CASE DIGESTS IN TORTS AND DAMAGES PROF. ROMMEL J.

CASIS F2017

TORTS
I. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 2. 3. Naguiat v. NLRC (1997) / Panganiban Facts CFTI [Sergio as President; Antolin as VP] held a concessionaire's contract with AAFES for the operation of taxi services in Clark Air Base. Respondents were previously employed by CFTI as taxi drivers. However, AAFES was dissolved as a result of the US military bases phase-out. During the negotiations between AAFES Taxi Drivers Association and CFTI re: separation benefits, it was agreed that separated drivers will be given P500/year of service. Other drivers accepted the amount, but respondents refused to accept it. The respondents, through NOWM, filed a complaint against S. Naguiat (NE), AAFES, and AAFES TDA. They alleged that they were hired by CFTI and then assigned to NE which managed, controlled, and supervised their employment. They averred that they were entitled to separation pay based on their earnings of $15 for working 16 days/month. CFTI's defense that the cessation of business was due to financial losses and lost business opportunity. Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the respondents, ordering CFTI to pay respondents P1,200/year of service for humanitarian consideration. NLRC affirmed LA's decision with modification by granting separation pay $120/year of service, and held that Naguiat Enterprises, S. Naguiat, and A. Naguiat are jointly and severally liable with CFTI. NLRC issued a second resolution denying the MfR of the petitioners. Issues and Holding 1. Amount of separation pay o Labor Arbiter correctly found that CFTI stopped the taxi business because of the phase-out of the US military bases, and NOT due to great financial loss as the business was earning profitably at the time of closure. o LC 283: separation pay = 1 month pay or at least 1/2 month pay/year of service, whichever is higher 4.

NLRC did not commit GAD in ruling that respondents were entitled to separation pay of $120 (half of $240 monthly pay) per year of service

Liability of NE, CFTI and officers NE not liable o o LA found that respondents were employees of CFTI as they received salary from said office, etc. (upheld by SC) S. Naguiat was presumed to be managing and controlling taxi business on behalf of NE; S. Naguiat, in supervising taxi drivers, was carrying out his responsibilities as CFTI o NE is a separate corporation completely (trading business); it is neither respondents' indirect employer nor labor-only contractor o Constitution of CFTI-AAFES TDA provided that members are CFTI employees and that for collective bargaining purposes, the definite employer is CFTI CFTI president solidarily liable [S. Naguiat] o A.C. Ransom Labor Union-CCLU v. NLRC - family-owned corporation filed application for clearance to cease operations. Backwages were computed; however, none of the motions for execution could be implemented for failure to find leviable assets. LA granted union's prayer that officers and agents be personally held liable for payment of backwages. NLRC however said that officers of a corporation are not personally liable for official acts unless they exceeded scope of authority. SC however reversed NLRC and upheld LA, saying that if the policy of the law were otherwise, the employer can have ways for evading payment of backwages. o o Employer - any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly (LC 212c) Applying the ruling on A.C. Ransom, S. Naguiat falls within the meaning of "employer" who may be held jointly and severally liable for the obligations of the corporation to the dismissed employees

Both CFTI and NE were close family corporations (Corp. Code Sec. 100, par. 5) [To the extent that the stockholders are actively engaged in the management or operation of the business [...] Said stockholders shall be personally liable for corporate torts unless the corporation has obtained reasonably adequate liability insurance]

2.

cf. MAM Realty Development v. NLRC: director / officer may still be held solidarily liable with a corporation by a specific provision of law 1. 2. WON there was corporate tort. YES TORT - violation of a right given or the omission of

a duty imposed by law; breach of legal duty o 5. S. Naguiat is solidarily liable for corporate tort because he actively engaged in CFTI's management or operation CFTI VP not personally liable [A. Naguiat] o o 6. Was not shown that he acted in the capacity of a GM No evidence on the extent of his participation in the management, operation of business NOWM's personality to represent respondents o Petitioners held in estoppel for not raising issue before LA or NLRC

7. No denial of due process since the Naguiats availed of the chance to present positions before LA Liwayway Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation (Millena) Ynares-Santiago, J. 2007 Nature: Petition for Certiorari assailing the decision of CA which affirmed the denial of the RTC of the petitioners motion to dismiss. Facts: 1. Hope, More and Champion are classified as local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. *ad valorem tax tax based on the value of the thing

June 10, 1993 RA 7654 was enacted which provided that locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand would be taxed at 55% ad valorem tax (Sec. 142). Effectivity: JULY 3, 1993 3. July 1 Vinzons as BIR Commissioner issued RMC 37-9 reclassfying Chamipon, More and Hope as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand. (effect: it will have to be subjected to the 55% ad valorem tax once the law becomes effective). 4. July 2, 1993 at about 5:50 p.m. BIR Deputy Comm Deoferio sent via telefax a copy of RMC 73-93 to Fortune Tobacco but addressed to no one in particular. 5. July 15, 1993 Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC 37-93 6. July 20, 1993 Fortune filed an MR requesting recall of the issuance. 7. Request was denied and in the same letter assessed Fortune for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9.5M. Payment was demanded within 10 days. 8. Fortune filed a petition for review with Court of Tax Appeals injunction issued against BIR 9. August 10, 1994 Injunction made permanent when CTA, CA and SC ruled that issuance was defective, invalid and unenforceable. 10. April 10, 1997 Fortune filed a complaint for damages against petitioner in her private capacity. Petitioner of course filed motion to dismiss. a. Fortune: i. Vinzons should be held liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws. b. Vinzons: i. Respondent has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. ii. No cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith. 11. RTC denied, CA and RTC affirmed denial of motion to dismiss, and order the RTC to proceed with trial. 12. Hence, this petition. ISSUES: (1) May a public officer be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office? (2) Which as between Article 32 of the Civil Code and Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code should govern in determining whether the instant complaint states a cause of action?

HELD: 1. YES. The rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence [based on Sec 38 of the Administrative Code]; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff [based on Section 32 of the Civil Code. Article 32. Being a special law, it should prevail over a general law (the Administrative Code). Article 32 was patterned after the tort in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property or reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of anothers legal right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent. The clear intention therefore of the legislature was to create a distinct cause of action in the nature of tort for violation of constitutional rights, irrespective of the motive or intent of the defendant.31 This is a fundamental innovation in the Civil Code, and in enacting the Administrative Code pursuant to the exercise of legislative powers, then President Corazon C. Aquino, could not have intended to obliterate this constitutional protection on civil liberties. Liwayway Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation (Millena) Nachura, J. 2008 Nature: Motion for Reconsideration of the June 19, 2007 decision denying the motion to dismiss of the petitioner. Facts: 13. Hope, More and Champion are classified as local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. *ad valorem tax tax based on the value of the thing 14. June 10, 1993 RA 7654 was enacted which provided that locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand would be taxed at 55% ad valorem tax (Sec. 142). Effectivity: JULY 3, 1993

2.

15. July 1 Vinzons as BIR Commissioner issued RMC 37-9 reclassfying Chamipon, More and Hope as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand. (effect: it will have to be subjected to the 55% ad valorem tax once the law becomes effective). 16. July 2, 1993 at about 5:50 p.m. BIR Deputy Comm Deoferio sent via telefax a copy of RMC 73-93 to Fortune Tobacco but addressed to no one in particular. 17. July 15, 1993 Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC 37-93 18. July 20, 1993 Fortune filed an MR requesting recall of the issuance. 19. Request was denied and in the same letter assessed Fortune for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9.5M. Payment was demanded within 10 days. 20. Fortune filed a petition for review with Court of Tax Appeals injunction issued against BIR 21. August 10, 1994 Injunction made permanent when CTA, CA and SC ruled that issuance was defective, invalid and unenforceable. 22. April 10, 1997 Fortune filed a complaint for damages against petitioner in her private capacity. Petitioner of course filed motion to dismiss. c. Fortune: ii. Vinzons should be held liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws. d. Vinzons: iii. Respondent has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. iv. No cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith. 23. RTC denied, CA and RTC affirmed denial of motion to dismiss, and order the RTC to proceed with trial. 24. June 19, 2007 Petitioner moved for reconsideration. Court denied motion with finality. 25. Undaunted, Petitioner filed a Motion to Refer the Case to the Court En Banc contending that the petition raises a legal question that is novel and is of paramount importance decision might send a chilling effect to public officers as it will cause POs to refrain from performing official duties for fear of prosecution in their private capacity. ISSUE: WON Petitioner can be held liable for damages arising from the performance of her official function as a public officer. Held:

No. The respondent does not have a particular or special injury sustained. The petitioner took nothing from the respondent as the latter did not pay a single centavo on the tax assessment. With no particular injury alleged in the complaint, there is, therefore, no delict or wrongful act or omission attributable to the petitioner that would violate the primary rights of the respondent. Generally, when what is involved is a duty owing to the public in general, an individual cannot have a cause of action for damages against the public officer, even though he may have been injured by the action or inaction of the officer. Exception is when the complaining individual suffers a particular or special injury on account of the public officers improper performance or non-performance of his public duty. Juxtaposed with Article 32 of the Civil Code, the principle may now translate into the rule that an individual can hold a public officer personally liable for damages on account of an act or omission that violates a constitutional right only if it results in a particular wrong or injury to the former. *Just see article 32. Note: In the 2007 decision ordering the dismissal of the case, the Court held that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, the liability of the public officer may accrue even if he/she acted in good faith as long as there is a violation of constitutional rights. This case does not impute bad faith hence, for Article 32 to operate, it must be that there was a violation of a constitutional right. Court here said that the ruling in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. CA did not declare RMC No. 37-93 unconstitutional but had fallen short of a valid and effective administrative issuance. Dispositive: Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the June 19, 2007 decision granted.

Executive Officer of Limay who requested another test. CDC conducted another test which indicated "Negative". CDCs Med-Tech Officer-in-Charge issued a Certification correcting the initial result. Company rehired Salvador.

Ranida and Ramon filed a complaint for damages, claiming that, by reason of the erroneous interpretation of results, she lost her job and suffered serious mental anxiety, trauma and sleepless nights, while Ramon was hospitalized and lost business opportunities.

TC dismissed for failure to present sufficient evidence to prove the liability of Garcia. CA reversed and found Garcia liable for damages for negligently issuing an erroneous result.

WON CA correctly found petitioner liable for damages

Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. The elements of an actionable conduct are: 1) duty, 2) breach, 3) injury, and 4) proximate causation. All the elements are present in the case at bar. Clinical laboratory owners and operators have the duty to comply with statutes, rules, and regulations promulgated to protect and promote the health of the people. Their business is impressed with public interest. Violation of a statutory duty is negligence. Where the law imposes upon a person the duty to do something, his omission or non-performance will render him liable to whoever may be injured thereby. From the The Clinical Laboratory Law and The Philippine Medical Technology Act of 1969, it is clear that a clinical laboratory must be administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician authorized by the Secretary of Health, like a pathologist who is specially trained in methods of laboratory medicine; that the medical technologist must be under the supervision of the pathologist or a licensed physician; and that the results of any examination may be released only to the requesting physician or his authorized representative upon the direction of the laboratory pathologist. Garcia failed to comply with these standards. CDC is not administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician as required by law. Garcia conducted the test without the supervision of a pathologist. The test result was released to Ranida without the authorization of a pathologist.

Garcia v. Salvador - Monfort Ynares-Santiago | 20 MAR 07 | 3rd

Ranida Salvador underwent a medical exam at the Community Diagnostic Center (CDC) as prerequisite to regular employment at Limay. MedTech Garcia conducted the Hepatitis B Surface Antigen test. CDC issued the result that Ranida was "HBs Ag: Reactive." The company physician said that she is suffering from Hepatitis B. Limay then terminated her employment. When she informed her father Ramon, the latter suffered a heart attack. Ranida underwent another test at the hospital which indicated that she is non-reactive. She informed the company physician but was told that CDC was more reliable because it used the Micro-Elisa Method. Ranida went back to CDC for confirmatory testing and it now indicated a "Negative". Salvador gave the results to the

Garcia may not have intended to cause the consequences which followed after the release of the HBsAG test result. However, his failure to comply with the laws and rules promulgated and issued for the protection of public safety and interest is failure to observe that care which a reasonably prudent health care provider would observe. Thus, his act or omission constitutes a breach of duty. Indubitably, Ranida suffered injury as a direct consequence of Garcias failure to comply. Court cited NCC 20. Court found the CA award of damages reasonable.

treatment of glaucoma. He also confirmed Dr. Tuanos diagnosis of tubular vision in Peters right eye. Peter claimed that Dr. Aquino essentially told Peter that the latters condition would require lifetime medication and follow -ups. Peter underwent two (2) procedures of laser trabeculoplasty to attempt to control the high IOP of his right eye. Now, Peter claims to have steroid-induced glaucoma and blames Dr. Tuanos negligence for the same.

Issue: W/N the evidence on record is insufficient to establish petitioners entitlement to the payment of damages. Held: Yes, the evidence on record is insufficient to establish the claim for damages of the petitioners. They failed to present an expert witness thus failing to establish the standard of care required which Dr. Tuano have supposedly violated. Furthermore, Petioners have also failed to establish the causal connection of the supposed negligence to the damage they sustained. Ratio:

Lucas v. Tuao - Namingit 21 April 2009 J. Chico-Nazario Facts: This is a case seeking damages for medical malpractice. Petitioners, Peter Lucas, his wife Fatima, and children Abbeygail and Gillian, filed a complaint against Dr. Prospero Tuao seeking the award of 2M as compensation for impaired vision, 300k as actual damages, 1M as moral damages, 500k as exemplary damages, and 200k as attorneys fees. Their claim of damages is based on ground that Dr. Tuao ignored the standard medical procedure for ophthalmologist, administered medication with recklessness and exhibited an absence of competence and skills expected from him. They claimed suffering and pain brought about by Dr. Tuanos negligence in prescribing to Peter Maxistrol for 3 mos without monitoring Peters IOP and notwithstanding Peters constant complains of intense pain while using the same. Sometime in August 1988, Peter contracted sore eyes in his right eye. Philamcare referred him to Dr. Tuao, an ophthalmologist at St. Lukes for consultation. According to Dr. Tuano, he performed ocular routine examination on Peters eyes. On that particular consultation, Dr. Tuano diagnosed that Peter was suffering from conjunctivitis or sore eyes. He prescribed an eye drop for this and asked him to come back for follow up check up. The sore eyes cleared up in the follow up check-up. However, Peter contracted several subsequent eye infections and he visited Dr. Tuano several times for check-up. Various medicines were also prescribed. Peter went to see another ophthalmologist, Dr. Ramon T. Batungbacal who allegedly conducted a complete ophthalmological examination of Peters eyes. His diagnosis was Glaucoma and recommended Laser Trabeculoplasty for Peters right eye. He continued to visit Dr. Tuano. Peter was prodded by his friends to seek a second medical opinion. He consulted Dr. Mario V. Aquino, another ophthalmologist who specializes in the

In cases involving medical negligence patients/heirs are required to prove by preponderance of evidence that the physician failed to exercise that degree of skill, care, and learning possessed by others in the same profession; and that as a proximate result of such failure, the patient/heirs suffered damage. Claims based on medical negligence are almost always anchored as a violation of Art. 21761. In such cases, 4 essential elements, namely: duty, breach, injury and proximate causation, must be established by the plaintiff/s. All 4 elements must co-exist in order to find the physician negligent and, thus, liable for damages. When a patient-doctor relationship is established, the physician has the duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent physician would use to treat the condition under similar circumstances. This standard level of care, skill and diligence is a matter best addressed by expert medical testimony, because the standard of care in a medical malpractice case is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of experts in the field (technical). There is breach of duty of care, skill and diligence, or the improper performance of such duty, by the attending physician when the patient is injured in body or in health

Art 2176: RT. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter
1

constituting an actionable malpractice. Proof of such breach must rest upon the testimony of an expert witness that the treatment accorded to the patient failed to meet the standard level of care, skill and diligence which physicians in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line of practice ordinarily possess and exercise in like cases. Further, in order that there may be a recovery for an injury, it must be shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes In this case, the petitioners merely made bare claims. They failed to present an expert witness thus failing to establish the standard of care required which Dr. Tuano have supposedly violated. Furthermore, petitioners have also failed to establish the causal connection of the supposed negligence to the damage they sustained.

CA: reversed TC decision. Haos failure to bring Bladimir to a better-equipped hospital was in violation of Article 161 of the Labor Code3 Issue: WON petitioners are liable for damages due to negligence that led to Bladimir's death Held: No Issue: WON petitioners are liable for damages due to negligence that led to Bladimir's death Held: No

SC: claim for damages based on torts (book: per NCC Art. 20). Elements of torts are: 1) duty 2) breach 3) injury and proximate causation

Ocean Builders v. Sps. Cubacub - Ogena Petitioner Ocean Builders employer of Bladimir Cubacub (maintenance man), son of Respondent spouses Bladimir afflicted w/ chicken pox and was advised by petitioner Hao, pet'r company's general manager, to rest in company barracks2 for 3 days. after 3 days, Bladimir was back at work (manning the gates and cleaning company vehicles). In the afternoon, Bladimir asked a co-worker to accompany him to his house so that he can rest. co-worker informed Hao, the latter gave the former P1,000 and ordered him to accompany Bladimir to Caybiga Community Hospital Bladimir was subsequently transferred by his parents, respondent spouses, to the intensive care unit of Quezon City General Hospital (QCGH). Bladimir dies in QCGH. QCGH death certificate identifies immediate cause of death as cardio-respiratory arrest and the antecedent cause as pneumonia. On the other hand, the death certificate issued by Dr. Frias (a friend of the respondents) recorded the causes of death as cardiac arrest, multiple organ system failure, septicemia and chicken pox complaint for damages filed against petitioners, alleging negligence on Hao's part that led to deterioration of Bladimir's condition and his subsequent death TC: complaint dismissed, Hao not negligent

-petitioner employer had a duty to provide adequate and immediate medical assistance to sick and injured employees per Article 161 of the Labor Code. -petitioner Haos advice for Bladimir to take a 3-day rest and to later have him brought to the nearest hospital constituted adequate and immediate medical attendance that he is mandated, under Art. 161 -Chicken pox is self-limiting. Hao does not appear to have a medical background. He may not be thus expected to have known that Bladimir needed to be brought to a hospital with better facilities than the Caybiga Hospital -alleged negligence of Hao also cannot be considered as the proximate cause of the death of Bladimir. Dissent's finding that Bladimir contracted chicken pox from a co-worker and that Hao was negligent in not bringing that co-worker to the nearest physician (or isolating him as well) is not supported by the records of the case. Dissent: -death was wrongful by reason of the employers failure: (a) to isolate the co-worker to prevent the spread of chicken pox; (b) to provide to him the legally mandated first aid treatment; and (c) to extend adequate medical and other assistance for his affliction with chicken pox and the expected complications of the affliction (like letting him off from work in order to have complete rest). -in relation to a): Haos testimony shows that he well knew that Bladimir had contracted

his chicken pox from a co-worker -in relation to b): implementing rules of the LAbor Code Section 4(a), Rule 1 of the Implementing Rules of Book IV***4 imposes a legal obligation on OBCC to employ at least a graduate first-aider with immediate access to the first-aid medicines, equipment, and facilities. OBCC had no such employee. -Hao willfully disregarded Bladimirs deteriorating condition and prevented him from taking time off from his job to have the much needed complete rest. Haos attitude enabled complications of chicken pox, like pneumonia, to set in. By the time Hao acted and had Bladimir brought to the community hospital, the complications of the disease were already irreversible. -petitioners did not use that reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation. All of the aforementioned circumstances demonstrates employer's gross neglect of their employees plight which led to or caused the employee's wrongful death. Book: -Main decision: characterized action as based on torts (per NCC Art. 20) -Dissent: characterized action as based on quasi-delict premised on Hao's negligence -Spouses Cubacub: filed complaint alleging negligence (quasi-delict) -TC: dismissed complaint finding no negligence (quasi-delict) -CA: ruled there was a violation of Labor Code 161 -Hao: defense in SC premised on exercise of due diligence -essentially, negligence is not a necessary element to make OBCC liable for damages under torts (i.e. duty, breach, injury + proximate causation). -negligent violation of said legal provision is irrelevant in determining liability for damages under torts. -negligence is only relevant for actions based on quasi-delict. Barredo v. Garcia Pascual Facts: On May 3, 1936, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate taxicab driven by Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Dimapilis. The carretela was over-turned, and a

passenger, a 16-year old boy, Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla, and he was convicted. The court in the criminal case granted the petition to reserve the civil action. Garcia and Almario, parents of the deceased, on March 7, 1939, filed a civil action against Barredo, the proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Fontanilla, making him primarily and directly responsible under culpa acquiliana of Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. It is undisputed that Fontanillas negligence was the cause of the accident, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road at high speed, and there was no showing that Barredo exercised the diligence of a good father of a family, a defense to Article 2180 of the said Code. Barredos theory of defense is that Fontanillas negligence being punished by the Revised Penal Code, his liability as employer is only subsidiary. Issue: Whether or not Barredo, as employer is civilly liable for the acts of Fontanilla, his employee. Held: Barredo was held liable for damages.

Quasi-delict or culpa acquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code of the Philippines is entirely distinct and independent from a delict or crime under the Revised Penal Code. In this juris- diction, the same negligent act causing damage may produce civil liability (subsidiary) arising from a crime under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines; or create an action for quasi- delicto or culpa aquiliana under Articles 2179 and 2180 of the Civil Code and the parties are free to choose which course to take. And in the instant case, the negligent act of Fontanilla produces two (2) liabilities of Barredo: First, a subsidiary one because of the civil lia- bility of Fontanilla arising from the latters criminal negligence un - der Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, and second, Barredos primary and direct responsibility arising from his presumed negli- gence as an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Since the plaintiffs are free to choose what remedy to take, they preferred the second, which is within their rights. This is the more ex- pedious and effective method of relief. When an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or em- ployee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selec- tion, or both; and that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the

presumption is overcome and he is relieve from liability. However there is no proof that Barredo exer- cised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. In fact it is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation of the Automobile Law and speeding violation which appeared in the records of the Bureau of Public Works available to be public and to himself. Cangco v. Manila Railroad - Tanya Mia Perez October 14, 1918/ Fisher, J. Facts: Cangco is a clerk of Manila Railroad. He goes to work by riding the companys train. On the side of the train where passengers alight, there is a cement platform which begins to rise with a moderate gradient. Cangco, about to alight the coach he was riding, took his position upon its steps. As the train slowed down, another passenger got off the same coach, alighting safely. When the train proceeded a little farther, Cangco stepped off but one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons. He fell on the platform. His body rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. The accident occurred between 7-8:00 on a dark night, and as the station was lighted dimly by a single light, objects on the platform where the accident occurred were difficult to discern. The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons is found in the fact that it was the customary season for harvesting these melons.

3. 1. The foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and the obligation to respond for the dam- age which Cangco has suffered arises from the breach of contract by reason of the company to exercise due care in its performance. Its liability is direct and immediate (culpa contractual), differ- ing essentially from that presumptive responsibility for the negli- gence of its servants (culpa aquiliana). 4. 2. The train was barely moving when Cangco alighted. Thousands of person alight from trains under these conditions every day, and sustain no injury where the company has kept its platform free from dangerous obstructions. The place was perfectly familiar to Cangco as it was his daily custom to get on and off the train at that station. There could therefore be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. The conduct of Cangco in undertaking to alight while the train was slightly under was not characterized by imprudence. 5. 6. 7. RELEVANT PRINCIPLES ACCORDING TO TOPICS LISTED IN THE SYLLABUS I.B.5.a Quasi-delict - Intentional acts

The companys liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially from that presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed by Art. 1903 which relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual. The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa (culpa aquiliana) is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another. A master who exercises all possible care in the selection of his servant, taking into consideration the qualifications they should possess for the discharge of the duties which it is his purpose to confide to them, and directs them with equal diligence, thereby performs his duty to third persons to whom he is bound by no contractual ties, and he incurs no liability whatever if, by reason of the negligence of his servants, even within the scope of their employment, such third person suffer damage. I.E.1.a Culpa aquiliana and culpa contractual - Source Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. Extracontractual obligation has its source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties which civilized society imposes upon it members, or which arise from these relations, other than contractual. I.E.1.b Culpa aquiliana and culpa contractual Burden of proof

Issues/Held: 1. 1. WON the company is primarily liable. YES 2. 2. WON recovery by Cangco is barred by his own contributory negligence. NO Ratio:

As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa, a suing creditor

should assume the burden of proof of its existence, as the only fact upon which his action is based; while on the contrary, in a case of negligence which presupposes the existence of a contractual obligation, if the creditor shows that it exists and that it has been broken, it is not necessary for him to prove negligence. I.E.2 Culpa aquiliana and culpa contractual Is there an intersection? These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties. PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO v. REGINALD HILL, and MARVIN HILL - Siang G.R. No. L-24803. May 26, 1977 Facts: The killing of the son, Agapito, of the Elcano spouses, by Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in the CFI of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake. The Elcanos instituted a civil case for recovery of damages against Reginald Hill and his father Marvin Hill. Reginald Hill is a married minor but is living with Marvin and getting subsistence from him. The Hills filed a motion to dismiss on the ff grounds: 1. 2. 3. The civil action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court; The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata; The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by marriage. The appellants filed for a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the CFI.

negligence as a source of obligation. The court cited Barredo vs Garcia and said that ...the same act can come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. The separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case. It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him. Regarding intentional acts, according to the court, an immediate reading of Barredo might suggest that culpa aquiliana only covers negligent acts. Deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited and also covers intentional voluntary acts. Article 1093 of the (old) Civil Code used in Barredo, provided that obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" The new civil code, when it adopted Art 1093 of the old Civil Code, removes the phrase not punishable by law. The equivalent of Art 1093 in the new civil code is Article 1162 which simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasidelicts) starting in Article 2176 Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a) Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Issue #2: YES While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Emancipation by marriage shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian." It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is that it is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. Disposition:

Issues: 8. W/N the present civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case extinguished? W/N Marvin, the father, could be held liable despite Reginald being married already? Holding Issue #1: NO The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or

CFI ordered to proceed with the civil case. Since Reginald is no longer a minor at the

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time of the decision, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son. ANDAMO v. IAC (1990) - Tejano / Abdon FACTS: Petitioner spouses Andamo owned a parcel of land situated in Biga Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent corporation, Missionaries of Our lady of La Salette, Inc. Within the land of the latter, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners land, caused a young man to drown, damagaed petitioners crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the livesofthepetitioners and their laborers and some other destructions. This prompted petitioner spouses to file a criminal action for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the RPC and a civil action for damages. ISSUE: WONpetitioner spouses Andamo can claim damages for destruction caused by respondents waterpaths and contrivances on the basis of Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. HELD: Yes. A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Clearly, from petitioners complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages. It must be stressed that the use of ones property is not without limitations. Arti cle 431 of the Civil Code provides that the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person. SIC UTERE TUO UT

ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered. Baksh v. CA Tiongco Davide, 1993 Facts Martilou Gonzales is a twenty two year old single Filipino girl who met an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano apartments in Dagupan, named Gashem Shookat Baksh. He was an exchange student studying a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges. He allegedly courted her and asked her to marry him, eventually forcing her to cohabit with him. Before Baksh, she was a virgin. Not anymore. He also allegdly maltreated her. She eventually got pregnant and was asked by Baksh to abort the fetus. She was also allegedly drugged. When her parents, the tanod, and her lawyer asked Baksh to fullfill his promise to marry her, he said that he was already married. At this point, her father, a tricycle driver, was already asking around for sponsors for her wedding. Petitioner's argument: That Art. 21 does not apply because he had not commited any moral wrong or anything contary to custom or public policy. He has not proposed marriage, and he never maltreaed him. Also his Moslem upbringing allegedly made all this excusable. RTC: Baksh to pay 20k moral damages, 3k attorneys fees, and litigation expenses. Reasoning: they were lovers, and the girl was not of loose morals. Baksh used machinations, deceit and false pretense of promise to marry heer to seduce her. Issue WON damages may be recovered under Art 21 of the CC based ona breach of promise to marry? TORTS issue: WON quasi delicts include willful or negligent acts. Held TORTS ISSUE: No, 2176 or quasi delicts is limited to negligent acts or omiissons and

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excluds the notion of willfulness or intent. The philippine scheme as envisioned by the Code Commission has these remedies for various types of injuries: RPC for intentional and malicious acts NCC 2176 for negligent acts and ommissions NCC 21 for other injuries Quasi delicts is a civil law concept, and is distinct from torts which is a common law concept. Torts is broader. Yes. The mere breach of promise to marry (Heart balm suits) is not actionable per se. This notwithstanding the code has in art. 21 expanded the concept of torts or quasi delicts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in statute books. Also applicable is Art. 23 which allows damages to be given by the party which causes another loss or injury in a mnaner that is contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. SC held that torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana (art. 2176)because it includes not only negligence, but intentional criminal act as well such as assualt and batter, false imprisonment, deceit. It is even postulated that together with arts 19 and 20, art 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs. Thus, the SC held that when a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by awoman and his represention to fullfill that promise becomes the proximate cuase of ht giving of herself unto him in sex when he really had no intention to marry her, is a subtle deceptive scheme under art. 21. CINCO v. HON. MATEO CANONONOY J. Melencio-Herrera May 31, 1979 FACTS: Porfirio Cinco filed a complaint in Mandaue City, Cebu, for the recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito. A criminal case was filed against the driver arising from the same accident. At the pre-trial, counsel for private respondents (Hilot, Pepitos) moved to suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Sec. 3(b) of the ROC [(b) After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered]. The City Court of Mandaue ordered the suspension of the Civil Case. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari alleged that the City Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in suspending the civil action for

being contrary to law and jurisprudence. Respondent Judge dismissed the petition because there was no grave abuse of discretion, as damage to property is not one of the instances when an independent civil action is proper. Canonoy interposed that petitioner could still claim for damages in the criminal case. ISSUE: Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action HELD: YES, there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action 1. Nature and character of the action was quasi-delictual, predicated on 2176 cf. 2180. 2180 provides that Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry...the responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they all observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage a. Plaintiff made essential averments that it was the drivers fault or negligence which caused the collision between their vehicles, and that the damages were sustained because of the collision. The complaint established a direct causal connection between the damages he suffered and the fault and negligence of private respondents. b. Respondents, in their answer, contended that they observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees, particularly of the driver 2. Accdg to NCC 2177, the case may proceed as a separate and independent civil action, the liability being predicated on quasi-delict. By virtue of 2177, responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from civil liability arising from negligence under the RPC, but the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant, 3. Barredo v. Garcia: (Im sorry I might be wrong, kindly edit instead if wrong, friends ) Criminal Negligence Quasi-delict Punishes reckless imprudence and Punishes simple imprudence simple imprudence In a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond Preponderance of evidence sufficient to reasonable doubt is required make defendant pay in damages Allows only for the exhaustion of Allows plaintiff to recover from defendants (drivers) liability master/employer via the latters primary and direct responsibility under OCC 1903 Allowed only for damages by virtue of Relies on Arts 1902-1910; it allows for civil responsibility arising from crime 1902 et seq for an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, stations, and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged, and is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress

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4.

5. 6.

Sec. 2 Rule 111 ROC allows for a separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict: ...provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. By virtue of 2177 and Sec. 2 Rule 111 of the ROC, the City Court, erred in placing reliance on Sec. 3(b) of Rule 111 of the ROC (other civil actions arising from cases not included in the section just cited instead of Sec. 2 Rule 111 NCC 31: When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter a. Jural concept of QD is that of an independent source of obligation not arising from the act/omission complained of as a felony; such conclusion is bolstered by NC 1157 where in it states that obligations arise from quasi-delicts b. Petitioners cause of action is based on quasi-delict, and the concept is so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property; no distinction between damage to persons and damage to property

The Trial Court denied the motion to dismiss. The Petitioners then went to the Court of Appeals which upheld the trial court. It said: the complaint neither represents nor implies that the responsibility charged was the petitioners subsidiary liability under Art 103 of the RPC Civil case 99-10845 exacts responsibility for fault or negligence under Art 2176 of the civil code, which is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the RPC the liability under Art 2180 of the Civil Code is direct and immediate, and not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee or prior showing of the latters insolvency. ISSUE WON the cause of action is founded on Art 103 of RPC or derived from Art 2180 of the Civil Code. HELD Civil Case 99-10845 is a negligence suit brought under Art 2176 to recover damages primarily form the Petitioners as employers responsible for their negligent driver pursuant to Art 2180 of the Civil Code. The obligation imposed by Art 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Thus the employer is responsible for damages caused by his employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. It was clear from the allegations of the complaint that quasi-delict was their choice of remedy against petitioners, by alleging gross fault and negligence on the part of petitioners, as employers, to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. They also alleged that petitioners are civilly liable for the negligence/imprudence of their driver since they failed to exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees, which, if exercised, could have prevented the vehicular accident that resulted in the death of their 7-year old son. Sec 2 Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines cause of action as the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. Such act or omissio n gives rise to an obligation which may come from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasidelicts. Corollarily, an act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to 2 separate liabilities on the part of the offender. i.e., 1) civil liability ex delicto, and 2) independent civil liabilities, such as those a) not arising from an act or o mission complained of as a felony (e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from the law, the intentional torts, and culpa aquiliana), or b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action. Stated otherwise, victims or negligence or their heirs have a choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from the culpa criminal under Art 100 of the RPC and an action for quasi-delict under Arts 2176-2194 of the Civil Code.

L. G. FOODS CORPORATION VS PAGAPANG-AGRAVIADOR G.R. No. 158995 Sept 26, 2006 Digest by BUENAVENTURA, MV FACTS 26 Feb 1996 Charles Vallejera, 7-yr old son of spouses Florentino and Theresa Vallejera, was hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by L. G. Foods Corporation and driven by their employee Vincent Norman Yeneza. Charles died as a result. AN Information for reckless Imprudence was filed against the driver but before the trial could be concluded, he committed suicide. 23 June 1999 spouses Vallejera filed a complaint for damages against Petitioner as employers of the deceased driver, alleging that they failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. The Petitioners answered that they exercised due diligence in the section and supervision of their employees, including the deceased driver. They prayed for dismissal of complaint for lack of cause of action. The court required them to file a memorandum of authorities supportive of their position. Instead they files a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the claim is for subsidiary liability against an employer under Art 103 of the RPC. They contended that a judgement of conviction against the driver was a condition sine qua non to hold them liable. They argued that since the Plaintiff did not make a reservation to institute a separate action for damages when the criminal case was filed, the damage suit was deemed instituted with the criminal action which was already dismissed.

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Article 1161 of the Civil Code provides that civil obligation arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by penal laws subject to the provision of Article 2177 and of the pertinent provision of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human Relation, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages. Plainly, Article 2177 provides for the alternative remedies the plaintiff may choose from in case the obligation has the possibility of arising indirectly from the delict/crime or directly from quasi-delict/tort. The choice is with the plaintiff who makes known his cause of action in his initiatory pleading or complaint, and not with the defendant who cannot ask for the dismissal of the plaintiffs cause of action or lack of it based on the defendants perception that the plaintiff should have opted to file a claim under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. Had the respondent spouses elected to sue the petitioners based on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, they would have alleged that the guilt of the driver had been proven beyond reasonable doubt; that such accused driver is insolvent; that it is the subsidiary liability of the defendant petitioners as employers to pay for the damage done by their employee (driver) based on the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. Since there was no conviction in the criminal case against the driver, precisely because death intervened prior to the termination of the criminal proceedings, the spouses recourse was, therefore, to sue the petitioners for their direct and primary liability based on quasi-delict.

Issues: 1. 2. WON GP Sarmiento may be considered a common carrier as defined under the law and existing jurisprudence. WON GP Sarmiento, either as a common carrier or a private carrier, may be presumed to have been negligent when the goods it undertook to transport safely were subsequently damaged while in its protective custody and possession WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable in this case.

3.

Held/Ratio: 1. The SC finds the conclusion of the RTC and the CA to be amply justified. GP Sarmiento, being an exclusive contractor and hauler of Concepcion Industries, Inc., rendering or offering its services to no other individual or entity, cannot be considered a common carrier. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for hire or compensation, offering their services to the public, whether to the public in general or to a limited clientele in particular, but never on an exclusive basis. The true test of a common carrier is the carriage of passengers or goods, providing space for those who opt to avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee. Given accepted standards, GP Sarmiento scarcely falls within the term common carrier. GP Sarmiento cannot escape from liability. In culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. The law will not permit a party to be set free from liability for any kind of misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof. A breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for recovering that which may have been lost/suffered. The remedy serves to preserve the interests of the promisee that may include his: Expectation interest interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed; b. Reliance interest interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract not been made; c. Restitution interest interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on the other party. Agreements can accomplish little unless they are made the basis for action. The effect of every infraction is to create a new duty, or to make recompense to the one who has been injured by the failure of another to observe his contractual a.

FGU Insurance v. Sarmiento Facts: 1. 2. GP Sarmiento Trucking Corp. undertook to deliver 30 units of Condura refrigerators aboard an Isuzu truck, driven by one Lambert Eroles. While traversing along McArthur Highway in Bgy. Anupol, Bamban, Tarlac on its way to its delivery point in Dagupan, Pangasinan, it collided with an unidentified truck, causing the former to fall into a deep canal, resulting in damage to its cargo. FGU Insurance, the insurer of the shipment, paid to Concepcion Industries, Inc. (makers of Condura aircon) the value of the covered cargo in the sum of Php204,450. FGU, as subrogee of Concepcion Industries, sought reimbursement of the same amount from GP Sarmiento. GP Sarmiento did not pay, thereby prompting FGU Insurance to file a complaint for damages and breach of contract of carriage from against GP Sarmiento and its driver, Eroles. GP Sarmiento responded, averring that it is the exclusive hauler only of Concepcion Industries, Inc. and it was not engaged in business as a common carrier. In addition, it argued that the cause of the damage to the cargo was purely accidental. FGU Insurance presented its evidence while GP Sarmiento filed a motion to dismiss by way of demurrer of evidence on the ground that petitioner failed to prove that it was a common carrier. The trial court ruled in favor of GP Sarmiento. On appeal, the CA likewise ruled in favor of GP Sarmiento. 2.

3.

4. 5.

6.

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obligation unless he can show extenuating circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence (normally that of the diligence of a good father of a family or, exceptionally by stipulation or by law such as in the case of common carriers, that of extraordinary diligence) or of the attendance of fortuitous event, to excuse him from his ensuing liability. A default on, or failure of compliance with, the obligation gives rise to a presumption of lack of care & corresponding liability on the part of the contractual obligor the burden being on him to establish otherwise. GPS has failed to do so. Eroles, on the other hand, may not be ordered to pay petitioner without concrete proof of his negligence or fault. The driver, not being a party to the contract of carriage between petitioners principal and defendant, may not be held liable under the agreement. A contract can only bind the parties who have entered into it or their successors who have assumed their personality or juridical position. Consonantly with the axiom res inter alios acta aliis neque nocet prodest, such contract can neither favor nor prejudice a third person. Petitioners civil action against the driver can only be based on culpa aquiliana, which would require the claimant for damages to prove the defendants negligence/fault. 3. Res ipsa loquitur holds a defendant liable where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the latters management and the accident is such that, in the ordinary course of things, cannot be expected to happen if those who have its management/control use proper care. In the absence of the defendants explanation, it affords reasonable evidence that the accident arose from want of care. It is not a rule of substantive law and does not create an independent ground of liability. Instead, it is regarded as a mode of proof, or a mere procedural convenience since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves the plaintiff of, the burden of producing specific proof of negligence. The maxim simply places the burden of going forward with the proof on the defendant. However, resort to the doctrine may only be allowed when: (a) the event is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence; (b) other responsible causes are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence (includes the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons); and (c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendants duty to the plaintiff.

Thus, it is not applicable when an unexplained accident may be attributable to one of several causes, for some of which the defendant could not be responsible.

Res ipsa loquitur generally finds relevance whether or not a contractual relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant, for the inference of negligence arises from the circumstances and nature of the occurrence and not from the nature of the relation of the parties. Nevertheless, for the doctrine to apply, the requirement that responsible causes (other than those due to defendants conduct) must first be eliminated should be understood as being confined only to cases of pure (non-contractual) tort since obviously the presumption of negligence in culpa contractual immediately attaches by a failure of the covenant or its tenor.

On the other hand, while the truck driver, whose civil liability is predicated on culpa aquiliana, can be said to have been in control and management of the vehicle, it is not equally shown that the accident has been exclusively due to his negligence. If it were so, the negligence could allow res ipsa loquitur to properly work against him. However, clearly this is not the case.

Calalas v. CA (Celebrado) 2nd Division | G.R. No. 122039 | May 31, 2000 | Mendoza, J. FACTS: Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, a freshman at Siliman University, took a jeepney owned/operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given an extension seat, a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. The jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Then, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She sustained a leg fracture. Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for a period of three months and would have to ambulate in crutches during said period. Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck. Dumaguete RTC rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible

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for the accident. Then, it took cognizance of another case (CC No. 3490) filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which it held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney. CA reversed RTC on the ground that Sungas cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code. The appellate court dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. ISSUE: WON the negligence of Verena being the proximate cause of the accident negates Calalas liability. HELD: No. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioners jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation. In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 NCC provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 NCC. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, NOT in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers. Upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose, and it became Calalas duty to prove that he had to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers.

Calalas did NOT carry Sunga safely as far as human care and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances as required by Art. 1755. First, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle in violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as amended, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. Second, it is undisputed that petitioners driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of 32(a) of the same law. The fact that Sunga was seated in an extension seat placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers. Some disquisitions beyond the assigned topic It is NOT true that the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. This requires that the following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent of the debtors will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway. Finally, there is NO legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no factual finding that Calalas acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage. Sungas contention that Calalas admission that the driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in going to a nearby hospital CANNOT be construed as an admission of bad faith. The fact that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to the hospital does NOT imply that petitioner was utterly indifferent to the plight of his injured passenger.

Fores v Miranda Respondent Ireneo Miranda was aboard a jeep driven by Eugenio Luga when the latter lost control of it as it was speeding down Sta. Mesa bridge. The vehicle swerved and hit the bridge wall, injuring passengers including respondent, who had to undergo 3 operations: 1) to wind wire loops around his broken bones, 2) to insert a metal splint, 3) to remove said splint.

The jeep was owned by Paz Fores, being registered in her name and having the name "Dona Paz" painted below its windshield.

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ISSUE: w/n an action for the breach of contract embodies an action on tort CONSOLIDATED BANK VS. THE CONSOLIDATED BANK and TRUST CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and L.C. DIAZ and COMPANY, CPAs Facts: Petitioner Solidbank is a domestic banking corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws. Private respondent L.C. Diaz and Company, CPAs, is a professional partnership engaged in the practice of accounting. In March 1976, L.C. Diaz opened a savings account with Solidbank. On 14 August 1991, L.C. Diaz through its cashier, Mercedes Macaraya, filled up a savings (cash) deposit slip for P990 and a savings (checks) deposit slip for P50. Macaraya instructed the messenger of L.C. Diaz, Ismael Calapre, to deposit the money with Solidbank. Macaraya also gave Calapre the Solidbank passbook. Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the two deposit slips and the passbook. The teller acknowledged the receipt of the deposit by returning to Calapre the duplicate copies of the two deposit slips. Teller No. 6 stamped the deposit slips with the words DUPLICATE and SAVING TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK HEAD OFFICE. Since the transaction took time and Calapre had to make another deposit for L.C. Diaz with Allied Bank, he left the passbook with Solidbank. Calapre then went to Allied Bank. When Calapre returned to Solidbank to retrieve the passbook, Teller No. 6 informed him that somebody got the passbook. Calapre went back to L.C. Diaz and reported the incident to Macaraya. Macaraya immediately prepared a deposit slip in duplicate copies with a check of P200,000. Macaraya and Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the deposit slip and check. The teller stamped the words DUPLICATE and SAVING TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK HEAD OFFICE on the duplicate copy of the deposit slip. When Macaraya asked for the passbook, Teller No. 6 told Macaraya that someone got the passbook but she could not remember to whom she gave the passbook. When Macaraya asked Teller No. 6 if Calapre got the passbook, Teller No. 6 answered that someone shorter than Calapre got the passbook. Calapre was then standing beside Macaraya. The following day L.C. Diaz learned of the unauthorized withdrawal the day before (14 August 1991) of P300,000 from its savings account. The withdrawal slip for the P300,000 bore the signatures of the authorized signatories of L.C. Diaz, namely Diaz and Rustico L. Murillo. The signatories, however, denied signing the withdrawal slip. A certain Noel Tamayo received the P300,000. L.C. Diaz demanded from Solidbank the return of its money. Solidbank refused. L.C. Diaz filed a Complaint for Recovery of a Sum of Money against Solidbank. The trial court absolved Solidbank. L.C. Diaz appealed to the CA. CA reversed the ecision of the trial court. CA denied the motion for reconsideration of

HELD: NO. The difference in conditions, defenses and proof, as well as the codal concept of quasi-delict as essentially extra contractual negligence, compel us to differentiate between action ex contractu (action arising from a contract), and actions quasi ex delicto (quasi-delict), and prevent us from viewing the action for breach of contract as simultaneously embodying an action on tort.

Thus, the moral damages ordered to be paid to respondent must be discarded, as such are not recoverable in damage actions predicted on a breach of contract of transportation. The term "analogous cases" in Art 2219 does not include quasi-delicts because the definition of quasi-delict in Art. 2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where there is a "preexisting contractual relation between the parties," while Art. 2220 requires bad faith in the contractual breach for damages to be recoverable.

APPLICABLE PROVISIONS

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under circumstances, such damages are justify due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. -

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage dome. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

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Solidbank. But it modified its decision by deleting the award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Hence this petition. Issue: WON petitioner Solidbank is liable.

The fiduciary nature of banking does not convert a simple loan into a trust agreement because banks do not accept deposits to enrich depositors but to earn money for themselves. Solidbanks Breach of its Contractual Obligation Article 1172 of the Civil Code provides that responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is demandable. For breach of the savings deposit agreement due to negligence, or culpa contractual, the bank is liable to its depositor. Calapre left the passbook with Solidbank because the transaction took time and he had to go to Allied Bank for another transaction. The passbook was still in the hands of the employees of Solidbank for the processing of the deposit when Calapre left Solidbank. When the passbook is in the possession of Solidbanks tellers during withdrawals, the law imposes on Solidbank and its tellers an even higher degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook. Solidbanks tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they return the passbook only to the depositor or his authorized representative. For failing to return the passbook to Calapre, the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz, Solidbank and Teller No. 6 presumptively failed to observe such high degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook, and in insuring its return to the party authorized to receive the same. In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract, there is a presumption that the defendant was at fault or negligent. The burden is on the defendant to prove that he was not at fault or negligent. In contrast, in culpa aquiliana the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant was negligent. In the present case, L.C. Diaz has established that Solidbank breached its contractual obligation to return the passbook only to the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz. There is thus a presumption that Solidbank was at fault and its teller was negligent in not returning the passbook to Calapre. The burden was on Solidbank to prove that there was no negligence on its part or its employees. But Solidbank failed to discharge its burden. Solidbank did not present to the trial court Teller No. 6, the teller with whom Calapre left the passbook and who was supposed to return the passbook to him. Solidbank also failed to adduce in evidence its standard procedure in verifying the identity of the person retrieving the passbook, if there is such a procedure, and that Teller No. 6 implemented this procedure in the present case. Solidbank is bound by the negligence of its employees under the principle of respondeat superior or command responsibility. The defense of exercising the required diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not a complete defense in culpa contractual, unlike in culpa aquiliana. The bank must not only exercise high standards of integrity and performance, it must also insure that its employees do likewise because this is the only way to insure that the bank will comply with its fiduciary duty Proximate Cause of the Unauthorized Withdrawal

Held: Yes. Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence, or culpa contractual.

The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on simple loan. Article 1980 of the Civil Code expressly provides that x xx savings x xx deposits of money in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning simple loan. There is a debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and its depositor. The bank is the debtor and the depositor is the creditor. The depositor lends the bank money and the bank agrees to pay the depositor on demand. The savings deposit agreement between the bank and the depositor is the contract that determines the rights and obligations of the parties. The law imposes on banks high standards in view of the fiduciary nature of banking. The bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship. This fiduciary relationship means that the banks obligation to observe high standards of integrity and performance is deemed written into every de posit agreement between a bank and its depositor. The fiduciary nature of banking requires banks to assume a degree of diligence higher than that of a good father of a family. Article 1172 of the Civil Code states that the degree of diligence required of an obligor is that prescribed by law or contract, and absent such stipulation then the diligence of a good father of a family. Section 2 of RA 8791 prescribes the statutory diligence required from banks that banks must observe high standards of integrity and performance in servicing their depositors. However, the fiduciary nature of a bank-depositor relationship does not convert the contract between the bank and its depositors from a simple loan to a trust agreement, whether express or implied. Failure by the bank to pay the depositor is failure to pay a simple loan, and not a breach of trust. The law simply imposes on the bank a higher standard of integrity and performance in complying with its obligations under the contract of simple loan, beyond those required of non-bank debtors under a similar contract of simple loan.

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Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred. Proximate cause is determined by the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. L.C. Diaz was not at fault that the passbook landed in the hands of the impostor. Solidbank was in possession of the passbook while it was processing the deposit. After completion of the transaction, Solidbank had the contractual obligation to return the passbook only to Calapre, the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz. Solidbank failed to fulfill its contractual obligation because it gave the passbook to another person. Had the passbook not fallen into the hands of the impostor, the loss of P300,000 would not have happened. Thus, the proximate cause of the unauthorized withdrawal was Solidbanks negligence in not returning the passbook to Calapre. Doctrine of Last Clear Chance The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss. The antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the present case. This is a case of culpa contractual, where neither the contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid the loss, would exonerate the defendant from liability. Such contributory negligence or last clear chance by the plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the plaintiff but does not exculpate the defendant from his breach of contract

He refused and even had a heated discussion with the manager but after being pacified and convinced by his fellow passengers, he reluctantly gave up the disputed seat Air France asserts that the ticket does not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties, and that the issuance of a first class ticket did not guarantee a first class ride

Issue: w/n decision failed to make complete findings of fact on all the issues properly laid before it w/n Carrascoso was entitled to the first class seat he claims w/n Air France, as employer, is liable for the tortious act of its employees w/n the award of the damages were proper

Held:

1. no, the law only requires that a decision state the essential ultimate facts and courts are not hidebound to write in its decision every bit and piece of evidence presented by one party and the other upon the issues raised. Neither are they to be burdened with the obligation to specify in the sentence the facts which a party "considered as proved". The mere failure to specify (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law and the Constitution.

Air France v. Carrascoso

Facts:

civil engr Rafael Carrascoso was with a group of Filipino pilgrims leaving for Lourdes, France Air France, through PAL, issued to Carrascoso a first class round trip ticket From Manila to Bangkok, he travelled in first class, but at Bangkok, the manager of Air France forced him to vacate his seat because a white man had a better right to it

2. yes, he is entitled to it. He paid to and received from petitioner a first class ticket. We cannot understand how a reputable firm like defendant airplane company could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of first-class tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or not the tickets it issues are to be honored or not.

The oral testimony of Air Frances witnesses that Carrascosos first class ticket was subject to confirmation in Hongkong cannot prevail over the written evidence that the ticket was issued without any reservation whatsoever.

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If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. What security then can a passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a rule, a written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable.

deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by evidence. Also, the stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion.

Exemplary damages are warranted because the Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant them in contracts and quasi-contracts. The only condition, which is fully supported by evidence, is that Air France and/or its employees acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.

3. yes, for the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer and that is well-settled in law. (the court did not linger on this issue and merely referred to Art. 21 of NCC, but see below).

Right to attorneys fees is fully established. Grant of exemplary justifies a similar judgment for this aspect.

FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY V CA ON THE CHARACTER OF AN AIR CARRIAGE CONTRACT: VITUG; February 23, 1995

A contract to transport passengers is impressed with public duty. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.

FACTS In October 1986, Luis A. Luna applied for, and was accorded, a FAREASTCARD issued by petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Company ("FEBTC") at its Pasig Branch. Upon his request, the bank also issued a supplemental card to Clarita S. Luna. In August 1988, Clarita lost her credit card. FEBTC was informed of this. On 06 October 1988, Luis tendered a despedida lunch for a close friend, a FilAm, and another guest at the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant of the Hotel Intercon Manila. To pay for the lunch, Luis presented his FAREASTCARD to the attending waiter who promptly had it verified through a telephone call to the bank's Credit Card Department. Since the card was not honored, Luis was forced to pay in cash the bill amounting to P588.13. Luis felt embarrassed by this incident. In a letter, dated 11 Oct. 1988, Luis Luna, through counsel, demanded from FEBTC the payment of damages. Adrian V. Festejo, a VP of the bank, expressed the bank's apologies to Luis in his letter which stated that: In cases when a card is reported to our office as lost, FAREASTCARD undertakes the necessary action to avert its unauthorized use to protect its cardholders. In cases of this nature, the bank's internal security procedures and policy would appear to beto meanwhile so record the lost card, along with the principal card, as a "Hot Card" or "Cancelled Card" in its master file. FEBTC admitted that it had failed to inform him about its security policy. Furthermore, an overzealous employee of the Bank's Credit Card Department did not consider the possibility that it may have been him who was presenting the card at that time (for which reason, the unfortunate incident occurred).

Passengers have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. Any discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. Although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort".

Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper. 4. Moral damages are proper because although the action is based on breach of contract, and there was no specific mention of bad faith in the facts and circumstances, the

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Festejo also sent a letter to the Manager of the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant to assure the latter that Luis was a "very valued clients" of FEBTC. William Anthony King, F&B Manager of the Intercon, wrote back to say that the credibility of Luis had never been "in question." A copy of this reply was sent to Luis by Festejo. Luis still filed a complaint for damages with the RTC of Pasig against FEBTC. RTC- FEBTC was ordered to the Lunas (a) P300,000.00 moral damages; (b) P50,000.00 exemplary damages; and (c) P20,000.00 attorney's fees. CA- affirmed the decision of the trial court.

idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. Article 21 states: Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Article 21 contemplates a conscious act to cause harm. Thus, even if we are to assume that the provision could properly relate to a breach of contract, its application can be warranted only when the defendant's disregard of his contractual obligation is so deliberate as to approximate a degree of misconduct certainly no less worse than fraud or bad faith. Most importantly, Article 21 is a mere declaration of a general principle in human relations that clearly must, in any case, give way to the specific provision of Article 2220 of the Civil Code authorizing the grant of moral damages in culpa contractual solely when the breach is due to fraud or bad faith. Fores vs. Miranda explained with great clarity the predominance that we should give to Article 2220 in contractual relations; we quote: Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the respondent, the same must be discarded. We have repeatedly ruled that moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation, in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code, which provide as follows: Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; xxx xxx xxx Art. 2220. Wilful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. By contrasting the provisions of these two articles it immediately becomes apparent that: (a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus), i.e., wanton or deliberately injurious conduct, is essential to justify an award of moral damages; and (b) That a breach of contract cannot be considered included in the descriptive term "analogous cases" used in Art. 2219; not only because Art. 2220 specifically provides for the damages that are caused contractual breach, but because the definition of quasidelict in Art. 2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where there is a "preexisitng contractual relations between the parties."

ISSUE WON the petitioner is entitled to moral and exemplary damages

HELD NO. Court instead ruled that the Lunas are only entitled to nominal damages because FEBTCs negligence is not so gross as to amount to bad faith or malice. The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here, the damage claim is predicated solely on their contractual relationship; without such agreement, the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent actionable tort. In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract. The Civil Code provides: Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence. Exceptionally, in a contract of carriage, moral damages are also allowed in case of death of a passenger attributable to the fault (which is presumed ) of the common carrier. Concededly, the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting to personally inform Luis of his own card's cancellation. Nothing in the findings of the trial court and the appellate court, however, can sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to private respondents. Neither could FEBTC's negligence in failing to give personal notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative

cases:

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Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. The exception to the basic rule of damages now under consideration is a mishap resulting in the death of a passenger, in which case Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. 2206, that entitles the spouse, descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger to "demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. But the exceptional rule of Art. 1764 makes it all the more evident that where the injured passenger does not die, moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. We think it is clear that then mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per se constitute or justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier; and in the case at bar there is no other evidence of such malice to support the award of moral damages by the Court of Appeals. To award moral damages for breach of contract, therefore, without proof of bad faith or malice on the part of the defendant, as required by Art. 2220, would be to violate the clear provisions of the law, and constitute unwarranted judicial legislation. xxx xxx xxx The distinction between fraud, bad faith or malice in the sense of deliberate or wanton wrong doing and negligence (as mere carelessness) is too fundamental in our law to be ignored (Arts. 1170-1172); their consequences being clearly differentiated by the Code. - Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faithis liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the nonperformance of the obligation. It is to be presumed, in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, that this difference was in the mind of the lawmakers when in Art. 2220 they limited recovery of moral damages to breaches of contract in bad faith. It is true that negligence may be occasionally so gross as to amount to malice; but the fact must be shown in evidence, and a carrier's bad faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding that the contract was breached through negligence of the carrier's employees. The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable principles on tort even where there is a pre-existing contract between the plaintiff and the defendant This doctrine, unfortunately, cannot improve private respondents' case for it can aptly govern only where the act or omission complained of would constitute an actionable tort independently of the contract.

Exemplary or corrective damages, in turn, are intended to serve as an example or as correction for the public good in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages (Art. 2229, Civil Code. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages are imposed when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances (Art. 2230, Civil Code). In quasi-delicts, such damages are granted if the defendant is shown to have been so guilty of gross negligence as to approximate malice. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant is found to have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner (Art. 2232, Civil Code).

1992 PSBA v CA Student Carlitos Bautista was stabbed in PSBA premises by non-students. His parents sued PSBAs officers, alleging negligence. PSBA officers filed motion to dismiss, saying that based on jurisprudence, academic institutions are beyond the ambit of 2180. RTC denied motion to dismiss; CA affirmed SC: Old doctrines in Exconde v Capuno and Mercado v CA are now abandoned and we adopt the ruling in Palisoc that 2180 should apply to educational institutions. CA correct to deny motion to dismiss but shouldnt base it on 2180. Exconde, et al - 2180 requires that damage shouldve been caused by students of the school. When a school accepts students for enrollment, a contract is established between them which gives rise to reciprocal obligations to educate, on the part of the school, and to abide by rules and requirements, on the part of the student. Because the case evinces a contractual relation, rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. But there could still be tort despite existence of a contract, as held in o Air France v Carrascoso liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort o Cangco vs. Manila Railroad the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties WON PSBA is liable under contract or for tort (say Art 21) will be best determined by the TC. PETITION DENIED. RTC is ordered to continue proceedings. Syquia vs CA

Facts:

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1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Issue:

Pursuant to a deed of sale, Vincent Juan Syquia (Father of the deceased) authorized and instructed the defendants to inter the remains of the deceased in Manila Memorial Park Cemetery. In preparation to transferring the remains of the deceased to a newly purchased family plot in Manila Memorial Park, the concrete vault encasing the coffin of the deceased was removed from its niche underground. Upon lifting, it was discovered that the concrete vault had a hole approximately 3 inches in diameter and water drained out of the hole. The remains of the deceased were flooded with water. Due to the alleged unlawful and malicious breach by the defendantappellee of its obligation A case was filed in conformity with Article 2176. The TC dismissed the case because the contract did not guarantee that the cement vault would be waterproof and that there is no quasi-delict and the defendant was not guilty of fault or negligence. The TC noted that it was the father itself that instructed that water be sprinkled constantly so that the grass be kept green. CA affirmed the decision.

The law defines negligence as the "omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place." The reason for the hole is the fact that during the time the vault is to be placed on the vault, it was raining heavily then because the vault has no hole the vault will float and the grave would be filled with water and the digging would caved

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY vs. NAVIDAD (2003) VITUG, J.:

WON the defendant was guilty of a tort

FACTS: On 14 October 1993, about 7:30pm, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token". While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously. On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad, along with her children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards.

Decision: No Ratio: In relation to culpa aquiliana, the Court of Appeals found no negligent act on the part of private respondent to justify an award of damages against it. Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana, We find no reason to disregard the respondent's Court finding that there was no negligence Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict . As there is an existing contract, then actual negligence should be based on culpa contractual and not culpa aquilana. Rule 17 of the Rules and Regulation provides that . Every earth interment shall be made enclosed in a concrete box, or in an outer wall of stone, brick or concrete, the actual installment of which shall be made by the employees of the Association. However, this cannot be used as basis of the claim as there is no gurantee that the vault will be waterproof. If ever, the defendant cannot be liable by virtue of culpa aquilana as there were negligence.

On 11 August 1998, the trial court rendered decision in favor of the Navidad ordering Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin to pay jointly and severally damages to Navidad. Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August 2000, the appellate court promulgated its decision exonerating Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable.

ISSUE: WON Prudent is liable for the death of Nicanor Navidad.

HELD: NO. CA decision AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability.

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CarlosTheFierce RATIO: Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for the employers liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not been shown. Absent such a showing, one might ask further, how then must the liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply. FACTS: Rhonda Brunty, an American citizen, came to the Philippines for a visit sometime in January 1980. Prior to her departure, she, together with her Filipino host Juan Manuel M. Garcia, traveled to Baguio City on board a Mercedes Benz sedan, driven by Rodolfo L. Mercelita. It was about 12:00 midnight, January 25, 1980. By then, PNR Train No. T-71, driven by Alfonso Reyes, was on its way to Tutuban, Metro Manila as it had left the La Union station at 11:00 p.m., January 24, 1980. By 2:00 a.m., Rhonda Brunty, Garcia and Mercelita were already approaching the railroad crossing at Barangay Rizal, Moncada, Tarlac. Mercelita, driving at approximately 70 km/hr, drove past a vehicle, unaware of the railroad track up ahead and that they were about to collide with PNR Train. Mercelita was instantly killed when the Mercedes Benz smashed into the train; the two other passengers suffered serious physical injuries. A certain James Harrow brought Rhonda Brunty to the Central Luzon Doctors Hospital in Tarlac, where she was pronounced dead after ten minutes from arrival. Garcia, who had suffered severe head injuries, was brought via ambulance to the same hospital. He was transferred to the Manila Doctors Hospital, and later to the Makati Medical Center for further treatment. Ethel Brunty (mother of Rhonda Brunty) and Garcia,filed a complaint for damages against the PNR before the RTC of Manila. They alleged that the death of Mercelita and Rhonda Brunty, as well as the physical injuries suffered by Garcia, were the direct and proximate result of the gross and reckless negligence of PNR in not providing the necessary equipment at the railroad crossing. ISSUE/HELD: Whether or not PNR was negligent HELD: YES. PNR WAS NEGLIGENT. There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence. The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages. II. NEGLIGENCE RATIO: The alleged safety measures installed by the PNR at the railroad crossing is not only inadequate but does not satisfy well-settled safety standards in transportation. An examination of the photographs of the railroad crossing at Moncada, Tarlac showed (1.) absence of flagbars or safety railroad bars; (2.) inadequacy of the installed warning signals; and (3.) lack of proper lighting within the area. 2. The Court has previously determined the liability of the PNR for damages for its failure to put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or semaphores. Such failure is evidence of negligence and disregard of the safety of the public, even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it because public safety demands that said device or equipment be installed. 2. DEFINITION OF NEGLIGENCE (with emphasis in Sirs book):

Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the late Nicanor Navidad, this Court is concluded by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that "there is nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven.

PNR V. BRUNTY HERNANDEZ PNR V. BRUNTY

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Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. In determining whether or not there is negligence on the part of the parties in a given situation, jurisprudence has laid down the following test: Did defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, the person is guilty of negligence. The law, in effect, adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet pater familias of the Roman law. 3. DUE DILIGENCE REQUIRED OF RAILROAD COMPANIES: Railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to persons and property at railroad crossings, which duties pertain both in the operation of trains and in the maintenance of the crossings.5 Moreover, every corporation constructing or operating a railway shall make and construct at all points where such railway crosses any public road, good, sufficient, and safe crossings and erect at such points, at a sufficient elevation from such road as to admit a free passage of vehicles of every kind, a sign with large and distinct letters placed thereon, to give notice of the proximity of the railway, and warn persons of the necessity of looking out for trains. Other Issue: Whether or not Mercelita, the driver of the Mercedez Benz, is guilty of contributory negligence YES, Mercelita was guilty of contributory negligence. There was a slight curve before approaching the tracks; the place was not properly illuminated; ones view was blocked by a cockpit arena; and Mercelita was not familiar with the road. Yet Mercelita was then driving the Mercedes Benz at a speed of 70 km/hr and, in fact, had overtaken a vehicle a few yards before reaching the railroad track. Mercelita should not have driven the car the way he did. However, while his acts contributed to the collision, they nevertheless do not negate petitioners liability. Pursuant to Article 2179 of the New Civil Code, the only effect such contributory negligence could have is to mitigate liability The record is bereft of any allegation and proof as to the relationship between Mercelita (the driver) and Rhonda Brunty. Hence, the earlier finding of contributory negligence on the part of Mercelita, which generally has the effect of mitigation of liability, does not apply. JORGE V. SICAM MANALO

SICAM vs. JORGE G.R. No. 159617 August 8, 2007 Facts: Lulu Jorge pawned several pieces of jewelry with Agencia de R. C. Sicam to secure a loan. On October 19, 1987, two armed men entered the pawnshop and took away whatever cash and jewelry were found inside the pawnshop vault. Sicam sent respondent Lulu a letter informing her of the loss of her jewelry due to the robbery incident in the pawnshop. Respondent Lulu expressed disbelief stating that when the robbery happened, all jewelry pawned were deposited with Far East Bank near the pawnshop since it had been the practice that before they could withdraw, advance notice must be given to the pawnshop so it could withdraw the jewelry from the bank. Respondent Lulu then requested petitioner Sicam to prepare the pawned jewelry for withdrawal on but petitioner Sicam failed to return the jewelry. Respondent Lulu is seeking indemnification for the loss of pawned jewelry and payment of damages. Petitioner is interposing the defense of caso fortuito on the robber committed against the pawnshop. Issue: WON Sicam is liable for the loss of the pawned articles in their possession? YES Held: Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable. It is therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same. Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous event. It does not foreclose the possibility of negligence on the part of herein petitioners. A review of the records clearly shows that petitioners failed to exercise reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation. Petitioners were guilty of negligence in the operation of their pawnshop business. No sufficient precaution and vigilance were adopted by petitioners to protect the pawnshop from unlawful intrusion. There was no clear showing that there was any security guard at all. Sicams admission that the vault was open at the time of robbery is clearly a proof of petitioners failure to observe the care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances justly demanded. Petitioner Sicam testified that once the pawnshop was open, the combination was already off. Instead of taking the precaution to protect them, they let open the vault, providing no difficulty for the robbers to cart away the pawned articles. In contrast, the robbery in this case took place in 1987 when robbery was already prevalent and petitioners in fact had already foreseen it as they wanted to deposit the pawn with a nearby bank for safekeeping. Moreover, unlike in Austria, where no negligence was committed, we found petitioners negligent in securing their pawnshop as earlier discussed.

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FAR EASTERN SHIPPING V. CA MILLENA Far East Bank and Trust Company v. CA (Millena) Petitioner: Far East Bank and Trust Company Respondent: Luis Luna and Clarita S. Luna Vitug , J. (1995) Facts: 1. 2. 3. October 1986 Luis Luna was accorded a FAREASTCARD and a supplemental card was given to Clarita Luna. August 1008 Clarita lost the card and informed Far East. As per policy, the car was tagged Hot Card. October 19888 Luis tendered a despedida for a close friend at Hotel Intercon and paid through his credit card. Card was dishonored which forced him to pay for cash. He felt embarrassed. Luis demanded damages from the bank. VP of bank wrote a letter of apology to Luis explaining that the incident was brought about by the banks failure to inform him of the banks security policy and their employees failure to consider the possibility that it was him presenting the card at that time. VP also wrote the Hotel and informed it that Luis was a very valued client. Hotel responded saying that the respondents credibility was never in question. Luis was not tamed, filed suit for damages against the bank. RTC and CA awarded: (a) P300,000.00 moral damages; (b) P50,000.00 exemplary damages; and (c) P20,000.00 attorney's fees. Hence the appeal. Issue: WON Luis is entitled to damages by way of moral and exemplary damages. Held: NO. Ratio: In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract. (Art. 2220) Bad faith includes gross, but not simple negligence. (Exception: contract of carriage where a passenger dies due to the fault of the common carrier.) Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.

In this case, there is no showing that the BANK deliberately intended to cause harm to private respondents. Neither would the failure to give personal notice to Luis of the policies be considered so gross to amount to malice or bad faith. Article 21 would not be applicable in this case, though the Court has at some instances applied it to award damages caused by contractual breach such as this case, because Art. 21 contemplates a conscious act to cause harm. Also, Article 21 is a general declaration of a principle in human relations which should give way to specific provision of Art. 2220. A rule however allows a quasi-delict to be the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of principles in tort even if there is a pre-existing contract. This doctrine, unfortunately, cannot improve private respondents' case for it can aptly govern only where the act or omission complained of would constitute an actionable tort independently of the contract. The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here, private respondents' damage claim is predicated solely on their contractual relationship; without such agreement, the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent actionable tort. PNR V. CA MONFORT PNR v. CA Nachura | 15 Oct. 07 | 3rd Jose Amores was traversing railroad tracks in Pandacan. At the intersection, a PNR train turned up and collided with the car. There was neither a signal nor a crossing bar. The only visible warning was the defective STOP, LOOK and LISTEN. No whistle blow from the train was heard. The car was dragged about 10 meters and Amores died as a consequence thereof. The heirs of Amores filed a Complaint for Damages against PNR and Virgilio Borja, the locomotive driver. RTC found in favor of PNR. CA reversed. It found petitioners negligent based on their failure to install a semaphore (flag signaling system) or to post a flagman as the crossing is located in a thickly populated area. The signboard Stop, Look and Listen was insufficient because of its defective condition. No negligence could be attributed to Amores as he exercised reasonable diligence. WON CA was correct in ascribing negligence on the part of petitioners. YES 1. It was ascertained that the proximate cause of the collision is the negligence and imprudence of the petitioner PNR and Borja in operating the passenger train. 2. As the action is predicated on negligence, the relevant provision is Article 2176. 3. Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.

4.

5. 6. 7.

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4. Using the aforementioned philosophy, it may be reliably concluded that there is no hard and fast rule whereby such degree of care and vigilance is calibrated; it is dependent upon the circumstances in which a person finds himself. All that the law requires is that it is perpetually compelling upon a person to use that care and diligence expected of sensible men under comparable circumstances. 5. The petitioners were negligent when the collision took place. The train was running at a fast speedinadequate precautions to forewarn the public of the impending danger no crossing bar, flagman or guarda dilapidated Stop, Look and Listen signage. It is the responsibility of the railroad company to use reasonable care to keep the signal devices in working order. Failure to do so would be an indication of negligence. 6. PNR v. Brunty: Railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to persons and property at railroad crossings, which duties pertain both to the operation of trains and to the maintenance of the crossingsEven if there is no law or ordinance requiring it, because public safety demands that said device or equipment be installed. 7. The petitioners insist that a train has a right-of-way in a railroad crossing under the existing laws. They claim that motorists are enjoined by law to stop, look and listen before crossing railroad tracks and that a heavier responsibility rests upon the motorists in avoiding accidents at level crossings. 8. However, the obligation to bring to a full stop vehicles moving in public highways before traversing any through street only accrues from the time the said through street or crossing is so designated and sign-posted. From the records of the case, it can be inferred that Amores exercised all the necessary. 9. The employer is actually liable on the assumption of juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not been demonstrated. Even the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory employees cannot be incidentally invoked to overturn the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer. AMEDO V. RIO NAMINGIT 24 May 1954 J. Concepcion Facts: Elena Amedo sought to collect from defendant Rio y Olabarrieta, Inc., the sum of P2,038.40 as compensation for the death of her son, Filomeno Managuit, who worked for the Rio as a seaman of the M/S Pilar II. While the Filomeno was in the course of his employment as a seaman on Rio's M/S "Pilar II", which was anchored then about 1 1/2 miles from the seashore of Arceli Dumarang, Palawan, his two-peso bill was blown by the breeze into the sea and in his effort to retrieve the same from the waters he was drowned.

Issue: W/N Elena Amedo is entitled to recover compensation from Rio for the death of her son while aboard Rios vessel as a seaman. Held: No, Elena Amedo is not entitiled to recover compensation from Rio, her sons employer. Pursuant to Sections 2 and 4 of Act No. 2428, prior to its latest amendment, three conditions are essential to hold an employer liable to compensate his employee for a personal injury sustained by him from an accident, namely: (1) the accident must arise out of the employment; (2) it must happen in the course of the employment; and (3) it must not be caused by the "notorious negligence" of the employee. The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident and are descriptive of its character. The words `in the course of' refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place. By the use of these words it was not the intention of the legislature to make the employer an insurer against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment, but only for such injuries arising from or growing out of the risks peculiar to the nature of work in the scope of the workmen's employment or incidental to such employment, and accidents in which it is possible to trace the injury to some risk or hazard to which the employee is exposed in a special degree by reason of such employment. The phrase "notorious negligence was held to be tantamount to "gross negligence". By gross negligence is meant "such entire want of care as to raise a presumption that the person in fault is conscious of the probable consequences of carelessness, and is indifferent, or worse, to the danger of injury to person or property of others." The negligence must amount to a reckless disregard of the safety of person or property. Admittedly, the death of Filomeno Managuit was due to an accident. The death of Filomeno took place "in the course of" his employment, in that it happened at the "time" when, and at the "place" where he was working. However, the accident which produced this tragic result did not "arise out of" his employment. The blowing of his 2-peso bill may have grown out of, or arisen from, his employment. It was the result of a risk peculiar to his work as a seaman or incidental to such work. But, his death was the consequence of his decision to jump into the water to retrieve said bill. The hazardous nature of this act was not due specially to the nature of his employment. It was a risk to which any person on board the M/S Pilar II, such as a passenger thereof or an ordinary visitor, would have been exposed had he, likewise, jumped into the sea. Further, the Court held that It cannot be denied that in jumping into the sea, one mile and a half from the seashore of Arceli, Dumarang, Palawan, Filomeno failed to exercise "even slight care and diligence," that he displayed a "reckless disregard of the safety" of his person, that he could not have been but conscious of the probable consequences" of his carelessness and that he was "indifferent, or worse, to the danger of injury. MARINDUQUE V. WORKMENS OGENA Marinduque Iron Mines v Workmens Compensation Commission

27

deceased Mamador together with other laborers of the Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc. rode a truck driven by its employee Macunat which was on its way to their workplace at the mine camp while trying to overtake another truck on the company road, their truck turned over and hit a coconut tree, resulting in the death of Mamador and injury to the others Criminal action against Macunat led to his being prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased but has paid nothing Petitioner Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc. questions by certiorari the order of the Workmens Compensation Commissioner confirming the referees award of compensation to the heirs of Pedro Mamador for his accidental death Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc. maintains that this claim is barred by section 6 of the Workmens Compensation Law because

o o

pursuing a course of conduct which would naturally and probably result in injury utter disregard of consequences

Getting or accepting a free ride on the companys haulage truck couldnt be gross negligence - no danger or risk was apparent.

ILAO-ORETA V. RONQUILLO PASCUAL ILAO-ORETA vs. RONQUILLO Facts: Despite several years of marriage, Spouses Ronquillo remained childless. They consulted Dr. Concepcion Ilao-Oreta, an obstetrician-gynecologist-consultant at St. Lukes and Chief of the Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility Section. The wife agreed to undergo alaparoscopic procedure where a laparoscope would be inserted through her abdominal wall to get a direct view of her internal reproductive organ in order to determine the real cause of her infertility. The procedure was scheduled on April 5, 1999 at 2 pm. Dr. Ilao-Oreta did not arrive and no prior notice of its cancellation was received by the Ronquillos. Dr. Ilao-Oreta was on her honeymoon in Hawaii. She estimated that she would arrive in Manila in the early morning of April 5. However, she failed to consider the time difference between Hawaii and Philippines. The Ronquillos filed a complaint against Dr. Ilao-Oreta and St. Lukes for breach of professional and service contract and for damages. RTC awarded Eva Marie only actual damages upon finding that the doctors failure to arrive on time was not intentional. CA found Dr. Ilao-Oreta grossly negligent. Issues: WON Dr. Ilao-Oreta was grossly negligent Held: The doctors act did not reflect gross negligence and the spouses were not entitled to recover moral damages. Gross negligence implies a wanton absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exercising any effort to avoid them. It is characterized by want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. The records show that before leaving for Hawaii, Dr. Ilao-Oreta left an admitting order with her secretary for one of the spouses to pick up, apprised Eva Marie of the necessary preparations for the procedure, and instructed the hospital staff to perform pre-operative treatments. These acts of the doctor reflect an earnest intention to perform the procedure on the day and time scheduled. Although Dr. Ilao-Oretas act is not grossly negligent, she was negligent when she scheduled to perform professional service at 2 pm without considering the time difference between Philippines and Hawaii. Having travelled to the US, where she obtained a fellowship in Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility, more than twice, she should have been mindful of the time difference.

o o

(a) Macunat was prosecuted and required to indemnify the heirs of the deceased for the sum of 150 pesos, Mamadors widow promised to forgive Macunat for the wrong committed and not to bring him before the authorities for prosecution (b) an amicable settlement was concluded between said heirs and Macunat Nava vs. Inchausti Co.: indemnity granted the heirs in a criminal prosecution of the other person does not affect the liability of the employer to pay compensation

o o

Issue: WON Mamadors violation of employers (herein petitoner) prohibition against laborers riding the haulage trucks was employees notorious negligence thereby precluding recovery Held: NO. award of compensation is hereby affirmed

Mere riding on haulage truck is not negligence since transportation by truck is not dangerous per se. Violation of a rule promulgated by the Commission/board is not negligence per se but may be considered evidence of such negligence Given that such order/prohibition by the employer could not be a greater obligation than a rule of the Commission/board; the aforesaid rule (violation=evidence for negligence) may be considered applicable Commissions referee considered such evidence and declared that the laborers did not act with negligence under the said circumstances, since such prohibition by the employer had nothing to do with the personal safety of the riders notorious negligence = gross negligence

conscious indifference to consequences

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The procedure to be conducted on the wife was only elective in nature thus the situation did not present any clear and apparent harm or injury that even a careless person may perceive. According to the SC, it bears noting that when she was scheduling the date of her performance of the procedure, Dr. Ilao-Oreta had just gotten married and was preparing for her honeymoon, and it is of common human knowledge that excitement attends its preparations. Her negligence could then be partly attributed to human frailty which rules out its characterization as gross.

who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequence. CORINTHIAN GARDENS V. SPS TANJANGCO SIANG Corinthian Gardens Association vs Spouses Tanjangcos and Spouses Cuasos June 27, 2008 Nachura, J. Torts and Damages: * (ELEMENTS/REQUISITES)

PICART V. SMITH PEREZ Picart v Smith GR L12219 15 March 1918 Street, J. Facts: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Picart was riding on his pony over a bridge. Smith approached from the opposite direction in an automobile. He blew his horn to give warning of his approach. Picart pulled the pony closely against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side. Smith assumed that Picart would move to the other side. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, Smith, instead of veering to the right, continue to approach directly toward the horse. When Smith had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, Smith quickly turned his car to escape hitting the horse. The horse became frightened, turned his body and was struck by the car. The horse fell and Picart was thrown off. The horse died.

In every tort case filed under Article 2176, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff;

(2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred. * (DEFINITION) A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly done from a lack of ordinary prudence and may be one which creates a situation involving an unreasonable risk to another because of the expectable action of the other, a third person, an animal, or a force of nature. A negligent act is one from which an ordinary prudent person in the actor's position, in the same or similar circumstances, would foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do the act or to do it in a more careful manner.

Issue/Held: 1. Ratio: 1. Smith must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to Smith; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side. Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequence. Picart himself was guilty of antecedent negligence. The problem is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. The negligence of Smith succeeded the negligence of Picart by an appreciable interval. The person WON Smith was guilty of negligence. YES

Facts: Tanjangcos owned joined lots in Corinthian Gardens. Spouse Cuasos, on the other hand, own a lot adjacent to the formers. Before the Cuasos constructed their house, it was surveyed by De Dios Realty (surveyor) as per recommendation of the petitioner association. Later on, the petitioner approved the plans made by CB Paras Construction (builder). Corinthian conducted periodic ocular inspections in order to determine compliance with the approved plans pursuant to the Manual of Rules and Regulations of Corinthian (MRRC). Unfortunately, after construction, the perimeter fence of the Cuasos encroached upon the Tanjangcos lot. Issue: Whether Corinthian was negligent under the circumstances and, if so, whether such negligence contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos.

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HELD: Corinthian is negligent. Its approval of the plan is tainted with negligence.

NO. Art 2185 is limited to motor vehicles and does not include non-motorized vehicles like bikes. Anonuevo argues that the framers did not intend to limit the scope of the provision to motor vehicles. According to his theory, framers did not expect today's greater interaction of motor and non-motor vehicles. This is untenable. Framers should have expressly included non-motor vehicles if they intended to do so, because there were much less motor vehicles in 1950. There is reason for the distinction. Motor vehicles result in greater damage because of their greater speed. Art 2185 therefore clearly limits application only to motor vehicles. 2) WON there was negligence per se on the part of Villagracia YES. Negligence per se is negligence because of violation of a statute or ordinance intended to promote safety. Villagracia violated the 1948 ordinance. 3) WON negligence per se of Villagracia is sufficient to establish liability for damages NO. Sanitary Steam v CA is controlling: Negligence per se (violation of statutory duty) should be the proximate cause of injury. It was Anonuevo's negligence that caused the accident. Ct emphasizes that Anonuevo saw Villagracia 10m away before the collision. He should have slowed down. 4) WON there was contributory negligence NO. Causal link must be established between negligence and injury to mitigate damages. Ct finds no reason to disturb the findings of RTC and CA. HEIRS OF COMPLETO V. ALBAYDA TIONGCO Heirs of Completo and Abiad v Albayda Nachura, 2010 FACTS: 9. Albayda was a soldier who was doing guard duties at the Villamor Airbase (VAB). He was riding his bike along 8th street while the taxi driven by Completo was running along 11th street. The bike reached the intersection first. The car sideswept it. The taxi was allegedly speedinng above the 25kph allowed at the place. Albayda was confined in a hospital for 7 months, had to undergo physical therapy, and suffered pain, sleepless nights, loss of income, etc.

Ratio: Petitioner is found negligent under the test. The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in committing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would have used in the same situation? The MRRC provides that no new constructions can be started without the approval of the petitioner association. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that Corinthian, through its representative, in the approval of building plans, and in the conduct of periodic inspections of ongoing construction projects within the subdivision, is responsible in insuring compliance with the approved plans, inclusive of the construction of perimeter walls. Corinthians failure to prevent the encroachment of the Cuasos perimeter wall into Tanjangcos property despite the inspection conducted constitutes negligence and, at the very least, contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos.

ANONUEVO V. CA TEJANO FACTS (as found by RTC and affirmed by CA) Jonas Anonuevo, who was driving a car owned by Procter & Gamble Inc, his brother's employer, was turning left at the intersection between Boni Ave and Barangka Drive in Mandaluyong from the far lane to Libertad St when he collided with Jerome Villagracia who was riding a bicycle. Villagracia sustained serious injuries which led to several times of hospitalization and 4 operations. At the time of the accident, the bicycle did not have safety gadgets such as a horn or headlights and was not registered with the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, both being required by a 1948 ordinance. Anonuevo also admitted that the bike did not have foot brakes. On the other hand, an eyewitness claims that Anonuevo was speeding when he was making the turn and, in fact, a jeepney was obstructing his path which should have warned him to slow down. These were not disputed by Anonuevo. He also admitted seeing Villagracia 10m away from his car before the collision. RTC and CA ruled in favor of Villagracia and awarded him actual & moral damages and attorney's fees. Anonuevo argues that, under Art 2185, there is presumed negligence on a driver of a motor vehicle when at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation. ISSUES & RULING 1) WON Art 2185 should apply

10. Albayda filed complaint for physical injuries through reckless imprudence. 11. Completo filed coutnercharge of damage to proerty through reckless impudnece, which was dismissed. 12. Albayda reserved separaet civil action for dmaages, and also sued Abiad, the 13. Albayda claimed that the proximate cause of his 7 month hospitalization and medical treatment was the incident. ISSUE:

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1. 2. RATIO 1. 2.

WON Completo was negligent? YES. WON Abiad failed to prove that he exercised the diligence of a good father to exempt him from liability under Art. 2180? NO.

Applying 2176, Completo was guilty of a quasi-delict. Completo failed to exercise reaonable diligence because he was overspeeding. Such negligence was the sole and prximate cfuase of the injuries sustained by Albayda. Completo did not slwo down even when he approaced the intersection of 8th and 11th street in VAB. It was alos proven that Albayda had the right of way, considering that he reached the itnersection ahead of Compelto. The bicycle occupies a legal position that is equal to that of other vehicles in the highway. More care is required of the motorist than the cyclist because it is more dangerous to the cyclist. 2180 applied in relation to Abiad. The liability under quasi delicts is direct and the employer need not be with the employee at the time of the incident. Abiad's testimony is short o the diligence required under the law, and consists entirely of testimonial evidence, unsubstantiated and self-serving.

CA: Morales not liable because there was no employer-employee relationship between him and Matibag, and 2180 does not apply because of the absence of such relationship; even if there were, Morales not negligent if based on the definition of negligence in Picart v. Smith**; not negligent because he kept a gun, a dangerous firearm, locked safely in a drawer; exercised due diligence by keeping the loaded gun in a locked drawer while on a business trip to Manila ISSUE: Whether or not Morales is guilty of negligence that will entitle the Pacis spouses to damages HELD: YES, Morales was negligent 1. Under NCC 1161, petitioners may enforce their claim for damages based on civil liability arising from crime under RPC 100 or they may file an independent civil action for damages under the NCCC. Unlike subsidiary liability of the employer under RPC 103, the liability of the employer under NCC 2176 is primary and direct, based on a persons own negligence. NCC 2176: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict, and is governed by this chapter PNP Circular No. 9: A person who is in the business of purchasing and selling of firearms and ammunition must maintain basic security and safety requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to operate Dealership will be suspended/cancelled a. Higher degree of care required of someone in possession or in control of an instrumentality extremely dangerous in character e.g. dangerous weapons and substances. Unlike ordinary affairs of life/business which involve little or no risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher degree of care As a gun store owner, Morales is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and should have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury o others. He has the duty to ensure all guns in his store are NOT LOADED. Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-access defensive use. Guns accepted by the store for repair should not be loaded precisely because they are defective and may cause an accidental discharge.

3.

4.

2.

PACIS V. MORALES - VALDEZ PACIS v. MORALES J. Carpio Feb. 25, 2010 FACTS: Defendant Jerome Jovanne Morales, the owner of Top Gun Firearms in Baguio City, was in Manila, and Armando Jarnague, an employee was not around, so he requested sales agents Aristedes Matibag and Jason Herbolario to look after the gun store while he and Morales were away. Jarnague entrusted a bunch of keys used in the gun store, which included the key to the drawer where a defective gun was kept. Matibag and Herboloario brought out the gun from its drawer and placed it on top of the table. Alfred Dennis Pacis, a 17 year-old, got hold of the same, but Matibag asked ADP to return the gun. ADP handed the gun to Matibag, but the gun went off, and the bullet hit ADP on the head (for recit purposes, ADP was a 1st year student at the Bagui Colleges Foundation taking up BS ComSci). A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag, but the latter was acquitted due to the exempting circumstance of accident. Redo and Cleopatra, parents of the deceased, filed a civil case against for damages against Morales. RTC: In favour of petitioners; Morales liable under 2180 cf. 2176; accidental shooting of Alfred which caused his death partly due to negligence of Matibag; Matibag and herbolario were employees of respondent even if they were on commission basis; Morales is liable for damages unless he can prove that he observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage; Morales failed to observe required diligence when he left key to the drawer containing the loaded defective gun without instructing his employees to be careful in handling the loaded gun

3.

b.

c. 4.

Morales negligence lies in the fact that he placed the gun for repair inside the drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded a. b. Gun should have been stored in a vault He should have made sure it was not loaded to prevent any untoward incident

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c.

He should never accept a firearm from another person until the cylinder/action is open and he has personally checked that the weapon is completely unloaded Not shown whether he even has a license to repair

where it is reasonable to believe children will wander into will make the property owner liable for injury to those children. However, to deny the Manila Railroad's liability here, the court noted two things. 1. David Taylor was 15, was already a cabin boy before and worked as a mechanical draftsman. He wasn't really a "child", remember during this period 15 year olds can be liable criminally and already marry. Therefore he must be judged more as a capable adult. THEREFORE David's act of lighting the blasting caps with a match was the immediate cause of the casualty. The negligence of defendant corporation in leaving the caps exposed was NOT the proximate cause of injury, thus it is not civilly liable.

d.

**Picart v. Smith: Could a prudent man, in the position of the person to who negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or take precaution against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. TAYLOR V. MANILA RAILROAD ABDON Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad / GR No. L-4977 / 2 Mar 1910 / J. Carson FACTS David Taylor, with another boy Manuel Claparols, went to appellant's premises to visit an employee on a Sunday afternoon, 30 Sep 1905. Because the employee was not around, as a curious boy of 15, he along with Manuel wandered around the appellant's premises and chanced upon about 20 to 30 blasting caps on the ground. The boys picked up all they could find and went back to the home of Manuel to experiment. They met a little girl less than 9 years old, Jesse Adrian, along the way, who went back with them. Arriving at the house, the boys started their experiments. They tried to plug it in a light socket, break it with a stone (they couldnt find a hammer), opened one up with a knife, with no exciting results. Finally someone got the bright idea to light a match to the contents of the blasting cap, at which point the little girl Jesse was smart enough to run. The resulting explosion burned Manuel's hand and blinded David in his right eye. ISSUE WON defendant company is liable for damages for loss of the eye and injuries. HELD No, because the proximate cause of Taylor's injury was his own act, not the negligence of Manila Railroad. But, the court had a lengthy discussion on the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases in the United States. In Railroad Co. v. Stout, the doctrine is that

2.

JARCO MARKETING V. CA ADORNA Jarco Marketing Corp., L. Kong, J. Tiope, and E. Panelo v. CA and Sps. Aguilar (1999) Davide Facts 1. 2. Sps. Aguilar are the parents of six year old Zhieneth. Petitioners are the owner and managers of Syvels Department Store in Makati May 1983, Zhieneth and her mother Criselda were shopping at the store. Criselda was signing her credit card receipt and when she heard a loud thud. Criselda turned to see her daughter pinned down by the gift wrapping counter which had fallen over. Zhieneth was rushed to the hospital where she died 14 days later from her injuries.

3. Spouses 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

a railroad company is not bound to the same degree of care in regards to trespassers (strangers) as the degree it owes it passengers BUT it is not exempt from responsibility to those strangers for its negligence AND the conduct of children should not be judged by the same rules as that of an adult, as his care and caution is according to his own maturity only

Proximate cause was the negligence of company in maintaining a safe counter employees testified that they had informed management that the counter was safe but the latter ignored the warnings. Conclusive presumption child below 9 years of age incapable of contributory negligence. Zhieneth was physically incapable of propping herself on the counter. Also, when asked by the doctor what happened, she spontaneously said that she never climbed the counter and it just fell on her. (should be part of res gestae) No negligence on part of Criselda because it was reasonable for her to let go of Zhieneth momentarily to sign the credit card slip. Damages Claimed: P157,522.86 for actual damages, P300,000 for moral damages, P20,000 for attorneys fees and an unspecified amount for loss of income and exemplary damages

Company 1. 2. Proximate cause of the injury was negligence of (a) Zhieneth who climbed on top of the counter (b) Criselda who let her daughter run freely around the store. Company exercised due diligence of good father of the family in maintaining a solid structure that had never fallen in 15 years.

This was applied to similar circumstances in Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. MacDonald. In general the rule is that children are curious, and leaving unguarded hazards in property

32

3.

Counter claim for moral, exemplary, and atty fees.

Facts Edgardo Aquino instructed his students to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried. He left the children temporarily and allegedly told the children "not to touch the stone." A few minutes after Aquino left, three of the four kids, Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully jumped into the pit. Then, Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening. Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately fo Ylarde, the concrete block caught him before he could get out. He died three days after. The lower court dismissed the complaint on the following grounds: o that the digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called Work Education; o that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person; and o that the demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless imprudence. CA affirmed. Issue: WON Aquino (teacher) and Soriano (principal) should be held liable for damages? Ruling Principal No. Soriano, as principal, cannot be held liable for the reason that the school he heads is an academic school and not a school of arts and trades. Besides, he did not give any instruction regarding the digging. Teacher Yes. Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence when he: o (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task; o (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging, knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area; o (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling; o (4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the children's safety; and o (5) left the children close to the excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance. The lower court did not consider his age and maturity. The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself. A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult, but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience. The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances. The court is not persuaded that the digging can pass as part of their Work Education. The site requires adult laborers. Also, it was not included in the lesson plan

RTC: Ruled in favor of company. Proximate cause was misbehavior of Zhieneth. Counter was placed in a corner of the floor and was not an attractive nuisance. CA: Reversed ruling. Company negligent in maintaining counter. Child under 9 years not capable of negligence. Criselda was not negligent in taking a moment to sign the credit card slip. Award: P99K actual, P50K compensatory for death, P100K moral and exemplary, P20K fees. No award for funeral expenses because not adequately proven. Issues: (1) Was it an accident or negligence? (2) Who was negligent? SC: Upheld CA. 1. Defined Accident: An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. It is a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens. Defined Negligence: Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Established Test: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. Established Rule: The rule, therefore, is that a child under nine years of age must be conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law Ruling a. There was negligence. (a) testimony of Zhieneth at hospital was res gestae and conclusive of the fact that the counter fell on its own. (b) Employees testified that management was told previously that counter was unsafe because it was top heavy and not nailed to the floor. Management did not act. b. Even if Zhieneth had climbed counter, she would not have been physically capable of toppling it over had it been properly built and maintained. c. Criselda was not negligent (a) she turned away only for a moment (b) and Zhieneth was still very close to herZhieneth was 1 foot away, and the counter was about 4 meters away. both distance and time were significant in arriving at conclusion of no negligence.

2.

3. 4. 5.

Dispositive Petition denied. CA decision affirmed. YLARDE V. AQUINO BRILLO Ylarde v. Aquino July 29, 1988

33

for their Work Education. A reasonably prudent person would have foreseen that bringing children to an excavation site, and more so, leaving them there all by themselves, may result in an accident. An ordinarily careful human being would not assume that a simple warning "not to touch the stone" is sufficient to cast away all the serious danger that a huge concrete block adjacent to an excavation would present to the children. Moreover, a teacher who stands in loco parentis to his pupils would have made sure that the children are protected from all harm in his company. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the questioned judgment of the respondent court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment is hereby rendered ordering private respondent Edagardo Aquino to pay petitioners the following: o (1) Indemnity for the death of Child Ylarde P30,000.00 o (2) Exemplary damages 10,000.00 o (3) Moral damages 20,000.00 CULION V. PHILIPPINE MOTORS BUENAVENTURA FACTS: When Culion wanted to get his motor schooner repaired, he went to PMC where Quest, PMCs manager decided to oversee the repairs. Apparently, the tube connecting the carburetor and the fuel tank was not well-fitted, such that the fuel mixture leaked and dripped down to the engine compartment. Quests attention was called on this but he took it lightly. When the engine was started, there was a backfire and the boat was burned. HELD: Ordinarily, a backfire from an engine would not be followed by any disaster, but here the leak along the pipeline and the flooding of the carburetor created a dangerous situation, which a prudent mechanic, versed in repairs of boat engines, would have taken precaution to avoid. When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do. Quest is experienced in fixing car and tractor engines, but not that of boats. A person skilled in dealing with boats would have been sufficiently warned by the circumstances to cause him to take precaution against the danger. Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engine on boats. RULE: When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do. US V. PINEDA BUHANGIN US v. Pineda Facts: 1. Defendant Santiago Pineda is a registered pharmacist of long standing and the owner of a drug store located at Calle Santo Cristo, Manila.

2. 3.

Horses owned by a certain Feliciano Santos were ill. Santos then presented a copy of a prescription obtained from one Dr. Richardson at Pinedas drug store. Under the supervision of Pineda, the prescription was prepared and returned to Santos in the form of six papers marked, "Botica Pineda Clorato potasa 120.00 en seis papeles para caballo Sto. Cristo 442, 444, Binondo, Manila. Santos, under the belief that he had purchased the item he had asked for, used it on two of his sick horses. These died shortly after being given the dose. Santos then brought the remaining drug packages to the Bureau of Science for examination. It was determined that the packages contained not potassium chlorate but barium chlorate. At the instance of Santos, two chemists from the Bureau of Science went to Pinedas drug store and bought potassium chlorate. It was later determined that it was likewise barium chlorate. Dr. Buencamino, a veterinarian, performed an autopsy on one of the dead horses and found that the cause of death was poisoning. The lower court found Pineda liable of Act No. 597, otherwise known as the Pharmacy Law, Sec. 17.

4. 5.

6.

7. 8. Issue:

WON Pineda should be liable even if he invoked the plea of accident and mistake. Held/Ratio: SC: In view of the tremendous an imminent danger to the public from the careless sale of poisons and medicines, we do not deem it too rigid a rule to hold that the law penalizes any druggist who shall sell one drug for another whether it be through negligence or mistake. The Pharmacy Law was first enacted as Act No. 597, was later amended by Act Nos. 1921, 2236, and 2382, and is now found as Chapter 30 of the Administrative Code. The law provides for a board of pharmaceutical examiners, and the examination and registration of pharmacists, and finally contains sundry provisions relative to the practice of pharmacy. High qualification for applicants for the pharmaceutical; examination are established. The program of subjects for the examination is wide. Responsibility for the quality of drugs is fixed by section 17 of the Pharmacy Law, in the following term: o Every pharmacist shall be responsible for the quality of all drugs, chemicals, medicines, and poisons he may sell or keep for sale; and it shall be unlawful for any person whomsoever to manufacture, prepare, sell, or administer any prescription, drug, chemical, medicine, or poison under any fraudulent name, direction, or pretense, or to adulterate any drug, chemical, medicine, or poison so used, sold or offered for sale. Any drug, chemical, medicine, or poison shall be held to be adulterated or deteriorated within the meaning of

34

this section if it differs from the standard of quality or purity given in the United States Pharmacopoeia. The profession of pharmacy, it has been said again and again, is one demanding care and skill. The responsibility of the druggist to use care has been variously qualified as "ordinary care," "care of a special high degree," "the highest degree of care known to practical men." Even under the first conservative expression, "ordinary care" with reference to the business of a druggist, the Supreme Court of Connecticut has said must be held to signify "the highest practicable degree of prudence, thoughtfulness, and vigilance, and most exact and reliable safeguards consistent with the reasonable conduct of the business, in order that human life may not be constantly be exposed to the danger flowing from the substitution of deadly poisons for harmless medicine." The rule of caveat emptor cannot apply to the purchase and sale of drugs. The vendor and the vendee do not stand at arms length as in ordinary transactions. An imperative duty is on the druggist to take precautions to prevent death or serious injury to anyone who relies on his absolute honesty and peculiar leaning. The nature of drugs is such that examination would not avail the purchaser anything. It would be idle mockery for the customer to make an examination of a compound of which he can know nothing. Consequently, it must be that the druggist warrants that he will deliver the drug called for. On fraud, it cannot be that the Philippine Legislature intended to use the word "fraudulent" in all its strictness. A plea of accident and mistake cannot excuse for they cannot take place unless there be wanton and criminal carelessness and neglect. How the misfortune occurs is unimportant, if under all the circumstances the fact of occurrence is attributed to the druggist as a legal fault. Rather considering the responsibility for the quality of drugs which the law imposes on druggists and the position of the word "fraudulent" in juxtaposition to "name," what is made unlawful is the giving of a false name to the drug asked for.

De Leon returned to the same Mercury Drug branch, and confronted Ganzon why he was given ear drops, instead of the prescribed eye drops, she did not apologize and instead brazenly replied that she was unable to fully read the prescription. It was her supervisor who apologized and informed De Leon that they do not have stock of the needed Cortisporin Opthalmic. De Leon wrote Mercury Drug, through its Pres. Vivian K. Askuna, about the days incident but did not merit any response. Having been denied his simple desire for a written apology and explanation, De Leon filed a complaint for damages against Mercury Drug. Mercury Drug denied that it was negligent and therefore liable for damages. It pointed out that the proximate cause of De Leons unfortunate experience was his own negligence. He should have first read and checked to see if he had the right eye solution before he used any on his eye. He could have also requested his sheriff to do the same before the latter applied the medicine on such a delicate part of his body. Also, no available medicine known as Cortisporin Opthalmic in the Philippine market. Furthermore, what was written on the piece of paper De Leon presented to Ganzon was Cortisporin Solution. Accordingly, she gave him the only available Cortisporin Solution in the market. The prescription is also improper since it lacked the required information concerning the attending doctors name and license number and that Guanzon entertained De Leons purchase request only because he was a regular customer. RTC ruled in favor of De Leon finding Mercury Drug liable for P153.25 for the value of the medicine, P100K as moral damages, P300K as exemplary damages and attorne ys fees of P50K plus litigation expenses. CA affirmed the said decision. ISSUE: WON Mercury Drug is liable to De Leon. HELD: Yes. Mercury Drug and Ganzon can NOT exculpate themselves from any liability. As active players in the field of dispensing medicines to the public, the highest degree of care and diligence is expected of them. Likewise, numerous decisions, both here and abroad, have laid salutary rules for the protection of human life and human health. The profession of pharmacy demands care and skill, and druggists must exercise care of a specially high degree, the highest degree of care known to practical men. In other words, druggists must exercise the highest practicable degree of prudence and vigilance, and the most exact and reliable safeguards consistent with the reasonable conduct of the business, so that human life may not constantly be exposed to the danger flowing from the substitution of deadly poisons for harmless medicines. Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life and death for a buying patient, the said employee should have been very cautious in dispensing medicines. She should have verified whether the medicine she gave to De Leon was indeed the one prescribed by his physician. The care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the law demands. In cases where an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there has been negligence on the part of the employer, either in the selection or supervision of ones employees. This presumption may be

MERCURY DRUG V. DE LEON CELEBRADO 3rd Division | G.R. No. 165622 | 17 Oct 2008 | Reyes, R.T., J. FACTS: Raul T. De Leon, presiding judge of Paraaque RTC, noticed that his left eye was reddish and had a difficulty reading. He met Dr. Charles Milla at a restaurant and consulted about his irritated left eye, who prescribed the drugs Cortisporin Opthalmic and Ceftin to relieve his eye problems. De Leon went to Mercury Drug Store Corporation and showed his prescription to petitioner Aurmela Ganzon, a pharmacist assistant. He paid for and took the medicine. De Leon requested his sheriff to assist him in using the eye drops. Instead of relieving his irritation, he felt searing pain. He immediately rinsed the affected eye with water, but the pain did not subside. Only then did he discover that he was given the WRONG medicine, Cortisporin Otic Solution.

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rebutted by a clear showing that the employer has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family. Mercury Drug failed to overcome such presumption. SC affirmed the decision but modified the award of moral and exemplary damages to P50K and P25K, respectively. CRUZ V. CA DESLATE The case is a medical malpractice suit filed by the heirs of the deceased against petitioner Dr. NInivetch Cruz and Dr. Lina Ercillo under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code . Lydia Umali was scheduled for a hysterectomy operation for her myoma. Her daughter, Rowena Umali Ocampo, accompanied her to the Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital in San Pablo, Laguna. Upon arriving, Rowena noticed that the clinic was untidy. She even asked for a rag to wipe the dusty floor and window with. Because of this, she tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with the operation. However, Dr. Cruz told Lydia that she had to be operated on as scheduled. Rowena, her husband, her sister, and her two aunts were there as Lydia was operated on. The ff. is the sequence of events: During the operation, Dr. Ercillo went out of the operating room and instructed them to buy tagamet ampules. Rowena's sister bought these. After 1 hour, Ercillo came out again and asked them to buy blood for Lydia. They bought blood type A from the St. Gerald Blood Bank. After a few hours, the operation was finished. Lydia was wheeled out on a stretcher, and Dr. Cruz again asked the relatives to buy her more blood. They weren't able to do this as there was no more available blood type A in the blood bank, but a person later arrived to donate blood and this was transfused to Lydia. Lydia then gasped for breath (she was attached to an oxygen tank). The oxygen had apparently run out so Rowena and her husband had to get more oxygen. This was administered to her as soon as it arrived but at 10PM, Lydia went into shock and her blood pressure dropped to 60/50. Lydia had to be transferred to another hospital, the San Pablo City District Hospital, so she could be connected to a respirator and further examined. However, this transfer was done without the prior consent of Rowena or her other relatives. They followed the ambulance on a tricycle. In San Pablo District Hospital, Lydia had to be operated on again because blood awas oozing out of her abdominal incision. When the doctors arrived, however, Lydia was already in shock and possibly dead as her BP was down to 0/0. Lydia was pronounced dead. ISSUE: whether or not petitioner can be convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, arising from an alleged medical malpractice HELD: NO. The standard of care that a physician in a certain situation should have observed is determined by other members of the profession in good standing and under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science. Did the said physician use the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would have used?

Thus, expert testimony is crucial, especially since the injuries involved demand scientific knowledge. In this case, no such testimony was given. The testimonies of Dr. Arizala and Dr. Salvador Jr. of the NBI only testified as to the possible cause of death of Lydia but not the standard of care petitioner should have exercised. The inadequacy of the facilities and untidiness of the clinic; the lack of provisions; the failure to conduct pre-operation tests on the patient; and the subsequent transfer of Lydia to the San Pablo Hospital and the reoperation performed on her by the petitioner may indicate that petitioner was recklessly imprudent in the exercise of her duties as a surgeon, but no cogent proof exists that any of these circumstances caused petitioner's death. Thus, the absence of the fourth element of reckless imprudence, that the injury to the person or property was a consequence of the reckless imprudence, does not exist. ELEMENTS OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. Dr. Arizala and Salvador point to hemorrhagic shock as the cause of death, which is the result of blood loss. There are many possible causes of hemorrhage such as the failure of the surgeon to cut or tie a blood vessel or allowing it to get out of control, the subsequent loosening of said blood vessel, and a clotting defect knows as DIC which occurs as a complication of surgery leaving raw surface. DIC can happen to anyone and cannot be prevented. In this case, the medical record shows that the cause of the hemorrhage is DIC which cannot be attributed to the doctor. Dr. Arizala said that "there is no fault on the part of the surgeon." Dr. Cruz is therefore acquitted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide but is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Lydia Umali damages: FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil liability, ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as moral damages, and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages. (For insufficiency of evidence this Court was not able to render a sentence of conviction but it is not blind to the reckless and imprudent manner in which the petitioner carried out her duties. A precious life has been lost and the circumstances leading thereto exacerbated the grief of those left behind. The heirs of the deceased continue to feel the loss of their mother up to the present time and this Court is aware that no amount of compassion and commiseration nor words of bereavement can suffice to assuage the sorrow felt for the loss of a loved one. Certainly, the award of moral and exemplary damages in favor of the heirs of Lydia Umali are proper in the instant case.") III. PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE 1. Tison v. Spouses Pomasin - Doria Facts:

36

Issue:

Vehicular collision involving two vehicles, a tractor-trailer and a jitney (i.e. share taxi or minibus) along Maharlika highway resulting in multiple death and injuries to those in the jitney driven by Laarni Pomasin Spouses Pomasin et al filed a complaint for damages against Tison, the owner of the truck, and Jabon, the driver TC: dismissed complaint because it was Pomasin who was negligent and this was proximate cause CA: Jabons reckless driving caused collision CA also noted that the restriction in Jabons drivers license was violated, thus giving rise to the presumption that he was negligent at the time of the accident

Instead, the Courts statements in Tison should be interpreted to mean that despite the presumption of negligence arising from the traffic regulation violation, the claimant must still prove that such negligence was the proximate cause in order to successfully claim for damages.

3.

Professional Services v Agana Enteria Professional Services Inc. (PSI) v. Natividad and Enrique Agana Natividad and Enrique Agana v. Juan Fuentes

w/n Jabon was negligent Held: No. Actually it was Laarni, the jitney driver, who was negligent and that this was the proximate cause of the accident. Case dismissed. The court noted that it was indeed true that at the time of the incident, Jabon was prohibited from driving the truck due to the restriction imposed on his drivers license. Jabon even asked that the LTO reinstate his articulate license containing restriction code to allow him to drive a tractor-trailer. However, although driving without a proper license is a violation of traffic regulation, and vis-a-vis Art. 2185, the legal presumption of negligence arises if at the time of the mishap, a person is violating any traffic regulation, a causal connection must exist between the injury received and the violation of the traffic regulation. It must be proven that the violation of the traffic regulation was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto (Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. CA). Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. WISE WORDS FROM THE GOOD BOOK: The highlighted portion should not be interpreted to mean that the presumption of negligence only arises when the traffic violation was the proximate cause of the injury. 1. There is nothing in the text of the article which would suggest such a requirement. 2. Such a requirement would put the cart before the horse, so to speak. A presumption of negligence only provides evidence of negligence in the absence of proof to the contrary. To establish proximate cause, one would have to prove that the negligent act in question is the legal cause of the injury. If one were able to prove that a negligent act is the proximate cause, the one would not need a presumption any more.

Miguel Ampil v. Natividad and Enrique Agana January 31, 2007

FACTS 1. Natividad Agana was rushed to Medical City because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. Dr. Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from cancer of the sigmoid. Dr. Ampil performed an anterior resection surgery on her, and finding that the malignancy spread on her left ovary, he obtained the consent of her husband, Enrique, to permit Dr. Fuentes to perform hysterectomy on her. After the hysterectomy, Dr. Fuentes showed his work to Dr. Ampil, who examined it and found it in order, so he allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil was about to complete the procedure when the attending nurses made some remarks on the Record of Operation: "sponge count lacking 2; announced to surgeon search done but to no avail continue for closure" (two pieces of gauze were missing). A "diligent search" was conducted but they could not be found. Dr. Ampil then directed that the incision be closed. 2. A couple of days after, she complained of pain in her anal region, but the doctors told her that it was just a natural consequence of the surgery. Dr. Ampil recommended that she consult an oncologist to examine the cancerous nodes which were not removed during the operation. After months of consultations and examinations in the US, she was told that she was free of cancer. Weeks after coming back, her daughter found a piece of gauze (1.5 in) protruding from her vagina, so Dr. Ampil manually extracted this, assuring Natividad that the pains will go away. However, the pain worsened, so she sought treatment at a hospital, where another 1.5 in piece of gauze was found in her vagina. She underwent another surgery.

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3.

Sps. Agana filed a complaint for damages against PSI (owner of Medical City), Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes, alleging that the latter are liable for negligence for leaving 2 pieces of gauze in Natividad's body, and malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence. Enrique Agana also filed an administrative complaint for gross negligence and malpractice against the two doctors with the PRC (although only the case against Dr. Fuentes was heard since Dr. Ampil was abroad). Pending the outcome of the cases, Natividad died (now substituted by her children). RTC found PSI and the two doctors liable for negligence and malpractice. PRC dismissed the case against Dr. Fuentes. CA dismissed only the case against Fuentes.

prudent health care provider would have done [or wouldn't have done], and that the failure or action caused injury to the patient.

Duty - to remove all foreign objects from the body before closure of the incision; if he fails to do so, it was his duty to inform the patient about it Breach - failed to remove foreign objects; failed to inform patient Injury - suffered pain that necessitated examination and another surgery

Proximate Causation - breach caused this injury; could be traced from his act of closing the incision despite information given by the attendant nurses that 2 pieces of gauze were still missing; what established causal link: gauze pieces later extracted from patient's vagina 2. Whether the Court of Appeals Erred in Absolving Dr. Fuentes of any Liability Dr. Fuentes is not liable. The res ipsa loquitur [thing speaks for itself] argument of the Aganas' does not convince the court. Mere invocation and application of this doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. Requisites for the applicability of res ipsa loquitur Occurrence of injury 1. AMPIL 2. 3. Occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not Absence of explanation by defendant have happened if those who had control or management used proper care Thing which caused injury was under the control and management of the defendant [DR. FUENTES] -- LACKING SINCE CTRL+MGT WAS WITH DR.

ISSUE AND HOLDING 1. 2. 3. RATIO 1. Whether the Court of Appeals Erred in Holding Dr. Ampil Liable for Negligence and Malpractice. His arguments are without basis [did not prove that the American doctors were the ones who put / left the gauzes; did not submit evidence to rebut the correctness of the operation record (re: number of gauzes used); re: Dr. Fuentes' alleged negligence, Dr. Ampil examined his work and found it in order]. Leaving foreign substances in the wound after incision has been closed is at least prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon. Even if it has been shown that a surgeon was required to leave a sponge in his patient's abdomen because of the dangers attendant upon delay, still, it is his legal duty to inform his patient within a reasonable time by advising her of what he had been compelled to do, so she can seek relief from the effects of the foreign object left in her body as her condition might permit. What's worse in this case is that he misled her by saying that the pain was an ordinary consequence of her operation. WON CA erred in holding Dr. Ampil liable for negligence and malpractice. NO; DR. AMPIL IS GUILTY WON CA erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of any liability. NO WON PSI may be held solidarily liable for Dr. Ampil's negligence. YES

Under the Captain of the Ship rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation. That Dr. Ampil discharged such role is evident from the following:

3.

He called Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy He examined Dr. Fuentes' work and found it in order He granted Dr. Fuentes permission to leave He ordered the closure of the incision

Whether PSI Is Liable for the Negligence of Dr. Ampil HOSPITAL OWNER PSI SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH DR. AMPIL [NCC 2180], AND DIRECTLY LIABLE TO SPS. AGANAS [NCC 2176]

Medical negligence; standard of diligence To successfully pursue this case of medical negligence, a patient must only prove that a health care provider either failed to do something [or did something] which a reasonably

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Previously, employers cannot be held liable for the fault or negligence of its professionals. However, this doctrine has weakened since courts came to realize that modern hospitals are taking a more active role in supplying and regulating medical care to its patients, by employing staff of physicians, among others. Hence, there is no reason to exempt hospitals from the universal rule of respondeat superior. Here are the Court's bases

PSI also liable under NCC 2180- It failed to adduce evidence to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the accreditation and supervision of Dr. Ampil

3. Layugan v. IAC Escalona 1988 Res Ipsa Loquitur not applicable if Direct Evidence is available While Layugan and a companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck parked along the right side of the National Highway, defendant Isidros truck, driven recklessly by Serrano, bumped Layugan = injury, hospital costs: 10K; lifetime income allegedly lost: 70K (security guard and truck-helper) + his wife left him and the kids. Layugan filed an action for damages Answer: o that the plaintiff was merely a bystander, not a truck helper being a brother-in-law law of the driver; that the truck allegedly being repaired was parked, occupying almost half of the right lane, right after the curve; that the proximate cause of the incident was the failure of the driver of the parked truck in installing the early warning device; a third-party complaint was filed by the defendant against his insurer, the Travellers Multi Indemnity Corp (P50K indemnity limit) RTC for plaintiff: 70K AD, 2K AF, 5K MD, From Ins Co: 50K AD IAC reversed and dismissed the complaint o because of its weight the truck could not have been driven to the shoulder of the road and concluded that the same was parked on a portion of the road at the time of the accident. So the mishap was due to the negligence of the driver of the parked truck (SC: this inference is erroneous; grounded on speculation, surmise, or conjecture) ISSUES: WHETHER IAC CORRECT IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT; WHETHER THE IAC CORRECT IN APPLYING "RES IPSA LOQUITUR" o Picart vs. Smith the test by which to determine the existence of negligence is: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. o The evidence on record discloses that 3-4 meters from the rear of the parked truck, a lighted kerosene lamp was placed (constitutes sufficient warning). Moreover, there is the admission of respondent Isidro's driver, Serrano, that: another vehicle with glaring lights from opposite direction momentarily blinded him so he didnt notice the parked truck; that when he stepped on the brake, it didnt function, hence he hit Layugan. He found out later that his trucks fluid pipe was cut. o It is clear from the foregoing disquisition that the absence or

for sustaining PSI's liability: Ramos v. CA doctrine on E-E relationship For purposes of apportioning responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. Agency principle of apparent authority / agency by estoppel Imposes liability because of the actions of a principal or employer in somehow misleading the public into believing that the relationship or the authority exists [see NCC 1869] PSI publicly displays in the Medical City lobby the names and specializations of their physicians. Hence, PSI is now estopped from passing all the blame to the physicians whose names it proudly paraded in the public directory, leading the public to believe that it vouched for their skill and competence. If doctors do well, hospital profits financially, so when negligence mars the quality of its services, the hospital should not be allowed to escape liability for its agents' acts. Doctrine of corporate negligence / corporate responsibility This is the judicial answer to the problem of allocating hospital's liability for the negligent acts of health practitioners, absent facts to support the application of respondeat superior. This provides for the duties expected [from hospitals]. In this case, PSI failed to perform the duty of exercising reasonable care to protect from harm all patients admitted into its facility for medical treatment. PSI failed to conduct an investigation of the matter reported in the note of the count nurse, and this established PSI's part in the dark conspiracy of silence and concealment about the gauzes. PSI has actual / constructive knowledge of the matter, through the report of the attending nurses + the fact that the operation was carried on with the assistance of various hospital staff It also breached its duties to oversee or supervise all persons who practice medicine within its walls and take an active step in fixing the negligence committed

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want of care of driver Serrano has been established by clear and convincing evidence. It follows that Res ipsa loquitur cannot be applied. RES IPSA LOQUITUR: This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. Black's Law Dictionary: Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable presumption or inference that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in absence of negligence. Under doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur" the happening of an injury permits an inference of negligence where plaintiff produces substantial evidence that injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality under exclusive control and management of defendant, and that the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things would not happen if reasonable care had been used. The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available. Hence, it has generally been held that the presumption of inference arising from the doctrine cannot be availed of, or is overcome, where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of the injury complained of or where there is direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident. Isidro is being sued under Art. 2176 in rel to Art. 2180, par 5. In the latter, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection, or both.

Tan is an owner of a passenger type jitney which was involved in an accident at an intersection along Maharlika Highway with JAM Transit passenger bus which was driven by Eddie Dimayuga The jitney is loaded with quail egg and duck egg The jitney is driven by Alexander Ramirez Tan alleged that Dimayuga was reckless, negligent, imprudent, and not observing traffic rules and regulations Essentially, it was due to the fact that Dimayuga failed to obey the proper light directions signals in relation to negotiating a left turn towards the feeder or barangay road which caused the collision with the jitney resulting to the cargo being destroyed and Ramirez and helper to be injured.

Issue: WON the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor is applicable in this case Held: No. Ratio: Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase that literally means "the thing or the transaction speaks for itself." o Where the thing that caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants; and o the accident, in the ordinary course of things, would not happen if those who had management or control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence in the absence of a sufficient, reasonable and logical explanation by defendant -- that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendants want of care This rule is grounded on the superior logic of ordinary human experience, and it is on the basis of such experience or common knowledge that negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. Hence, the rule is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and does not constitute an independent or separate ground for liability. Instead, it is considered as merely evidentiary, a mode of proof, or a mere procedural convenience In other words, mere invocation and application of the doctrine do not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. The following are the requisites o The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones negligence o It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and o The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated The SC deemed the following requisite are present in the case The SC do not adhere to the finding of CA that the petitioner has direct access to the evidence What was testified was that Ramirez drove along Maharlika Highway

PETITION GRANTED. 4. Tan v. Jam Transit Fullecido -

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Ramirez has no vivid recollection on how the passenger jitney was hit by JAM The SC appreciated that in absence of testimonial or direct evidence, the petitioner can still be provided with remedies. Indeed, no two motor vehicles traversing the same lane of a highway with double yellow center lines will collide as a matter of course, both ending up on the opposite lane,unless someone is negligent. Driving the bus gave Dimayuga exclusive management and control over it. no contributory negligence could be attributed to Ramirez relative to the incident on the basis of the available evidence No direct evidence was presented with respect to the exact road position of the bus and the jitney at the time of the collision such that the same can only be inferred from the pictures of the colliding vehicles taken immediately after the incident

After its third demand went unheeded, respondent filed with the RTC a complaint against petitioners for damages. The RTC rendered a Decision against the plaintiff. CA modified the RTC Decision as to the damages. ISSUE FOR TORTS: WON the CA erred in applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. HELD: NO. The CA correctly applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The petition is DENIED for lack of merit. RATIO: The CA correctly applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur under which expert testimony may be dispensed with to sustain an allegation of negligence if the following requisites obtain: a) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; b) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and c) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. The fire that damaged Belfranlt Building was not a spontaneous natural occurrence but the outcome of a human act or omission. It originated in the store room which petitioners had possession and control of. Respondent had no hand in the incident. Hence, the convergence of these facts and circumstances speaks for itself: petitioners alone having knowledge of the cause of the fire or the best opportunity to ascertain it, and respondent having no means to find out for itself, it is sufficient for the latter to merely allege that the cause of the fire was the negligence of the former and to rely on the occurrence of the fire as proof of such negligence. It was all up to petitioners to dispel such inference of negligence, but their bare denial only left the matter unanswered. The CA therefore correctly affirmed the RTC in holding petitioners liable to respondent for actual damages consisting of unpaid rentals for the units they leased. The CA deleted the award of actual damages of P2.2 million which the RTC had granted respondent to cover costs of building repairs. In lieu of actual damages, temperate damages in the amount of P500,000.00 were awarded by the CA. The SC found this in order. 6. DM Consunji vs. Court of Appeals - CarlosTheFierce FACTS: At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widows prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego.

5. COLLEGE ASSURANCE PLAN and COMPREHENSIVE ANNUITY PLAN and PENSION CORPORATION vs. BELFRANLT DEVELOPMENT INC. (2007) - Galang AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: FACTS: Belfranlt Development, Inc. is the owner of Belfranlt Building in Angeles City, Pampanga. It leased to petitioners College Assurance Plan Phil., Inc. (CAP) and Comprehensive Annuity Plans and Pension Corporation (CAPP) several units on the second and third floors of the building. On October 8, 1994, a fire destroyed portions of the building, including the third floor units being occupied by petitioners. An October 20, 1994 field investigation report by an unnamed arson investigator assigned to the case disclosed that the origin of fire was in the store room occupied by CAP, located at the 3rd floor of the building and the cause of fire was the overheated coffee percolator. Citing the foregoing findings, respondent sent petitioners on November 3, 1994 a notice to vacate the leased premises to make way for repairs, and to pay reparation estimated at P1.5 million. On November 11, 1994, petitioners vacated the leased premises, including the units on the second floor, but they did not act on the demand for reparation. Respondent wrote petitioners another letter, reiterating its claim for reparation, this time estimated by professionals to be no less than P2 million. It also clarified that, as the leased units on the second floor were not affected by the fire, petitioners had no reason to vacate the same; hence, their lease on said units is deemed still subsisting, along with their obligation to pay for the rent. In reply, petitioners explained that they could no longer re-occupy the units on the second floor of the building for they had already moved to a new location and entered into a binding contract with a new lessor. Petitioners also disclaimed liability for reparation, pointing out that the fire was a fortuitous event for which they could not be held responsible.

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On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. D. M. Consunji then sought the reversal of the CA decision. ISSUES: 1. 2. Whether or not the petitioner is held liable under the grounds of negligence. Whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the workers right under the Workmens Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions,

held that the case at bar came under exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Had the claimant been aware, she wouldve opted to avail of a better remedy than that of which she already had. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE RULE ON RES IPSA LOQUITUR One of the theoretical basis for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that necessary evidence is absent or not available. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence. The inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person. It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a bridge by which a plaintiff, without knowledge of the cause, reaches over to defendant who knows or should know the cause, for any explanation of care exercised by the defendant in respect of the matter of which the plaintiff complains. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine, another court has said, is a rule of necessity, in that it proceeds on the theory that under the peculiar circumstances in which the doctrine is applicable, it is within the power of the defendant to show that there was no negligence on his part, and direct proof of defendants negligence is beyond plaintiffs power . Accordingly, some court add to the three prerequisites for the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the further requirement that for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to apply, it must appear that the injured party had no knowledge or means of knowledge as to the cause of the accident, or that the party to be charged with negligence has superior knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the accident.23 7. Fe Cayao-Salam v. Sps. Ramolete (GR No. 159132) Manalo FACTS: On July 28, 1994, respondent, three months pregnant Editha Ramolete (Editha) was brought to the Lorma Medical Center (LMC) in San Fernando, La Union due to vaginal bleeding. Upon advice of petitioner relayed via telephone, Editha was admitted to the LMC on the same day. A pelvic sonogram2 was then conducted on Editha revealing the fetus weak cardiac pulsation. The following day, Edithas repeat pelvic sonogram showed that aside from the fetus weak cardiac pulsation, no fetal movement was also appreciated. Due to

RULING: 1. YES. DM CONSUNJI IS NEGLIGENT.

All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of appellants negligence arises. Petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks for itself) is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. It has the following requisites: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3)the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. 2. The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under the Workmens Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. In the course of availing the remedies provided under the Workmens Compensation law, the claimants are deemed to have waived theirknown right of the remedies provided by other laws. The Court of Appeals, however,

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persistent and profuse vaginal bleeding, petitioner advised Editha to undergo a Dilatation and Curettage Procedure (D&C) or "raspa." The procedure was performed by the petitioner and Editha was discharged the next day. On September 16, 1994, Editha was once again brought at the LMC, as she was suffering from vomiting and severe abdominal pains. She was found to have a massive intraabdominal hemorrhage and a ruptured uterus. Thus, Editha had to undergo a procedure for hysterectomy and as aresult, she has no more chance to bear a child. Respondents: first, petitioners failure to check up, visit or administer medication on Editha during her first day of confinement at the LMC; second, petitioner recommended that a D&C procedure be performed on Editha without conducting any internal examination prior to the procedure; third, petitioner immediately suggested a D&C procedure instead of closely monitoring the state of pregnancy of Editha. Petitioner: it was Edithas gross negligence and/or omission in insisting to be discharged against doctors advice and her unjustified failure to return for check-up as directed by petitioner that contributed to her life-threatening condition on; that Edithas hysterectomy was brought about by her very abnormal pregnancy known as placenta increta, which was an extremely rare and very unusual case of abdominal placental implantation; that whether or not a D&C procedure was done by her or any other doctor, there would be no difference at all because at any stage of gestation before term, the uterus would rupture just the same. RULING: Medical malpractice is a particular form of negligence which consists in the failure of a physician or surgeon to apply to his practice of medicine that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily employed by the profession generally, under similar conditions, and in like surrounding circumstances. There are four elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty, breach, injury and proximate causation. In the present case, respondents did not present any expert testimony to support their claim that petitioner failed to do something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would have done. Petitioner, on the other hand, presented the testimony of Dr. Augusto M. Manalo, who was clearly an expert on the subject. He testified that the rupture occurred minutes prior to the hysterectomy or right upon admission on September 15, 1994 which is about 1 months after the patient wasdischarged, after the D&C was conducted. It is evident thatthe D&C procedure was not the proximate cause of therupture of Edithas uterus. The defenses in an action for damages, provided for under Article 2179 of the Civil Code are: Art. 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack

of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.55 An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage; and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission. The Court notes the findings of the Board of Medicine: When complainant was discharged on July 31, 1994, herein respondent advised her to return on August 4, 1994 or four (4) days after the D&C. This advise was clear in complainants Discharge Sheet. However, complainant failed to do so. This being the case, the chain of continuity as required in order that the doctrine of proximate cause can be validly invoked was interrupted. Had she returned, the respondent could have examined her thoroughly. Contributory negligence is the act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured, which, concurring with the defendants negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury. Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be considered immediate causes of the accident.60 Where the immediate cause of an accident resulting in an injury is the plaintiffs own act, which contributed to the principal occurrence as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover damages for the injury. 8. Ramos v. CA Millena Note: Sorry for the lengthy digest. I just took this from the web. Im not able to read the case in the original yet. Its a very lengthy case. Ill try to upload my version before 4 pm. Im just kinda busy at work talaga. Sorry.

Ramos v. CA Kapunan, 1999 Facts: Erlinda Ramos, a 47-year old robust woman, was normal except for her experiencing occasional pain due to the presence of stone in her gall bladder. She was advised to undergo an operation for its removal. The results in the examinations she underwent indicate that she was fit for the operation. She and her husband Rogelio met Dr. Hosaka, one of the defendants, who advised that she should undergo cholecystectomy. Dr. Hosaka

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assured them that he will get a good anaesthesiologist. At 7:30 a.m. on the day of the operation at Delos Santos Medical Center, Herminda Cruz, Erlindas sister -in-law and the dean of the College of Nursing in Capitol Medical Center, was there to provide moral support. Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez was to administer the anaesthesia. Dr. Hosaka arrived only at 12:15 p. m. Herminda saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating the patient, and heard the latter say Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O, lumalaki ang tiyan. Herminda saw bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of the patient. She heard Dr. Hosaka issue an order for someone to call Dr. Calderon. The doctor arrived and placed the patient in trendelenburg position, wherein the head of the patient is positioned lower than the feet, which indicates a decrease of blood supply in the brain. Herminda knew and told Rogelio that something wrong was happening. Dr. Calderon was able to intubate the patient. Erlinda was taken to the ICU and became comatose. Rogelio filed a civil case for damages. The trial court ruled in his favor, finding Dr. Gutierrez, Dr. Hosaka, and the hospital, guilty of negligence, but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. Hence, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. However, it was found that the notice of the decision was never sent to the petitioners counsel. Rather, it was sent to the petitioner, addressing him as Atty. Rogelio Ramos, as if he was the legal counsel. The petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari. On the procedural issue, the Supreme Court rules that since the notice did not reach the petitioners then legal counsel, the motion was filed on time. Issue: Whether a surgeon, an anaesthesiologist, and a hospital, should be made liable for the unfortunate comatose condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy Held: Res Ipsa Loquitor Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means "the thing or the transaction speaks for itself." The phrase "res ipsa loquitur'' is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff's prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant's want of care. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself.

However, much has been said that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and, as such, does not create or constitute an independent or separate ground of liability. Mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. It is simply a step in the process of such proof, permitting the plaintiff to present along with the proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or presumption of negligence, and to thereby place on the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof. Still, before resort to the doctrine may be allowed, the following requisites must be satisfactorily shown. (1) The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and (3) The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. Medical malpractice cases do not escape the application of this doctrine. Thus, res ipsa loquitur has been applied when the circumstances attendant upon the harm are themselves of such a character as to justify an inference of negligence as the cause of that harm. Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence. Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him. Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case. A distinction must be made between the failure to secure results, and the occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. The real question, therefore, is whether or not in the process of the operation any extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of the routine performance occurred which is beyond the regular scope of customary professional activity in such operations, which, if unexplained would

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themselves reasonably speak to the average man as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequence. We find the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar. Erlinda submitted herself for cholecystectomy and expected a routine general surgery to be performed on her gall bladder. On that fateful day she delivered her person over to the care, custody and control of private respondents who exercised complete and exclusive control over her. At the time of submission, Erlinda was neurologically sound and, except for a few minor discomforts, was likewise physically fit in mind and body. However, during the administration of anesthesia and prior to the performance of cholecystectomy she suffered irreparable damage to her brain. Thus, without undergoing surgery, she went out of the operating room already decerebrate and totally incapacitated. Obviously, brain damage, which Erlinda sustained, is an injury which does not normally occur in the process of a gall bladder operation. In fact, this kind of situation does not in the absence of negligence of someone in the administration of anesthesia and in the use of endotracheal tube. Furthermore, the instruments used in the administration of anesthesia, including the endotracheal tube, were all under the exclusive control of private respondents, who are the physicians-in-charge. Likewise, petitioner Erlinda could not have been guilty of contributory negligence because she was under the influence of anesthetics which rendered her unconscious. Negligence of the Anaesthesiologist The pre-operative evaluation of a patient prior to the administration of anesthesia is universally observed to lessen the possibility of anesthetic accidents. Respondent Dra. Gutierrez' act of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled operative procedure was, therefore, an act of exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility. Her failure to follow this medical procedure is, therefore, a clear indicia of her negligence. Erlinda's case was elective and this was known to respondent Dra. Gutierrez. Thus, she had all the time to make a thorough evaluation of Erlinda's case prior to the operation and prepare her for anesthesia. However, she never saw the patient at the bedside. She herself admitted that she had seen petitioner only in the operating room, and only on the actual date of the cholecystectomy. She negligently failed to take advantage of this important opportunity. As such, her attempt to exculpate herself must fail. Opinion of Expert Witness An anesthetic accident caused by a rare drug-induced bronchospasm properly falls within the fields of anesthesia, internal medicine-allergy, and clinical pharmacology. The resulting anoxic encephalopathy belongs to the field of neurology. While admittedly, many bronchospastic-mediated pulmonary diseases are within the expertise of pulmonary medicine, Dr. Jamora's field, the anesthetic drug-induced, allergic mediated bronchospasm alleged in this case is within the disciplines of anesthesiology, allergology

and pharmacology. On the basis of the foregoing transcript, in which the pulmonologist himself admitted that he could not testify about the drug with medical authority, it is clear that the appellate court erred in giving weight to Dr. Jamora's testimony as an expert in the administration of Thiopental Sodium. Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one must have acquired special knowledge of the subject matter about which he or she is to testify, either by the study of recognized authorities on the subject or by practical experience. Clearly, Dr. Jamora does not qualify as an expert witness based on the above standard since he lacks the necessary knowledge, skill, and training in the field of anesthesiology. Oddly, apart from submitting testimony from a specialist in the wrong field, private respondents' intentionally avoided providing testimony by competent and independent experts in the proper areas. Proximate Cause Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case, that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage; and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission. Instead of the intended endotracheal intubation what actually took place was an esophageal intubation. During intubation, such distention indicates that air has entered the gastrointestinal tract through the esophagus instead of the lungs through the trachea. Entry into the esophagus would certainly cause some delay in oxygen delivery into the lungs as the tube which carries oxygen is in the wrong place. That abdominal distention had been observed during the first intubation suggests that the length of time utilized in inserting the endotracheal tube (up to the time the tube was withdrawn for the second attempt) was fairly significant. Due to the delay in the delivery of oxygen in her lungs Erlinda showed signs of cyanosis. Responsibility of the Surgeon As the so-called "captain of the ship," it is the surgeon's responsibility to see to it that those under him perform their task in the proper manner. Respondent Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols. In fact, no evidence on record exists to show that respondent Dr. Hosaka verified if respondent Dra. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient. Furthermore, it does not escape us that respondent Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlinda's cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for the latter's operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient. Thus, he shares equal responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlinda's condition.

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Responsibility of the Hospital Hospitals hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting "consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not, technically employees, a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient's condition, the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control test is determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others based on the former's responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas. Such responsibility ceases when the persons or entity concerned prove that they have observed the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage. In the instant case, respondent hospital, apart from a general denial of its responsibility over respondent physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and supervision of the latter. It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the degree of supervision which it exercised over its physicians. In neglecting to offer such proof, or proof of a similar nature, respondent hospital thereby failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180. Having failed to do this, respondent hospital is consequently solidarily responsible with its physicians for Erlinda's condition. DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of the appellate court appealed from are hereby modified so as to award in favor of petitioners, and solidarily against private respondents the following: 1) P1,352,000.00 as actual damages computed as of the date of promulgation of this decision plus a monthly payment of P8,000.00 up to the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously survives; 2) P2,000,000.00 as moral damages, 3) P1,500,000.00 as temperate damages; 4) P100,000.00 each as exemplary damages and attorney's fees; and, 5) the costs of the suit. IV. DEFENSES AGAINST THE CHARGE OF NEGLIGENCE Bernardo v. Legaspi - Monfort Moreland | 23 Dec. 1914 | En banc FACTS CFI dismissed the complaint in an action to recover damages for injuries sustained by

plaintiff's automobile by reason of defendant's negligence in causing a collision between his automobile and that of plaintiff. CFI also dismissed a cross-complaint filed by the defendant. CFI found that both plaintiff and defendant were negligent and that said negligence was of such a character as to prevent either from recovering. SC CFI judgment affirmed. Where the plaintiff in a negligence action, by his own carelessness contributes to the principal occurrence, that is, to the accident, as one of the determining causes thereof, he cannot recover. This is equally true of the defendant; and as both of them, by their negligent acts, contributed to the determining cause of the accident, neither can recover. PLDT v. CA and Sps. Antonio Esteban and Gloria Esteban - Namingit 29 September 1989 J. Regalado Facts: Action for damages instituted by spouses Antonio and Gloria Esteban for the injuries they sustained in the evening of July 30, 1968 when their jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. Antonio allegedly failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the darkness and lack of warning lights or signs. Because of the accident both Antonio and Gloria sustained injuries. PLDT denies liability and contends that the injuries were the result of their own negligence and that the entity which should be held responsible, if at al, is L.R. Barte and Company Barte, an independent contractor which undertook the construction of the manhole and the conduit system. Trial Court: Decided in favor of spouses Esteban and ordered PLDT to pay damages CA: reversed TC and dismissed complaint. It held Esteban spouses were negligent. CA resolution on 2nd MR: affirmed in toto TCs decision Issue: W/N PLDT is liable to pay damages to the spouses Esteban Held: No. The negligence of Antonio Esteban goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident as one of its determining factors and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. The following findings clearly show that the negligence of Antonio was the proximate cause of the accident:

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1. Exhibit B shows, through the tire marks, that the accident mound was hit by the jeep swerving from the inside lane was the cause of the accident 2. Jeep was not running at 25kph. At that speed, he could have braked the vehicle the moment it struck the accident mound. The jeep would not have climbed the mound several feet and the plaintiffs would not have been thrown against the windshield and not have suffered their injuries. The jeep must have been running quite fast. 3. With the drizzle, he should not have run on dim lights, but should have put on his regular lights, which would have made him see the mound in time. The perils of the road were known to, hence appreciated and assumed by Esteban spouses. By exercising reasonable care and prudence, Antonio could have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on the part of the petitioner. Antonio also cannot recover notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to PLDT considering that he had the last clear chance to avoid the injury. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday and had the knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and his wife to danger, hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence. Note: Even through the Court discussed the substantive issues, it ruled that the both the second motion for leave to file a 2nd MR and consequently, the 2nd MR were filed out of time. Thus, CAs original and 1st resolution became final and executory Manila Electric v. Remoquillo Ogena -Magno called in to repair a leaking media agua (awning) in his stepbrother Penaloza's 3storey house. Awning just below 3rd-storey window -While standing on the awning, Magno received a 6 feet long galvanized iron sheet (to cover the leaking portion) from his son via said window. -Magno turns around and said iron sheet comes into contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric Company, which was strung parallel to the edge of the awning (and was merely 2 1/2 feet away from the edge of the awning), causing his death by electrocution -regulations of the City of Manila require wires to be kept 3 feet away from the building -distance from side of the building and the wires was 7 feet and 2 3/4 inches Issue: WON Magno's death was due to Petitioner Company's negligence Held: No -Magno's death was primarily caused by his own negligence and in some measure by the too close proximity of the awning's edge to the electric wire of the company due to the violation of the original permit given by the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal construction of the media agua.

-Book: this would seemingly imply that proximate cause was a combination of two negligent acts: Magno's and the third party responsible for the illegal construction -distance from wire to side of building was sufficient to comply with regulations (7' 2.75" versus 3') -assuming however that said 3' requirement pertained to a projecting part of the building (and not merely to its side), terms of the construction permit issued by the city only provided for a 1 meter wide (3' 3.37") awning, which if complied with would have yielded a distance of 3' 11.37" from edge of awning to the wires (and thus still compliant with the 3' regulation).

-Houseowner disregarded said 1m permit however and exceeded it by 17.37 inches thus leaving a distance of 2.5' between the illegally constructed awning and the wires -thus, serious violations of a city ordinance and permit is not imputable as negligence of petitioner company -company cannot be expected to be always on the lookout for any illegal construction which reduces the distance between its wires and said construction, and after finding that said distance of 3 feet had been reduced, to change the stringing or installation of its wires so as to preserve said distance -it would be much easier for the City, or rather it is its duty, to be ever on the alert and to see to it that its ordinances are strictly followed by house owners and to condemn or disapprove all illegal constructions Was violation of permit proximate cause?: -violation of the permit for the construction of the awning was not the direct cause of the accident. It merely contributed to it. -Had said media agua been only one meter wide as allowed by the permit, Magno standing on it, would instinctively have stayed closer to or hugged the side of the house in order to keep a safe margin between the edge of the media agua and the yawning 2 story distance or height from the ground, and possibly if not probably avoided the fatal contact between the lower end of the iron sheet and the wires. -Book: Rakes v Atlantic distinguished between negligence contributing to accident (i.e. proximate cause) versus negligence contributing to injury (i.e. contributory negligence). Since SC pointed out that non-compliance with regulations was not the proximate cause, then we can logically infer that what they meant was that said non-compliance contributed to the injury. -the real cause of the accident/death was Magno's reckless/negligent act.

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-when he undertook the repair of the awning, it is to be presumed that due to his age and experience he was qualified to do so. Perhaps he was a tinsmith or carpenter and had training and experience for the job. So, he could not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them. -in the instant case, his training and experience failed him, and forgetting where he was standing, holding the 6-feet iron sheet with both hands and at arms length, evidently without looking, and throwing all prudence and discretion to the winds, he turned around swinging his arms with the motion of his body, thereby causing his own electrocution. Rakes vs Atlantic Gulf - Pascual FACTS: Rakes was a black man working as a laborer for Atlantic Gulf in the early 1900s. One day, they were working in the companys yard and they were transporting heavy rails using two hand cars (karitons?); each car carrying the opposite ends of the rails. The cars were pulled by rope from the front and other workers are pushing the cars from behind. There were no side guards installed on the sides of the cars but the rails were secured by ropes. The track where the cars move were also weakened by a previous typhoon. It was alleged that Atlantics foreman was notified of said damage in the tracks but the same were left unrepaired. While the cars were being moved and when it reached the depressed portion of the track, and while Rakes was beside one of the cars, the ropes gave in and the rails slipped thereby crushing his leg and causing it to be amputated. Rakes sued Atlantic Gulf and he won; he was awarded 5,000 pesos for damages ($2,500). Atlantic assailed the decision of the lower court alleging that they specifically ordered their workers to be walking only before or after the cars and not on the side of the cars because the cars have no side guards to protect them in case the rails would slip. Atlantic also alleged that Rakes should be suing the foreman as it was him who neglected to have the tracks repaired; that Rakes himself was negligent for having known of the depression on the track yet he continued to work. ISSUE: 1. Of the negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the accident, to what extent it existed in fact 2. What legal effect is to be given 1st: that having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work; and 2nd: that he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along the boards, either before or behind it. HELD: 1. As to the first point, the depression in the track night indicates either a serious or a rival difficulty. There is nothing in the evidence to show that the plaintiff did or could see the displaced timber underneath the sleeper. While the method of construction may have been known to the men who had helped build the road, it was otherwise with the plaintiff who had worked at this job less than two days. A man may easily walk along a railway without perceiving a displacement of the

underlying timbers. The foreman testified that he knew the state of the track on the day of the accident and that it was then in good condition, and one Danridge, a witness for the defendant, working on the same job, swore that he never noticed the depression in the track and never saw any bad place in it. The sagging of the track this plaintiff did perceive, but that was reported in his hearing to the foreman who neither promised nor refused to repair it. His lack of caution in continuing at his work after noticing the slight depression of the rail was not of so gross a nature as to constitute negligence, barring his recovery. Thus the SC accepted the conclusion of the trial judge who found as facts that "the plaintiff did not know the cause of the one rail being lower than then other" and "it does not appear in this case that the plaintiff knew before the accident occurred that the stringers and rails joined in the same place." In respect of the second charge of negligence against the plaintiff: While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only were they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but were expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of the company and three of the workmen testify that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all the gang against walking by the side of the car, and the foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of this particular load. On this contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in favor of the defendant's contention to the extent of the general order being made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not as its primary cause. 2. Although the defendant's' negligence may have been the primary cause of the injury complained of, yet an action for such injury cannot be maintained if the proximate and immediate cause of the injury can be traced to the want of ordinary care and caution in the person injured; subject to this qualification, that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it be shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the injured party's negligence. Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be considered immediate causes of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. this produced the event giving occasion for damages that is, the shrinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not contribute, although it was an element of the damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly thorough his act of omission of duty, the last would have been one of the determining causes of the event or accident, for which he would have been responsible. Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence. In summary, Rakes as per the evidence could not have known of the damage in the track as it was another employee who swore he notified the foreman about said damage.

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Further, his lack of caution in continuing to work is not of a gross nature as to constitute negligence on his part. On the other hand though, Rakes contributory negligence can be inferred from the fact that he was on the side of the cars when in fact there were orders from the company barring workers from standing near the side of the cars. His disobedient to this order does not bar his recovery of damages though; the Supreme Court instead reduced the award of damages from 5,000 pesos to 2,500 pesos. Ma-ao Sugar v CA - Perez 27 August 1990 Cruz, J. Facts: Famoso was riding with a co-employee in the caboose of a cargo train of Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. when the locomotive was suddenly derailed. 2. He and his companion jumped off but the train fell on its side, caught his legs by its wheels and pinned him down. He died. 3. Derailment of the locomotive was caused by protruding rails which had come loose because they were not connected and fixed in place by fishplates. The fishplates could not be found at the scene. Issues/Held: 1. 2. 3. Ratio: 1. The maintenance of the rails was the responsibility of Ma-ao Sugar. The person in charge of train operations testified that cases of derailment in the milling district were frequent. Ma-ao Sugar should have been more prudent. The fishplates were supposed to have been bolted to the rails and could be removed only with special tools. The fact that they were not found at the scene may show that they were never there to begin with. At any rate, the absence of fishplates whatever the cause is by itself proof of the negligence of Ma-ao Sugar. Res ipsa loquitur. Ma-ao Sugar: Famoso was guilty of contributory negligence because he was not at his assigned station when the train was derailed. Court: That might have been a violation of company rules but could not have directly contributed to his injury. It is pure speculation that he would not have been injured if he had stayed in the front car rather than at the back. It must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of an impending danger to health and body. There is no showing that the caboose where Famoso was riding was a dangerous place and that he recklessly dared to stay there despite warnings or signs of impending danger. WON Ma-ao Sugar is liable. YES WON Famoso was guilty of contributory negligence. NO WON the SSS pension to be received by the Famoso heirs should be deducted from the total damages awarded. NO 1.

3.

The amount to be paid by the SSS represents the usual pension received by the heirs of a deceased employee who was a member of the SSS and had regularly contributed his premiums. The pension is the benefit derivable from such contributions. It does not represent the death benefits payable under the Workmens Compensation Act to an employee who dies as a result of a workconnected injury.

NPC vs Heirs of Casionan Siang November 27, 2008 Reyes, Ruben J. Facts: A trail leading to Itogon, existed in Dalicno and this trail was regularly used by members of the community. In 1970, NPC installed high-tension electrical transmission lines of 69 kilovolts (KV) traversing the trail. Eventually, some of the transmission lines sagged and dangled reducing their distance from the ground to only about eight to ten feet. Standard for such transmission lines should be 18-20 ft. The lines posed passersby to the danger of electrocution especially during the rainy season. Several requests and letters in 1991, 1993, 1995 were sent to NPC to institute safety measures. On June 27, 1995, Noble and his co-pocket miner, Melchor Jimenez were walking through the trail. They were carrying bamboo poles that were to use for pocket mining. As Noble was going uphill, the tip of the bamboo pole he was carrying touched one of the dangling high tension wires. Noble due to electrocution. The parents of Noble filed a claim for damages against NPC.

NPCs defense: Denied being negligent in maintaining transmission lines. Claimed that there were danger and warning signs but were stolen by children. Excavations were made to increase the necessary clearance some towers or poles sank due to pocket mining in the area. NPC witnesses claim that death could not have been due to electrocution because there were no extensive burns. NPC argued that if Noble did die by electrocution, it was due to his own negligence.

2.

RTC: found for Heirs, NPCs negligence has been established by preponderance of evidence CA: affirmed the RTC

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Issue: Whether the award for damages should be deleted in view of the contributory negligence of the victim Held: There is no contributory negligence. NPC asserts that it was Nobles negligent carrying of the bamboo pole that caused his death. They further claim that other people traversing the trail have not been similarly electrocuted. The Court held that NPCs contentions are absurd (sorry, cant help it. I just had to add this). The Court said that if the transmission lines were properly maintained by NPC, the bamboo pole carried by Noble would not have touched the wires. NPC cannot excuse itself from its failure to properly maintain the wires by attributing negligence to the victim. Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Contributory negligence is: Conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his own protection There is contributory negligence when the partys act showed lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his life in danger. It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with the defendants negligence, is the pr oximate cause of the injury. Article 2179 is the basis for reducing damages if there is contributory negligence. A plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. It must be shown that the plaintiff performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs on an impending danger to health and body. In this case, the trail where Noble was electrocuted was regularly used by others. There were no warning signs to inform passersby of the impending danger. The trail was the only viable way from Dalicon to Itogon. Noble should not be faulted for simply doing what was ordinary routine to other workers in the area. Petitioner further faults the victim in engaging in pocket mining, which is prohibited by the DENR in the area. According to the Court, that the pocket miners were unlicensed was not a justification for petitioner to leave their transmission lines dangling. The Court quoted Aonuevo v. Court of Appeals: The bare fact that Villagracia was violating a municipal ordinance at the time of the accident may have sufficiently established some

degree of negligence on his part, but such negligence is without legal consequence unless it is shown that it was a contributing cause of the injury. Disposition: CA is affirmed. Lambert v. Heirs of Ray Castillon Tejano FACTS: Ray Castillon was driving a motorcycle he borrowed from his brother, Joel, with Sergio Labang as a backrider. They were roaming around Iligan City. Ray was not wearing a protective helmet (decision does not say won Sergio was wearing one). After drinking one or two bottles of beer at a restaurant, Ray traversed the highway towards Tambo at a high speed. He was tailgating a Tamaraw jeepney owned by Nelen Lambert and driven by Reynaldo Gamot. At some point, the Tamaraw veered slightly to the right. Ray instinctively veered to the left. At this point, however, the Tamaraw made a sharp turn to the left. The motorcycle thus collided with the Tamaraw. Ray died and Sergio was injured. The TC, affirmed by CA, awarded damages in favor of the heirs of Ray Castillon but reduced liability by 20% in view of Rays contributory negligence. ISSUES & RULING 1) WON Rays own negligence was the proximate cause of his death NO. Clearly, the abrupt and sudden left turn by Reynaldo, without first establishing his right of way, was the proximate cause of the mishap which claimed the life of Ray and injured Sergio. Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. The cause of the collision is traceable to the negligent act of Reynaldo for, as the trial court correctly held, without that left turn executed with no precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have happened. Raynera v. Hiceta cannot be used by Lambert as defense by citing the rule enunciated therein that drivers of vehicles "who bump the rear of another vehicle" are presumed to be "the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence." This presumption cannot hold in this case because it is sufficiently contradicted by evidence, which is the left turn made by Reynaldo which proximately caused the collision. WON Ray is guilty of contributory negligence and, therefore, Lamberts liability should be reduced YES. In the case at bar, it was established that Ray, at the time of the mishap: (1) was driving the motorcycle at a high speed; (2) was tailgating the Tamaraw jeepney; (3) has imbibed one or two bottles of beer; and (4) was not wearing a protective helmet. These circumstances, although not constituting the proximate cause of his demise and injury to Sergio, contributed to the same result. The contribution of these circumstances are all considered and determined in terms of percentages of the total cause. Hence, pursuant to Rakes v. AG & P, the heirs of Ray Castillon shall recover damages only up to 50% of the

2)

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award. In other words, 50% of the damage shall be borne by the private respondents; the remaining 50% shall be paid by the petitioner. Other issues: award of loss of earning capacity and other damages Genobiagon v. CA - Tiongco Facts 14. Rita B. Cabrera was an old woman who was walking along T Padilla St. in Cebu City one evening when appelant bumbed into her. Appelant was riding a rig, which was following another right around 2 meters away. The appellant was trying to overtake the rig in front of him and was riding pretty fast. Apart from this, the road was also sloping downwards. 15. When he hit her, a bystander, one Vicente Mangyao, ran to appellant and asked why he hit the woman. Appellant just replied that it was the woman who hit him. 16. The woman was rushed to the hospital where she died three hours later. Autopsy reveals cerebral hemmorhage. 17. Appellant was charged with Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence and was convicted. 18. CA affirmed TC decision 19. Appellant's assignment of error: 1. Reckless negligence of the victim was the proximate cause of the accident Issue: WON the victim's alleged negligence may be considered as contributory negligence? No. Reason: 20. The alleged contirbutory negligence of the victim, if any, does not exonerate the accused. The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligence. 21. All the issues are factual, and the decisions of the lower courts are held in high regard. Juntilla v. Fontanar - Valdez || G.R. No. L-45673 || May 31, 1985 || J. Gutierrez FACTS: Roberto Juntilla was a passenger of the jeep driven by Berfol Camoro, franchised by Clemente Fontanar, and owned by Fernando Banzon. When the jeep reached manadue, the rear right tire burts, casuing the vehicle to turn turtle. Juntilla, seated at the front, catapulted out of the vehicle, turned unconscious, woke up, and found out he had a rash of injuries (lacerated wound on his right palm, among others) and had lost his Omega wrist watch (never found).

Juntilla filed a civil case for breach of contract with damages against Camoro, Banzon, and Fontanar, who interposed force majeure as a defense. The Civil Court of Cebu decided in favour of Juntilla but the CFI reversed the judgment of the City Court, finding that the accident was a result of force majeure. ISSUE: Whether or not respondents should be exonerated by reason force majeure? NO HELD: 1. CFI anchored its defense on the ruling in Rodriguez v. Red Line Transportation Co. Where the CA ruled that A tire blowout does not constitute negligence unless the tire was already old and should not have been used at all. Indeed, this would be a clear case of fortuitous event. The CFI committed a misapprehension of overall facts because its reliance on Rodriguez is not in order. La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co. V. De Jesus provides that the ruling in Rodriguez are not binding on the case at bar because the CA fund no specific acts of negligence on the part of the defendants and confined itself to the question of whether or not a tire blow-out, by itself alone and without a showing as to the causative factors would generate liability. 2. There are specific acts of negligence on the part of the respondents, because the act of the vehicle turning turtle and jumping n a ditch implies that the passenger jeepney was running at a very fast speed before the accident. The observation of the petitioner that a public utility jeep running at a regular and safe speed will not jump into a ditch when its rear tire blows up is correct. 3. The jeep was overloaded at the time of the incident. There were three (3) passengers in the front seat and 14 in the rear. 4. While the grooves of the tire were still visible, this fact alone does not make the explosion of the tire a fortuitous event, because no evidence was presented to show that the accident was due to adverse road conditions or that precautions were taken by Camoro to compensate for any conditions liable to cause accidents. Blowing up could have been caused by too much air pressure injected into the car and the fact that the jee p was overloaded. 5. Lasam v. Smith: The characteristics of caso fortuito are: a. Cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will b. It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid c. Occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfil his obligation in a normal manner d. The obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the debtor 6. The unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not independent of the human will, because it was cause either through the negligence of the driver or because of mechanical defects in the tire. Common carriers should teach their drivers not to overload their vehicles, not to exceed safe and legal speed limits, and to know the correct measures to take when a tire blows up thus insuring safety of passengers at all times. 7. Necesito et al v. Paras: Preponderance of authority is in favour of the doctrine that a passenger is entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an injury resulting from a defect in an appliance purchased from a manufacturer,

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whenever it appears that the defect would have been discovered by the carrier if it had exercised the degree of care which under the circumstances was incumbent upon it, with regard to inspection and application of the necessary tests. The manufacturer is considered as being in law the agent or servant of the carrier, as far as regards the work of constructing the appliance. According to this theory, the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability. a. Rationale: The passenger has neither choice nor control over the carrier in the selection and use of the equipment and appliances in use by the carrier, Having no privity whatever with the manufacturer or vendor of the defective equipment, the passenger has no remedy against him, while the carrier usually has. Southeastern College v. CA Abdon GR No. 126389 / 10 Jul 1998 / J Purisima / Third Division FACTS In 1989 during Typhoon "Saling", the roof of the school building in Pasay City of petitioner blew off and hit the roofs of private respondents' house, destroying portions of the latter's roofing.

ISSUE WON the damage to the roof of the house of private respondent was due to fortuitous event, thereby making petitioners not liable? HELD Yes. This is a fortutious event AND there was no negligence on the part of the school. Thus the school is not liable. RATIO In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that he be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may have been occasioned. When a person's negligence concurs with an act of God in producing injury to another, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the proximate cause was the fortuitous event. In this case, the SC reeavaluated the evidence (in contravention of the general rule that factual findings by the trial court especially when affirmed by the CA are binding and conclusive) and said that the lower courts erred in appreciating the evidence offered. The private respondents relied only on the ocular inspection of petitioner's school building after the storm. But there was no further investigation, and the respondents did not even show the plans, designs and specifications of the building that they claim were deficient and defective. but, the petitioners presented as witness the city building official who testified that the school would have needed to procure a permit from the city to construct its building, and the plans and designs would have needed approval from the city engineer's office. This is prima facie evidence that the building is not defective. In addition the school presented as evidence its VP for finance who testified to the regular maintenance of the building. Moreover the city building official testified that there had been no previous complaints regarding a defect in the building's structure before his office prior to this case. As there had been typhoons in the past, stronger than "Saling", if the roof had not been anchored properly it would have flown off before.

After the storm an ocular inspection was conducted by the city building official, finding that:

The particular U-shaped formation of the 4-storey school building funneled the
winds to a portion of the building, which resulted in portions of the building's roof in both ends remaining intact There was improper anchorage of trusses to the roof beams. The steel bars of the concrete roof beams were not bolted to the trusses, and some were not even bent to the trusses. The recommendation is to declare the fourth storey a "structural hazard"

Private respondents filed a complaint before the Pasay RTC for damages based on culpa aquiliana, alleging that the damage to the house rendered it uninhabitable, forcing them to stay in other houses. The trial court found for respondents and said that while admitting typhoon "Saling" had strong winds, the damage to the respondent's houses could have been avoided if the roof construction of the school was not faulty. The CA affirmed the lower court's decision but reduced the award of moral damages.

Afialda v. Hisole Adorna Margarita Alfiada v. Basilio and Francisco Hisole (1949) Reyes. DOCTRINE: Assumption of risk by the complainant voids the liability of the defendant under NCC 1174 (although this case was under Old Civil Code) FACTS 1. Loreto Afialdo was the caretaker of the defendants animals. He was gored and killed by one of the carabaos under his care.

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2.

Loretos sister Margarita is suing for damages claiming that the accident was not due to Loretos fault nor force majeure, thus employers should be liable under Article 1905 of the Old Civil Code: a. The possessor of an animal or one who uses the same is liable for any damages it may cause, even if such animal should escape him or stray away. This liability shall cease only in case the damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the person who may have suffered it

death prepared by Dr. Castro stated the cause of' death as ,'circulatory shock electrocution". Heirs filed an action for damages in the amount of P250,000.

Relevant Issue: WON the SC should apply the legal principle of "assumption of risk" in the present case to bar private respondents from collecting damages from petitioner company? Ruling: No. The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds no application in the case at bar. It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. The deceased were on their way to the latter's grocery store "to see to it that the goods were not flooded." As such, shall we punish her for exercising her right to protect her property from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not. A person is excused from the force of the rule if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal incident occurred, was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to petitioner's consent as she was on her way to protect her merchandise. Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from recovering damages as a result of the death caused by petitioner's negligence Dispositive: In considering the liability of petitioner, the respondent CA awarded the following in private respondent's favor: P30,229.45 in actual damages (i.e., P12,000 for the victim's death and P18,229.45 for funeral expenses); P50,000 in compensatory damages, computed in accordance with the formula set in the Villa-Rey Transit case (31 SCRA 511) with the base of P15,000 as average annual income of the deceased; P10,000 in exemplary damages; P3,000 attorney's fees; and costs of suit. Except for the award of P12,000 as compensation for the victim's death, We affirm the respondent CA's award for damages and attorney's fees. Pusuant to recent jurisprudence (People vs. Mananquil, 132 SCRA 196; People vs. Traya, 147 SCRA 381), We increase the said award of P12,000 to P30,000, thus, increasing the total actual damages to P48,229.45. Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v. Ruby Lim - Buhangin Facts: 1. Roberto Reyes a.k.a. Amay Bisaya, alleged that around at around 6pm on October 13, 1994, he was approached by one Dr. Violeta Filart, his friend for several years.

ISSUE: WON the owner of the animal is liable for damage caused to the caretaker. HELD: (NO liability) 1. 2. 3. Article 1905 of the Old Civil Code was applied to cases where the injury was to 3rd persons, not to employees. The text of the provision specifically refers to possessor or user of the animals. In this case, a. Injury was to an employee of the Hisoles. b. Said employee was the one in possession and control of the animals, and thus in a position to prevent them from causing injury. c. Application of the doctrine: Being injured under the circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences.

INELCO v. CA Brillo Facts: On June 29, 1967 typhoon Gening buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte. Around 6:00 A.M., when the floodwaters were beginning to recede the deceased Isabel Lao Juan (Nana Belen) went out to check her grocery store. She was followed by two of her employees Aida Bulong and Linda Alonzo Estavillo. Suddenly, Nana Belen screamed and quickly sank into the water. The two girls attempted to help, but fear dissuaded them because on the spot where the deceased sank they saw an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the house and tried to go to the deceased, but at four meters away from her he turned back shouting that the water was grounded. Aida and Linda prodded Ernesto to seek help from Antonio Yabes at the YJ Cinema building which was four or five blocks away. When Antonio Yabes (son-in-law) and his wife requested the police to ask Ilocos Norte Electric Company or INELCO to cut off the electric current. Yabes instructed his boys to fish for the body of the deceased. The body was recovered about two meters from an electric post. Dr. Castro examined the body at about 8:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967. The skin was grayish or, in medical parlance, cyanotic, which indicated death by electrocution. On the left palm, the doctor found an "electrically charged wound".The certificate of

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2. 3. 4. 5.

6.

7.

Filart invited him to join her in a party held for former hotel manager Masakazu Tsuruoka at the penthouse. While at the party, Reyes lined up at the buffet table. Shortly thereafter, he was stopped by one Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for the hotel as Executive Secretary. Lim told him to leave the party for being uninvited. Reyes explained to Lim that he was invited by Filart. Filart, who was within hearing distance, feigned ignorance. A Makati policeman then escorted him out of the hotel. On her defense, Lim argued that she was working with a guest list which is limited only to 60 attendees. Having seen Reyes, she asked him to leave the party. Reyes, however, made a big scene. He shouted at her and even threatened to dump food on her. Filart, on the other hand, averred that she never invited Reyes to the party. She said that Reyes volunteered to carry the fruit basket intended for the celebrant. She added that Reyes was heading to another in-hotel restaurant, Altitude 49, and not to the penthouse. The lower court dismissed the complaint. The CA reversed as it found believable the testimony of Reyes that Lim, with a loud voice, ordered the former to leave the party premises.

observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties; its elements are the following: o Legal right or duty o Exercised in bad faith o For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another NCC 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: o There is an act which is legal o But it is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, public policy o And it is done with intent to injure Common theme running through NCC 19 and 21act must be INTENTIONAL o Reyes has not shown that Lim was driven by animosity against him; he had a lame argument: Lim, being single at 44, had a very strong bias and prejudice against him possibly influenced by her associates in her work at the hotel with foreign businessmen o Manner by which Lim asked Reyes to leave was acceptable and humane

Any damage which Reyes might have suffered through Lims exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith must be his to bear alone. DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA DOES NOT FIND APPLICATION IN THIS CASE Volenti non fit injuria (to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury) Selfinflicted injury or consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so Even if Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame. [NCC 19, 21] Thus, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is granted. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is reserved and set aside. Pantaleon v. American Express - Celebrado Special 2nd Division | G.R. No. 174269 | 25 August 2010 | Brion, J. FACTS: Polo Pantaleon, and his family joined an escorted tour of Western Europe organized by Trafalgar Tours of Europe. The group had arrived late in Amsterdam, so it was agreed that they would start early the next day to see the entire city. 10 min before 9AMThey arrived at the Coster Diamond House in Amsterdam. The group had agreed that the visit should end by 9:30AM to allow time for tour of Amsterdam. They listened to a lecture on the art of diamond polishing and led to the stores showroom to allow them to select items for purchase. Mrs. Pantaleon decided to

Issue: WON petitioners acted abusively in asking Reyes to leave the party.

Held: No. In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Lim to humiliate Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct. Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the party was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. It was plaintiffs reaction to the request that must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between them. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employees. Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko be made answerable for exemplary damages especially for the reason stated by the Court of Appeals. NCC 19 (principle of abuse of rights) is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances; NCC 19s object is to set certain standards which must be

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buy a diamond, pendant and a chain, totaling USD 13,826.00. 9:15AMMr. Pantaleon presented his American Express (AmEx) credit card together with his passport to the Coster sales clerk. The sales clerk took the cards imprint, and asked Pantaleon to sign the charge slip. 9:20AMThe charge purchase was then referred electronically to Amexs Amster dam office. 9:30AMThe store clerk informed him that its not yet approved. His son informed them that the entire tour group was waiting for them. 9:40AMPantaleon asked the store clerk to cancel the sale. The store manager though asked him to wait a few more minutes. After 15 minutes, the store manager informed Pantaleon that AmEx had demanded bank references. Pantaleon supplied the names of his depositary banks, then instructed his daughter to return to the bus and apologize to the tour group for the delay. 10AMCoster decided to release the items even without AmExs approval of the purchase. The spouses Pantaleon returned to the bus. The city tour of Amsterdam was to be canceled due to lack of remaining time, as they had to catch a 3:00 p.m. ferry at Calais, Belgium to London. Mrs. Pantaleon ended up weeping, while her husband had to take a tranquilizer to calm his nerves. After the tour, Pantaleon family proceeded to the USA before returning to Manila. While in USA, Pantaleon continued to use his AmEx card, several times without hassle or delay, but with two other incidents similar to the Amsterdam. After coming back to Manila, Pantaleon demands for apology from AmEx, who did not accede. SC in its 2009 decision ruled in favor of Pantaleon, thus this motion for reconsideration by AmEx. ISSUE: 1. 2. HELD 1. NO. The issuance of a credit card is but an offer to extend a line of open account credit. It is unilateral and supported by no consideration. The offer may be withdrawn at any time, without prior notice, for any reason or, indeed, for no reason at all, and its withdrawal breaches no duty for there is no duty to continue it and violates no rights. Thus, under this view, each credit card transaction is considered a separate offer and acceptance. Since AmEx has no obligation to approve the purchase requests of its credit cardholders, Pantaleon CANNOT claim that AmEx defaulted in its obligation. 2. NO. In Garciano v. Court of Appeals, the right to recover [moral damages] under Article 21 is based on equity, and he who comes to court to demand equity, must WON AmEx had committed a breach of its obligations (i.e. mora solvendi) to Pantaleon. WON (assuming theres no breach of obligations) AmEx is still remained liable for damages under Art. 21 of the Civil Code.

come with clean hands. Article 21 should be construed as granting the right to recover damages to injured persons who are NOT themselves at fault. Pantaleon is NOT a blameless party in all this. Pantaleon is the proximate cause for this embarrassment and humiliation. Pantaleon tried to cancel the sale at 9:40 a.m. because he did not want to cause any inconvenience to the tour group. However, when Costers sale manager asked him to wait a few more minutes for the credit card approval, he agreed, despite the knowledge that he had already caused a 10minute delay and that the city tour could not start without him. Cited in page 285 (Torts Book) In Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v. Reyes, we ruled that a person who knowingly and voluntarily exposes himself to danger cannot claim damages for the resulting injury: The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury) refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so. This doctrine, in our view, is wholly applicable to this case. Pantaleon himself testified that the most basic rule when travelling in a tour group is that you must never be a cause of any delay because the schedule is very strict. When Pantaleon made up his mind to push through with his purchase, he must have known that the group would become annoyed and irritated with him. This was the natural, foreseeable consequence of his decision to make them all wait. We do not discount the fact that Pantaleon and his family did feel humiliated and embarrassed when they had to wait for AMEX to approve the Coster purchase in Amsterdam. We have to acknowledge, however, that Pantaleon was NOT a helpless victim in this scenario at any time, he could have cancelled the sale so that the group could go on with the city tour. But he did not. More importantly, AMEX did NOT violate any legal duty to Pantaleon under the circumstances under the principle of damnum absque injuria, or damages without legal wrong, loss without injury.

Kramer vs CA Deslate The F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by petitioners Ernesto Kramer Jr. and Marta Kramer, was navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere near Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat figured in a collision with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines owned by the private respondent Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. As a consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish catch. The Board of Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard concluded that the loss of F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was attributable to the negligence of M/V Asia Philippines' employees. Petitioners thus filed a complaint for damages against private respondent. The latter filed a Motion to Dismiss complaint on the ground of prescription under Article 11462, asserting that petitioners filed their complaint (on May 1985) beyond 4 years since the maritime collision took place (on April 1976).

Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years :

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Petitioners countered that their cause of action accrued only on April 1982, when the decision of the Board of Marine Inquiry imputing negligence on the crew of M/V Asia Phils had become final. This is because there is a need to rely on highly technical aspects attendant to maritime collisions, as determined by the Board. Thus, filing of their complaint in 1985 was not barred. ISSUE: when does the prescriptive period for filing an action based upon a quasi-delict start to run? From the day the QD is committed or from the day the decision of a concerned government agency (Board of Marine Inquiry) becomes final? HELD: The petition is devoid of merit. Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within 4 years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed. The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3 elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff ... It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen ... . From the foregoing ruling, it is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted when the last element occurs or takes place, that is, the time of the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of action arises. Thus, respondent court correctly found that the action of petitioner has prescribed. V. CAUSE Bataclan v. Medina - Doria Facts: Juan Bataclan figured in an accident when the bus he was riding (owned by Medina Transportation, driven by Conrado Saylon, operated by Mariano Medina) had its front tires burst, the bus zigzagging ominously before plunging into a canal The bus turned turtle but some passengers managed to escape

Among those that were left pinned down were Bataclan (they were seated near the driver) After about half an hour, some men carrying lighted torches approached to help When they got close to the bus, a fierce fire started, killing the 4 left people Salud Villanueva, the widow, filed action to recover from Medina compensatory, moral, exemplary, attys fees (87k) TC: o breach of contract of carriage; o negligence of driver Saylon - he was speeding at time of accident so when he applied the brakes, the bus was catapulted 150m before it fell o PROXIMATE CAUSE: fire that burned the bus (thus, damages correspond to physical injuries)

Issue: w/n the carrier is liable and to what degree (i.e. what is the proximate cause of Bataclans death)

Held: Defendant carrier is liable since the proximate cause of Bataclans death was the overturning of the bus. Ordinarily when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, injuring him, if through some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire (e.g. lightning or looters), and the passenger is burned to death, one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle.

HOWEVER, in the present case, when the vehicle turned turtle, the leaking of gasoline was not unnatural or unexpected. The coming of the men with the torches was but a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus. Burning can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier (thru its driver and its conductor who failed to exercised diligence in cautioning the men with fire as the leak reeks even from a distance)

(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff; (2) Upon a quasi-delict; However, when the action arises from or out of any act, activity, or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year. (As amended by PD No. 1755, Dec. 24, 1980.)

PROXIMATE CAUSE short: that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred

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long: that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

Baking filed a complaint for damages against Mercury Drug. RTC rendered its decision in favor of Baking. CA affirmed RTC.

Issues: 1. Whether petitioner was negligent, and if so, whether such negligence was the proximate cause of respondents accident; and 2. Whether the award of moral damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and cost of the suit is justified.

Others: evidence to support supposition that the tires were already old (Medina was overheard ordering bus inspector to change them since driver failed to do so before accident)

Held: 1. YES. MERCURY DRUG EMPLOYEE GROSSLY NEGLIGENT IN SELLING DORMICUM To sustain a claim based on NCC 2176, the following requisites must concur: Damage suffered by plaintiff Fault or negligence of defendant Connection of cause and effect between A & B The drugstore business is imbued with public interest. The health and safety of the people will be put into jeopardy if drugstore employees will not exercise the highest degree of care and diligence in selling medicines. The care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the law demands. Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life and death for a buying patient, the employee should have been very cautious in dispensing medicines. She should have verified WON the medicine she gave was what was prescribed by Dr. Sy. MERCURY DRUG ALSO LIABLE UNDER NCC 2180 It failed to prove that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of the employee.

Mercury Drug v Baking - Enteria 2007 / Sandoval-Gutierrez / Petition for review on certiorari of CA decision and resolution The cause > Different categories > Proximate Facts: 5. Sebastian Baking went to Dr. Cesar Sys clinic for a medical check-up. The next day, after undergoing several tests, Dr. Sy found that Bakings blood sugar and triglyceride levels were above normal, so he gave him 2 medical prescriptions Diamicron (blood sugar) and Benalize (triglyceride). Baking went to Mercury Drug Alabang branch to buy the medicines. However, the saleslady misread the prescription as Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet, so that was what was sold to Baking. Unaware that he was given the wrong medicine, Baking took one Dormicum pill a day for 3 days. On the 3rd day of taking the medicine, Baking figured in a vehicular accident, as his car collided with Josie Peraltas car. Baking fell asleep while driving, and he could not remember anything about the collision nor felt its impact. Suspecting that the tablet he took may have a bearing on his state at the time of the collision, he returned to Dr. Sy, who was shocked to find that what was sold to Baking was Dormicum. Petitioner contends that the proximate cause of the accident was respondents negligence in driving his car.

a. b. c.

PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT NEGLIGENCE OF DRUGSTORE EMPLOYEE Proximate cause any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise; determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy and precedent

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Vehicular accident could not have occurred had the drugstore employee been careful in reading the prescription; without the potent effects of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that Baking would fall asleep while driving his car, resulting in a collision. 2. Yes. Award of damages are justified. AWARD 50k moral damages, 25k exemplary damages. Attorney's fees and costs of suit deleted.

ISSUE: WON Art.2179 of NCC is applicable to exempt Pilipinas Bank from liability

HELD: No. Pilipinas Bank was held liable. For Article 2179 of the Civil Code to apply, it must be established that private respondent's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. The concept of proximate cause is defined in our corpus of jurisprudence as "any cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which would not have occurred and from which it ought to have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary case that the injury complained of or some similar injury, would result therefrom as a natural and probable consequence." In this case, the proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of petitioner's employee in erroneously posting the cash deposit of private respondent in the name of another depositor who had a similar first name. As held by the trial court: the bank employee is deemed to have failed to exercise the degree of care required in the performance of his duties. The bank employee posted the cash deposit in the account of Florencio Amador from his assumption that the name Florencio appearing on the ledger without, however, going through the full name, is the same Florencio stated in the deposit slip. He should have continuously gone beyond mere assumption, which was proven to be erroneous, and proceeded with clear certainty, considering the amount involved and the repercussions it would create on the totality of the person notable of which is the credit standing of the person involved should a mistake happen. The checks issued by the plaintiff in the course of his business were dishonored by the bank because the ledger of Florencio Reyes indicated a balance insufficient to cover the face value of checks. Far Eastern Shipping v. CA - Fullecido Doctrine:

Pilipinas Bank v. CA Pascual PILIPINAS BANK v. CA and FLORENCIO REYES 1994 / Puno / Petition for review of a CA decision The cause > Different categories > Proximate

FACTS: FLORENCIO REYES issued two postdated checks. These are for WINNER INDUSTRIAL CORP. in amount of P21T due Oct.10, 1979 and for Vicente TUI in amount of P11.4T due Oct.12. To cover the face value of the checks, he requested PCIB Money Shop's manager to effect the withdrawal of P32T from his savings account and have it deposited with his current account with PILIPINAS BANK. PILIPINAS BANKS Current Account Bookkeeper made an error in depositing the amount: he thought it was for a certain FLORENCIO AMADOR. He, thus, posted the deposit in the latter's account not noticing that the depositor's surname in the deposit slip was REYES. On Oct.11, the Oct.10 check in favor of WINNER INDUSTRIAL was presented for payment. Since the ledger of Florencio REYES indicated that his account had only a balance of P4,078.43, it was dishonored and the payee was advised to try it for next clearing. It was redeposited but was again dishonored. The same thing happened to the Oct.12 check. The payee then demanded a cash payment of the checks face value which REYES did if only to save his name. Furious, Reyes immediately proceeded to the bank and urged an immediate verification of his account. That was only when they noticed the error. The P32,000 deposit posted in the account of Florencio Amador was immediately transferred to the account of Reyes upon being cleared by Florencio Amador that he did not effect a deposit in that amount. RTC: ordered petitioner to pay P200T compensatory damages, P100T moral damages, P25T attorneys fees, as well as costs of suit. CA: modified amount to just P50T moral damages andP25T attorneys fees and costs of suit.

As a general rule, negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiffs, is the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured.

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Facts: 1. 2. The M/V Pavlodar, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company, arrived at the Port of Manila from Vancouver, Canada at about 7:00AM. The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port. Captain Roberto Abellana was tasked by the Philippine Port Authority (PPA) to supervise the berthing of the vessel. Herein appellant Senen Gavino was assigned by the Manila Pilots Association (MPA) to conduct docking manoeuvres. They were assisted by Capt. Victor Kabankov. Prior to the berthing, the sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking manoeuvres. When the vessel was 2000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. The bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the same. The vessel likewise sustained damage. The PPA, through the Solicitor General, filed before the RTC a complaint for sum of money against Far Eastern Shipping, Gavino, and MPA. Trial court ordered the defendants therein jointly and severally to pay the PPA the amount required. The CA affirmed as to the solidary liability of Far Eastern Shipping.

for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause the injury.

3. 4. 5. 6.

Prof Casis: the liability of one actor is not affected by the negligence of another acto if both acts comprise the proximate cause of the injury. Thus, if several causes combine to produce injury, the actor responsible for one cause is not absolved by the fact that another actor is responsible for another cause. The Courts statement implies that there is only one proximate cause, but this may consist of several combined causes. This implies that each cause independently is incomplete to form the proximate cause. Gabeto v. Araneta - Hernandez October 17, 1921 STREET, J. Topic : Remote Cause Facts: Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata with a view to going to a cockpit. When the driver of the carromata had turned his horse and started in the direction indicated, the defendant, Agaton Araneta, stepped out into the street, stopped the horse, and at the same time protested to the driver that he himself had called this carromata first. The driver, Julio Pagnaya, replied that he had not heard or seen the call of Araneta. Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the horse from the control of Agaton Araneta in order that the vehicle might pass on. However, due to the looseness of the bridle on the horse's head or to the rottenness of the material of which it was made, the bit came out of the horse's mouth. Pagnaya, the driver, and Ilano, one of the passengers, had alighted from the carromata but Gayetano unfortunately retained his seat. When Pagnaya was trying to fix the bridle, the horse, being free from the control of the bit, became disturbed and moved forward, in doing he was able to pull one of the wheels of the carromata up on the sidewalk; thus, striking a police telephone box which was fixed to a post on the sidewalk, upon which the box came down with a crash and frightened the horse to such an extent that the horse set out at full speed up the street. After the runaway horse had proceeded up the street to a point in front of the Mission Hospital, Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig, and in so doing received injuries from which he soon died. Consequently, the widow of Gayetano, Consolacion, filed an action for damages against Araneta. ISSUE:

Issue (pertinent to concurrent negligence) Would the owner of the vessel be liable likewise if the damage is caused by the concurrent negligence of the master of vessel and the pilot under a compulsory pilotage?

Held: The Court found that both Capt. Gavino and Capt. Kabankov were negligent. Far Eastern Shipping is liable. Regarding the solidary liability of Far Eastern, the Court explained:

On CONCURRENT NEGLIGENCE, it is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible

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Whether Araneta (the one who stopped the horse) should be held liable for the death of passenger Gayetano. HELD: No. Araneta should not be held liable. His stopping of the horse is too remote a cause of death of Gayetano. RATIO: The mere fact that Araneta interfered with the carromata by stopping the horse would not make him liable for the death of passenger Gayetano. The stopping of the rig by Agaton Araneta in the middle of the street was TOO REMOTE from the accident that presently ensued to be considered the legal or proximate cause thereof. Moreover, by getting out and taking his post at the head of the horse, the driver was the person primarily responsible for the control of the animal, and the defendant cannot be charged with liability for the accident resulting from the action of the horse thereafter. After Julio Pagnaya alighted, the horse was conducted to the curb and that an appreciable interval of time elapsed some witnesses say several minutes before the horse started on his career up the street. Other nice-to-know information from the case: The evidence indicates that the bridle was old, and the leather of which it was made was probably so weak as to be easily broken. Julio Pagnaya testifies to one fact which, if it were fully accredited, would possibly put a different complexion on the case; for he says that when the horse was pulled over to the curb, the defendant gesticulated with one of his arms and incidentally brought his hand down on the horse's nose. This, according to Pagnaya, is what made the horse run away. There is no other witness who testifies to this; and it is noteworthy that Basilio Ilano does not mention it. A decided preponderance of the evidence in our opinion is against it. Casis Emphasis on his book: In this case, TIME and CONTROL over the vehicle was determinative as to whether a particular act was considered a proximate cause. Phoenix Construction v. IAC Manalo Facts: At about 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 1975, private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from cocktails and dinner meeting with his boss. He was proceeding down General Lacuna Street when he saw a Ford dump truck parked askew, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic, with no lights or early warning reflector devices. The truck was driven earlier by Armando Carbonel, a regular driver of the petitioner company. Dionisio tried to swerve his car to the left, but it was too late. He suffered some physical injuries and nervous breakdown. Dionision filed an action for damages against Carbonel and Phoenix Insurance. Petitioners countered the claim by imputing the accident to respondents own negligence in driving at high speed without curfew pass and headlights, and while intoxicated. The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent.

Issue: Whether the collision was brought about by the way the truck was parked, or by respondents own negligence Held: We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass during the night of the accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have such a pass during that night. It is the petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even before he reached the intersection so as not to be detected by the police in the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from the intersection. We believe that the petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than that offered by private respondent Dionisio, i.e., that he had his headlights on but that, at the crucial moment, these had in some mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, although he succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright" split seconds before contact with the dump truck. We do not believe that this evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was so heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of reckless imprudence. The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that private respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane. Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence. The distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the 'petitioners would have us adopt have already been "almost entirely discredited. If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active forces which have gone before. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and

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"condition" which is important but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause.

We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope original risk, and hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's responsibility. Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even though the car is negligently driven; and one who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when another negligently drives into it. We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts. Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose negligence - the plaintiff's or the defendant's - was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the members of society. To accept the petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken the very bonds of society.

We believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by private respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarity liable therefor to the former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. 18 We see no sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced award of damages made by the respondent appellate court. Dy Teban v. Jose Ching (Millena taken from the web) Injured Party: Nissan owned by Dy Teban Trading Negligent Party: Driver of Primemover owned by Libery Forest Facts: On July 4, 1995, at around 4:45 a.m., Rogelio Ortiz, with helper Romeo Catamora, was driving a Nissan van owned by petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. along the National Highway in Barangay Sumilihon, Butuan City, going to Surigao City. They were delivering commercial ice to nearby barangays and municipalities. A Joana Paula passenger bus was cruising on the opposite lane towards the van. In between the two vehicles was a parked prime mover with a trailer, owned by private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. The night before, at around 10:00 p.m., the prime mover with trailer suffered a tire blowout. The driver, private respondent Cresilito Limbaga, parked the prime mover askew occupying a substantial portion of the national highway, on the lane of the passenger bus. He parked the prime mover with trailer at the shoulder of the road with the left wheels still on the cemented highway and the right wheels on the sand and gravel shoulder of the highway. The prime mover was not equipped with triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates, the early warning device required under Letter of Instruction No. 229. As substitute, Limbaga placed a banana trunk with leaves on the front and the rear portion of the prime mover to warn incoming motorists. It is alleged that Limbaga likewise placed kerosene lighted tin cans on the front and rear of the trailer. To avoid hitting the parked prime mover occupying its lane, the incoming passenger bus swerved to the right, onto the lane of the approaching Nissan van. Ortiz saw two bright and glaring headlights and the approaching passenger bus. He pumped his break slowly, swerved to the left to avoid the oncoming bus but the van hit the front of the stationary prime mover. The passenger bus hit the rear of the prime mover.[6] Ortiz and Catamora only suffered minor injuries. The Nissan van, however, became inoperable as a result of the incident.

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ISSUE: Whether or not PrimeMover is liable for the damages suffered by the Nissan Van HELD: YES Defendant Liberty Forest, Inc. did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in managing and running its business. The evidence on record shows that it failed to provide its prime mover and trailer with the required early warning devices with reflectors and it did not keep proper maintenance and condition of the prime mover and the trailer. The circumstances show that the trailer were provided with wornout tires and with only one (1) piece of spare tire. We find that Limbaga was utterly negligent in parking the prime mover askew on the right side of the national highway. The vehicle occupied a substantial portion of the national road on the lane of the passenger bus. It is common sense that the skewed parking of the prime mover on the national road posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. It was incumbent upon Limbaga to take some measures to prevent that risk, or at least minimize it. Private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. was utterly negligent in allowing a novice driver, like Limbaga, to operate a vehicle, such as a truck loaded with a bulldozer, which required highly specialized driving skills. The employer clearly failed to properly supervise Limbaga in driving the prime mover. Limbaga was negligent in parking the prime mover on the national highway. Liberty Forest, Inc. was also negligent in failing to supervise Limbaga and in ensuring that the prime mover was in proper condition. ** Facts of the case reveal that when Ortiz, the driver of the truck, failed to give the Joana Paula bus the space on the road it needed, the latter vehicle scraped its rear right side on the protruded bulldozer blade and the impact threw the bus directly on the path of the oncoming truck. This made plaintiffs-appellants/appellees conclude that the Joana Paula bus occupied its lane which forced Ortiz, the driver of the truck, to swerve to its left and ram the front of the parked trailer. ** To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of defendant; and (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of defendant and the damage incurred by plaintiff. **The two (2) flat tires suffered by the trailer and these two (2) tires were attached to one of the two (2) I-beams or axles attached to the rear of the trailer which axle is very near but behind the other axle and with the location , it would have the other beam suffer the flat tires as it has to bear the brunt of weight of the D-8 bulldozer. Glan v. IAC - Monfort Narvasa | 18 May 89

FACTS: Engineer Calibo, Roranes, and Patos were on the jeep, with Calibo at the wheel, as it approached a bridge going towards the direction of Davao City. At about that time, the cargo truck, Zacarias coming from the opposite direction of Davao City had just crossed said bridge. At about 59 yards after crossing the bridge, the cargo truck and the jeep collided as a consequence of which Engineer Calibo died while Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries. Zacarias was unhurt. As a result of the impact, the left side of the truck was slightly damaged while the left side of the jeep,\ was extensively damaged. After the impact, the jeep fell and rested on its right side on the asphalted road a few meters to the rear of the truck, while the truck stopped on its wheels on the road. A case for damages was filed by the surviving spouse and children of the late Engineer Calibo against the driver and owners of the cargo truck with the CFI of Bohol. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence The Court of Appeals saw things differently. It rendered judgment 9 on the plaintiffs appeal, reversing the decision of the Trial Court. It found Zacarias to be negligent and his negligence gave rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of his employer, and their liability is both primary and solidary. It therefore ordered the defendants jointly and solidarily to indemnify the plaintiffs The defendants have appealed to this Court on certiorari and pray for a reversal of the judgment of the IAC which, it is claimed, ignored or ran counter to the established facts ISSUE: 1. WON the decision of the IAC was erroneous 2. WON the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable in this case HELD: The appealed judgment of the IAC is hereby REVERSED 1. YES. The SC found Calibo negligent instead, because of the following: 1. It is alleged that at the time of the collision, the truck was occupying 25 cm of the jeeps lane. However it was found out that the centre stripe of the road is misaligned and with the correct calculation of the width of the road, the truck on still on its proper lane and it was actually the jeep who is intruding the trucks lane. 2. Nor was the Appellate Court correct in finding that Zacarias had acted negligently in applying his brakes instead of getting back inside his lane upon the coming of the approaching jeep. Being well within his own lane, as has already been explained, he had no duty to swerve out of the jeeps way as said Court would have had him do. And even supposing that he was in fact partly inside the opposite lane, coming to a full stop with the jeep still 30 meters away cannot be considered an unsafe or imprudent action. 3. Unlike Zacarias who readily submitted himself to investigation by the police, Calibos companions, Roranes and Patos, who suffered injuries on account of the collision, refused to be so investigated or give statements to the police officers is a telling indication that they did not attribute the happening to defendant Zacarias negligence or fault.

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 The evidence not only acquits Zacarias of any negligence in the matter; there are also quite a few significant indicators that it wa s rather Engineer Calibos negligence that was the proximate cause of the accident. Zacarias had told Patrolman Dimaano at the scene of the collision and later confirmed in his written statement at the police headquarters that the jeep had been zigzagging, which is to say that it was travelling or being driven erratically at the time. The other investigator also testified that eyewitnesses to the accident had remarked on the jeeps zigzagging. There was also testimony that Calibo was drunk while driving the jeep. 2. YES. Even, however, ignoring these tell-tale indicia of negligence on the part of Calibo, and assuming some antecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias in failing to keep within his designated lane, incorrectly demarcated as it was, the physical facts would still absolve the latter of any actionable responsibility for the accident under the rule of the last clear chance. Both drivers, as the Appellate Court found, had had a full view of each others vehicle from a distance of 150 meters. The truck had been brought to a stop while the jeep was still thirty meters away. From these facts the logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had what judicial doctrine has appropriately called the last clear chance to avoid the accident, while still at that distance of thirty meters from the truck, by stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep away from the truck, either of which he had sufficient time to do while running at a speed of only thirty kilometres per hour. In those circumstances, his duty was to seize that opportunity of avoidance, not merely rely on a supposed right to expect the truck to swerve and leave him a clear path. The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as valid and complete a defense to accident liability today as it did when invoked and applied in the 1918 case of Picart vs. Smith, supra, which involved a similar state of facts. Since said ruling clearly applies to exonerate petitioner Zacarias and his employer (and co-petitioner) George Lim, an inquiry into whether or not the evidence supports the latters additional defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of said driver is no longer necessary and wig not be undertaken. The fact is that there is such evidence in the record which has not been controverted. Osmundo Canlas & Angelina Canlas v. CA, Asian Savings Bank, Maximo C. Contreras, & Vicente Maosca - Namingit 28 February 2000 J. Purisima Facts: August 1982 - Osmundo Canlas and Vicente Maosca decided to venture in business and raise the capital needed therefor. Canlas executed a SPA authorizing Maosca to mortgage 2 parcels of land with semi-concrete residential house thereon owned by spouses Canlas

Canlas agreed to sell said parcels of land for 850k, 500k payable within 1 week, and the balance 350k to serve as his investment in the business. Thus, Canlas delivered to Maosca the transfer certificates of title. Maosca issued 2 postdated checks in the amounts of 40k and 460k but it turned out that the check covering the bigger amount was not sufficiently funded. Sept. 3, 1982 Maosca was able to mortgage the 2 parcels of land for 100k to a certain Atty. Manuel Magno with the help of impostors who misrepresented themselves as the spouses Canlas. Sept. 29, 1982 Asian Savings Bank granted Maosca a loan amounting to 500k with the use of the 2 parcels of land as security, and with the involvement of the same impostors who misrepresented themselves as the spouses Canlas. When the loan was not paid, Asian Savings Bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. Jan. 15, 1983, Osmundo wrote a letter informing Asian Savings Bank that the execution of subject mortgage was without their authority and requests that steps are taken to annul and/or revoke the questioned mortgage. Canlas filed for annulment of deed of real estate mortgage with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. TC annulled the subject deed of mortgage. CA reversed

Issues: 1. W/N Asian Savings Bank exercised due diligence in granting the loan application 2. W/N Asian Savings Bank is liable to bear the loss Held: 1. No. The degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a family as the business of a bank is affected with public interest. In the case, from the evidence presented it can be gleaned unerringly that the bank did not observe the requisite diligence in ascertaining or verifying the real identity of the couple who introduced themselves as the spouses Canlas. Not even a single ID was exhibited by said impostors and yet, the bank on their representatives simply on the basis of the residence certificates bearing signatures on a previous deed of mortgage which tended to match the signatures affixed on a previous deed of mortgage to a certain Atty. Magno. The negligence of the bank was magnified by the fact that the previous deed of mortgage used as basis for checking the genuineness of the signatures of the supposed Canlas spouses did not ber the tax account number of the spouses as well as the CTC of Angelina Canlas. Despite such fact, the bank did not require the impostors to submit additiona proof of their true identity. 2. Yes Under the last clear chance doctrine, the bank must suffer the resulting loss. In essence, the doctrine of the last clear chance is to the effect that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impeding harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom.

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Assuming that Osmundo was negligent in giving Maosca the opportunity to perpetuate the fraud by entrusting the owners copy of the land titles, it cannot be denied that the bank had the last clear chance to prevent the fraud, by the simple expedient of faithfully complying with the requirements for banks to ascertain the identity of the persons transacting with them For not observing the degree of diligence required of banking institutions, Asian Savings Bank has to bear the loss sued upon. Note: Court held that Canlas was also negligent which made him undeserving of Attys fees Lapanday v Angala - Ogena -Crewcab owned by petitioner corporation (driven by Deocampo) collides with pick-up truck owned by respondents -left door, front fender, and part of the front bumper of pick-up was damaged -R's version of events: alleged that he was slowing down to 5-10 kph and was making a left turn when the crewcab (running at 60-70 kph) bumped R's vehicle from behind -P's version of events: both vehicles were running at 40 kph. Pick-up was 10 meters in front on the outer lane. Pick-up (without signaling) attempted to make a U-turn to the left. -P's driver allegedly tried to avoid the pick-up but was unable to avoid the collision. He further alleged that he did not apply the brakes because he knew the collision was unavoidable and that he stepped on the brakes only after the collision. Issue: WON P is liable

to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so is chargeable with the loss. -P had the last clear chance to avoid the collision. Since P was driving the rear vehicle, he had full control of the situation since he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. P had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him. -a U-turn is done at a much slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning, compared to running straight ahead. P could have avoided the vehicle if he was not driving very fast while following R. -P was not only driving fast, he also admitted that he did not step on the brakes even upon seeing R. He only stepped on the brakes after the collision. -P Lapanday solidarily liable with driver -Moral damages awarded to R Philippine Bank of Commerce v CA - Escalona 1997 RMC filed a complaint to recover from PBC P304,979, representing various deposits it made in its current account with said bank but which were not credited to its account, and were instead deposited to the account of one Bienvenido Cotas, allegedly due to the gross and inexcusable negligence of the bank. From May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976, RMC claims to have entrusted funds in secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said funds in the current accounts of RMC with PBC. It turned out, however, that these deposits, on all occasions, were not credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited to Account No. 53-01734-7 of Yabut's husband, Bienvenido Cotas who likewise maintains an account with the same bank. During this period, petitioner bank had, however, been regularly furnishing private respondent with monthly statements showing its current accounts balances. Unfortunately, it had never been the practice of Romeo Lipana to check these monthly statements. Irene Yabut's modus operandi: she would accomplish two (2) copies of the deposit slip, an original and a duplicate. The original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current account number. On the duplicate copy was written the account number of her husband but the name of the account holder was left blank. PBC's teller, Azucena Mabayad, would, however, validate and stamp both the original and the duplicate of these deposit slips retaining only the original copy despite the lack of information on the duplicate slip. The second copy was kept by Irene Yabut allegedly for record purposes. After validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the space left blank in the duplicate copy and change the account number written thereon, which is that of her husband's, and make it appear to be RMC's account number, i.e., C.A. No. 53-01980-3.

Held: Yes -both parties were negligent: -R was in the wrong lane (outer) when he tried to execcute the U-turn; he should have stayed in the inner lane near the center of the highway if he intended to make a U-turn -P should have slowed down when R slowed down to make the U-turn; P could have avoided R if he was not driving very fast prior to collision -since both parties were at fault, doctrine of last clear chance applies. -doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible

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This went on in a span of more than one (1) year without private respondent's knowledge. Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from petitioner bank the return of its money, but as its demand went unheeded, it filed a collection suit. The trial court found petitioner bank negligent. ISSUE: What is the proximate cause of the loss, to the tune of P304,979.74, suffered by the private respondent RMC petitioner bank's negligence or that of private respondent's? SC: The bank's teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms. Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate, as testified to by Ms. Mabayad herself. Ms. Mabayad failed to observe procedure. The fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the bank in accepting deposits should not relieve the petitioner bank of responsibility. The odd circumstance alone that such duplicate copy lacked one vital information that of the name of the account holder should have already put Ms. Mabayad on guard. Rather than readily validating the incomplete duplicate copy, she should have proceeded more cautiously by being more probing as to the true reason why the name of the account holder in the duplicate slip was left blank while that in the original was filled up. Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms. Mabayad. This was exemplified in the testimony of Mr. Romeo Bonifacio, then Manager of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner bank and now its Vice-President, to the effect that, while he ordered the investigation of the incident, he never came to know that blank deposit slips were validated in total disregard of the bank's validation procedures. It was this negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad, coupled by the negligence of the petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller, which was the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent, and not the latter's act of entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, as insisted by the petitioners. Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. 15 Vda. de Bataclan v. Medina, 16 reiterated in the case of Bank of the Phil. Islands v. Court of Appeals, 17 defines proximate cause as "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. . . ." In this case, absent the act of Ms. Mabayad in negligently validating the incomplete

duplicate copy of the deposit slip, Ms. Irene Yabut would not have the facility with which to perpetrate her fraudulent scheme with impunity. Furthermore, under the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to, at times as "supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril"), petitioner bank was indeed the culpable party. Assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud the company, as advanced by the petitioner, yet it cannot be denied that the petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation procedure. While it is true that had private respondent checked the monthly statements of account sent by the petitioner bank to RMC, the latter would have discovered the loss early on, such cannot be used by the petitioners to escape liability. This omission on the part of the private respondent does not change the fact that were it not for the wanton and reckless negligence of the petitioners' employee in validating the incomplete duplicate deposit slips presented by Ms. Irene Yabut, the loss would not have occurred. The foregoing notwithstanding, it cannot be denied that, indeed, private respondent was likewise negligent in not checking its monthly statements of account. Had it done so, the company would have been alerted to the series of frauds being committed against RMC by its secretary. The decision of Court of Appeals is modified by reducing the amount of actual damages private respondent is entitled to by 40%. CONSOLIDATED BANK VS. THE CONSOLIDATED BANK and TRUST CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and L.C. DIAZ and COMPANY, CPAs Domingo as edited by Perez Facts: In March 1976, L.C. Diaz opened a savings account with Solidbank. On 14 August 1991, L.C. Diaz through its cashier, Mercedes Macaraya, filled up a savings (cash) deposit slip for P990 and a savings (checks) deposit slip for P50. Macaraya instructed the messenger of L.C. Diaz, Ismael Calapre, to deposit the money with Solidbank. Macaraya also gave Calapre the Solidbank passbook. Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the two deposit slips and the passbook. The teller acknowledged the receipt of the deposit by returning to Calapre the duplicate copies of the two deposit slips. Teller No. 6 stamped the deposit slips with the words DUPLICATE and SAVING TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK HEAD OFFICE. Since the transaction took time and Calapre had to

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make another deposit for L.C. Diaz with Allied Bank, he left the passbook with Solidbank. Calapre then went to Allied Bank. When Calapre returned to Solidbank to retrieve the passbook, Teller No. 6 informed him that somebody got the passbook. Calapre went back to L.C. Diaz and reported the incident to Macaraya. Macaraya immediately prepared a deposit slip in duplicate copies with a check of P200,000. Macaraya and Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the deposit slip and check. The teller stamped the words DUPLICATE and SAVING TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK HEAD OFFICE on the duplicate copy of the deposit slip. When Macaraya asked for the passbook, Teller No. 6 told Macaraya that someone got the passbook but she could not remember to whom she gave the passbook. When Macaraya asked Teller No. 6 if Calapre got the passbook, Teller No. 6 answered that someone shorter than Calapre got the passbook. Calapre was then standing beside Macaraya. The following day L.C. Diaz learned of the unauthorized withdrawal the day before (14 August 1991) of P300,000 from its savings account. The withdrawal slip for the P300,000 bore the signatures of the authorized signatories of L.C. Diaz, namely Diaz and Rustico L. Murillo. The signatories, however, denied signing the withdrawal slip. A certain Noel Tamayo received the P300,000. L.C. Diaz demanded from Solidbank the return of its money. Solidbank refused. L.C. Diaz filed a Complaint for Recovery of a Sum of Money against Solidbank. The trial court absolved Solidbank. L.C. Diaz appealed to the CA. CA reversed the ecision of the trial court. CA denied the motion for reconsideration of Solidbank. But it modified its decision by deleting the award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Hence this petition.

In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract, there is a presumption that the defendant was at fault or negligent. The burden is on the defendant to prove that he was not at fault or negligent. In contrast, in culpa aquiliana the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant was negligent. In the present case, L.C. Diaz has established that Solidbank breached its contractual obligation to return the passbook only to the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz. There is thus a presumption that Solidbank was at fault and its teller was negligent in not returning the passbook to Calapre. The burden was on Solidbank to prove that there was no negligence on its part or its employees. But Solidbank failed to discharge its burden. Solidbank did not present to the trial court Teller No. 6, the teller with whom Calapre left the passbook and who was supposed to return the passbook to him. Solidbank also failed to adduce in evidence its standard procedure in verifying the identity of the person retrieving the passbook, if there is such a procedure, and that Teller No. 6 implemented this procedure in the present case. Solidbank is bound by the negligence of its employees under the principle of respondeat superior or command responsibility. The defense of exercising the required diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not a complete defense in culpa contractual, unlike in culpa aquiliana. The bank must not only exercise high standards of integrity and performance, it must also insure that its employees do likewise because this is the only way to insure that the bank will comply with its fiduciary duty. Proximate Cause of the Unauthorized Withdrawal L.C. Diaz was not at fault that the passbook landed in the hands of the impostor. Solidbank was in possession of the passbook while it was processing the deposit. After completion of the transaction, Solidbank had the contractual obligation to return the passbook only to Calapre, the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz. Solidbank failed to fulfill its contractual obligation because it gave the passbook to another person. Had the passbook not fallen into the hands of the impostor, the loss of P300,000 would not have happened. Thus, the proximate cause of the unauthorized withdrawal was Solidbanks negligence in not returning the passbook to Calapre. Doctrine of Last Clear Chance We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the present case. This is a case of culpa contractual, where neither the contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid the loss, would exonerate the defendant from liability. Such contributory negligence or last clear chance by the plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the plaintiff but does not exculpate the defendant from his breach of contract Bustamante v. CA Siang February 6, 1991 MEDIALDEA, J

Issue: Held: Yes. Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence, or culpa contractual. WON petitioner Solidbank is liable.

There is a debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and its depositor. The bank is the debtor and the depositor is the creditor. The law imposes on banks high standards in view of the fiduciary nature of bankingThe fiduciary nature of banking requires banks to assume a degree of diligence higher than that of a good father of a family. Section 2 of RA 8791 prescribes the statutory diligence required from banks that banks must observe high standards of integrity and performance in servicing their depositors. Solidbanks Breach of its Contractual Obligation

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FACTS:

the doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to recovery. a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. since the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles the court erred in absolving the owner and driver of the cargo truck from liability

April 20, 1983 6:30 am: a collision occurred between a 1947 model gravel and sand truck driven by Montesiano and owned by Del Pilar and a Mazdapassenger bus driven Susulin along the national road at Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite front left side portion (barandilla) of the body of the truck sideswiped the left side wall of the passenger bus, ripping off the wall from the driver's seat to the last rear seat several passengers of the bus were thrown out and died as a result of the injuries they sustained: 1. Rogelio Bustamante, 40, husband of Emma Adriano Bustamante and father of Rossel, Gloria, Yolanda, Ericson, and Ederic, all surnamed Bustamante; 2. Maria Corazon Jocson, 16, daughter of spouses Salvador and Patria Jocson; 3. Jolet C. Ramos, 16, daughter of spouses Jose and Enriqueta Ramos; 4. Enrico Himaya, 18, son of spouses Narciso and Adoracion Himaya; and 5. Noel Bersamina, 17, son of spouses Jose and Ma. Commemoracion Bersamina

Pantranco v. Baesa - Tejano FACTS: Spouses Baesa, their 4 children, the Ico spouses and their son and 7 other people boarded a passenger jeep driven by David Ico to go to a picnic in Isabela, to celebrate the 5th wedding anniversary of the Baesa spouses While they were proceeding towards Malalam River at a speed of about 20 kph, a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on a route to Manila, encroached on the jeepneys lane while negotiating a curve, and collided with it. As a result, the entire Baesa family, except for their daughter Maricar Baesa, as well as David Ico, died, and the rest suffered from injuries. Maricar Baesa, through her guardian filed separate actions for damages arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO. PANTRANCO: alleged David Ico's negligence as a proximate cause of the accident and invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver. CA upheld RTC: favor of Baesa ISSUE: W/N the last clear chance applies thereby making David Ico who had the chance to avoid the collision negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence HELD: NO. Generally, the last clear change doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense to defeat claim for damages The doctrine of the last clear chance simply, means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence. This doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff. The subsequent negligence of the defendant in failing to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to plaintiff becomes

The bus was registered in the name of Novelo but was owned and/or operated as a passenger bus jointly by Magtibay and Serrado before the collision, the cargo truck and the passenger bus were approaching each other, coming from the opposite directions of the highway. While the truck was still about 30 meters away, Susulin, the bus driver, saw the front wheels of the vehicle wiggling. He also observed that the truck was heading towards his lane. Not minding this circumstance due to his belief that the driver of the truck was merely joking, Susulin shifted from fourth to third gear in order to give more power and speed to the bus, which was ascending the inclined part of the road, in order to overtake or pass a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along the shoulder of the highway RTC: liability of the two drivers for their negligence must be solidary CA: owner and driver of the sand and gravel truck appealed was granted

ISSUE: W/N the last clear chance can apply making the bus negligent in failing to avoid the collision and his act in proceeding to overtake the hand tractor was the proximate cause of the collision making him solely liable

HELD: NO. Petition is granted. CA reversed.

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the immediate or proximate cause of the accident which intervenes between the accident and the more remote negligence of the plaintiff, thus making the defendant liable to the plaintiff. For the last clear chance doctrine to apply, it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly has the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril, or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending danger. When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching form the opposite direction. Even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds before the actual collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered Engada v. CA - Tiongco Quisumbing, 2003 Facts Edwin Iran was driving a Tamaraw with Sheila Seyan, the owner. They saw a pickup truck moving from a hilly gradient, from the opposite direction. The pickup truck was driven by Engada. When the truck was just a few meters away, it flashed its right signal light then swerved left, ENCROACHING Irans lane. To avoid the truck, Iran swerved left. At the last minute, the truck again swerved to its right lane, resulting in a collision. Iran and Seyan were injured. A criminal case for damage to property through reckless imprudence with serious physical injuries was filed. The RTC found Engada guilty, and the CA affirmed, finding the proximate cause of the accident the fact that Engada was in the wrong side of the lane. Engadas defense: that Irans swerving was the cause of the accident, and that when Engada flashed his signal light, sufficient notice was given to Iran to return to his lane, and that this constituted an intervening event which made Engadas actions not the proximate cause.

RULING The Court applied the Emergency Rule. A person who is confronted with a sudden emergency might have no time for thought, and he must make a prompt decision based largely upon impulse or instinct. Petitioners acts put Iran in an emergency situation, and an individual placed in an emergency and required to act fast may not be held guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. The doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable under the emergency rule because in effect there is no last clear chance or opportunity for the plaintiff to escape the accident. Acts of Engada which shows that there was an emergency situation: the fast speed, the last minute changing of lanes. This required Iran to make a quick decision. Casis notes: the Court had no problem applying the doctrine of last clear chance to criminal cases, although in this case the doctrine was barred because of the emergency rule. This case is an instance where the doctrine of last clear chance cannot be applied. VI. PERSONS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE

Libi v. IAC - Valdez Sep. 18, 1992 J. Regalado DOCTRINE: The parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful offender. However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor offender. For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the

Issue WON Engadas actions were the proximate cause of the accident, and whether the doctrine of last clear chance may be applied in Engadas defense? NO, NO.

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same rules shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified. FACTS: Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke up her relationship with Wendell after she supposedly found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but the latter persisted in her refusal, prompting the former to resort to threats against her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend, Malou Alfonso. Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm. Their parents are the contending parties. Private respondents submitted that Wendell caused her death by shooting her with the aforesaid firearm and turning the gun on himself to commit suicide. Petitioners contended that an unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary AntiNarcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused Wendells death and then shot Julie Ann. The parents of Julie Ann filed a civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latters vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The RTC dismissed while the IAC ruled in favour of the Gotiongs. ISSUE: Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by respondent court to make petitioners liable for vicarious liability HELD: Yes. Petition denied. Petitioners should be held liable for the civil liability based on what appears from all indications was a crime committed by their minor son.

Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. If we apply Article 2194 of said code which provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act or omission, in this case the minor and the father and, in case of his death of incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides that" (t)he responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages."c ralaw virtua1aw library The liability of the parents for felonies committed by their minor children is likewise primary, not subsidiary. Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code provides: "ARTICLE 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. x x x

First. In cases of subdivisions . . . 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by . . . a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part." Like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the civil liability of the parents for crimes committed by their minor children is likewise direct and primary, and also subject to the defense of lack of fault or negligence on their part, that is, the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily respond for such damages is buttressed by the corresponding provisions in both codes that the minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall respond with his own property only in the absence or in case of insolvency of the former. Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto of minors, Article 2182 of the Civil Code states that" (i)f the minor causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor . . . shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed." For civil liability ex delicto of minors, an equivalent provision is found in the third paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit: "Should there be no person having such . . . minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent, said . . . minor shall respond with (his) own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with civil law." Under Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon the father and, in

In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious liability of petitioners, respondent court cites Fuellas v. Cadano, Et. Al. 20 which supposedly holds that" (t)he subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses," followed by an extended quotation ostensibly from the same case explaining why under Article 2180 of the Civil Code and Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code parents should assume subsidiary liability for damages caused by their minor children. If the liability of the parents for crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children is subsidiary, then the parents can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages. On the other hand, if such liability imputed to the parents is considered direct and primary, that diligence would constitute a valid and substantial defense. The civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in

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case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful offender. Under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor offender. 33 For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified. In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a felony or a quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi, respondent court did not err in holding petitioners liable for damages arising therefrom. Subject to the preceding modifications of the premises relied upon by it therefor and on the bases of the legal imperatives herein explained, we conjoin in its findings that said petitioners failed to duly exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such damages. Tamargo v. CA Abdon GR No. 85044 / 3 Jun 1992 / J. Feliciano

1.

The retroactive effect claimed is due to Art. 36 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which states "If the court is satisified that the petitioner is qualified to maintain, care for and educate the child a decree of adoption shall be entered which shall be effective on the date the original petition was filed " In relation to Art. 39 of the same Code, which states that 39(2) "Effects of adoption - The adoption shall (2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents "

But the basis for parental liability for torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the parents and the minor child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control.

No presumption of parental dereliction on part of adopting spouses could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.

FACTS On 20 Oct 1982 Adelberto Bundoc, 10 years old, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle, killing her. A civil complaint for damages was filed in the Vigan RTC by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adoptive parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia, her natural parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, with whom he was living at the time of the incident. An additional case for homicide against Adelberto was filed where he was acquitted for lacking discernment. Prior to the incident, on 10 Dec 1981, spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisrua filed a petition for adoption of Adelberto, which was granted on 18 Nov 1982, after he had killed Jennifer. Respondent spouses claim that it should be the adopting spouses who are indispensable parties, not they. Trial court and CA sided with them. ISSUE WON the natural parents were liable for an act of their child done before the petition for adoption was granted. HELD Yes. The retroactive effect under Art. 36 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code does not impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual custody of the child. CA reversed and case is remanded. RATIO 2. To hold that parental authority has been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses to hold them to act the could not have foreseen nor prevented would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Art. 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides that during the period of trial custody, parental authority shall be vested in the adopting parents. Under this rule parental authority is given precisely because the adopting parents are given actual custody during the trial period. At the time of the shooting, there was no custody, hence no authority.

3. 4.

Spouses Palisoc v. Brillantes, Valenton, Daffon, and Quibulue Adorna (1971) Actors in this case: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Facts: Spouses Palisoc (parents of minor victim) Dominador Palisoc (minor victim) Virgilio Daffon (assailant, majority age) Brillantes and Valenton (owner and president, respectively of Manila Technical Institute (MIT)) Quibulue (professor of Palisoc and Daffon)

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1. 2.

Daffon and D. Palisoc are students at MIT. They got into an altercation during which Palisoc suffered serious injuries due to fist blows inflicted by Daffon. He eventually died of his injuries. Spouses Palisoc sued Daffon and impleaded the three school officials vicarious liability under NCC 2180 (second to last paragraph) a. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students and apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody

2. 3.

The grouping of the paragraphs supposedly according to him teachers are not grouped with parents and guardians but ranged with owners of enterprises. EFFECT of MAJORITY AGE reduces the degree of responsibility of the head/teacher but does not negate the existence thereof. In other words, lower degree of diligence required in supervision of majority age students. Mercado v. CA is good law because that was the intent in Article 2180 Highly unreasonable to hold teachers liable for actions of the students especially in schools with large enrolment. To hold that custody under 2180 begins at enrolment is to demand responsibility without the commensurate authority (limitations on expulsion/suspension, teachers are the ones abused by students). Assuming that the rationale for the law imputing liability to teachers is the fact that they step into the shoes of the parents, then the phrase in custody of for teachers should be equated to who live in their company for parents. Also, the limitation of liability to acts of minor children should likewise apply to teachers.

Dissenting Makalintal 1. 2. 3. 4.

RTC Ruled: Daffons actions caused the death of Palisoc in violation of Article 2176 (quasi-delict). However, it absolved the three school officials BECAUSE citing obiter dictum in Mercado v. CA the phrase so long as they remain in their custody in NCC 2180 contemplates a situation where the students live and board at the school and thus the school officials would assume the role of parents, including their liability. In this case, Daffon was a day student who did not board at the school. Issue: WON the school officials could be held liable in light of (1) the obiter in Mercado v. CA (and later in Exconde case) requiring that students live at the school in order to be considered in custody under NCC 2180 (2) the fact that Daffon was no longer a minor. SC: The following are solidary liable with Daffon: Valenton (president) and Quibulue (teacher). Brillantes not liable because he was just a board member (the school had become a corporation). WHY? 1. The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students so long as they remain in their custody, is that they stand to a certain extent in loco parentis and are called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child. Because of this mandatory substitution, heads and teachers become liable for the actions of their students, even during recess time when the fight occurred. The phrase in their custody only refers to the protective and superviso ry custody of the school and does not require that the students actually live and board in the school. (Mercado and Conde cases set aside) In order to relieve themselves of the liability, they must prove diligence of good father of the family, which they failed to do. NCC 2180 applies only to non-academic institutions MIT was a nonacademic institution; it was a vocational and training school. Second, the case was instituted directly against school officials. The parents of Daffon are no longer involved because Daffon was of age.

Amadora v. CA- Brillo GR No. L47745, April 15, 1988 FACTS: Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally hit by a gun by Pablito Daffon resulting to the formers death. Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence. The victims parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil action for damages against Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rectors, high school principal, dean of boys, the physics teacher together with Daffon and 2 other students. Complaints against the students were dropped. Respondent Court absolved the defendants completely and reversed CFI Cebus decision for the following reasons: 1. Since the school was an academic institution of learning and not a school of arts and trades 2. That students were not in the custody of the school since the semester has already ended 3. There was no clear identification of the fatal gun, and 4. In any event, defendants exercised the necessary diligence through enforcement of the school regulations in maintaining discipline. Petitioners on othe other hand claimed their son was under school custody because he went to school to comply with a requirement for graduation (submission of Physics reports). ISSUE: WON Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable. HELD: The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of the school notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the incident happened. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics requirement. What was important is that he was there for legitimate purpose. On the other hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them

2. 3. 4.

Other things to note: 1. 2.

Concurring Reyes JBL Statutory interpretation of NCC 2180 with respect to why students of majority age still fall within the custody and supervision of teachers. 1. Because the law explicitly states minors only in the paragraph describing liability of Guardians and Parents. No mention in the section of teachers.

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was the teacher-in-charge as defined in the provision. Each was exercising only a general authority over the students and not direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in-charge of particular classes. In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably be held liable considering that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and later returned to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to the higher authorities. Though it was clear negligence on his part, no proof was shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident. Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision because only the teacher of the head of school of arts and trade is made responsible for the damage caused by the student. Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the respondents were held liable for the injury inflicted with Alfredo resulting to his death. Petition was denied.

Salvosa v IAC - Buhangin Facts: Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit, the Baguio Colleges Foundation Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) Unit An armory is located at the basement of the main building The Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon as its duly appointed armorer As armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon received his appointment from the AFP. Not being an employee of the BCF, he also received his salary from the AFP, 8 as well as orders from Captain Roberto C. Ungos, the Commandant of the Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit, concurrent Commandant of other ROTC units in Baguio and an employee (officer) of the AFP. 9 Jimmy B. Abon was also a commerce student of the BCF On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF.

Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are hable for "damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody." The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student]. "the phrase used in [Art. 2180 'so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time." A "recess," as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the area within which the school activity is conducted. Recess by its nature does not include dismissal. Upon the foregoing considerations, we hold that Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in the school," or in the custody of BCF o Roberto B. Ungos ROTC Unit Commandant, AFP, had instructed Jimmy B. Abon "not to leave the office and [to keep the armory] well guarded."

St. Marys Academy v. Carpitanos - Celebrado 1st Division | G.R. No. 143363 | 06 February 2002 | Pardo, J.

FACTS St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. Part of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School (Dapitan City). The jeep was driven by James Daniel II (15 years old) and a student of the same school. Allegedly, James drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. Sps. William Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys Academy before the Dipolog RTC. RTC and CA ordered St. Marys Academy to pay Sps. Carpitanos. It also held James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel as subsidiary liable. James Daniel II, being a minor at the time of the

ISSUE: WON petitioner BCF is solidarily liable? (scope of recess) HELD: No. Ratio:

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commission of the tort and who was under special parental authority of defendant St. Marys Academy, and Vivencio are absolved. Hence, this certiorari by St. Marys Academy.

attorneys fees demands factual, legal and equitable justification, thus, the grant of attorneys fees is likewise deleted.

St. Josephs College v. Miranda Doria ISSUES 1. 2. WON St. Marys Academy is liable for damages for the death of Sherwin. WON the award of moral damages is proper. Facts: HELD 1. NO. CA ruled by using Art. 218 and 219 of the Family Code. However, for St. Marys Academy to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. As cited in p. 379, Torts Book In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. (Cruz v. CA) Sps. Daniel and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was NOT the negligence of St. Marys Academy or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. The cause of the accident was NOT the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva. No evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident. Hence, liability for the accident must be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The negligence of St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. NO. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission. In this case, the proximate cause of the accident was not attributable to St. Marys Academy. In addition, the order of CA to pay death indemnity to respondent Carpitanos must be deleted. The power of the court to award A class taught by Rosalinda Tabugo was conducting a science experiment about the fusion of sulfur power and iron fillings Tabugo left her class without having adequately secured it from any untoward incident Sixth grader Jayson Miranda, who was the assistant leader of one of the class groups checked the result of the experiment by looking into the test tube held by one of his groupmate with a magnifying glass After that groupmate moved it close toward Jayson, the compound in the test tube spurted out, hitting Jaysons eyes and some of his groupmates Left eye was chemically burned and he had to undergo surgery and spend for medication Upon learning of the incident, Jaysons mother (who was then working abroad) had to rush back home (expenditures on fare, and missed salary for a time) According to St. Josephs college and Tabugo, the students were given strict instructions to follow the written procedure for the experiment and not to look into the test tube until the heated compound had cooled off They also argued that Jayson was a person of sufficient age and discretion, and knowingly violated the given instructions Thankfully, there was no permanent damage to Jaysons eyes, and SJC advanced amount for hospital bill (fathers request and promise to pay when wife arrived) the parents demanded from SJC that they shoulder all the medical expenses already incurred and those that will be incurred RTC: in favor of Jayson CA: affirmed

Issue:

w/n St. Josephs College, Sister Josephini Ambatali, and Tabugo are liable

Held: Yes. Proximate cause of the accident which caused the injury to Jayson was the sudden and unexpected explosion of the chemicals, independent of any intervening cause (NOT Jaysons negligence). Petitioners could have prevented the accident had they exercised a higher degree of care, caution and foresight.

2.

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The individuals are persons tasked with the teaching and vigilance over their students as well as the supervision and ensuring of their well-being. Based on the facts, they were remiss in their responsibilities and lacking in the degree of vigilance expected of them.

Art. 218 of the Family Code, in relation to Art. 2180 of NCC, bestows special parental authority on: The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody. Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.

Tabugo was inside the classroom when the class undertook the experiment although Jayson insisted that she left. No evidence, however, was presented to establish that Tabugo was inside for the whole duration of the experiment. It was unnatural in the ordinary cause of events that Jayson was brought to the clinic not by Tabugo but by somebody else. At the very least, it appears that she was somewhere else at the time of the accident. Also, classmates were not presented to corroborate petitioners claim. Abdan is likewise liable because as class adviser, she exercised control and supervision over Tabugo and the students. Sister Ambatali is also liable because under the doctrine of command responsibility, the other petitioners were under the direct control and supervision. The negligent acts of the others were done within the scope of their assigned tasks. The defense of due diligence of a good father of a family is unavailing guilty in inexcusable laxity in the supervision of its teacher despite an apparent rigid screening process for hiring, and in the maintenance of what should have been a safe and secured environment for conducting dangerous experiments.

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. xxx Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

On argument of teacher-given instructions Moreover, petitioners cannot simply deflect their negligence and liability by insisting that petitioner Tabugo gave specific instructions to her science class not to look directly into the heated compound. In marked contrast, both the lower courts similarly concluded that the mishap which happened during the science experiment was foreseeable by the school, its officials and teachers. This neglect in preventing a foreseeable injury and damage equates to neglect in exercising the utmost degree of diligence required of schools, its administrators and teachers, and, ultimately, was the proximate cause of the damage and injury to Jayson. As we have held in St. Marys, "for petitioner [St. Marys Academy] to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident."

On argument of no previous accident The fact that there has never been any accident in the past during the conduct of science experiments is not a justification to be complacent in just preserving the status quo and do away with creative foresight to install safety measures to protect the students. Schools should not simply install safety reminders and distribute safety instructional manuals. More importantly, schools should provide protective gears and devices to shield students from expected risks and anticipated dangers.

On vicarious liability Ordinarily, the liability of teachers does not extend to the school or university itself, although an educational institution may be held liable under the principle of RESPONDENT SUPERIOR. It has also been held that the liability of the employer for the [tortuous] acts or negligence of its employees is primary and solidary, direct and immediate and not conditioned upon the insolvency of or prior recourse against the negligent employee.

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES and FELIX PANGALANGAN v. PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS, ARCHIMEDES BALINGIT, and FERNANDO PINEDA - Enteria 1975 / Aquino / Appeal from CFI order

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FACTS Pineda recklessly drove a freight truck [owned by Phil-American Forwarders] along the national highway at Pampanga, and the truck bumped the PRBL bus driven by Pangalangan. As a result, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days, thus depriving PRBL of earnings amounting to P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of Phil-American Forwarders. PRBL and Pangalangan filed a complaint for damages against Phil-American Forwarders, Balingit, and Pineda. Defendants said Balingit was not Pineda's employer. Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that PRBL and Pangalangan had no cause of action against him. CFI dismissed the complaint against Balingit, on the ground that he is not the manager of an establishment as contemplated in NCC 2180. ISSUE AND HOLDING WON the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise" embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck, the reckless operation of which allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident from which the damage arose. NO. RATIO Those terms do not include the manager of a corporation. It may be gathered from the context of NCC 2180 that the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) is used in the sense of "employer". Hence, no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be imposed on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders, in connection with the vehicular accident in question, because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of Phil-American Forwarders.

Ratio: It was contended by the petitioner that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry. However, the phrase "even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry" found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task (This is only what was discussed by Casis): The following are the distinction identified by the court: o Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise; and the fifth paragraph, to employers in general, whether or not engaged in any business or industry. o The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions, while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task. o The 5th is an expansion of the 4thin both employer coverage and acts included. Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry, are covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned task, even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions. Under the 5th, it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment, an employee is engaged in his employer's business in the operation of a motor vehicle, so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employee's action or inaction; but rather, the result varies with each state of facts The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment. Operation of Employer's Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals

Castilex v. Vasquez Fullecido Facts: Romeo S. Vasquez was driving a Honda motorcycle without wearing helmet and was only carrying a student permit. Abad, a manager in Castilex, driving a company car. An accident occurred when Abad drove against the traffic flow which resulted to the death of Vasquez Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills, professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur

ISSUE: WON Castilex is liable? HELD: No. -

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Not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer Operation of Employer's Vehicle in Going to or from Work o in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment Use of Employer's Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours o generally not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use, even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way beyond the normal working hours. o

SPS. BUENAVENTURA JAYME AND ROSARIO JAYME vs. RODRIGO APOSTOL Hernandez FACTS: On February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board the Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an employee of the Municipality of Koronadal. The pick-up truck was registered under the name of Rodrigo Apostol, but it was then in the possession of Ernesto Simbulan. Lozano borrowed the pick-up truck from Simbulan to bring Miguel to Buayan Airport at General Santos City to catch his Manila flight. The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then crossing the National Highway in South Cotabato. The intensity of the collision sent Marvin some 50 meters away from the point of impact, a clear indication that Lozano was driving at a very high speed at the time of the accident. Marvin sustained severe head injuries. Despite medical attention, Marvin expired six (6) days after the accident. ISSUE: MAY a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts of the driver assigned to him MAY an LGU be held liable for the tortuous act of a government employee. RULING: 1. It is uncontested that Lozano was employed as a driver by the municipality. That he was subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel during the time of the accident is of no moment. The Municipality of Koronadal remains to be Lozanos employer

notwithstanding Lozanos assignment to Mayor Miguel. Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had authority to give instructions or directions to Lozano, he still cannot be held liable. In Benson v. Sorrell, the New England Supreme Court ruled that mere giving of directions to the driver does not establish that the passenger has control over the vehicle. Neither does it render one the employer of the driver. Mayor Miguel was neither Lozanos employer nor the vehicles registered owner. There existed no causal relationship between him and Lozano or the vehicle used that will make him accountable for Marvins death. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger at the time of the accident. 2. The municipality may not be sued because it is an agency of the State engaged in governmental functions and, hence, immune from suit. This immunity is illustrated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme, where the Court held that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can only be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover. Liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver and his direct employer. Settled is the rule that the registered owner of a vehicle is jointly and severally liable with the driver for damages incurred by passengers and third persons as a consequence of injuries or death sustained in the operation of said vehicles. Regardless of who the actual owner of the vehicle is, the operator of record continues to be the operator of the vehicle as regards the public and third persons, and as such is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences incident to its operation. The petition is DENIED. Filamer v. IAC Manalo FACTS: Daniel Funtecha was a working student of Filamer. He was assigned as the school janitor to clean the school 2 hours every morning. Allan Masa was the son of the school president and at the same time he was the schools jeepney service driver. On October 20, 1977 at about 6:30pm, after driving the students to their homes, Masa returned to the school to report and thereafter have to go home with the jeep so that he could fetch the students early in the morning. Masa and Funtecha live in the same place so they usually go home together. Funtecha had a student drivers license so Masa let him take the drivers seat. While Funtecha was driving, he accidentally hit an elderly Kapunan which led to his hospitalization for 20 days. Kapunan filed a criminal case and an independent civil action based on Article 2180 against Funtecha. In the independent civil action, the lower court ruled that Filamer is subsidiarily liable for the tortious act of Funcheta and was compelled to pay for damages based on Article 2180 which provides that employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks.

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Filamer assailed the decision and it argued that under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Labor Code IRR, working scholars are excluded from the employment coverage hence there is no employer-employee relations between Filamer and Funcheta; that the negligent act of Funcheta was due to negligence only attributable to him alone as it is outside his assigned task of being the school janitor. The CA denied Filamers appeal but the Supreme Court agreed with Filamer. Kapunan filed for a motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not Filamer should be held subsidiarily liable. HELD: Yes. This time, the SC ruled in favor of Kapunan (actually his heirs cause by this time Kapunan was already dead). The provisions of Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Labor Code IRR was only meant to provide guidelines as compliance with labor provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages is concerned. This does not in any way affect the provisions of any other laws like the civil code. The IRR cannot defeat the provisions of the Civil Code. In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. There is a distinction hence Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident against a working student of a school and against the school itself. The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to void liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code. Funtecha is an employee of Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a drivers position in order that Filamer may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of Filamer (the act of driving the jeep from the school to Masas house is beneficial to the school because this enables Masa to do a timely school transportation service in the morning). Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve Filamer of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. Filamer has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.

NPC v. CA Millena Romero J., 1998 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. On July 22, 1979, 4 dump trucks owned by NPC went to Iligan City. Enroute its destination, one truck driven by Gavino Ilumba collided with a Toyota Tamaraw that killed 3 people and injured 17 others. Heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO. PHESCO, in its answer, contended that it did not own the trucks and that it was merely a contractor of NPC with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians. NPC denied liability and countered that the driver was the employee of PHESCO. RTC absolved NPC and ruled against PHESCO. CA reversed saying on the ground that a labor only contractor is considered a mere agent of the employer which is equivalent to a finding that there is an employer-employee relationship between the owner of the project (NPC) and the employees of the labor only contractor (PHESCO).

ISSUE: Between NPC and PHESCO, who is the employer of Ilumba? Held: NPC In resolving the issue, the Court first determined the contractual relationship between NPC and PHESCO. It ruled that PHESCO is a job only contractor of NPC as opposed to a job or independent contractor. The Court said that an independent contractor satisfies the following conditions: (a) the contractor carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract work on his own account under his own responsibility according to his own manner and method, free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except to the result thereof; and (b) the contractor has substantial capital or investments in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises and other materials which are necessary in the conduct of his business. Absent these requisites, what exists is a labor only contract under which the person acting as contractor (PHESCO) is considered merely as an agent of the principal (NPC) who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him. The Memorandum of Understanding between the PHESCO AND NPC also leads to the same conclusion. NPC is to provide the money or funding that will be used by PHESCO to undertake the project. The Court said that NPC has the right to wield so much power to be considered as the employer.

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Court also held that the Civil Code, Art 2180 specifically, and NOT the Labor Code will determine the liability of an employer in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person for any negligent act of the employees under the labot only* contractor. *As a defense, NPC invoked Section 9(b) of the Labor code: (b) Labor only contracting as defined herein is hereby prohibited and the person acting as contractor shall be considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him.

salons, P1,000,000 in moral damages, P50,000, as exemplary damages, P60,000, as reasonable attorneys fees and costs. 26. CA: there was ample evidence that the car was parked at the side but absolved Li's employer 1. 2. Li: 55 kph - self serving and uncorroborated Rogelio Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an establishment located just across

the scene of the accident: Valenzuelas car parked parallel and very near the sidewalk and Li was driving on a very fast speed and there was only a drizzle (NOT heavy rain) ISSUES: 1. W/N Li was driving at 55 kph - NO 2. W/N Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence - NO 3. W/N Alexander Commercial, Inc. as Li's employer should be held liable - YES 4. W/N the awarding of damages is proper. - YES. HELD: CA modified with reinstating the RTC decision 1. NO If Li was running at only about 55 kph then despite the wet and slippery road, he could have avoided hitting the Valenzuela by the mere expedient or applying his brakes at the proper time and distance it was not even necessary for him to swerve a little to the right in order to safely avoid a collision with the on-coming car since there is plenty of space for both cars, since Valenzuela car was running at the right lane going towards Manila and the oncoming car was also on its right lane going to Cubao 2. NO. 3. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection

Valenzuela v. CA - Monfort Kapunan | Feb. 7, 1996 | 1st FACTS: 22. June 24, 1990 2 am: While driving from her restaurant at Araneta avenue towards the direction of Manila, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela noticed that she had a flat tire so she parked along the sidewalk about 1 1/2 feet away, place her emergency lights and seeked help 1. She was with her companion Cecilia Ramon 23. While she was pointing her tools to the man who will help her fixed the tires, she was suddenly hit by another Mitsubishi Lancer driven by Richard Li who was intoxicated and she slammed across his windshield and fell to the ground 24. She was sent to UERM where she stayed for 20 days and her leg was amputated and was replaced with an artificial one. 1. Her expenses totaled 147, 000 [120,000 (confinement) + 27, 000 (artificial leg)] 25. RTC: Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Alexander Commercial, Inc., Lis employer, jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180 P41,840 actual damages, P37,500 unrealized profits because of the stoppage of plaintiffs Bistro La Conga restaurant 3 weeks after the accident on June 24, 1990, P20,000 a month as unrealized profits of Bistro La Conga restaurant, from August, 1990 until the date of this judgment, P30,000.00, a month, for unrealized profits in 2 Beauty

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4. emergency rule 1. an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence 1. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark Street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her 2. She stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed 3. she parked along the sidewalk, about 1 feet away, behind a Toyota Corona Car 3. YES. 6. Not the principle of respondent superior, which holds the master liable for acts of the servant (must be in the course of business), but that of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his employees 7. Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent supervision of its employee during the performance of the latters assigned tasks would be enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 1. situation is of a different character, involving a practice utilized by large companies with either their employees of managerial rank or their representatives. 8. Moreover, Lis claim that he happened to be on the road on the night of the accident because he was coming from a social visit with an officemate in Paranaque was a bare allegation which was never corroborated in the court below. It was obviously self-serving. Assuming he really came from his officemates place, the same could give rise to speculation that he and his officemate had just been from a work-related function, or they were together to discuss sales and other work related strategies. 9. Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it

exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li

4. YES. As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Courts discretion, we are of the opinion that the amount of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court is in greater accord with the extent and nature of the injury -. physical and psychological suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Lis grossly negligent driving of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the early morning hours of the accident. the damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, it would also be permanently changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes which her body would normally undergo through the years. The replacements, changes, and adjustments will require corresponding adjustive physical and occupational therapy. All of these adjustments, it has been documented, are painful. Cornelio Lampesa and Dario Copsiyat v. Dr. Juan De Vera, Jr., Felix Ramos, and Modesto Tollas Namingit 14 February 2008 J. Quisumbing Facts: De Vera boarded a passenger jeepney bound for Baguio City driven by Tollas. Upon reaching the Km. 4 marker of the national highway, the jeepney came to a complete stop to allow a truck driven by Copsiyat to cross the path of the jeepney in order to park at a private parking lot on the right side of the road. As Tollas began to maneuver the jeepney slowly along its path, the truck, which had just left the pavement, suddenly started to slide back towards the jeepney until its rear left portion hit the right side of the jeepney. De Vera, who was seated in the front passenger seat, noticed his left middle finger was cut off as he was holding on to the handle of the right side of the jeepney. He asked Tollas to bring him immediately to the hospital. Defense version: While the rear of the truck was still on the pavement of the highway in the attempt to park it in the lot across the highway, an approaching passenger jeepney sideswiped the rear portion of the truck. This resulted in the dismemberment of De Vera, Jr.s left middle finger, according to the defense. Lampesa also avers he did his legal duty in the selection and supervision of Copsiyat as his driver. He alleges that before hiring Copsiyat, he asked the latter if he had a professional drivers license.

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Failing to reach an amicable settlement, De Vera filed an action for damages against Lampesa, Copsiyat, Ramos and Tollas, as the truck owner, truck driver, jeepney owner/operator and jeepney driver. TC and CA: found driver Copsiyat negligent in the operation of his truck and ruled that his negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by De Vera, Jr. It also ruled that Lampesa did not exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of his driver as required under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code W/N Court of Appeals err in affirming the trial courts ruling that petitioners are liable for the injury sustained by De Vera

-Petitioner corporation Mercury Drug registered owner of a six-wheeler truck driven by petitioner del Rosario. -Respondent spouses Richard and Carmen Huang are parents of the respondent Stephen Huang. -Respondent spouses owned a car which was being driven by Stephen which ws involved in an accident with petitioner's truck along C-5 -at the time of the accident, Del Rosario only had a traffic violation receipt since his license was confiscated due to a previous apprehension for reckless driving -due to accident, Stephen Huang sustained massive injuries, became paralyzed from the chest down, and required continuous medical/rehabilitative treatment. Issue: WON petitioner corporation was negligent Held: Yes -driver Del Rosario was found negligent. Liability of the petitioner corporation premised on NCC Art. 2180, with such liability being direct and immediate -to disclaim liability, petitioner corporation needs to show exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees by submitting concrete proof of such, including documentary evidence -petitioner corporation produced testimonial evidence on its hiring procedure and further averred that employee-applicants are required to undertake theoretical & actual driving tests, and a psychological examination

Issues: 1.

No. Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Whether a person is negligent or not is a question of fact, which we cannot pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law. In this case, both the trial and the appellate courts found Copsiyat negligent in maneuvering the truck and ruled that his negligence was the proximate cause of the injury sustained by De Vera, Jr. Lampesa was also held accountable by both courts because he failed to exercise due diligence in the supervision of his driver. Court held that such finding is binding. Once negligence on the part of the employee is established, a presumption instantly arises that the employer was negligent in the selection and/or supervision of said employee. To rebut this presumption, the employer must present adequate and convincing proof that he exercised care and diligence in the selection and supervision of his employees. The record is bare on Lampesas claim that he did his legal duty as an employer in the selection and supervision of Copsiyat. Admitting arguendo that Copsiyat did show his professional license when he applied for the job of truck driver, Lampesa should not have been satisfied by the mere possession of a professional drivers license by Copsiyat. As an employer, Lampesa was duty bound to do more. He should have carefully examined Copsiyats qualifications, experiences and record of service, if any. Lampesa must also show that he exercised due supervision over Copsiyat after his selection. But all he had shown on record were bare allegations unsubstantiated by evidence. Having failed to exercise the due diligence required of him as employer, Lampesa cannot avoid solidary liability for the tortuous act committed by his driver, Copsiyat Mercury Drug v. Huang Ogena

-it was proven however that Del Rosario: 27. took driving tests and psych exam when he applied for the position of Delivery Man, but not when he applied for the position of Truck Man 28. used a light vehicle (Galant) during said driving test instead of a truck 29. was not tested on motor skills development, perceptual speed, visual attention, depth visualization, eye and hand coordination and steadiness 30. NBI and police clearances were not presented 31. attended a driving seminar 12 years prior (1984) to the accident (1996). The other two driving seminars he attended were done after the accident 32. Mercury did not provide back-up drivers for long trips and had no policy pertaining to such. Del Rosario had been out on the road for more than 13 hours prior to the accident -Mercury also failed to exercise due diligence on supervision and discipline of its employees when it allowed Del Rosario to drive without a license on the day of the accident

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--Del Rosario reported the accident to his superior, but nothing was done about it. He was not suspended or reprimanded. In fact, no disciplinary action whatsoever was taken against him -Thus, Mercury failed to discharge burden of proving exercise of due diligence in its selection and supervision of their employee Del Rosario

In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a government officer acting as a special agent hence, there can be no liability from the government. The Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest. ROSETE v. AUDITOR GENERAL - Escalona 1948 Feria, J. The Insular Auditor denied the claim of Rosete et al against the Government for damages caused to their buildings caused by fire that came from the contiguous warehouse of the Emergency Control Administration (ECA). Claimants allege negligence on the part of a certain Jose Frayno in igniting his cigarette-lighter near a 5-gallon drum into which gasoline was being drained, and on the officers of said ECA (a govt agency) in storing gasoline in said warehouse contrary to Manila Ordinances. ISSUE: WON the Insular Auditor erred in dismissing Rosetes claim. Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands: Re Paragraph 5 of article 1903: "The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable." The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said: The responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility. There being no showing that whatever negligence may be imputed to the Emergency Control Administration or its officers, was done by an special agent, because the officers of the ECA did not act as special agents of the government within the above defined meaning of that word in 1903 in storing gasoline in warehouse of the ECA, the government is not responsible for the damages caused through such negligence.

MERITT V. GOVERNMENT Pascual Torts and Damages Liability of the State for acts of special agents

The facts of the case took place in the 1910s. Meritt was a constructor who was excellent at his work. One day, while he was riding his motorcycle along Calle Padre Faura, he was bumped by a government ambulance. The driver of the ambulance was proven to have been negligent. Because of the incident, Meritt was hospitalized and he was severely injured beyond rehabilitation so much so that he could never perform his job the way he used to and that he cannot even earn at least half of what he used to earn. In order for Meritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government which later authorized Meritt to sue the government by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by the legislature (An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit). The lower court then determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not the government is liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance. HELD: No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents. The State can only be liable if it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him.

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PERFECTO, J., dissenting: ECA must be considered a special agent under Article 1903. 1903 distinguishes the special agent from the official with specific duty or duties to perform. Under the meaning of the paragraph, the word official comprises all officials and employees of the government who exercise duties of their respective public offices. All others who are acting by commission of the government belong to the class of special agents, whether individual or juridical bodies. The ECA was not a branch or office of the government, such as the legislative bodies, the executive offices, or the tribunals. It was an agency set up for specific purposes which were not attainable through the official functions entrusted by law to the government or its branches. In qualifying the special agent with the adjective "special", the Civil Code aimed at distinguishing it from the regular or ordinary agent of government, which refers to all officers and employees in the public service. The Civil Code uses the adjective "special", because its authors could not miss the fact that the official, mentioned in paragraph 5 of article 1903, is also an agent. Fontanilla v. Maliaman Perez Second Division, 1 December 1989 Facts: 1. 2. Pickup owned by National Irrigation Administration driven officially by Hugo Garcia, its employee bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla and one Deligo. Fontanilla died. Court: 1. 2.

officials usual governmental functions. If the States agent is not a public official, and is commissioned to perform non-governmental functions, then the State assumes the role of an ordinary employer and will be held liable as such for its agents tort. Where the government commissions a private individual for a special governmental task, it is acting through a special agent within the meaning of Art 2180, paragraph 6. NIA is a government corporation with juridical personality and not a mere agency of the government. Since it is a corporate body performing non-governmental functions, it now becomes liable for the damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act of its employee. NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer. The pickup was travelling at a high speed within the city limits and yet the supervisor of the group failed to caution and make the driver observe the allowed speed limit. Such negligence is aggravated by their desire to reach their destination without even checking whether or not the vehicle suffered damage from the object it bumped, thus showing imprudence.

Resolution, 27 February 1991 NIAs contention: 1. NIA does not perform solely and primarily proprietary functions but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortious act of its driver who was not its special agent. The responsibility vested in NIA concerns public welfare and public benefit, and is therefore an exercise of sovereignty. NIA was created for the purpose of constructing, improving, rehabilitating and administering all national irrigations systems. The state and the community as a whole are largely benefited by the services the agency renders, but these functions are only incidental to the principal aim which is irrigations of lands. NIA is a government agency invested with corporate personality separate and distinct from the government, thus is governed by the Corporation Law. NIA may sue and be sued in court. It has its own assets and liabilities. It also has corporate powers to be exercised by a Board of Directors.

Issue/Held: 1. 2. Ratio: 1. The liability of the State has two aspects: (1) public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special agents only; and (2) private or business aspects where it becomes liable as an ordinary employer. The States agent, if a public official, must not only be specially commissioned to do a particular task but such task must be foreign to said WON NIA is liable for the tortious act of its employee. YES WON NIA was negligent in the supervision of the driver. YES

Feliciano, J., concurring: 1. Feliciano agrees that NIA is liable for the acts of its employee but for a different reason. The term State as used in Article 2180 refers to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines which as defined in Section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code is a corporate governmental entity through which the

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functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines. It refers to that juridical person that is constituted by the Government and logically does not include agencies, instrumentalities or other entities which their enabling laws have invested with separate and distinct juridical personality. NIA should not be regarded as part of the State for purposes of application of Article 2180. Since it has been vested with the powers of a corporate person, it is subjected to all ordinary liabilities of a corporate person: one of those liabilities is the vicarious liability of an employer. Padilla, J., dissenting: 1. NIA is an agency of the government with an original charter. It is maintained by the government in the performance of governmental function of providing improved irrigation systems. That the NIA is empowered to charge minimal fees does not change the nature of the function for which it is created. Such monetary charges do not constitute monetary gain but are merely reimbursement of the operational cost. Public service is the thrust in the creation of NIA in contrast to a business venture. The fact that its charter treats the NIA as incorporated under the Corporation Law is not the test in determining whether it is performing a governmental or proprietary function. The spirit, intent or purpose behind its creation determines its true character. However, the sovereign immunity of the state has been waived by NIA since its charter provides that it can sue and be sued. Nevertheless, under 2180, par. 6, the state is not liable for tort save when it acts through a special agent, and Hugo Garcia was not a special agent but NIAs regular driver.

Ratio: 1. What must be determined is the possession of the dog regardless of the ownership. That Purita is not in possession of her fathers house is hardly credible. The boarders of the house paid the Vestils for meals and accommodations. The Vestils also applied for water connection. Purita was the only heir residing in the city thus the only logical person to take care of the property. The Vestils regularly went to the house. Their daughter was in fact playing in the house with Theness when the latter was bitten. Purita: They could not be expected to exercise remote control of the dog. Court: Possessor of the animal is liable even if it should escape or be lost and so be removed from the formers control.

Purita: The dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child. Court: Article 2183 covers both vicious and tame animals. Theness was only 3 years old and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done.

The obligation under Article 2183 is not based on the negligence of the possessor or user but on natural equity and the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must anser for the damage which such animal may cause. Chapman v. Underewood Siang March 28, 1914 Moreland, J. Facts: There was a single-track street-car line running along Calle Herran, with occasional switches to allow cars to meet and pass each other. Chapman wanted to board a certain San Marcelino car which was a closed one, the entrance being from the front or the rear platform. He tried to board the front platform however since he couldnt reach it without extra exertion, he stopped beside the car, facing toward the rear platform, and waited for it to come abreast of him. While in this position he was struck from behind and run over by the defendants automobile. The defendant entered Calle Herran his automobile driven by his chauffeur, a competent driver. The automobile was following behind a street car. The street car turned left on

VII. PERSONS SPECIFICALLY LIABLE Vestil V. IAC Perez Facts: 1. 2. 3. Theness Uy was bitten by a dog, while she was playing with the child of the Vestils. They were at the house of the late grandfather of the child Vestil. Theness died. Purita Vestil, mother of the child Vestil: She is not the owner of the house nor the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned and there are other heirs to the property.

Issue/Held: 1. WON Purita Vestil is liable. YES

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one of the switches in Calle Herran while the defendant either kept straight or went a little to the right. The street car that Chapman was attempting to board was running in an opposite direction to that of Underwood. When the front of the street car was almost in front of the defendants automobile, defendants driver suddenly went to the right and struck and ran over Chapman. Trial Court found for Underwood. Issue: W/N Underwood is liable for the negligence of his chauffer? Held: No. Underwood did not have the chance to correct the act of his driver. 1.) The driver was guilty of negligence. Chapman was not obliged, for his own protection, to observe whether a car was coming upon him from his left hand. He had only to guard against those coming from the right. 2.) Underwood however is not liable. The driver does not fall within the list of persons in article 1903 of the Civil Code for whose acts the defendant would be responsible. Regardless of whether or not the owner of the car is onboard the vehicle when the accident happened, he is not to be held liable unless the negligent act of the driver is continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom. An owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts. If the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the acts or its continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present therein at the time the act was committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length a time that the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his drivers act his own. Caedo v. Yu Khe Thai Tejano CAEDO v YU KHE THAI December 18, 1968 FACTS Rafael Bernardo was driving Yu Khe Thai with the latters Cadillac along EDSA (formerly Highway 54) at a speed of 30-35 miles per hour or 48-56 kph. Attempting to overtake a carretela by the left side, the Cadillac hit the carretelas wheel. At this point, Marcial

Caedos Mercury car was coming from the opposite lane and hit the Cad illac. The Mercury was carrying Caedos wife and kids; they were all injured. There is no doubt that Bernardo was negligent in this case. He should have seen the carretela, given the latters two lights and the Cadillacs own headlights. Also, the risk when he tried to overtake the carretela should have also been obvious. ISSUE: WON Yu Khe Thai as owner of the Cadillac should be held liable under NCC Art 2184 HELD: NO. Art 2184 reads: In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage. IN THIS CASE, the car, as has been stated, was not running at an unreasonable speed. The road was wide and open, and devoid of traffic that early morning. There was no reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. He had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver. He became aware of the presence of the carretela when his car was only twelve meters behind it, but then his failure to see it earlier did not constitute negligence, for he was not himself at the wheel. And even when he did see it at that distance, he could not have anticipated his driver's sudden decision to pass the carretela on its left side in spite of the fact that another car was approaching from the opposite direction. The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. Bernardo also did not have any record of violation of traffic laws and regulations. Thus, no negligence against Yu Khe Thai for having employed Bernardo may be imputed. The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a great degree, necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers. In many cases they refrain from driving their own cars and instead hire other persons to drive for them precisely because they are not trained or endowed with sufficient discernment to know the rules of traffic or to

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appreciate the relative dangers posed by the different situations that are continually encountered on the road. The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The test of his intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another. Were the law to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers by car owners who, by their very inadequacies, have real need of drivers' services, would be effectively proscribed. DISPOSITIVE: Yu Khe Thai is not liable.

HELD: to resolve the issue, what must be determined is control and supervision of the road. the ownership of the road is not determinative of the issue. the possession and control devolves upon dagupan city because of its charter which specifically gives it superevision and control. this supervision and control is exercised through Tangco, the city engineer. the fact that Tangco concurrently held position with the national government is of no moment considering the MPH employees follow his instructions as Dagupan city engineer. the provision in the city charter stating that the city will not be liable for injuries resulting in the failure to enforce the chapter is not applicable because it only lays down general rules, while 2189 lays down specific rules. Casis notes: the basis of the liability is the supervision and control of the local government unit. if so, negligence on the part of the LGU is irrelevant.

Guilatco v Dagupan - Tiongco FACTS

QC v. DACARA - Valdez June 15, 2005 || J. Panganiban Facts: Fulgencio Dacara, Jr, owner of an '87 Toyota Corolla, rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was being repaired by the QC government. Dacarra Jr. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive damage because it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth. Indemnification was sought from the city government which yielded negative results. Dacara Sr. filed a Complaint for damages against the Quezon City and Engr. Ramir Tiamzon. Defendants admitted the occurrence of the incident but alleged the diggings were provided with a mound of soil and barricaded with reflectorized traffic paint with sticks placed before or after it which were visible during the incident. Defendants claimed they exercised due care by providing the area of the diggings all necessary measures to avoid accidents. Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. fell into the diggings was because of the latter's negligence and failure to exercise due care. The RTC found the petitioners negligent under Article 2189 of the Civil Code. The CA ruled in favor of the Dacaras. It held that: "x x x the evidence indicates that [petitioners] failed to show that they placed sufficient and adequate precautionary signs at Matahimik Street to minimize or prevent the dangers to life and limb under the circumstances. Contrary to the

florentina guilatco was a court interpreter who one day fell down a manhole while walking along perez boulevard. the manhole was around Two feet wide and was covered by flower pots. because of the fall, she was hospitalized and was operated on. she was unable to go to work because she could not climb the stairs at the office, she suffered a lot of pain even after the hospitalization. because of the injury, she was no longer her former jovial self. note that the road was a national highway and owned by the national government, and not by dagupan city an action was filed for damages under article 2189. trial court ruled in favor of guilatco appelate court reversed, because of a finding that there was no sufficient evidence to show that the the city had supervision or control over the road. dagupan citys defense: that the road as a national road is under the control and supervision of the national government city engineer tangco's defense: that though he was a part of the ministry of highways, it was only as an ex officio engineer, and that his salary as a dagupan official was greater than the honoraria he received from the national government.

ISSUE: WON dagupan city and its city engineer are liable? Yes.

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testimony of the witnesses for the [petitioners], namely Engr. Ramir Tiamzon, Ernesto Landrito and Eduardo Castillo, that there were signs, gasera which was buried so that its light could not be blown off by the wind and barricade, none was ever presented to stress and prove the sufficiency and adequacy of said contention." "x x x the negligence of [petitioners] was clear based on the investigation report of Pfc. William P. Villafranca stating to the effect 'that the subject vehicle rammed into a pile of earth from a deep excavation thereat without any warning devi[c]e...Dacara, Jr. lost control of his driven car and finally turnedturtle causing substantial damage to the same.' As a defense against liability on the basis of quasi-delict, one must have exercised the diligence of a good father of a family which [petitioners] failed to establish in the instant case." The CA ruled that 2189 was applicable in case of damage when there has been no death or injury. ISSUE: Whether or not 2189 applies to cases where there has been no death or physical injury HELD: Yes, 2189 applies to cases where there has been no death or physical injury. The proximate cause of the accident which almost cost Dacara Jr his life and limb was the existence of a pile of earth from a digging done relative to the base failure at Matahimik Street nary a lighting device or a reflectorized barricade or sign perhaps which could have served as an adequate warning to motorist especially during the thick of the night where darkness is pervasive. The defense failed to prove that it put up necessary warning signs around the mound of earth and the digging site. The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the responsibility of the city government relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the same. Failure of the defendant to comply with the statutory provision found in the subject-article is tantamount to negligence per se which renders the City government liable. Harsh application of the law ensues as a result thereof but the state assumed the responsibility for the maintenance and repair of the roads and bridges and neither exception nor exculpation from liability would deem just and equitable. Although petitioners point out that Fulgencio Jr. was driving at the speed of 60 kilometers per hour (kph) when he met the accident, a speed which was allegedly well

above the maximum limit of 30 kph allowed on "city streets with light traffic, when not designated 'through streets,'" as provided under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code (Republic Act 4136), these matters were not raised by petitioners at any time during the trial. Alarcon v. Alarcon - Abdon Gilchrist v. Cuddy, Espejo, and Zaldarriaga (1915) Adorna

This case illustrates doctrines relating to tortious interference in the valid contract of another and is cited by later cases. However, this was not a direct action to prosecute such quasi-delict, rather it is an action by the alleged interferor for damages arising from the injunction that prohibited him from interfering. FACTS 1. 2. 3. Cuddy owned the film Zigomar which he contractually agreed to supply to Gilchrist for a one week period for showing in the latters theater in Iloilo. Cuddy reneged on the agreement (in an apology letter) and leased the film to a competitor of Gilchrist in Iloilo (Espejo). Gilchrist filed for a writ of preliminary injunction on the grounds of breach of contract: a. CFI granted the injunction forbidding Espejo from showing the film and ordering Cuddy to deliver the film as contractually obligated to Gilchrist b. Cuddy complied and Gilchrist actually showed the film as originally intended [these facts are found in the concurring opinion]

ACTION in this CASE: Cross complaint by Espejo alleging damages due to the wrongful issuance of the preliminary injunction. SC ON PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 1. Injunction was justified in light of judicial notice that profits of theaters are driven by attendance to good films. If Espejo showed the film before Gilchrist, the latter would stand to lose considerable profits. The injunction saved the plaintiff harmless from damages due to unwarranted interference in the contract by Espejo. Citing US case Nashville R.R. Co v. McConnell: a. One who wrongfully interferes in a contract between others, and for the purpose of gain to himself induces one of the parties to break it, is liable to the party injured thereby; and his continued interference

2. 3.

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may be ground for an injunction where the injuries resulting will be irreparable. RE TORTIOUS INTEREFERENCE 1. Knowledge of the original contract is a requisite (obviously) and in this case, Cuddy knew that there was a contract because he had been informed by his agents that he could not get the film for the dates that he wanted. Malicious intent is not required to be liable. Mere right to compete does not justify interference. Citing Read v. Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons: a. sufficient justification for interference with plaintiffs right must be an equal or superior right in themselvesno one can legally excuseon the ground that he [a] acted on a wrong understanding of his own rights [b] without malice [c] bona fide [d] in the best interest of himself, or [e] that he acted as an altruist Knowledge of identity of injured party is not required to be liable. a. Liability arises from quasi delict in OCC 1902 (NCC 2176) b. Quasi delict does not require knowledge of identity of injured party.

(2) Whether private respondents are entitled to attorneys fees Held: (1) Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. One becomes liable in an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if (a) the other has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with, (b) the invasion is substantial, (c) the defendant's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and (d) the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under general negligence rules. The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of contract; and (3) interference of the third person is without legal justification or excuse. Petitioner's Trendsetter Marketing asked DCCSI to execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived respondent corporation of the latter's property right. Clearly, and as correctly viewed by the appellate court, the three elements of tort interference above-mentioned are present in the instant case. Authorities debate on whether interference may be justified where the defendant acts for the sole purpose of furthering his own financial or economic interest. One view is that, as a general rule, justification for interfering with the business relations of another exists where the actor's motive is to benefit himself. Such justification does not exist where his sole motive is to cause harm to the other. Added to this, some authorities believe that it is not necessary that the interferer's interest outweigh that of the party whose rights are invaded, and that an individual acts under an economic interest that is substantial, not merely de minimis, such that wrongful and malicious motives are negatived, for he acts in self-protection. Moreover justification for protecting one's financial position should not be made to depend on a comparison of his economic interest in the subject matter with that of others. It is sufficient if the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives. Where there was no malice in the interference of a contract, and the impulse behind one's conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives, a party cannot be a malicious interferer. Where the alleged interferer is financially interested, and such interest motivates his conduct, it cannot be said that he is an officious or malicious intermeddler. In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner So Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSI to lease the warehouse to his enterprise at the expense of respondent corporation. Though petitioner took interest in the property of respondent corporation and benefited from it, nothing on record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on him. Petitioner argues that damage is an essential element of tort interference, and since the trial court

2.

3.

So Ping Bun v. CA - Brillo Facts: In 1963, Tek Hua Trading Co. entered into lease agreements with lessor Dee C. Chuan and Sons, Inc. involving four (4) premises in Binondo, which the former used to store textiles. The agreements were for one (1) year, with provisions for month-to-month rental should the lessee continue to occupy the properties after the term. In 1976, Tek Hua Trading Co. was dissolved, and the former members formed Tek Hua Enterprises Corp., herein respondent. So Pek Giok, managing partner of the defunct company, died in 1986. Petitioner So Ping Bun, his grandson, occupied the warehouse for his own textile business, Trendsetter Marketing. On March 1, 1991, private respondent Tiong sent a letter to petitioner, demanding that the latter vacate the premises. Petitioner refused, and on March 4, 1992, he requested formal contracts of lease with DCCSI. The contracts were executed. Private respondents moved for the nullification of the contract and claimed damages. The petition was granted by the trial court, and eventually by the Court of Appeals. Issue: (1) Whether So Ping Bun is guilty of tortuous interference of contract

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and the appellate court ruled that private respondents were not entitled to actual, moral or exemplary damages, it follows that he ought to be absolved of any liability, including attorney's fees. While we do not encourage tort interferers seeking their economic interest to intrude into existing contracts at the expense of others, however, we find that the conduct herein complained of did not transcend the limits forbidding an obligatory award for damages in the absence of any malice. The business desire is there to make some gain to the detriment of the contracting parties. Lack of malice, however, precludes damages. But it does not relieve petitioner of the legal liability for entering into contracts and causing breach of existing ones. The respondent appellate court correctly confirmed the permanent injunction and nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI and Trendsetter Marketing, without awarding damages. The injunction saved the respondents from further damage or injury caused by petitioner's interference. (2) Lastly, the recovery of attorney's fees in the concept of actual or compensatory damages, is allowed under the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. One such occasion is when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest. But we have consistently held that the award of considerable damages should have clear factual and legal bases. In connection with attorney's fees, the award should be commensurate to the benefits that would have been derived from a favorable judgment. Settled is the rule that fairness of the award of damages by the trial court calls for appellate review such that the award if far too excessive can be reduced. This ruling applies with equal force on the award of attorney's fees. In a long line of cases we said, "It is not sound policy to place in penalty on the right to litigate. To compel the defeated party to pay the fees of counsel for his successful opponent would throw wide open the door of temptation to the opposing party and his counsel to swell the fees to undue proportions." Considering that the respondent corporation's lease contract, at the time when the cause of action accrued, ran only on a month-to-month basis whence before it was on a yearly basis, we find even the reduced amount of attorney's fees ordered by the Court of Appeals still exorbitant in the light of prevailing jurisprudence. Consequently, the amount of two hundred thousand (P200,000.00) awarded by respondent appellate court should be reduced to one hundred thousand (P100,000.00) pesos as the reasonable award or attorney's fees in favor of private respondent corporation. Source: http://princesslawyer.blogspot.com/2010/07/so-ping-bun-v-ca.html Lagon vs. CA - Buhangin Facts:

1.

2.

3.

4.

Petitioner Jose Lagon purchased from the estate of Bai Tonina Sepi two parcels of land. After the sale, private respondent herein Menandro Lapuz filed a complaint for torts and damages against Lagon. Lapuz claimed that he entered into a contract of lease with Sepi over the said parcels of land. One of the provisions agreed upon was for Lapuz to put up commercial buildings for leasing purposes. The rentals to be paid by the tenants would answer for the rent Lapuz was obligated to pay Sepi for the lease. When Sepi died, Lapuz started remitting his rent to the court-appointed administrator of the formers estate. Said administrator advised him to stop collecting rentals from the tenants. He later on discovered that Lagon, representing himself as the new owner of the property, had been collecting rentals from the tenants, prompting him to file suit. Lagon claimed that before he bought the properties, he went to one Atty. Benjamin Fajardo, the lawyer who allegedly notarized the lease conract between Lapuz and Sepi, to verify if the parties indeed renewed the lease contract after it expired in 1974. Lagon argued that Atty. Fajardo showed him four unsigned copies of the lease renewal.

Issue: WON the purchase by Lagon of the property during the existence of Lapuz lease contract constituted tortuous interference, thus making him specifically liable for damages? Held: No, not all three elements to hold Lagon liable for tortuous interference are present.

NCC 1314 provides that any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. The tort recognized in that provision is known as interference with contractual relations. Said interference is penalized since it violates the property rights of a party in a contract to reap the benefits that should result therefrom. So Ping Bun v. CA lists the elements of tortuous interference with contractual relations: o Existence of a valid contract o Knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of the contract o Interference of the third person without legal justification or excuse In the case at bar, the second and third elements are not present. Lagon conducted his own personal investigation and inquiry, and unearthed no

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suspicious circumstance that would have made a cautious man probe deeper and watch out for any conflicting claim over the property. o An examination of the entire propertys title bore no indication of the leasehold interest of private respondent, nor did the registry of property have record of the same. The records show that the decision of the heirs of the late Sepi to sell the property was completely of their own volition and that Lagon did absolutely nothing to influence their judgment. Lagons purchase was merely an advancement of his financial interests, absent any proof that he was enthused by improper motives. o Gilchrist v. Cuddy a person is not a malicious interferer if his conduct is impelled by a proper business interest.

Cordero informed Go that such act of dealing directly with Robinson violated his exclusive distributorship. His lawyer, Atty. Tabujara, also wrote ACG Express Liner assailing the fraudulent actuations committed by Go in connivance with his lawyers in breach of Corderos exclusive distributorship appointment. The lawyers of AFFA and Robinson, asserts that the appointment of Cordero as AFFAs distributor was for the purpose of 1 transaction only and that the offer of exclusive distributorship was already being revoked for failure of Cordero to return the draft agreement within a reasonable time. Cordero testified that Landicho talked to him over the telephone and offered to amicably settle the dispute. Tecson and Landicho offered to convince Go to honor his exclusive distributorship with AFFA and to purchase all vessels for ACG Express Liner through him. They proposed that they will convince Go to pay him on the condition that they will get a cut of 20%. It was agreed that the lawyers will give Cordero a weekly status report and that the matter will be settled amicably within 3-4 weeks. Cordero would give Landicho and Tecson their respective commission, from his own commission. However, no such weekly status report was made as it turned out that they had no intention to do so and were just buying time as the catamaran vessel was due to arrive from Australia. Cordero filed a complaint with the Bureau of Customs (BOC) to prohibit the entry of SEACAT 25 from Australia. An Alert Order was issued by BOC for the vessel. Cordero claimed that Go and Robinson had conspired to undervalue the vessel. Cordero instituted a Civil Case seeking to hold Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landicho liable jointly and solidarily for conniving and conspiring together in violating his exclusive distributorship in bad faith and wanton disregard of his rights, thus depriving him of his due commissions and other damages. RTC and CA ruled in favor of Cordero. Thus, this appeal by Go.

Go v. Cordero - Celebrado 1st Division | G.R. No. 164703 | 04 May 2010 | Villarama, Jr., J.

FACTS: Mortimer Cordero, VP of Pamana Marketing Corporation (Pamana), ventured into the business of marketing inter-island passenger vessels and came to meet Tony Robinson, Managing Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA). Robinson signed documents appointing Cordero as the exclusive distributor of AFFA catamaran and other fast ferry vessels. Cordero offered for sale to prospective buyers the catamaran known as the SEACAT 25. Cordero was able to close a deal for the purchase of SEACAT 25 after negotiation with Allan Go owner/operator of ACG Express Liner of Cebu City and Gos lawyers Felipe Landicho and Vincent Tecson. As per agreement, Cordero shall receive commissions from the sale of each vessel. Cordero made 2 trips to the AFFA Shipyard in Australia to monitor the progress of the building of the vessel. He shouldered all the expenses during these trips and long distance telephone calls to Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landicho. However, Cordero discovered that Go was dealing directly with Robinson when he was informed by Dennis Padua of Wartsila Phils. that Go was canvassing for a 2 nd catamaran engine from their company which provided the ship engine for the first SEACAT 25. Padua told Cordero that Go instructed him to fax the requested quotation of the second engine to Brisbane where Go was then staying. Cordero tried to contact Go and Landicho to confirm but they were nowhere to be found, while Robinson refused to answer his calls. Cordero go to Brisbane to clarify matters with Robinson, only to find out that Go and Landicho were already there in Brisbane negotiating for the second sale.

ISSUES: 1. WON Cordero has a cause of action against Go et al. YES. 2. WON Go can be held liable even if they are not parties to the contract. YES. 3. WON Go et al.s interference was unjustified. YES.

HELD/RATIO: 1. YES. Cordero is the exclusive distributor and not Pamana AND Cordero has proprietary rights under the agreement that he may protect.

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The right to perform an exclusive distributorship agreement and to reap the profits resulting from such performance are proprietary rights which a party may protect. The rights granted not be rendered illusory by interposing a person to obtain goods for which the exclusive distributorship was conceptualized. (Yu v. CA) 2. YES. While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued for breach of contract because only parties can breach contractual provisions, a contracting party may sue a third person not for breach but for inducing another to commit such breach. Based on Art. 1314, any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of a contract; (3) interference of the third person is without legal justification. The presence of the first and second elements is not disputed. Go et al were clearly aware of the contract between Cordero and AFFA. Landicho and Tecson aware of Corderos authority, which can be gleaned from their act of immediately furnishing him with copies of bank transmittals everytime Go remits payment to Robinson. 3. YES. A duty which the law of torts is concerned with is respect for the property of others, and a cause of action ex delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful interference by one person of the enjoyment by the other of his private property. This may pertain to a situation where a third person induces a party to renege on or violate his undertaking under a contract. General rule: JUSTIFIED INTERFERENCE with the business relations of another exists where the actors motive is to benefit himself. It is sufficient if the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives. He acts in SELFPROTECTION in this case. HENCE: -NOT necessary that the interferers interest outweigh that of the party whose rights are invaded -NOT necessary that an individual acts under an economic interest that is substantial, not merely de minimis. UNJUSTIFIED INTERFERENCE sole motive is to cause harm to the other. induce refers to situations where a person causes another to choose one course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation. Malice connotes ill will or spite, and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive.

for entering into contracts and causing breach of existing ones. Gilchrist vs. Cuddy: Not a malicious interferer if there is no malice and the impulse behind ones conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives. Lagon v. CA: to sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant must have acted with malice or must have been driven by purely impure reasons to injure the plaintiff (unjustified interference) The act of Go, Landicho and Tecson in inducing Robinson and AFFA to enter into another contract to obtain a lower price for the second vessel resulted in AFFAs breach of its contractual obligation to pay in full the commission due to Cordero and unceremonious termination of Corderos appointment as exclusive distributor. Such act may not be deemed malicious if impelled by a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives (Gilchrist). HOWEVER, it was demonstrated that Go et al transgressed the bounds of permissible financial interest to benefit themselves at the expense of Cordero. They furtively went directly to Robinson after Cordero had worked hard to close the deal for them. Worst, even as Go et al secretly negotiated with Robinson for the purchase of a second vessel, Landicho and Tecson continued to demand and receive from Cordero their commission or cut from Corderos own earned commission from the first sale. The lawyers failed to refute the receipts signed by them. They clearly connived not only in ensuring that Cordero would have no participation in the second sale, but also that he would not be paid the balance of his commission. This, despite their knowledge that it was commission already earned by and due to Cordero. The failure of Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landicho to act with fairness, honesty and good faith, to the prejudice of Cordero, is further proscribed by CC Art. 19 (complemented with 21) (partly sourced from www.scribd.com/doc/95503451/Digest-Cordero-vs-Go-Torts)

VIII. HUMAN RELATIONS TORT GLOBE MACKAY V. CA - REINIER JEFFREY ABDON Globe McKay v. CA GR No. 81262 / 25 Aug 1989 / J. Cortes / Third Division FACTS Globe McKay discovered fraudulent transactions in 1972. According to Restituto Tobias, private respondent, he reported them to his immediate superior and to the EVP of Globe McKay Herbert Hendry.

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On 11 Nov 1972, one day after he made the report, Hendry confronted him and said he was the number one suspect, ordered him to take a forced leave, not to communicate with the office, leave his table drawers open and leave the office keys. When he returned to work on 20 Nov, he was made to take a lie detector test, and called a "crook and swindler". He was ordered to submit specimen handwriting and signatures for police investigation. On 6 Dec 1972, the Manila police submitted a lab report that cleared him. Not satisfied, petitioners hired a private investigator who on 10 Dec found Tobias guilty. On 19 Dec, Lt. Tagle, Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner, after investigating other documents, submitted a second lab report again clearing Tobias. The lie detector test also showed negative results. On 17 Jan 1973, Tobias received a notice that his employment was terminated effective 13 Dec 1972. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, which was dismissed by the labor arbiter but there were reversals from the NLRC to Labor Sec and while it was pending appeal in the office of the President Tobias and petitioners entered into a compromise agreement regarding the illegal dismissal complaint. Tobias tried to get a job with RETELCO, but petitioner Hendry wrote an unsolicited letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed due to dishonesty. Tobias filed a complaint for damages in the RTC and won. On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto. ISSUE WON petitioners are liable to Tobias for damages. HELD Yes. RTC/CA decision affirmed. RATIO On the tort Art. 19 lays a rule of conduct but does not provide a remedy for violation. Generally an action for damage under Art. 20 or 21 would be proper. Art. 20 - violation of provision of law in this case, petitioner claims no violation of law Art. 21 - willful injury to another in manner contrary to morals, good customs, public policy may apply in this case The test whether or not the principle of abuse of rights (under Art. 19) has been violated resulting in damages under Art. 20 or 21 or other applicable provision of law depends on the circumstances of each case. In this case: I. Imputation of guilt without basis AND pattern of harassment

1. Regardless WON it was respondent Tobias who reported anomalies to petitioners, the pettioner's reactions upon uncovering the anomalies were less than civil. An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has committed dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action such as ordering an investigation and directing the employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be expected from such employer. But the high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for. 2. Upon reporting for work, Tobias was confronted by Hendry who said "Tobby, you are the crook and swindler in this company." Considering that the first report made by the police investigators was submitted only on December 10, 1972 the statement made by petitioner Hendry was baseless. The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The right to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised, and if done abusively, employer may be liable for damages to the employee. II. "Crook and swindler" 1. After the filing of the first six criminal complaints against Tobias, he protested against Hendry, who cut him off and told him that he should just confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases against him and land him in jail. Hendry added that "You Filipinos cannot be trusted." which unmasked petitioner's bad faith in the various actions against Tobias. The scornful remark about Filipinos as well as Hendry's earlier statements about Tobias being a "crook and swindler" are clear violations of Tobias' personal dignity. (see Art. 26) III. The letter to RETELCO Because of petitioners' letter to RETELCO sometime in Oct 1974, stating that Tobias was dismissed due to dishonesty, the latter was not able to get a job with RETELCO. Under 2176 (quasi-delict) petitioners must be held liable for damages. The argument of petitioner that it had an obligation to advise others of the dangers of dealing with Tobias only reveal an obsession to prevent Tobias from getting job, even after almost two years has passed since Tobias was dismissed. IV. Malicious prosecution To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that

prosecution was prompted by a design to vex and humiliate a person

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initiated deliberately knowing the charges were false and groundless

Trial court found that petitioners acted in bad faith in filing the criminal complaints. 1. Despite 2 police reports clearing plaintiff of participation in the fraudulent transactions, six criminal cases were filed, 5 for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents and 1 for violation of RPC Art. 290. 2. All were dismissed by the fiscal, four were appealed to the Ministry of Justice, also dismissed, and TWO were refiled in the Judge Advocate General's office, but was frustrated by a presidential decree transferring criminal cases to civil courts. 3. The cases were filed during pendency of illegal dismissal case by Tobias against petitioners. This explained the haste in which they were filed. 4. The threat of Hendry that "a hundred more cases would be filed" is a sword of Damocles, which belies any good faith claimed by petitioners. On Damages Because there were several tortous acts of the petitioners, the damages awarded by the RTC is reasonable. Damnum absque injuria, does not apply because there was a legal right here (Art. 19). Moral damages are recoverable in cases mentioned in Art. 21. And applying Zulueta v. Pan American, exemplary damages may be awarded not only for gross negligence but also for an act that is deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad faith, which it was in this case. ALBENSON V. CA - MCGYVER GUILDENSTERN DORIA Albenson v. CA Facts:

Issue:

When the asst fiscal Sumaway filed the complaint, he claimed that he gave Eugenio S. Baltao opportunity to submit controverting evidence, but failed to do so, and considered such failure a waiver Baltao reiterated his claims and asked provincial fiscal for reinvestigation, alleging that such opportunity was never afforded him Provincial fiscal Castro reversed asst fiscals finding and exonerated Baltao. He also found that the signature on the check was not Baltaos, and that there is no showing that he received notice of preliminary investigation As such, Baltao filed before RTC a complaint for damages against Albenson, owner Jesse Yap, and its employee Mendiona, for alleged unjust filing of a criminal case RTC: o It was Baltao III that Albenson had dealings with since check was to be drawn from account of EL Woodworks and not of Guaranteed (where plaintiff used to be president). Also, Guaranteed had been inactive since 1975. EL Woodworks has same address as Guaranteed. o Defendants to pay compensatory 133k, moral 1M, exemplary 200k, attys fees 100k, costs of suit CA: o Modified RTC decision o Moral 500k, attys fees 50k, affirmed in all other respects Petitioners contend: complaint is for malicious prosecution; therefore, absence of malice on their part absolves them from any liability Baltao argues: complaint for damages is based on Art. 19, 20 and 21

w/n petitioners Albenson, Yap and Mendiona are liable under Art. 19, 20 and 21 Held:

Albenson Enterprises received from Guaranteed Industries a Pacific Banking Corp check as partial payment for steel plates the latter ordered. When presented for payment, the check was dishonored because the account from which it was to be drawn from was already closed. The account belonged to EL Woodworks. As per their inquiries, they found out that ff: o from SEC: president of Guaranteed is Eugenio S. Baltao o Ministry of Trade & Industry: EL Woodworks is registered in the name of Eugenio Baltao o from drawee bank: signature on the check belonged to Eugenio Baltao Thus, Albenson demanded from Baltao to replace and/or make good the dishonored check Baltao countered that he never issued suck check, that the signature was not his, and that Guaranteed was a defunct entity Albenson filed complaint against Baltao for violation of BP 22 It appeared however that Baltao had a namesake his son, Eugenio Baltao III, who manages EL Woodworks

No, petitioners could not be said to have abused their right. This is a case of mistaken identity. When Baltao denied the transactions, he should not have merely cautioned petitioners to check the veracity of their claims. He should have clarified that there, in fact, are three persons with the same name Baltao Sr., Baltao Jr., and Baltao III. The last two Baltaos were doing business in the same building (aptly named Baltao Bldg.) . Petitioners had every reason to believe that the person who issued the bouncing check is respondent Eugenio S. Baltao. Instead, Baltao waited in ambush and pounced on the hapless petitioners at a time he thought was propitious by filing an action for damages a devious scheme indeed. The criminal complaint filed by petitioners was a sincere attempt to find the best possible means to collect the sum of money due them. A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek ways to compel the debtor to pay him. Therefore, they acted in good faith. Complaint lacked proof of 2nd and 3rd elements of malicious prosecution. Elements of malicious prosecution:

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1. 2. 3.

The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that action was finally terminated with an acquittal That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice

FOR DISCUSSION: Tolention: art. 21, combined with art. 19 and 20, the scope of law on civil wrongs has been greatly broadened. It is now difficult to conceive of any malevolent exercise of a right which could not be checked by the application of these articles. Elements of abuse of right (Art. 19): 1. 2. 3. There is a legal right or duty Right or duty is exercised in bad faith With intent of prejudicing or injuring another

Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda. The Attorney's fees charged by Amonoy was P27,600.00 and on 20 January 1965 Asuncion and Alfonso executed a deed of real estate mortgage on the said two (2) lots in favor of Amonoy to secure the payment of his attorney's fees. But by the time the estate was declared closed on Aug. 1969, both Asuncion and Alfonso were both dead. Among the heirs of the latter was his daughter, plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez. Because his Attorney's fees secured by the two lots were not paid Amonoy filed for their foreclosure. The heirs opposed, contending that the attorney's fees charged [were] unconscionable. Judgment was rendered in favor of Amonoy requiring the heirs to pay within 90 days and failure to do so would result to the sale of the two (2) lots in a public auction. The attorneys fees remained unpaid and so the lots were sold in a public auction where Amonoy was the highest bidder. The CFI on 25 July 1985 issued a Writ of Possession and pursuant to which a notice to vacate was made on 26 August 1985. On Amonoy's motion orders of 25 April 1986 and 6 May 1986 were issued for the demolition of structures in the said lots, including the house of the Gutierrez spouses. On 27 September 1985 the petition for Certiori was filed by several persons including respondent Angela Gutierrez). A temporary restraining order was then granted by the SC on 2 June 1986 enjoining the demolition of the petitioners' houses.On October 5,1988 the certiorari was granted enjoining the sheriff from demolishing the houses in the subject lots including that of Sps. Gutierrez and ordering Amonoy to return the lot to the Sps. Gutierrez among others. But by the time the Supreme Court promulgated the abovementioned Decision, respondents' house had already been destroyed, supposedly in accordance with a Writ of Demolition ordered by the lower court. Thus, a Complaint for damages in connection with the destruction of their house was filed by respondents against petitioner. The RTC dismissed respondents' suit. On appeal, the CA set aside the lower court's ruling and ordered petitioner Amonoy to pay respondents P250,000 as actual damages. Amonoy filed MR which was also denied. Amonoy invokes the legal principle damnum absque injuria wherein damage resulting from the legitimate exercise of a person's rights is a loss without injury for which the law gives no remedy. He maintains that he was merely acting in accordance with the Writ of Demolition ordered by the RTC.

Nature of Art. 20 general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own sanction (willfully or negligently) Elements of acts contra bonus mores (Art. 21): 1. 2. 3. There is an act which is legal Such act is contrary to morals, good custom, public order or public policy With intent to injure

Art 19 and 21 have a common element of being intentional. Art. 20 does not distinguish. On malicious prosecution: - there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. - however, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution - it will not lie where the prosecutor acted with probable cause - otherwise, it would be a very great discouragement to public justice, if prosecutors, who has tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to be sued at law when their indictment miscarried AMONOY V. GUTIERREZ - JYRINE ENTERIA AMONOY v. SPS. GUTIERREZ G.R. No. 140420, February 15, 2001 FACTS: A Special Proceedings for the settlement of the estate involving six (6) parcels of land was filed. Petitioner Sergio Amonoy was the counsel Francisca Catolos, Agnes Catolos, Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formida. The partition of the estate was approved and two (2) of the said lots were adjudicated to Asuncion ISSUE:

WON Amonoy is liable to Sps. Gutierrez for respondents for damages. HELD:

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Yes. Damnum absque injuria finds no application to this case.The demolition of respondents' house by petitioner, despite his receipt of the TRO, was not only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right. In insisting on his alleged right, he wantonly violated this Court's Order and wittingly caused the destruction of respondents house. Petitioner commenced the demolition of respondents' house on May 30, 1986 under the authority of a Writ of Demolition issued by the RTC. But the records show that a TRO enjoining the demolition of respondents' house, was issued by the SC on June 2, 1986. The CA also found, based on the Certificate of Service of the SC process server, that a copy of the TRO was served on petitioner on June 4, 1986. Petitioner did not heed the TRO of this Court. Amonoy unlawfully pursued the demolition of respondents' house well until the middle of 1987 as seen in the testimony of Angela Gutierrez. Although the acts of petitioner may have been legally justified at the outsset, their continuation after the issuance of the TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of his right. His actions were tainted with bad faith. Had he not insisted on completing the demolition, respondents would not have suffered the loss that engendered the suit before the RTC. Verily, his acts constituted not only an abuse of a right, but an invalid exercise of a right that had been suspended when he received the TRO from this Court on June 4, 1986. By then he was no longer entitled to proceed with the demolition.

tentative list; degrees will be conferred upon candidates who satisfactorily complete requirements Apr 16, 1988, Jader attended the investiture ceremonies; he went up the stage when his name was called, escorted by his mother and his eldest brother; his Tassel was turned from left to right, the Dean handed him a rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of a diploma; he gave a blow-out for neighbors, friends and relatives He thereafter prepared himself for the bar; took a leave of absence without pay from his job and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in FEU. Having learned of the deficiency, he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar. Jader sued EU for damages (MD, ED, unrealized income) RTC and CA granted damages (AD, MD)

UEs defence: the proximate cause of Jaders injury was his own negligence in not verifying from the professor the result of his removal exam. SC: No merit. Theres a contractual relationship between EU and Jader, under which EU was obliged to timely inform its students as to whether they have complied with all the requirements for the conferment of a degree or whether they would be included among those who will graduate. UE, in belatedly informing Jader of the result of the removal exam, particularly at a time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar, cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious. Being the party that hired them, it is the school that exercises general supervision and exclusive control over the professors with respect to the submission of reports involving the students' standing. The college dean must see to it that his own professors and teachers comply with the rules set by the school Considering further, that the institution involved is a law school, it should have practiced what it inculcates in its students, i.e., the principle of good dealings under Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code (quoted Art 19 and 20) 35K AD awarded. No MD because, according to Court, Jader didnt suffer shock, trauma and pain when he was informed that he couldnt take the bar... and Jader shouldve verified for himself whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar.

"Artilce 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible xxx." UE V. JADER - NADINE ANNE ESCALONA 2000 UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST v JADER Jader was enrolled in UE College of Law. 1st sem of his last year, he failed to take the finals in Practice Court I so he was given an INC 2nd sem, he filed an application for the removal of the INC and took the exam on March 28, 1988 May 30, 1988, the Prof submitted his grade which was a 5. In the faculty delibs on who among the 4th year students should be allowed to graduate, Jaders name appeared in the Tentative List with annotation: JADER ROMEO A, Def. Conflict of Laws x-1-87-88, Practice Court I Inc., 1-87-88 C-1 to submit transcript with S.O. On the grad invitation, Jaders name appeared still w annotation: this is a

WASSMER V. VELEZ - JOHN RAYMUND FULLECIDO FACTS: Following the mutual promise to marry, left a note to his brides postponing the wedding Sent a letter stating that he will return but did not anymore

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A case was filed for damages TC denied the petition The record reveals o that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which was subsequently issued o Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances o The bride-tobe's trousseau, party dresses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased o gifts received o two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding

the defendant expressed and professed his undying love and affection for plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings: that in consideration of the defendants PROMISE OF MARRIAGE plaintiff consented and acceded to defendants pleas for ca rnal knowledge(sexual intercourse) which later Araceli Santos conceived a child. Apolonio REFUSED TO MARRY Araceli as promised and refrained from seeing the plaintiff which led to her suffering from mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feeling, moral shock and social humiliation. The plaintiff asked that the defendant recognize the child she was bearing; to pay her not less than P430 a month for her support plus P100,000 in moral and exemplary damages plus 10,000 attorneys fees. ISSUE: Whether or not a breach of promise of marriage can bring any action for damages in court. Whether or not seduction has been an element in the relationship between Apolonio and Arceli RULING: NO case can be made since the plaintiff Araceli was a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant with repeated acts of intercourse. Such is not compatible to the idea of seduction. Plainly, there is voluntariness and mutual passion: for had the appellant been deceived she would not have again yielded to his embraces much less for one year without exacting fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage and she would have cut all relationship upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. One cannot be held liable for a breach of promise to marry. BAKSH V. CA - LAWI MANALO

ISSUE: WON there are damages by reason of Art. 21 HELD: Yes Ratio: It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage." Based on the facts stated above, this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the abovedescribed preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid

BAKSH VS CA FACTS: This is an appeal by certiorari. On October 27, 1987, without the assistance of counsel, private respondent filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint for damages against petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that she is 20 years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her country; other petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student, before August 20, 1987 the latter courted and proposed to marry her, she accepted his love on the condition that they get married; they therefore agreed to get married. The petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano apartments. She was a virgin at that time; after a week before the filing of complaint, petitioners attitude towards her started to change. He maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of the complaint. Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and that the petitioner is already married to someone in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering petitioner to pay her damages. On the other hand, petitioner claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent and denied all allegations against him. After trial on the merits, the lower court ordered petitioner to pay the private respondent damages. ISSUE: Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. HELD: The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Notwithstanding, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concepts of torts and quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold

TANJANCO V. CA - CARLOS S. HERNANDEZ JR. APOLONIO TANJANCO VS. COURT OF APPEALS & ARACELI Posted: July 1, 2007 in case digest, LLB111 0 FACTS: Apolonio Tanjanco courted the plaintiff Araceli Santos BOTH BEING OF ADULT AGE: that

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number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines quasi-delicts thus: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, the court held that where a mans promise to marry in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and obtain her consent to sexual act could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such breach of promise of marriage but because of the fraud and deceit behind it, and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. PE V. PE - CJ MILLENA

P5 fine. CFI dismissed. CA reversed and granted damages of P75,000 by way of moral damages, P25,000 as exemplary damages, and P5,000 as attorney's fee. WON Grand Union should be liable for public humiliation founded on Article 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the New Civil Code YES. Jose did not intend to steal the file and that his act of picking up the file from the open shelf was not criminal or done with malice or criminal intent for on the contrary, he took the item with the intention of buying and paying for it. Personal circumstances: graduate Mechanical Engineer from U.P. Class 1950, employed as an executive of Proctor & Gamble, a corporate manager in charge of motoring and warehousing; honorably discharged from the Philippine Army in 1946; a Philippine government pensionado for six months; member of the Philippine veterans Legion; author of articles published in the Manila Sunday Times and Philippines Free Press; member of the Knights of Columbus, Council No. 3713; son of the late Jose Maria Espino, retired Minister, Department of Foreign Affairs at the Philippine Embassy Washington. Jose was falsely accused of shoplifting is evident. Fine branding him as a thief which was not right nor justified. The mode and manner in which he was subjected, shouting at him, imposing upon him a fine, threatening to call the police and in the presence and hearing of many people at the supermarket which brought and caused him humiliation and embarrassment, sufficiently rendered the petitioners liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 in relation to Article 2219. It is against morals, good customs and public policy to humiliate, embarrass and degrade the dignity of a person. Everyone must respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. His forgetfullness led to his embarassment and humiliation thereby causing him mental anguish, wounded feelings and serious anxiety. His act of omission contributed to the occurrence of his injury or loss and such contributory negligence is a factor which may reduce the damages that private respondent may recover (Art. 2214, New Civil Code). Moreover, that many people were present and they saw and heard the ensuing interrogation and altercation appears to be simply a matter of coincidence in a supermarket which is a public place and the crowd of onlookers, hearers or bystanders was not deliberately sought or called by management to witness private respondent's predicament. Grand Union Supermarket acted in good faith in trying to protect and recover their property, a right which the law accords to them. Eliminate the grant of exemplary damages.
SOLEDAD CARPIO V. LEONORA VALMONTE AIZA

GRAND UNION V. ESPINO - IDEL MONFORT Grand Union v. Espino Guerrero | Dec. 28, 1979 | 1st Jose J. Espino. Jr., a civil engineer and an executive of Procter and Gamble Philippines together with his wife and two daughters went to shop at South Supermarket in Makati. Finding a cylindrical "rat tail" file which he needed for his hobby, he picked it up and held it fearing it might get lost because of its tiny size. While shopping, they saw the maid of Jose's aunt. As he talked, he placed the rat tail in his breast pocket partly exposed. At the check-out counter, he paid for their purchases worth P77 but forgot to pay the file. As he was exiting the supermarket, he was approached by Guard Ebreo regarding the file in his pocket. He quickly apologized and he turned towards the cashier to pay. But, he was stopped and instead was brought to the rear of the supermarket when he was asked to fill out an Incident Report labeling him as "Shoplifter". His wife joined him since he was taking so long and they were brought to the first checkout counter where Ms. Nelia Santos-Fandino's desk was. She made a remark: "Ano, nakaw na naman ito". Jose told Ms. Fandino that he was going to pay for the file because he needed it but she replied "That is all they say, the people whom we cause not paying for the goods say... They all intended to pay for the things that are found to them." Jose objected stating he is a regular customer of the supermarket. He gave P5 to pay for the P3.85 cost of the file but Ms. Fandino said the P5 was his fine which will be rewarded to the guard. People were staring at them. He took the file and paid the file at the nearest checkout counter with P50 and got out as fast as they could. He filed against Grand Union Supermarket founded on Article 21 in relation to Article 2219 and prays for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, costs of the suit and the return of the

09 September 2004 J. Tinga Facts: Valmonte, a wedding coordinator, was contracted by Michelle Del Rosario and Jon Sierra for their church wedding. On the day of the wedding, Valmonte went to the Manila Hotel

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where the bride and her family were billeted. When she arrived at Suite 326-A, several persons were already there including the bride, the brides parents and relatives, the make-up artist and his assistant, the official photographers, the fashion designer, and Soledad Carpio, an aunt of the bride who was preparing to dress up for the occasion. After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite carrying the items needed for the wedding rites and the gifts from the principal sponsors. She proceeded to the Maynila Restaurant where the reception was to be held to prepare the needed arrangements. Upon returning to the suite, Carpio allegedly uttered the following words to Valmonte: "Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang and lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha." Carpio then ordered one of the ladies to search Valmontes bag. It turned out that after Valmonte left the room, Carpio discovered that the pieces of jewelry which she placed inside the comfort room in a paper bag were lost consisting of 2 diamond rings, 1 set of diamond earrings, bracelet and necklace with a total value of about 1M. The hotel security was called in to help in the search. The bags and personal belongings of all the people inside the room were searched. Valmonte was allegedly bodily searched, interrogated and trailed by a security guard throughout the evening. Later, police officers arrived and interviewed all persons who had access to the suite and fingerprinted them including Valmonte. During all the time Valmonte was being interrogated by the police officers, Carpio kept on saying the words "Siya lang ang lumabas ng kwarto." Valmontes car which was parked at the hotel premises was also searched but the search yielded nothing. A few days after the incident, petitioner received a letter from Valmonte demanding a formal letter of apology which she wanted to be circulated to the newlyweds relatives and guests to redeem her smeared reputation as a result of petitioners imputations against her. Petitioner did not respond to the letter. Thus, Valmonte filed a suit for damages against Carpio. Issue: W/N Carpio is liable to pay damages to Valmonte Held: Yes, Carpio is liable for the payment of moral damages to Valmonte. The Court held that there is sufficient evidence on record tending to prove that Carpios imputations against Valmonte was made with malice and in bad faith. Valmontes allegations were supported by the testimonies of Serea Manding, a make-up artist during the wedding, and Jaime Papio, Security Supervisor at Manila Hotel. To warrant recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action, for a wrong inflicted by the defendant, and the damage resulting therefrom to the plaintiff.

Article 19 embodies the principle known as the abuse of rights. To find the existence of an abuse of right, the following elements must be present: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent or prejudicing or injuring another.14 When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be held accountable. Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the provisions of Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code: Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals or good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. In the case at bar, Carpios verbal reproach against Valmonte was certainly uncalled for considering that by her own account nobody knew that she brought such kind and amount of jewelry inside the paper bag. This being the case, she had no right to attack Valmonte with her innuendos which outrightly accusatory. By openly accusing almonte as the only person who went out of the room before the loss of the jewelry in the presence of all the guests therein, and ordering that she be immediately bodily searched, Carpio virtually branded respondent as the thief. True, Carpio had the right to ascertain the identity of the malefactor, but to malign Valmonte without an iota of proof that she was the one who actually stole the jewelry is an act which, by any standard or principle of law is impermissible. Carpio had willfully caused injury to Valmonte in a manner which is contrary to morals and good customs. Her firmness and resolve to find her missing jewelry cannot justify her acts toward respondent. She did not act with justice and good faith for apparently, she had no other purpose in mind but to prejudice Valmonte. Certainly, Carpio transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in relation to Article 21 for which she should be held accountable. Thus, Valmonte is entitled to the award of moral damages. The Court awarded 100K as moral damages. The claim for actual damages has not been substantiated with satisfactory evidence during the trial and must therefore be denied QUE V. IAC - ALVIN LORENZO V. OGENA DRILON V. CA - SHEI PASCUAL DRILON V CA (ADAZA) 270 SCRA 211HERMOSISIMA JR; March 20, 1997 NATURE Petition to reverse CAs Resolutions

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FACTS - Gen Renato DE VILLA, Chief of Staff of the AFP, requested the DOJ (headed by Sec Franklin DRILON) to order the investigation of several individuals, including private respondent ADAZA for their alleged participation in the failed Dec 1989 coup detat. - This was then referred for preliminary inquiry to the Special Composite Team of Prosecutors who issued a subpoena to the said individuals after finding sufficient basis to continue the inquiry. The panel assigned to conduct prelim investigation found that there was probable cause to hold them for trial for the crime of REBELLION WITH MURDER AND FRUSTRATED MURDER. Information was filed before RTC QC, with no recommendation as to bail. - Feeling aggrieved by the institution of these proceedings against him, ADAZA filed a complaint for damages and charged petitioners with engaging in a deliberate, willful and malicious experimentation by filing against him a charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder when petitioners were torts & damages fully aware of the non-existence of such crime in the statute books. - Petitioners filed MD since there was no valid cause of action for this complaint for damages. - RTC denied MD. MFR for Order of Denial was also denied. - CA also dismissed petition for certiorari and ordered RTC judge to proceed with the trial of civil case filed by ADAZA. (In Adazas latest Comment, he maintained that his claim before the trial court was merely a suit for damages based on tort and NOT a suit for malicious prosecution.) ISSUES 1. WON complaint was a suit for damages for maliciousprosecution2. WON petitioners are liable for malicious prosecution HELD 1. YES Definition of Malicious Prosecution: - In American jurisdiction, it has been defined as-One begun in malice without probable cause tobelieve the charges can be sustained. Instituted with intention of injuring defendant and without probable cause, and which terminates in favor of the person prosecuted. For this injury an action on the case lies, called the action of malicious prosecution. - In Philippine jurisdiction, it has been defined as- An action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. The gist of the action is the putting of legal process in force, regularly, for the mere purpose of vexation or injury. Reasoning-

Nowhere in his complaint filed with the trial court did respondent Adaza allege that his action is one based on tort. (Sec 3e of RA 3019) An examination of the records would show that this latest posture as to the nature of his cause of action is only being raised for the first time on appeal. Such a change of theory cannot be allowed. 2. NO Ratio In order for a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove these elements: (a) The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor and that the action finally terminated with an acquittal; (b) That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (c) That the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is by improper or sinister motive.- The statutory basis for a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution are found in the provisions of the NCC [Art 19, 20, 21, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, 2217 and 2219(8)]. Reasoning - Judging from the face of the complaint itself filed by Adaza, NONE of these requisites have been alleged, thus rendering the complaint dismissible on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. (a) Insofar as Adazas Criminal Case is concerned, whatappears clear from the records only is that respondent has been discharged on a writ of habeas corpus and granted bail. This is not considered the termination of the action contemplated under Philippine jurisdiction to warrant the institution of a malicious prosecution suit against those responsible for the filing of the information against him. (b) It is well-settled that one cannot be held liable for maliciously instituting a prosecution where one has acted with probable cause. The petitioners were of the honest conviction that there was probable cause to hold Adaza for trial. (c)Suffice it to state that the presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice. Disposition: Petition is GRANTED. Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to take no further action on civil case except to DISMISS it. MAGBANUA V. JUNSAY - TANYA MIA PEREZ Magbanua v Junsay Facts:

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1. 2. 3. 4.

Magbanua worked as a housemaid of Junsay. She was charged as a co-accused with the crime of robbery. The case for the prosecution relied on an alleged confession made by Magbanua. RTC acquitted Magbanua on the ground that the alleged confession, which is the only evidence establishing participation of Magbanua, is inadmissible in evidence. Magbanua filed a complaint for damages against Junsay and Ibarra and Juanita, members of the police force.

order because the work of purchasing logs is inconsistent with his position as internal auditor. The following day Hyde informed him of his temporary relief as internal auditor so that he could carry out immediately the instructions given. On January 16, 1973 he responded with a plea for fairness and mercy as he would be without a job during an economic crisis. He further claims that he was demoted from a position of dignity to a servile and menial job and that the defendants did not reconsider their "clever and subterfugial dismissal" of him which for all purposes constituted a "constructive discharge. He prays for moral damages for suffering mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock and social humiliation. The complaint does not pray for reinstatement or payment of backwages. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint asserting that that the proper forum is not with the CFI of Davao but with the NLRC. Quisaba opposed the motion to dismiss claiming that the NLRC has said that they have no jurisdiction over claims or suits for damages arising out of employer-employee relationship. The CFI of Davao granted the motion to dismiss. Issue and Holding: W/N a complaint for damages arising out of an employees constructive dismissal is cognizable by regular courts or the NLRC? Regular courts of justice have jurisdiction. Ratio: Civil law consists of that "mass of precepts that determine or regulate the relations ... that exist between members of a society for the protection of private interests. Although the acts complained of seemingly appear to constitute "matters involving employee-employer relations" as Quisaba's dismissal was the severance of a pre-existing employee-employer relation, his complaint is grounded not on his dismissal per se as in fact he does not ask for reinstatement or backwages, but on the manner of his dismissal and the consequent effects of such dismissal. The "right" of the respondents to dismiss Quisaba should not be confused with the manner in which the right was exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal was done anti-socially or oppressively then the respondents violated article 1701 and article 21 of the Civil Code. The case at bar is intrinsically concerned with a civil (not a labor) dispute; 5 it has to do with an alleged violation of Quisaba's rights as a member of society, and does not involve an existing employee-employer

Issue/Held: 1. Ratio: 1. The four elements of malicious prosecution are: (1) the prosecution did occur, and the defendant instigated its commencement, (2) criminal action ended with an acquittal; (3) prosecutor acted without probable cause, and (4) prosecution was impelled by legal malice. The first and second elements are present. Prosecution of Magbanua did occur and Junsay instigated its commencement. As to the third element, the filing was not without probable cause. During the investigation, Magbanua admitted her participation. The investigation report prompted the filing of information. The inadmissibility was an evidentiary matter, which does not detract from the fact that based on Magbanuas admission, there was reason for Junsay to believe that the suit was not unfounded. Mere filing of a suit does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution should he be unsuccessful, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. As to the fourth, there was no proof of sinister design on the part of Junsay and the two police officers. Junsay was robbed of her valuable belongings. There can be no evil motive that should be attributed to one, who, as victim of a crime institutes the necessary legal proceedings. There was no other explanation as to why Junsay would institute baseless prosecution. Regarding the actuations of the police officers, their commencement of the action was pursuant to their duties. WON Magbanua is entitled to damages for malicious prosecution. NO

QUISABA V. STA. INES - JET SIANG August 30, 1974 CASTRO, J Facts: Jovito N. Quisaba filed a complaint with CFI of Davao against respondents for moral damages, exemplary damages, termination pay and attorney's fees. He claims that he was an employee of the company for 18 years. On January 11, 1973, the vice president of the company asked him to purchase logs. He refused to comply with the

ST. LOUIS V. CA - JUAN CARLO TEJANO ST LOUIS v CA (1984) FACTS St Louis Realty caused to be published on Sunday Times an advertisement for Brookside Hills that contained a picture of Dr Conrado Aramils house and the family of Arcadio S.

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Arcadio representing the latter to be the owners of the said house. For this, Dr Aramil received insulting remarks from friends, students, and colleagues like How much are you renting from the Arcadios? and like your wife portrayed in the papers as belonging to another husband, resulting in mental anguish for Dr Aramil. He wrote St Louis a letter of protest. St Louis stopped publication and offered apologies but no rectification was made. Dr Aramil demanded actual, exemplary, and moral damages. St Louis claimed it was an honest mistake and offered rectification on Manila Times. Later, St Louis published another picture of the Arcadios with their real house. Dr Aramil filed for damages. St Louis eventually published a notice of rectification on Manila Times explaining the mistake. TC noted loss of income for Dr Aramil at P1000-P1500 a month and mental anguish. Actual and moral damages and atty fees awarded. CA affirmed, noting that St Louis committed actionable quasi-delict under Art 21 & 26 NCC. ISSUE: WON case falls under Art 26 YES. Art 2219 allows moral damages for acts under Art 26. "Prying into the privacy of another's residence" and "meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another" and "similar acts", "though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief". St. Louis employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification." Persons who know the residence of Dr Aramil were confused by the distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income and mental anguish. GREGORIO V. CA - SANTIAGO TIONGCO

Petitioner received information that private respondents Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts merchandise without any authority. Petitioner de Guzman, an employee of MHP, was tasked to undertake the necessary surveillance and to make a report to the Philippine Constabulary. De Guzman and officers of the Philippine Constabulary, Reaction Force Battalion, went to the stores of respondents at the Marikina Public Market. Without warrant, they seized merchandise on display at respondents' stalls. The seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed private respondents. Receipts were issued for the seized items. The items were then turned over by Captain Peafiel to MHP for safekeeping. A criminal complaint for unfair competition was filed against private respondents. During its pendency, de Guzman exacted from private respondent Lugatiman P3,100.00 to be dropped from the complaint. After preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the complaint against all the private respondents and he ordered the return of the seized items, which was done. Private respondents had to go personally to petitioners' place of business to recover their goods. Not all the seized items were returned and other items returned were of inferior quality. Private respondents filed a civil case against the petitioners for sums of money and damages. The trial court ruled for the private respondents. The CA affirmed the Decision with modification. Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeal erred in imputing liability for damages to petitioners who did not effect the seizure of the merchandise ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in imputing liability for damages to petitioners who did not effect the seizure of the subject merchandise HELD: No, the CA did not err Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution protects from unreasonable search and seizure. It protects not only those who appear to be innocent but also those who appear to be guilty but are nevertheless to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. The seizure was made without any warrant. Under the Rules of Court, a warrantless search can only be undertaken under the following circumstance: Sec. 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. - A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. The evidence did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of private respondents' goods. MHP received information that private respondents were illegally selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia in October 1983. The specific date and time are not established in the evidence adduced by the parties. Petitioner de Guzman then made a

IX. INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS MHP Garments v. CA - Valdez J. Puno Sep. 2, 1994 MHP Garments, Inc. was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts merchandise. In their Memorandum Agreement, MHP was given the authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies."

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surveillance of the stores of private respondents. They reported to the Philippine Constabulary and on October 25, 1983, MHP and the PC raided the stores of private respondents and the supposed illicit goods were seized. The progression of time between the receipt of the information and the raid of the stores of private respondents shows there was sufficient time for petitioners and the PC raiding party to apply for a judicial warrant. Despite the sufficiency of time, they did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods of private respondents. They took the risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure would be proved to violate the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. The search and seizure were clearly illegal. There was no probable cause for the seizure. Probable cause for a search has been defined as "such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." These facts and circumstances were not in any way shown by the petitioners to justify their warrantless search and seizure. After preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed their complaint for unfair competition and later ordered the return of the seized goods. While the members of the PC raiding team should have been included in the complaint for violation of the private respondents' constitutional rights, the omission will not exculpate petitioners. Lim vs. Ponce de Leon: Recovery of damages for violation of constitutional rights and liberties from public officer or private individual were allowed Aberca vs. Ver: In NCC Art. 32, the law speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. It is not the actor alone (i.e., the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. The raid was conducted with active participation of their employee. Larry de Guzman did not lift a finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scouts items. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto, he was liable to the same extent as the officers themselves, and so with the MHP which even received for safekeeping the goods unreasonably seized by the PC raiding team and de Guzman, and refused to surrender them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition. If petitioners did not have a hand in the raid, they should have filed a third-party complaint against the raiding team for contribution or any other relief, but they did not.

Ynares-Santiago, J. 2007 Nature: Petition for Certiorari assailing the decision of CA which affirmed the denial of the RTC of the petitioners motion to dismiss. Facts: 26. Hope, More and Champion are classified as local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. *ad valorem tax tax based on the value of the thing 27. June 10, 1993 RA 7654 was enacted which provided that locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand would be taxed at 55% ad valorem tax (Sec. 142). Effectivity: JULY 3, 1993 28. July 1 Vinzons as BIR Commissioner issued RMC 37-9 reclassfying Chamipon, More and Hope as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand. (effect: it will have to be subjected to the 55% ad valorem tax once the law becomes effective). 29. July 2, 1993 at about 5:50 p.m. BIR Deputy Comm Deoferio sent via telefax a copy of RMC 73-93 to Fortune Tobacco but addressed to no one in particular. 30. July 15, 1993 Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC 37-93 31. July 20, 1993 Fortune filed an MR requesting recall of the issuance. 32. Request was denied and in the same letter assessed Fortune for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9.5M. Payment was demanded within 10 days. 33. Fortune filed a petition for review with Court of Tax Appeals injunction issued against BIR 34. August 10, 1994 Injunction made permanent when CTA, CA and SC ruled that issuance was defective, invalid and unenforceable. 35. April 10, 1997 Fortune filed a complaint for damages against petitioner in her private capacity. Petitioner of course filed motion to dismiss. e. Fortune: iii. Vinzons should be held liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws. f. Vinzons: v. Respondent has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. vi. No cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith. 36. RTC denied, CA and RTC affirmed denial of motion to dismiss, and order the RTC to proceed with trial. 37. Hence, this petition.

Silahis v. Soluta - ReinierAbdon LiwaywayVinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation - Millena

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ISSUES: (1) May a public officer be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office? (2) Which as between Article 32 of the Civil Code and Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code should govern in determining whether the instant complaint states a cause of action? HELD: 3. YES. The rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence [based on Sec 38 of the Administrative Code]; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff [based on Section 32 of the Civil Code. Article 32. Being a special law, it should prevail over a general law (the Administrative Code). Article 32 was patterned after the tort in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property or reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of anothers legal right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent. The clear intention therefore of the legislature was to create a distinct cause of action in the nature of tort for violation of constitutional rights, irrespective of the motive or intent of the defendant.31 This is a fundamental innovation in the Civil Code, and in enacting the Administrative Code pursuant to the exercise of legislative powers, then President Corazon C. Aquino, could not have intended to obliterate this constitutional protection on civil liberties. LiwaywayVinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation - Millena Nachura, J. 2008

Nature: Motion for Reconsideration of the June 19, 2007 decision denying the motion to dismiss of the petitioner. Facts: 38. Hope, More and Champion are classified as local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. *ad valorem tax tax based on the value of the thing 39. June 10, 1993 RA 7654 was enacted which provided that locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand would be taxed at 55% ad valorem tax (Sec. 142). Effectivity: JULY 3, 1993 40. July 1 Vinzons as BIR Commissioner issued RMC 37-9 reclassfying Chamipon, More and Hope as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand. (effect: it will have to be subjected to the 55% ad valorem tax once the law becomes effective). 41. July 2, 1993 at about 5:50 p.m. BIR Deputy Comm Deoferio sent via telefax a copy of RMC 73-93 to Fortune Tobacco but addressed to no one in particular. 42. July 15, 1993 Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC 37-93 43. July 20, 1993 Fortune filed an MR requesting recall of the issuance. 44. Request was denied and in the same letter assessed Fortune for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9.5M. Payment was demanded within 10 days. 45. Fortune filed a petition for review with Court of Tax Appeals injunction issued against BIR 46. August 10, 1994 Injunction made permanent when CTA, CA and SC ruled that issuance was defective, invalid and unenforceable. 47. April 10, 1997 Fortune filed a complaint for damages against petitioner in her private capacity. Petitioner of course filed motion to dismiss. g. Fortune: iv. Vinzons should be held liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws. h. Vinzons: vii. Respondent has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. viii. No cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith. 48. RTC denied, CA and RTC affirmed denial of motion to dismiss, and order the RTC to proceed with trial. 49. June 19, 2007 Petitioner moved for reconsideration. Court denied motion with finality.

4.

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50. Undaunted, Petitioner filed a Motion to Refer the Case to the Court En Banc contending that the petition raises a legal question that is novel and is of paramount importance decision might send a chilling effect to public officers as it will cause POs to refrain from performing official duties for fear of prosecution in their private capacity. ISSUE: WON Petitioner can be held liable for damages arising from the performance of her official function as a public officer. Held: No. The respondent does not have a particular or special injury sustained. The petitioner took nothing from the respondent as the latter did not pay a single centavo on the tax assessment. With no particular injury alleged in the complaint, there is, therefore, no delict or wrongful act or omission attributable to the petitioner that would violate the primary rights of the respondent. Generally, when what is involved is a duty owing to the public in general, an individual cannot have a cause of action for damages against the public officer, even though he may have been injured by the action or inaction of the officer. Exception is when the complaining individual suffers a particular or special injury on account of the public officers improper performance or non-performance of his public duty. Juxtaposed with Article 32of the Civil Code, the principle may now translate into the rule that an individual can hold a public officer personally liable for damages on account of an act or omission that violates a constitutional right only if it results in a particular wrong or injury to the former. *Just see article 32. Note: In the 2007 decision ordering the dismissal of the case, the Court held that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, the liability of the public officer may accrue even if he/she acted in good faith as long as there is a violation of constitutional rights. This case does not impute bad faith hence, for Article 32 to operate, it must be that there was a violation of a constitutional right. Court here said that the ruling in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. CA did not declare RMC No. 37-93 unconstitutional but had fallen short of a valid and effective administrative issuance. Dispositive: Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the June 19, 2007 decision granted.

1. 2. 3. 4.

A criminal case of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against Dr. Japzon by complainant Carmen Madeja who is the widow of the deceased (who died after an appendectomy conducted by the doctor) In the information, Madeja reserved the right to institute a separate civil action for damages. While the criminal case was pending, Madeja filed an action for damages for violation of NCC Art 33 of the New Civil Code. Dr. Japzon filed a motion to dismiss which Judge Caro granted on the basis of Sec 3(a), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which states the general rule that after criminal action has commenced, the civil action can not be instituted until final judgement has been rendered in the former action.

ISSUE: WON Madeja can file a separate civil action under Article 33 despite the pendency of criminal action in relation to Sec 3(a), Rule 111. SC: (YES) 1. Pertinent rule: a. Sec 2, Rule 111 explicitly carves out exception to general rule for violations of NCC Art 31, 32, 33, 34, and 2177. An independent civil action may be brought under these provisions during the pendency of the criminal case AS LONG AS the right to do so is reserved (which was the case here). Also, only a preponderance of evidence is necessary to prove liability. Court cited the Code Commission and Tolentino to support this conclusion. (see text below). The term physical injuries in NCC Art 33 should be construed in the general sense to include any type of bodily injury, and not the definition in the RPC of physical injuries. THUS, in this case, homicide was deemed to be included within the definition.

2. 3.

DISPOSITIVE: Order of Judge Caro to dismiss is reversed. Text of Code Commission deliberations: The underlying purpose of the principle under consideration is to allow the citizen to enforce his rights in a private action brought by him, regardless of the action of the State attorney. It is not conducive to civic spirit and to individual self-reliance and initiative to habituate the citizens to depend upon the government for the vindication of their own private rights. It is true that in many of the cases referred to in the provision cited, a criminal prosecution is proper, but it should be remembered that while the State is the complainant in the criminal case, the injured individual is the one most concerned because it is he who has suffered directly. He should be permitted to demand reparation for the wrong which peculiarly affects him. Tolentino

Carmen Madeja v. Judge Caro and Eva Arellano-Japzon - Adorna (1983)

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The general rule is that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party reserves his right to institute it separately; and after a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted. The present articles creates an exception to this rule when the offense is defamation, fraud, or physical injuries, In these cases, a civil action may be filed independently of the criminal action, even if there has been no reservation made by the injured party; the law itself in this article makes such reservation; but the claimant is not given the right to determine whether the civil action should be scheduled or suspended until the criminal action has been terminated. The result of the civil action is thus independent of the result of the civil action. Arafiles v. Phil. Journalists Inc., et. al. - Brillo FACTS: About 2 a.m., while respondent Morales, a reporter of Peoples Journal Tonight, was at the Western Police District (WPD) Headquarters Emelita Despuig, an employee of the National Institute of Atmospheric Sciences (NIAS), lodged a complaint against petitioner, a NIAS director, for forcible abduction with rape and forcible abduction with attempted rape. Emelita executed a sworn affidavit which was later on written in the police blotter and perused by Morales. The latter interviewed Emelita. The following day, the article appeared in the headline of respondents newspaper which wrote, GOVT EXEC RAPES COED. About a year following the publication, petitioner instituted a complaint before the RTC against respondents for damages. Petitioner alleged that because of the article, his reputation was injured. Respondent answered that his write-up was protected by the constitution on freedom of the press. RTC ruled in favor of petitioner. ISSSUE: W/N the CA erred in holding that the publication of the news item was not attended with malice to thus free respondents of liability for damages. RULING: Petition denied. In actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole. Respondents could of course have been more circumspect in their choice of words as the headline and first seven paragraphs of the news item give the impression that a certain director of the NIAS actually committed the crimes complained of by Emelita. The succeeding paragraphs sufficiently convey to the readers, however, that the narration of events was only an account of what Emelita had reported at the police headquarters. Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider that the respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused the freedom of the press. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and [editors] usually

have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words. http://choclitcandycoatedbrat.blogspot.com/2009/02/arafiles-vs-phil-journalists-incet-al.html MVRS v. Islamic - John Dominic TuzonBuhangin Facts: 1. ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., a local federation of more than seventy (70) Muslim religious organizations, and individual Muslims filed an action for damages against MVRS Publications for the Bulgar article stating: Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim? Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay

Issue/Held: 1. 2. WON Islamic Dawah has a cause of action against MVRS. NO WON filing of a class suit can cure their lack of cause of action. NO

Ratio:

1.

Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of a class, no member of such class has a right of actionwithout at all impairing the equally demanding right of free speech and expression, as well as of the press, under the Bill of Rights. The statements published by MVRS did not specifically identify nor refer to any particular individuals who were purportedly the subject of the alleged libelous publication. Respondents can scarcely claim to having been singled out for social censure pointedly resulting in damages.

2.

An element of a class suit is the adequacy of representation. In determining the question of fair and adequate representation of members of a class, the court must consider (a) whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with the interest of the other members of the class; (b) the proportion of those made parties as it so bears to the total membership of the class; and, (c) any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the class. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., seeks in effect to assert the interests not only of the Muslims in the Philippines but of the whole Muslim world as well. Private respondents obviously lack the sufficiency of numbers to

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represent such a global group Alfonso T. Yuchengco versus The Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation, Roberto Coyiuto, Jr., Noel Cabrera, Gerry Zaragoza, Donna Gatdula, Rodney P. Diola, Raul Valino and Thelma San Juan - Celebrado 3rd Division | G.R. No. 184315 | 25 November 2009 | Chico-Nazario, J. FACTS Multi-millionaire Filipino-Chinese businessman Yuchengco alleged that Chronicle Publishing Corporation published in the Manila Chronicle a series of defamatory articles against him. In two of the subject articles, he was imputed to be a Marcos crony or a Marcos-Romualdez crony, which term according to him was commonly used and understood in Philippine media to describe an individual who was a recipient of special and underserving favors from former Pres. Marcos and/or his brother-in-law Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez due to special and extra-ordinary closeness to either or both, and which favors allowed an individual to engage in illegal and dishonorable business activities. Yuchengco claims that the said articles: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. branded him as a mere front or dummy for the Marcos and Romualdez clans in Benguet Corp., which company sought to take-over the management of Oriental Petroleum Mineral Corp. accused him of unsound and immoral business practices by insinuating that he wanted to take control of Oriental in order to divert its resources to rescue the debt-ridden Benguet Corp. insinuated that he personally and intentionally caused the failure of Benguet Corp. and that if even if he ever assumed control of Oriental, it would suffer the same fate as the former portrayed him as being an unfair and uncaring employer when the employees of Grepalife Corp., of which he is the Chairman, staged a strike accused him of inducing RCBC bank to violate the provisions of the General Banking Act on DOSRI loans insinuated that he induced others to disobey lawful orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission imputed to him the derogatory tag of corporate raider, implying that he was seeking to profit for something he did not work for.

4. 5.

since Yuchengco was a public figure, and assuming that the articles were indeed defamatory, they could not be held liable for damages since they were not impelled by actual malice in the composition thereof they did not compose and/or publish said articles with the knowledge that they contained falsehoods, or with reckless disregard on whether or not they contained falsehood

RTC decided in favor of Yuchengco. CA affirmed it in toto but reversed itself through a Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, this appeal by Yuchengco. ISSUE WON the imputations against Yuchengco are libelous as a purely civil action. YES. HELD YES. Libel is defined by RPC Art. 3533 but it can also be instituted as a purely civil action, the cause of action for which is provided by NCC Art 334. An award of damages under the premises presupposes the commission of an act amounting to defamatory imputation or libel, which, in turn, presupposes malice. Libel is the public and malicious imputation to another of a discreditable act or condition tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person. Liability for libel attaches present the following elements: (a) an allegation or imputation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice. ( GMA NETWORK, INC. V. BUSTOS) 1st Element: Publication Of these four elements, the most apparent in the case at bar would be the publication of the alleged imputation. Libel is published not only when it is widely circulated, but also when it is made known or brought to the attention or notice of another person other than its author and the offended party. The circulation of an allegedly libelous matter in a newspaper is certainly sufficient publication. 2nd Element: Defamation Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's character, fame or reputation through false and malicious statements . It is that which tends to injure reputation or to diminish esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in the plaintiff, or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. The subject articles would show the intention of the writers to injure the reputation, credit and virtue of Yuchengco and expose him to public hatred, discredit, contempt and

Manila Chronicle, et al. denied liability claiming that: 1. 2. 3. the subject articles were not defamatory since they were composed and published in good faith and only after having ascertained their contents the articles were privileged and/or constituted reasonable and balance[d] comments on matters of legitimate public interest which cannot serve as basis for the finding of libel against them they were acting within the bounds of constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press

Art. 353.Definition of Libel. A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. 4 Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

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ridicule. The indirect manner in which the articles attributed the insults to Yuchengco (e.g., the money involved came from depositors, and not from Yuchengco) does not lessen the culpability of the writers and publishers thereof, but instead makes the defamatory imputations even more effective. Words calculated to induce suspicion are sometimes more effective to destroy reputation than false charges directly made. Ironical and metaphorical language is a favored vehicle for slander. 3rd Element: Identification Defamatory words must refer to an ascertained or ascertainable person, and that person must be the plaintiff. Statements are not libelous unless they refer to an ascertained or ascertainable person. However, the obnoxious writing need not mention the libeled party by name. It is sufficient if it is shown that the offended party is the person meant or alluded to. All but one of the subject articles explicitly mention the name of petitioner Yuchengco. That one article, nevertheless chided the owners of RCBC. 4th Element: Malice Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. It is present when it is shown that the author of the libelous remarks made such remarks with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof. There are two types of malice malice in law and malice in fact. Malice in law is a presumption of law. It is also known as constructive malice, legal malice, or implied malice. On the other hand, malice in fact is a positive desire and intention to annoy and injure. It may denote that the defendant was actuated by ill will or personal spite. It is also called express malice, actual malice, real malice, true malice, or particular malice. In this jurisdiction, malice in law is provided in RPC Art. 3545. There is a presumption of malice in the case of every defamatory imputation, where there is no showing of a good intention or justifiable motive for making such imputation, except for qualifiedly (or, much more, absolutely) privileged communications. In the case at bar the publication of the subject articles was attended by actual malice. Manila Chronicle failed to show that they had any good intention and justifiable motive for composing and publishing the vicious and malicious accusations against Yuchengco. In order to be considered as fair commentaries on matters of public interest, the individual to whom the defamatory articles were imputed should either be a public officer or a public figure whomYuchengco is not.

Heirs of Simon v. Elvin Chan - McgyverDoria Facts: In 1997, Eduardo Simon was charged in Manila with the violation of BP 22 for issuing a Landbank check to Elvin Chan worth 336k in 1996 Three years later, Elvin Chan filed an action for collection of money against Simon Simon filed an urgent Motion to Dismiss with application to change his attachment bond for damages on the ground of litis pendentia as a consequence of another action between parties for the same cause (the criminal case) Motion was granted by Pasay MCTC. RTC upheld the dismissal of the civil action. CA overturned RTC decision.

Issue:

w/n Chans civil action to recover the amount of the bounced c heck is an independent civil action

Held: No, the SC applied the new circular 57-97 re: BP 22, specifically, the rule that the criminal action for violations of BP 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized.

Although the circular was not yet in effect when Chan commenced his civil case, it is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws do not violate any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable because, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws.

Art. 354.Requirement of publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases: (1) A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and (2) A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.

Any new rules may validly be made to apply to cases pending at the time of their promulgation, considering that no party to an action has a vested right in the rules of procedure, except that in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than what is required at the time of the commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity would be unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the Constitution

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Furthermore, for litispendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary: (a) identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and, (c) identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in respect of the other.

Absent the first two requisites, the possibility of the existence of the third becomes nil. A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and Criminal Case No. 275381 ineluctably shows that all the elements of litispendentia are attendant. First of all, the parties in the civil action involved in Criminal Case No. 275381 and in Civil Case No. 915-00, that is, Chan and Simon, are the same. Secondly, the information in Criminal Case No. 275381 and the complaint in Civil Case No. 915-00 both alleged that Simon had issued Landbank Check No. 0007280 worth P336,000.00 payable to cash, thereby indicating that the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for, as well as the facts upon which the reliefs sought were founded, were identical in all respects. And, thirdly, any judgment rendered in one case would necessarily bar the other by res judicata; otherwise, Chan would be recovering twice upon the same claim. Capuno v. Pepsi Cola - JyrineEnteria CAPUNO V PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES MAKALINTAL; April 30, 1965 FACTS The case arose from the collision of a Pepsi delivery truck driven by Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno that caused the death of Capuno and the Spouses Buan. Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence in the CFI of Pampanga. The information was subsequently amended to include claims for damages by the heirs of the three victims. While the criminal case was pending, the Intestate Estate of the Buan spouses and their heirs filed a civil action, also for damages, in the CFI of Tarlac against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi. Included in the complaint was a claim for indemnity in the sum of P2,623.00 allegedly paid by the Estate to the heirs of Capuno under the Workmen's Compensation Act. In the criminal case both the heirs of Capuno and the Estate of were represented by their respective counsel as private prosecutors: Attorney Ricardo Y. Navarro and Attorneys Jose W. Diokno and Augusto M. Ilagan.

In view of the filing of the civil action the accused Jon Elordi moved to strike out the appearances of these private prosecutors in the criminal case. Grounds for the motion were (1) that as the Capuno heirs were concerned, they no longer had any interest to protect in the criminal case since they had already claimed and received compensation for the death of their decedent; and (2) that on the part of the Estate of Buan its right to intervene in said case had been abated by the civil action. The appearance and intervention of Attorneys Diokno and Ilagan was disallowed by the Court and that of Attorney Navarro was disallowed in an amending order. No appeal was taken from either of the two orders. The parties in the civil case entered into a "Compromise and Settlement." For P290,000.00 the Buan Estate gave up its claims for damages, including the claim for reimbursement of the sum of P2,623.00 previously paid to the heirs of Capuno "under the Workmen's Compensation Act." The Court approved the compromise and accordingly dismissed the case. At that time the criminal case was still pending; judgment was rendered wherein the accused Elordi was acquitted of the charges against him. Prior thereto, herein appellants commenced a civil action for damages against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi. This is the action which, upon appellees' motion, was dismissed by the Court a quo in its order of February 29, 1960, from which order the present appeal has been taken. The grounds upon which appellees based their motion for dismissal and which the Court found to be "well taken" were; (1) that the action had already prescribed; and (2) that appellees had been released from appellants' claim for damages by virtue of the payment to the latter of the sum of P2,623.00 by the Buan Estate under the Workmen's Compensation Act, which sum, in turn, was sought to be recovered by the said Estate from appellees in Civil Case No. 838 but finally settled by them in their compromise.

ISSUE WON the action had already prescribed. RULING YES. - There can be no doubt that the present action is one for recovery of damages based on a quasi-delict, which action must be instituted within four (4) years (Article 1146, Civil Code). - Appellants originally sought to enforce their claim ex-delicto, that is, under the provisions of the Penal Code, when they intervened in the criminal case against Jon Elordi. The information therein, it may be recalled, was amended precisely to include an allegation concerning damages suffered by the heirs of the victims of the accident for which Elordi was being prosecuted. - But appellants' intervention was subsequently disallowed and they did not appeal from the Court's order to the effect. - And when they commenced the civil action on September 26, 1958 the criminal case was still pending, showing that appellants then chose to pursue the remedy afforded by

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the Civil Code, for otherwise that action would have been premature and in any event would have been concluded by the subsequent judgment of acquittal in the criminal case. - In filing the civil action as they did appellants correctly considered it as entirely independent of the criminal action, pursuant to Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code, which read: ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. - The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 includes bodily injuries causing death. In other words, the civil action for damages could have been commenced by appellants immediately upon the death of their decedent, Cipriano Capuno, and the same would not have been stayed by the filing of the criminal action for homicide through reckless imprudence. But the complaint here was filed only on September 26, 1958, or after the lapse of more than five years. - The foregoing considerations dispose of appellants' contention that the four-year period of prescription in this case was interrupted by the filing of the criminal action against Jon Elordi inasmuch as they had neither waived the civil action nor reserved the right to institute it separately. Such reservation was not then necessary; without having made it they could file as in fact they did a separate civil action even during the pendency of the criminal case; and consequently, as held in Paulan v. Sarabia, supra, "the institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict." - As to whether or not Rule 111, Section 2, of the Revised Rules of Court which requires the reservation of the right to institute a separate and independent civil action in the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34, and 2177 of the Civil Code affects the question of prescription, the said rule does not apply in the present case. DISPOSITION The order appealed from was affirmed, without costs. CORPUS v PAJE - Escalona Capistrano, J. 1969 A Victory Liner bus driven by Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and in physical injuries to 2 other persons An information for homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed against Paje. Right to file a separate civil action for damages was reserved. RTC found Paje guilty; he appealed in the CA. While his appeal was pending, Marcia's heirs filed a separate civil action for damages based on reckless imprudence against Paje and Victory Liner

CA subsequently acquitted Paje, finding that the collision was a case of pure accident; thus reckless imprudence didnt exist. Paje and Victory filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was barred by the acquittal. RTC denied motion. Defendants then asked to rule on their special defense that plaintiffs' cause of action based upon a quasi-delict had prescribed considering that the complaint was brought 4 years and 11 months after the collision (i.e., beyond 4yr prescription pd under 1144). RTC dismissed the complaint on this ground.

ISSUE: WON dismissal was correct Yes. It prescribed; was barred by acquittal. SC: Pajes acquittal was a bar to the civil action for damages, the action being upon the same criminal negligence of which Paje was acquitted o Chantangco vs. Abaroa - a verdict of acquittal must carry with it exemption from civil responsibility. Criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 which authorizes the institution of an independent civil action. o Said article mentions only defamation, fraud, and physical injuries Although in Dyogi, et al. vs. Yatco, the Court held that the term "physical injuries" used in article 33 includes homicide,the charge against Paje was for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, and not for homicide and physical injuries. In People vs. Buan. J.B.L. Reyes said that the "offense of criminal negligence under RPC 365 lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. " It is, therefore, clear that the charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide but for reckless imprudence, that is, criminal negligence resulting in homicide and double physical injuries. As reckless imprudence/ criminal negligence is not mentioned in Article 33, there is no independent civil action for damages that may be instituted in connectionwith said offense. Hence, homicide through reckless imprudence or criminal negligence comes under the general rule that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal action is a bar to his civil liability based upon the same criminal act notwithstanding that the injured party reservedhis right to institute a separate civil action (Chantangco vs. Abaroa) Assuming, arguendo, that the civil action for damages was based upon a quasidelict,the RTCs finding that the action had prescribed is correct.The four-year prescriptive period began to run from the day the quasi-delict was committed

Footnotes (Justices opinion on Art 33 controversy, as member of the Code Commission)

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The holding in Dyogi, et al. vs. Yatco that the term "physical injuries" used in Article 33 includes homicide or murder, is contrary to the letter and spirit of the law. Chairman Bocobo: In America the injured party in crime has the initiative, through his lawyer he immediately files a civil action for damages against the offender. In the Philippines the offended party depends upon the fiscal to demand in the criminal action the damages he has suffered. I think it is about time to educate our people the American way by giving the injured party in crime the initiative to go to court through his lawyer to demand damages, and for this purpose we should give him an independent civil action for damages. Let us begin with just three crimes which are of common occurrence, namely, defamation, fraud, and physical injuries. Physical Injuries is to be understood in its ordinary meaning and does not include homicide or murder because where physical injuries result in homicide or murder, the reason for the law (namely, to give the injured party personally the initiative to demand damages by an independent civil action) ceases, for the reason that a dead person can no longer personally, through his lawyer institute an independent civil action for damages. In the RPC, homicide is treated in Title Eight (Crimes Against Persons), Chapter One (Destruction of life), while physical injuries is separately treated in Chapter Two. This shows that the two crimes are distinct from each other, that physical injuries is not included in homicide. Bonite v. Zosa - JR Fullecido

57. The court dismissed the complaint for damages by reason of res adjudicata

ISSUES: (1) WON the independent civil actions for damages, under Article 29 of the Civil Code, is deemed barred petitioners' failure in the criminal action to make a reservation to file a separate civil action and by their active participation in the prosecution of such criminal action. HELD: YES RATIO: 1. When the accused in a criminal case is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may still be instituted against him, and only a preponderance of evidence is required to hold the accused liable. The civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal of the accused, where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt. Article 29 action requires only a preponderance of evidence. As this is the case, the guilt of the respondent was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, thus, petitioners have the right to file an independent civil action for damages Another basis that can be used is Article 2176 a. Acquittal of the accused from a charge of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, is not a bar to a subsequent civil action for recovery of civil liability, arising not from criminal negligence, but from a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. b. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed to recover damages on both scores Article 33 will not apply a. Article 29 of the Civil Code does not state that the right to file an independent civil action for damages (under said article) can be availed of only in offenses not arising from a tortious act. The only requisite set forth therein for the exercise of the right to file a civil action for damages is that the accused must have been acquitted in the criminal action based on reasonable doubt. b. Article 33 of the Civil Code assumes a defamation, fraud, or physical injuries 11 intentionally committed. The death of the deceased in the case at bar was alleged to be the result of criminal negligence

2. 3. 4.

Padilla Nature: Petition for Certiorari assailing the decision of CA which affirmed the denial of the RTC of the petitioners motion to dismiss. Facts: 51. while Florencio Bonite was working as "caminero" of the Bureau of Public Highways in Barrio Vicente Alto (Dagatan), Oroquieta City, 52. he was hit by a truck driven by private respondent, as a result of which, Bonite died on that same day. 53. An information for reckless imprudence was filed by the surviving heir agains thte respondent 54. Petitioners, though their counsel Atty. Dulalas, as private prosecutor, actively participated in the prosecution of the criminal case 55. The court acquitted Abamonga for failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt 56. Petitioners filed an action for recovery of damages 5.

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Dulay v. Court of Appeals- Hernandez Bidin, J. Keywords: Barilansa Big Bang saAlabang; liability of company for a criminal act done deliberately while on duty

motion for exclusion. CAAffirmed.

ISSUE WoN Maria Dulay has cause of action against Safeguard and/or Superguard to hold them liable for the criminal act of Torzuela.

FACTS HELD YES. An altercation occurred between Atty. Napoleon Dulay (deceased) and BenignoTorzuela, the security guard on duty, and the latter shot and killed Atty. Dulay with a .38 caliber revolver belonging to his employers, Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc. (Safeguard) and/or Superguard Security Corp. (Superguard) Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased, filed an action for damages against BenignoTorzuela, Safeguard and Superguard (as alternative defendants) o The complaint alleged that the incident was due to the concurring negligence Torzuelas wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm issued to him Safeguard and/or Superguards failure to exercise the diligence of a good father in the supervision and control of its employee o Maria Dulay prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Superguard filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state a valid cause of action. Safeguard also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the ground that defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees. Maria Dulay opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action is based upon their liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code: o The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or an industry. xxx Meanwhile, an Information, charging BenignoTorzuela with homicide,was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. RTC Judge Rginogranted Safeguards motion to dismiss and Superguards

RATIO Although Torzuela is being prosecuted for homicide, Maria Dulay still has the right to file in independent civil action to recover damages for the fatal shooting of Atty. Dulay. o Section 1, of Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure6 that a civil action may be separately instituted when the party expressly reserves the right to do so or when it is instituted prior to the criminal action. o Yakult Philippines v. Court of Appeals: The filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of express reservation. This is precisely what the Maria Dulay opted to do. However, the Safeguard and/or Superguard opposed the civil action on the ground that the same is founded on a delict and not on a quasi-delict as the shooting was not attended by negligence. There is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code7 to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. o Elcano v. Hill (echoed by Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court):"Fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character. A separate civil action

6Sec.

1.Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action , reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
7Art.

2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

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lies against the offender, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed to recover damages on both scores. Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the Civil Code8 applies only to injuries intentionally committed9 and that the actions for damages allowed thereunder are ex-delicto. o Physical injuries is discussed in jurisprudence, to wit: It includes bodily injuries causing death10. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide.11 o Marcia V. CA: No independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence. However, since Torzuela is charged with homicide, and not with reckless imprudence, a civil action based on Article 33 lies. Safeguard and/or Superguard further contend that they are not liable for Torzuela'sact which is beyond the scope of his duties as a security guard. And their liability (if any) would only be subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code. Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court: Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code12when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law thatthere was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. o The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee.13 Therefore, it is incumbent upon Safeguar and/or Superguard to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee. [Side issue] Whether the complaint states a sufficient cause of action o General rule: allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance

with the prayer therein. Elements of a cause of action: A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and An act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. The Court finds, that the complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable breach on the part of the defendant Torzuela and Safeguard and/or Superguard. o This does not operate however, to establish that the defendants below are liable. Such question would be better resolved after trial on the merits. o

DAMAGES
I. THE CONCEPT OF DAMAGES

II. ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES

1. Custodio v. Court of Appeals (Abdon) 6 Feb 1996 J. Regalado

FACTS: Plaintiff (herein private respondent survived by his spouse and children) Mabasa purchased an apartment with tenants occupying the premises. When sometime one of the tenants vacated the apartment, Mabasa went to his property and saw that one of the neighbors built an adobe fence in her property, in effect closing one of the two passageways connecting the apartment to the main road. The remaining tenants vacated the area. Defendant Ma. Cristina Santos defended the fence on her property, since there were several incidents with the tenants that inconvenienced her and her daughter. Thus, Mabasa filed for an easement of right of way against defendants. Lower court: Easement granted, defendants will provide plaintiff with permanent access to the public street, and the plaintiff will pay the defendants an indemnity for the use of the passageway.

8Art.

33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. 9 Marcia v. CA 10Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines 11Madeja v. Caro 12Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or an industry. 13Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado

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Mabasa was not satisfied with the decision and she raised the error that the lower court did not award damages in her favor. Upon appeal Court of appeals: Affirmed trial court decision but additionally awarded P65,000 actual damages, P30,000 moral damages, P10,000 exemplary damages. Defendants appealed decision to the SC.

Underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. In order that the law will give redress for the act causing damage, it must not only be hurtful, it must be wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria.

ISSUE: 1. W/N right of way granted is proper 2. W/N award of damages is in order

In the case, there was damage but no injury. It is within the rights of the owners of the property under Art. 430 to enclose and fence their property. At the time of enclosure of the passageway there was no existing easement, as proven by the court granting one. Thus, prior to the decision, the petitioner was well within his rights to fence his property since no easement existed yet. The proper exercise of a legal right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie.

HELD: 1. Yes 2. No. 2. Reynalda Gatchalian v. Aresenio Delim and Court of Appeals (Adorna) 21 Oct 1991 J. Feliciano RATIO: 1. Petitioners are barred from raising this issue as they did not appeal the Facts: judgment of the lower court on this ground, hence they are presumed to be satisfied. 1. 2. 2. Award of damages has no legal basis. CA awarded damages based solely on the fact that original plaintiff incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the premises. 3. 4. Gatchalian boarded a mini-bus owned by DeLim from Aringay to Bauang, La Union. While on the road, the passengers heard a snapping sound which the driver dismissed as normal. Subsequently, the bus went off the road and turned turtle, causing injuries to the passengers including petitioner lacerated wound on the forehead, abrasions to other body parts. Gatchalian and the other passengers were visited by DeLims wife in the hospital. The latter: a. Paid for their medical expenses b. Gave transportation allowance to Gatchalian c. Asked all the victims to sign a waiver which they did: we are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil, against the said driver and owner because it was an accident and the said driver and ownerhave gone to the extent of helping us be treated upon our injuries

However, mere fact that plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to right to recover damages. To recover damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by defendant, and damage resulting to plaintiff therefrom.

Injury is different from damage. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation for the damage suffered. There can be damage without injury, when loss is not the result of the violation of a legal duty. These are known as damnum absque injuria.

Action: Extra Contractu to recover compensatory and moral damages. 1. Grounds: Her injuries left an obvious scar which generated mental suffering and inferiority complex. Also, that she was denied employment opportunities.

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2.

Amount: P10K for loss of employment, P10K for cost of plastic surgery to remove scar, P30K for moral damages, and P1K for attorneys fees.

Attorney Fees: P1K as requested (Court considered this modest) 6% interest from date of judgment

Issue: 1. WON the waiver was binding so as to relieve the bus company of liability. 2. WON damages were appropriate. 3. Oceaneering Contractors (Phils), Inc. v. Nestor Barreto, doing business as N.N.B. Lighterage (Brillo) 09 Feb 2011 J. Perez Held: #1 Bus Company Liability 1. The Court applied the ruling in Yepes and Susaya v. Samar Express Transit in holding that the waiver was not couched in clear and unequivocal terms. Moreover, the circumstances under which the waiver was signed leave doubt as to the intention of Gatchalian to sign it (she was still dizzy from her injuries and signed without reading it entirely). Bus company is required to exercise extraordinary diligence of a common carrier a. Waiver must be construed strictly against the company b. Statutory presumption that the bus company was at fault if injuries or death were caused by the accident. Even if no express finding of fault or negligence, bus company is liable. c. Bus company must overcome presumption by showing proof that it exercised extraordinary diligence, which in this case it did not (driver ignored the unusual sound). FACTS: Doing business under the name and style of N.N. B. Lighterage, Nestor N. Barretto is the owner of the Barge "Antonieta" (last licensed and permitted to engage in coastwise trading for 1 year expiring on Aug 21 98) Nov 27 97: Barretto and Oceaneering Contractors (Phils.), Inc. entered into a Time Charter Agreement whereby, for P306,000, the latter hired the aforesaid barge for a renewable period of 30 calendar days, for transporting construction materials from Manila to Ayungon, Negros Oriental. Brokered by freelance ship broker Manuel Velasco, the agreement included Oceaneering's acknowledgment of the seaworthiness of the barge as well as the ff stipulations: a) Barreto shall be responsible for the salaries, subsistence, SSS premium, medical, workmen's compensation contribution and other legal expenses of the crew; b) Oceaneering shall be responsible for all port charges, insurance of all equipments, cargo loaded to the above mentioned deck barge against all risks (Total or Partial), or theft, security and stevedoring during loading and unloading operations and all other expenses pertinent to the assessment, fines and forfeiture for any violation that may be imposed in relation to the operation of the barge; f) Delivery and re-delivery be made in Pasig River, Metro Manila; g) Damage to deck barge caused by carelessness or negligence of stevedores hired by Oceaneering will be Oceaneering's liability. Upon clear findings by owners or barge patron of any damages to the barge that will endanger its seaworthiness and stability, such damage/s shall be repaired first before loading and leaving port. Under such conditions, the Barge Patron has the right to refuse loading and/or leaving port; i) Barreto reserves the right to stop, abort and deviate any voyage in case of imminent danger to the crew and/or vessel that may be occasioned by any storm, typhoon, tidal wave or any similar events. In accordance w/ the agreement, Oceaneering's hired stevedores who loaded the barge with pipe piles, steel bollards, concrete mixers, gravel, sand, cement and other construction materials in the presence of and under the direct supervision of the broker Manuel Velasco and Barretto's Bargemen.

2.

#2 Nature of Damages (main issue for this section of the syllabus) 1. 2. 3. Loss of employment Gatchalian failed to prove that she had lost employment opportunities because at the time of the accident, she was unemployed and only had occasional jobs as a substitute teacher. Plastic Surgery a person is entitled to physical integrity of the body, actual or compensatory damages are assessable if there is injury thereto. Gives rise to an obligation to restore to the prior condition (conditio ante). Moral damages awarded when there is gross negligence on the part of the common carrier, which was shown in this case.

Amounts awarded Actual and compensatory: Surgery P15K (Gatchalian estimated P10-15K, doctor witness estimated P5-10K). Moral damages: P30K (considering extent of pain and anxiety, and the permanent scar suffered)

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In addition to the polythene ropes with which they were lashed, the cargoes were secured by steel stanchions which Oceaneering caused to be welded on the port and starboard sides of the barge. Dec 3 97: barge left Manila for Negros Oriental, towed by the tug-boat "Ayalit" w/c was likewise chartered by Oceaneering from Lea Mer Industries, Inc. Dec 5:Barretto's Bargeman, Eddie La Chica, executed a Marine Protest, reporting the ff circumstances under which the barge reportedly capsized in the vicinity of Cape Santiago, Batangas: While underway on or about 0245 Dec 4, 1997 encountered rough sea at the vicinity of Cape Santiago, Batangas and made the barge roll and pitch which caused the steel pipes and various construction materials to shift on the starboardside causing the breakdown of the steel stanchions welded on the deck of the barge leaving holes on the deck that caused water to enter the hold. (nagkabutaskasinaguloyung pipes) 1529 Dec 5:, w/ the continuous entrance of sea water on the hold, the barge totally capsized touched bottom (i think lumubognasiya) Dec 9 97: Barretto apprised Oceaneering of the mishap caused by the incompetence and negligence of the latter's personnel in loading the cargo and that it was going to proceed with the salvage, refloating and repair of the barge. Oceaneering caused its counsel to serve Barretto a lette r (Mar 12 98), demanding the return of the unused portion of the charter payment amounting to P224,400 as well as the expenses in the sum of P125,000 it purportedly incurred in salvaging its construction materials contending that the barge tilted bec. of the water which seeped through a hole in its hull Mar 25 98 letter: Barretto's counsel informed Oceaneering that its unused charter payment was withheld by his client who was likewise seeking reimbursement for the P836,425 he expended in salvaging, refloating and repairing the barge. In response to Barretto's 29 Jun 29 98 formal demand for the payment of the same expenses, Oceaneering reiterated its demand. Oct 6 98: Barretto commenced the instant suit with the filing of his complaint for damages against Oceaneering, in RTC Las Pias City. Barretto sought indemnities for expenses incurred and lost income in the aggregate sum of P2,750,792.50 and atty's fees equivalent to 25% of said sum accident was attributable to the incompetence and negligence which attended the loading of the cargo by Oceaneering's hired employees Oceaneering prayed for the grant of its counterclaims for the value of its cargo in the sum of P4,055,700, salvaging expenses in the sum of P125,000, exemplary damages, atty's fees and litigation expenses. accident was caused by the negligence of Barretto's employees and the dilapidated hull of the barge which rendered it unseaworthy Barettos witnesses and their testimonies: Barretto: to prove the seaworthiness of the barge as well as the alleged negligent loading of the cargo by Oceaneering's employees. ToribioBarretto II: VP for Operations of N.B.B. Lighterage: effort exerted to salvage the barge; Manuel Velasco: his participation in the execution of the Time Charter Agreement as well as the circumstances before and after the sinking of the barge

Recalled as a rebuttal witness, ToribioBarretto: the hull of the barge was not damaged and that the sinking of said vessel was attributable to the improper loading of Oceaneering's construction materials Oceaneeringstestimonies of the following witnesses: (a) Engr. WenifredoOracion: its Operation's Manager, to prove the value of the cargo and the salvage operation it conducted (b) Maria Flores Escao: Accounting Staff at Castillo Laman Tan Pantaleon and San Jose Law Offices, to prove its claim for atty's fees and litigation expenses. To disprove the rough sea supposedly encountered by the barge as well as the negligence imputed against its employees: (a) Rosa Barba, a Senior Weather Specialist at the PAGASA, (b) Cmdr. Herbert Catapang, Officer-inCharge of the Hydrographic Division at the Natl Mapping Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA); and, (c) Engr. Carlos Gigante, a freelance marine surveyor and licensed naval architect. Upon the formal offer respectively made by the parties, the pieces of documentary evidence identified and marked in the course of the testimonies of the witnesses were, accordingly, admitted by the RTC. RTC (Dec 27, 2005): dismissed both complaint and counterclaims for lack of merit. Barretto failed to adduce sufficient and convincing evidence to prove that the accident was due to the negligence of Oceaneering's employees brushed aside Oceaneering's claim that the barge was not seaworthy as acknowledged in the Time Charter Agreement Alongside its claim for reimbursement of the sums expended for the salvage operation it conducted w/c was denied for lack of evidence to prove the same, Oceaneering's claim for the value of its cargo was likewise denied not included in the demand letters it served Barretto it has no one but itself to blame for failing to insure its cargo against all risks, as provided in the parties' agreement Oceaneerings claims for exemplary damages and atty's fees further denied for lack of showing of bad faith on the part of Barretto Oceaneering motion for partial reconsideration - denied for lack of merit (Apr 28, 2006) Oceaneering perfected its appeal from the aforesaid 27 December 2005 decision CA (Dec 12, 2007): appeal partially granted agreement executed by the parties, by its express terms, was a time charter where the possession and control of the barge was retained by Barretto the latter is, therefore, a common carrier legally charged w/ extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by him the sinking of the vessel created a presumption of negligence and/or unseaworthiness which Barretto failed to overcome and gave rise to his liability for Oceaneering's lost cargo despite the latter's failure to insure the same. Applying the rule, however, that actual damages should be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty, CA denied Oceaneering's claim for the value of its lost cargo and merely ordered the refund of the P306K it paid for the time charter, with indemnity for atty's fees of P30K.

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MR (by both) denied for lack of merit (Aug 11 2008) Hence, this petition.

ISSUES: (1) W/N there was no valid documents showing the real value of the materials lost and those actually recovered? No, there were vouchers and receipts (2) W/N Oceaneeringss counterclaims for actual damages (amounting to (a) P 3, 704, 700 representing the value of the materials it lost due to the sinking of the barge and (b) P125, 000 representing the expenses it insured for salvaging its cargo should awarded? Yes to materials but only P2,226,620. No to salvaging expenses (3) W/N Oceaaneerings award for attys fees was correctly reduced to P30,000 only?No, there should be none HELD: We find the modification of the assailed decision in order. RATIO: Oceaneering: having determined Barretto's liability for presumed negligence as a common carrier, CA erred in disallowing its counterclaims for the value of the construction materials lost as a consequence of the sinking of the barge. Alongside the testimony elicited from its Operation's Manager, Engr. WinifredoOracion, Oceaneering calls attention to the same witness' inventory which pegged the value of said construction materials at P4,055,700 as well as the various sales receipts, order slips, cash vouchers and invoices which were formally offered before and admitted in evidence by the RTC. it should be indemnified the sum of P3,703,700 for the value of the lost cargo, with legal interest at 12% PA, from the date of demand until fully paid considering that it was able to salvage only nine steel pipes amounting to P351,000 Barretto should be held liable to refund the P306,000 it paid as consideration for the Time Charter Agreement and to pay the P125,000 it incurred by way of salvaging expenses as well as its claim for atty's fees in the sum of P750,000 Actual or compensatory damages are those damages which the injured party is entitled to recover for the wrong done and injuries received when none were intended. Pertaining as they do to such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of measurement, they areintended to put the injured party in the position in which he was before he was injured. Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages. There must be pleading and proof of actual damages suffered for the same to be recovered. In addition to the fact that the amount of loss must be capable of proof, it must also be actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or the best evidence obtainable. The burden of proof of the damage suffered is, consequently, imposed on the party claiming the samewho should adduce the best evidence available in

support thereof, like sales and delivery receipts, cash and check vouchers and other pieces of documentary evidence of the same nature. In the absence of corroborative evidence, it has been held that self-serving statements of account are not sufficient basis for an award of actual damages. Corollary to the principle that a claim for actual damages cannot be predicated on flimsy, remote, speculative, and insubstantial proof, courts are, likewise, required to state the factual bases of the award. (1 and 2): Oceaneering correctly fault the CA for not granting its claim for actual damages or, more specifically, the portions thereof which were duly pleaded and adequately proved before the RTC. While concededly not included in the demand letters dated Mar 12 and Jul 13 98 Oceaneering served Barretto, the former's counterclaims for the value of its lost cargo of P4,055,700 and salvaging expenses of P125,000 were distinctly pleaded and prayed for in the Jan 26 99 answer it filed a quo. Rather than the entire P4,055,700 worth of construction materials reflected in the inventory which Engr. Oracion claims to have prepared on Nov 29 97, based on the delivery and official receipts from Oceaneering's suppliers, we are, however, inclined to grant only the ff items which were duly proved by the vouchers and receipts on record (a) P1,720,850 worth of spiral welded pipes with coal tar epoxy procured on Nov 22 97 (b) P629,640 worth of spiral welded steel pipes procured on Oct 28 97 (c) P155,500 worth of various stainless steel materials procured on Nov 27 97 (d) P66,750 worth of gaskets and shackles procured on Nov 20 97 (e) P4,880 worth of anchor bolt procured on Nov 27 97 The foregoing sums all add up to of P2,577,620 from which should be deducted the sum of P351,000 representing the value of the nine steel pipes salvaged by Oceaneering, or a total of P2,226,620 in actual damages representing the value of the latter's lost cargo. (OMG! MATH! :)))) Excluded from the computation are the ff items w/c, on account of the dates of their procurement, could not have possibly been included in the Nov 29 97 inventory prepared by Engr. Oracion: (a) P1,129,640 worth of WO#1995 and PO#OCPI-060-97 procured on Dec 9 97 (b) P128,000 worth of bollard procured on Dec 16 97 Likewise excluded are the anchor bolt with nut Oceaneering claims to have procured for an unspecified amount on Nov 3, 1997 and the P109,018.50 worth of Petron oil it procured on Nov 28 97 which does not fit into the categories of lost cargo and/or salvaging expenses for which it interposed counterclaims a quo. Although included in its demand letters and pleaded in its answer, Oceaneering's claim for salvaging expenses of P125,000 cannot, likewise, be granted for lack of credible evidence to support the same. Tested alongside the twin requirements of pleading and proof for the grant of actual damages, on the other hand, CA also erred in awarding the full amount of P306,000 in favor of Oceaneering, as and by way of refund of the consideration it paid Barretto for the Time Charter Agreement. Aside from not being clearly pleaded in the answer it filed a quo, said refund was claimed in Oceaneering's demand letters only to the extent of the unused charter

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payment in the reduced sum of P224,400 which, to our mind, should be the correct measure of the award. INTEREST: Having breached an obligation which did not constitute a loan or forbearance of money, Barretto can only be held liable for interest at the rate of 6% per annum on said amount as well as the P2,226,620 value of the lost cargo (instead of 12%) Although the lost cargo was not included in the demand letter, said interest rate of 6% PA shall be imposed from the time of the filing of the complaint which is equivalent to a judicial demand. Upon the finality of this decision, said sums shall earn a further interest of 12% PA until full payment in accordance with the ff pronouncements handed down in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. CA "2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, CC) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date of the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount of finally adjudged. 3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under par. 1 or par. 2, above, shall be 12% PA from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit." ATTYS FEES: NO For lack of sufficient showing of bad faith on the part of Barretto, we find that the CA, finally, erred in granting Oceaneering's claim for attorney's fees, albeit in the much reduced sum of P30,000 In the absence of stipulation, after all, the rule is settled that there can be no recovery of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation other than judicial costs except in the instances enumerated under Article 2208 of the Civil Code. Being the exception rather than the rule, attorney's fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit, in view of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorney's fees may not be awarded where, as here, no sufficient showing of bad faith can be reflected in the party's persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause. DISPOSITIVE: Petition PARTIALLY GRANTED. CAMODIFIED: (a) to GRANTOceaneering's claim for the value of its lost cargo in the sum of P2,226,620 with 6% interest PA computed from the filing of the complaint and to earn further interest at the rate of 12% PA from finality of the decision until full payment; (b) to REDUCE the refund of the consideration for the Time Charter Agreement from P306,000 to P224,400,

with 6% interest per annum computed from Mar 12 98, likewise to earn further interest at the rate of 12% PA from finality of this decision; and, (c) to DELETE the CA's award of salvaging expenses and atty's fees, for lack of factual and legal basis. The rest is AFFIRMED in toto. 4. PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. CA and Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation (Buhangin) 08 Oct 1998 J. Romero Facts: 1. On September 21, 1977, the M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corp., was navigating the waters in Batangas when it collided with the Petroparcel, owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corp (later substituted by the PNOC). After the Board of Marine Inquiry conducted and concluded its investigation, the Philippine Cost Guard determined that it was the Petroparcels fault. After unsuccessful demands, private respondent sued Luzon Stevedoring as well as the captain of the Petroparcel, praying for the award (P692,680.00) of the value of the fishing nets, boat equipment, and cargo of the M/V Maria Efigenia XV. The complaint was successively amended, including revising the actual value of the M/V Maria Efigenia XV. The lower court ruled in favor of herein private respondent, ordering PNOC to pay P6,438,048.00 representing the value of the fishing boat from the date of the filing of the complaint with interest at 6% per annum. The valuation was based on the testimony and evidence presented by private respondents sole witness, Edilberto del Rosario. The lower court mentioned that PNOCs senior estimator did not provide documentary evidence to support herein petitioners position. After the Motion for Reconsideration was denied, the PNOC elevated the matter to the CA, which affirmed the lower courts ruling, saying that there is no need to qualify Del Rosario as witness since it was well within his knowledge and competency to identify and determine the equipment installed and the cargoes loaded on the vessel.

2. 3.

4.

5.

Issue: WON the valuation for damages was correct and proven.

Held: No, the testimony of private respondents sole witness, Del Rosario, who also owns the company, was not backed up by the preponderance of evidence required by law. The high court determined that the evidence presented by Del Rosario was inadequate to grant private respondent the actual damages confirmed by the lower court. Nonetheless, the SC agrees with the lower court that private respondent is entitled to damages. But for lack of evidentiary bases, the SC modified the lower court ruling, awarding private respondent with P2,000,000.00 as and for nominal damages.

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Ratio: Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong that has been done, to compensate for the injury inflicted and not to impose a penalty. In actions based on torts or quasi-delicts, actual damages include all the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. There are two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: one is the loss of what a person already possesses ( dao emergente), and the other is the failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him ( lucro cesante).

In arriving at the sum of P608,400, the CA applied the standard prescribed by Art. 194 of the Labor Code. It likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration of Candano Shipping in a resolution issued on April 1, 2004. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: WON the formula for fixing the amount of death compensation in Art. 194 of the Labor Code applies in determining the compensation claimed by the heir of the deceased employee against the employer under Art. 1711 of the civil code

HELD: Yes. Petition is denied. CA is affirmed.

To enable an injured party to recover actual or compensatory damages, he is required to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available. The burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence would be presented on either side. He must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence which means that the evidence, as a whole, adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. In other words, damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making an award must point out specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne.

The remedy availed by Florentina in filing the claim under the New Civil Code has been validly recognized by the prevailing jurisprudence. Floresca v. Philex Mining Company declared that the employees may invoke either the Workmen's Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance of the compensation under the remedy chosen will exclude the other remedy except on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy. This doctrinal rule is rooted on theory that the basis of compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act is separate and distinct from the award of damages under the Civil Code. In this case, Florentina instituted a civil suit for indemnity under the New Civil Code. The employer shall be liable for the death of personal injury of its employees in the course of employment as sanctioned by Art. 1711 of the Civil Code. The liability of the employer for death or personal injury of his employees arose from the contract of employment entered into between the employer and his employee which is likely imbued with public interest. Accordingly, when the employee died or was injured in the occasion of employment, the obligation of the employer automatically attaches. The indemnity may partake in the form of actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages, as the case may be. The provisions on damages of the New Civil Code must be transformed into a more tangible and practical mathematical form, so that the purpose of the law to indemnify the employee or his heirs for his death or injury occasioned by his employment under article 1711 may be realized. In regard to this, the formula for loss of earning capacity enunciated in the case of Villa Rey v. Court of Appeals, in computing the amount of actual damages to be awarded to the claimant under article 1711 of the New Civil Code is adopted in this case. Source: http://ustlawreview.com/pdf/cases/2007/March/Candano_Shipping_Lines_v._Sugata_o n.pdf 6. Spouses Zalamea v. CA (Buenaventura) G.R. No. 104235, November 18, 1993, 2nd Division, Nocon, J.

5. Candano Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Florentina J. Sugata-on (Celebrado) 13 Mar 2013 J. Chico-Nazario FACTS: On March 27, 1996, M/V David Jr., owned by Candano Shipping Lines, sank together with its cargo in Surigao del Sur. Melquiades Sugata-on employed by Candano Shipping Lines as third marine engineer in the cargo vessel was one of those missing. Florentina Sugata-on (respondent and widow of Melquiades Sugata-on), went to the office of Candano Shipping in Manila to claim the death benefits of her husband but it refused to pay. Thus, Florentina filed an action before the RTC of Manila. She prayed that actual, moral, and exemplary damages including attorney's fees, be awarded in her favor in view of the provision of Art. 1711 NCC. The RTC decided in favor of Florentina. Candano Shipping filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. It then elevated the RTC decision to the CA which affirmed with modification the judgment of RTC. The award for actual damages was reduced from P998,400 to P608,400, while the awards for moral and exemplary damages including attorney's fees were deleted for lack of sufficient basis for their allowance.

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FACTS: Petitioners-spouses Cesar C. Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana Zalamea, purchased three (3) airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. for a flight to New York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984. Liana Zalamea appeared as the No. 13 on the wait-list while the two other Zalameas were listed as "No. 34, showing a party of two." Out of the 42 names on the wait list, the first 22 names were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles, including petitioner Cesar Zalamea. The two others, on the other hand, at No. 34, being ranked lower than 22, were not able to fly. As it were, those holding full-fare tickets were given first priority among the wait-listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while his wife and daughter, who presented the discounted tickets were denied boarding. According to Mr. Zalamea, it was only later when he discovered the he was holding his daughter's full-fare ticket. Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter, could not be accommodated because it was also fully booked. Thus, they were constrained to book in another flight and purchased two tickets from American Airlines at a cost of Nine Hundred Eighteen ($918.00) Dollars. Upon their arrival in the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for damages based on breach of contract of air carriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. ISSUE: WON TWA breached its contract of carriage entitling Petitioners to damages? HELD: YES. In accordance with Article 2201, respondent TWA should, therefore, be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of its obligation. Ruling. That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did not allow petitioners to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets cannot be disputed. The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer service agent, in her deposition dated January 27, 1986 that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus, respondent court's finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact. Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which require that the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by the court where the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is

issued in such State by the defendant airline. Since the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be Philippine law. Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling the passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular flight, on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises, and the passenger has every right to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date. If he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage. Existing jurisprudence abounds with rulings where the breach of contract of carriage amounts to bad faith. Even on the assumption that overbooking is allowed, respondent TWA is still guilty of bad faith in not informing its passengers beforehand that it could breach the contract of carriage even if they have confirmed tickets if there was overbooking. Moreover, respondent TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its alleged policy of giving less priority to discounted tickets. It is respondent TWA's position that the practice of overbooking and the airline system of boarding priorities are reasonable policies, which when implemented do not amount to bad faith. But the issue raised in this case is not the reasonableness of said policies but whether or not said policies were incorporated or deemed written on petitioners' contracts of carriage. Respondent TWA failed to show that there are provisions to that effect. Neither did it present any argument of substance to show that petitioners were duly apprised of the overbooked condition of the flight or that there is a hierarchy of boarding priorities in booking passengers. It is evident that petitioners had the right to rely upon the assurance of respondent TWA, thru its agent in Manila, then in New York, that their tickets represented confirmed seats without any qualification. SOURCE: http://www.scribd.com/doc/139188530/Zalamea-Vs-CA

7. People vs Sarcia(Deslate) Sept. 10, 2009 5 year old AAA was playing in the yard of Saling Crisologo with her cousin and two other playmates, when Richard Sarcia invited her to go with him to the backyard. AAA's cousin followed them though Sarcia didn't know about it.

In the backyard, Sarcia removed AAA's shorts and underwear, ordered her to lie down on her back, removed his trousers and brief, lay on top of her, inserted his penis into her private organ, and made an up-and-down movement. AAA felt pain in her private part and stomach, and said "aray."

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Her cousin told AAA's mom about the incident but she only said that they were too young to talk about such things. When she bathed AAA later that day, AAA felt a grating sensation in her private part. AAA's cousin told her aunt again what appellant did earlier that day but the mom didn't say anything.

Appellant denies molesting girls, and claims that Salvacion Bobier, grandmother of Mae Christine Camu whose death was imputed to him, concocted and instigated the rape charge against him to make their murder case against him stronger.

justifiable ground to depart from the jurisprudential trend in the award of damages in the case of qualified rape, considering the compensatory nature of the award of civil indemnity and moral damages. This was the same stance this Court took in People v. Candelario, a case decided on July 28, 1999, which did not reduce the award of damages. At that time, the damages amounted to P75,000.00 for civil indemnity and P50,000.00 for moral damages, even if the public penalty imposed on the accused was lowered by one degree, because of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.

Appellant turned 18 in 1996, but since the exact date of the rape case could not be determined, it is not certain that the crime of rape was committed on or after he reached 18 years old in 1996. Issue: 1. w/n the award of damages should be reduced in view of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance14 of minority of the accused at the time the offense was committed 2. what damages must the accused pay to the victim?

The principal consideration for the award of damages, under the ruling in People v. Salome and People v. Quiachon is the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender. The litmus test therefore, in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.

It should be noted that while the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is still death and the offense is still heinous. Consequently, the civil indemnity for the victim is still P75,000.00.

Held: 1. NO. "Civil indemnity is in the nature of actual and compensatory damages for the injury caused to the offended party and that suffered by her family, and moral damages are likewise compensatory in nature. The fact of minority of the offender at the time of the commission of the offense has no bearing on the gravity and extent of injury15 caused to the victim and her family, particularly considering the circumstances attending this case.

2. The increased amount of P75,000.00 each as civil indemnity and moral damages should be maintained. It is also proper and appropriate that the award of exemplary damages be likewise increased to the amount ofP30,000.00 based on the latest jurisprudence on the award of damages on qualified rape. Thus, the CA correctly awarded P75,000.00 as civil indemnity. However the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages is increased to P75,000.00 and that of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is likewise increased to P30,000.00. NOTES ON DAMAGES from the case:

In any event, notwithstanding the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance16 of minority, which warrants the lowering of the public penalty by one degree, there is no

Moral damages Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed tocompensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.

14

Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. 15 Art. 107: Indemnification-What is included. Indemnification for consequential damages shall include not only those caused the injured party, but also those suffered by his family or by a third person by reason of the crime. 16 Art. 2204: in crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances

Exemplary damages Exemplary damages are not recoverable as a matter of right. The requirements of an award of exemplary damagees are: (1) they may be imposed by way of example in

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addition to compensatory damages, and only after the claimants right to them has been established; (2) they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant; (3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner. 8. Mercury Drug v. Huang (Domingo) FACTS: Petitioner Mercury Drug is the registered owner of a Mitsubishi truck, with petitioner del Rosario as driver. Respondents Richard and Carmen Huang are parents of the respondent Stephen Huang, who owned a Sedan. The two vehicles got into an accident as they were traversing a highway. The Sedan was on the left innermost lane while the truck was on the next lane to its right, when the latter swerved to its left and slammed in the front right side of the car. As a consequence, the car was wrecked and Stephen Huang incurred massive injuries and became paralyzed. The parents of Stephen faulted Del Rosario for committing gross negligence and reckless imprudence, and Mercury Drug for failing to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver. The RTC found the petitioners jointly and severally liable for damages. The damages awarded b the RTC are: 1. 2,973,000 for actual damages. 2. As compensatory damages: a) 23,461,062 for life care cost of Stephen b) 10,000,000 for lost of impaired earning capacity of Stephen 3. 4,000,000 as moral damages 4. 2,000,000 as exemplary damages 5. 1,000,000 as attorneys fees and litigation expenses. Petitioners went to the CA for appeal but were denied. However, CA reduced Moral damages to 1,000,000. Hence this appeal to the SC. WON Mercury Drug is liable as employer of Del Rosario. WON the award for damages was proper. Yes. Mercury Drug is jointly and solidarily liable with Del Rosario, as the employer of the latter. In order to be relieved of such liability, Mercury should show that it exercise the diligence of a good father of a family, both in the selection and supervision of the employee in the performance of his duties. Mercury failed in both respects.

In the case at bar, it was shown that Del Rosario didnt take driving tests and psychological exams when he applied for the position of a Truck Man. In addition, Mercury didnt present Del Rosarios NBI and police clearances. Next, the las t seminar attended b the driver occurred a long 12 years before the accident occurred. Lastly, Mercury didnt have a backup driver for long trips. When the accident happened, Del Rosario has been out on the road for more than 13 hours. 2. Yes. With regard to actual damages, Art 2199 of the NCC provides that: Except as provided b law or b stipulation one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered b him as he has duly proved. In the instant case, the actual damages claimed b Respondents were supported b receipts from hospital expenses, medicines, medical services and supplies and nursing care services. Petitioners are also liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. For the rest of his life, Stephen will need continuous rehabilitation and therapy to prevent further complications such as pneumonia, bladder and rectum infection, renal failure, sepsis and severe bed sores, osteoporosis and fractures, and other spinal cord injury-related conditions. He will be completely dependent on the care and support of his family. The Court therefore affirm the award of P23,461,062 for the life care cost of respondent Stephen Huang, based on his average monthly expense and the actuarial computation of the remaining years that he is expected to live; and the conservative amount of P10,000,000, as reduced by the trial court, for the loss or impairment of his earning capacity, considering his age, probable life expectancy, the state of his health, and his mental and physical condition before the accident.

ISSUES: 1. 2. HELD: 1.

The Court likewise upholds the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. The award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante. Moral damages are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused a person. Although incapable of pecuniary computation, they must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. The amount of the award bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the offender.

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On the matter of exemplary damages, Art. 2231 of the Civil Code provides that in cases of quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. The records show that at the time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario was driving without a license because he was previously ticketed for reckless driving. The evidence also shows that he failed to step on his brakes immediately after the impact. Had petitioner Del Rosario done so, the injuries which respondent Stephen sustained could have been greatly reduced. Wanton acts such as that committed by petitioner Del Rosario need be suppressed; and employers like petitioner Mercury Drug should be more circumspect in the observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. The award of exemplary damages in favor of the respondents is therefore justified.

(What was raised was the issue regarding evidence pointing to his guilt. I think the court modified the award of damages motu propio) Held: Award for loss of earning capacity modified. The rule is that documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate a claim for loss of earning capacity. Employers certification that his monthly salary ranges from 1,780 to 3,570 on per story basis while honoraria and transportation amounted to 24,990 (7 months) is sufficient. Defense did not object to the presentation of the certification; hence, deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the courts. Also established was Melendres age when he died 41 years old. Earnings derived from salary and honoraria and transporation allowance

With the award of exemplary damages, we also affirm the grant of attorneys fees to Respondents. In addition, attorneys fees may be granted when a party is compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the other party.

NET EARNING

Capacity = Life Expectancy x [ Gross Annual Income Living Expenses ] 9. People v. Lopez (Doria) = [ 2/3 (80 age of death) ] x [ GAI ( 50% of GAI ) ] = [ 2/3 (80 age of death) ] x [ (min + max)/2 + (7-month allowance/7) ( 50% of GAI ) ] = [ 2/3 (80 41) ] x [ (1780 + 3570)/2 + 24990/7 37470 ] Indemnity for murder CA ordered accused to pay as follows: 50k civil indemnity; 50k moral damages; 33k actual damages; 200k loss of earning capacity Wife presented receipts as follows: 33k burial and interment; 7,500 wake She also presented certification from Tanod Publishing, Inc. (employer) as to his monthly salary range, honoraria and transportation allowance Original 40k moral damages award by TC was reduced to 33k because of receipts CA held that there was no accurate way to determine earnings since certification by employer only indicated range and not specific amount But since heirs are still entitled to reasonable amount, amount for loss of earning capacity was increased from 45,420 (TC) to 200k CRIM ASPECT: Melendres was buying cigarettes from a store when Lopez shot him with a gun from behind = [ 2/3 (39) ] x [ 74940 37470 ] = 26 x 37470 = 974,220 NOTE: Please take note of brackets in red. Wala yan sa original decision. Hindi sumunod sa EMDAS si J. Carpio lels 10. Philippine Hawk v. Lee (Enteria) February 6, 2010 Ponente: J. Peralta Facts Vivian Tan Lee filed against Philippine Hawk Corporation and defendant Margarito Avila for damages based on quasi-delict, arising from a vehicular accident that occurred on March 17, 1991 in Barangay Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon. The accident resulted in the death of respondents husband, Silvino Tan, and caused respondent physical injuries.

Facts:

Issue:

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Respondent sought the payment of indemnity for the death of Silvino Tan, moral and exemplary damages, funeral and interment expenses, medical and hospitalization expenses, the cost of the motorcycles repair, attorneys fees, and other just and equitable reliefs. The accident involved a motorcycle, a passenger jeep, and a bus with Body No. 119. The bus was owned by petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation, and was then being driven by Margarito Avila. Philippine Hawk denied liability for the vehicular accident, alleging that the immediate and proximate cause of the accident was the recklessness or lack of caution of Silvino Tan. Petitioner asserted that it exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees, including Margarito Avila. RTC ruled in favour of Lee. CA affirmed RTC decision with modification in the awarded damages. Issues (1) whether or not negligence may be attributed to petitioners driver, and whether negligence on his part was the proximate cause of the accident, resulting in the death of Silvino Tan and causing physical injuries to respondent; (2) whether or not petitioner is liable to respondent for damages; and (3) whether or not the damages awarded by respondent Court of Appeals are proper. Ratio (1) Yes. Petitioners bus driver, Margarito Avila, was guilty of simple negligence as affirmed by the appellate court.Margarito was driving on the right side of the road, already saw the motorcycle on the left side of the road before the collision. However, he did not take the necessary precaution to slow down, but drove on and bumped the motorcycle, and also the passenger jeep parked on the left side of the road, showing that the bus was negligent in veering to the left lane, causing it to hit the motorcycle and the passenger jeep. Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence. To be negligent, a defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary reasonable man would have realized that certain interests of certain persons were unreasonably subjected to a general but definite class of risks. (2) Yes. Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption that the employer failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of the family in the selection or supervision of its employees.To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that

he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. The Court upholds the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that petitioner is liable to respondent, since it failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its bus driver, Margarito Avila, for having failed to sufficiently inculcate in him discipline and correct behavior on the road. Indeed, petitioners tests were concentrated on the ability to drive and physical fitness to do so. It also did not know that Avila had been previously involved in sideswiping incidents. (3) Yes. CA correctly awarded civil indemnity for the death of respondents husband, temperate damages, and moral damages for the physical injuries sustained by respondent in addition to the damages granted by the trial court to respondent. The trial court overlooked awarding the additional damages, which were prayed for by respondent in her Amended Complaint. The appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case. a. Indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased is provided for by Article 2206 of the Civil Code. It is awarded not for loss of earnings, but for loss of capacity to earn money. Documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when: (1) the deceased is self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. In the computation of loss of earning capacity, only net earnings, not gross earnings, are to be considered; that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary for the creation of such earnings or income, less living and other incidental expenses.In the absence of documentary evidence, it is reasonable to peg necessary expenses for the lease and operation of the gasoline station at 80 percent of the gross income, and peg living expenses at 50 percent of the net income (gross income less necessary expenses). b. Actual damages Must be substantiated by documentary evidence, such as receipts, in order to prove expenses incurred as a result of

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c.

d.

the death of the victim or the physical injuries sustained by the victim. Moral damages are not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. They are awarded to allow the plaintiff to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone due to the defendants culpable action and must, perforce, be proportional to the suffering inflicted. Temperate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. The cost of the repair of the motorcycle was prayed for by respondent in her Complaint. However, the evidence presented was merely a job estimate of the cost of the motorcycles repair amounting to P17, 829.00 In the absence of competent proof of the actual damage caused on the motorcycle or the actual cost of its repair, the award of temperate damages by the appellate court in the amount of P10,000.00 was reasonable under the circumstances. Moral damages to respondent who sustained physical injuries - CA also correctly awarded respondent moral damages for the physical injuries she sustained due to the vehicular accident. Under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered in quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. However, the award of P50,000.00 should be reduced to P30,000.00 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.

earnings; 59K actual damages; 500K moral damages for other heirs, 50K for Carmela CA affirmed, with modification: Actual damages 39K; loss of earning capacity 1.15M PETITION: questioning 1) finding of negligence; 2) award of damages SC: 1. The issue of negligence is factual, so SC not to disturb RTC and CA findings. 2. Re damages and loss of earning capacity: Petitioners argue that: 1) CA pegging monthly expenses at 50% of gross earnings is wrong/ contrary to Villa Rey; 2) respondents failed to prove gross income. Petitioners misread Villa Rey. CA right in pegging necessary expenses at 50% of GAI. Net Earning Capacity = [2/3 x (80 age at time of death) x (gross annual income reasonable and necessary living expenses)] = [2/3 x (80 44) x (96,000 48,000)] =P1,152,000 Re no proof shown to prove gross income, SC said that failure to present documentary evidence is not fatal to lost earning capacity claim. Testimonial evidence suffices. CA DECISION AFFIRMED (except moral damages to heirs reduced to 100K)

e.

12. People vs Astrologo (Fullecido) GR No. 169873 / 8 June 2007 / J. Chico-Nazario FACTS CA affirmed the decision of RTC finding Norberto Astrologo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed his daughter. o RTC-Penalty was set at reclusion perpetua and payment of Civil indemnity of P75,000 Moral damages of P75,000 o CA-Penalty was set at reclusion perpetua and payment of Civil indemnity of P50,000 Moral damages of P50,000 Exemplary damages of P25,000 The facts of the case are as follows: o AAA testified that she is the daughter of the appellant. o she went home after watching television from their neighbors house

Civil indemnity for the death of her husband, which has been fixed by current jurisprudence at P50,000.00. The award is proper under Art. 2206 of the Civil Code

11. Pleyto v. Lomboy (Escalona) 2004 1995 (AM) head-on collision bet. PRBL bus headed north, and Lancer car, headed to Manila. According to a witness (a bus pssgr), bus driver Pleyto tried to overtake a tricycle in front of it but hit tricycle instead. Pleyto then swerved to the left lane where Lancer was traversing, smashed the latter, instantly killing driver Arnulfo and front passenger Ricardo Lomboy; Carmela (daughter of Sps Lomboy) and a friend on the backseat suffered injuries. Maria, wife of Ricardo, filed an action for damages against PRBL and driver. RTC: PRBL and Pleyto negligent. Award: 50K death indemnity; 1.6M Ricardos lost

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she slept beside her two siblings, namely: BBB, nine years old; and CCC, seven years old. o At around 11:00 p.m., while she was sleeping inside a room she woke up when she felt someone kissing her lips. o She opened her eyes and recognized that it was her father, herein appellant. She struggled in refusal. o The appellant started mashing her breasts, and when she resisted, he pointed a knife at her. Then, the appellant touched her vagina, lifted her skirt and succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina despite her continuing refusal, thereby causing her so much pain. SC affirmed the conviction of the accused. Aggrieved by the decision of the court, the appealent filed a notice appeal to the SC. o

the incident to her mother. When AAA finally told her mother on June 13, 2003 that she was being abused by her own father, her mother whipped her for not telling her about it immediately. Thereafter, they went to the DSWD office in Peablanca, Cagayan, where AAA was interviewed by DSWD personnel. Afterwards, they proceeded to the police station where AAA executed a sworn statement narrating what happened. Dr. Simangan subsequently conducted a physical examination on AAA and discovered that the latter had a healed hymen laceration at 4 and 7 oclock positions, and that her vagin a admitted the tip of the fifth finger easily. She stated that the laceration could have been caused by a blunt object.

The accused denied the accusation of rape hurled against him and claimed that his wife was the one who initiated the criminal complaint against him because she thinks that he has a mistress.

ISSUE: W/N the civil indemnity is proper HELD. RATIO Yes The trial court gave credence to the version of the prosecution and rendered its decision finding the accused guilty of three (3) counts of rape and imposed the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for each case. Apattad was further ordered to pay AAA the amount of P150,000.00 Pesos as civil indemnity. Accused is acquitted in one of the criminal cases for lack of sufficient evidence. The CA affirmed the judgment of conviction by the trial court with the modification that the civil indemnity awarded should be P75,000.00 for each count of rape. In addition, moral damages and exemplary damages in the amounts of P75,000.00 and Php25,000.00 respectively, for each count of rape were awarded.

Civil indemnity, which is actually in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape. The case law also requires automatic award of moral damages to a rape victim without need of proof because from the nature of the crime, it can be assumed that she has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award. Such award is separate and distinct from civil indemnity. The reduction of civil indemnity to P50,000.00 and moral damages to P50,000.00 is proper because the crime committed by the appellant is only simple rape. The award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages to AAA is likewise proper in order to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behaviors from sexually abusing their own daughters. 13. People v. Juanito Apattad (Galang) (2011) VELASCO, JR., J.:

ISSUE with regard to DAMAGES: WON the C.A. GRAVELY ERRED IN MODIFYING THE DAMAGES IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT.

HELD: NO. As modified, accused-appellant is ordered to pay AAA for each count of rape, PhP 75,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 75,000 as moral damages, and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages.

FACTS: Accused was charged in four (4) separate informations of raping his 10 year-old daughter, AAA in Cagayan. AAA testified that sometime in 2001, while she was sleeping with her sisters, the accused pulled and positioned her just below the feet of her siblings, and right then and there, succeeded in molesting her. AAA was just seven (7) years old then. It was repeated in 2003 where the accused also threatened to kill her if she reports

RATIO: In rape cases, when the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim, the imposable penalty is death. However, with the enactment of Republic Act No. (RA) 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the imposition of death penalty is now prohibited. In lieu of the penalty of death, the penalty of reclusion

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perpetua shall be imposed when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC.

Consequently, courts can no longer impose the penalty of death. Instead, they have to impose reclusion perpetua. Nonetheless, the principal consideration for the award of damages is the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender.

When the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the imposition of the penalty of death were it not for RA 9346, the award of civil indemnity for the crime of rape should be PhP 75,000 racionating that this is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity.

cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence. In the present case, AAA positively identified accused-appellant in her testimony as the very perpetrator of the crime of rape committed against her. As correctly observed by the trial court, a distance of three (3) kilometers does not make it physically impossible for accused-appellant to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. Calimag himself admitted during cross-examination that the house of accusedappellant may be reached by jeepney in an hour. Significantly, even if accusedappellant indeed stayed in Calimags house on the dates that he committed rape, it was still not physically impossible for accused-appellant to go home and commit the said crime at the time it was said to have been committed.

Likewise, the award of moral damages in the amount of PhP 75,000 is warranted without need of pleading or proving them. In rape cases, it is recognized that the victims injury is concomitant with and necessarily results from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the award of moral damages.

After a careful examination of the records of this case, the S.C. is satisfied that the prosecutions evidence established the guilt of accused -appellant beyond reasonable doubt. AAA was below twelve (12) years old when the crime was committed. A copy of AAAs birth certificate to prove her age was duly presented in evidence by the prosecution, indicating that she was indeed born on October 14, 1994. When AAA was called to the witness stand, she gave a detailed narration of how she was sexually molested by her father, which narration is difficult, if not improbable, for a 10-year-old girl to concoct.

Further, the Court also awards exemplary damages in the amount of PhP 30,000, despite the lack of any aggravating circumstances, to deter others from committing similar acts or for correction for the public good.

Pertinently, it is settled jurisprudence that the testimony of a child -victim is given full weight and credence, considering that when a woman, specially a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. The medical examination conducted and the medical certificate issued are veritable corroborative evidence, which strongly bolster AAAs testimony.

MAIN ISSUE: WON THE C.A. GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING APATTAD GUILTY DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

14. People v. Banago (CarlosTheFierce)

HELD: S.C. sustained accused-appellants conviction. The appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.

FACTS:

RATIO: Accused-appellants defenses of alibi and denial cannot prosper. Alibis and denials are inherently weak defenses. This is understandably so because said defenses can be easily fabricated by an accused in order to escape criminal liability. An alibi is evidence negative in nature and self-serving, and, thus,

RTC Malolos convicted Reynaldo Banago of raping a thirteen-year old girl named Dolores Jaurige one evening in the bodega of Bauer Company in Marilao Bulacan.

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He poked a gun at Dolores, removed her shorts and underwear, and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. He was seen coming out of the bodega zipping his pants by the victims sister, Dorotea.

Hence, in addition to the 50,000 moral damages, Banago is ordered to pay the complainant the amount of 75,000 by way of civil indemnity.

DICTA: Medico-legal report confirmed that Dolores was in non-virgin state physically. It took nine months before the criminal complaint was filed against Banago because Dolores and Dorotea initially decided to keep the incident to themselves but Dolores during an altercation was compelled to tell her mother about the rape incident. In rape cases, the court may, in its discretion, award moral damages to the victim without need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof.

Banago, welder at Bauer, offered an alibi that he was in his residence that evening. His companion Delfin Castillo corroborated this alibi bay testifying that he spent the night at the bodega but he did not see Dolores there.

Civil indemnity is automatically granted to the rape victim without need of proof other than the fact of the commission of the offense.

15. People v Bartolini (Manalo) RTC sentenced Banago to reclusion perpetua and ordered him to indemnify the victim the sum of 50,000 as moral damages ONLY (without civil indemnity).

Facts: Bartolini was convicted with 3 counts of qualified rape of his two underage daughters. CA on appeal modified judgment and convicted him of 2 counts of qualified rape and 1 count of simple rape because of failure to allege minority in the Information.

ISSUE: Whether or not civil indemnity should have been awarded to private complainant in addition to moral damages

As to damages: HELD: YES. Civil damages should have been awarded to private complainant RTC (x3) 75,000 civil indemnity RATIO: Moral damages is SEPARATE AND DISTINCT from the civil indemnity awarded to rape victims. The moral damages cannot take the place of the civil indemnity. 50,000 moral damages

CA I. x2

While the award of moral damages is discretionary on the part of the court, the civil indemnity, which is actually in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, is MANDATORY upon the finding of the fact of rape.

75,000 civil indemnity 75,000 moral damages 25,000 exemplary damages

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II 50,000 civil indemnity 50,000 moral damages 25,000 exemplary damages

II 75,000 civil indemnity 75,000 moral damages 30,000 exemplary damages 16. Quirante v IAC (Mendoza) [GR 73886/ January 31, 1989]

Issue related to the course: How much should the damages be?

Holding: Where the special qualifying circumstances of age and relationship, although not alleged in the information, are nonetheless established during the trial, the award of civil indemnity and moral damages in a conviction for simple rape should equal the award of civil indemnity and moral damages in convictions for qualified rape (BBB).

Ratio: Attorney's fees as an item of damages provided for under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, is made in favor of the litigant, not of his counsel. Therefore, the litigant, not his counsel, is the judgment creditor who may enforce the judgment for attorney's fees by execution.

Rule set in in Rule 100 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should only affect criminal liability, and should not affect civil liability, which is for the benefit of the injured party. Section 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. (8a) Section 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment. (9a) SC I. x2 75,000 civil indemnity 75,000 moral damages 30,000 exemplary damages

Important Portion of the Decision: Counsel's claim for attorney's fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the services in question have been rendered, or in a separate action. If the first alternative is chosen, the Court may pass upon said claim, even if its amount were less than the minimum prescribed by law for the jurisdiction of said court, upon the theory that the right to recover attorney's fees is but an incident of the case in which the services of counsel have been rendered."

Petitioners: John Quirante Dante Cruz Respondent: Intermediate Appellate Court Manuel Casasola Estrellita Casasola

Facts:

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- Dr. Indalecio Casasola (Father of Respondent) contracted with Norman Guerrero (Respondent), a building contractor, with Philippine-American General Insurance, Co. Inc. (PhilAmGen) as bondsman. Guerrero failed to make good with his contract with Dr. Casasola so with the help of Atty. John Quirante (Petitioner), Dr. Casasola sued Guerrero and PhilAmGen for damages. - CFI of Manila (RTC of Manila) entered a decision on October 16, 1981 rescinding the contract and ordering Guerrero and PhilAmGen to pay Dr. Casasola Actual Damages (AD) of P129,430, Moral Damages (MD) of P50,000, Exemplary Damages (ED) of P40,000, and Atty.s Fees (AF) of P30,000. Also, the RTC ordered Guerrero alone to pay Dr. Casasola P300 per day from December 15, 1978 to July 16, 1979 and ordered PhilAmGen the amount of surety bond for P120,000. A Motion of Reconsideration was submitted but was denied on November 4, 1982. PhilAmGen filed a notice of appeal but was not given due course because it was filed out of time. - RTC issued a writ of execution. A petition was filed in the IAC for the quashal of the writ of execution but was dismissed so the case was elevated to the SC. During this period, Dr. Casasola died so he was substituted by his wife and children. - On June 18, 1983, Atty. Quirante filed a motion in the trial court for the confirmation of his AF that was provided in the oral agreement between him and Dr. Casasola. The agreement was confirmed by the widow and 2 daughters of Dr. Casasola. The agreement stated the following: A. In case of recovery of the P120,000.00 surety bond, the attorney's fees of the undersigned counsel (Atty. Quirante) shall be P30,000.00. B. In case the Honorable Court awards damages in excess of the P120,000.00 bond, it shall be divided equally between the Heirs of I. Casasola, Atty. John C. Quirante and Atty. Dante Cruz. - RTC granted the motion for confirmation on March 20, 1984.

the jurisdiction of said court, upon the theory that the right to recover attorney's fees is but an incident of the case in which the services of counsel have been rendered." What is being claimed here as attorney's fees by petitioners is, however, different from attorney's fees as an item of damages provided for under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, wherein the award is made in favor of the litigant, not of his counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the judgment creditor who may enforce the judgment for attorney's fees by execution. The SC agrees with the IAC that the confirmation of attorney's fees is premature. As it correctly pointed out, the petition for review on certiorari filed by PhilAmGen in this Court (G.R. No. 64334) "may or may not ultimately result in the granting to the Casasola family of the total amount of damages" awarded by the trial court. Since the main case from which the Atty. Quirantes claims for his AF may arise has not yet become final, the determination of the propriety of said fees and the amount thereof should be held in abeyance. It was ruled that: ". . . an attorney's fee cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject of recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorney's fee only arises when something has been recovered from which the fee is to be paid."

17. Sps. Luciano and Nelly Briones v. Spa. Jose and Fe Macabagdal and Vergon Realty Investments Corporation (Millena) August 3, 2010

Villarama, J. Issue: WoN the motion for confirmation of AF as damages was properly granted? Fox of the case: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Sps. Macabagdal (respondent spouses) purchased from Vergon Realty Lot. No. 2-R. Sps. Briones are the owners of Lot No. 2-S which is adjacent to 2-R. In 1984, with the approval of Vergon, Sps. Briones constructed a house on Lot No. 2-R which they thought was 2-S. After being informed of the mix up by Vergons manager, Sps. Macabagdal demande the petitioners to demolish the house and vacate the property. Petitioners refused. Thus, respondent-sps filed an action to recover ownership and possession of Lot No. 2-R. As their defense, petitioners insisted that the lot on which they constructed the house was the lot pointed to them consistently by Vergons agents over the

Held: No. Well settled is the rule that counsel's claim for attorney's fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the services in question have been rendered, or in a separate action. If the first alternative is chosen, the Court may pass upon said claim, even if its amount were less than the minimum prescribed by law for

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7.

8.

9. ISSUES: 1.

seven year period they were paying for the lot, hence, they were buyers in good faith. Petitioners impleaded Vergon as third party defendant claiming that because of the warranty against eviction, they were entitled to indemnity from Vergon in case the suit is decided against them. RTC ruled against the Sps. Briones with the following judgment: a. That Sps. Briones demolish the house or pay the Sps. Macabagdal the prevailing price of the lot involved. b. That Sps. Briones pay Sps. Macabagdal P50,000 as moral damages for shattering the latters dreams of having their own house on their own land. c. That Sps. Briones pay Sps. Macabadal P30,000 as attorneys fees. d. Pay the costs of the proceedings. e. Sps. Brioness third-party complaint against Vergon is dismissed for lack of cause of action. f. That Sps. Briones pay Vergon P20,000 as compensatory damage and P10,000 attorneys fees. CA affirmed.

prayed for and may not be deemed incorporated within a general prayer for such other relief and remedy as this court may deem just and equitable. Attorneys fees are not awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorneys fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification; its basis cannot be left to speculation or conjecture. Where granted, the court must explicitly state in the body of the decision, and not only in the dispositive portion thereof, the legal reason for the award of attorneys fees.

18. Frias v. San Diego-Sison (Monfort) April 4, 2007 | Austria-Martinez Facts: 1. Petitioner FRIAS is the owner of a house and lot in Ayala Alabang. 2. Petitioner, as the FIRST PARTY, and Dra. Flora SAN DIEGO-SISON (respondent), as the SECOND PARTY, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement over the property.

2.

WON petitioners should demolish the house they built in good faith on the lot owned by the respondents. [not really related to the course but determination of this question will be substantial to the answer to the question on damages] WON petitioners should pay moral and compensatory damages as well as attorneys fees.

3. For THREE MILLION PESOS, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by the FIRST PARTY from the SECOND PARTY:

a. b. c.

Ruling: Case was remanded but must be decided accordingly: 1. NO. Petitioners are builders in good faith. As per Art. 448, the builder in good faith can compel the landowner to make a choice between appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land if its value is considerably less than the value of the building. The choice belongs to the owner of the land. NO. Petitioners acted in good faith hence, the award of moral damages has no basis. Compensatory damages to Vergon are also improper since it was not specifically prayed for. Under Article 2208, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation (compensatory damages) are recoverable only in the concept of actual damages, not as moral damages nor judicial costs, hence, must be specifically

The SECOND PARTY has a period of 6 months within which to notify the FIRST PARTY of her intention to purchase the aforementioned parcel of land. In the event that on the sixth month the SECOND PARTY would decide not to purchase the aforementioned property, the FIRST PARTY has a period of another six months within which to pay the sum. The amount of P3 million given by the SECOND PARTY shall be treated as [a] loan and the property shall be considered as the security for the mortgage.

4. Petitioner received from respondent two million pesos in cash and one million pesos in a post-dated check. Petitioner then gave respondent TCT No. 168173 in the name of IMRDC and the Deed of Absolute Sale over the property between petitioner and IMRDC.

2.

5. Respondent decided not to purchase the property and notified petitioner through a letter reminding petitioner of their agreement.

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6. Petitioner subsequently failed to pay respondent.

3.

7. Respondent filed with the RTC a complaint for sum of money. 4. 8. Respondent alleged that petitioner tried to deprive her of the security for the loan by making a false report of the loss of her owners copy of TCT No. 168173 , executing an affidavit of loss and by filing a petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy. 5. 6.

9. Respondent prayed for P100,000.00 moral, corrective and exemplary damages. 10. RTC issued a decision ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P100,000.00 by way of moral, corrective and exemplary damages:

7. 8.

We agree with the findings of the trial court and the CA that petitioners act of trying to deprive respondent of the security of her loan by executing an affidavit of loss of the title and instituting a petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 168173 entitles respondent to moral damages. Moral damages may be awarded in culpa contractual or breach of contract cases when the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong . It partakes of the nature of fraud. Petitioners actuation would have deprived respondent of the security for her loan were it not for respondents timely filing of a petition for relief whereby the RTC set aside its previous order granting the issuance of new title. Thus, the award of moral damages is in order. The entitlement to moral damages having been established, the award of exemplary damages is proper. Exemplary damages may be imposed upon petitioner by way of example or correction for the public good.

19. Dario Nacar v. Gallery Frames and/or Felipe Bordey, Jr. (Namingit) The fraudulent scheme employed by petitioner to deprive respondent of her only security to her loaned moneyentitled respondent to moral damages. 13 August 2013 (Please note. Latest jurisprudence on rate of interest) J. Peralta 11. CA affirmed the RTC decision with modification, in the sense that the rate of interest is reduced. Issue: WON respondent is entitled to moral damages. Petitioner claims that moral damages were awarded on the erroneous finding that she used a fraudulent scheme to deprive respondent of her security for the loan; that such finding is baseless since petitioner was acquitted in the case for perjury and false testimony filed by respondent against her.

Facts: Nacar won an illegal dismissal case against Gallery Frames and was awarded separation pay worth Php158,919.92 in lieu of reinstatement. Amount was computed only up to the promulgation of the decision of the Labor Arbiter on October 15, 1998. Respondent Gallery Frames appealed the ruling on the illegal dismissal but eventually lost when SC rendered a decision in favor of Nacar on April 17, 2002. The Entry of judgment was issued which became final and executory on May 27, 2002.

Held: Yes. Ratio: 1. Article 31 of the Civil Code provides that when the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. While petitioner was acquitted in the false testimony and perjury cases filed by respondent against her, those actions are entirely distinct from the collection of sum of money with damages filed by respondent against petitioner.

Nacar, after the entry of judgment, filed a Motion for Correct Computation which prayed that his back wages be computed from date of his dismissal (January 24, 1997) to date of finality of the SC decision on May 27, 2002 (originally computed until October 15, 1998 as per the Labor Arbiters decision) which totalled to Php471, 320.31. He also posits that he is entitled to the payment of interest from the finality of the decisions until full payment by Gallery Frames.

2.

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Respondent assert that no recomputation can be made to the originally awarded sums as the decision was already final and executory.

NLRC and CA denied appeals by Nacar. CA opined that since Nacar did not appeal the October 15, 1998 decision of the Labor Arbiter which already became final and executory, a correction9RECOMPUTATION) is no longer allowed and that there is nothing left to do except to enforce the said judgment. Only clerical errors may be modified.

Issues: 1. 2. W/N a recomputation on Nacars back wages is allowed. W/N Nacar is entitled to the payment of interest from the finality of the decision until full payment by Gallery Frames.

decision. By the nature of an illegal dismissal case, the reliefs continue to add up until full satisfaction as expressed by Art. 279 of the Labor Code. The computation of the consequences of illegal dismissal upon execution of the decision does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final decision being implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the computation of monetary consequences of this dismissal is affected and this is not a violation of the principle of immutability of final judgements. When separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is allowed, the finality of the illegal dismissal decision becomes the reckoning point. In allowing separation pay, the final decision effectively declares that the employment relationship ended so that separation pay and backwages are to be computed up to that point.

2.

Ruling & Ratio: 1. Yes, the backwages to be computed from the time Nacar was illegally dismissed on Jan. 24, 1997 up to May 27, 2002 and the separation pay computed from August 1990 up to May 27, 2002 at the rate of 1 mo pay per year of service.

Yes at the interest of 12 p.a. of the total monetary wards, computed from May 27, 2002 to June 30, 2013 and 6% p.a. from July 1, 2013 until their full satisfaction. Note that the 2002 to June 30, 2013 rate is under the old guideline while the Juli 1, 2013 is subject to the modification of the guidelines laid down in Eastern Shipping Lines by BSPMB Circular No. 799 effective July 1, 2013, as follows: I. II. When an obligation is breached, the contravener can be held liable for damages under Title XVIII on Damages of the Civil Code. With regard to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows: 1. When an obligation is breached, and it consists of the payment of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% p.a. to be computed from default. 2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, and interest may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% p.a 3. When the judgement of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executor,

Based on the case of Session Delights Ice Cream and Fast Foods v. CA, the decision of the Labor Arbiter on a complaint for illegal dismissal consists of essentially 2 parts:

First part is the finding of illegality of the dismissal and the awards of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, backwages, attorneys fees, and legal interest. This is the part of the decision that cannot now be disputed since it has been confirmed with finality.

Second part is the computation of the awards made. This part, being merely a computation of what the first part of the decision established and declared, can by its nature, recomputed.

A recomputation (or an original computation, if no previous computation has been made) is a part of the law that is read into the

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the rate of legal interest shall be 6% p.a. from such finality until its satisfaction. III. 1. Kierulf v CA - Narvacan MORAL DAMAGES

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March 13, 1997 Panganiban, J. Consolidated petitions for review on certiorari of a CA decision FACTS: A Pantranco bus was travelling along EDSA to Balintawak. Its driver lost control of the bus causing it to swerve and fly over and eventually bump the front portion of an Isuzu pickup driven by Legaspi. As a result, both vehicles were damaged and physical injuries were inflicted on Legaspi and LucilaKierulf (passenger). The injuries sustained by Lucila required major surgeries like "tracheotomy, open reduction, mandibular fracture, intermaxillary repair of multiple laceration" and prolonged treatment by specialists. Legaspi also suffered injuries. The front portion of the pickup truck, owned by Spouses Kierulf, was smashed to pieces. Kierulfs filed civil case for damages. Pantranco asked for exoneration by invoking an alleged fortuitous event as the cause of the accident (it contends that the proximate cause was the accidental dropping of a used engine differential by a junk truck immediately ahead of the bus). Trial court decided in favor of the plaintiffs and Pantranco was ordered to pay actual, moral and exemplary damages to the former. Upon appeal, CA modified the RTC decision increasing the award for damages. Both parties were dissatisfied with the CA decision: Spouses Kierulf and Legaspi argue that the damages awarded were inadequate while Pantranco counters that they were astronomical, bloated and not duly proved, hence these petitions. ISSUE: W/N plaintiffs are entitled to increase in the award of damages HELD/RATIO*: YES. Petition of Spouses Kierulf&Legaspi partially granted; petition of Pantranco dismissed. As to the increase in the award of MORAL damages: The spouses aver that the disfigurement of Lucila's physical appearance cannot but affect their marital right to consortium thus, the moral damages awarded in favor of Lucila should be increased not only for Lucila but also for her husband Victor who also suffered psychologically.HOWEVER Victor's claim for deprivation of his right to consortium, although argued before Respondent Court, is not supported by the evidence on record BE THAT AS IT MAY, Court still found that it is proper to award moral damages to Lucila considering her physical sufferings, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety and wounded feelings and increased the award to PhP400K (from PhP200K) As to PURPOSE of moral damages: Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action. Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; thus, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. *Court also discussed other types of damages in this case but I focused only on moral damages as per the syllabus. (Modifications on the decision: moral damages to

Lucila and Legaspi increased; exemplary damages to Lucila increased and Legaspi was awarded exemplary damages as well; actual/compensatory damages also awarded to Legaspi) 2. People v. Cleopas and Pirame - Ogena (2000) Facts: -TeodoricoCleopas and Florencio Pirame convicted by the TC for murder -witness Supero saw the Cleopas brothers, Epifanio and Teodorico, kill Torrenueva by hitting him with an iron pipe and piece of wood respectively, while victim was being held by Pirame (appellant). -TC: sentence of Reclusion Perpetua, awards P50k civil indemnity each, approx. P23k for burial and incidental expenses and P50k representing moral and exemplary damages. Only appellant Pirame appeals to SC Issue: WON TC's award of moral damages was proper. Held: No. -There was no testimony produced by the widow of the victim with respect to the mental anguish/emotional distress she suffered due to her husband's death. As such, there was no legal or factual basis to justify said award. Disposition: TC affirmed, award of P50k moral damages deleted Obiter: On witness credibility: -Appellant assails witness credibility, citing minor inconsistencies and a two month delay on reporting said crime. -SC: inconsistencies in testimony pertaining to minor details does not impair credibility of said witness when he can consistently relate the principal occurrence and provide positive identification of the assailant. -Also, witness was only able to confirm the death of victim two months after the crime. Upon learning such, it was when the witness testified to the crime in open court. As such said delay in reporting cannot cast any doubt on the veracity of said testimony. On conspiracy: -Appellant assails TC's finding that he was a conspirator -witness Supero testified that appellant held the victim's arms while the Cleopas brothers hit the victim with a steel pipe and a long piece of wood. -Active participation of the appellant was convincingly shown by his act of holding the victim immobile, thus enabling the other accused to kill the victim

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April 16, 2008 On award of exemplary damages: -absence of any attendant generic aggravating circumstance precludes award of such. 3. Carlos Arcona y Moban v. CA (2002) - Pascual FACTS: Tinga, J. Doctrine: In order that an award of moral damages can be aptly justified, the claimant must be able to prove that he has suffered such damages and that the injury causing it has sprung from any of the causes listed in Articles 2219 and 2200 of the NCC. Facts: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Umuyon was driving an owner-type jeepney. The jeepney is owned by Spouses Lomotan A speeding ten-wheeler truck driven by River, employee of B.F. Metal, overtook a car by invading the lane traversed by the jeep and rammed into the jeep. Umuyon was injured. He could no longer drive, reducing his daily income. Spouses Lomotan and Umuyon filed a separate action for damages and prayed for the award of actual, exemplary and moral damages, and attorneys fees. Trial court declared Rivera and B.F. Metal negligent. It awarded the damages prayed for. (Moral damages P100,000) B.F. Metal argues that the award of moral damages was premised on the resulting physical injuries, arising from the quasi-delict; since only Umuyon suffered physical injuries, the award should pertain only to him.

Napoleon Ong and Edgardo Talanquines were walking along the national highway at Barangay Labog, Brookes Point, Palawan, on their way home after coming from a birthday party. Then Carlos Arcona y Moban and his brother Benito Arcona y Moban, strike and beat with a bamboo pole, Edgardo Talanquines who managed to escape and seek medical assistance thereby preventing his death. They also stabbed Napoleon Ong with a bladed weapon causing his immediate death. RTC: Carlos Arcona y Moban guilty of the crime of Homicide under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code, with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to authorities and no aggravating circumstances. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty, and to indemnify the heirs of Napoleon Ong P30,000 for his death, P10,000 actual damages and P10,000 moral damages. Benito Arcona is acquitted. Benito Arcona is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Slight Physical injuries and to indemnify Edgardo Talanquines 10,000 as actual damages. CA: Affirms increases indemnity to P50,000 SC: AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION increased moral damages to P50,000. actual damages is deleted

Issue/Held: 1. Whether or not the moral damages should be awarded solely to Umuyon. YES, it should in the amount of P30,000. Spouses Lomotan are not entitled to moral damages.

ISSUE: the amount of damages to be awarded RULING: Moral Damages the award of moral damages in the sum of P 10,000.00 must be increased to P50,000. As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victims family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and support, but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them. For this reason, moral damages must be awarded even in the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs emotional suffering. Actual Damages the award of actual damages in the amount of P10,000.00 does not appear to have been substantiated. Only those expenses which are duly proven, or those that appear to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim, will be recognized in court.18Hence, the same must be deleted.

Ratio: 1. Award of moral damages require: a. Evidence of besmirched reputation or physical, mental or psychological suffering sustained by claimant b. Culpable act or omission factually established c. Proof that the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the damages sustained by the claimant d. That the case is predicated on any of the instances expressed by Article 2219 and 2200 B.F. Metal is liable for the moral damages suffered by Umuyon based on Article 2219 (2): Moral damages may be recovered in quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. Rivera is liable for the moral damages suffered by Umuyon base d on either Article 2219 (2) or (1): Moral damages may be recovered in a criminal offense causing physical injuries Spouses Lomotan cannot be awarded moral damages based on Article 2219. Neither can they be awarded based on Article 2200: Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages Article 2200

2.

3.

4. B.F. Metal (Corporation) v Lomotan - Perez

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requires that the injury to property be willful. There was no proof that the accident was willful. 5. People vsLizano - Siang Facts: Lizano was charged with three (3) counts of rape in three (3) separate Informations to all of which he pleaded not guilty. Trial then proceeded. AAA had been staying in her grandmothers house together with Lizano and his wife, BBB. BBB is AAAs aunt. AAA, only 11 at the time, was sleeping inside the house when appellant lay down beside her and began undressing her while threatening to kill her, her grandmother and aunt should she reveal his acts to anybody. Lizano took off this clothes, went on top of AAA and inserted his inserted his penis into her vagina, causing her to feel pain. AAAs age was established by her birth certificate and testimony from her mother. A medical clerk testified on the medical findings of the medico-legal which saw superficial lacerations of the hymen. Lizano testified for himself raising the defenses of denial and alibi. Lozano claims that he was driving his tricycle the whole day. He recalled an incident where he asked AAA to get a spare part of a tricycle in the living room. Unable to follow his orders, appellant followed AAA inside the house. It was at that moment when his wife, BBB, arrived and accused him of raping AAA. Lizano claims that BBB had induced AAA to charge him with rape because of their frequent quarrels. RTC found him guilty of 1 count of rape. The CA affirmed the RTC in toto. Note: at this point, the decision hasnt mentioned any moral damages yet or any kind of penalty. Issues: W/N the prosecution established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt In the rape cases, conviction or acquittal issue boils down to credibility. Findings of fact of the trial court should not be disturbed on appeal since conclusions as to the credibility of witnesses in rape cases hinge heavily on the sound judgment of the trial court

The trial court observed: The private complainant AAA then an 11 years old [sic] girl in a clear, convincing and straightforward manner testified on how the rape occurred. Her clear account of the first incident of rape unequivocally show that she was indeed raped by the accused FilominoLizano. During the trial, AAA recounted the rape incident and positively identified appellant as the perpetrator. AAA was also consistent in her story when he first reported her ordeal to the police and it was reduced to writing. Lizanos main argument is premised on the delay of reporting the crime. The OSG correctly points out that delay in reporting a rape incident does not impair the credibility of the victim in the face of threats of death or physical violence. AAA satisfactorily explained the delay. Appellant threatened to kill her, her grandmother and aunt should she report the incident to anybody. According to the SC, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the rape of AAA, who was then under 12 years old. The SC affirmed the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. Civil indemnity is automatically imposed upon the accused without need of proof other than the fact of the commission of rape. Moral damages is also automatically granted in rape cases without need of further proof other than the commission of the crime because it is assumed that a rape victim had actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award . 6. People v. Madsali Tejano FACTS SajironLajim and his father, MaronLajim, took and carried away AAA, a 15 y/o girl (at time of commission of the offense), while she was fetching water with her aunt InonDama. The Lajims tied her hands behind her back and covered her mouth then brought her to the forest. There, Sajiron undressed AAA and raped her 3 times. Maron stood nearby as look-out. The next day, Sajiron brought AAA to EgapMadsalis house. There, she was detained by Sajiron and Egap. Sajiron eventually married AAA 10 days after the rape under Muslim rites. The wedding was not attended by AAAs parents and it was against her will. RTC rendered a decision, which was affirmed by CA, holding: 1) 2) Sajiron and Maron guilty of forcible abduction with rape (reclusion perpetua) and ordering them to indemnify AAA P50,000 as civil indemnity; and Sajiron and Egap guilty of serious illegal detention (reclusion perpetua) and ordering them to indemnify AAA P50,000 as civil indemnity.

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FOR SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION: ISSUES & RULING (NB: Issues were not raised by parties but by the Court on its own.) WON accused are guilty of a) forcible abduction with rape; and b) serious illegal detention a) NO. There was no lewd design, which as element of forcible abduction, in the taking and carrying away of AAA by Sajiron and Maron. Instead, the two are guilty of serious illegal detention with rape, a special complex crime punishable by death. However, death penalty having been suspended by RA 9346, accused are punished with reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. YES. All the elements of the crime of serious illegal detention are present in the instant case: AAA, a female and a minor, testified that on July 2, 1994, after she was raped in the forest, she was brought to and detained at the house of Egap and forced to cohabit with Sajiron. From the very start of her detention on July 2, 1994, Egap directed Sajiron to guard her, and shoot her if she attempted to escape. She did not dare to escape because the accused threatened to kill her and her family if she attempted to flee The trial court's award of P50,000 civil indemnity to AAA was proper, in line with prevailing jurisprudence. We also find that AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Art. 2219 of the Civil Code, which provides that moral damages may be recovered in cases of illegal detention. This is predicated on AAA's having suffered serious anxiety and fright when she was detained for more than five months. Thus, the Court awards the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages. Finally, AAA was sexually abused on July 1, 1994 and gave birth on April 8, 1995. There was no showing that AAA had previously been sexually abused or had sexual relations with other men. Further, Dr. Ma. Rebethia Alcala, a Municipal Health Officer of Bataraza, Palawan, testified that since AAA gave birth on April 8, 1995, the baby must have been conceived sometime in July 1994, which was at or about the time of the commission of the rape. Therefore, it can be logically deduced that Sajiron is the father of the child. Under Art. 345 of the Revised Penal Code, he is civilly liable for the support of his offspring. Hence, he is directed to provide support to the victim's child born out of the rape, subject to the amount and conditions to be determined by the trial court, after due notice and hearing, in accordance with Art. 201 of the Family Code. 7. Expertravel v. CA and Lo-Tiongco Vitug, 1999 Facts October 7, 1987: Expertravel and Tours Inc, a domestic corporation engaged in the travel agency business issued 4 round trip tickets to Ricardo Lo for Hong Kong, together with accommodations and transfers, for a total of Php 36,677.20. Expertravel alleged that Lo failed to pay, thus made demands for payment The outstanding account was actually remitted to Expertravel through its chairperson, Ma. Rocio De Vega who was then authorized to deal with Expertravels clients. Payment was evidenced by a check dated October 6, 1987 for which de Vega issued a city trust check in favour of Expertravel, with the notation in placement for Ricardo Lo. Per its own invoice, Expertravel received the sum on October 10, 1987. RTC and CA ruled in favour of Lo. CA also imposed 30k moral damages and 10k attys fees. Petition challenges the damages awarded. Issue Can moral damages be recovered in a clearly unfounded suit? No. Can moral damages be awarded for negligence or quasi-delict that did not result in physical injury to the offended party? No. Ratio Moral damages requires certain conditions:

b)

WON the awards of damages are correct NO. AAA is entitled to a) P75,000 as civil indemnity + P75,000 as moral damages for serious illegal detention with rape from Sajiron and Maron; and b) P50,000 as civil indemnity + P50,000 as moral damages for serious illegal detention from Sajiron and Egap. FOR SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION WITH RAPE: AAA is entitled to civil indemnity in line with prevailing jurisprudence that civil indemnification is mandatory upon the finding of rape. In People v. Quiachon, even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed because of the prohibition in R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is proper, because it is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the offense. As explained in People v. Salome, while R.A. No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the fact remains that the penalty provided for by the law for a heinous offense is still death, and the offense is still heinous. Accordingly, the civil indemnity for AAA is P75,000.00. In addition, AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Art. 2219 of the Civil Code, without the necessity of additional pleadings or proof other than the fact of rape. Moral damages is granted in recognition of the victim's injury necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape. Such award is separate and distinct from the civil indemnity. Therefore, the Court awards the amount of P75,000.00 as moral damages.

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Injury, whether physical, mental, psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant o Culpable act or omission factually established o Wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by claimant o Award is predicated on nay of the cases stated in Art. 2219. In the case at bar, the quasi delict did not result in physical injuries, hence the requirement set forth in 2219 was not present. Other cases where moral damages may be recovered: o 1764 vis a vis 2206: in case the death of a passenger results from a breach of carriage. o In culpa aquiliana: where act or omission causes physical injuries or where defendant is guilty of intentional tort o In culpa criminal: when accused is guilty of physical injuries, lascivious acts, adultery, concubinage, illegal or arbitrary detention, illegal arrest, illegal search, defamation. o Malicious prosecution. Note that a clearly unfounded suit may fall within the concept of malicious prosecution where an award for attorneys fees may be granted. But this is avoided as much as possible because the right to litigate must not be penalized. Thus, damages awarded are deleted. o

8. Industrial Insurance v. Bondad - Valdez J. Panganiban April 12, 2000 FACTS: A D.M. Transit Bus driven by Eduardo Mendoza was speeding along South Expressway from Alabang towards Makati when it hit a jeepney (owned by Ligorio Bondad) which was at a full stop, owing to a flat tire. After bumping the rear left portion of Bondads jeepney, the bus swerved to the left and hit Grace Ladaw Morales Galant Sigma car, which was travelling northbound as well, albeit in the innermost lane. Grace Morales and petitioner filed a complaint for damages against DM Transit, Eduardo Mendoza, Pablo Bondad and Ligorio Bondad for failing to exercise and observe the diligence required by law in the management and operation of their respective vehicles and by their defendant employers. Respondents Bondads denied any responsibility or liability to petitioner and Morales, saying that the car was on full stop because of a flat tire. They contended that petitioner acted in bad faith in impleading them. RTC: Exculpated the Bondads and asked petitioner to pay them actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as well as AF CA: Affirmed the RTC ruling 1. Petitioner had no cause of action against the Bondads 2. After hitting the jeepney, the bus swerved to the left hitting the car of Morales; such facts appeared in the police report and the testimony of Ligorio supported by photographs of his jeepney which were taken immediately after the incident. The jeepney stayed in the right shoulder of the expressway as it were. 3. The proximate cause (that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient and intervening clause, produces injury without which

the result would not have occurred) was the negligence of DM Transits driver, who was racing a Baliuag Transit bus ISSUE: Whether or not the award of moral and exemplary damages to respondents was proper HELD: Yes, such award was proper 1. CA was correct in concluding that respondents were compelled to litigate an unfounded suit because of petitioners negligence and lack of prudence in not verifying the facts before filing this action. 2. Petitioners suit against respondents was manifestly unjustified, as the jeepney came into contact with Morales car not because of its own motion but because the bus rammed the jeepney. The police report, testimonial evidence from the Bondads, and findings of fact of the lower courts attested to this. 3. It is absurd that respondents caused the incident, as respondents jeepney was lying motionless in the right shoulder of the highway due to a flat tire. They could not have done anything to avoid getting hit by a bus. 4. Petitioners knew that respondents were not the cause of the accident, failing to make a formal demand on them before initiating the suit. As no formal demand was made, and without clarifying the latters role in the mishap, the Bondads were constrained to go all the way from Alaminos to Manila to face trial. 5. Because of wanton disregard of facts, attorneys fees sustained AS TO MORAL DAMAGES: To sustain an award of moral damages, is must be shown that (1) that claimant suffered injury; and (2) such injury sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code. It is not enough that claimant alleges mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the like as a result of the acts of the other party. It is necessary that such acts be shown to have been tainted with bad faith or ill motive. Petitioner acted in bad faith by litigating an unfounded claim. It caused the Bondads lack of concentration on their job. Pablo suffered a mild stroke. AS TO EXEMPLARY DAMAGES: Awarded because petitioners dragged innocent bystanders into an unfounded litigation. Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages. 9. Triple Eight Integrated Services v. NLRC - Abdon GR No. 128584 / 3 Dec 1998 / J. Romero Facts

August 1992 - private respondent ErlindaOsdana recruited by Triple Eight for employment with Triple Eight's principal, the Gulf Catering Company (GCC) based in Saudi Arabia. Original contract is for a food server for a period of 36 months with 550 saudiRial salary Osdana claims she was required to pay P11,950 in placement fees and other charges, for which no receipt was issued. Subsequently she was made to sign another "contractor-employee agremeent" which provided she would be waitress for 12 months on a salary of $280. This was the agreement approved by the POEA.

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16 Sep 1992, Osdana left for Riyadh. Contrary to the employment contract, she was made to do janitorial work at the College of Public Administration of Oleysha University unrelated to her job designation as waitress. Because of a 12 hour shift without overtime and strenuous work, she had was confined to Ladies Villa, a housing facility of the GCC from 18 Jun to 22 Aug 1993, during which she was not paid her salaries. After confinement she worked as food server and cook at HotaBaniTameem Hospital, where she worked seven days a week from 2 Aug to 5 Oct 1993, during which she was not paid. From 6 Oct to 23 Oct, she was again confined at Ladies Villa for no reason and was not paid. On 24 Oct she was assigned back at Oleysha, and was diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. She had to be hospitalized and underwent surgery in January and April 1994. She was not given any assignments during the period even if the doctor allowed her to do light work. Also, she was not paid. On 25 Apr 1994, she was discharged and described in the medical report as having good improvement. After four days however, she was dismissed due to illness and not given separation pay or her salaries for the periods where she was not allowed to work.

3. 4.

There was no certification from a competent public health authority of the disease being incurable within a period of 6 months with proper medical treatment. Lex loci contractus, since the contract of employment was perfected here, laws of the PH govern. Award for unexpired portion should have been only $1,260 ($280 x 4 1/2 months), not $2,499 as adjudged by the LA and NLRC, because her stint with foreign principal lasted one year 7 1/2 months, implying a renewal of the one-year contract. b. The unpaid differential of $1,076 is proper because the "no work no pay" rule does not apply as she did not work due to an illness that was work related. c. Moral and exemplary award is proper but must be reduced. The rule is that moral damages are recoverable where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. According to the facts of the case as stated by public respondent, Osdana was made to perform such menial chores, as dishwashing and janitorial work, among others, contrary to her job designation as waitress. She was also made to work long hours without overtime pay. Because of such arduous working conditions, she developed Carpal Tunnel Syndrome. Her illness was such that she had to undergo surgery twice. Since her employer determined for itself that she was no longer fit to continue working, they sent her home posthaste without as much as separation pay or compensation for the months when she was unable to work because of her illness. Since the employer is deemed to have acted in bad faith, the award for attorneys fees is likewise upheld. Since Osdana did not name GCC in the complaint, the POEA and labor arbiter did not acquire jurisdiction over the foreign principal. However, this does not mean Osdana cannot claim from it. a.

Return Upon return to PH, she sought the help of Triple Eight, but to no avail. She filed a complaint before the POEA against Triple Eight, praying for unpaid and underpaid salaries, salaries for the unexpired portion of the employment contract, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees, as well as the revocation, cancellation, suspension and/or imposition of administrative sanctions against petitioner. Case was transferred to NLRC pursuant to RA 8042 (Migrant workers and overseas Filipinos act of 1995) Labor arbiter granted salaries, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fee. Upon appeal to NLRC, NLRC affirmed decision of LA. Certiorari to the supreme court Issue WON there is factual or legal basis for the award - yes WON Osdana was illegally dismissed by GCC - no WON laws of Saudi Arabia should apply to the employment of Osdana - no WON monetary awards are proper yes with modification WON Triple Eight is solely liable or its liability with the principal GCC is joint and several - no Ratio 1. Court found that decisions of the LA and the NLRC were based on facts and allegations in Osdana's position paper and supporting documents. Well settled is the rule that if doubt exists between evidence provided by employer and the employee, justice will favor the employee. 2. Citing Sec. 8 Rule 1 book VI of the Omnibus Rules implementing the labor code and Art. 284 thereof, Osdana was clearly terminated in violation of labor laws.

5.

10. Concepcion v. CA Adorna FACTS 1. 2. Rodrigo Concepcion accused Nicolas Nestor, a married man, of having an affair with Rodrigos sister in law, Florence Concepcion. The latter also happened to be Nicolas landlady and business partner. Rodrigo did so publicly and persistently (a) confronted and accused him in front of his wife, friends and neighbors (b) brought Nicolas to face Florence relatives (c) accused him and Florence when the two were together. All parties denied the existence of the affair. The actions caused tension in the personal relationship of Nestor with his wife, the business relationship with Florence, as well as public humiliation.

3.

Rodrigos DEFENSE (aside from procedural infirmities): 1. No basis in law alleged acts do not fall under Art 26 or Art 2219 2. His interest was to protect the family name.

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RTC/CA Awarded damages: Moral P50K, Exemplary P25K, Atty Fees P10K, Cost of suit. SC: Rodrigo was liable for damages 1. Art 26 protects a persons dignity, privacy, personality, and peace of mind. 2. Acts committed were at the very least an invasion of Nicolas privacy 3. Acts enumerated in Art 26 ARE NOT exhaustive. May be liable for damages for analogous or similar acts. 4. Rodrigo also liable under Art 2217. His acts were the proximate cause of Nicolas mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and social humiliation. 5. Rodrigo went beyond protecting the family name and took an inordinate interest in proving the rumors despite repeated denials and lack of evidence. 11. Manila Electric v. Spouses Chua Brillo FACTS: The Chuas are users at their residence of electric service provided by MERALCO. The latter installed an electric meter in a concrete post outside the Chuas perimeter fence. From June 11, 1996 to Sept 11, 1996, the Chuas consumed between 231 to 269 KwH of electricity per month, with their corresponding monthly electric bills ranging from P747.84 to P887.27. Oct 1996: Chuas were surprised to receive their Sept. 1996 bill for the amount of P4,906.87 for the period of Sept 11 to Oct 11, 1996. According to this bill, they consumed 1,297 KwH for this one month period, or approximately 553% higher than their previous monthly bill. Florence Chua (the Chuas daughter) went to MERALCO office to question the bill, but paid the bill under protest to avoid disconnection. MERALCO responded to the Chuas complaint by sending a representative , Albano, to their residence to inspect the electric meter. Albano filed a Meter/Socket Inspection Report stating that he replaced the old meter and installed a new one because the old meters terminal seal was missing, the cover seal was broken, and the meter had a broken sealing wire. The Chuas were billed based on the new meter(Oct1996-Jan1997), with an average usage ranging from 227 to 254 kilowatt hours, with corresponding monthly electric bills ranging from P700.00 to P800.00. Jan 1997:, the Chuas received a letter from MERALCO (findings re the meter): THE TERMINAL SEAL WAS MISSING. THE SEALING WIRE OF THE ERB AND MERALCO LEAD COVER SEALS WAS CUT. THE 1000TH, 100TH AND 10TH DIAL POINTERS OF THE REGISTER WERE OUT OF ALIGNMENT. Given the above condition(s) and in accordance with the rules implementing RA 7832, you are billed the amount of P183,983.66 (rate charge of P179,353.26 and energy tax of P4,630.40). Furthermore, the company is now allowed to collect Surcharges

as a penalty for all Violation of Contract cases apprehended effective January 17, 1995, which would be collected later. This is a formal demand upon you to pay the above stated amount at this office within 10 days from your receipt of this letter; if no settlement is made within the given grace period, your service shall be disconnected and the necessary criminal or civil action initiated against you for violation of RA 7832. Chuas refused to pay. MERALCO returned to their residence and removed the meter, thereby disconnecting their electric supply. MERALCO sent another demand letter stating that it had re-evaluated the Chuas case based on field findings and the documents they furnished, and reduced the amount they had to pay from P183,983.66 to P71,737.49. Chuasfiled a complaint for mandamus and damages, praying that they be granted a preliminary mandatory injunction to compel MERALCO to restore the electrical connection to their residence. The Chuasalso asked the court to award them moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses. RTC ruled in favor of the Chuas: Restore electric power. P300K moral damages P30K attorneys fees Cost of the suit CA affirmed. The meter had been tampered, but the tampering was mitigated by the Chuas voluntary act of going to MERALCO to report the possible defect in their meter. The voluntary act constituted good faith as MERALCO would not have discovered the defects in the meter if the Chuas had not reported the matter. RA 7832: Disconnecting electric service, may only be done when the owner of the house has either been caught in flagrante delicto in any of the acts constituting prima facie evidence of illegal use, or has been discovered a second time in any of the enumerated circumstances. Reduced moral damages to 100K MERALCO contends that: It had right to disconnect the electric service of the Chuas. It did not immediately disconnect electric service to the Chuas. It first sent several demand letters. RA 7832: no writs of injunction shall be issued by any court against any private electric utility exercising its right and authority to disconnect electric service unless there is prima facie evidence that the disconnection was made with evident bad faith or grave abuse of authority. Since the Chuas failed to prove MERALCOs evident bad faith in disconnecting their electric service, they are not entitled to an injunctive writ. It is entitled to collect the differential billing of P183,983.66. The differential billing represents the monetary equivalent of the electricity used by the Chuas but not registered by the meter. Even assuming that MERALCO had no right to disconnect the Chuas electric service, they are nevertheless not entitled to moral

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damages in the absence of evidence of damages they sustained. The Chuas did not sustain damages after the disconnection since they sourced their electric supply from another electric meter within the premises. SC ruled in favor of Chuas and denied the petition. MERALCO HAD NO RIGHT TO DISCONNECT DISCOVERY OF BROKEN METER, instance when it is prima facie evidence against user: The discovery of a tampered, broken, or fake seal on the meter shall only constitute prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity by the person who benefits from the illegal use if such discovery is personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law (brgy captain, brgy. leader, etc.) or a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) . Meralco is a monopoly that derives its power from the government. Clothing it with unilateral authority to disconnect would be equivalent to giving it a license to tyrannize its hapless customers. NO proof that MERALCO ever complied with the required presence of an officer of the law. Only Albano inspected the Chuas electric meter; no evidence shows that he was accompanied by anyone else. The IRR provides that the discovery must be personally witnessed and attested to by the consumer concerned or a duly authorized ERB representative SC: The phrase by the consumer concerned in the IRR is invalid because it is in excess of what the law being implemented provides. As RA 7832 stands, only the presence of an authorized government agent, either an officer of the law or an authorized representative of the ERB, would allow any of the circumstances enumerated in Section 4 of RA 7832 to be considered prima facie evidence MERALCO presented no proof that it ever caught the Chuas, or anyone acting in the Chuas behalf, in the act of tampering with their electric meter. The Chuas could not have been caught in flagrante delicto committing the tampering since in the first place, they were the ones who reported the defect in their meter. Moreover, the presence of a broken cover seal, broken sealing wire, and a missing terminal seal, is not enough to declare the Chuas in flagrante delicto tampering with the electric meter. As the basic complaint for mandamus alleged, without any serious refutation from the petitioner, the electric meter is in a concrete post outside of the Chuas perimeter fence; hence, in a location accessible to the public. We note, too, that MERALCO did not present any evidence that it caught the Chuas committing any of the acts constituting prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity for the second time. CHUAS are entitled to writ of injunction: MERALCO abused its superior and dominant position as well as the authority granted to it by law as a service provider when it persisted in disconnecting the Chuas electric service. Hence, the general prohibition against the issuance of a restraining order or an injunction under Section 9 of RA 7832 cannot apply. Rather, what must prevail

is the exception: an injunction can issue when a disconnection has been attended by bad faith or grave abuse of authority. THE DIFFERENTIAL BILLING CANNOT BE COLLECTED There is serious doubt on the allegation and assumption that the Chuas ever tampered with their electric meter. In the Chuas billing record, no discernable difference exists between the Chuas electric bills before and after MERALCO had replaced their tampered meter. The Chuas consumed between 231 to 269 kilowatt hours of electricity per month from June 11, 1996 to September 11, 1996, with their corresponding monthly electric bills ranging from P747.84 to P887.27. Tampering with the electric meter is committed by the consumer to prevent the meter from registering the correct amount of electric consumed; thus, while using the same regular power supply, they are billed for less than what they actually consumed. If the Chuas had truly tampered with their electric meter, it stands to reason that after MERALCO replaced the tampered electric meter with a new one, the Chuas electric bills would have gone up to reflect the electricity they were actually consuming. That the Chuas monthly electric consumption remained virtually unchanged even after the defective electric meter had been replaced strongly disproves the contentions that the Chuas tampered with their electric meter and that the Chuas electric meter registered less than the electricity they had actually consumed. NO factual or legal basis for differential billing: Meralco after examining the Chuas records for the past four years should have noticed that the September 1996 bill was truly unusual. As seen from their billing history, while the Chuas consistently consumed no more than 300 kilowatt hours of electricity every month for the past four years, in their September bill, their usage dramatically spiked to 1,297 kilowatt hours, or a difference of more than 400%. Even more telling is that after MERALCO replaced the alleged tampered electric meter, the Chuas continued to consume the same amount of electricity they had consumed prior to the September 1996 bill. MERALCO should have exercised prudence and employed another method to compute the Chuas differential billing, such as using the estimated monthly consumption based on a load inspection report. Also, theunexplained and inconsistent MERALCO posture (reducing the bill in a later letter) further strengthens our doubts on to the legitimacy and correctness of the Chuas differential billing. MERALCO guilty of inexcusable negligence MERALCOs failure to make the necessary repairs and replacement of the defective electric meter installed within the premises of petitioners was obviously the proximate cause of the instant dispute between the parties. Public utilities should be put on notice, as a deterrent, that if they completely disregard their duty of keeping their electric meters in

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serviceable condition, they run the risk of forfeiting, by reason of their negligence, amounts originally due from their customers. Jurisprudence: Electric companies are faulted for not immediately inspecting the electric meters after they noted a sudden drop in the consumers registered electric consumption. Since the public utility companies allowed several years to lapse before deciding to conduct an inspection of the electric meters, they were both negligent and consequently barred from collecting their claims of differential billing against the consumers. CASE AT BAR: MERALCO discovered the broken seals in the Chuas meter after more than four years (from August 1992 to October 1996), and only because the Chuas reported a possible defect with their electric meter to the public utility company. MERALCO has the imperative duty to make a reasonable and proper inspection of its apparatus and equipment to ensure that they do not malfunction, and the due diligence to discover and repair defects therein. Failure to perform such duties constitutes negligence.

facts and circumstances. Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty. As prevailing jurisprudence deems the award of moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 appropriate in cases where MERALCO wrongfully disconnected electric service, we uphold the CA ruling, reducing the moral damages awarded from P300,000.00 to P100,000.00. DISPOSITIVE PORTION: Petition is hereby DENIED. CA decision affirmed in toto. 12. Rodolfo Regala v. FedericoCarin - Buenaventura FACTS: Petitioner and respondent are adjacent neighbors at Spirig Street, BF Resort Village, LasPias City. When petitioner decided to renovate his one story residence by constructing a second floor, he under the guise of merely building an extension to his residence, approached respondent sometime in May 1998 for permission to bore a hole through a perimeter wall shared by both their respective properties, to which respondent verbally consented on condition that petitioner would clean the area affected by the work. Petitioners real intention was to build a second floor, in fact with a terrace atop the dividing wall. In the course of the construction of the second floor, respondent and his wife Marietta suffered from the dust and dirt which fell on their property. As petitioner failed to address the problem to respondents satisfaction, respondent filed a letter complaint with the Office of the City Engineer and Building Official of Las Pias City. No satisfactory agreement was reached at the barangay conciliation proceedings. Respondent filed on March 1999 a complaint for damages against petitioner before the RTC of Las Pias City. Respondent alleged that petitioner demolished the whole length of the wall from top to bottom into five parts for the purpose of constructing a second floor with terrace; and that debris and dust piled up on respondents property ruining his garden and forcing him to, among other things, shut some of the windows of his house. Respondent thus prayed for the award of moral and exemplary damages. The RTC decided in favor of respondent whom it awarded moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees plus costs of suit. On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision but modified the award of moral and exemplary damages. ISSUE: Whether or not the award of moral and exemplary damages is proper? NO RULING: The trial courts award of moral and exemplary damages, as affirmed by the appellate court, was premised on the damage and suffering sustained by respondent arising from quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. However, in prayers for moral damages, recovery is more an exception rather than the rule. Moral damages are not meant to be punitive but are designed to compensate and

DAMAGES ISSUE: Whether or not the award of moral damages is proper (YES) RATIO: Article 32 of the Civil Code provides that moral damages are proper when the rights of individuals, including the right against deprivation of property without due process of law, are violated . Jurisprudence has established the following requisites for the award of moral damages: there is an injury whether physical, mental, or psychological clearly sustained by the claimant; there is a culpable act or omission factually established; the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. CASE AT BAR: Considering the manner MERALCO disconnected the Chuas electric service, we find the award of moral damages proper . Apart from the havoc wreaked on the Chuas daily lives when MERALCO abruptly and without legal basis cut off their electricity, the removal of the electric meter also caused the Chuasextreme social humiliation and embarrassment as they were subjected to speculations in their neighborhood of being power thieves. As Mrs. Felicidad Chua testified, she suffered sleepless nights and felt serious anxiety after the removal of their electric meter came to the attention of the barangay. In fact, she even had to consult a doctor for this anxiety. Thus, even if the Chuas did subsequently obtain their electricity from another source, the damage to the Chuas reputation and social standing had already been done. However, moral damages, which are left largely to the sound discretion of the courts, should be granted in reasonable amounts, considering the attendant

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alleviate the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar harm unjustly caused to a person. To be entitled to such an award, the claimant must satisfactorily prove that he has suffered damages and that the injury causing it has sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code. Moreover,the damages must be shown to be the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission. The claimant must thus establish the factual basis of the damages and its causal tie with the acts of the defendant. In fine, an award of moral damages calls for the presentation of 1) evidence of besmirched reputation or physical, mental or psychological suffering sustained by the claimant; 2) a culpable act or omission factually established; 3) proof that the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the damages sustained by the claimant; and 4) the proof that the act is predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code. In the present case, respondent failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the injuries he sustained were the proximate effect of petitioners act or omission. It bears noting that petitioner was engaged in the lawful exercise of his property rights to introduce renovations to his abode. While he initially did not have a building permit and may have misrepresented his real intent when he initially sought respondents consent, the lack of the permit was inconsequential since it only rendered petitioner liable to administrative sanctions or penalties. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.[27] While the Court harbors no doubt that the incidents which gave rise to this dispute have brought anxiety and anguish to respondent, it is unconvinced that the damage inflicted upon respondents property was malicious or willful, an element crucial to merit an award of moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 26, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals is VACATED. The Court orders petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P25,000 as nominal damages. 13. Spouses Valenzuela v. Spouses Mano - Buhangin Facts: 1. 2. Petitioner Federico Valenzuela is the son of Andres Valenzuela who was the owner and possessor of the subject land located at Dampol 1st, Pulilan, Bulacan. The property was declared in the name of Andres. Andres passed away and the possession of said property was transferred to Federico. A document was executed by the heirs of Andres who waived all their rights to the property in favor of Federico.

3. 4.

5. Issue:

A Deed of Conditional Sale was executed between one Feliciano Georonimo and herein respondent, Jose Mano, Jr. wherein the former agreed to sell to the latter a parcel of land situated near the location of Federicos property. Federico then moved to Malabon and left the care of the property to his nephew, Vicente Joson. Federico instructed Vicente to construct a perimeter fence on his property but was prevented by Mano, claiming that 447 square meters was his property. Federico countered by saying that the land is part of the property he inherited from his father. A case was filed in the RTF of Bulacan, which ruled in favor of Federico. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the lower court decision.

WON Federico is the lawful owner of the land. WON Mano committed fraud. Held: On the first issue SC: There is a preponderance of evidence that Federico is the owner of the disputed property. We rule that Federico is the owner of the disputed 447 square meter lot. Feliciano, the owner of an adjacent lot next to Federicos, testified that petitioners father, Andres, owned the adjoining lot being claimed by Mano. On the second issue SC: We rule that Mano committed fraud in obtaining title to the disputed property. The evidence on record disclosed that even before Mano purchased the land from Feliciano, he had already caused the survey of a 2,739 square meter lot markedly different from the 2,056 square meter lot sold to him. He also caused the registration of the false measurement. On damages SC: Petitioners are entitled to an award of moral and exemplary damages. Moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. The person claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence. On the other hand, to warrant the award of exemplary damages, the wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and an award of damages would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in wanton fraudulent, reckless or malevolent manner. Mano committed fraud in obtaining title to the disputed property, thus he should be liable for both moral and exemplary damages. This was duly proven by petitioners. 14. Sulpicio Lines v. Curso - Celebrado

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G.R. No. 157009|March 17, 2010|Bersamin, J.

HELD: NO. (nakatipidsi SLI ). SLI is correct.

CAST: Petitioner:Sulpicio Lines, Inc. Respondents: Domingo, Lucia, Melecio, Segundo, Virgilio, Diosdada, and Cecilia (all surnamed E. Curso)

Pertinent provisions of NCC: Art. 1764: Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier. Art. 2206: (3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. The foregoing legal provisions set forth the persons entitled to moral damages. The omission from Art. 2206 (3) of the brothers and sisters of the deceased passenger reveals the legislative intent to exclude them from the recovery of moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. Inclusiouniusestexclusioalterius. The solemn power and duty of the courts to interpret and apply the law do NOT include the power to correct the law by reading into it what is NOT written therein. On moral damages (central topic) PURPOSE: indemnity or reparation, to enable the injured party to obtain the means, diversions, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone by reason of the tragic event. CONDITIONS for awarding (generally): (a) there must be an injury, whether physical, mental, or psychological, clearly substantiated by the claimant; (b) there must be a culpable act or omission factually established; (c) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant must be the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (d) the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Art. 2219. While it is true that under Art. 1003 (collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased) they succeeded to the entire estate. However, they were NOT included among the persons entitled to recover moral damages, as enumerated in Art. 2219. This provision does NOT include succession in the collateral line as a source of the right to recover moral damages. The usage of the phrase analogous cases in the provision means simply that the situation must be held similar to those expressly enumerated in the law in questionfollowing the ejusdem generis rule. Hence, Art. 1003 of the Civil Code is NOT concerned with recovery of moral damages. CONDITIONS for awarding (specific for breach of contract of carriage): (a) where death of a passenger results, or (b) it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud and bad faith, even if death does NOT result. Dispositive portion: The certiorari is granted, and the award of moral damages ordered by CA amounting to P100K is deleted and set aside.

FACTS: October 23, 1988: Dr. Curso boarded MV Doa Marilyn, a vessel by Sulpicio Lines, Inc (SLI) bound for Tacloban City. October 24, 1988: MV Doa Marilyn sank due to typhoon Unsang.The body of Dr. Curso (48 y/o) was NOT recovered, along with hundreds of other passengers. He is employed as a resident physician at the Naval District Hospital in Naval, Biliran with a basic monthly salary ofP3,940.00, and would have retired by December 20, 2004 (65 y/o). January 21, 1993: The respondents (surviving brothers and sisters of Dr. Curso, who is single and without issue), sued SLI in the RTC in Naval, Biliran to claim damages based on breach of contract of carriage by sea, because it had acted negligently in transporting Dr. Curso and the other passengers. Being the surviving heirs and successors-in-interest, petitioners pray to recover moral and other damages. SLI denied liability (of course), insisting that it was due to force majeure which exempted a common carrier from liability. SLI said that (1) MV Doa Marilyn was seaworthy in all respects (2) it was cleared by the Philippine Coast Guard for the voyage; (3) it conducted intensive search and rescue operations and (4) extended assistance and aid to the victims and their families. RTC:DismissedCursos prayer. The sinking of the vessel was due to force majeure. The officers of the MV Doa Marilyn had acted with the diligence required of a common carrier. CA: Sets aside RTCs decision. Theres an inadequate proof that SLI exercised the required degree of diligence. It ordered SLI to pay death indemnity, loss of earning capacity, moral damages (SLI does NOT agree with this) and the costs of suit.

ISSUE: WON the brothers and sisters of a deceased passenger in a case of breach of contract of carriage entitled to an award of moral damages against the carrier? SLI bases are Article 1764 and Article 2206 of NCC, and Receiver for North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. v. Ybaez, where SC disallowed the award of moral damages in favor of the brothers and sisters of a deceased passenger in an action upon breach of a contract of carriage.

15. ABS-CBN vs CA Deslate ABS-CBN and Viva Production Inc. executed a Film Exhibition Agreement whereby Viva gave ABS-CBN an exclusive right to exhibit some Viva films, said right being a right of

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first refusal to the next 24 Viva films for TV telecast under terms to be agreed upon by both parties. Viva (Del Rosario) offered ABS-CBN (Charo Santos-Concio) 3 film packages of 36 titles each over which ABS-CBN can exercise its right of first refusal. ABS-CBN could only tick off 10 titles, however, and as such rejected the list. Viva again offered ABS-CBN a list of 52 movie titles and 52 reruns from which ABS-CBN can choose another 52 titles for the price of P60M. What follows is a series of conflicting claims. Eugenio Lopez III of ABS-CBN claims that Del Rosario agreed to grant ABS-CBN exclusive film rights to 14 films for a total consideration of P36M, said agreement placed on a napkin and signed by Del Rosario. Del Rosario, on the other hand, claims that what he offered was 104 films for the price of P60M, to which Lopez promised to make a counterproposal, counterproposal embodied in a draft contract sent by Charo Santos-Concio offering P35M for 53 films. This was, however, rejected by Viva's Board of Directors. Viva ended up selling RBS (Republic Broadcasting Corporation) the exclusive right to air 104 Viva-produced and/or acquired films, including the 14 ones claimed by Eugenio Lopez III. ABS-CBN thus filed before the RTC a complaint for specific performance with a prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order against RBS, Viva Production, and Vicente Del Rosario. The trial court ruled in favor of RBS and awarded it actual, moral, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. CA, however, reduced the moral damages. RBS' claim for damages is based on its supposed harassment and prejudice by ABS-CBN pursuant to Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. It also claims that a juridical entity can recover moral and exemplary damages if it has a good reputation that is debased, like in this case when RBS was unable to air its promised showing of "Maging Sino Ka Man." ISSUE: w/n RBS should be awarded moral damages HELD: NO. (1) RBS is a corporation, and thus cannot suffer actual injury which moral damages are designed to compensate for. The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a corporation because, being an artificial person and having existence only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no emotions, no senses, It cannot, therefore, experience physical suffering and mental anguish, which call be experienced only by one having a nervous system. Moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered. and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer... It is aimed at the restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante, and should be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.

(2). ABS-CBN did not act in bad faith, which is at the core of Articles 19-21, the only possible sources of moral damages in this case. CC 2219 provides for the cases when moral damages may be awarded. In this case, RBS' claim can only fall under Section 10 of Art 2219: (10) Acts and actions referred to in Arts 21, 26, 27, 28, 29. 30, 32, 34, and 35. When ABS-CBN It was honestly convinced of the merits of its cause after it had undergone serious negotiations culminating in its formal submission of a draft contract. Settled is the rule that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. If damages result from a person's exercise of a right, it is damnumabsqueinjuria. 16. Filipinas Broadcasting v. Ago - Domingo J. Carpio Facts: Expose is a radio documentary hosted by Mel Rima and Jun Alegre. It aired ever morning over DZRC-AM which is owned by Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc. In the morning of December 15 and 15 1989, Rima and Alegre exposed various alleged complaints from students, teachers and parents against Ago Medical and Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine and its administrators. Claiming that the broadcasts were defamatory, AMEC and Angelita Ago, as Dean of AMECs College of Medicine, filed a complaint for damages against FBNI, Rima and Alegre on Februar 27, 1990. Quoted are portions of the allegedly libelous broadcasts: o if you have children taking medical course at AMEC-BCCM, advise them to pass all subjects because if they fail in any subject they will repeat their year level, taking up all subjects including those they have passed already o Earlier AMEC students in Physical Therapy had complained that the course is not recognized by DECS. o Students are required to take and pay for the subject even if the subject does not have an instructor - such greed for money on the part of AMECs administration. o On the other hand, the administrators of AMEC-BCCM, AMEC Science High School and the AMEC-Institute of Mass Communication in their effort to minimize expenses in terms of salary are absorbing or continues to accept rejects. AMEC is a dumping ground, garbage, not merely of moral and physical misfits. The complaint further alleged that AMEC is a reputable learning institution. With the supposed exposs, FBNI, Rima and Alegre transmitted malicious imputations, and as such, destroyed plaintiffs reputation. AMEC and

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Ago included FBNI as defendant for allegedly failing to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly Rima and Alegre. FBNI, Rima and Alegre, through Atty. RozilLozares, filed an Answer alleging that the broadcasts against AMEC were fair and true. FBNI, Rima and Alegre claimed that they were plainly impelled by a sense of public duty to report the goings-on in AMEC, [which is] an institution imbued with public interest. Trial ensued and the RTC found for AMEC ordering FBNI and Jun Alegre jointly and severally to pay the Plaintiff the amount of P300,000 for moral damages, plus P30,000 as attorneys fees and cost of suit. CA modified the judgment by ordering Rima to be solidarily liable with Alegre and FNBI. However, The appellate court denied Agos claim for damages and attorneys fees because the broadcasts were directed against AMEC, and not against her.

17. Crystal v. BPI - Doria Facts:

Issues: 1. 2. WON the broadcasts are libelous. WON AMEC is entitled to Moral Damages.

Held 1. Yes. Every defamatory imputation is presumed malicious. Rima and Alegre failed to show adequately their good intention and justifiable motive in airing the supposed gripes of the students. As hosts of a documentary or public affairs program, Rima and Alegre should have presented the public issues free from inaccurate and misleading information. Hearing the students alleged complaints a month before the expos,] they had sufficient time to verify their sources and information. However, Rima and Alegre hardly made a thorough investigation of the students alleged gripes. Neither did they inquire about nor confirm the purported irregularities in AMEC from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. Alegre testified that he merely went to AMEC to verify his report from an alleged AMEC official who refused to disclose any information. Alegre simply relied on the words of the students because they were many and not because there is proof that what they are saying is true.] This plainly shows Rima and Alegres reckless disregard of whether their report was true or not. Yes. AMECs claim for moral damages falls under item 7 of Article 2219 of the Civil Code. This provision expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. Article 2219(7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a natural or juridical person. Therefore, a juridical person such as a corporation can validly complain for libel or any other form of defamation and claim for moral damages.[ Moreover, where the broadcast is libelous per se, the law implies damages. In such a case, evidence of an honest mistake or the want of character or reputation of the party libeled goes only in mitigation of damages. Neither in such a case is the plaintiff required to introduce evidence of actual damages as a condition precedent to the recovery of some damages. In this case, the broadcasts are libelous per se. Thus, AMEC is entitled to moral damages.

Spouses Raymundo and Desamparados obtained a 300k loan in behalf of Cebu Contractors Consortium Co. (CCCC) from BPI-Butuan secured by a chattel mortgage on heavy equipment and machinery On the same day, spouses executed a Continuing Suretyship in favor of BPIButuan binding themselves to pay aggregate principal sum not exceeding 300k CCCC renewed a previous 120k loan with BPI-Cebu, with spouses signing in their personal capacities and as managing partners of CCCC holding them solidarily liable, secured by real estate mortgage over their own real property CCCC also obtained another loan worth 200k secured by another real estate mortgage over the same lot Because CCCC and the spouses failed to pay, BPI resorted to foreclosure of the chattel and real estate mortgage. Foreclosure of former pushed through, proceeds amounting to 240k but insufficient to pay 707k BPI-Butuan loan. On the other hand, Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA) offered to buy the lot subject of the 2 real estate mortgages. BPI rejected this offer. BPI filed complaint for sum of money against CCCC and the spouses. TC ruled in favor of BPI, prompting BPI to institute extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage Spouses filed an action for Injunction with damages claiming foreclosure is illegal because BPI should have exhausted CCCCs properties first, as they are mere guarantors They also prayed for the awarding of moral and exemplary damages, inter alia TC dismissed spouses complaint ruling that they are solidarily liable and thus, are not entitled to the benefit of exhaustion. It also ordered them to pay moral and exemplary damages to BPI. Appealed to, and then moved for MR at, CA but was both were dismissed

Issue: 1. W/N spouses are solidarily liable for the three loans YES 2. W/N award of moral damages to BPI, a juridical person, is correct NO Held: 1. Petitioners rely on IBAAs offer to purchase the mortgaged lot from them and to directly pay BPI out of the proceeds thereof to settle the loan. BPIs refusal to agree to such payment scheme cannot extinguish the spouses loan obligation. In the first place, IBAA is not privy to the loan agreement or the promissory note between the spouses and BPI. Contracts, after all, take effect only between the parties, their successors in interest, heirs and assigns.21 Besides, under Art. 1236 of the Civil Code, the creditor is not bound

2.

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to accept payment or performance by a third person who has no interest in the fulfillment of the obligation, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. We see no stipulation in the promissory note which states that a third person may fulfill the spouses obligation. A solidary obligation is one in which each of the debtors is liable for the entire obligation, and each of the creditors is entitled to demand the satisfaction of the whole obligation from any or all of the debtors. A liability is solidary "only when the obligation expressly so states, when the law so provides or when the nature of the obligation so requires." More importantly, the promissory note, wherein the spouses undertook to be solidarily liable for the principal loan, partakes the nature of a suretyship and therefore is an additional security for the loan. Thus we held in one case that if solidary liability was instituted to "guarantee" a principal obligation, the law deems the contract to be one of suretyship.26 And while a contract of a surety is in essence secondary only to a valid principal obligation, the suretys liability to the creditor or promisee of the principal is said to be direct, primary, and absolute; in other words, the surety is directly and equally bound with the principal. The surety therefore becomes liable for the debt or duty of another even if he possesses no direct or personal interest over the obligations nor does he receive any benefit therefrom. 2. Moral damages are meant to compensate the claimant for any physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injuries unjustly caused.30 Such damages, to be recoverable, must be the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission the factual basis for which is satisfactorily established by the aggrieved party.31 There being no wrongful or unjust act on the part of BPI in demanding payment from them and in seeking the foreclosure of the chattel and real estate mortgages, there is no lawful basis for award of damages in favor of the spouses. Neither is BPI entitled to moral damages. A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock. The Court held that the statements in Manero and Mambulao were mere obiter dicta, implying that the award of moral damages to corporations is not a hard and fast rule. Indeed, while the Court may allow the grant of moral damages to corporations, it is not automatically granted; there must still be proof of the existence of the factual basis of the damage and its causal relation to the defendants acts. This is so because moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. The spouses complaint against BPI proved to be unfounded, but it does not automatically entitle BPI to moral damages. Although the institution of a clearly unfounded civil suit can at times be a legal

justification for an award of attorney's fees, such filing, however, has almost invariably been held not to be a ground for an award of moral damages. The rationale for the rule is that the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. Otherwise, moral damages must every time be awarded in favor of the prevailing defendant against an unsuccessful plaintiff.40 BPI may have been inconvenienced by the suit, but we do not see how it could have possibly suffered besmirched reputation on account of the single suit alone. Hence, the award of moral damages should be deleted. 18. Lopez v. Pan Am World Airways - Enteria 16 SCRA 431 BENGZON; March 30, 1966 FACTS - Sen Fernando Lopez, his wife, his son-in-law, and his daughter made reservations, through their agency, for first class accommodations in the Tokyo San Francisco flight of PAN-AM . PAN-AM's SF head office confirmed the reservations. First class tickets were subsequently issued, with the total fare having been fully paid before this. -As scheduled, they left Manila and as soon as they arrived in Tokyo, they contacted PANAM's Tokyo office regarding their accommodations. For the given reason that the first class seats were all booked up , PAN-AM's Tokyo office informed them that they could not go in that flight unless they took the tourist class. Due to pressing engagements in the US, they were constrained to take PAN-AM's flight as tourist passengers . - Sen Lopez filed suit for damages alleging breach of contracts in bad faith by defendant out of racial prejudice against Orientals. He asked for P500T actual and moral damages, P100T exemplary damages, P25T attorney's fees plus costs. - PAN-AM asserted that its failure to provide first class accommodations to plaintiffs was due to honest error of its employees . It interposed a counterclaim for atty's fees of P25T.- CFI Rizal decision : in favor of plaintiff and granted (a) P100T, moral damages; (b) P20T, exemplary damages; (c) P25T, atty's fees, and costs of the action. - Plaintiffs filed MFR asking that moral damages be increased to P400T and for 6% interest per annum on amount to be granted. - CFI modified decision : (a) P150T, moral damages; (b) P25T, exemplary damages; with legal interest on both from date of filing of complaint until paid; (c) P25T, atty's fees; and costs of the action. -Both appealed : PAN-AM contended that there was NO bad faith; Lopez et al wanted a total of P650T as award for damages. ISSUES 1. WON there was bad faith on the part of PAN-AM 2. WON the amount of damages should be increased HELD

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1. YES Reasoning - Defendant through its agents first cancelled plaintiffs, reservations by mistake and thereafter deliberately and intentionally withheld from plaintiffs or their travel agent such information. In so misleading plaintiffs into purchasing first class tickets in the conviction that they had confirmed reservations, when in fact they had none, defendant wilfully and knowingly placed itself into the position of having to breach its contracts with plaintiffs should there be no last-minute cancellation by other passengers before flight time , as it turned out in this case. Bad faith means a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill-will. - At any rate, granting all the mistakes advanced by the defendant, there would at least be negligence so gross and reckless as to amount to malice or bad faith . 2. YES Ratio Moral damages are recoverable in breach of contracts where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith (Art. 2220). Exemplary or corrective damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in breach of contract where the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner (Art. 2229, 2232). A written contract for an attorney's services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable (Sec. 24, Rule 138, ROC). - Factors in determining Amount for Moral Damages : The amount of damages awarded in this appeal has been determined by adequately considering the official, political, social, and financial standing of the offended parties on one hand, and the business and financial position of the offender on the other. The present rate of exchange and the terms at which the amount of damages awarded would approximately be in U.S. dollars has also been considered. (a) MORAL DAMAGES As a proximate result of defendant's breach in bad faith of its contracts with plaintiffs, the latter suffered social humiliation, wounded feelings, serious anxiety and mental anguish. It may not be humiliating to travel as tourist passengers; it is humiliating to be compelled to travel as such, contrary to what is rightfully to be expected from the contractual undertaking Sen Lopez was then Senate President Pro Tempore. International carriers like defendant know the prestige of such an office. For the Senate is not only the Upper Chamber of the Philippine Congress, but the nation's treaty-ratifying body. He was also former VicePresident of the Philippines. (MD = P100T) - Mrs. Maria Lopez, as wife of the Senator, shared his prestige and therefore his humiliation. In addition she suffered physical discomfort during the 13-hour trip; her reason for going to the US was actually for medical check-up and relaxation. The fact that the seating spaces in the tourist class are quite narrower than in first class will suffice to show that she indeed experienced physical suffering during the trip. (MD = P50T) - Mr. and Mrs. Alfredo Montelibano, Jr., were travelling as immediate members of the family of Sen Lopez. Even if they initially wanted to change their seat reservations from first class to tourist class, they eventually paid for first class seats. Hence, they also suffered social humiliation. (MD = P25T each) (b) EXEMPLARY DAMAGES- In view of its nature, it should be imposed in such an amount as to effectively deter similar breach of

contracts in the future by defendant or other airlines. (ED = P75T) (c) ATTORNEYS FEES- Record shows a written contract of services wherein plaintiffs engaged the services of their counsel Atty. Francisco and agreed to pay the sum of P25T upon the termination of the case in the CFI, and another P25T if case is appealed to the SC. This is reasonable considering the subject matter of the present controversy, the professional standing of the attorney for plaintiffs-appellants, and the extent of the service rendered by him . Disposition Judgment appealed from is hereby MODIFIED so as to award in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant, the following: (1) P200T as moral damages, divided among plaintiffs; (2) P75T as exemplary or corrective damages; (3) Interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on the moral and exemplary damages, from date of amended CFI decision, until said damages are fully paid; (4) P50T as attorney's fees; and (5) Costs of action. Counterclaim dismissed.

IV. NOMINAL DAMAGES

Gonzales v PCIB - Escalona 2011 Velasco, J. PCIB granted a credit line to Gonzales via a Credit-On-Hand Loan Agreement (COHLA). Gonzales also had a Foreign Currency Deposit (FCD) of $8.7K with PCIB. Gonzales and his wife got a 500K loan. Later, SpsPanlilio and Gonzales obtained 2 more loans of 1M and 300K. These 3 loans (Total: P1.8M) were covered by 3 promissory notes (naming Gonzasolidarily liable), and secured by REM over some land. But, it was ONLY spsPanlilio who received P1.8M loan proceeds. SpsPanlilio paid the monthly interest dues but later on defaulted in payment. Meantime, Gonzales issued a 250K check for Rene Unson. Upon Unsons presentment of check, it was dishonored due to the termination by PCIB of the credit line under COHLA. PCIB also froze FCD account. Gonzales had a falling out withUnson; got embarrassed at the Philippine Columbian Assoc (PCA) when Unson confronted him there in front of other members. He was forced to pay the P250K he owed Unson in cash. Through counsel, he wrote PCIB insisting that the check had been fully funded, demanded the return of the proceeds of his FCD, damages for the unjust dishonor of the check PCIB refused demands; Gonzales filed case for damages

RTC: Denied; Gonzales solidarily liable with SpsPanlilio on the 3 loans; no fault in PCIBs termination of the COHLA and in freezing FCD account

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CA: affirmed ISSUES: a) WON Gonzales is liable for the 3 promissory notes; b) WON PCIB properly dishonored the check SC: Partly meritorious. 1. 2. Yes, Gonzales solidarily liable with Panlilios for loans because promissory notes say so (he co-signed them as accommodation party; words jointly and severally appear on notes) PCIB improperly and negligently dishonored the check There was no prior notice to Gonzales before COHLA was terminated, as required by clear stipulation (xxx can be termina ted UPON PRIOR NOTICE TO CLIENT). Gonzales has a right to be properly apprised of the default of the loan because he is a co-signatory of the promissory notes. b. This is a violation of Art 19 which requires honesty and good faith in exercising ones rights. Theres prima facie evidence of malice/bad faith when PCIB failed to give prior notice of COHLA termination. DAMAGES: The termination of the COHLA by PCIB without prior notice and the subsequent dishonor of the check constitute acts contra bonus mores under Art. 21 Hence Court finds payment of nominal damages warranted (cited Almeda v. Cario: x xxso long as there is a showing of a violation of the right of the plaintiff, an award of nominal damages is proper) a.

cake will not arrive because the order slip got lost and they were forced to buy the only available cake which is only two-layered CA initially decided the award of moral damages of P250,000, exemplary damages of P100,000, cost of cate of P3,175 and attorneys fee of P10,000

ISSUES: WON nominal damages may be awarded

Decision: Yes, P10,000

Ratio: First, moral damages and exemplary damages were removed by the SC by the fact that there was no bad faith proven For nominal damages, the court stated the following: o petitioners must be held liable for nominal damages for insensitivity, inadvertence or inattention to their customer's anxiety and need of the hour. o "Nominal damages are 'recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind or where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown. o "to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered."

3.

PARTLYGRANTED (50K NOMINAL; 50K MD; 10K ED; 50K AF) Twin Ace Holdings Corporation v. Rufina and Company - CarlosTheFierce Francisco v. FerrerFullecido FACTS: Facts: Rebecca Lo and her daughter ordered a three layer cake from Fountainhead Bakeshop. This will be used as a wedding cake for the wedding of the daughter Upon arrival on the reception (Cebu Country Club), they noticed the absence of the wedding cake and made follow up call to Fountainhead Initially, they were informed that the cake will arrive and it was late due to traffic. However, at 8 pm (2 hours after the set deadline) they were informed that the Rufina and Company, manufacturer of patis and other food seasonings, uses container bottles owned by Twin Ace without any authority or permission from the latter.

Twin Ace is a manufacturer of rhum, wines, and liquor under the name and style Tanduay Distillers. It has registered its mark of ownership of its bottles with the Bureau of Patent, Trademarks and Technology Transfer under Republic Act No. 623. It sells its products to the public excluding the bottles. It makes substantial investments in brand new bottles which it buys from glass factories and which they use for about five

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times in order to recover the cost of acquisition. It thus retrieves its used empty bottles, washes and uses them over and over again as containers for its products. Twin Ace applied for and was granted a writ of replevin over 26,241 empty bottles marked TANDUAY DISTILLERY, INC. at the address of Rufina.

On the issue of nominal damages:

1.

Article 2222 of the Civil Code states that the court may award nominal damages in every obligation arising from any source enumerated in Article 1157, or in every other case where any property right has been invaded. Nominal damages are given in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. In another case, this Court held that when plaintiff suffers some species of injury not enough to warrant an award of actual damages, the court may award nominal damages. The award of nominal damages to Rufina in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) is reasonable, warranted and justified.

Rufina and Company claimed that the marked bottles it used as containers for its products were purchased from junk dealers; hence it became the owner thereof.

2.

Trial Court ruled in favor of Rufina, ordered the return of the bottles, because the law prohibiting unauthorized use of such container bottles with duly registered marks of ownership exempts manufacturers of sisi, bagoong, patis, and other similar native products, and; awardedPhP 100K nominal damages , 100K actual damages, 1M moral damages for besmirched reputation, and 50K attorneys fees

3.

Court of Appeals Modified trial courts decision Deleted the award of damages, except nominal dama ges and attorneys fees Reduced nominal damages to 50,000

Note: Above is the only explanation (if you may consider this an explanation to begin with) provided by the Court. China Airlines, Ltd. v. CA Manalo

ISSUE: Whether or not award of nominal damages is proper HELD: Yes, the award of nominal damages is proper

Facts: Respondents, Antonio Salvador and Rolando Lao planned to travel to Los Angeles, California to pursue a cable business deal involving the distribution of Filipino films. Initially, Morelia Travel Agency booked their flight with China Airlines (CAL). Upon discovering that Morelia charged higher rates than American Express Travel (Amexco), they dropped the services of Morelia. Lao called Amexco claiming that he and Salvador had a confirmed booking with CAL. Lao then gave to Amexco the record locator number that CAL issued previously to Morelia. CAL confirmed the booking. When the respondents were at the airport, CAL prevented them from boarding because their names were not in the passenger's manifest. CAL cancelled the reservations when Morelia revoked the booking. But the respondents were able to get a flight with Northwest Airlines. Issue/s: 1. Whether or not there was a breach in the contract of carriage. 2. Whether or not there there was bad faith. 3. Whether or not there was sufficient claims for damages.

RATIO: The exemption to manufacturers of sisi, bagoong, patis from compliance with the law that regulates the use of duly stamped or marked bottles is without distinction or qualification as to whether they are small, medium or large scale. The exemption also applies to both criminal and civil liability of the patis manufacturer.

Clearly, Rufina violated no law in its use of the bottles of Twin Ace. The Court also took judicial notice of the standard practice today that the cost of the container is included in the selling price of the product such that the buyer of the liquor or any such product from any store is not required to return the bottle.

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Held: 1. Yes. When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed for a particular flight on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises. The passenger has every right to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date. When CAL did not allow respondents, who were in possession of the confirmed tickets, from boarding its airplane because their names were not in the manifest, it ocnsituted a breach of contract of carriage. 2. No. Bad faith should always be established by clear and convincing evidence since the law always presumes good faith. In the case, there were three reasons why CAL cancelled the reservations. First was Amexco's unauthorized use of the record locator number. Second was CAL's negligence in confirming the reservations of Amexco. Third was the absence of the correct contact numbers of private respondents. There was no concerted effort on the part of CAL to cancel respondent's reservations in favor of other passengers. 3. Not entitled to moral damages because not every case of mental anguish, fright or anxiety calls for the award of moral damages. Not entitled to exemplary damages because CAL was not in bad faith and its employees did not act in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. Not entitled to actual damages because respondents did not shell out any money for their CAL tickets. Respondents would have been entitled to the price difference between the tickets of CAL and Northwest had the latter cost more than the former but this was not the case. Evidence shows that Northwest tickets ($625) cost less than CAL tickets ($629). The court cannot order reimbursement of the Northwest tickets because this would have enabled respondents to fly for free. The cost of the tickets were a necessary expense that private respondents could not pass on to CAL. Entitled to nominal damages of P5,000 when the plaintiff suffers some species of injury not enough to warrant an award of actual damages. The court may award nominal damages purely to vindicate a right of a plaintiff which defendant has violated and not to indemnify any loss the plaintiff has suffered. The court may award nominal damages in every obligation arising from any source enumerated in Article 1157 of the Civil Code, or in any case where there is an invasion of any property right. This is because they still suffered some form of injury. Undeniably, however, private respondents soldered some form of injury. CAL confirmed the reservations of private respondents carelessly. Private respondents relied on this confirmation. Private respondents went through the trouble of going to the airport at the appointed time expecting that they would be able to board CAL Flight 632. To their consternation, CAL personnel prevented them from boarding because Morelia cancelled their reservations. Spouses Guanio v. Shangri-la Mendoza

(2001), QUISUMBING, J.: Facts: Spouses Miguel and Rosalina de Rodriguez adopted Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa. Years later, Miguel died intestate. Private respondents filed an action to annul the adoption of Maria Elena. The RTC upheld the validity of the adoption. While the case is pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals, the Rodriguezes entered into a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition with respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and of another sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. Settlement covered 14 parcels of land. Rodriguezes were able to secure new TCTs and were able to transfer some parcels to the other private respondents. The adoption was subsequently upheld by the CA. When the adoption was upheld, petitioner Maria Elena sent her daughter to claim their share of the properties from the Rodriguezes. The latter refused saying that Maria Elena and Loreto were not heirs since they were not their blood relatives. Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul the partition between Rosalina and Rodriguezes. RTC dismissed this complaint. The CA affirmed this decision. Issues: W/N petitioners action has prescribed. No. W/N the partition is valid. Not as to Maria Elena. W/N the petitioner can recover land already conveyed to 3 rd persons. Not in this action. Issue # 1: Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a 2 year prescriptive period if all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians. Petitioner did not participate in the extrajudicial partition so the 2 year prescriptive period is not applicable in her case. The prescription period applicable is four (4) years. [The action to annul] a deed of extrajudicial settlement upon the ground of fraud...may be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively. Complaint of the petitioner was filed on January 28, 1987, or three years and ten months after the questioned extrajudicial settlement was executed.

Pedrosa v. CA Millena

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Issue # 2: Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court: no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. Since Maria Elena did not participate in the said partition, the settlement is not binding on her. To say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in the partitioning is imprecise. Maria Elena, the adopted child, was no longer a minor at the time Miguel died. Rosalina, only represented her own interests and not those of Maria Elena. Since Miguel predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estate automatically vested to his child and widow, in equal shares. Respondent Rodriguezes interests did not include Miguels estate but only Pilars estate. Issue #3:

Nominal damages are awarded in this instance in recognition of the existence of a technical injury.The amount to be awarded as such damages should at least commensurate to the injury sustained by the petitioner considering the concept and purpose of said damages. Robes-Francisco v. CFI - Monfort 30 October 1978 Muoz-Palma | 1st Division

Facts: 1. 2. Robes-Francisco Realty agreed to sell to Lolita Millan a parcel of land in Caloocan. Millan complied with her obligation under the contract and paid the installments stipulated. She made repeated demands upon the corporation for the execution of the final deed of sale and the issuance to her of the TCT. The parties executed a deed of absolute sale. The deed of absolute sale contained, among others, this particular provision: That the VENDOR further warrants that the TCT of the parcel of land shall be transferred in the name of the VENDEE within the period of 6 mos from the date of full payment and in case the VENDOR fails to issue said TCT, it shall bear the obligation to refund to the VENDEE the total amount already paid for, plus an interest at the rate of 4% per annum. Notwithstanding the lapse of the 6 mos, the corporation failed to cause the issuance of the TCT. Millan filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against RobesFrancisco Realty in the CFI. CFI: Ordered Robes-Francisco Realty to register deed of absolute sale in favor of Lolita Millan and pay NOMINAL DAMAGES of P20K, finding that the realty corporation failed to cause the issuance of the corresponding TCT because the parcel of land conveyed to Millan was included among other properties of the corporation mortgaged to the GSIS to secure an obligation of P10M and that the owner's duplicate certificate of title of the subdivision was in the possession of the GSIS.

Given the circumstances in this case, we are constrained to hold that this is not the proper forum to decide this issue. The properties sought to be recovered by the petitioner are now all registered under the name of third parties. A Torrens Title cannot be collaterally attacked. The validity of the title can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for such purpose.

3. 4.

About damages: Actual and Moral damages: No receipts, agreements or any other documentary evidence was presented to justify such claim for damages. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. These cannot be awarded in the absence of any factual basis Nominal damages: P100,000 was granted. Under the law, nominal damages are awarded, so that a plaintiffs right, which has been invaded or violated by defendants may be vindicated and recognized. In this case, (1) technically, petitioner sustained injury but which, unfortunately, was not adequately and properly proved (2) petitioner was unlawfully deprived of her legal participation in the partition of the estate of Miguel, her adoptive father (3) respondents had transferred portions of the properties involved to third parties (4) this case has dragged on for more than a decade, 5. 6. 7.

Issue: WON TC erred in awarding nominal damages. Held: NO, but circumstances of the case warrant a reduction of the amount. SC:

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1.

Petitioner corporation was guilty of delay, amounting to nonperformance of its obligation. 2. Article 170 of the Civil Code expressly provides that those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages . 3. Unfortunately, the vendee, now private respondent, submitted her case without presenting evidence on the ACTUAL DAMAGES suffered by her as a result of the nonperformance of petitioner's obligation under the deed of sale. 4. Nonetheless, the facts show that the right of the vendee to acquire title to the lot bought by her was violated by petitioner and this entitles her at the very least to nominal damages. 5. Pertinent provisions are 2221 and 2222. 6. Under the foregoing provisions, nominal damages are not intended for indemnification of loss suffered but for the vindication or recognition of a right violated or invaded. 7. They are recoverable where some injury has been done the amount of which the evidence fails to show, the assessment of damages being left to the discretion of the court according to the circumstances of the case. 8. Nominal damages are damages in name only and not in fact, and are allowed, not as an equivalent of a wrong inflicted, but simply in recognition of the existence of a technical injury. 9. Circumstances of a particular case will determine whether or not the amount assessed as nominal damages is within the scope or intent of the law, NCC Art. 2221. 10. We are of the view that the amount of P20K is excessive. 11. Facts do not show that there was bad faith or fraud. There was the expectation of the vendor that arrangements were possible for the GSIS to make partial releases of the subdivision lots from the overall real estate mortgage. It was simply unfortunate that petitioner did not succeed in that regard. 12. We hold that the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) by way of nominal damages is fair and just under the following circumstances. People v. Bernardo Naminigit March 11, 2002 J. Mejo Facts: Teresa Bernardo was convicted by the RTC of the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor and sentenced her to s reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the complainant, Rosita Tolibas P300, 000.00 as moral damages and P50, 000.00 as nominal damages, and to pay the costs.The judgment of conviction was affirmed by SC. Rosita Tolibas (mother) was with her 2 children, Roselle (12 y/o) and Rosalyn (15-day old) at the Fabella Medical Center for check-up. While the mother was undergoing check-up, the baby was carried by Roselle outside the clinic while waiting for their mother. Bernardobefriended Roselle. She asked Roselle to buy

ice water assuring her that she would take care of her sister. Roselle was not able to find ice water. On her way back to the hospital, she saw the accused running away with her baby sister. She chased the appellant. She held and pulled the appellants skirt to prevent her from getting away with her baby sister, but the Bernardo persisted in running with Roselle holding on to the appellants skirt. Torres, a barangay kagawad witnessed the incident. He accosted Bernardo. Torres took the baby from the appellant and entrusted the baby to his wife. Then he led appellant and Roselle to the hospital to look for the mother of the baby. Torres found Rosita at the hospital and she confirmed to him that she was the mother of the baby. Issue: W/N Bernardo is liable to pay moral and nominal damages with interest. Held: Yes, Bernado is liable to pay both moral and nominal damages. The crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor is clearly analogous to illegal and arbitrary detention or arrest. Thus, the award of moral damages is justified. However, taking into consideration the fact that appellant had custody of the child only for a few minutes before being apprehended, P300, 000.00 was reduced to P10,000.00 The award of nominal damages is allowed under Article 2221 which states that, Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. However, given the relatively short duration of the childs kidnapping, the amount of P50,000.00 awarded as nominal damages excessive, and reduced the same to P10,000.00.

VI. TEMPERATE DAMAGES Pleno v. CA Ogena Facts: -Private respondent De Luna, driver of private respondent company Philippine Paper Products, Inc. (PPPI), sideswiped with his cargo truck plaintiff Pleno's Volkswagen Kombi van, causing the latter vehicle to swerve and ram into a parked truck.

-Pleno was hospitalized for 5 months, with serious injuries to his head and legs. His passenger Longley (New Zealander geologist) escaped with minor injuries.

-Blunt force trauma to plaintiff's head due to accident led to defective eyesight (double vision in left eye). Also alleged that said injury affected his brain to the point that "he acted beyond normalcy at times".

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-Pleno's legs sustained multiple fractures that required surgery to fix, which led to a permanent deformity (shortening of his left leg).

-TC finds for Pleno, awards actual damages, exemplary damages, temperate damages (P200k), moral damages and attorney's fees.

-Actual income however was not established, so no award was given for actual damages pertaining to lost earning capacity (Note: actual damages was awarded for medical expenses). Temperate damages, however, was awarded for his loss/impairment of earning capacity. (What did the book say:this would constitute yet another exception to the rule requiring documentary evidence for the award of loss for earning capacity)

-CA affirms but reduces temperate (P100k), moral, and attorney's fees to half of their original amounts respectively. Said reduction was based on the ground that the awards were "too high" considering the fact that De Luna was just a driver and that PPPI was only subsidiarily liable.

-It was also alleged that after the accident, his leg deformity and his defective eyesight made him suffer from inferiority complex and he was thus no longer active in business and social life.

-Both parties thus appeal CA decision (PPPI to disclaim liability, Pleno due to reduction of damages)

Tan vs. OMC - Pascual October 19, 2011 FACTS:

Issue: WON CA's reduction of damages was justified

Held: No.

-CA did not provide sufficient reason to alter TC's factual findings that justified said awards. SC thus affirms TC's award (except for attorney's fees which they reduced from 30k to 20k).

-SC adopted TC's findings WRT to awards of temperate damages, saying it was awarded due to Pleno's loss of earning capacity

-It was established that Pleno was an entrepreneur with his own corporation, and that prior to the accident he was conducting an ocular inspection (with the geologist Longley) of the site of his corporation. It was established that he was the founder of Mayon Ceramics Corporation, a manufacturer of ceramic wares. It was alleged that he had several projects in line that might have pushed through if not for the accident

Arambala was driving a truck with a trailer owned by OMC, along Meralco Road, Sucat, Muntinlupa City. When Arambala noticed that the truck had suddenly lost its brakes, he told his companion to jump out. Soon thereafter, he also jumped out and abandoned the truck. Driverless, the truck rammed into the house and tailoring shop owned by petitioner Leticia Tan and her husband Celedonio Tan, instantly killing Celedonio who was standing at the doorway of the house at the time. The petitioners alleged that the collision occurred due to OMCs gross negligence in not properly maintaining the truck, and to Arambalas recklessness when he abandoned the moving truck. Thus, they claimed that the respondents should be held jointly and severally liable for the actual damages that they suffered, which include the damage to their properties, the funeral expenses they incurred for Celedonio Tans burial, as well as the loss of his earning capacity. The petitioners also asked for moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees. The respondents denied any liability for the collision, essentially claiming that the damage to the petitioners was caused by a fortuitous event, since the truck skidded due to the slippery condition of the road caused by spilled motor oil. The RTC held OMC jointly and severally liable with Arambala for the damage caused to the petitioners, based on the principle of vicarious liability embodied in Article 218012 of the Civil Code The CA affirmed but reduced the actual damages, deleted the RTCs award for loss of earning capacity, reduced the exemplary damages and deleted the award of attorneys fees

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ISSUE: what damages the petitioners are entitled to HELD: Temperate damages in lieu of actual damages For petitioners claim for actual damages arising from the damage inflicted on petitioner Leticia Tans house and tailoring shop, taking into account the sewing machines and various household appliances affected, there must be pleading and proof of actual damages suffered. Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. To justify an award of actual damages, there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss, credence can be given only to claims which are duly supported by receipts. The petitioners do not deny that they did not submit any receipt to support their claim for actual damages to prove the monetary value of the damage caused to the house and tailoring shop when the truck rammed into them. Thus, no actual damages for the destruction to petitioner Leticia Tans house and tailoring shop can be awarded. Nonetheless, absent competent proof on the actual damages suffered, a party still has the option of claiming temperate damages, which may be allowed in cases where, from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced although the court is convinced that the aggrieved party suffered some pecuniary loss. As defined in Article 2224 of the Civil Code: Article 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. The photographs the petitioners presented as evidence show the extent of the damage done to the house, the tailoring shop and the petitioners ap pliances and equipment. This damage was directly attributable to Arambalas gross negligence in handling OMCs truck. Unfortunately, these photographs are not enough to establish the amount of the loss with certainty. From the attendant circumstances and given the property destroyed, the amount of P200,000 is a fair and sufficient award by way of temperate damages. Temperate damages in lieu of loss of earning capacity Similarly, the CA was correct in disallowing the award of actual damages for loss of earning capacity. Damages for loss of earning capacity are awarded pursuant to Article

2206 of the Civil Code As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when: (1) the deceased is selfemployed and earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of work, no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. According to the petitioners, prior to his death, Celedonio was a self-employed tailor who earned approximately P156,000 a year, or P13,000.00 a month. At the time of his death in 1995, the prevailing daily minimum wage was P145 or P3,770 per month, provided the wage earner had only one rest day per week. Even if we take judicial notice of the fact that a small tailoring shop normally does not issue receipts to its customers, and would probably not have any documentary evidence of the income it earns, Celedonios alleged monthly income of P13,000 greatly exceeded the prevailing monthly minimum wage; thus, the exception set forth above does not apply. In the past, SC has awarded temperate damages in lieu of actual damages for loss of earning capacity where earning capacity is plainly established but no evidence was presented to support the allegation of the injured partys actual income. Similarly, in Victory Liner, Inc. v. Gammad, the SC deleted the award of damages for loss of earning capacity for lack of evidentiary basis of the actual extent of the loss. Nevertheless, because the income-earning capacity lost was clearly established, the heirs were awarded P500,000 as temperate damages. In the present case, the income-earning capacity of the deceased was never disputed. Petitioners Mary Jane Tan, Mary Lyn Tan, Celedonio Tan, Jr., Mary Joy Tan and Mark Allan Tan were all minors at the time the petition was filed on February 4, 2010, and they all relied mainly on the income earned by their father from his tailoring activities for their sustenance and support. Under these facts and taking into account the unrebutted annual earnings of the deceased, we hold that the petitioners are entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P300,000 [or roughly, the gross income for two (2) years] to compensate for damages for loss of the earning capacity of the deceased. Reduction of exemplary damages proper Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.

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Celedonio Tans death and the destruction of the petitioners home and tailoring shop were unquestionably caused by the respondents gross negligence. The law allows the grant of exemplary damages in cases such as this to serve as a warning to the public and as a deterrent against the repetition of this kind of deleterious actions. The grant, however, should be tempered, as it is not intended to enrich one party or to impoverish another. From this perspective, the CAs reduction of the exemplary damages awarded to the petitioners from P500,000 to P200,000 is proper. Attorneys fees in order In view of the award of exemplary damages, it is also proper to award the petitioners attorney's fees, in consonance with Article 2208(1) of the Civil Code. The award of attorneys fees, equivalent to 10% of the total amount adjudged the petitioners, is just and reasonable under the circumstances. De Guzman v Tumolva - Perez October 19, 2011 Mendoza, J. Topic: Factors in Determining Amount In general Facts: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. De Guzman and Tumolva entered into a Construction Agreement for the construction of an orphanage. During Typhoon Milenyo, a portion of the perimeter collapsed. Tumolva was found negligent in failing to place weepholes on the collapsed portion of the perimeter fence. Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) awarded actual, moral and exemplary damages to De Guzman. CA deleted the award of actual, moral and exemplary damages but awarded temperate damages.

3.

certainty, temperate damages may be recovered. Undoubtedly, De Guzman suffered pecuniary loss brought about by the collapse of the perimeter fence by reason of Tumolvas negligence. As she failed to prove the exact amount of damage with certainty as required by law, the CA was correct in awarding temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages. After weighing carefully the attendant circumstances and taking into account the cost of rebuilding the damaged portions of the perimeter fence, the award of P150,000 by way of temperate damages is reasonable and just.

People v. Lucero - Siang (2010) del Castillo, J. Facts:

Witness Maceda went out of his house to get a medicinal herb for his sick child. He saw the victim loading vegetables on a jeepney. After the jeepney left, Lucero arrived and asked the victim to allow Lucero to go with him as he was allegedly being pursued by a certain Pandeta. The victim acceded to the request and even invited appellant to sleep in his house. Lucero suddenly hacked the victim at the left side of his head causing the victim to fall to the ground. Lucero further stabbed him on his waist. Lucero was the lone witness for the defense and he could only offer denial and alibi. He claimed that on July 21, 1998, he was at his farm located at Nyholm, Agusan del Sur. He alleged that he had no prior disagreement with the victim or any of the prosecution witnesses. Hence, he could not understand why he was being implicated in the crime.

RTC: found Lucero guilty of murder qualified by treachery. It noted that appellant beguiled [the victim by] pleading for helpbut after walking a distance of about 10 meters, suddenly hacked him on the head leaving him with no opportunity to defend himself. Sentence: Reclusion perpetua Civil indemnity: P50,000 Exemplary damages: P10,000

Issue/Held: 1. WON CA erred in deleting the award of actual, moral and exemplary damages and in awarded temperate damages instead. NO.

CA: affirmed the ruling but modified the award of damages Ratio: 1. 2. The award of actual damages by the CIAC is not proper. De Guzman failed to adduce evidence to satisfactorily prove the amount of actual damage incurred. When the court is convinced that the aggrieved party suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proven with Civil indemnity: P50,000 Exemplary damages: P25,000 Actual damages: P3,000

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Moral damages: 50,000

victim Anthony Galang, Arceo, and Richard Tan. During the fistfight, members of the group of Serrano, including his brother accused Giovani Serrano, and those of the group of Galang arrived to watch. Gener lost to Comia and the fistfight turned into a rumble. Giovani had a knife. He scared away the group of Galang which left only Galang in the vicinity. Giovani stabbed the left side of Galangs stomach, with Gener and an Orieta holding Galangs arms. Thereafter, Giovani, Gener, and Orieta continued to beat and stone Galang until he fell into a nearby creek. The three left Galang there. A portion of Galangs intestines protruded from the stab wound. He was taken to the UP Infirmary which referred him to the East Ave Medical Center where he underwent surgery. He was hospitalized for a week and stayed at home for 1 month to recuperate.

Issue: W/N Luceros guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt. Held. Yes. The inconsistencies in Macedas testimony refer to minor details which are very inconsequential to the outcome of the case. The basic fact was proven that Lucero did indeed maul and hack the victim. Moreover, the prosecution correctly argued that Lucero quoted Macedas testimony separately and took it out of context. Maceda as witness was also able to positively identify Lucero. No ill motive could be attributed to Macedafor testifying against the appellant. Lucero even admitted that he had no quarrel or previous misunderstanding or disagreement with Maceda. The SC sentenced Lucero to reclusion perpetua. In regards to the damages, the court quoted Art 100 of the RPC. When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorneys fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases. The court awarded Civil indemnity: raised P50,000 to P75,000 Moral damages: no added comment, just deleted Exemplary damages: P25,000 increased to P30,000 Actual damages: P3,000 deleted replaced with P25,000 temperate damages.

RTC held Giovani guilty of frustrated homicide and awarded damages for medical expenses of P15,000 and loss of income for P4,000. CA held Giovani guilty of attempted homicide and awarded actual damages of P3,858.50, deleting loss of income. ISSUES & RULING WON Giovani is guilty of attempted homicide YES. Giovani was positively identified by Galang. Intent to kill was sufficiently established, Giovani and his friends having left Galang for dead. Crime was attempted, as it was not proven by evidence (no evidence from hospital) that the wound was fatal.

CA awarded P3,000.00 representing the amount spent for the embalming as shown by the receipt. However, the prosecution also presented a list of expenses such as those spent for the coffin, etc., which were not duly covered by receipt.

WON actual damages of P3,858.50 awarded by CA was proper NO. In People v. Andres, we held that if the actual damages, proven by receipts during the trial, amount to less than P25,000.00, the victim shall be entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00, in lieu of actual damages. The award of temperate damages is based on Article 2224 of the New Civil Code which states that temperate or moderate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss was suffered but its amount cannot be proven with certainty. In this case, the victim is entitled to the award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages considering that the amount of actual damages is only P3,858.50. The amount of actual damages shall be deleted. Lastly, we find that the victim is also entitled to moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00 in accordance with settled jurisprudence.[36] Under Article 2219, paragraph 1 of the New Civil Code, the victim is entitled to moral damages in a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries.

Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved. P25,000.00 as temperate damages in murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court. Serrano v. People Tejano (2010) FACTS (NB: Accused is Giovani Serrano. Victim is Anthony Galang.) There was a rumble between two groups in UP Diliman that stemmed from a fistfight between Roberto Comia and Gener Serrano, after an encounter between Gener and

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People v. Andres - Tiongco 2003 Corona

Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation (Philphos). On May 31, 1994, plaintiff paid Philphos the amount of P1,336,313.00 and by reason thereof the Spouses Sylvia (Soledad) and Antonio executed on June 24, 1994 a Promissory Note binding themselves jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the said amount in 31 monthly installments beginning June 30, 1994. Of the amount, however, only one (1) payment in the amount of P15, 000.00 on July 27, 1994 have been made by the spouses.

Facts The eight appellants were charged with murder. The Ducusins and the Damasils were feuding families. their children brandished knives against one another, and a conference between the parents was called. On the day of the conference, an altercation ensued where the Damasils stabbed and threw rocks at the Ducusins, leading to Williams death. The SC held that only Benjamin Damasil, Reynaldo Damasil, Renato Damasil, Robert Tejano and Pedrito Andres were guilty of murder. CalixtoHagunos, Ernesto Tejano, and CamiloTejano were acquitted on reasonable doubt. Damages: o Williams death: 50k civil indemnity o Moral damages: 50k because victims mom testified for mental anguish o Actual damages: 24,363.85 was proven by competent evidence during trial What is the correct award for the Ducusins? When the actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than 25k, the award of temperate damages for 25k is justified in lieu of actual damages to a lesser amount. Conversely, if the actual damages exceeds 25, temperate damages may no longer be awarded. VI. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES

That pursuant to a specific clause in the Promissory Note, defendants have unequivocally waived the necessity of demand to be made upon them to pay as well as a Notice of Dishonor and presentation with acceleration clause. As of March 31, 1995 defendants owe plaintiff P1,321,313.00 exclusive of interest, other charges which is already due and demandable but remains unpaid, hence this collection suit with prayer for moral damages and attorneys fees.

Issue Ratio

Lower court rendered judgment in favor of Reyes ordering the spouses to pay actual damages in the amount of P1,321,313.00 plus interest at 12% per annum from May 31, 1994 representing the total outstanding balance of defendants indebtedness to plaintiff by virtue of the Promissory Note dated June 24, 1994, moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00, attorneys fees in the amount of 20% of the sum collected; and to pay costs of suit.

On October 29, 2003, the C.A. promulgated a decision affirming with modification the trial courts decision. It upheld the award of attorneys fees equivalent to 20% of the balance of petitioners obligation and modified the decision of the trial court by lowering the award of moral damages from P1, 000,000.00 to P200,000.00.

ISSUES: WON the C.A. acted with grave abuse of discretion and committed a mistake of law in awarding 20% attorneys fees contrary to the 5% as stipulated in the promissory note.

SUATENGCO VS. REYES (2008) - Galang LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: HELD: YES. The C.A. decision is MODIFIED in that the amount of attorneys fees is reduced to 5% of the total balance of the outstanding indebtedness.

FACTS: This is an action for Sum of Money with Damages filed by Carmencita O. Reyes against Spouses Soledad Leonor Pea and Antonio Esteban Suatengco, wherein Reyes claimed that sometime in the first quarter of 1994, Sylvia (Soledad) approached her for the purpose of borrowing a sum of money in order to pay her obligation to Philippine

RATIO: The fifth paragraph of the Promissory Note executed by petitioners in favor of respondent undeniably carried a stipulation for attorneys fees and interest in case of the latters default in the payment of any installment due.

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Strictly speaking, the attorneys fees herein litigated are in the nature of liquidated damages and not the attorneys fees recoverable as between attorney and client enunciated and regulated by the Rules of Court. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the parties to a contract to be paid in case of breach thereof. The stipulation on attorneys fees contained in the said Promissory Note constitutes what is known as a penal clause. A penalty clause, expressly recognized by law, is an accessory undertaking to assume greater liability on the part of the obligor in case of breach of an obligation. It functions to strengthen the coercive force of obligation and to provide, in effect, for what could be the liquidated damages resulting from such a breach. The obligor would then be bound to pay the stipulated indemnity without the necessity of proof on the existence and on the measure of damages caused by the breach. It is well-settled that so long as such stipulation does not contravene law, morals, or public order, it is strictly binding upon the obligor. The attorneys fees so provided are awarded in favor of the litigant, not his counsel.

expenses, dues, and insurance premiums on the condo unit which Titan turned over to Uni-Field. RTC: In favour of Uni-field; awarded principal amount, interest charges with 24% compounded yearly; liquidated damages in amount of P324,147.94; AF equivalent to 25% of whatever amount is due and payable and accumulated appearance fees CA: Affirmed RTC findings; appellant did not deny the existence of the deliver receipts and invoices, which indicated the interest rate of 24%, 25% liquidated damages, 25% AF, and appearance fees ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in finding legal basis for awarding liquidated damages, among others HELD: No, there was legal basis for awarding liquidated damages 1. Although the delivery receipts and sales invoices did not form part of respondents formal offer of evidence, records show that delivery receipts and sales invoices formed part of petitioners formal offer of evidence. These receipts and invoices stipulated the rates of interest, liquidated damages, and attorneys fees. Since petitioner freely entered into the contract, the stipulations in the contract are binding on petitioner. 2. Whether these delivery receipts are contracts of adhesion are of no moment, as contracts of adhesion are as binding as ordinary contracts. 3. Petitioner and respondent have been doing business for three years and petitioner is presumed to have full knowledge and to have acted with due care, or at least, was aware of the terms and conditions of the contract. 4. Court reduced amount of attorneys fees awarded by the RTC and CA, because the RTC and CA ordered petitioner to pay respondents AF equivalent to 25% of whatever amount is due and payable, which was exorbitant, considering the principal due was at P1.4M while interest was at P504k. Court reduced the award of AF to 25% of the principal obligation because liquidated damages and AF serve the same purpose. a. Law allows a party to recover AF under a written agreement b. Barons Marketing Corp v CA: AF are in the nature of liquidated damages and stipulation therefor is aptly called a penal clause. As long as such stipulation does not contravene law, morals, or public order, it is strictly binding upon defendant. 5. Law allows parties to a contract to stipulate on liquidated damages in case of breach. A stipulation on liquidated damages is a penalty clause where the obligor assumes a greater liability in case of breach of an obligation. The obligor is bound to pay the stipulated amount without need for proof on the existence and on the measure of damages caused by the breach. Ligutan v. CA Abdon Ligutan v. Court of Appeals

It is undeniable from the evidence submitted by respondent herself to the trial court that the agreement of the parties with respect to attorneys fees is only 5% of the total obligation and the trial court granted the 20% rate based on the testimony of respondents counsel who opined that the same is the reasonable amount of attorneys fees, despite the unequivocal agreement of the parties.

The court found it improper for both the RTC and the C.A. to increase the award of attorneys fees despite the express stipulation contained in the said Promissory Note which they deemed to be proper under these circumstances, since it is not intended to be compensation for respondents counsel but was rather in the nature of a penalty or liquidated damages.

TITAN v. UNI-FIELD - Valdez J. Carpio March 1, 2007 FACTS: Titan Construction Corp is engaged in the construction business while Uni-Field Enterprises Inc is engaged in the business of selling construction materials. From 199093, Titan purchased construction supplies and materials from Uni-Field. Purchases amounted to P7.62M but Titan only paid P6.215, leaving a balance of P1.4M. Uni-field sent sent a demand letter to Titan but the balance remained unpaid. Uni-field filed a complaint for the collection of sum of money with damages against petitioner. Titan admitted the purchases but disputed the amount claimed, interposing a counterclaim with regard to damaged vinyl tiles, non-delivery of materials, and advances for utility

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FACTS

RCBC et al. v. CA and GOYU & SONS (1998) MELO Petitioners Tolomeo Ligutan and Leonidas dela Llana obtained on 11 May 1981 a loan of P120,000 from Security Bank. They executed a promissory note for solidary liability, 15.189% per annum interest payable with the principal upon maturity, a penalty of 5% every month on the outstanding principal and interest in case of default, and 10% of the total amount due as attorney's fees if it was endorsed to a lawyer for collection or a suit is filed. Petitioners failed to pay and the bank sent a final demand on 30 Sep 1982 for full payment within 5 days. Failing to get On 3 Nov 1982, the bank filed a case at the Makati RTC for recovery. The RTC found for the bank and ordered petitioners to pay the amount plus the 15.189% p.a. stipulated interest and 5% p.m. penalty charge, as well as 2% service charge. On appeal, the CA deleted the 2% service charge, but on MR reduced the penalty charge to 3% p.m. applying Art. 1229. A second MR was interposed by petitioners seeking to admit newly discovered evidence that there was a mortgage to secure the contract that was extrajudicially foreclosed, but this was denied. RCBC v. CA, GOYU & SONS, et al. MALAYAN v. GOYU & SONS

FACTS: 1. 2. 3. GOYU secured a credit facility with RCBC with total amount reaching P117M. As security for the loan, GOYU executed real estate and chattel mortgages in favor of RCBC. GOYU was required to and did acquire 10 insurance policies for the properties from Malayan Insurance (MICO). They were to be endorsed to RCBC. One of the properties was destroyed by fire. GOYU submitted claim for indemnity with MICO but was denied on the grounds that the insurance policies were attached pursuant to writs of attachments/garnishments or claimed by other creditors of GOYU alleging better rights. RCBC also filed with MICO as the alleged beneficiaries of the insurance claims as mortgagee of the properties.

4.

RELEVANT ISSUE WON the interest and penalty is still manifestly exorbitant, iniqutious and unconscionable. ACTIONS: Specific performance and damages RTC: 1. 2. No. A penalty clause is an accessory undertaking, that functions to strengthen the coercive force of the obligation and to provide, in effect, what could be liquidated damages resulting from such a breach. A court may not at liberty ignore the freedom of the parties to contract, but Art. 1229 can apply if the penalty is iniquitous or unconscionable. 3. 4. Malayan to pay GOYU: a. Fire loss claims P74M b. Interest for the duration of the delay at 2x monetary board ceiling RCBC to pay GOYU a. Actual and compensatory damages of P2M For both RCBC and Malayan to pay GOYU a. Exemplary P1M b. Atty Fees P1M GOYU to pay RCBC a. Loan obligations of P68M b. BUT EXCLUDING surcharges and penalties

HELD

The CA already reduced the penalty interest. Given the circumstances, not to mention repeated acts of breach by petitioners of their contractual liability, the SC sees no reason to modify the ruling of the CA. The interest of 15.189% per annum does not seem excessive. The 10% attorney's fees which would answer not only for judicial costs but expenses of collection as well does not seem unreasonable. Lastly, the subsequent execution of the real estate mortgage does not extinguish the loan by novation. RCBC v. CA Adorna

CA: Modified damages; deleted award for interest while still excluding surcharges and penalties.

ISSUE of CASE: WON RCBC, as mortgagee, has any right over the insurance policies taken by GOYU, the mortgagor, in case of the occurrence of loss

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ISSUE for DAMAGES: WON GOYU should pay RCBC the surcharges and penalties on the mortgages.

Henry Dela Rama Co v. Admiral Bank Brillo FACTS:

HELD 1. 2. 3. RCBC had a right to the insurance proceeds to the extent of outstanding obligations of GOYU. CA was incorrect to delete the award for interest which was the very reason for existence of a banking institution Issue of payment of surcharges and penalties a. Although GOYU's pitiful situation must be taken into account, cannot be deleted entirely. b. We cannot accept the lower courts' finding that RCBC had thereby ipso facto effectively waived collection of any additional interests, surcharges, and penalties from GOYU. Assurances of assistance are one thing, but waiver of additional interests, surcharges, and penalties is another. Surcharges and penalties agreed to be paid by the debtor in case of default partake of the nature of liquidated damages. Art. 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous and unconscionable. What constitutes iniquitous and unconscionable? a. Court must consider the circumstances of each case. (no general sweeping rulings) b. What may be iniquitous and unconscionable in one case, may be totally just and equitable in another. Given the circumstance under which GOYU found itself after the occurrence of the fire, the Court rules the surcharges rates ranging anywhere from 9% to 27%, plus the penalty charges of 36%, to be definitely iniquitous and unconscionable. a. The Court tempers these rates to 2% and 3%, respectively. b. Furthermore, in the light of GOYU's offer to pay the amount of P116M to RCBC as of March 1993, which RCBC refused, we find it more in keeping with justice and equity for RCBC not to charge additional interest, surcharges, and penalties from that time onward.

4. 5.

6.

On February 28, 1983, Admiral United Savings Bank (ADMIRAL) extended a loan of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Henry Dela Rama Co. The loan was evidenced by a Promissory Note and payable on or before February 23, 1984, with: o interest at the rate of 18% per annum and o service charge of 10% per annum. o liquidated damages at the rate of 3% per month plus incidental cost of collection and/or legal fees/cost, in the event of nonpayment on due date. Petitioners defense: o promissory note was sham and frivolous o merely an accommodation party for Metro Rent o ceded several vehicles to ADMIRAL, the value of which was more than enough to cover the alleged obligation. RTC: o dismissed the complaint on the ground that the obligation had already been paid or otherwise extinguished. o relied on the release of mortgage executed by the officers of ADMIRAL, and on Cos testimony that METRO RENT already paid the loan. CA: Henry Dela Rama Co ordered to pay Admiral United Savings Bank: 1. PRINCIPAL: P500,000.00 2. LOAN INTEREST: 18% per annum, 3. SERVICE CHARGES: 10% per annum, from 28 February 1984, 4. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES: 3% per month from said due date until fully paid 5. ATTORNEYS FEES: 25% of the total amount due

ISSUE: WON CA committed error in holding Co liable for the loan? YES, but damages modified. RULING:

DISPOSITIVE: Ordering Goyu & Sons, Inc. to pay its loan obligation with Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation in the principal amount of P107,246,887.90, with interest at the respective rates stipulated in each promissory note from January 21, 1993 until finality of this judgment, and surcharges at 2% and penalties at 3% from January 21, 1993 to March 9, 1993, minus payments made by Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. and the proceeds of the amount deposited with the trial court and its earned interest. The total amount due RCBC at the time of the finality of this judgment shall earn interest at the legal rate of 12% in lieu of all other stipulated interests and charges until fully paid.

interest rate of 18% per annum is fair and reasonable. EQUITY dictates that we reduce the service charge, liquidated damages and attorneys fees awarded in favor of ADMIRAL.

Service Charge In L.M. Handicraft Manufacturing Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[ we held that a bank is only entitled to a maximum of 2% per annum service charge for amounts not over P500,000.00.

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Amount of service charge changed from 10% to 2%, or P10,000.00 per annum beginning February 28, 1984 until full payment of the loan obligation.

other a warning to correct said violation within 60 days. If after 60 days the violator has failed to comply with the provision a notice of 60 days shall be given for the final termination with the aggrieved party having the right to collect liquidated damages in the sum of PhP 20,000, attorneys fees and other expenses in case of litigation.

Liquidated Damages The agreement also stipulated that Sy would extend a revolving capital of PhP 4,000 to Luzon payable at PhP 50/shipment without interest.

Courts are empowered to reduce such penalty if the same is iniquitous or unconscionable. Article 1229 of the Civil Code states: o ART. 1229. The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even if there has been no performance, the penalty may also be reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable.

Sy extended to Luzon the revolving capital of PhP 4,000.

This sentiment is echoed in Article 2227 of the same Code: o ART. 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable. ADMIRAL is more than adequately protected from a possible breach of contract because of the stipulations on the payment of interest, service fee, liquidated damages and attorneys fees. Thus, this Court finds the award of liquidated damages and attorneys fees by the CA exorbitant. After all, liquidated damages and attorneys fees serve the same purpose, that is, as penalty for breach of contract.[27] Accordingly, we reduce the liquidated damages to P150,000.00, and attorneys fees to 10% of the principal loan or P50,000.00. AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Henry Dela Rama Co is ordered to pay Admiral United Savings Bank P500,000.00, with interest at 18% per annum from February 28, 1984 until the loan is fully paid. In addition, Co is adjudged liable to pay ADMIRAL a service charge equivalent to 2% of the principal loan, or P10,000.00 per year also from February 28, 1984 until the full payment of the loan; P150,000.00, as liquidated damages; and P50,000.00, as attorneys fees.

From March to June 1969, Luzon delivered approximately 133.2 metric tons, short of the stipulated quantity. In June after the 7th and 8th shipments, SY presented to LUZON the statement of account where he (SY) deducted from the value of the shipments all the advances including the PhP3,700 still due on the revolving capital. He promised to Luzon that he would send the money (revolving capital) to Luzon. He failed to do so despite a telegram from Luzon in June. Luzon went to see him at end of July still Sy did not give it. On 7 Aug 1969 Luzon wrote a letter requesting that Sy correct his violation within 60 days from receipt. Sy did not answer this letter.

On 18 November 1969 Luzon filed a complaint. The CFI rendered judgment against Sy for having violated the contract even as it found Luzon was short in deliveries, reasoning that since no demand or notice was served on him by Sy, the latter condoned such delinquent performance. The court ordered Sy to pay Luzon PhP 20,000 in liquidated damages, PhP 4,000 in revolving capital, PhP 2,000 in attorneys fees and costs.

Sy appealed and the Court of Appeals eliminated the PhP 4000 revolving capital because it said Luzon was suing for rescission by praying for liquidated damages.

SY v CA - Buenaventura L-39853 Buenasenso SY v CA and Jaime LUZON Sy appealed for reduction of liquidated damages. The Supreme Court reduced the sum to PhP 10,000 because Luzon had not delivered the 60 tons of ipil ipil leaves monthly as agreed upon, and he therefore had not complied faithfully with the agreement as well.

On 20 March 1969 SY and LUZON entered into a Distributorship where LUZON, as producer, would supply SY, as Distributor, 60 metric tons monthly of ipil ipil leaves. The agreement was to last for 2 years, extendible to another 2 years upon mutual agreement. The agreement stipulated that in case of violation, the complaining party shall give the

VII. EXEMPLARY/CORRECTIVE DAMAGES

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PNB v. CA - Buhangin

b. c.

FACTS: 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. Private respondent Loreto Tan owns a parcel of land abutting the national highway in Mandalagan, Bacolod City. The government then instituted expropriation proceedings against Tan and other pertinent property owners before the CFI of Negros Occidental. Tan filed a motion requesting the issuance of an order for the release to him of the expropriation price of Php32,480. The lower court required PNB (Bacolod branch) to release to Tan the said amount deposited with it by the government. PNB, through Assistant Branch Manager Juan Tagamolila, issued a managers check for the said amount and delivered it to on Sonia Gonzaga without Tans consent. Tan then demanded payment from PNB but the latter refused, stating that it had already paid the amount to Gonzaga on the strength of an SPA executed in her favor by Tan. Tan denied that he authorized Gonzaga to receive the amount in his stead. The court ordered PNB to produce the SPA, but PNB failed to do so. Lower court rendered judgment ordering PNB and its Tagamolila to pay Tan the amount of Php32,480 with legal interest, damages, and attorneys fees. On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower court decision with modification wherein the award of Php5,000 for exemplary damages and Php5,000.00 for attorn eys fees were deleted.

They cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant; The act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive, or malevolent manner.

There is no evidence that PNB acted in a fraudulent, wanton, reckless, or oppressive manner. Furthermore, there is no award to compensatory damages which is a prerequisite before exemplary damages may be awarded. The award by the trial court is, therefore, baseless.

People v. Catubig - Celebrado En Banc | G.R. No. 137842 | August 23, 2001 | Vitug, J. FACTS: Dannilyn Catubig, and her 4 younger siblings were watching TV in the sala of their house in Bulacan. After an hour, Dannilyns father, Danilo Catubig, arrived and told Dannilyns siblings to proceed to her aunts house. Then he told Dannilyn to go inside a room and to lie down on the bed. Danilo removed Dannilyns shorts and panty, while he laid on top of her. Afraid of Danilo who beat and raped her in the past, Dannilyn was not able to resist and he succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina. However, Dannilyns aunt, who got suspicious, informed the latters mother, Jocelyn Catubig, about the said suspicion. Thus, when confronted by her mother, Dannilyn revealed that she was raped by his father. The sexual assault was reported to the San Jose del Monte Police Station. Dannilyn was examined by Dr. Tiera, Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI, who found out that Dannilyns healed laceration in the hymen. Danilo denied the accusation against him. He claimed that the rape charge was brought about only because of the ill-will between him, on the one hand, and his wife and daughter Dannilyn, on the other hand, following a quarrel. He said that he had fought with his wife, hitting her and his daughter. His wife then threatened him that it was the last time that she would allow him to harm her and that he would regret what he did. The next day, he was arrested and a complaint for rape was filed against him. Danilo was charged with the crime of rape by Malolos RTC. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH, and to pay Dannilyn the amount of P50K as moral damages. Thus, this automatic review by SC. ISSUE: 1. 2. HELD: WON the penalty is correct despite the fact that the information failed to state that the accused is the father of the victim and that the victim was under 18 y/o at the time of the commission of the alleged rape WON moral damages is enough.

ISSUE (related to exemplary damages): WON the CA was correct in deleting the award of exemplary damages by the lower court.

HELD/RATIO: The SC agrees with the appellate court that exemplary damages in this case should be deleted. 1. Under NCC Art. 2232, exemplary damages may be awarded if a party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. However, they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, the court yes yet to decide whether or not they should be adjudicated. Requirements for exemplary damages to be awarded: a. They may be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the claimants right to them has been established;

2.

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No. While the court agrees that there is an existence of rape, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender are special qualifying circumstances under RA 7659 that are needed to be alleged in the complaint or information for the penalty of death to be decreed. The Constitution guarantees to be inviolable the right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. It is a requirement that renders it essential for every element of the offense with which he is charged to be properly alleged in the complaint or information. Thus, the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty on the accused. Appellant could only thus be convicted under Art. 335 of RPC of simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua. 2. No. The trial court has correctly awarded P50K moral damages, an award that rests on the jural foundation that the crime of rape necessarily brings with it shame, mental anguish, besmirched reputation, moral shock and social humiliation to the offended party. In addition, the offended party deserves to receive the amount of P50K civil indemnity (the equivalent of compensatory damages) AND exemplary damages in the amount of P25K. The attendance of aggravating circumstances in the perpetration of the crime serves to increase the penalty (the criminal liability aspect), as well as to justify an award of exemplary or corrective damages (the civil liability aspect), moored on the greater perversity of the offender manifested in the commission of the felony such as may be shown by: a. b. c. d. e. the motivating power itself, the place of commission, the means and ways employed, the time, or the personal circumstances of the offender or the offended party or both.

1.

humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendantassociated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraudthat intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future.

The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. The ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender.

People v. Diunsay-Jalandoni Deslate

There are various types of aggravating circumstances, among them, the ordinary and the qualifying. Relationship is an alternative circumstance under Art. 15 RPC, which can be considered under Art. 2230 NCC. ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.

Retardate AAA (21 year old with the mental age of a 4 year old) was pushed into the guard outpost by accused Samuel Diunsay-Jalandoni, forcibly laid down on its floor, and was raped after he held her thighs, punched her stomach and ordered her to keep quiet otherwise he would maul and kill her.

Also known as punitive or vindictive damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and

Construction workers Aganon and Pastor passed by and saw accused pushing AAA on the floor and unzipping his pants to which Pastor merely said, "Hoy, bawal yan, bitay aabutin mo diyan." They had not travelled far when they heard AAA shout, "Tama na po, tama na po, ayaw ko na." They then went back to the guard outpost but before they could reach it, they saw appellant immediately stand up and ring his ice cream bell while AAA pulled up her short pants.

Aganon and Pastor then reported the incident to the subdivision guards and homeowners and brought appellant to the Barangay Hall.

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Diunsay-Jalandoni was convicted of the crime of qualified rape.

Yes, the Appellant is guilty of simple rape and is liable for Exemplary damages. Article 2229 of the NCC provides that: Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Article 2230 further provides that: In Criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.

ISSUE: w/n AAA is entitled to exemplary damages

HELD: YES.

"Aggravating circumstances which were not alleged in the information but proved during the trial may be appreciated for the limited purpose of determining appellants liability for exemplary damages. In the instant case, the presence of the qualifying circumstance of knowledge by the offender of the offended partys mental disability, although not alleged in the information, was proved during trial, which justifies the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in consonance with current rulings."

People v. Dalisay - Domingo Facts: The case was of simple rape. The victim was at the time of the incident a 16 years old lass. Who together with her siblings, stayed with her mothers live in partner, appellant Dalisay. They lived in Fairview, Quezon City while their mother worked and stayed in Makati and goes home only once a month. Prior to the Rape, Dalisay has been molesting the victim(inserting his finger in the victims genitalia) since she was 13 yrs old. However due to fear that Appellant will harm her family if she will disclose the dastardly acts, victim kept the crime as a secret and suffered in silence. However, on July 11, 2003, the day after the victim was allegedly raped by the appellant, the victim and her sister had a quarrel and as a result the former run away and went to the house of her aunt. There she disclosed the crimes perpetuated against her by the appellant. Hence a case was filed against the appellant. Appellant denied the allegations and contends that the charge was instigated by the aunt who harbored grudges against him. ISSUE (for Damages Purposes) HELD WON the Appellant was guilty and the award of exemplary damages proper?

Although the Court cannot apply Article 2230 since the aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship were not sufficiently alleged, the Court used Article 2229 as the basis for awarding exemplary damages. According to Justice Carpio-Morales, the application of Article 2230 strictissimi juris in such cases, as in the present one, defeats the underlying public policy behind the award of exemplary damages - to set a public example or correction for the public good. In this case, finding that appellant, the father figure of the victim, has shown such an outrageous conduct in sexually abusing his ward, a minor at that, the Court sustains the award of exemplary damages to discourage and deter such aberrant behavior. People v. Dadulla - Doria -

FACTS:

Renato Dadulla was convicted by TC of the simple rape (death penalty, 50k civil indemnity, 20k moral) and attempted rape of his daughter (indeterminate, prision correccional, 20k moral) CA changed this to simple rape (reclusion perpetua, 50k civil indemnity, 50k moral) and acts of lasciviousness (arresto mayor to prision correccional, 30k moral) CA ratio: penalty for rape should be lower for failure to allege relationship as qualifying circumstance; acts of lasciviousness only because fact is only opening the zipper and buttons of AAAs shorts, touching her, and pulling her from under the bed Dadullas defense was a denial and that AAA was raped by other men, no longer a virgin

ISSUE: w/n the convictions and consequent award of damages were correct

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HELD:

Yes, the CA was correct in determining the criminal liabilities in both cases. However, the award of exemplary damages are warranted.

Under Art. 2230, the attendance of any aggravating circumstance entitles the offended part to recover exemplary damages. Here, relationship was the aggravating circumstance attendant in both cases. We need to award P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in rape and of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages in acts of lasciviousness.

Although, as earlier mentioned, an aggravating circumstance not specifically alleged in the information (albeit established at trial) cannot be appreciated to increase the criminal liability of the accused, the established presence of one or two aggravating circumstances of any kind or nature entitles the offended party to exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the Civil Code because the requirement of specificity in the information affected only the criminal liability of the accused, not his civil liability. The Court has well explained this in People v. Catubig.

Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.

FACTS: The jeepney driven by Lope Grajera was then coming from Pila, Laguna and traversing an old highway towards Sta. Cruz collided with a KBL bus driven by its regular driver Virgilio Llamoso. As testified to by Atty. Conrado L. Manicad who was driving a Mustang car coming from the direction of Sta. Cruz and proceeding towards the direction of Manila, he stopped at the intersection to give way to the jeepney driven by Grajera. The sketch marked very clearly that the jeepney had already traversed the intersection when it met the KBL bus head-on. It is also obvious that the point of impact was on the right lane of the highway which is the lane properly belonging to the jeepney. Judging from the testimony of Atty. Conrado L. Manicad and the sketch (Exhibit 'E'), the sequence of events shows that the first vehicle to arrive at the intersection was the jeepney. Seeing that the road was clear, the jeepney which had stopped at the intersection began to move forward, and for his part, Atty. Manicad stopped his car at the intersection to give way to the jeepney. The KBL bus had no more room within which to stop without slamming into the rear of the vehicle behind the car of Atty. Manicad. The KBL driver chose to gamble on proceeding on its way, unfortunately, the jeepney driven by Grajera, which had the right-of-way, was about to cross the center of the highway and was directly on the path of the KBL bus. The impact indicates that the KBL bus was travelling at a fast rate of speed because, after the collision, it did not stop; it travelled for another 50 meters and stopped only when it hit an electric post. Kapalaran's driver had become aware that some vehicles ahead of the bus and travelling in the same direction had already stopped at the intersection obviously to give way either to pedestrians or to another vehicle about to enter the intersection. The bus driver, who was driving at a speed too high to be safe and proper at or near an intersection on the highway, and in any case too high to be able to slow down and stop behind the cars which had preceded it and which had stopped at the intersection, chose to swerve to the left lane and overtake such preceding vehicles, entered the intersection and directly smashed into the jeepney within the intersection. Immediately before the collision, the bus driver was actually violating the following traffic rules and regulations. RTC ruled in favor of private respondents and ordering Kapalaran (a) to pay Angel Coronado the sum of P40,000.00 as compensation for the totally wrecked jeepney, plus the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses, and (b) to Dionisio Shinyo the sum of P35,000.00 representing the expenses incurred by said intervenor for his treatment including his car-hire, the further sum of P30,000.00 representing the expenses said defendant will incur for his second operation to remove the intramedulary nail from his femur, the additional sum of P50,000.00

The retroactivity of the ruling vis-avis the accused could not be challenged or be barred by virtue of its being civil, not penal, in effect.

Kapalaran Bus Line v. Coronado Enteria (G.R. No. 85331; August 25, 1989)

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to serve as moral damages for the pain and suffering inflicted on said defendant, plus the sum of P10,000.00 in the concept of exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent to others who, like the plaintiff, may be minded to induce accident victims to perjure themselves in a sworn statement, and the sum of P15,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses. CA affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the award of damages by setting aside the grant of exemplary damages as well as the award of attorney's fee and litigation expenses made to Dionisio Shinyo.

Article 2231 of the Civil Code explicitly authorizes the imposition of exemplary damages in cases of quasi-delicts "if the defendant acted with gross negligence." The award of exemplary damages to Dionisio Shinyo shall be restored and increased from P10,000.00 to P25,000.00, and (2) that the grant of attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the sum of P15,000.00 to Dionisio Shinyo shall similarly be restored.

Baliwag Transit v. CA - Escalona 1996 Nov 1990 Baliwag Transit Bus was driven by Juanito Fidel to its terminal for repair of its brake system. Fidel told mechanic Mario Dionisio to inform the headman about the matter so that proper order to the mechanics could be made. Fidel then alighted from the bus. Shortly after, Fidel returned to the bus and sat on the driver's seat. Suddenly the bus moved; he felt something was hit. When he went down and saw Dionisio lying on the ground bleeding and convulsive, sandwiched between his and another bus parked there. Fidel and co-employees took Dionisio to St. Luke's but he died. Complaint for damages was filed by Dionisios wife, for herself& in behalf of minor children. RTC ordered Baliwag Transit and Fidel jointly and severally to pay heirs: P50K as death indemnity, P6.6K as litigation expenses, P10K as attorney's fees, P3K as funeral expenses CA modified amounts: P50K death indemnity, P1.4M loss of earning capacity, P3K funeral expenses, P 60K moral damages, P30K exemplary damages, P50K attorney's fees Appeal: Petitioners maintain Dionisio had contributory negligence of in failing to take the necessary precaution while doing repair work on the brake system + increase of the award of damages is unreasonable being unsupported by law and the evidence SC: Petition denied. Circumstances clearly show that proximate cause of Dionisios death was the negligence of driver Fidel when he failed to take the precaution to prevent the accident. Article 2231 awards exemplary damages if the defendant acted with gross negligence, as Juanito did, when he moved Bus No. 117 without first ascertaining if the repair of its break system was already undertaken. Exemplary damages having been awarded, recovery of attorney's fees follows under Art. 2208, par. (1).

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in reducing the award of damages HELD: YES. The CA erred in setting aside the award for damages awarded by the RTC

Moral Damages Kapalaran assails the award of moral damages against itself, upon the ground that its own bus driver, third-party defendant, was apparently not held liable by the trial court. The patent and gross negligence on the part of Kapalaran's driver raised the legal presumption that Kapalaran as employer was guilty of negligence either in the selection or in the supervision of its bus driver. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. So far as the record shows, petitioner Kapalaran was unable to rebut the presumption of negligence on its own part. The award of moral damages against petitioner Kapalaran is not only entirely in order; it is also quite modest consideirng Dionisio Shinyo's death during the pendency of this petition, a death hastened by, if not directly due to, the grievous injuries sustained by him in the violent collision.

On exemplary damages The law authorizes the imposition of exemplary damages in cases of quasidelicts "if the defendant acted with gross negligence." The award of exemplary damages by the trial court was quite proper, although granted for the wrong reason (granted in order "to serve as a deterrent to others who, like the plaintiff [Kapalaran], may be minded to induce accident victims to perjure themselves in a sworn statement.), and should not only be restored but augmented in the present case. The law seeks to stop and prevent the slaughter and maiming of people (whether passengers or not) and the destruction of property (whether freight or not) on our highways by buses, the very size and power of which seem often to inflame the minds of their drivers.

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CA MODIFIED: (a) P50K death indemnity, (b) P712K loss of earning capacity, (c) P3K funeral expenses, (d) P40K moral damages, (e) P15,K exemplary damages (f) P20K attorney's fees Philtranco vs CA - Fullecido

Munsayac v. De Lara (1968) - Galang MAKALINTAL, J.: FACTS: As a result of injuries suffered by the plaintiff-appellee while riding as a passenger on a jeepney owned and operated by the defendant-appellant, the action for recovery of damages was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The trial Judge found the driver recklessly negligent: he drove at an excessive speed, unmindful of the fact that the road was under repair and heedless of the passengers' pleas that he go more slowly. Besides the award of compensatory damages for actual expenses incurred and loss of income, the defendant was ordered to pay P1,000.00 as exemplary damages and P500.00 as attorney's fees. On these last two items the defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered a judgment of affirmance. ISSUE: WON the award of exemplary damages is proper. HELD: NO. The exemplary damages should be deleted. RATIO: The Civil Code provides that "exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good" (Act 2229); and that in contracts "the Court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner" (Art. 2232). It is difficult to conceive how the defendant in a breach of contract case could be held to have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or violent manner within the meaning of Article 2232 for something he did or did not do after the breach, which had no causal connection therewith. The law does not contemplate a vicarious liability on his part: the breach is his as party to the contract, and so if he is to be held liable at all for exemplary damages by reason of the wrongful act of his agent, it must be shown that he had previously authorized or knowingly ratified it thereafter, in effect making him a coparticipant. However, there is nothing to show previous authority or subsequent ratification by appellant insofar as the recklessness of the driver was concerned. The mere statement that the defendant failed, even refused, to placate the suffering of the plaintiff, necessitating the filing of the action, is too tenuous a basis to warrant the conclusion that the defendant approved of the wrongful act of his servant with full knowledge of the facts. It is not enough to say that an example should be made, or corrective measures employed, for the public good, especially in accident cases where public carriers are

Facts: 18. Ramon A. Acuesta was riding a bicycle while a Bus by Philtranco was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine 19. As the bus was pushed, its engine started thereby the bus continued on its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A. Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus. 20. As the bus started abruptly and suddenly, the bus bumped on the victim Ramon A. Acuesta 21. The bus did not stop although it had already bumped and ran [sic] over the victim 22. According to a witness he approached the bus driver defendant Manilhig herein and signalled to him to stop, but the latter did not listen. So the police officer jumped into the bus and introducing himself to the driver defendant as policeman, ordered the latter to stop. 23. From the place where the victim was actually bumped by the bus, the said vehicle still had run to a distance of about 15 meters away 24. An exemplary damage of P500,000 was awarded ISSUE (related to exemplary damages): WON the damages awarded by the lower court is excessive.

DECISION: Yes, should only be 50,000 RATIO: The award of P500,000 for exemplary damages is also excessive. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be awarded if the party at fault acted with gross negligence The Court of Appeals found that there was gross negligence on the part of petitioner Manilhig. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages. Considering its purpose, it must be fair and reasonable in every case and should not be awarded to unjustly enrich a prevailing party. In the instant case, an award of P50,000 for the purpose would be adequate, fair, and reasonable.

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involved. For the causative negligence in such cases is personal to the employees actually in charge of the vehicles, and it is they who should be made to pay this kind of damages by way of example or correction, unless by the demonstrated tolerance or approval of the owners they themselves can be held at fault and their fault is of the character described in Article 2232 of the Civil Code. Otherwise there would be practically no difference between their liability for exemplary damages and their liability for compensatory damages, which needs no proof of their negligence since the suit is predicated on breach of contract and due diligence on their part does not constitute a defense. Singapore Airlines v. Fernandez - CarlosTheFierce

A family friend picked her up at the airport for an overnight stay in Singapore. The next day she went back to airport to arrange her flight to Manila only to be told by the employee in the counter Cant you see I am doing something? and Its your problem, not ours.

Fernandez never made it to Manila. She went straight to Malaysia. Her performance before the Royal Family of Malaysia was below par. This is due to the fact that she was engulfed with fear, anxiety, humiliation and embarrassment causing her to suffer mental fatigue and skin rashes. She suffered acute urticaria.

ISSUE: FACTS: Andion Fernandez is an acclaimed soprano in the Philippines and abroad (the year was 1991). She was pursuing a Masters degree in Music majoring in Voice in Germany. She was invited to sing before the King and Queen of Malaysia on February 3 and 4, 1991. HELD: She bought airline passage ticket from Singapore Airlines to transport her from Frankfurt, Germany to Manila on January 28. From Manila, where she was supposed to gather her wardrobe and have rehearsal, she would then proceed to Malaysia. The flight schedule was from Frankfurt to Singapore, arrival time at 8:50 in the morning. Then from Singapore, there would be a connecting flight to Manila, arrival time at 2:20 in the afternoon. YES. Singapore Airlines should be held liable for exemplary damages Whether or not Singapore Airlines should be held liable for exemplary damages Note: Singapore Airlines defense was fortuitous event because of inclement weather in Copenhagen, and the Gulf War which forced the plane to take the restricted Russian airspace --- cause of two-hour delay

RATIO: ART 2232 provides that in a contractual or quasi-contractual relationshio, exemplary damages may be awarded only if the defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. Employees of Singapore Airlines acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. They did not accord Fernandez the attention and treatment allegedly warranted under the circumstances. 2. The lady employee at the night counter was unkind and of no held to her. 3. She was only allowed to use the telephone to call her mother in Manila when she threatened to sue the company. 4. The male employee at the counter curtly retorted to her that he was busy. These inattentiveness and rudeness of the personnel of Singapore Airlines was gross enough amounting to bad faith. 1.

Arrival at Singapore was late for two hours. Fernandez missed her flight to Manila, along with about 25 other passengers.

She informed the lady employee of Singapore Airlines at the night stop counter that it was important for her to reach Manila on that day (January 28). The employee told her that there were no more flights bound to Manila that day. She was eventually told, due to her persistence, that she can actually fly to HongKong and from there get a flight to Manila. She would, however, have to pay for the ticket herself. She had no money, unfortunately. She pleaded Singapore Airlines to make arrangements for her immediate transport to Manila, but her pleas went unheeded.

NOTES/DICTA:

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1.

Bad faith means a breach of known duty through some motive of interest or ill will. Self-enrichment or fraternal interest, and not personal ill will, may well have been the motive, but is malice nevertheless.

In an action for breach of contract of carriage, the aggrieved party does not even have to prove that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent. All that is necessary to prove are the following: 1. Existence of the contract, and 2. The fact of its non-performance by the carrier This is because the contract of air carriage is imbued with public interest. The law requires common carriers to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all the circumstances.

2.

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