An Institutionalist Approach to Security in East Asia: From the Perspective of Neoliberalism Tsuneo Akaha, Monterey Institute of International Stu

ies

!" Intro uction This paper will analyze the evolution and current status of security cooperation in East Asia from the perspective of Neoliberal Institutionalism. More specifically, it will present case studies of the Si !"arty Tal#s in Northeast Asia and the ASEAN!centered re$ional security cooperation in Southeast Asia. %y usin$ Neoliberalism as a mirror on which the neorealist realities of the East Asian re$ion are reflected, the paper will demonstrate the need to build neoliberal international relations in the re$ion. %efore presentin$ the analysis, we need to define &East Asia' and &security'. discussion will be brief because there are many discussions on both concepts. ( (1) &East Asia' defined There are $eo$raphic, historical, political!diplomatic, economic, and social!cultural aspects to &re$ion' and the definition of the concept varies dependin$ on which aspect is emphasized. Moreover, the definition also varies dependin$ on the purpose and the rationale for which it is discussed, as well as the theoretical framewor# in which it is discussed. )or e ample, in discussin$ the possibility of an &Asian union,' Ama#o *+,,-. (/!(01 introduces &Asia' as a &$eo$raphic concept,' a &value system,' a &set of characteristics,' a &$oal to aspire to,' and a &methodolo$y.' As Ama#o mentions, Mori *Mori +,,-. (01 or$anizes the idea of &Asia' in terms of a &myth', a &symbol', a &dynamic space,' an &identity', and a &construct'. The present study first views &East Asia' as primarily a $eo$raphic concept and then, from an institutionalist perspective, observes it as a &dynamic space' in which nation! states establish and maintain or$anized, re$ularized, and intense relations, e chan$es, and lin#a$es. )urthermore, the study defines &East Asia' as bein$ composed of two subre$ions, &Northeast Asia' and &Southeast Asia,' both as well!established concepts in the discourse on re$ional inte$ration in Asia. 2ere, we will analyze the various attempts at institutionalizin$ security cooperation separately in the two subre$ions accordin$ to the dynamic of international relations in each area, as well as the role and limits of those efforts. (2) &Security' defined 3ecent years have seen the development of the concept of &security' as a diversified concept beyond its traditional meanin$. The traditional concept of security refers to the
1

The

)or e ample, on Northeast Asia, see A#aha (444, 5alder and 6e +,(,, 7ent and 2uan$ +,,+, 8im +,,9, and 3ozman +,,,: on Southeast Asia, see 5iorciari +,(, and 7ayley and Neher +,,4. 1

totality of the physical ; especially military ; threats to the political independence, territorial inte$rity, and soverei$nty of states in the international system and the various means to counter the threats. The state is understood both as the source and the tar$et of threats. In recent years, however, we have seen the $rowin$ influence of non!state a$ents in the international system, such as international or$anizations, multinational corporations, and international nonprofit or$anizations. Also, there are phenomena that cannot be appropriately captured by the traditional concept of security. )or e ample, we see the threat that environmental destruction poses to people<s livin$ and health, the threat that ener$y and food shorta$es present to people, as well as $rowin$ $aps in economic development and financial crisis leadin$ to social instability and riots. =e also reco$nize that many states cannot ade>uately deal with the threats their citizens face. These phenomena are collectively referred to as &nontraditional security' *A#aha +,,-. (0?!(001. )urthermore, we also see the concept of &human security' that focuses on the preservation and protection of the life, livin$, and basic human ri$hts of people, in contrast to the protection of the state<s independence, territory and soverei$nty *A#aha +,,4. ((!@91. This paper will e amine mainly international relations in the realm of traditional security. This is because state!centric international security dominates security discourse in East Asia and even response to nontraditional security and human security problems in the re$ion ultimately centers on the policies of states, the capacity of state or$anizations, and cooperation between states *A#aha +,,4. ((!@91. 2owever, the paper will point out that in Southeast Asia there is an emphasis on nontraditional security problems. Also, &5onclusion' will su$$est that the construction of a system for security cooperation that lin#s Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia re>uires the or$anization of cooperation that transcends states and this in turns calls for the development of civil society and the incorporation of nontraditional security issues into national policy and international cooperation. +. Security Theories. 3ealism, Aiberalism, and Neoliberal Institutionalism (1) 5lassical 3ealism and Neorealism The ori$ins of modern traditional security theory are found in 5lassical 3ealism. 5lassical 3ealism views the international system as anarchy and considers the supreme priority of states within it to be self!preservation and the various resources and capabilities to be instruments of self!preservation. States sometimes form alliances and other cooperative systems but their ultimate purpose, accordin$ to 5lassical 3ealism, is self!preservation. Security theory based on 5lassical 3ealism is naturally national security theory and sees the state as the main a$ent of international relations and its self!help capability as central to its survival. As a conse>uence, &security dilemma' emer$es.+ &Structural 3ealism' is based on 5lassical 3ealism but additionally incorporates into its theory the impact of the structure of the international system on states within it. @
2

)or a classic wor# on 3ealism, see Mor$enthau and Thompson (40? 2

Structural 3ealism is one of the strains in Neorealism *Aamy +,,(. (0?!(0/1.9 The main >uestions for the states whose most important purpose is self!preservation are how many maBor powers there are in the international system, how their power is distributed, and which powers are allies and friends and which are enemies. The stability of the international system re>uires a balance between the maBor powers, which can be accomplished throu$h self!help, international cooperation, and alliances. Another strain within Neorealism is &2e$emonic Stability Theory.' This theory focuses on the role of an he$emonic power or an he$emonic coalition of nations in the international system. &2e$emony' is variously defined, but in terms of security theory, a state that is so dominant that it can provide security for its allies and friends is called a &he$emon' or an &he$emonic power' and its status in the system and its relations with other states is called &he$emony'. Accordin$ to 2e$emonic Stability Theory, the he$emonic state stabilizes the international system with its overwhelmin$ power. =hen the relative power or influence of the he$emonic state declines, other states that are benefitin$ from the e istin$ system will cooperate to preserve the status >uo. 2owever, if the power of a state or states that want to chan$e the e istin$ system $rows and those powers try to establish a new system, the e istin$ system becomes unstable and a transition to a new system may ensue *Cilpin (40(: Dr$ans#i (4/0: Coldstein (400: Models#i (4-0. +(9!+@?: Thompson (400: 8ennedy (40-: 8upchan (4491. =e see today that East Asia, with the relative decline in the he$emonic power of the Enited States, the rise of 5hina, and the lon$!sta$nant Fapanese economy, is in a transition period. (2) 5lassical Aiberalism, Neoliberalism, and Neoliberal Institutionalism There are several #inds of 5lassical Aiberalism *Aamy +,,(. (00!(4(1. &5ommercial Aiberalism' is a theory that promotes peace and prosperity throu$h the development of free trade and mar#et economy. &3epublican Aiberalism' states that democratic countries respect citizens< ri$hts and try to maintain $ood relations with other democracies. &Sociolo$ical Aiberalism' focuses on the two concepts of community and interdependence and ar$ues that states deepen interdependence and friendly relations throu$h commerce and e chan$e and e pand international cooperation that transcends national borders and as a result contribute to the formation of a peaceful international communityGsociety. Neoliberalism has applied the above #inds of Aiberalism to the analysis of the institutionalization of international relations and its role. The basic lo$ic of Neoliberalism runs as follows *8eohane (409: Martin +,,-. (((1. The international system has no authority or $overnmental or$anization that controls it from the center. Therefore, the states that ma#e up the system must cooperate with each other to overcome the so! called &collective action problem.' The &collective action problem' refers to the situation in which some members of a $roup behave in a way that benefits the $roup as a whole *for e ample, to contribute to environmental conservation or peace maintenance1, while
3

)or a class wor# on Structural 3ealism, see =altz (4-4 )or Neorealism, see 8eohane (40/ 3

other members fail to do so and, as a conse>uence, all members suffer the ne$ative conse>uences of noncompliance. In order to overcome this problem, it is necessary for the members to share information about each other<s action and their $oals, as well as the conse>uences of noncompliance, and to coordinate their action. It is necessary to establish Boint decision!ma#in$ rules, re$ulate the behavior of members, and achieve the $oals of the or$anization as a whole. In other words, the or$anization needs to build an institution. %ecause Neoliberalism contributes to the advancement of theory of international relations by focusin$ on the formation and the role of international institutions, it is called &Neoliberal Institutionalism.' This theory is based on the followin$ assumptions *Aamy +,,(. (04!(4,1. The state is the main actor in international relations and it is a rational actor and attempts to ma imize its interests in every field. Even thou$h there are non!state actors, such as international or$anizations and transnational corporations, their $lobal or re$ional impact does not compare with that of the state actors. *2ereafter &Assumption ('1 In the environment of competition, states attempt to obtain absolute $ain throu$h cooperation. States see value in cooperation, and are not concerned how much other states benefit from cooperation. This contrasts sharply with the neorealist assumption about the importance of relative $ain. *&Assumption +'1 The bi$$est obstacle to successful cooperation is noncompliance with a$reements and cheatin$. Since effective implementation or enforcement of a$reements reached throu$h international cooperation depends heavily on the willin$ness and capacity of #ey state actors, noncompliance and cheatin$ remain important obstacles to successful coopertion. *&Assumption @'1 5ooperation is not perfect and problems remain, but if the institution is reco$nized as mutually beneficial and as ma imizin$ opportunities to ensure their interests, states hold their e pectations for and contribute their resources to the system of cooperation they create. *&Assumption 9'1

(3) Security from the perspective of Neoliberal Institutionalism Neoliberal Institutionalism has been applied mainly to institutions for international trade and environmental protection. This is because the theory is readily applicable to issue! areas in which many states share interests. That is, all states e pect to obtain benefits from international trade and environmental protection institutions by behavin$ in an e pected manner. In $ame theory, &positive!sum $ames' ta#e place in such issue! areas. Dn the other hand, international security cooperation has been the most important subBect of discussion in 3ealist and Neorealist theories because the assumptions of Neoliberal Institutionalism outlined above do not apply in zero!sum $ames, which are the central preoccupation of 3ealists and Neorealists *Aamy +,,(. (4,1.

=hy is it then that this paper analyzes security institutions in East Asia from the perspective of Neoliberal InstitutionalismH There are three reasons. )irst, it is possible to use Neoliberal Institutionalism as a mirror onto which the current state of international cooperation in security issues in East Asia can be reflected and obstacles to cooperation identified. Second, there are important differences in the or$anizationGinstitutionalization of multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia and the assumptions of Neoliberal Institutionalism can be used as criteria to delineate those differences. )inally, the neoliberal analysis can normatively su$$est that the construction of peaceful and stable international relations in East Asia re>uires a chan$e from the current neorealist world in the re$ion toward a neoliberal world. #" $ase Stu y !: Northeast Asia an the Si%&Party Talks (1) The E.S. he$emonic security strate$y in Northeast Asia durin$ the 5old =ar and the post!5old =ar era. The end of the Second =orld saw the emer$ence of a $lobal 5old =ar bipolarity, includin$ in East Asia, where an East!=est conflict structure too# hold. The Enited States initially wanted to establish in East Asia a multilateral alliance similar to NATD, but this was not to be because it was impossible to brin$ into the same alliance 8orea and Fapan, the former of which suffered much dama$e and humiliation under the colonialism of the latter. Instead, Fapan and South 8orea were separately allied with the Enited States in what has come to be called a &hub!and!spo#es' system. The Enited States and South 8orea fou$ht as allies in the 8orean =ar from (4?, to (4?@, and the alliance deepened thereafter as the North!South tension on the peninsula continued. The E.S.!Fapan alliance was established and maintained for the dual purpose of defendin$ Fapan and preventin$ its rearmament. As the Enited States and 5hina reached rapprochement in the (4-,s, Fapan and 5hina established diplomatic relations in (4-+. 2owever, the E.S.!Soviet conflict continued, and both the Fapan!E.S. alliance and the 3D8!E.S. alliance were maintained. =ith the fall of the Soviet Enion in (44( and the end of the 5old =ar, the ideolo$ical rationale for the E.S. alliances with Fapan and South 8orea diminished. 2owever, the 5old =ar structure, symbolized by the divided countries of 8orea and 5hina, remained in East Asia. Also, North 8orea<s nuclear and missile development and military provocations since the (44,s have hei$htened tensions on the 8orean peninsula. As far as the &Taiwan issue' is concerned, 5hina considers it an internal issue and reBects any interference by others: it vehemently opposes the independence movement in Taiwan and does not rule out the use of force for national reunification. As lon$ as 5hina considers it a domestic issue, the &Taiwan issue' cannot be subBect to multilateral ne$otiation. Northeast Asia is also home to territorial disputes. between Fapan and 3D8 over the Ta#eshimaG7o#to Island: between Fapan, 5hina, and Taiwan over Sen#a#uGTiaoyu Island: between Fapan and 3ussia over the Northern TerritoriesGsouthern 8uriles: and between 5hina and 8orea over territories in northeast 5hina. These are bilateral conflicts that relate directly to each party<s soverei$nty and are not amenable to a solution in a multilateral framewor#.

(2) North 8orean nuclear and missile development North 8orea has maintained its socialist system under the hereditary dictatorship and Buche ideolo$y handed down from 8im Il!sun$ to 8im Fon$!il. 8im Fon$!il has maintained his control of power and dictatorship throu$h the military!first policy. 2e has also maintained national unity and people<s patriotism by hei$htenin$ international tension throu$h provocative actions. Dn the other hand, he has sometimes shown a conciliatory posture to obtain benefits from others, such as economic investment from South 8orea. North 8orea views the E.S. military power as the $reatest threat to its survival and has placed the hi$hest priority on the termination of the hostile policy of the Enited States. In order to brin$ the Enited States to the ne$otiatin$ table, North 8orea has resorted to provocative actions such as missile launches and nuclear tests but also displayed a conciliatory posture by puttin$ nuclear development on hold. )or its part, the Enited States considers North 8orea<s nuclear development as a threat to the $lobal nonproliferation re$ime and also as a threat to the security of its allies Fapan and South 8orea. Since the death of 8im Il!sun$ in Fuly (449, some in the Enited States have hoped for or e pected the collapse of North 8orea, which obviously has not ta#en place. The Enited States has also paid attention to the human ri$hts problem in North 8orea and adopted the North 8orean 2uman 3i$hts Act in Fanuary +,,9. In Fanuary (44+, North 8orea si$ned the safe$uards inspection treaty with the International Atomic Ener$y A$ency *IAEA1 but withdrew from the N"T in March (44@ and also withdrew from the IAEA in March (449 and reBected international inspections. The North 8orean nuclear crisis came to an end with the conclusion of the &A$reed )ramewor#' in Dctober. North 8orea froze its nuclear pro$ram and in return the 8orean "eninsula Ener$y 7evelopment Dr$anization *8E7D1 was established with the Enited States, 3D8, Fapan, and many other countries as its members, to built li$ht!water reactors. Also, heavy oil was provided to the North under international cooperation. 2owever, soon after the conclusion of the A$reed )ramewor#, the 3epublican "arty, which has many members opposed to the A$reed )ramewor# as soft, became the maBority party in E.S. 5on$ress. Moreover, in Fanuary +,,(, the Administration chan$ed from 7emocratic 5linton to 3epublican %ush and the E.S. North 8orea policy too# a hard turn. The construction of li$ht!water reactors was si$nificantly delayed and be$an in )ebruary +,,+, but heavy oil delivery was suspended in 7ecember after suspicions $rew in Dctober that North 8orea had a hi$hly enriched uranium pro$ram and was buildin$ a centrifu$e plant. The construction of li$ht!water reactors was also suspended indefinitely. In Fanuary +,,@, North 8orea declared it was withdrawin$ from the N"T and in )ebruary 8E7D halted the li$ht!water reactor construction plan. In )ebruary +,,?, North 8orea announced that it had built a nuclear weapon for defensive purposes. In May +,,/, 8E7D decided to terminate the li$ht!water reactor construction plan. Thus came the end of the first!ever attempt at multilateral security institution buildin$ in Northeast Asia that had be$un under international cooperation based on the A$reed )ramewor#.

North 8orea had successfully built the intermediate!ran$e ballistic missile Nodon$ in the middle of the (44,s and launched Nodon!( toward the middle of the Sea of FapanGEast Sea in March (44@. In Au$ust (440, North 8orea launched a lon$!ran$e ballistic missile Taepodon$!( over the Fapanese archipela$o toward the "acific Dcean. This was followed by the launchin$ of a Taepodon$!+ toward the Sea of FapanGEast Sea in May +,,?. North 8orea followed this up with the launchin$ of a Taepodon$!+ and si other missiles toward the Sea of FapanGEast Sea in Fuly +,,/. The Enited Nations Security 5ouncil responded by adoptin$ 3esolution (/4? callin$ for international sanctions. =hen North 8orea tested a plutonium nuclear bomb in Dctober +,,/, the Enited Nations Security 5ouncil, where Fapan was servin$ as "resident, unanimously approved 3esolution (-(0, includin$ sanctions a$ainst North 8orea. North 8orea immediately reBected it. (3) The Si !"arty Tal#s )ollowin$ the trilateral tal#s between 5hina, the Enited States, and North 8orea in April +,,@, South 8orea, 3ussia, and Fapan a$reed to participate in the multilateral forum, now #nown as the &Si !"arty Tal#s.' The multilateral tal#s have under$one much turbulence since its first session in Au$ust+,,@. The first session failed to produce a Boint document but 5hina, servin$ as chair of the tal#s, issued an oral summary of the discussions. The participatin$ nations could not even a$ree on when to meet ne t. At the second session in )ebruary +,,9 North 8orea insisted on limitin$ the discussion to the nuclear weapons pro$ram and e cludin$ peaceful uses of nuclear technolo$y. At the third session in Fune the North stated it was willin$ to $ive up its nuclear weapons pro$ram if =ashin$ton would abandon its hostile policy toward "yon$yan$. The si parties a$reed to consider a nuclear freeze as a first step toward denuclearization. 2owever, when National Security Advisor 3ice called North 8orea &a despotism' in Fanuary +,,?, the North retaliated by announcin$ it would indefinitely suspend its participation in the Si !"arty Tal#s. It also announced officially that it had been ma#in$ nuclear weapons and that it already possessed some nuclear weapons. The fourth session too# two rounds, in Fuly!Au$ust and in September +,,?. The tal#s resulted in the first Boint statement, in which the North a$reed to abandon its nuclear weapons. 2owever, when the North 8orean money launderin$ throu$h %anco 7elta Asia *%7A1 in Macao became #nown, the Enited States ordered a ban on all dealin$s with the ban# by American financial institutions and the Macao administration froze the North 8orean assets worth about I+,9,, million. North 8orea hardened its position in retaliation and the fifth session of the Si !"arty Tal#s in November went into recess after only three days. In Fuly the North launched a ballistic missile toward the Sea of FapanGEast Sea and the EN Security 5ouncil adopted a resolution criticizin$ this action and callin$ for international sanctions. Moreover, when the North announced it was $ettin$ ready for a nuclear test, the "resident of the Security 5ouncil issued a statement criticizin$ the action on Dctober /. 2owever, three days later North 8orea went ahead with the nuclear test. Dn Dctober (?, the EN Security 5ouncil responded by adoptin$ 3esolution (-(0 mentioned earlier.

It was a$ainst the bac#drop of this deterioratin$ situation that the Si !"arty Tal#s were resumed in 7ecember +,,/. There were e chan$es of criticisms around the table and the tal#s went into recess a$ain. )inally, in )ebruary +,,-, the tal#s resumed and produced a Foint Statement with the followin$ elements *Fapanese Ministry of )orei$n Affairs +,,-1. North 8orea would discuss with the other five parties about the list of items related to its nuclear development pro$ram that would be subBect to abandonment. This would be called the &initial phase.' The other five parties would reciprocate by providin$ ?,,,,, tons of heavy oil as emer$ency ener$y aid, economic assistance e>uivalent to a ma imum of 4/,,,,, tons of heavy oil, ener$y, as well as humanitarian aid. The Enited States and North 8orea would commence tal#s toward diplomatic normalization, and the Enited States would remove North 8orea from the list of terrorism!supportin$ states and ta#e steps to end the application of the Tradin$ with the Enemy Act to North 8orea. Fapan and North 8orea would commence discussion toward diplomatic normalization. The parties would establish five tas# forces. on &denuclearization of the 8orean peninsula' *to be chaired by 5hina1: on &economic and ener$y assistance' *3D81: on &Fapan!North 8orea normalization' *Fapan and North 8orea1: on &ES! North 8orea normalization' *the E.S. and North 8orea1: and on &security in Northeast Asia' *3ussia1. Epon completion of the measures in the &initial phase,' the si parties would hold a forei$n minister!level meetin$.

The si parties held the si th session in March +,,-, but they failed to hold any substantive discussions and recessed after four days. The situation has since deteriorated and the parties have not returned to the multilateral table. In April +,,4, North 8orea launched what it called a &roc#et', but the E.S. and Fapan believed it was a ballistic missile and sou$ht a EN Security 5ouncil resolution but 5hina obBected and the Security 5ouncil "resident issued a statement criticizin$ the North 8orean action. The statement also called on the North not to repeat the action, to abandon completely the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and to return to the Si !"arty Tal#s as soon as possible. The North reBected the statement and announced it would resume nuclear weapons development and that it would also withdraw from the Si !"arty Tal#s. )urthermore, North 8orea conducted a second nuclear test in May. This prompted the Enited Nations Security 5ouncil to approve 3esolution (0-9 includin$ a call for economic sanctions. Even 5hina, which had been reluctant to support such sanctions, a$reed to the resolution.

North 8orea<s provocative actions did not stop: on the contrary, they escalated. In March +,(,, accordin$ to South 8orea and an international team of investi$ators, a North 8orean torpedo hit the South 8orean corvette 5heonan causin$ an e plosion and sin#in$ it. In November, North 8orea launched a barra$e of artillery shells on the South 8orean island of 6eon$pyeon$ in the =est Sea, #illin$ four South 8oreans and woundin$ (4. The prospect of the Si !"arty Tal#s bein$ resumed has since been slim to none. (4) The Si !"arty Tal#s from the "erspective of Neoliberal Institutionalism The Si !"arty Tal#s are clearly a multilateral institution dealin$ with security in Northeast Asia. %y applyin$ the four assumptions of Neoliberal Institutionalism outlined above, we can see the characteristics of this forum. =e can see that the first assumption holds in the Si !"arty Tal#s. That is, it is the states that participate in the tal#s and there is no room for non!state actors to participate or even e ercise si$nificant influence in the ne$otiatin$ process. Also, as lon$ as these multilateral tal#s are narrowly focused on the traditional security issue of North 8orea<s nuclear development, they are li#ely to remain an inter!state forum. 2ow about the ssumption re$ardin$ the state<s rational decision!ma#in$H North 8orea<s military!first policy is maintained at the cost of human sufferin$ in the country. In view of the resultant economic crisis and lar$e!scale famine, we cannot see the North<s policy as rational. 2owever, if we see it as an instrument of dictatorship and national defense policy, we cannot necessarily say it is irrational. Moreover, from the standpoint of the North 8orean leader, it is tactically rational to switch between provocative actions and accommodatin$ postures in order to win concessions from relevant powers. 5hina needs a stable international environment to promote its lon$!term economic $rowth and to maintain the dictatorship by the 5ommunist "arty as well as social stability. The collapse of North 8orea or the outbrea# of a conflict on the peninsula must be prevented. )or these reasons, 5hina is reluctant to support sanctions a$ainst North 8orea even thou$h it criticizes North 8orea<s provocative actions. It is in 5hina<s interest to promote active diplomacy for the success of the Si !"arty Tal#s *8im +,,/. (-+!(-?1. Also, as evident in 8im Fon$!il<s visit to 5hina in May +,(( and the hi$h! ran#in$ 5hinese 5ommunist "arty officials< visit to North 8orea in Fune, 5hina is conductin$ fle ible diplomacy to prevent North 8orea<s collapse by proppin$ up the latter<s economy. 3ussia<s North 8orea policy is >uite rational. "ost!Soviet 3ussia established diplomatic relations with South 8orea and deepened its economic ties with the latter. )or a while domestic political and economic woes prevented Moscow from pursuin$ active diplomacy, but in recent years 3ussia has been ma#in$ efforts to improve its relations with North 8orea. 3ussia stands to $ain economically if the North!South tension eases and the construction of railroads and other infrastructure on the peninsula proceeds. 3ussia is ma#in$ efforts to e pand Asian mar#ets for the ener$y resources in the 3ussian )ar East and, therefore, stability in the 8orean peninsula is clearly in 3ussia<s interest. 3ussia<s approach to the Si !"arty Tal#s reflects this fact *%lan# +,,0. +(+1. 9

The Enited States, South 8orea, and Fapan share a common interest in securin$ the denuclearization and endin$ the dictatorship of North 8orea. All three countries also want a peaceful resolution to the North 8orean problem. 2owever, domestic political chan$es have caused maBor chan$es in their approaches to North 8orea. 5han$es in the ES and South 8orean $overnments have led to maBor chan$es in their respective policies towards North 8orea *Armstron$ +,((. (//1, as well as inconsistencies. The %ush Administration that be$an in +,,( reBected the 5linton Administration<s &carrot and stic#' policy and pursued a policy #nown as &anythin$ but 5linton', in favor of a hostile policy toward "yon$yan$. In the wa#e of the September ((, +,,( terrorist attac#s in the Enited States, the %ush Administration declared &war on terrorism' and "resident %ush, in his State of the Enion Address in Fanuary +,,(, referred to Iran, Ira>, and North 8orea as the &A is of Evil,' terrorist states harborin$ weapons of mass destruction. Since rational behavior in strate$ic interaction between states re>uires consistency, the inconsistency in the E.S. policy reduces rationality. In South 8orea, the 8im 7ae!Bun$ Administration<s en$a$ement policy, #nown as the &Sunshine "olicy,' was succeeded by the 3oh Moo!hyun $overnment in +,,@ and South 8orea<s economic presence in North 8orea e panded durin$ these two administrations. 2owever, the inau$uration of the Aee Myun$!ba# $overnment in )ebruary +,,0 brou$ht about a maBor shift in Seoul<s policy toward "yon$yan$. The new $overnment be$an a policy of &selective en$a$ement,' whereby Seoul would reduce its economic e chan$e with "yon$yan$ unless there were clear concessions from the latter. This has led to a si$nificant deterioration in North!South relations. Aac#in$ in effective ways to counter North 8orea<s nuclear and missile development and provocative actions, Fapan has emphasized coordination with the Enited States and South 8orea *Austin +,,0. +,@1. 7iplomatic normalization is Fapan<s important diplomatic a$enda toward North 8orea, but there has been virtually no pro$ress on this front. Fapan has been insistin$ on pro$ress on the abduction issue as a condition for en$a$in$ in normalization tal#s with North 8orea. Althou$h Fapan demanded inclusion of this issue in the a$enda of the Si !"arty Tal#s, it was not to be due to opposition by other parties. Fapan mana$ed to have the abduction issue included in the a$enda of the tas# force on Fapan!North 8orea normalization established on the basis of the &Foint Statement' of +,,-. 2owever, the abduction issue is fundamentally a bilateral issue between Fapan and North 8orea and can be resolved only throu$h bilateral ne$otiations. Moreover, even if the issue were resolved, it is hard to believe it would have much of an impact on denuclearizin$ North 8orea *A#aha +,,/1. In short, there are contradictions in Fapan<s behavior vis!J!vis the Si !"arty Tal#s. =hat about Assumption + of Neoliberal InstitutionalismH Amon$ the participants in the Si !"arty Tal#s, North 8orea attaches the least value to this multilateral framewor#. North 8orea wants to win concessions from the Enited States throu$h bilateral tal#s: therefore the multilateral process is both wasteful and ineffective. Moreover, the Si ! "arty Tal#s represent $reater international pressure on North 8orea than bilateral ne$otiations. Therefore, it is not surprisin$ that North 8orea has been the most reluctant participant in the multilateral tal#s, usin$ them more as an occasion for criticizin$ others and insistin$ on its own demands than as a process for $enuine 10

ne$otiations re>uirin$ $ive!and!ta#e on all sides. The Enited States wants to put diplomatic pressure on North 8orea and therefore prefers the multilateral process to bilateral tal#s with North 8orea. Moreover, the Enited States wants to prevent the evolution of North 8orea and of the 8orean peninsula that favors 5hina over the Enited States: therefore the Si !"arty Tal#s offers one of the venues for pursuin$ its interests and possible constrain 5hina<s unilateral $ains. Therefore, even thou$h =ashin$ton is very dissatisfied with "yon$yan$<s behavior at the Si !"arty Tal#s, it will continue to participate in the tal#s as lon$ as the possibility of North 8orean concessions remains. 5hina probably sees more value in the Si !"arty Tal#s than any other participant. As a process that offers some chance of denuclearizin$ North 8orea, the multilateral forum is valuable to 5hina. Moreover, 5hina, as the host country for the forum, has found it useful for displayin$ its diplomatic s#ills. 5hina<s active diplomacy in this venue is in line with the nation<s increasin$ly active diplomacy, includin$ multilateral diplomacy, since the (44,s, whose purpose is to ensure a stable international environment supportive with its domestic developmental priorities. )urthermore, Bust as the Enited States sees the Si !"arty Tal#s as possibly limitin$ 5hina<s unilateral $ains, 5hina also sees the multilateral process as constrainin$ possible unilateral actions, includin$ military intervention, on the part of the Enited States. South 8orea wants to pursue its interests vis!J!vis North 8orea throu$h both bilateral dealin$s with North 8orea and the Si !"arty process. So, as lon$ as the latter process does not Beopardize its bilateral approach, it finds value in the Si !"arty framewor#. 3ussia does not possess effective carrots or stic#s to induce North 8orea<s denuclearization. As noted above, improvement of the North!South relations on the peninsula is in 3ussia<s interest, politically as well as economically. So, Moscow wants to see the Si !"arty Tal#s to succeed in achievin$ its purpose. Moreover, Moscow values the multilateral venue as an opportunity to ma#e its presence felt, particularly when it sides with %eiBin$ as a$ainst =ashin$ton. Fapan, as observed above, as lon$ as bilateral diplomatic normalization is not proceedin$, it has no other diplomatic forum to press its demands a$ainst North 8orea. )or this passive reason, Fapan finds some value in the Si !"arty Tal#s. 2ow about the assumption of Neoliberal Institutionalism that the state does not care much about the relative $ains by othersH As Bust noted, both the Enited States and 5hina sees value in the Si !"arty Tal#s as a means of constrainin$ unilateral $ains by the other. To both sides, relative $ains matter a lot. Ender whose leadership the denuclearization of North 8orea is achieved is an important >uestion for both. So is the distribution of burden for brin$in$ about this desirable, commonly shared outcome. That is, neorealist lo$ic pertains to their assessment of the value of the multilateral process. Moreover, how the balance of power will be affected by North 8orea<s denuclearization and the future of the 8orean peninsula is of $reat strate$ic interest to the Enited States and 5hina, as well as to South 8orea, 3ussia, and Fapan. The +,,- Foint Statement, proposed the formation of multiple tas# forces, clearly reflects this reality. In short, the neoliberal assumption about absolute vs. relative $ains fails to apply to this case. 5oncernin$ Assumption @, there was noncompliance and violation of the A$reed )ramewor# from the perspectives of both North 8orea and the Enited States. The most important document comin$ out of the Si !"arty Tal#s is the &Foint Statement' of +,,-. It too# four lon$ years for the multilateral discussions to produce this document. Even 11

after the adoption of the document, the Si !"arty Tal#s have been suspended and no pro$ress has been seen on any of the a$reed items in the Foint Statement. )inally, with re$ard to Assumption 9, it is evident that the Si !"arty Tal#s are imperfect. 2owever, the fact that the multilateral tal#s have been maintained despite the fact that they have been delayed and suspended numerous times indicates that the participants in the tal#s see value in the tal#s and e pect some results from them. =e can at least say that the parties have found no alternative venue or forum for addressin$ the North 8orean nuclear problem *Thompson and Matthews +,,0. (0(1. =hat is also clear in both the A$reed )ramewor# and the Si !"arty Tal#s is that even thou$h the core issue may be limited to the nuclear development in North 8orea, it cannot be resolved by the participants in the Si !"arty Tal#s alone. It re>uires coordination with the N"T and IAEA *8i#uchi +,,0. +,9!++91.

'" $ase Stu y (: Southeast Asia an ASEAN (1) Establishment and Evolution of ASEAN The Association of Southeast Asian Nations *ASEAN1 has its ori$in in the (4/&%an$#o# 7eclaration.' The document calls for cooperation for economic $rowth, social pro$ress, and cultural development but ma#es no reference to security cooperation. 2owever, when ASEAN was established, its ori$inal purpose was confidence!buildin$ amon$ the five ori$inal members *Indonesia, Malaysia, the "hilippines, Sin$apore, and Thailand, and the establishment of the or$anization was made possible by important chan$es in the security situation of the re$ion, such as the cessation of the Malaysia! "hilippines conflict over Saba and the end of Indonesia<s policy of 8onfrontasi toward Malaysia. Also, in the 5old =ar conte t, the ASEAN members found it necessary to ma#e it clear to the socialist countries in the re$ion and others outside of the re$ion that their or$anization was not a pro!E.S., anti!5ommunist alliance *ShoBi +,,0. (0!(41. There were also some important differences in the security concerns amon$ the ASEAN member states. Indonesia wanted security cooperation as a way to balance 5hina, but Sin$apore relied on the %ritish 5ommonwealth for its security. Malaysia, the "hilippines, and Thailand saw security cooperation as a future possibility and #new they would have to rely on the Enited States *ShoBi +,,0. (41. The concept that has become the common denominator under$irdin$ the formation of re$ional security cooperation within the ASEAN re$ion is the concept of &collective political defense,' which was first introduced by former Thai forei$n minister Thanat 8homan. The idea was that confidence buildin$ was necessary to achieve two purposes, avoidance of intrare$ional conflicts and prevention of intervention by e trare$ional powers into re$ional conflicts *6ama#a$e (44(. (,-1. As discussed below, these two purposes have contributed $reatly to the subse>uent development of ASEAN. 5han$es in the international environment surroundin$ Southeast Asia and international relations within the re$ion since the end of the (4/,s contributed to the deepenin$ of

12

political relations amon$ the ASEAN member states. The %ritish withdrawal from Malaya, the E.S. troop reduction in Southeast Asia, and the $rowin$ presence of 5hina and the Soviet Enion in the re$ion led to initiatives within ASEAN. Malaysia<s proposal for the establishment of a neutral zone in Southeast Asia led to the ASEAN declaration of the &Kone of "eace, )reedom, and Neutrality' *KD")AN1 in (4-(. =hen the Lietnam =ar ended in (4-?, ASEAN faced the new socialist countries of Lietnam, Aaos, and 5ambodia. The first ASEAN Summit in (4-/ adopted the 7eclaration of ASEAN 5oncord *&%ali 7eclaration'1, callin$ for the stren$thenin$ of political cooperation for peace and stability in Southeast Asia. At the same time, the ASEAN leaders concluded the Treaty of Amity and 5ooperation in Southeast Asia *TA51, which called for peaceful resolution of conflicts within the re$ion. It also called for re$ional cooperation based on the principles of mutual respect for the independence, soverei$nty, territorial inte$rity, and national identity of all countries, as well as self!determination and noninterference in the internal affairs of member countries. It also called for the eventual establishment of an &ASEAN 5ommunity.' The treaty also stated other Southeast Asian countries could Boin ASEAN *ShoBi +,,0. (4!+(1. )rom the (4-,s to the (40,s ASEAN countries deepened their political dialo$ue to prevent conflicts within Southeast Asia from affectin$ the entire re$ion and appealed to parties to conflicts to resolve their disputes peacefully. As seen in ASEAN<s policy toward the 5ambodian conflict, the ASEAN members reaffirmed the basic principles stated in TA5 and especially stressed noninterference and conflict prevention. These efforts resulted in stability and economic development within the ASEAN re$ion. The ASEAN membership also $rew, %runei Boinin$ the $roup in (40@, Lietnam in (44?, Myanmar and Aaos in (44- and 5ambodia in (444. (2) Institutionalization of ASEAN security cooperation and ASEAN!centered re$ional security cooperation In (449, the ASEAN 3e$ional )orum *A3)1 was established to promote political and security dialo$ue amon$ Southeast Asian nations and confidence buildin$ and preventive diplomacy in the Asia "acific. The earliest maBor accomplishment of the new forum was the conclusion of the Treaty on the Southeast Asian Nuclear!=eapon!)ree Kone *SEAN=)K1 in (44? *6ama#a$e (44-. (0(1. The Asian financial crisis in (44- sent Southeast Asian economies into turmoil. =hen economic $rowth stopped, the re$ional $overnments were forced to cut their defense spendin$ substantially. The Suharto $overnment fell and Indonesia suffered a loss to its leadership within ASEAN. Moreover, the ASEAN countries could not ta#e an effective collective response to the financial crisis *ShoBi +,,0. ++!+@1. The terrorist attac#s in the Enited States on September ((, +,,( also affected Southeast Asia. There are terrorist $roups with ties to al!Maeda, there have been terrorist attac#s in Indonesia since +,,+, and the Thai $overnment has suspected the involvement of terrorist or$anizations in the series of e plosions that have happened in the south of the country since +,,9. The ASEAN countries be$an discussin$ the formation of an &ASEAN Security 5ommunity.' The discussion that be$an with an Indonesian proposal in +,,@ reflected 13

the ASEAN countries< shared understandin$ that &security' needed to be &comprehensive security,' includin$ both traditional and nontraditional security *ShoBi +,,0. +9: Su#ma +,,@1. The ASEAN Summit in +,,@ adopted the &7eclaration of ASEAN 5oncord II' *&%ali 7eclaration II'1, envisa$in$ the formation of an &ASEAN 5ommunity' composed of three pillars, an &ASEAN Security 5ommunity,' an &ASEAN Economic 5ommunity,' and an &ASEAN Social!5ultural 5ommunity.' The declaration outlined the framewor# of the proposed ASEAN Security 5ommunity as follows *ShoBi +,,0. +/1. The $oal of the ASEAN Security 5ommunity is the peaceful co!e istence amon$ the member states in an environment of Bustice, democracy, and harmony. The ASEAN members should resolve conflicts within the re$ion peacefully. The ASEAN Security 5ommunity is not defense cooperation or an alliance, nor does it rely on Boint forei$n policy: instead it aims at buildin$ comprehensive security that includes political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions. The ultimate $oal of the ASEAN Security 5ommunity is to establish methods for norm settin$, conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and post!conflict peacebuildin$.

At the (+th ASEAN Summit in Fanuary +,,-, a$reement was reached on establishin$ the ASEAN 5ommunity, includin$ the ASEAN Security 5ommunity, in +,(?, five years earlier than ori$inally planned. As the multilateral dialo$ue e panded in scope and became more ambitious, disa$reements amon$ the member states surfaced. )or e ample, the +,,9 proposal by Indonesia to establish an ASEAN peace#eepin$ force by +,(+ was opposed by Sin$apore, Thailand, Lietnam, Myanmar, and Aaos. Also, all member states other than Indonesia remained reluctant about the idea of an ASEAN Security 5ommunity *ShoBi +,,0. +-!+01. At the (,th ASEAN Summit in November +,,0, the ASEAN leaders adopted the &ASEAN Lision' and the &Lientiane Action "ro$ramme' *LA"1 to achieve the $oals of the %ali 7eclaration II, but these documents simply reaffirmed the basic principles for cooperation outlined above. Moreover, in +,,?, when the ASEAN members a$reed to draft an &ASEAN 5harter,' there was disa$reement on whether the $roup should maintain the principle of noninterference. The issue came up in the conte t of the international community<s criticism of the military Bunta in Myanmar and the need for ASEAN to respond to the criticism. The member states failed to reach a$reement and adopted in November +,,- the &ASEAN 5harter' which included the principle of noninterference. In +,,/, ASEAN established the &ASEAN 7efense Ministers< Meetin$' *A7MM1 as the hi$hest framewor# in ASEAN for dialo$ue and cooperation concernin$ defense and security issues. At the first meetin$ in May +,,/, the ASEAN defense ministers e chan$ed views on the future of the ASEAN 3e$ional )orum, maritime security issues, terrorism, and the situation on the 8orean peninsula. At the second defense ministers< meetin$ in November +,,-, it was decided that an &ASEAN 7efense Ministers< Meetin$ 14

"lus' *A7MM "lus1 should be established to deepen relations with the dialo$ue partners *ShoBi +,,0. @+!@@1. This was followed by the decision by the ASEAN leaders in April +,(, to establish an &ASEANN0 7efense Ministers< Meetin$,' which was to include the ASEANN@ members *i.e., the ASEAN countries plus Fapan, 5hina, and South 8orea1 and, additionally, India, Australia, and New Kealand1. The defense ministers of these (0 nations met in 2anoi in Dctober +,(,. They a$reed on the central role of ASEAN *&ASEAN centrality'1 in the ASEANN0 7efense Ministers< Meetin$. They also confirmed the principles of e>uality, nondiscrimination, and mutual benefit as provided for in the Treaty of Amity and 5ooperation in Southeast Asia, as well as the basic principles of soverei$nty, e>uality, noninterference, consensus, and unity in diversity. ? (3) ASEAN!centered re$ional security cooperation from the perspective of Neoliberal Institutionalism Now, let us loo# at the ASEAN!centered re$ional security cooperation in terms of the assumptions of Neoliberal Institutionalism. )irst, it is evident that the assumption about the state as the main actor in international relations applies here. =e also see that the assumption re$ardin$ the state as a rational actor $enerally applies. =e need to >ualify this observation, however. As we have noted above, ASEAN<s decision!ma#in$ is based on consensus and, therefore, issues that are unli#ely to result in consensus are not apt to be brou$ht up in the multilateral dialo$ue. If reachin$ consensus on common issues is the $roup<s $oal, then precludin$ controversial issues from the discussion can be considered &rational'. 2owever, if full transparency of the member states< interests and concerns is a re>uisite for rational decision!ma#in$ by ASEAN as a whole, then the consensus norm is incompatible with such re>uirement. Indeed, the consensus rule is an obstacle to the resolution of substantive political and security problems between ASEAN members. The disputes between 5hina and ASEAN members *particularly Lietnam and the "hilippines1 over island territories in the South 5hina Sea are a case in point. The territorial disputes over the Spratly Islands and the "aracel Islands are serious problems in the relations between 5hina and Southeast Asian nations. )rom the late (4-,s to the (40,s 5hina made efforts to improve relations with the nei$hborin$ countries and #eep territorial rows from disruptin$ those efforts. )or e ample, 5hina announced in (40/ that it would put aside territorial disputes in the South 5hina Sea in favor of Boint development of the related areas of the sea *Iida +,,0. /1. Also, in normalizin$ relations with Lietnam in (44(, 5hina vowed to resolve territorial disputes peacefully throu$h ne$otiation *Iida +,,0. /!-1. 2owever, these actions were not meant to indicate 5hina<s territorial concessions but rather to develop an environment in which the nei$hborin$ countries would reco$nize 5hinese soverei$nty as they went throu$h the Boint development of the areas concerned. In (44?, 5hina forcibly occupied the Mischief 3eef and has since occupied the territory over the obBections of ASEAN countries, includin$ the "hilippines, which also claims it. Since the late (44,s, however,
5

Ministry of )orei$n Affairs, Indonesia Foint 7eclaration on the )irst A7MM "lus, 2anoi Foint 7eclaration on the )irst ASEAN 7efense Ministers< Meetin$ ; "lus, 2anoi, (+ Dctober +,(,,' http.GGwww.deplu.$o.idG"a$esGInformationSheet.asp HI7"O(+PlOen 15

5hina has Boined ASEAN countries in multilateral dialo$ues on territorial issues in the South 5hina Sea *Iida +,,0. -!(?1. In +,,+, 5hina and the ASEAN countries issued the &7eclaration on the 5onduct of "arties in the South 5hina Sea,' declarin$ the followin$. The parties are committed to the purposes and principles of the 5harter of the Enited Nations, the (40+ EN 5onvention on the Aaw of the Sea, the Treaty of Amity and 5ooperation in Southeast Asia, the )ive "rinciples of "eaceful 5oe istence, and other universally reco$nized principles of international law: They are committed to e plorin$ ways for buildin$ trust and confidence in accordance with the above!mentioned principles and on the basis of e>uality and mutual respect: They respect and are committed to the freedom of navi$ation in and overfli$ht above the South 5hina Sea as provided for by the universally reco$nized principles of international law, includin$ the (40+ EN 5onvention on the Aaw of the Sea: They will underta#e to resolve their territorial and Burisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resortin$ to the threat or use of force, throu$h friendly consultations and ne$otiations by soverei$n states directly concerned, in accordance with universally reco$nized principles of international law, includin$ the (40+ EN 5onvention on the Aaw of the Sea: They will underta#e to e ercise self!restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability includin$, amon$ others, refrainin$ from action of inhabitin$ on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner.

5hina and the ASEAN countries also declared to intensify efforts to see# ways to build trust and confidence between and amon$ them, and to underta#e cooperative activities in marine environmental protection, marine scientific research, safety of navi$ation and communication at sea, search and rescue operation, and combatin$ transnational crime. 2owever, 5hina has been e pandin$ its naval capabilities, stren$thenin$ its naval presence in the South 5hina Sea, and see#in$ effective control of both the Spratly Islands and the "aracel Islands. At the same time, 5hina is continuin$ multilateral dialo$ues to e pand and improve its relations with ASEAN countries. In Fuly +,((, senior officials from 5hina and the ASEAN countries a$reed on $uidelines for implementin$ the 7eclaration of 5onduct of "arties in the South 5hina Sea, / and the $uidelines were approved by the forei$n ministers of the relevant countries. =hile
6

&Epdate (!5hina, ASEAN Set &Cuidelines' on Sea 3ow, but No 7eal E pected,' 3euters, Fuly +,, +,((, http.GGwww.reuters.comGarticleG+,((G,-G+,Gasean! southchinasea!idESA@E-I8(%/+,((,-+,. 16

virtually all countries welcomed the adoption of the $uidelines, there was no mention of the soverei$nty issue. The $uidelines were technical in nature, relatin$ to cooperation in functional areas, such as marine technolo$ical research, rescue, and anti!pirate efforts.- Althou$h ASEAN nations want to develop a le$ally bindin$ code of conduct based on the approved $uidelines, 5hina remains reluctant. 5oncernin$ Assumption +, it is clear that the ASEAN member states see value in the multilateral dialo$ue. Also, 5hina, South 8orea, and Fapan also see value in the multilateral framewor#, and this is evident in their participation as dialo$!partners and in the ASEANN@ framewor#. 2owever, Fapan prefers to limit 5hina<s influence by e pandin$ the framewor# further, to ASEANN/, with the addition of Australia, New Kealand, and India. 5hina wants to bloc# E.S. participation in re$ional security tal#s in Southeast Asia. The Enited States wants to maintain and if possible e pand its political and security presence in the re$ion and, therefore, does not desire a multilateral framewor# that e cludes it. At least, the Enited States want to prevent re$ional security cooperation that is unfavorable to its interests in Southeast Asia. Therefore, the Enited States will stren$then its bilateral and multilateral coordination and cooperation with its allies, Fapan, South 8orea, and Australia, outside of the ASEAN!anchored framewor# if the Enited States cannot Boin it. Moreover, the e pansion of the ASEAN!centered institutionalization of re$ional security cooperation helps maintain the relevance of ASEAN. 2owever, it will invite bi$!power rivalries, such as between 5hina and the Enited States, into the process. %ecause the bi$!power relations in the re$ion tend toward neorealist character, concerns about relative $ain will enter the picture. It will not be reasonable to e pect an e panded ASEAN!centered institution to be able to contain or restrict bi$!power rivalries. Ne t, as noted above, the ASEAN members have avoided issues that directly relate to national soverei$nty or the survival of particular $overnments and, as the South 5hina Sea conflicts indicate, they are far from bein$ able to resolve soverei$nty disputes over island territories. Therefore, we must >ualify the applicability of Assumption @. The most concrete results of the multilateral security dialo$ue amon$ the ASEAN countries and between them and ASEAN dialo$ue partners are declaratory statements about principles and aspirations rather than bindin$ a$reements. )inally, Assumption 9 is evident in the multilateral dialo$ue within ASEAN and between ASEAN nations and their dialo$ue partners. It is also safe to say that the dialo$ues have achieved one of their main $oals, confidence!buildin$. 2owever, it remains to be seen whether the dialo$ues will lead to a resolution of substantive disa$reements, such as territorial or Burisdictional disputes in the South 5hina Sea. )" $onclusion: A *nifie Security Frame+ork in East Asia, In Northeast Asia, the E.S.!centered bilateral alliance system that dates bac# to the 5old =ar period has continued to this day. Althou$h the Si !"arty Tal#s e ist as a multilateral framewor#, it is focused on the specific issue of North 8orean nuclear and
7

&5hina Avert 5ollision in South 5hina Sea,' Asia Times, Fuly +4, +,((, http.GGwww.atimes.comGatimesG5hinaGMC+4Ad,(.html. 17

missile development. Therefore, if the denuclearization of North 8orea should prove impossible and if the countries concerned should come to see North 8orea as a nuclear!weapons state, the framewor#<s raison d<Qtre would have been dashed. =ould it be possible to replace the Si !"arty Tal#s with some other cooperative framewor#H The incompatibility of the maBor powers< strate$ic interests re$ardin$ the future of the 8orean peninsula ma#es it very difficult to transform the Si !"arty Tal#s into a framewor# for sustained multilateral cooperation to resolve broader re$ional security issues. In contrast, ASEAN as a multilateral framewor# for cooperation has helped Southeast Asian countries in stabilizin$ their re$ion. ASEAN has also successfully limited e trare$ional powers< political intervention in the re$ion. In recent years, ASEAN has also been endeavorin$ to establish an ASEAN!centered security institution that can address security issues of concern not only to its members but also to the maBor powers outside of the re$ion. Althou$h Indonesia has played a leadin$ role in this process, ASEAN owes much of its success to its adherence to the consensus!based process and $radualism. Also essential has been the members< commitment to the principles of e>uality, nondiscrimination, and mutual interest, as well as soverei$nty, e>uality, and noninterference. 2owever, it remains to be seen whether ASEAN will be able to maintain these principles and resolve the territorial disputes between 5hina and ASEAN member countries in the South 5hina Sea. =hile it may be possible to maintain the consensus that disputes should be resolved throu$h peaceful means, territorial disputes are zero!sum problems, and the noninterference principle limits the effectiveness of the ASEAN!centered multilateral dialo$ue in resolvin$ those disputes. In sum, we see that some assumptions of Neoliberal Institutionalism pertain to both the Si !"arty Tal#s and the ASEAN!centered process of re$ional security dialo$ue, but they are both limited in their ability to resolve issues that directly relate to national soverei$nty. This is the reality that we see in East Asia. East Asia remains a neorealist world. Althou$h the he$emonic power of the Enited States may be e periencin$ a relative decline, its military power is by far the most powerful of any country in the re$ion. Moreover, the influence of the Enited States in maintainin$ the e istin$ $lobal system far e ceeds that of any other re$ional power. Althou$h 5hina<s rapid economic $rowth is increasin$ its national power, its military capabilities are several decades behind those of the Enited States. Moreover, 5hina<s influence in the mana$ement of the $lobal system is still limited. 5hina is pursin$ active diplomacy as the host nation for the Si !"arty Tal#s, but the multilateral framewor# has been unsuccessful in attainin$ its sin$le most important $oal, the denuclearization of North 8orea, due to the substantial disa$reements amon$ the parties on how to achieve that $oal. Moreover, 5hina is a maBor party to the territorial disputes in the South 5hina Sea and its position on those conflicts is e posin$ the limitations of the ASEAN! centered security dialo$ue. =hile the E.S.!centered hub and spo#es alliance system will li#ely continue in the foreseeable future, over the medium to lon$ term, East Asia needs to transition to a multilateral security system. )or this to happen, we need to promote the establishment of a system of international relations that infuse neoliberal elements with the present 18

international relations that are hi$hly neorealist in character. The eventual multilateral re$ional security system for the re$ion must also reflect this shift. In short, we need a multi!layered security system that combines the elements of Neorealism with elements of Neoliberalism. Theoretically there are two scenarios. The first scenario would be centered on the construction of a 8antian international society, where national policies focused on narrowly defined national interests would be $radually replaced by policies that fostered common international aspirations. This would re>uire national leaders who shared common values and common perspectives on re$ional issues. 2owever, in view of the centralized state systems and the nationalism!heavy international relations that e ist in East Asia today, we cannot e pect this scenario to unfold in the foreseeable future. The second scenario would be one in which civil society and transnational networ#s were hi$hly developed, such that civil society institutions and or$anizations would ma#e sustained contributions to the resolution of common problems amon$ the countries of East Asia. Drdinary citizens would come to believe in international cooperation that did not depend on state institutions. This would re>uire the democratization of each country in the re$ion. 5ivil society or$anizations in democratic political systems would freely e tend cooperation across national borders, share their resources and abilities with each other, and cooperate to address common problems. They would build mutual confidence and trust, develop common values, and share a sense of community. That is, this scenario would eventuate in the construction of international relations alon$ the lines of Sociolo$ical Aiberalism. )inally, in the heavily neorealist East Asian re$ion, we are li#ely to see continued reliance on the state!centric system for addressin$ traditional security issues. 2owever, we can hope that civil society!led transnational cooperation will complement the state! centric system.

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