Larry Nelson Attorney at Law (California Bar #108833 Inactive) 312 Roberts Road Nokomis, FL 34275 352-412-3767 fotogreg@gmail.

.com March 30, 2014

Congress of the United States House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce 2125 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, DC 20515-6115

Re: General Motors and the NHTSAs response to consumer complaints

Dear Committee Members: I am writing to you in regard to NHTSAs woefully inadequate system of automotive safety defect identification. The system, as it is today, cannot, and will never, identify automotive safety defects in an efficient or rapid manner. A cynic might conclude that this system is designed to not identify safety defects, or to identify them with great delay, to the financial benefit of automobile manufacturers. Below I will enumerate eight obvious defects in the NHTSA safety defect reporting system, and propose a common sense, essentially cost free, solution which would improve safety defect identification immensely. That solution is to allow not just drivers and manufacturers to report potential safety defects, both of whom are hopelessly flawed as reporting sources, but to allow independent automotive mechanics to also report potential safety defects as they repair vehicles. Independent mechanics have both the knowledge and lack of bias needed to recognize and report safety defects, they are the ones who work on out of warranty cars day in and day out, and they are the ones who see, replace and discard faulty ignition switches, sticking gas pedal assemblies, and rusted brake lines every day. Once again, a cynic might expect such a simple solution to be opposed by a large number of lobbyists and campaign contributions on behalf of automobile manufacturers. There is a tendency in bureaucratic systems to assume that any problem which rises to the level of getting attention is something that fell through the cracks and that the system works fine otherwise. This gives dysfunctional systems an unwarranted pass. Sometimes the system itself is made entirely of cracks. This letter is not about defects in automobiles that need to be fixed, it is about defects in NHTSA that need to be fixed.

Larry Nelson Letter to House of Representatives, Committee on Energy & Commerce Page 2

A defect that needs to be fixed

Assume a typical automotive safety defect, regardless of what it is. Defective ignition switch, gas tank, brake lines, seat belts, whatever. As the defect manifests itself, owners become aware to varying degrees. They may become aware of the safety issue or they may only become aware that a repair of their vehicle had to be made. Unless the defect results in a total loss accident, the defect is usually repaired and the defective part discarded. Many times, due to internet communication, the defect becomes common knowledge among a small percentage of knowledgeable affected vehicle owners. Yet NHTSA can remain blissfully unaware for years and years and years unless a spectacular fiery death, or series of deaths, bring the matter to media attention. At which point the defect is treated as some sort of cause clbre, or exception, where the system failed to work. In reality, the exception was not a breakdown in the system, it was how the system works. So how is it that the NHTSA system fails to identify defects?

1. The NHTSA system relies on reporting only by owners and manufactures. Both sources are flawed in the extreme as set forth in other numbered points below. The best source of information would independent mechanics, including the 330,000 automotive technician and service professionals who hold ASE Certifications. These independent mechanics work on out of warranty vehicles day in and day out. They know all about rusted brake lines, defective ignition switches and sticking brake pedal mechanisms. They replace them every single day. 2. Owners are not good reporting sources. Unless an accident has occurred, the owner mostly wants the defect fixed. If an accident has occurred, the evidence may well have gone to the automobiles (or owners) grave. If no accident has occurred, the owner is happy to have it fixed under warranty and is unlikely to report it. If it is not under warranty, the owner may not recognize it as a safety defect but just as an out of warranty repair problem. Even if the owner recognizes it as a safety problem, the owner may be unaware that it can be reported to NHTSA. If the owner is aware it can be reported, the owner may not have any incentive, or faith in the system, to go to the trouble to make the report. Thus you have the absurd situation where only a handful of people report defects that are present in many, many vehicles. How else do you end up with the Cobalt situation where only 164 drivers report, over 9 years (average 18 reports per year), a problem that results in at least 13 deaths, dozens of crashes and the recall of 2,600,000 vehicles?1 3. Manufacturers are not good reporting sources. Manufacturers have economic incentives not to report safety defects. The realities are that automobiles break and that 34,000 people died last year in in passenger vehicle crashes. Those are both facts of life. The incentive is overwhelming for manufactures to argue that there is no defect. Those are just regular breakdowns and regular crashes. There is no safety defect. There is no unusual breakdown rate, no connection between breakdown and safety defect. They argue this car is no more
1

See: AP story of 3/29/2014, retrieved 3/30/2014 from http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ap-impact-govt-safetyagency-missed-cobalt-clues-0, copy attached as Exhibit A.

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unsafe than that car, this breakdown is at a normal rate, etc. etc. And what allows that argument to prevail, to prevent recognition of defects, and thus to prevent costs of repair, costs of recall, and costs of liability, is the miniscule numbers of defect reports. Miniscule defect reports are precisely what the NHTSA and manufactures reporting systems reliably provide. Time and time again, from Pinto gas tanks to Cobalt ignition switches, manufacturers prefer not to recognize repair problems as safety defects, or just out and out do everything they can to deny, minimize or cover up the problem (Toyota floor mats and sticking gas pedal assemblies). 4. Manufacturers do not facilitate owners making safety related complaints or reports to the manufacturer. If the manufacturer doesnt receive a report, they dont have to report it to NHTSA. In many cases it is difficult to find a manufactures contact information to make an out of warranty safety complaint or report. Even if the owner finds the manufacturers information and calls the manufacturer, unless the owner is insistent on making a report or complaint, chances are, it is not going to happen. Usually an owner will not even bother to try to contact the manufacturer. If the owner does call up the manufacturer, the owner is usually trying to get the manufacturer to pay for the repair, not to report or complain which would be, in the owners mind, a pointless exercise. Very few people would have any way of knowing that their report or complaint to the manufacturer has to be reported to NHTSA. So the conversation goes like this: the owner calls up the manufacturer and says I have problem X and I want you to pay for it. The manufacturers employee says let me look that up to see if there are any recalls or service accommodations (program of paying for certain out of warranty repairs) on that. What is your VIN number? Then the manufacturers representative says there is no recall or service accommodation on that and says goodbye. No report or complaint is taken. Do manufacturers fall over themselves to ask the owner if the problem is safety related and would the owner like to make a report or complaint? The answer is as obvious as if the question were: Are manufacturers required to fall all over themselves to take safety reports and complaints from owners? To both questions the answer is no. Here is an account of how Chevrolet handled a corroded brake line problem: 2 I called Chevy customer service to ask about the problem and was forwarded (.. long after your call is important to us...) to a call center who said no TSB's [Technical Service Bulletins] or recalls on brake lines - with the obligatory end tag "is there anything else I can help you with today" I asked where I was calling - answer the Philippines. And I received no "case number" or any concern from the Philippine - based Chevrolet Customer Service help line. I provided my VIN number on the call line

(retrieved from the chevytalk.org website on 3/29/2014 at http://www.chevytalk.org/fusionbb/showtopic.php?tid/274830/)

Larry Nelson Letter to House of Representatives, Committee on Energy & Commerce Page 4

and she read me the other safety recall campaigns for my vehicle and she was done.

5. The NHTSA website for reporting safety problems only allows for reports of safety incidents, not safety defects. If you go to your mechanic for an oil change and he tells you your ignition switch is broken or your brake line or gas tank is leaking, the NHTSA website gives the impression that that is not a reportable incident. This is a screenshot of the NHTSA website safety defect reporting form taken 3/29/2014:

Thus obvious safety defects that do not result in incidents may not be reported. 6. It appears that NHTSA organizes what few reports it does get primarily by vehicle model and year, not by the affected part. With such a small number of safety defect reports, it appears that further delay in identifying safety issues occurs because the reports are fragmented by vehicle model and it appears insufficient effort is made to identify defective parts used across multiple vehicle platforms. Even assuming that a single defect across multiple model years and different models on the same platform is identified, the ability of NHTSA to identify other platforms using the identical defective part appears to be lacking. It appears to be lacking in part because the NHTSA really has no way to know what other assembly lines may have used the defective part unless the vehicle manufacturer provides that information and it does not seem that vehicle manufacturers are eager to supply that type of information. So you end up with a situation where vehicle A has an apparent elevated defect rate but vehicle B does not. In reality, both vehicles have the exact same defective part but due to the infinitesimal reporting rate, vehicle B, by random distribution, doesnt end up with an elevated defect rate and thus any NHTSA Preliminary Evaluation or Engineering Analysis is limited to vehicle A. This can be seen in NHTSA action #EA11001,3 an Engineering Analysis now open for three years concerning brake failure due to corroding brake lines in over 6 million 1999 to 2003

Available at: http://wwwodi.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/problems/defect/results.cfm?action_number=EA11001&SearchType=QuickSearch&summa ry=true, copy attached as Exhibit B.

Larry Nelson Letter to House of Representatives, Committee on Energy & Commerce Page 5

GM light trucks and SUVs. The original NHTSA Preliminary Evaluation, #PE10010,4 was opened March 30, 2010. This investigation is limited to various GMT800 platform vehicles but arguably should not be. The real questions that should be asked do not take four years and counting to resolve. The real questions are: 1) is the brake line material itself defective? And, if so, 2) what vehicles were assembled with that brake line material? Three years into the investigation (a year ago), in an email available on the NHTSA website,5 Mark Deacon of GM Product Investigations emails Chris Lash, NHTSA Safety Defects Engineer on February 1, 2013: I'll get a request out today for any new Owner Complaints, Field Reports or Legal Claims General Motors has received for brake line rust/corrosion leaks on 1999 - 2003 MY GMT800 vehicles in corrosion states. [Emphasis added] Mr. Lash of NHTSA then replies the next day: Hello Mark Deacon thank you for the reply we do need all complaints, reports, legal claims for 1999-2006 (trucks SUVs with same brake line we have been investigating). Also, it would be better to have all States included as a comparison [Emphasis added] So three years into the investigation, we have GM Products Investigations limiting the data provided to fewer years, locations and platforms, while the NHTSA engineer wants reports on vehicles with same brake line. Whether Mr. Nash ever got his data remains to be seen but the scope of the vehicles being investigated did not expand. Yet anecdotal evidence seems to indicate the same brake line material has been used on other platforms and in years prior to 1999. Imagine the consequences to GM if tens of millions of vehicles have brake lines determined to be substandard and defective. Is it any wonder that GM wants to limit the investigation to certain years, models and geographic locations? One would think the NHTSA investigation would be fairly straightforward: determine whether the brake line material is substandard and defective in its susceptibility to corrosion failure. If it is, determine what vehicles the same brake line material was used on, and recall vehicles for inspection and repair as necessary. But when enough money is at stake, nothing is straightforward. Here we are four years and counting into the investigation. Meanwhile, GM, while still claiming no fault and claiming that the problem affects less than 1 out of 1000 trucks, is offering a GM brake line repair fix kit which includes coated brake line for the deeply discounted price of $500, installation not included.6

Available at: http://wwwodi.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/problems/defect/results.cfm?action_number=PE10010&SearchType=QuickSearch&summa ry=true, copy attached as Exhibit C. 5 At http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/cs/jaxrs/download/doc/UCM435858/INME-EA11001-55749P.pdf, copy attached as Exhibit D.
6

See Detroit ABC affiliate WXYZ news report of September 18, 2013 retrieved 3/29/2014 from http://www.wxyz.com/money/auto-news/rusty-brake-lines-cause-concern-for-gmc-chevy-truck-drivers, copy attached as Exhibit E.

Larry Nelson Letter to House of Representatives, Committee on Energy & Commerce Page 6

7. There appears to be an incorrect assumption that the number of reported defects represents the actual number of defects in the manner of a statistically valid sample or poll. The 164 drivers reports (over 9 years) for 2005- 2007 Cobalts stalling represent only 2/100 of 1% of the 625,000 2005-2007 Cobalts, and only 6/1000 of 1% (.006%) of the 2,600,000 vehicles eventually recalled. With numbers that insanely low, it is no wonder manufacturers can pretend there is no problem. But to return to the point, there is no evidence at all that a vehicle with comparable complaint numbers to its peers really represents a vehicle as safe as its peers. That would require that the sample of 164 Cobalt drivers complaints represents the 625,000 2005 -2007 Cobalt vehicles in the same way that a statistically valid sample does. And that all vehicle reports represent all vehicles in the same statistically valid way. To the contrary, it is more likely that for equally severe, equally numerous defects, the tiny sample size of drivers reports received by NHTSA causes random variation in the apparent defect rate. The bottom line is that there is no way to find defects that are not spectacular fiery deaths from such small numbers of reports unless the defect is so massively obvious and numerous as to overwhelm the small sample size. Anything less than spectacular fiery death or massively numerous does not stick out from business as usual, which is all of the defects routinely denied and ignored by the manufacturers. Even if spectacular fiery death does eventually stick out from business as usual, it takes forever for the number of reports and evidence to accumulate. In the Cobalt case it took 9 years. In the meantime, many Preliminary Evaluations and Engineering Assessments chug along with no media attention, and many more defects dont even have enough reports to merit a Preliminary Evaluation. The system effectively suppresses identification of vehicle safety defects by burying defects in the gray area of uncertainty. When some safety defect does emerge, due to spectacular fiery death, and come to media attention, the response is, to paraphrase Captain Renault in the movie Casablanca: I'm shocked, shocked to find that there are safety defects going on in here! 8. Even when evidence is compelling, NHTSA does not take effective action. To return to the example of NHTSA Preliminary Evaluation #PE10010: This was opened in March 2010 and involves corroding brake lines on over 6 million 1999 2003 GM light trucks and SUVs. GM responded with, among other things, the brake system of the subject vehicles is split front/rear and should a brake pipe suddenly fail for any reason, the affected vehicle would be capable of stopping with the pressure supplied by the remaining circuit. However, the NHTSA Preliminary Evaluation (and current open Engineering Analysis, both cited previously) goes on to say the complaint rates per 100,000 vehicles for Salt Belt States is 43.0 . . . In approximately 25 percent of the complaints the brake pipe failure occurred suddenly, with no warning (i.e., no MIL, Brake Fluid Loss Warning), and resulted in extended stopping distances. In 30 of these the increase in stopping distance that resulted was a factor in the crash and in 10 others the vehicle was intentionally steered off the road or into another lane of travel in order to avoid a crash.

Larry Nelson Letter to House of Representatives, Committee on Energy & Commerce Page 7

In this case, the complaint rate of 43 per 100,000 vehicles is twice the driver complaint rate for the 2005-2007 Cobalt. Is this comparing apples to oranges? I dont know because it is not clear whether the complaint rate is driver supplied or GM supplied or both. Has this resulted in a recall? No. How hard is it really to figure out whether corroding brake lines are an abnormal safety defect? Pretty hard apparently. Despite cars crashing with sudden loss of braking power, the Preliminary Evaluation has been closed and an Engineering Analysis (#EA11001) was opened on January 5, 2011. Three years later the Engineering Analysis is still open. Will this be the next spectacular fiery death defect to pop out of the bureaucratic fog into media attention? Perhaps. But one thing is certain, there will be a next spectacular fiery death defect that pops up to much handwringing over how could this happen? To return to the point made at the beginning of this section, the affected owners know about deadly problems. Only NHTSA seems not to know. This is a typical account of the brake failure posted to the internet: We were bringing a sick yearling back home from Blue Ridge Equine, 100 yards from getting on to I-64 west, when the brake lines failed on our 2001 GM 3500 and we sailed through a red light. If we had gotten on I-64, and those brakes had failed on the back side of Afton Mountain we would all be dead. Every time I think about that I get short of breath.7

A Solution
The people who see vehicle safety defects day in and day out are independent mechanics. Independent mechanics are the people who primarily work on out of warranty vehicles. Independent mechanics are the people who are knowledgeable enough to know what a safety defect is and who put their hands on the defective parts every day. Independent mechanics are the people that have no dog in the fight, no interest to protect. Independent mechanics are the people that talk to the driver. Independent mechanics are the people who know what is normal and what is a safety defect. Logic will tell you that every safety defect that results in a breakdown is either going to total the vehicle (and possibly the owner) or get fixed. If the vehicle is out of warranty, it is likely going to get fixed by an independent mechanic, even if that independent mechanic is the owner of the vehicle. There are 330,000 automotive technician and service professionals currently holding ASE certifications,8 as well as who knows how many other independent mechanics. Making a simple NHTSA web page where independent mechanics can report possible safety defects has the potential to increase defect reporting by tens, hundreds or thousands of times the current rate.

7 8

Retrieved 3/29/2014 from http://www.chronofhorse.com/forum/archive/index.php/t-303625.html Retrieved 3/29/2014 from ase.com

Larry Nelson Letter to House of Representatives, Committee on Energy & Commerce Page 8

Essentially no cost is involved and the statistical significance of defect reports has the potential to jump in a huge and immediate manner. No compensation is required for the independent mechanic. Even if a very small percentage of independent mechanics reported possible safety defects it would be a huge increase over current reporting rates. According to the University of Georgia as of 2001, there were nearly 175,000 automotive repair shops in the U.S.9 If each shop only reported one potential safety defect a year, that would be 175,000 reports a year. The current reporting rate by drivers to the safercar.gov is 45,000 to 55,000 per year according to the Committee Majority Staff, Committee on Energy and Commerce, Memorandum of March 30, 2014. Advantages of this plan: 1. No compensation or compulsion required. The independent mechanics motivation for making a potential vehicle safety defect report would be to please his customer. The customer is not happy about paying for any repair, and is especially not happy about fixing a potentially dangerous fault that the customer may feel should not have occurred in the first place. Having someone in the shop spend 5 minutes on a website to put in the VIN#, the date of repair and the potential safety defect makes the customer feel better about the repair. Some mechanics will also make reports simply because they care about saving lives. Many may not make reports. This is strictly a voluntary undertaking. There would be no mandate or requirement that they do it. 2. No conflict of interest. There is no foreseeable benefit or motivation for the independent mechanic to make a false report. No interest to protect, no benefit to receive. 3. Privacy concerns are easily addressed. Even assuming that the potential safety defect information belongs to the customer and cannot be posted without the customer/vehicle owners consent (HIPPA for cars!), that consent can easily be obtained or refused. There is already a requirement for customers to sign an estimate/invoice and require or decline retention of replaced parts. All that is needed is another signature on the same piece of paper. A rubber stamp with a signature line on the paid invoice paper that says I request that this repair be reported to NHTSA as a potential safety defect or a paper sticker applied to the invoice with the same language could easily take care of privacy concerns. 4. There is the potential to completely transform automotive safety defect identification. It may not be that only a small percentage of potential safety defects end up being reported by independent mechanics. It may be that a large percentage of potential safety defects end up being reported. Independent mechanics are well, independent. Their customers lives are in their hands on a daily basis. They (and their liability insurers) are fully aware of this and have to conduct themselves to a high safety standard every day. It is not inconceivable that this ethos of safety could result in most potential safety defects being reported. If so, the ability to identify safety defects among the 15,600,000 vehicles sold in the U.S. last year and the 254,000,000 total vehicles on the road would skyrocket. The benefits in terms of lives saved,
9

Industry Fact Sheet Mechanical Automobile Repair (NAICS 8111), page 1, copy attached as Exhibit F

Larry Nelson Letter to House of Representatives, Committee on Energy & Commerce Page 9

injuries prevented, and ultimately, in terms of vehicle quality and competitiveness, could be immense. I therefore beg this Committee and NHTSA to change NHTSAs safety defect reporting procedures and implement a simple webpage where independent mechanics can report potential safety defects to NHTSA.

Sincerely,

Larry Nelson Attorney at Law (California Bar #108833 Inactive) cc: The Honorable David J. Friedman Acting Administrator National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE West Building Washington, DC 20590 Frank Borris, Director Office of Defects Investigation National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE Washington DC 20590 Anthony Foxx United States Secretary of Transportation US Department of Transportation 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE Washington, DC 20590 Clarence Ditlow, Director Center for Auto Safety 1825 Connecticut Avenue NW, Suite 330 Washington, DC 20009-5708 Tom Krisher Associated Press 300 River Place Drive Detroit, Michigan 48207

Exhibit A, page 1 of 6

The Big Story

AP IMPACT: Govt safety agency missed Cobalt clues
By TOM KRISHER and DEE-ANN DURBIN Mar. 29, 2014 9:46 AM EDT Home General Motors Co AP IMPACT: Gov't safety agency missed Cobalt clues

This combination of undated family photos shows, from left, Amber Marie Rose, Natasha Weigel, and Amy Rademaker. All three were killed in deadly car crashes involving GM's Cobalt during 20052006. The complaint tally for the top-selling small cars in the 2005-2007 model years was: Corolla, 228; Cobalt, 164; Honda Civic, 60; Ford Focus, 25; and the Mazda 3, 19. (AP Photo) Prev 2 of 4 Next

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Exhibit A, page 2 of 6

DETROIT (AP) For years, the U.S. government's auto safety watchdog sent form letters to worried owners of the Chevrolet Cobalt and other General Motors small cars, saying it didn't have enough information about problems with unexpected stalling to establish a trend or open an investigation. The data tell a different story. An Associated Press review of complaints to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration shows that over a nine-year period, 164 drivers reported that their 2005-2007 Chevrolet Cobalts stalled without warning. That was far more than any of the car's competitors from the same model years, except for the Toyota Corolla, which was recalled after a government investigation in 2010. Stalling was one sign of the ignition switch failure that led GM last month to recall 1.6 million Cobalts and other compact cars, including the Saturn Ion, Pontiac G5 and Chevrolet HHR. Another 971,000 cars from model years 2008-2011 were recalled late Friday to find faulty replacement switches, bringing the total to about 2.6 million. GM has linked the problem to at least 13 deaths and dozens of crashes. The company says the switch can slip out of the "run" position, which causes the engine to stall. This knocks out the power steering and power-assisted brakes, making the car harder to maneuver. Power to the device that activates the air bags is also cut off. GM has recently acknowledged it knew the switch was defective at least a decade ago, and the government started receiving complaints about the 2005 Cobalt just months after it went on sale. House and Senate subcommittees have called the current heads of the automaker and NHTSA to testify on April 1-2 about why it took so long for owners to be told there was a potentially deadly defect in their cars. Although the overall number of complaints represents only 0.02 percent of the nearly 625,000 Cobalts sold from 2005-2007 in the U.S., experts familiar with NHTSA say they were enough to warrant an investigation and recall. The Cobalt had about the same rate of complaints as the Corolla. And the agency knew of at least two fatalities in Cobalt crashes that involved a sudden stall when it first declined to investigate the cars in 2007. Spotting trends in the tens of thousands of complaints NHTSA gets each year is a tough job, and this case may have been more complicated than most. The Cobalt had a litany of problems, including fuel leaks, and a power steering defect that the agency did investigate. GM may not have disclosed all the information it had on the switches. And the 2010 recall of millions of Toyotas for unintended acceleration claimed much of the government's attention. But several experts say NHTSA should have pressed for a recall sooner.

Exhibit A, page 2 of 6

Exhibit A, page 3 of 6

"They're not connecting up the dots. That's the generous explanation," says Clarence Ditlow, executive director of the Washington-based Center for Auto Safety, who has studied the government's auto safety agency for decades. "The not-so-generous is that they did connect the dots but they just didn't do anything." U.S. Transportation Secretary Anthony Foxx, whose department oversees auto safety, has asked for an internal investigation into the GM issue. In a letter calling for the probe, Foxx said he is unaware of information that NHTSA "failed to properly carry out its safety mission based on the data available to it and the processes followed." The safety agency, in a statement provided to the AP, said that during the past seven years, its investigations have brought 929 recalls of more than 55 million vehicles. "Each potential recall investigation is unique and dependent on the data gathered in each case," it said. Foxx has said that GM didn't give the government enough information on the defective switches. In papers submitted to the safety agency last month, GM says engineers proposed solutions to the problem in early 2005, but the company didn't take action, developments unknown to the safety agency at the time. But the AP analysis makes clear that even without that information, NHTSA had evidence in 2005 that the switches were a problem. That summer, the agency hired a contractor to look into a July 29, 2005, crash in Maryland that killed 16-year-old Amber Marie Rose. The report concluded that the air bags of Rose's 2005 Cobalt did not inflate, and the ignition switch had moved from the run position to "accessory," which runs devices like the radio but not the engine. Alcohol and speed also were factors, the report said. Rose's birth mother, Laura Christian, said that after the crash, she studied the government's complaint database and found multiple problems with engine stalling and power steering failures on other Cobalts. She tried to tell NHTSA, but the agency wasn't interested, she said. "Basically, it was 'No, thank you,'" Christian said. "NHTSA should have known, based on the information I have seen, certainly in 2006." On Thursday, David Friedman, the agency's acting administrator, told Christian that he was taking steps to improve NHTSA's information-gathering processes, Christian says. They met at the agency's offices. Among the other evidence available to the agency: In December 2005, General Motors sent the safety agency and its dealers a service bulletin telling them that drivers could inadvertently turn off the ignition switch with minimal effort in

Exhibit A, page 3 of 6

Exhibit A, page 4 of 6

Cobalts from the 2005 and 2006 model years. Dealers were told about repairs and to tell drivers reporting engine shutdowns to remove unnecessary items from their key chains. In October 2006, GM sent the agency and dealers another service bulletin, adding Cobalts from the 2007 model year. In 2007, the government commissioned a report on a 2006 Wisconsin crash that killed two teenage girls and injured another. In that report, Indiana University's Transportation Research Center found that the ignition in the 2005 Cobalt was in the "accessory" position and the air bags failed to inflate. Investigators told the agency that "inadvertent contact with the ignition switch or a key chain in the 2005 Chevrolet Cobalt can in fact result in engine shut-down and loss of power." In 2007 and later in 2010, NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigations examined data on stalling incidents and air bag failures in GM cars. Yet the agency recently told House members it was unable to spot trends that were significant when compared with "peer vehicles" or the U.S. passenger car fleet, according to a letter released earlier this month by the House Energy and Commerce Committee. But Ditlow says comparisons with peers are less important than simply watching the numbers and taking action when they get too high. "I don't believe in innocence by association, that if you can find someone as bad as me, then I get off," he said. "If you're 50 percent worse, 25 percent worse, what's the dividing line?" The complaint tally for the top-selling small cars in the 2005-2007 model years was: Corolla, 228; Cobalt, 164; Honda Civic, 60; Ford Focus, 25; and the Mazda 3, 19. The government opened an investigation into the Corolla in late 2009, which led to the 2010 recall of nearly 1.3 million cars to replace faulty engine control modules that could make the cars stall without warning. The agency investigated the Toyota complaints even though there were no reports of deaths or injuries related to the stalls. By contrast, it had already learned about deadly crashes in the Cobalt. The Wisconsin crash, which happened on a rural road at 7:55 p.m. Oct. 26, 2006, killed Natasha Weigel, 18, and Amy Rademaker, 15. The driver, Megan Phillips, then 17, was severely injured. Margie Beskau, Rademaker's mother, blames NHTSA for not recalling the cars beforehand. "You have all these reports on this car. They should have done their job," she said.

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Exhibit A, page 5 of 6

Phillips remembers little of the crash and still suffers from brain damage. She does recall that everything in the car shut down, according to her attorney, Robert Hilliard of Texas, who represents 12 people killed in GM cars when the air bags failed to inflate. Hilliard says NHTSA doesn't have the cash, the staff or the legal resources to match the automakers. "It's a poor watchdog of a very powerful industry," he said. NHTSA says it screens around 40,000 complaints per year. There is no set number for starting an investigation, but it considers complaints, injuries and deaths, warranty data submitted by automakers and other factors. Sometimes NHTSA acts quickly. For example, the agency investigated electric car maker Tesla Motors after just two reports of vehicle fires and no injuries. It ended the four-month investigation when Tesla decided to fortify the bottom of its cars. It also began investigating older model Porsche 911 sports cars for coolant leaks last year based on 10 complaints and no injuries. That probe was closed without finding a safety defect. When the Cobalt ignition problems surfaced in 2005, the agency was still building its consumer complaint database, so the Cobalt stalling data could have been overlooked, says a person familiar with the agency, who asked not to be identified because of the Congressional investigation. In 2000, Congress passed legislation that required automakers to give NHTSA more data, including data about injuries, deaths and consumer complaints. The agency was building the new system to sort through it all. The person familiar with the agency also says the Cobalt's other defects could have been a distraction. For instance, the government prodded GM to recall more than 1 million Cobalts and other small cars in 2010 to replace power steering motors. Sorting out the mechanical causes of a problem like stalling is difficult, particularly when it's not happening in every vehicle. "When you have things that are this infrequent, it's difficult to find out what the cause is," said David Cole, the former chairman of the Ann Arbor, Mich.-based Center for Automotive Research and the son of a former GM president. "Something that happens in 10 percent of vehicles, you catch that right away. But one in 100,000 is really tough." That's no comfort to victims or current Cobalt owners like Penny Brooks. Brooks feels betrayed by GM and by the government. She bought a used 2005 Cobalt, with 40,000 miles on it, five years ago. Last year, her husband was driving about 60 mph when the engine

Exhibit A, page 5 of 6

Exhibit A, page 6 of 6

suddenly stalled. They made it safely to the side of the road and took the car to a mechanic, who could find nothing wrong. Since then, the car has stalled two more times when Brooks hit bumps in the road that caused the ignition to slip out of the run position. "Nobody should have to sit there and pray, 'Keep me safe until I get back home,'" said Brooks, a licensed cosmetologist from Kingsport, Tenn. She filed a complaint on NHTSA's website last year and says she even wrote a letter to GM's thenCEO, Dan Akerson, but got no responses. After the recall was announced, Brooks took the car to a local dealer, who gave her a loaner to drive until the Cobalt is repaired. "It's a criminal and immoral act to hide that kind of information for so long," she said. "I pray that nobody else dies because of these faulty cars." ____ Dee-Ann Durbin can be reached at http://twitter.com/deedurb . Tom Krisher can be reached http://twitter.com/tkrisher

Exhibit A, page 6 of 6

Exhibit B, page 1 of 1

Exhibit B, page 1 of 1

Exhibit C, page 1 of 1

Exhibit C, page 1 of 1

Exhibit D, page 1 of 3

RE: EA11-001 GM truck brake line rust - VOQ Update since 1/7/13
Chris.Lash to: mark.deacon
Cc: Jeff.Quandt From: <Chris.Lash@dot.gov> 02/02/2013 12:44 PM

To: <mark.deacon@gm.com> Cc: <Jeff.Quandt@dot.gov> History: This message has been replied to.

Hello Mark Deacon thank you for the reply we do need all complaints, reports, legal claims for 1999-2006 (trucks SUVs with same brake line we have been investigating). Also, it would be better to have all States included as a comparison, GM Supplement 3 from April 2012 was inclusive of these as well. If this is a problem, please have Dale Furney call Jeff Quandt to dicuss the details of the request.

Chris Lash Safety Defects Engineer NHTSA/ODI 202-3662370 chris.lash@dot.gov<mailto:chris.lash@dot.gov><mailto:chris.lash@dot.gov>

________________________________ From: mark.deacon@GM.COM [mark.deacon@GM.COM] Sent: Friday, February 01, 2013 11:14 AM To: Lash, Chris (NHTSA) Subject: Re: EA11-001 GM truck brake line rust - VOQ Update since 1/7/13 Hi Chris, Thanks for the VOQ update. I'll get a request out today for any new Owner Complaints, Field Reports or Legal Claims General Motors has received for brake line rust/corrosion leaks on 1999 - 2003 MY GMT800 vehicles in corrosion states. Once I know how many records I get that may be related I'll know how long it will take to provide you with the responsive information. Have a nice weekend. Mark R. Deacon

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Exhibit D, page 2 of 3

GM Product Investigations 30001 Van Dyke Road Warren, MI 48090 Mail Code: 480-210-2V1 Cell 586-907-3843 Email: mark.deacon@gm.com From: <Chris.Lash@dot.gov> To: <mark.deacon@gm.com> Cc: <dale.a.furney@gm.com> Date: 01/31/2013 03:13 PM Subject: EA11-001 GM truck brake line rust - VOQ Update since 1/7/13 ________________________________

Hello Mark Deacon, I have attached a spreadsheet that contains all VOQs related to this investigation, new complaints are highlight in yellow and a crash claim we just received is highlight in red. I have also attached PDF copies of the new complaints for you. Jeff Quandt also asked me to request an update of any new Owner Complaints, Field Reports or Legal Claims General Motors has received for brake line rust/corrosion leaks. Chris Lash Safety Defects Engineer National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Office of Defects Investigation Direct 202-366-2370 Fax 202-366-1767 chris.lash@dot.gov<mailto:chris.lash@dot.gov> ---------------------------------------------------------IMPORTANT WARNING: This email (and any attachments) is only intended for the use of the person or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is privileged and confidential. You, the recipient, are obligated to maintain it in a safe, secure and confidential manner. Unauthorized disclosure or failure to maintain confidentiality may subject you to federal and state penalties. If you are not the recipient, please immediately notify us by return email, and delete this message from your computer. -----------------------------------------------------------[attachment "New VOQs since Jan 7 2013 for GM update 013113.pdf" deleted by Mark Deacon/US/GM/GMC] [attachment "New VOQs since 1_7_2013.xlsx" deleted by Mark Deacon/US/GM/GMC] Nothing in this message is intended to constitute an electronic signature unless a specific statement to the contrary is included in this message. Confidentiality Note: This message is intended only for the person or entity to which it is addressed. It may contain confidential and/or privileged

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Exhibit D, page 3 of 3

material. Any review, transmission, dissemination or other use, or taking of any action in reliance upon this message by persons or entities other than the intended recipient is prohibited and may be unlawful. If you received this message in error, please contact the sender and delete it from your computer.

Exhibit D, page 3 of 3

Exhibit E, page 1 of 3

Rusty brake lines cause concern for GMC, Chevy truck drivers
GM offering fix to rusted brake lines
BY: Jeff Vaughn POSTED: 6:18 PM, Sep 18, 2013 UPDATED: 6:22 PM, Sep 18, 2013

GM rusty brake line issues WXYZ (WXYZ) - All new information has been released on a lingering problem with rusted brakes lines in GMC and Chevy trucks. Thousands of Sierra and Silverado owners are complaining of brake failure due to rusted brake lines. 7 action news anchor Jeff Vaughn looked into the NHTSA investigation and has heard from General Motors.

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Exhibit E, page 2 of 3

There are thousands of complaints of brake line failures into the Office of Defects and Investigations of the National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration. Today, GM reports they are aware of the problem and are offering a solution, but is it enough to satisfy drivers? Mike Thomann opened his hood recently to see what happened when his brakes failed. "I hit my brakes, all of a sudden it felt really mushy. I hit my brakes again and they went all the way to the floor." But the problem wasn't under the hood. It was under the truck. Thomann says he found a corroded brake line, rusty and fragile. "They were completely rusted through, and the fluid was pouring out of it basically." Thomann isn't the only General Motors driver with brake problems. A search of complaints into NHTSA shows thousands of drivers, mostly in northern states, with similar issues dating back to model year 2000 and as recently as 2009. The traffic safety agency investigated but never issued a recall. GM, in a statement to 7 Action News states this is "not a safety issue" as the brakes still operate with a broken brake line and admit that rusty brakes lines are a problem that "can happen over time", presumably from liquid salt used in cold weather states. GM has a solution. The company is offering what they call a deeply discounted brake repair kit that runs $2-thousand dollars for only $500.
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Exhibit E, page 3 of 3

But that's not enough for Thomann, who thinks General Motors should pay for the fix and notify drivers of the rusty brake line problem. "They're not even letting people know." GM reports this is happening to less than 1:1000 trucks. The fix includes a nylon coated brake line to resist rust. You can have that installed at authorized GM dealer, or at your own repair shop through parts provided by AC Delco (http://www.acdelco.com/index.jsp?seo=goo_|_GM_ACDelco_Upfront_|_A CDelco-BrandExact_|_Acdelco_|_Ac_Delco), just ask for GM brake line repair fix kit. The repairs are typically not covered under the 36,000 mile warranty as the problem occurs on trucks that are several years old.
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Exhibit F, page 1 of 1

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