Jared Ritenour Nasserism: The Rise and Fall of Gamal Abdel Nassers Pan-Arabic Vision European imperialism caused

intense resentment and anger in the Middle East. Through regulations, capitulations, and other agreements, Europeans projected their influence in the Middle East and stirred enormous tensions. European and Western ideas greatly affected economies, governments, and daily life in the Middle East, causing many traditionalists to form nationalist movements against the Europeans. One of the most pivotal movements against imperialism was pan-Arabism, and from pan-Arabism, Nasserism and an assortment of other political ideologies, such as Baathism. Pan-Arabism was an Arab unification idea based on the concept that all Arabs shared a history, ethnicity, and culture. To unite the Arab world into a singular state or federation was the goal of the pan-Arabs and many leaders took to the task of achieving that end. Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser was among those leaders who sought to expand pan-Arabic ideas and reject European influence. Nassers political ideology, Nasserism, flourished in the 1950s and 1960s in Egypt and the Middle East and was the most popular and noted pan-Arabic vision among the Arabic states. Nasserism, as an ideology, was successful initially because of Nassers ability to play into anti-imperialist sentiments, the nationalization of the Suez Canal, and through Arab socialist ideas involving land, industrial, and education reform, but problems with his Arab socialist reforms, the failure of the United Arab Republic, his interventionism in Yemen, and the Six Days War weakened the Nasserist and panArabic philosophy. Many historians point to the British as the force exacerbating Arab nationalist tendencies in the Middle East. When the British began their correspondence with Sharif Husain in the Hijaz, they dredged up Arab nationalist ideologies. Nationalist ideas fueled the Arab Revolts in

1916, which weakened the Ottoman Empire. Out of the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, the British gained a heavy hand in the Middle East, including Egypt. It was out of European imperialism (although it was not called imperialism per se) that the roots of Gamal Abdel Nassers rise to power were born. Rejecting European interventionism, Nasser rose from obscurity to become the icon for Arab nationalism.1 His policies initially were successful and united the Egyptians, especially the fellaheen (peasants). Nassers rise to power resulted from a military coup that he, along with leaders such as Anwar al-Sadat, orchestrated in July of 1952. Nasser was a powerful leader in a military group known as the Free Officers. The Free Officers were dissatisfied profoundly with the state of Egyptian affairs, especially the influence that Britain held over Egypt and were also unhappy with King Farouk, the tenth in the dynasty of Muhammad Ali. Farouk was a distant and carless ruler who lived in luxury while his people suffered and lived in poverty. Farouks distance from his people and the ever-increasing influence of Britain in Egyptian affairs led to the bloodless coup of the Free Officers. A new government was created under the Free Officers called the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). The leaders of the Free Officers ran the RCC and had control over all Egyptian governmental policy. Over the next few years the RCC suffered from political infighting between leaders like President Muhammad Nagib and Nasser.2 Eventually, in 1956, Nasser was named president of Egypt and Nassers political and nationalist ideologies were manifested in what became known as Nasserism. As president, Nasser was a powerful ruler and incredibly influential in the Arab world. In Egypt, he was a unifier, building upon the nationalist tendencies of the Arab-Egyptian people.
1

Rashid Khalidi, Arab Nationalism: Historic Problems in the Literature, The American Historical Review 96, no. 5 (Dec., 1991): 1371; Curtis Richardson, In-class notes, History 370, Spring 2013, 3/14/2013. 2 R. Hrair Dekmejian, Egypt Under Nasir (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1971), 20-27; Derek Hopwood, Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1981 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), 43-44; Geoffrey Wawro, Quicksand: Americas Pursuit of Power in the Middle East (New York: Penguin Press, 2010), 157.

Through his socialist policies, he was able to help build a strong following, especially among the fellaheen and his anti-Western positions made him popular among those disaffected by the British intrusions into their lives. The British cared only about their economic interests in Egypt: cotton, the Suez Canal as a way to ship oil, and the sale of British goods.3 Greed was the overwhelming catalyst in the British efforts in Egypt, causing many Egyptians to harbor resentment. The British controlled the major economic interests of Egypt and it resulted in a large disparity of wealth. The poor grew while the rich grew richer, aggravating the already growing anti-imperialist desires of the Egyptian people. The lack of empathy among the British for the Egyptians and the meddling in the Egyptian economy created fierce resentment and opposition to Britain. Nassers nationalism gave Egyptians pride in their heritage and also enhanced their connection to their Arab roots.4 It is not surprising that Nassers ideas caught hold in other areas of the Arab world because of its anti-imperialist message. Imperialism had caused many problems in the Arab world, especially under the League of Nations mandate system. Groups that were traditionally enemies were placed within the same borders causing violence and turmoil to grow.5 Nassers ideas and actions gave hope to the Arab world, proving that the Arabs could come out from beneath the shadow of the Europeans. It was through the nationalization of the Suez Canal that Nasser first showed his true fortitude against the British and proved to the Arab world that the Europeans could be dealt with through strength and persistence. Perhaps Nassers greatest achievement was the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the construction of the Aswan Dam. The nationalization of the canal was a direct result of reneged
3 4

Wawro, 155. Barry Rubin, Pan-Arab Nationalism: The Ideological Dream as a Compelling Force, Journal of Contemporary History 26, no. 3/4 (Sept., 1991): 536. 5 William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East, Fourth Edition (Philadelphia, PA: Westview Press, 2009), 205.

financial support from the United States and Britain for the funding of the Aswan Dam. Nasser believed the dam to be an economic boon to Egypt, but the country was short on capital. Nasser went to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to ask for monetary support and the United States, playing a large governing role in the IMF, agreed to support financially the building of the Aswan Dam. At the same time, Egypt was doing business with the Soviet Union, buying arms from Czechoslovakia to use against Israel. Eventually the United States discovered the Egypt/Soviet deal and considered dropping the financial support it had promised. The US decided to attach a stipulation to the deal requiring Nasser make peace with Israel, something Nasser refused to do. The US decided to cut all funding for the Aswan Dam. Outraged, but unable to find another way to counter the lost US financial support, Nasser called for the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956.6 The nationalization of the Suez Canal alarmed Britain, France, and Israel who secretly met to devise a plan to stop it. Britain and France planned to have Israel begin an unprovoked conflict that they would join after the first Israeli strike. Israel complied and attacked Egypt, taking parts of the Sinai Peninsula. Britain and France joined it and attacked Egypt. The Tripartite Aggression as the Egyptians called it, was orchestrated without the knowledge of the US. President Dwight Eisenhower was furious at the three powers for the attack and went to the United Nations to draw up a cease-fire. Britain, France, and Israel accepted the cease-fire and the former two pulled out of Egypt. With the United States on his side at the time and the defeat of the tripartite powers, Nasser became a hero to Egypt and the rest of the Middle East.7

Peter Johnson, Egypt Under Nasser, MERIP Reports, no. 10 (July, 1972): 5; Robert Dreyfuss, Devils Game (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2005), 106; Douglas Little, American Orientalism (Chapel Hill, NC: North Carolina University Press, 2002), 166-169. 7 Little, 180.

Although Nassers armies were almost decimated, Nasser emerged from the Suez Crisis with a burgeoning cult of personality surrounding him and the Suez Canal in his hands. The Suez Crisis served to strengthen Nassers power and also help Egypt finance the Aswan Dam. Through nationalization, Cairo gained control of the operations of the canal and profit from it through tolls and taxes. The money that Cairo made went towards building the dam. The Aswan Dam was an important economic project for Egypt because it would help power much of Egypts electricity and it would help irrigate the Egyptian desert. Nasser realized the importance of the Aswan Dam and the nationalization of the Suez Canal helped support the financing of the dam. The Suez Crisis also served as a blow to British and French imperialism and decisively removed British influence from Egypt. Nasser was a hero and his cult of personality grew.8 Even before he became president, Nassers political and nationalist philosophy was manifested in the RCC, over which he held control. The RCC announced a platform of six policy goals: liquidation of imperialism, abolition of feudalism, an end to monopolies and their domination of capital, the creation of a strong army, achieving social justice, and establishing a democracy.9 The platform of six goals was central to the RCC government and was put in place to help build an egalitarian Egypt. The first of the policies put into place was agrarian reform, which helped build fellaheen support for the RCC and eliminated feudal influences from Egypt.10 The wealthy landowners and the government profoundly exploited the fellaheen prior to the rise of the RCC. Between the large landholdings of the government and King Farouk, the fellaheen owned and operated a meager portion of Egypts land assets. Believing that a wider
8 9

Wawro, 186-187; Curtis Richardson, In-class notes, History 370, Spring 2013, 4/2/13. Youssef M. Choueiri, Arab Nationalism: A History (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, Inc., 2000), 182. 10 Hopwood, 125.

distribution of land amongst the fellaheen would lead Egypt to a more prosperous future, the RCC instated agrarian reform. Nasser, as vice-chairman of the RCC, was heavily behind the land reform laws. The new land reform laws limited the amount of land a person could own to 200 feddans, which was equal to slightly more than 200 acres. The remainder of the land, which was a massive sum, was redistributed among the fellaheen. The socialistic agrarian reform of Nasser and the RCC was a social and political weapon against the wealthy landowners who had willingly supported Britain and King Farouk. By enfranchising the peasant farmers, Nasser and the RCC built support and at the same time crushed the ability of the wealthy landowners to mount a successful counter-movement to remove the RCC from power.11 While land reform seemed to be the answer to Egypts wealth disparity problem, it was not entirely successful. While land may have been redistributed, a hierarchy system still existed in Egypt. Egypt realized that it was easy to change the wealth status of an individual, but to eradicate a class system that had existed for generations was almost impossible. Despite the prevalence of the deeply ingrained class system, those in Egypt and the Arab world lauded the RCCs land reform, especially in its early days.12 Alongside agrarian reform was education reform. In Egypt, Islamic schools were the foremost source of education, where the ulama (religious leaders) instructed students in Islamic traditions and beliefs. Nassers secular vision forced the end of the Islamic state schools. Under Nassers policies, primary, secondary, and higher education became free and accessible to all of the social classes. Free education revolutionized the way Egyptians lived and created many opportunities for the lower classes. The free education system was a useful tool to influence the political thought of the young students. Students were often taught the ideals of Arabism,

11 12

Dekemejian, 123; Hopwood, 126. Fouad Ajami, On Nasser and His Legacy, Journal of Peace Research 11, no. 1 (1974): 41.

nationalism, and socialist thought which helped build the nationalism of the Egyptian people. In turn, the growing intellectual base of Egypt worked to strengthen Nassers power and influence.13 Despite the success of Nassers education reform, there were problems. With the influx of new students, schools became crowded and inefficient with many teachers who were not proficient or educated enough to handle the growing demand of the students. The higher education system also became bloated and many facilities were understaffed which became a problem. There were too many students for too few teachers and lecture halls were over filled. Nasser added to the problems of over enrollment by promising jobs in the government to those who graduated from the universities. Initially, Nassers promise was not a problem because the Egyptian government was a fledgling creation, but eventually it became oversaturated and many Egyptians were unemployed or underpaid. The growing unemployed, educated class became restless and active against Nassers regime in the late 1960s.14 Along with education reform and land reform, Nasser sought to nationalize the Egyptian economy in the vein of Ataturk in Turkey. Ataturk, realizing that there was little middle class to support industry in Turkey, decided to nationalize industry. Taking his cues from what Ataturk had done in Turkey, Nasser followed suit, nationalizing the banks, industry, insurance, and other sectors of the economy. Small businesses and agricultural production remained in the hands of private interests, but the small farmers and business owners were a minor part of the Egyptian economy. In truth, Egypts economy was not truly socialistic, but more of a state capitalist system. Still, Egypts economy and land reform systems harkened to socialist philosophical ideals. The goal of nationalization was to build capital, which was in short supply in Egypt

13 14

Hopwood, 136-140. Hopwood, 140-141; Curtis Richardson, In-class notes, History 370, Spring 2013, 4/2/13.

because there were few foreign investors willing to take a stake in the Egyptian market. Like the land and education reforms, Nassers nationalization of the economy fell short of its intended goals. The economy stagnated and there was little competition which led to a decline in product quality. Salaries were capped and taxes on the upper-level salaried workers were incredibly high. Increasingly, Egypt became dependent on outside sources like the Soviet Union to supply them with capital and other materials. Nassers form of Arab socialism was not as successful as he had hoped. Indeed, the failing economy of the late 1960s sealed Nassers political fate and the fate of his ideology.15 Nassers ideology, as previously written, was dependent on the idea of nationalism. As leader of Egypt, he built enormous support for Egyptian nationalism, with Egyptians embracing their Egyptian heritage and nature. Despite Nassers growing Egyptian nationalism, he was also an Arab nationalist with a desire to unite the Arab world. Egyptian nationalism seemed like a stepping stone towards his greater goal. By removing Britain and other Western powers from the Middle East, Nassers goal of Arab unification was one step closer. To remove the Europeans, exacerbating nationalist tendencies among the people was a necessity. Nationalism was growing throughout the Middle East and Nasser was seen as a hero due to his success against the tripartite powers during the Suez Crisis. To create his Arab nation, Nasser played into the leadership role that much of the Arab world had symbolically placed upon him.16 Before delving into Nassers international plans, attention should be given to Nassers perceived role for Egypt in his pan-Arabic vision. Nasser saw Egypt as the center of three worlds: the African world, the Middle East, and the Muslim world. Egypt was African, Middle Eastern, and predominantly Muslim so it seemed logical to Nasser that Egypt should spearhead

15 16

Cleveland and Bunton, 316-319; Johnson, 6-8. Cleveland and Bunton, 313.

the eventual uniting of the Arabic peoples. To achieve his goals, Nasser hoped to instill a nationalist ideology throughout the three worlds so he decided on a policy of non-alignment. By not joining America or the Soviet Union, Nasser wielded a power and influence apart from the two great powers and promoted his nationalist ideologies.17 It was from Nassers pan-Arabic desires that he agreed to unite Egypt with Syria into a United Arab Republic. The United Arab Republic (UAR) was formed in 1958 at the behest of Baath Party leaders in Syria who feared a communist takeover of the government. The Baath leaders approached Nasser, advocating the uniting of Egypt and Syria into one nation. The idea was tempting and perhaps the beginning of the Arab nation Nasser was seeking. Nasser agreed to merge the countries into a united republic with himself as the head. The union started out with a positive note, a new constitution was written and Nassers personal fame was a catalyst in creating a large mass of support in both Egypt and Syria. Soon, though, Nasser exerted more control on Syria than the Syrians expected. He disbanded the Syrian political parties, including the Baath Party, and sent in Egyptians to run Syria which was an affront to the Syrians. Nassers goal was to set up the system of government in Syria that had worked so well for the Egyptians. What he did not take into consideration was that the Syrian people were different from the Egyptians. The Syrians were unable to handle the new form of government and legal system thrust upon them by Nasser.18 The UAR lasted until 1961 and became a black mark on Nassers record. The UAR was destined to fail because it had been pieced together so quickly with little planning. The demands that Nasser put on the Syrians and the influence he exerted over them crushed any hope of the ability of the republic to work. Seemingly it was Nassers ego that allowed him to believe that

17 18

Little, 168. Cleveland and Bunton, 314; Hopwood, 58-60.

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what he did in the UAR would work. Nasser believed that the cult of personality that surrounded him was enough to guarantee success, but that was not the case. The Baath Party and the military decided to rebel against Egypt and seized control of the Syrian government again. The UAR failed and Egypt and Syria parted ways after four mishandled years under Nasser. Nassers quest for Arab unity had failed and he turned back to Egypt, taking on numerous domestic projects, such as his education and industrial reforms. Despite the failure, Nasser remained interested and involved in affairs outside of his country. The hope for a united Arab world continued to echo through Nassers mind. Indeed, Nasser continued to involve himself in the affairs of the rest of the Arab world, often to his own detriment.19 It was not long after the failure of the UAR that Nasser decided to intervene in Yemen. Nasser spurred a military coup against the leader of Yemen, Imam Muhammad al-Badr and was successful. The leaders of the Yemeni uprising announced the creation of the Yemeni Arab Republic, although they failed to capture al-Badr who organized a resistance. A civil war began with Nasserite military leaders facing the Saudi-backed al-Badr. To Nasser, Yemen was a way to regain his standing as de facto leader of the Arab world. Success in Yemen could lead to regaining his stature after the failure of the UAR. The problem for Nasser was that Egypt was spending millions of dollars a day, which Cairo did not have. As he was seeking to regain his former status, Nasser was allowing Egypt to weaken through his excessive wartime spending. Nasser continued to keep troops in Yemen even into 1967 during the breakout of the Six Days War. Because he could not stay out of the affairs of the other Middle Eastern countries, Nasser harmed his own country economically and Egypts war effort during the Six Days War.20

19 20

Hopwood, 60-62; Cleveland and Bunton, 314. Cleveland and Bunton, 454; Wawro, 243-246.

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Nasser previously faced Israel militarily in the Suez Crisis and had handily dealt with it with the assistance of Eisenhower and the United Nations. The Six Days War was a different experience from the Suez Crisis and ultimately became the death knell to Nasserism and panArabism. In the Six Days War, Egypt and a host of other Middle Eastern countries faced Israel and were ill-prepared to handle the technologically advance Israeli military. The Israeli defense force was equipped with the best technologies and weapons the Middle East. Much of the technology and advanced weaponry came from the United States and was sold in arms deals with the Pentagon. The Israelis were also fighting for a nationalist cause, the Zionist homeland against the invading Arabs. The cause bolstered Israeli will to fight because it realized that loss would inevitably lead to Israels destruction. As for the Arabs, they were many in number but their militaries were not as modern or dedicated as the Israeli forces. Egypts military was the best of the lot, but it faced weak leadership and untested men. It did not aid the Arab effort that Egypt still had several thousand troops in Yemen, fighting a futile civil war.21 The Six Days War, which began in June of 1967, was a result of Arab-Israeli hostilities and it in turn, created even more tension between the two groups. Lies ignited the Six Days War. Due to the actions of Israel, there were thousands of Palestinian refugees seeking asylum. Nasser, as the voice of the Arab world spoke out harshly against Israel in support of Palestine. Nasser realized that there could never be a united Arab world without a sovereign Palestine, so he exacerbated issues with Israel. It was in May of 1967 that Nasser, through Soviet channels, learned that Israel was moving forces toward Syria. The report was wrong, but Nasser did not realize the inaccuracy of the report and began mobilizing his troops. When Israel caught wind of Nassers mobilization, it decided to mobilize and landed the first strike. The Six Days War had erupted and before the United States or the Soviet Union
21

Wawro, 248-255.

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could intervene, it was finished. Israel decimated the Arab troops, forcing them to call for a quick truce and treaty. Expanding its borders, Israel created new tensions among the Arab Middle East.22 The Six Days War weakened Nassers influence and position in the Middle East. It effectively destroyed what little hope remained of a united Arab world and stigmatized him. The Six Days War was not only a disaster for Nasserism but a calamity for Egypt. The Suez Canal was closed and the Egyptians lost millions of dollars in revenue that they desperately needed; Egypt had to take money from other countries, such as Saudi Arabia. Along with the economic problems, the military who had built Nassers Egypt was in ruins. Egypt, a once proud country, was also forced to cede some of its land, including the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula, to Israel. Nasser offered to resign as president, but the people of Egypt urged him to remain in his post. He acquiesced to their request and remained president until his death in 1970. Despite remaining in power, Nassers influence waned and his prestige in the Middle East collapsed. As the primary form of pan-Arabism, Nasserisms demise was the proverbial nail in the coffin to the movement. The Baathists remained, but eventually evolved into a more nationalistic movement, rather than a pan-Arabic movement. Pan-Arabism was essentially dead from June of 1967 onward.23 The defeat of the Arabs in the Six Days War set the stage for another showdown in 1973 that resulted in another Israeli victory. When Gamal Abdel Nasser died in 1970, so did his political and nationalist ideology. Pan-Arabisms survival was heavily tied to Nasserism because they were closely linked. Although Nasserism was only one variety of pan-Arabism, the reality that it was the most successful form of the movement meant that pan-Arabisms credibility and continuation hinged
22

Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Eighth Edition (New York: Bedford/St. Martins, 2013), 280-289. 23 Cleveland and Bunton, 339-341; Ajami, 46.

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on Nasserism. With Nassers death, the ideologies of Arab socialism and pan-Arabism collapsed and new policies and ideas replaced them. When Anwar al-Sadat took the Egyptian presidency upon the death of Nasser, he realized that changes needed to be made. He replaced Arab socialism with limited free enterprise and attempted to reform Egypt. Islam regained its hold as a unifying force among Arabs, eventually leading to a rise in pan-Islamism. The Muslim Brotherhood and other pan-Islamic groups that were essentially silenced during Nassers secular reign began to gain prominence and grow in power. Nassers influence in Egypt and across the Middle East cannot be disregarded, though. Nassers ideas held sway over leaders like Muammar Gaddafi and neo-Arabism movements that grew and declined in the decades after his death.24 Despite the effect Nasser had on the minds of leaders like Gaddafi, pan-Arabism was never truly resurrected. As a movement, Nasserism was powerful and popular upon its inception in the early 1950s. It promised social justice and an end to British domination of the Egyptian system. Nasserisms success can partially be attributed to the charisma and forceful personality of its namesake and the great lengths he went to ensure Egypts role as the center of the Arab world. Nasser plugged into Egyptian nationalism and history and made it the most powerful Arab country in the Middle East. In the beginning, Nassers great plans for Egypt and the rest of the Arab world seemed feasible and offered immense promise, but Nassers egotism and policies eventually led to the weakened state of Egypt and the pan-Arabic movement. Nasser, even when he was better off maintaining a policy of non-intervention, continued to meddle in the affairs of other Arab countries, such as Yemen and Syria, in the hopes of building his pan-Arabic state. His inability to focus entirely on Egypt led to many conflicts including the Yemeni Civil War and the Six Days War. Despite his foibles, Nasser remained a powerful force in Middle Eastern
24

Ian Tuttle, Egypts War for Peace, The History Teacher 42, no. 1(Nov., 2008): 60; Choueiri, 206-210.

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politics until his death. While his movement and ideologies essentially died with him, Nasser continues to hold a revered place in the minds of many Arabs and Arab leaders.