche polyphonique _ le mot devient geste e relationnel et l'espace est reconstruit en fonction du rapport de places'. de la citation est propre a l'humain. Rapporter, reproduire, raconter a un `la possibilite me, ce qu'on m'a dit et ce que moi-me structurante troisie me je n'ai pas vu est une activite '. de mon humanite `Bicorporel et pas seulement bivocal, le discours carnavalesque renvoie toujours au corps'. qui je parle, qui est lui-me `Il n'y a pas de langage sans qu'il y ait un autre a me parlant/ pondant et sans la possibilite de parler de ce qu'un autre a dit.' re s teorias do discurso' [Bakhtin's contributions to theories `Contribuic o es de Bakhtin a of discourse]. `Ao tratar, em seus escritos, do texto como objeto das cie ncias humanas, Bakhtin aponta as duas diferentes concepc gico, a do dia logo entre interlocutores ja o es do princ pio dialo logo entre discursos _' e a do dia `O sujeito da cognic a o procura interpretar ou compreender o outro sujeito em lugar de buscar apenas conhecer um objeto'. `M. Bakhtin em M. Pe cheux: no risco do conteudismo'. [M. Bakhtin in M Pe cheux: On the risk of fetishizing contents]. `Dialogizac a o enunciativa e paisagens do sujeito' [Dialogism in the utterance and landscapes of the subject]. para agir'. `o signo e `nos confrontamos em Bakhtin com uma descric a o que oscila entre um enraizamento da descontinuidade do sujeito no discurso e seu deslocamento das superf cies discursivas gicas'. sob o efeito de determinac o es psico-sociolo gica da linguagem' [Bakhtin and the `Bakhtin e a natureza constitutivamente dialo fundamentally dialogical nature of language]. com`O conceito da linguagem que emana dos trabalhos desse pensador russo esta ria, mas com uma prometido na ncia lingu o com uma tende stica ou uma teoria litera visa a a o de mundo que, justamente na busca das formas de construc o e instaurac o do sentido, resvela pela abordagem lingu stico/discursiva, pela teoria da literatura, pela tica da cultura, por umconjunto de dimenso losoa, pela teologia, por uma semio es entretecidas e ainda na o inteiramente decifradas'. `Signicac a o e forma lingu o de Bakhtin' [Meaning and form in Bakhtin's stica na visa vision']. `O outro da personagem: enunciac a o, exterioridade e discurso' [The other of the character: Utterance, the outside, and discourse]. `A dialogia e os efeitos de sentido iro nicos' [Dialogicity and the semantic eects of irony']. tico' [Genres and the body of aesthetic `Os ge neros e o corpo do acabamento este nalization]. `A entonac a o no dialogismo bakhtiniano' [Intonation in Bakhtin's dialogism]. As is known, the corporeal issues related to intonation have only recently been investigated. On this topic see especially Stefania Sini (1998) and Pierrette Malcuzynski (1998).

4.

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

198 A. Wall
23. `Escritura, leitura, dialogicidade' [Writing, reading, dialogicity]. 24. `O marxismo neo-kantiano do primeiro Bakhtin' [The early Bakhtin's neo-Kantian Marxism]. 25. `Nos textos de Bakhtin e Vygotsky: um encontro poss vel'. 26. `Mikhail Bakhtin e Walter Benjamin: polifonia, alegoria e o conceito de verdade no discurso da cie ncia contempora nea'. ligada a dois pontos ba sicos: o me todo diale tico 27. `A possibilidade dessas semelhanc as esta e a sua visa ncias humanas'. o de cie 28. `O sujeito se constitui na relac a o'. 29. `Essa nova perspectiva possibilita a constituic a ncias humanas o de uma teoria das cie m do conhecimento objectivo e da neutralidade pro prios dos modelos das para ale cie ncias exatas'. 30. `o signo como um produto social tem uma func a o geradora e organizadora dos processos gicos'. psicolo s do dia logo das ide ias que se expandem no 31. `Esta conquista progresiva da verdade, atrave espac o e no tempo, desaa as cie ncias humanas a construir uma outra compreensa o de si pria'. pro 32. `nossos autores acreditam que as cie ncias humanas podem e devem assumir o compromisso e a responsabilidade com um outro conceito de verdade, resgatando a dignidade da linguagem para transitar e revelar a tensa o permanente entre conhecimento e verdade na esfera do saber humano e social'. gica entre textos, 33. `se para Bakhtin a verdade pode ser encontrada na relac a o dialo prios objetos, coisas, escritos ou falados, em Banjamin a verdade se expressa nos pro rica e cultural gestos, etc., e tudo isto se constitui em signos de uma situac a o histo mais ampla'.

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