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POLSIS, School of Government & Society (College of Social Sciences) Student ID No. (srn): Programme of study: Year of study: Module title: Module banner code: Module leader: Seminar teacher: Submission date: Assignment title: Extension: Extension approved by: 1117509 SPT 1 Sex, Death, Gender and (In)Security 08 23416 DR EMMA FOSTER 13/01/2014 What are the political and gendered implications of state secrecy? no date approved: new date:

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What are the political and gendered implications of State secrecy? Since the emergence of Wikileaks, awareness of the political issues of state secrecy has been radically expanded. Even before, the dubious premise on which the 2003 invasion of Iraq was fought demonstrates the corrosive political effect that institutionally-sanctioned secrecy has on democracy. Associated to international conflict is the feminist argument - there is a relationship between gender and warfare. This paper seeks to link these concerns over gender and warfare, by arguing for an association between US state secrecy, gender, and aggressive international policy. We will begin by outlining some key concepts in GIR scholarship, focusing on hegemonic masculinity and hypermasculinity. Drawing on feminists such as Maruska, we posit a link between hypermasculinity, hegemonic masculinity, and warfare. Afterward, we will shift our focus to the issue of state secrecy. To do this we draw on Melley's critique of state secrecy, and his concept of the covert sphere. By elaborating on Melley's position, we will greater understand the political and gendered implications of state secrecy. Moreover, because Melley understands this issue from a gendered perspective, his argument shows a link between secrecy and hypermasculinity which complements Maruska's analysis of masculinity and war. We will emphasise this link. As a consequence, it will be argued the political implications of state secrecy are inextricably linked to gender, and therefore gender international relations scholars could productively expand their critical scope to include state secrecy. Hegemonic masculinity Approaching this question from a GIR perspective, gender is seen as fluid, in line with third wave feminists such as Butler (1990) and Kristeva (1986). Traditionally a set of characteristics have been ascribed to each side of the gendered binary man/woman, acting as "essentializing labels" (Maruska 2010:236); the identity 'man' has been associated with traits such as rationality, autonomy, and aggression, whereas 'woman' has been labelled irrational, passive and dependent (ibid). However, this dichotomy obfuscates the myriad forms of gender present at any moment in time, themselves subject to change as these forms of subjectivity are reproduced, negotiated, and elaborated (Wadley, 2010). While there exists a spectrum of different gendered representations within the diachronic structure of patriarchy, there exists a synchronic, 'hegemonic' form of masculinity; defined as the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women. Page 3 of 16

Connell, 1995:77. It is an idealised and historically-contingent gender construction, which "other forms of masculinity are subordinate" (Wadley, 2010:49). Hegemonic masculinity should not be understood as the most common form of gender subjectivity; its actualization and dominance "require other actors to position themselves in relation to it" (Ibid). This form of gender-subjectivity is authorized by its privileged position in relational networks of power through which individuals are branded along lines of race, class and gender (Nayak, 2006). There are forms of masculinities which are "oppositional or deviant" (Maruska, 2010:238) - such as those held by subaltern groups - which do not conform to hegemonic masculinity, and these have a disempowering effect. Hegemonic masculinity, like all gender configurations, is fluid and contingent upon socio-cultural factors; existing in a process of contestation between competing forms of masculinity (ibid:247). As most (if not all) social formations have been patriarchal, "where there is patriarchy, there is hegemonic masculinity" (ibid:237). While any gender form has the potential to become hegemonic, it is through the relation between knowledge and power (Spivak, 1990) that specific forms (i.e. masculine) become hegemonic. The concept of hegemonic masculinity aids in understanding power relations on both micro and macro-levels, where it dominates, "occasionally taking hypermasculine forms" (Maruska, 2010:235). This argument suggests gender inequality is reproduced through the way gender subjectivity's relate to dominant discourses, which privilege patriarchal norms. Therefore

highlighting the dynamics of gender inequality is considered normatively favourable - in the interests of equality. Having outlined hegemonic masculinity we now turn to hypermasculinity, observing its relationship to hegemonic masculinity. Hypermasculinity Cockburn (2010:114) suggests "gender may be seen as both a cause and consequence of war", whereby societies predominated by an aggressive form of masculinity, are more prone to external conflict. Moreover, the effect of waging war can contribute to a more aggressive and militaristic hegemonic masculinity; undesirable because of the impact on gender equality as well as the violence brought about during war (ibid). Feminist scholars have noted the relationship between masculinity and war, whereby "a states hegemonic masculinity becomes reactionary or 'hypermasculine' in response to threat[s]" (Sjoberg, 2010:89). Hooper (2001:55) views hypermasculinity within a plural understanding of masculinities, overcoming dichotomous shortcomings. She explains hegemonic hypermasculinity has been a sporadic feature of American history. It denotes "[t]he exaggeration of characteristics or modes of behaviours that are associated with being male" (Shepherd, 2010:xxi); it is Page 4 of 16

the sensationalistic endorsement of elements of masculinity, such as rigid gender roles, vengeful and militarized reactions and obsession with order, power and control. Ashis Nandy coined 'hypermasculinity' to refer to reactionary masculinity that 'arises when agents of hegemonic masculinity feel threatened or undermined, thereby needing to inflate, exaggerate, or otherwise distort their traditional masculinity.'

Nayak,2006:43; emphasis added

Maruska (2010:243) argues there are general characteristics of hypermasculinity, such as "muscular foreign policy, Manichean moral certitude, and opportunity windows" (ibid) which help identify this form - despite its fluid 'nature'. Muscular foreign policy is associated with military interventions "hypermasculine by definition" (ibid). Moral Manichaeism refers to a polarising mentality, in which reality is strictly dichotomised along a good/evil binary. Opportunity windows are a crucial factor for understanding hypermasculinity; while 'ever-present', it becomes a predominant feature of hegemonic masculinity only under specific conditions, or 'opportunity windows'. The 9/11 attacks "gave hypermasculinity the chance to re-enter mainstream, hegemonic masculinity" (ibid), yet prior to this, Lind (2000) argues hypermasculinity was in a period of ascendancy. Maruska follows Hooper, arguing hypermasculinity can become hegemonic, outlining a historical pattern intimating a relationship between war and hegemonic hypermasculinity. She points to three historical periods in U.S. history (1890s period of the American-Spanish war, the 1950s Cold War climate, and the post-9/11 period). In all cases hypermasculinity became "a dominant feature of hegemonic masculinity" (Maruska, 2010:250). A powerful example of such an 'opportunity window' can be seen when masculinity enters a period of 'crisis' (ibid), emphasised in Nayak's quote. 'Crisis' occurs when hegemonic masculinity's defining norms come under 'threat', as in 1890s U.S. when economic hardship and the closure of the American frontier created a masculine crisis (Hooper, 2001; Maruska, 2010). Another 'opportunity' arises when perceived threats from dangerous 'outsiders' creates public anxiety. The portrayal of an obdurate , irascible communist threat provided this during the Cold War, and the attack of 9/11 offered another (Maruska, 2010:250). Therefore, when hegemonic masculinity is threatened it can be augmented by hypermasculine norms, potentially generating hegemonic hypermasculine culture. Maruska's account offers a useful way to understand the gendered dynamics of foreign policy, with deeply normative implications. It suggests structural gender inequalities contribute toward

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'hypermasculinizing' hegemonic masculinity, which is more aggressive and amenable to international conflict. It is likely hegemonic hypermasculinity would exacerbate already-existing gender inequalities at both the macro-level of international politics (increasing the likelihood of war), and the micro-level of lived experience (exacerbating existing inequalities). Caprioli (2000:53) agrees, arguing an "environment of equality between women and men would lead toward greater state pacifism" - argued here normatively desirable. A second implication is the democratic threat hypermasculine norms pose; in acting as enabler for public approval of international interventions, hypermasculinity could be politically mobilized in episodes of dubious legitimacy. Maruska (2010) and Nayak (2006) highlight US public approval polls for the Iraq invasion, intimating the Bush administration's hypermasculine norms were reflected by the public. They successfully link aggressive foreign policy to hypermasculinity, yet fail to relate this to wider hegemonic masculinity highlighted in the public realm. Maruska (2010:244) notes foreign policy does not exist "in a vacuum"; pointing to the Iraq invasion as evidence of hegemonic hypermasculinity. How the public reflects the administrations norms, however, is not adequately elaborated. Cockburn's (2010) analysis is similar; she hints at a possible 'vehicle' for hypermasculinity becoming hegemonic, in films, videogames and sports. However, her account appears caught between identifying them as both cause and effect of hypermasculinity. The Iraq example emphasises the gendered/political implications of hypermasculinity. Moreover, it leads us toward the issue of state secrecy - for it played an instrumental role in justifying invasion (White and Whitaker, 2003). This example suggests extending the relationship between gender and war to understand state secrecy. We now turn to this issue, building on Dean's (2002) account of publicity, and particularly, Melley's (2012) theory of the covert sphere. We will return to the notion of hypermasculinity, observing how it functions through the 'covert sector' and 'covert sphere', in an economy of secrecy and fantasy. In drawing on the work of Melley, we will develop a view reflecting Jeffords (1989) argument linking discourse on

warfare to hypermasculine hegemony. Consequently, we argue for linking political

implications of state secrecy, to gendered implications of hypermasculinity. Secrecy and the Cover Sphere Outlining the connection between publicity and secrecy, Dean builds on Bentham's stratified view of publicity. She criticises viewing secrecy as acceptable because the public "lacks the capacity of judgement" (Dean, 2002:19); a view typical of realist IR scholars (Gibbs, 1995). Dean develops a dualistic conception of the public; between a judging elite - the-public-supposed-to-know - and a class who defer to its judgement - the-public-supposed-to-believe. This believing class - whose ignorance threatens the public sphere's democratic function - is shepherded by the knowing class,

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through a system of publicity and trust linking these classes together (ibid:20-23). The judging class take responsibility for public opinion. The believing class, freed from the responsibility of thinking for themselves "can enjoy publicity's pleasures" (ibid:21). Bentham believes the public acts as a watchdog; secrecy by state officials becomes a focus of public interest, enabling the public to act as a watchdog on the excesses of government (ibid). Dean argues in contemporary culture secrecy undermines the public's judging efficacy; the media commandeers the role of the-public-supposedto-know, and its close relationship to government undermines the political function of the public (Dean, 2002) - reflecting Herman and Chomsky's (1988) Manufacturing Consent. In an era of state secrecy the guarantors of democracy become subsumed by a state/market compact, displacing thepublic-supposed-to-know into the-public-supposed-to-believe. An ignorant public highlights the democratic contradiction - It cannot serve its political function as watchdog - raising questions of the state's democratic legitimacy, most problematic in the case of war, such as the Iraq invasion. Melley (2012) builds on this issue providing an international, historical and gendered lens; highlighting the implicative extent of state secrecy. He argues US state secrecy has spiralled out of control since the onset of the Cold War. Government bodies such as the CIA constitute a 'covert sector', shielded from public scrutiny and thus democratic oversight. He explains the covert sector as 'the institutional sedimentation' of undemocratic functions in the name of democracy; he likens this to Agamben's (2005) 'state of exception' - the paradoxical suspension of democracy in the name of preserving it (Melley, 2012:5). Moreover, public interest in the secrecy of the covert sector generates an ideological fantasy which reduces public concern in its political threat. This arrangement amounts to an economy which vitiates democratic legitimacy, and exacerbates gender issues. Before outlining Melley's account we should take note of the terms 'fantasy' and 'ideology', as these are crucial to understanding this argument. Melley draws on iek's (1991; 2008, 2012) approach; ideology is not simply a case of 'false consciousness', but the manner in which the contradiction between belief and action is smoothed over (iek, 2008:27-41). iek formulates this as "I know, but nevertheless..." (1991:245); it is 'transparent' - something we see through, yet act as if true. Fantasy operates as the smoothing mechanism, sustaining action which may contradict 'the facts'; "within a powerful enough fantasy simply knowing that something is wrong is not enough to change behaviour" (Melley, 2012:14). The origins of the covert sector lie in the Cold War and an imperialist ideology described by Pease, as 'American exceptionalism': American exceptionalism produced the desire within U.S. citizens to construe U.S. imperialism as a nation-preserving measure that would prevent Soviet imperialism from Page 7 of 16

destroying Americas national ideals. American exceptionalism also enabled U.S. citizens to turn this nation preserving measure into an exception to U.S. national identity that proved its rule. Pease, 2009:20-1 It is a state fantasy facilitating the construction of national identity "through the disavowal of U.S. imperialism" (ibid:20). This disavowal was 'dramatically assisted' by the division of U.S foreign policy into 'overt' and 'covert' sectors (Melley, 2012:200). In the process the state provided the infrastructure which concealed the 'dirty work' of US empire, conserving the fantasy of exceptionalism from the contradictory reality of the state's 'imperial' practices (ibid:200-1). This implies the US government has sanctioned activities which are beyond democratic oversight. Pease's critical account of exceptionalism suggests it involves the valorisation of a form of masculine subjectivity, which Melley (2000; 2012) describes as 'rugged individualism'. This argument mirrors Jeffords (1989) and Gibson (1994), who suggest that a prominent 'lone hero' (Rambo-esque) discourse has contributed to post-war hegemonic masculinity. However, we will see how state secrecy presents a 'crisis' for hegemonic masculinity, which in turn 'hypermasculinizes' hegemonic masculinity - as a reaction to secrecy. The covert sector operates along dual lines of intelligence gathering - "a sort of global detective agency that gather both secret and public information about other states" (ibid:124) - and operations, which by contrast; conducts paramilitary actions, and produces strategic fictions, deceptions and propaganda for a range of purposes, including the deliberate creation of uncertainty about what is real and true. If the work of intelligence gathering is to make the world transparent to U.S. leaders, the work of operations is often to make it opaque to outsiders. Melley, 2012:125 It operates as a regime of surveillance and secrecy, regulating (and producing) knowledge related to US security. The full extent of this regime is hinted at through intelligence leaks provided by Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden; the revelations demonstrate the extent of surveillance - where even heads of (allied) states are not exempt - undertaken without oversight (Traynor, 2013; MacAskill, 2013). For instance by 1977, the CIA commissioned over one thousand books - among countless cultural works - projecting "a strategically favourable view of Western liberal capitalism" (Melley, 2012:30). In addition, the burgeoning covert sector - in conducting its secret operations Page 8 of 16

paradoxically drew on strategies associated with publicity; "the most celebrated public-relations experts of Madison Avenue" (ibid:32) were hired by the Eisenhower administration. Highlighting the manner in which the CIA acts as a cultural agent for ideological purposes, Melley points to how the covert state operates as an agent of propaganda, both domestically and internationally. State confidentiality in foreign policy, combined with the covert sector's role as a cultural producer, effected a fundamental transformation of the public sphere. The-public supposed-to-know is converted into the-public-supposed-to-believe; "its original role is assumed by government institutions" (ibid:160). The implications of this dynamic are stark; suggesting democratic legitimacy has been vitiated by state secrecy. A salient example is the 'dodgy dossier' on Iraq; misinformation was presented as intelligence on Iraq's military capacities to win public support for regime change, contravening international law (Ames, 2009; Ames & Norton-Taylor, 2010; Norton-Taylor, 2011; White & Whitaker, 2003). This intimates the use of 'strategic fiction', undermining the public's capacity to make informed judgement, likely resulting in greater dissent. Our understanding helps us explain high levels of public support which Bush enjoyed. The political implications of state secrecy are highlighted with this example, demonstrating how state secrecy can harm democracy, in this case leading to international conflict. Melley's thesis rests on this public transformation; while the covert sector created a distinct area of government, in the public sphere a 'cultural imaginary' emerged which focused on the covert sector. In part, it was a reaction to state secrecy - an attempt to fantasise what occurred behind the veil. It was also a consequence of the covert sector's 'strategic fictions'. This arena of discourse, which Melley labels the 'covert sphere', satisfies an interest in the activities of the covert sector, through cultural representations which fantasize it: The covert sphere is the sum of public discourse about secret government. In addition to popular and 'literary' fiction, this discourse includes histories, documentaries, journalism, professional intelligence and diplomatic writings, unclassified or declassified government documents, conspiracy theories, blog posts, Wikileaks... Melley, 2012:23 This 'cultural imaginary' is the result of institutionalised secrecy and a public concerned by this; it is "an array of discursive forms and cultural institutions through which the public can 'discuss; or, more exactly, fantasize the clandestine dimension of the state" (ibid:5). The covert sphere fills the deficit in public discussion brought about by concealing public interest issues. However, it cannot redeem the democratic threat caused by the covert sector, because it elides the issue through fantasy. While

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this assemblage originated in Cold War tensions, a 'continuous structure' regulating knowledge of foreign policy, has "persisted through the interregnum between the end of the Cold War and the rise of George W. Bush's 'Homeland Security State'" (ibid:201). The effect has been to weaken democracy, because the public cannot serve its function as watchdog on the state. Since the 18th century, an influential intellectual tradition (liberal individualism) has construed the public/private distinction along gendered lines, whereby the public sphere was seen the realm of male freedom, and women were consigned to the ignominy of the private. This tradition feminists have long criticized, arguing it has acted as an exclusionary and domesticating force, impeding gender equality (Weintraub, 1997; Pateman, 1987). In drawing on this gendered conceptualisation, Melley points to how the covert sector's regulation of public knowledge has a domesticating effect on the public sphere. During the Cold War the public sphere was "tacitly reconceived along lines of the feminized domestic sphere" (Melley,2012:24). The public-supposed-to-know's democratic role becomes subsumed by government institutions: "the security state feminizes the public, shuttling it toward the 'apolitical' but 'safe' space of the nineteenth-century domestic sphere" (ibid:160). This generates a political problematic (in the form of an ignorant demos which undermines the democratic function of the public), however it is mollified by the rise of the covert sphere, which presents an anxious recognition of this issue, and offers compensatory fantasies: The anxiety came in the nightmarish form of brainwashed assassins, pliant citizens, and a security state run amok; the compensation was a steady diet of masculinist fantasy heroic violence, individual agency, and rogue bravado. Melley, 2012: 24

This anxious recognition can be interpreted as Nayak (2006) and Maruska's (2010) 'masculine crisis'. The 'security state run amok' generates anxiety, because it threatens the ideals of 'rugged' liberal individualism - a key component of hegemonic masculinity. In outlining examples of this

compensatory fantasy, Melley cites numerous cultural products such as the TV-series' Homeland and 24, and the video-game Call of Duty. Melley explains an advert for this game highlights the public's 'utter deception', and invites the audience "to pierce the deceptive veil of the domestic sphere and enter 'the real world' of hypermasculine racialized combat, political power, and secret knowledge" (2012:25-6). Melley's examples cogently register the gendered structure of the covert sphere, wherein ideological projection transposes 'feminized' citizens into "hypermasculine bodies of professional warriors" (ibid:26). The projection is a 'compensatory fantasy', countering the anxiety of a 'feminizing' security apparatus; providing "fantasies of heroic male agency and national

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superiority" (Ibid:205). These fantasies serve to misdirect anxieties over the democratic legitimacy of state secrecy, by hypermasculinizing hegemonic masculinity; they aid to redirect public interest without addressing this political problematic. Melley argues the reason the covert sphere projects hypermasculine norms is partly because it focuses on the hypermasculine 'boy gang' culture which pervades the covert sphere. Cohn's seminal work in the area of US defence planning supports Melley's argument. She offers a startling insight into the "hypermasculinized subculture" (Enloe in Maruska, 2010:240) of the covert sector; wherein violence and weaponry combine in bizarre masculinist rituals - ie. 'pat the missile' (Cohn, 1987), and oppositional forms of masculinity are subordinated, treated "like a woman" (Cohn and Ruddick, 2004:416-7).

Political and gendered implications

The political implications of this institutional-cultural economy of the covert sector/sphere are stark; "we have institutionalized undemocratic means of preserving our democracy." (Melley, 2012:222). State secrecy's democratic threat causes public anxiety, which is addressed by cultural representations to ease it. The assemblage is thus the institutions of the covert sector, and the covert sphere's cultural apparatus. The two operate as an economy of secrecy and ideological fantasy, whereby state secrecy generates public anxiety, ameliorated through fantasies. Melley's account is deeply normative. It shows how US democracy is vitiated by state secrecy. Moreover, the public sphere's capacity to highlight this issue is undermined by the covert sphere's fantasies. These normalize the undemocratic nature of state secrecy in public consciousness. Furthermore, because the covert sector generates a masculine crisis, it offers an opportunity for hypermasculinity to become hegemonic, which is facilitated through the covert sphere's representations. This second point reflects the work of feminist scholars such as Jeffords (1989) and Gibson (1994), who posit the link between the masculine heroism of movies such as Rambo, as examples of 'masculine power' which valorises combat as "the only life worth living" (Gibson 1994:32). What is distinct about Melley's position, is the link he makes between state secrecy and the cultural representations emanating from the covert sphere - which normalize hypermasculinity. The covert sphere's productions can be understood as part of a "strategy of remasculinization" (Cockburn, 2010:113), whereby a reactive hypermasculinity shores up the identity of threatened hegemonic masculinity, "taking revenge on the state" (ibid) for its 'effeminizing' effect on the public. Because the covert sector 'feminizes' the public sphere, it creates systemic-conditions which can lead to a crisis in masculinity. In turn, the cultural apparatus of the covert sphere - which exists as a reaction to the presence of the covert sector - compensates for the public anxiety that recognition of the

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democratic threat of secrecy produces. This amounts to an economy of secrecy and fantasy, a circuit which normalizes the contradictions of state secrecy, in part though the dissemination of hypermasculine norms in the public imaginary.

Melley's account highlights the paradox of state secrecy, whereby this institutional/cultural assemblage serves to resolve the "internal contradictions" (Melley, 2012:5) secrecy has on

democracy. It 'resolves' this issue is by normalizing state secrecy, rather than in the more democratic form of public debate. Consequently, we can see this is an unsatisfactory arrangement, because it undermines the political function of the public sphere - held here to be vital for democratic legitimacy. iek touches on this when addressing the issue of whistle blowing. The revelations of Snowden and Manning "provided a factual foundation to our suspicions of being monitored and controlled" (iek, 2013) - highlighting the effect of the covert sphere's fantasies. He champions the actions of whistle blowers, arguing in this age of heightened surveillance they preserve the democratic hope of the public use of reason - therefore fulfilling the public's political function. The political implications of institutionalized secrecy are best captured with iek's words "Once we choose to follow the path of state secrets, we sooner or later reach the fateful point at which the legal regulations prescribing what is secret become secret" (iek, 2013). Melley's account also has a gendered dimension, illustrating how hypermasculine norms play an integral role in undermining democracy. The 'feminization' of the public sphere was shown to be a democratic threat; undermining the public's political function as watchdog. Because this is achieved through a 'strategy of remasculinization' - projecting hypermasculine fantasies - it also highlights the normative gender implications. By considering Melley's argument in terms of the critique of hegemonic masculinity, hypermasculinity and the relationship to war, we see this economy of secrecy and fantasy not only reinforces masculinist hegemony - and thus reproduces gender inequalities. Moreover, it increases the likelihood of international conflict - argued here to be normatively objectionable. In this sense Melley's account enriches critiques of hypermasculinity, by arguing state secrecy contributes to an economy of secrecy and fantasy which hypermasculinizes the public, which we saw above can be politically mobilized in the interests of conflict. Melley goes further than Maruska and others by highlighting this economy, which is the 'vehicle' through which hegemonic masculinity becomes hypermasculinized. Consequently, it is argued here that GIR scholars could productively expand their critical scope to include state secrecy as contributing toward gender inequality, and conflict. Conclusion

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In conclusion, we have seen how patriarchy can be better understood through the concept of hegemonic masculinity, which is socially constructed and historically contingent. In addition, we observed a relationship between an extreme form of masculine subjectivity - hypermasculinity - and international conflict. We noted how feminist scholars argue hypermasculine foreign policy wins public support in times when culture reflects hypermasculine norms, and can lead to war. Afterward, we considered the issue of secrecy, considering Dean's account of publicity, and Melley's concept of the covert sphere. By outlining Melley's argument, we observed the political implications that institutionalising undemocratic practices has for democracy. Moreover, we highlighted a structured dynamic which has significant implications for GIR scholarship - the cultural apparatus (the covert sphere) which acts to mollify US public anxiety about the threat of secrecy to democracy. Moreover, it also serves to project hypermasculine norms, which can contribute to international conflict. Finally, we reiterated the normative implications that the covert state poses, suggesting state secrecy is not only a threat to democratic legitimacy, but also serves to exacerbate gender inequality which in turn, can contribute to a greater likelihood of international warfare. Therefore, it has been argued that when considering the political implications of state secrecy, one must also be mindful of the gendered implications, for it was shown these two are closely related and equally significant in their scope.

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WORD COUNT - 4324 Bibliography Agamben, G. (2005) State of Exception. University of Chicago Press: London Ames, C. (2009) 'The dossier was dodgy. Is there any doubt?'. The Guardian [online]. Available from: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/mar/12/iraq-iraq [accessed 09/01/2014]. Ames, C. and Norton Taylor, R. (2010) 'Alastair Campbell had Iraq dossier changed to fit US claims' The Guardian [online]. Available from: http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/jan/10/ alastair-campbell-iraq-dossier-inquiry [accessed 09/01/2014] Butler, J (1990) Gender Trouble, 2nd Edition, London: Routledge. Caprioli, M. (2000) 'Gendered Conflict' Journal of Peace Research. Vol 37, No. 1, pp.53-68. Cockburn, C. (2010) 'Militarism and War' in Shephard, L. [ed] Gender Matters in Global Politics. Routledge: New York pp. 105-114. Cohn, C. (1987) 'Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals' Signs, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp.687-718. Cohn and Ruddick, (2004) ' A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction' in Hashmi, S. and Lee, S. [eds] Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. pp.405-435. Connell, R. (1995) Masculinities. University of California Press, Berkeley. Dean, J. (2002) Publicity's Secret. Cornell University Press: New York. Gibbs, D. (1995) Secrecy and International Relations. Journal of Peace Research Vol. 32, No. 2, pp.213-228. Gibson, J.W. (1994) Warrior Dreams: Paramilitary Culture in Post-Vietnam America, New York, NY: Hill and Wang. Herman, E. and Chomsky, N. (1988) Manufacturing Consent. Pantheon: New York. Hooper, C. (2001) Manly States. Columbia University Press: New York. Jeffords, S. (1989) The Remasculinization of America: Gender and the Vietnam War, Indiana University Press: Indiana. Kristeva, J (1986) Womens time in Moi, T (ed.) The Kristeva Reader, Blackwell: Oxford. pp.187-213. Page 14 of 16

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