Clasico Massey

Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal Author(s): Douglas S.
Massey, Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino and J. Edward Taylor Reviewed work(s): Source: Population and Development Review, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Sep., 1993), pp. 431-466 Published by: Population Council Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2938462 . Accessed: 22/11/2012 23:06
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Population Council is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Population and Development Review.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.223 on Thu, 22 Nov 2012 23:06:55 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Theoriesof International A Review Migration: and Appraisal

DOUGLAS S. MASSEY JOAQUIN ARANGO GRAEME HUGO ALI KOUAOUCI ADELA PELLEGRINO J. EDWARD TAYLOR
OVERTHEPAST30 YEARS, hasemerged as a major imrnigration force throughout In traditional theworld. suchas Australia, immigrant-receiving societies Canada, andtheUnited hasgrown anditscomposition thevolume ofimmigration States, has shifted decisively away fromEurope,the historically dominant source, In Europe, and LatinAmerica. countries that toward Asia,Africa, meanwhile, for centuries had been sendingout migrants were suddenly transformed inWestern intoimmigrant-receiving societies. After 1945,virtually all countries Europebeganto attract significant numbers from abroad.Although ofworkers the migrants were initially drawnmainly from southern Europe,by the late in Africa, 1960sthey mostly came from developing countries Asia,theCaribbean,and theMiddleEast. in southern By the 1980s even countries Europe-Italy,Spain, and Portugal-which onlya decadebefore had beensending to wealthier migrants in the north, countries workers from began to import Africa, Asia, and the MiddleEast.Atthesametime, birth Japan-withitslow and still declining rate, its aging population, and its high standard of living-founditself turning increasingly to migrants from in Asiaand evenSouthAmerica poorer countries to satisfy itslaborneeds. Mostoftheworld's havebecomediverse, multiethnic developed countries inthat and those that havenotreached this state aremoving societies, decisively direction. Theemergence ofinternational as a basicstructural feature migration all industrialized andcoherence ofnearly tothestrength ofthe countries testifies
POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 19, NO. 3 (SEPTEMBER 1993)
431
432
THEORIES
OF INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION
these forces remains understanding basefor forces. Yetthetheoretical underlying and hastherefore taken officials, boominimmigration citizens, weak.Therecent migration, and when it comes to international by surprise, demographers and in nineteenth-century concepts, models, mired remains popularthinking assumptions. migration, theory ofinternational coherent there is no single, Atpresent, in isolation from have developed largely that setoftheories onlya fragmented boundaries. butnotalwayssegmented bydisciplinary one another, sometimes that a full and trendsin immigration, however,suggest Current patterns processes will not be achievedby migratory of contemporary understanding on a single levelof alone,or byfocusing relying on thetoolsofone discipline a sophisticated theircomplex, multifaceted naturerequires Rather, analysis. and assumptions. a variety levels, ofperspectives, that incorporates theory theleading contemandintegrate is toexplicate ofthis article Thepurpose that models We begin byexamining migration. theories ofinternational porary that consider theories andthen movement describe theinitiation ofinternational acrossspaceand time. flows persist population account forwhytransnational a priori, we seekto understand Rather thanfavoring overanother one theory in orderto illuminate and key assumptions each model on its own terms do we separately has been considered Only after each theory hypotheses. to revealareas of frameworks and contrast the different conceptual compare In undertaking this exercise, disagreement. and substantive logical inconsistency andtolay a soundbasisfor themodels empirically, evaluating we seektoprovide of theory an accurateand comprehensive the groundwork forconstructing century. thetwenty-first migration for international
of intemational The initiation migration

to explain whyinternational A variety oftheoretical modelshas beenproposed thesamething, seekstoexplain and although eachultimately begins, migration ofreference. and frames different assumptions, concepts, radically they employ condiinwagesandemployment focuses on differentials economics Neoclassical it conceives of and on generally tionsbetweencountries, costs; migration The "new ecomaximization. for income decision movement as an individual in a variety ofmarkets, in contrast, conditions considers nomics ofmigration," as a householddecisiontakento notjust labormarkets. It viewsmigration on family capitalconstraints incomeor to overcome minimize risks to family and world systems theory Dual labor market theory activities. production instead on forces decision focusing processes, suchmicro-level ignore generally Theformer links to atmuchhigher levels ofaggregation. immigration operating sees whilethelatter industrial ofmodern thestructural economies, requirements and market of economic globalization as a natural consequence immigration boundaries. acrossnational penetration
DOUGLAS
S.
MASSEY
ET
AL.
433
Given thefact that causalprocesses atsuchdifferent theories conceptualize levelsof analysis-theindividual, thehousehold, thenational, and theinternational-they cannot be assumed, a priori, tobe inherently incompatible. It is quite possible, forexample,thatindividuals act to maximize incomewhile families minirnize risk, and thatthe context within are whichbothdecisions madeis shapedby structural forces operating at thenational and international levels.Nonetheless, the variousmodels reflect different research objectives, focuses, interests, andwaysofdecomposing an enormously complex subject into analytically manageable basis forjudging parts;and a firm their consistency requires that theinner logic, propositions, assumptions, and hypotheses ofeach be clearly theory specified and well-understood. Neoclassical economics: Macrotheory Probably the oldestand best-known of international was theory migration in to explainlabor migration the processof economic developedoriginally and Todaro,1970; development (Lewis, 1954; Ranis and Fei, 1961; Harris and itsextensions, Todaro,1976). According to this theory international migrain the is caused by geographic differences tion,like its internal counterpart, of and demandforlabor.Countries supply witha largeendowment of labor relative to capital have a low equilibrium market wage,whilecountries witha limited arecharacterized endowment oflabor relative tocapital market bya high of laborsupply and interaction wage, as depicted graphically by the familiar demand Theresulting inwagescausesworkers curves. differential from thelowto moveto thehigh-wage As a result ofthis wagecountry country. movement, thesupply oflabordecreases and wagesrisein thecapital-poor while country, thesupply inthecapital-rich oflabor increases andwagesfall at country, leading, to an international that equilibrium, wage differential reflects onlythecostsof international and psychic. movement, pecuniary theflowofworkers from labor-abundant to labor-scarce counMirroring tries is a flowofinvestment to capital-poor from countries. capital capital-rich Therelative scarcity ofcapital inpoorcountries yields a rate ishigh ofreturn that The movement investment. of by international standards, thereby attracting also includes humancapital, withhighly skilled workers from capital moving in order to capital-poor returns skills capital-rich countries to reaphigh on their in a human capital-scarce of environment, leadingto a parallelmovement managers, technicians, and otherskilledworkers. The international flowof labor, therefore, be kept distinct from theassociated must conceptually international flowofhumancapital. Evenin themostaggregated macro-level models, theheterogeneity linesmust ofinmmigrants be clearly alongskill recognized. Thesimple and compelling offered explanation ofinternational migration neoclassical and macroeconomics has strongly by shapedpublicthinking has the intellectual basis formuchinmmigration The perspective provided policy. contains several and assumptions: implicit propositions
434
THEORIES
OF INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION
1 Theinternational migration ofworkers is causedbydifferences inwage rates between countries. 2 The elimination ofwage differentials willend themovement oflabor, and migration willnotoccurin theabsenceofsuchdifferentials. 3 International flows ofhumancapital-that is,highly skilled workersrespond to differences in therateof return to humancapital, whichmaybe different from theoverall wagerate, a distinct yielding pattern ofmigration that maybe opposite that ofunskilled workers. 4 Labor markets are the primary mechanisms by whichinternational flows oflaborareinduced; other kinds ofmarkets do nothaveimportant effects on international migration. 5 The way forgovernments to control migration flowsis to regulate or influence labormarkets in sending and/or receiving countries. Neoclassical economics: Microtheory to the macroeconomic Corresponding model is a microeconomic model of individual choice (Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro, 1969, 1976, 1989; Todaro and Maruszko, 1987). In thisscheme, individual rational actors decideto migrate becausea cost-benefit calculation leads themto expecta positive netreturn, usually monetary, from movement. International migration is conceptualized as a form ofinvestment inhumancapital. Peoplechoosetomovetowhere can they be mostproductive, giventheir butbefore skills; theycan capture thehigher wages associated withgreater laborproductivity mustundertake they certain investments, whichinclude thematerial costsoftraveling, thecostsofmaintenancewhilemoving and looking for work, theeffort involved inlearning a new languageand culture, the difficulty in adapting experienced to a new labor market, and thepsychological costsofcutting old tiesand forging new ones. Potential migrants estimate thecosts andbenefits ofmoving toalternative international locations andmigrate towhere theexpected discounted netreturns are greatest oversometimehorizon (Borjas,1990). Netreturns in each future periodare estimated the observed by taking to the earnings corresponding individual's skillsin the destination country and multiplying theseby the of obtaining probability a job there(and forillegal migrants thelikelihood of beingable to avoid deportation) to obtain"expecteddestination earnings." Theseexpected earnings arethen subtracted from those inthecommuexpected oforigin nity (observed earnings there multiplied bytheprobability ofemployment) and thedifference is summed overa time horizon from 0 ton,discounted bya factor that reflects thegreater utility ofmoney earned inthepresent thanin thefuture. Fromthisintegrated difference theestimated costsare subtracted to theexpected yield netreturn to migration. Thisdecisionmaking process is summarized analytically bythefollowing equation:
DOUGLAS
S.
MASSEY
ET
AL.
435
ER(O)
ffl
[PI (t)P2(t)YOt)
P3(t)Yo(t)]ertdt
- C(0)
(1)
whereER(0) is the expectednet return to migration calculated just before P1(t)istheprobability departure attime 0; tistime; ofavoiding deportation from the area of destination (1.0 forlegal migrants and <1.0 forundocumented
niigrants);P2(t) is the probability of employmentat the destination;Yd(t) is P3(t) is the probability if employed earnings at the place of destination; of
in thecommunity ifemployed in the employment oforigin; Yo(t)is earnings risthediscount andC(O)isthesumtotal community oforigin; factor; ofthecosts ofmovement (including psychological costs). Ifthequantity for somepotential destination, therational ER(0) ispositive if if actormigrates; it is negative the actorstays;and it is zero,the actoris indifferent between moving and staying. In theory, a potential migrant goesto wherethe expected net returns are greatest, to migration leadingto several important conclusions that differ slightly from theearlier macroeconomic formulations: 1 International in both movement stems from international differentials earnings and employment rates, whoseproduct deternines expected earnings full (theprior model,in contrast, assumed employment). 2 Individual humancapital thelikely characteristics thatincrease rateof remuneration ortheprobability ofemployment inthedestination relative tothe sendingcountry (e.g., education, experience, training, languageskills)will increase thelikelihood ofinternational movement, other things beingequal. 3 Individual or technologies thatlower characteristics, socialconditions, to migration migration costsincreasethe net returns and, hence,raisethe probability ofinternational movement. 4 Becauseof2 and 3,individuals thesamecountry candisplay within very different proclivities to migrate. 5 Aggregate sumsofindicountries are simple flows between migration vidualmovesundertaken calculations. on thebasisofindividual cost-benefit in 6 International movement doesnotoccurin theabsence ofdifferences occursuntil earnings and/or employment ratesbetweencountries. Migration and employment expected earnings (theproduct ofearnings rates)have been and movement does equalizedinternationally (netofthecostsofmovement), notstopuntil thisproduct has been equalized. in expected 7 Thesizeofthedifferential returns determines thesizeofthe international flowofmigrants between countries. 8 Migration decisions stem between from or discontinuities disequilibria markets thedecision to migrate. labormarkets; other do notdirectly influence 9 If conditions in receiving are psychologically attractive to countries In thiscase,a negative prospective migrants, migration costsmaybe negative. differential to haltmigration between countries. earnings maybe necessary
436
THEORIES
OF INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION
10 Governments controlimmigration primarily through policiesthat in sending affect and/or countries-for expected earnings receiving example, ofemployment or raisetheriskof thosethatattempt to lowerthelikelihood in thedestination area (through underemployment employer sanctions), those that seek to raise incomesat the origin(through long-term development programs), or thosethataim to increasethe costs (bothpsychological and material) ofmigration. Thenew economics ofmigration In recent hasarisen years, a "neweconomics ofmigration" tochallenge many of the assumptions and conclusions of neoclassical theory (Starkand Bloom, is thatmigration are not 1985). A keyinsight ofthisnew approach decisions made by isolatedindividual actors, but by larger unitsof relatedpeoplefamilies notonlyto typically or households-inwhichpeopleact collectively maximnize expected income, butalso tominimize risks and toloosenconstraints inthelabor market associated with a variety ofmarket failures, apart from those and Levhari, (Stark 1982; Stark, 1984; Katzand Stark, 1986; Laubyand Stark, 1988; Taylor, 1986; Stark, 1991). risks Unlike are in a position to control to their individuals, households such economic well-being bydiversifying theallocation ofhousehold resources, as family labor. Whilesomefamily members canbe assigned economic activities inthelocaleconomy, inforeign others maybe sent towork labor markets where correlated conditions are negatively or weaklycorrewagesand employment latedwiththosein thelocal area. In theeventthatlocal economic conditions in sufficient and activities failto bring the household deteriorate there income, can rely remittances on migrant for support. In developedcountries, minirisks incomeare generally to household but in mizedthrough private insurance markets or governmental programs, riskare countries these institutional mechanisms formanaging developing themincentives or inaccessible to poor farnilies, to imperfect, absent, giving In developedcountries, risksthrough credit diversify migration. moreover, markets arerelatively tofinance newprojects, well-developed toenablefarnilies in In most suchas theadoption ofnewproduction technology. developing areas, is usually credit notavailable oris procurable contrast, onlyat highcost.In the and credit absence ofaccessible insurance public oraffordable private programs, market failures createstrong forinternational as the pressures movement, show. following examples insurance marketsWhenever households and money farmn Crop puttime a crop, at a future intosowing they arebetting that theinvestment willpayoff datein theform ofa product that canbe soldfor cashtopurchase desired goods and services, or whichcan be consumed forsubsistence. Between the directly
DOUGLAS
S.
MASSEY
ET
AL.
437
humanor natural timea cropis planted and harvested, however, events may reduceor eliminate theharvest, thefamily withinsufficient leaving incomeor foodfor subsistence. Likewise, theintroduction ofnew agricultural technology (such as high-yielding seeds or new methods of cultivation) may alterthe farm objective and/or risks households. a new seed subjective confronting Using ifthedevelopment variety mayincrease a farmner's yield expert is right; butifhe or sheis wrong, thehousehold theprospect ofhaving insufficient faces foodor income. In developed countries, thesesorts of objective and subjective risks are managedthrough formal insurance arrangements, whereby agricultural producers paya feetoa company ora government toinsure thecrop agency against future loss. The insuring assumesthe riskto the future institution crop,and shoulda drought or flooddestroy theharvest or a new technology backfire, it paystheproducer for theinsured market valueofthecrop, thereby guaranteeing theeconomic is notavailable, ofthefamily. Ifcropinsurance families well-being havean incentive to self-insure bysending one ormore abroad workers toremit eveniftheharvest fails. earnings home,thereby guaranteeing income family Futures marketsWhenever a household sowsa cashcrop, itassumes that thecrop, whenharvested, canbe soldfor a price sufficient thefamily or tosustain In making itswell-being. improve this bet,however, there is a risk that theprice thecropmaydrop for belowexpected thefamily with insufficient levels, leaving In developed income. risk is managed countries, price through markets futures thatallow farmers to sell all or partof theircrop forfuture at a delivery guaranteed price. Investors assumetherisk oflossshouldprices fallbelowthe andthey rise guaranteed price, abovethis level. reapthegainshould prices Most developing countries lack futures and when theyexist, markets, poor farm households generally lack access to them.Migration offers a mechanism by which farm families can self-insure income risks from against arising cropprice fluctuations. insuranceNonfarm as wellas many farm Unemployment housefamilies, Iflocaleconomic holds, dependon wagesearned byfamily workers. conditions and employment deteriorate levelsfall,or ifa family is injured and member the cannot work, household's livelihood or maybe threatened bya reduction In wealthy lossofincome. countries, governments maintain insurance programs that workers and their families this protect from butinpoorcountries risk, such and disability unemployment programs areabsent intheir orincomplete coverfamilies age,againgiving incentives to self-insure bysending workers abroad. Ifemployment conditions inforeign andlocallabor markets arenegatively correlated or are uncorrelated, theninternational a way of migration provides reducing therisk tofamily wagesand guarantees a reliable stream ofincome, in theform ofremittances, to support thefamily. Moreover, migration fulfills this
438
THEORIES
OF INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION
observed. Migrants, insurance function whether or notremittances areactually The likeformal insurance contracts, onlyhave to pay outiflossesare realized. insurance however, canhavean existence ofan implicit orexplicit arrangement, and thedesire to acquire important effect on a household's economic behavior, in forfamilies to participate this insurance motivation may be a primary international migration. the productivity of marketsHouseholds Capital may desireto increase theirassets,but to do so theyneed to acquirecapitalto make additional their Farmfamilies, for fields, apply investments. example, mayseekto irrigate oracquire butthey machinery, may fertilizers, buyscientifically improved seeds, families in these Nonfarm lackthemoney topurchase mayseektoinvest inputs. ortraining ofhousehold ortoacquire theeducation capital goodsthat members, butagainthey saleon consumer canbe usedtoproduce markets, may goodsfor arefunded investments In developed lackmoney tocover these costs. countries, bothofwhich aregreatly assisted orborrowing, either by through private savings can also provide accessto a sound and efficient Borrowing banking system. In manydeveloping ifincomeis variable. risk protection against consumption or underdeveloped, and are unreliable institutions countries, however, savings to them. to entrust their peopleare reluctant savings In poorcountries toborrow because theneededfunds mayalsobe difficult thefamily fora loan, becausethere is a scarcity of lackscollateral to qualify incomplete coverage, lending capital, or becausethebanking system provides theonly realaccessto serving mainly theneedsoftheaffluent. Forpoorfamilies, is often from who chargehighinterest local moneylenders rates, borrowing costsprohibitive. Underthese circumstances, migration makingtransaction attractive as an alternative source ofcapital to finance improveagainbecomes in productivity in consumption, and ensure and thefamily has a ments stability incentive tosendone ormore workers abroad toaccumulate savings orto strong transfer backin theform ofremittances. capital in the foregoing A key proposition is thatincomeis not a discussion The sourceofthe homogeneous good,as assumedby neoclassical economics. incentives to invest incomereallymatters, and households have significant in activities scarcefamily resources and projects thatprovide access to new income increase total income. sources, evenifthese activities do notnecessarily The new economicsof migration the assumption that also questions incomehas a constant effect on utility foran actoracross socioeconomic a $100 realincrease in income to a person settings-that meansthesamething ofhisorherposition in regardless oflocalcommunity conditions andirrespective theincomedistribution. The new economictheorists argue,in contrast, that income inabsolute terms, households sendworkers abroadnotonlytoimprove butalso to increase and,hence,to reduce incomerelative to other households, their relative somereference group (see Stark, Taylor, deprivation compared with
DOUGLAS
S.
MASSEY
ET
AL.
439
and Yitzhaki, 1986, 1988; Stark and Yitzhaki, and Taylor, 1988; Stark 1989, 1991; Stark, 1991). A household's senseof relative deprivation dependson theincomesof in thereference-group IfF(y) is the whichit is deprived incomedistribution. cumulative incomedistribution and h[1-F(y)] represents felt thedissatisfaction an income bya household with nothaving is slightly income y from that higher than ofa household y (i.e.,y+ A), thentherelative withincome deprivation y can be expressed as: conceptually
RD(y)
y1 h[l-F(z)]
f ymax
dz
(2)
is thehighest in thecommunity. where In thesimple incomefound case ymax h[1 - F(y)] = 1- F(y), this where is equivalent expression totheproduct oftwo the shareof households terms: thany, and the average withincomegreater difference incomes and y (Stark betweenthesehigher household and Taylor, 1989). To illustrate thisconcept ofrelative income, in the consider an increase ofaffluent Ifpoorhouseholds' income households. then incomes areunchanged, Ifhousehold is negatively their relative affected deprivation increases. utility by relative deprivation, theneventhough a poorhousehold's and absolute income in itsincentive expected gainsfrom migration remain to participate unchanged, international a family migration increases if, bysending member abroad, itcan hopeto reapa relative income gainin thecommunity. Thelikelihood ofmigrationthusgrowsbecauseofthe changein other households' incomes. Market failures that constrain localincome for opportunities poorhouseholds mayalso increase inrelative theattractiveness ofmigration as an avenuefor effecting gains
income.
Thetheoretical models growing outofthe"new economics" ofmigration yielda setof propositions and hypotheses thatare quitedifferent from those from neoclassical andthey leadtoa very emanating different setofpolicy theory, prescriptions: 1 Families, households, or otherculturally defined unitsof production andconsumption aretheappropriate ofanalysis for units not migration research, theautonomous individual. 2 A wagedifferential is nota necessary for condition international migrationto occur;households to diversify risks mayhave strong incentives through transnational movement evenin theabsenceofwagedifferentials. 3 International and local employment or localproduction migration are not mutually exclusivepossibilities. for Indeed,thereare strong incentives inboth households toengage migration andlocalactivities. In fact, in an increase the returns to local economicactivities of the attractiveness may heighten as a meansofovercoming in migration and risk on investing capital constraints thoseactivities. within neednot Thus,economic development sending regions reduce thepressures for international migration.
440
THEORIES
OF
INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION
stopwhenwagedifferen4 International movement doesnotnecessarily for boundaries. Incentives migration acrossnational tialshavebeen eliminated within countries are absent, sending to existifothermarkets may continue imperfect, or in disequilibria. on the willnothavethesameeffect gainin income 5 Thesameexpected in points the income located at different for households probability ofmigration withdifferent income or among thoselocatedin communities distribution, distributions. ratesnotonlythrough policies migration 6 Governments can influence labor markets, those thatshape insurance thatinfluence but also through insurance programs, markets. Government markets, andfutures markets, capital for affect theincentives can significantly unemployment insurance, particularly international movement. that distribu7 Government andeconomic shapeincome changes policies andthus alter their ofsomehouseholds tions therelative deprivation willchange incentives to migrate. affect thedistribution 8 Government and economic changes that policies oftheir effects on ofincome willinfluence international migration independent meanincome In fact, that produce a higher government policies meanincome. ifrelatively do poorhouseholds inmigrant-sending migration areasmayincrease if policiesmay reducemigration not sharein the incomegain. Conversely, do notsharein theincomegain. relatively rich households theory Dual labormarket ofmigratheory and thenew economics humancapital Although neoclassical ofinternational abouttheorigins and nature tionlead to divergent conclusions arethe decision models. Whatdiffer bothare essentially micro-level migration, orthehousehold), theentity assumed tomakethedecision units (theindividual abouttheecoor minimized assumptions (incomeor risk), beingmaximized and markets well-functioning nomic contextof decisionmaking (complete or imperfect and the extent to whichthemigration versus markets), missing in absolute incomeis evaluated decisionis socially contextualized (whether from these to somereference terms or relative distinctly apart group).Standing sets its is labor market which modelsofrational theory, choice, however, dual and argues thatinternational made by individuals decisions sights away from ofmodern industrial societies. from theintrinsic labordemands migration stems and elegant of this Piore(1979) has been the mostforceful proponent is caused by a theoretical that international migration viewpoint, arguing demand forimmigrant labor thatis inherent to the economic permanent is notcausedby ofdeveloped structure nations. According toPiore, immigration in sending butby countries (low wagesor highunemployment), pushfactors in receiving and unavoidable needfor foreign countries (a chronic pullfactors
DOUGLAS
S.
MASSEY
ET
AL.
441
Thisbuilt-in demand for laborstems from four fundamenworkers). immigrant talcharacteristics ofadvanced industrial societies and their economies. Structural inflation Wages not only reflect conditions of supplyand demand;they also confer status and prestige, socialqualities that inhere to the In general, jobs to whichthe wages are attached. peoplebelievethatwages should reflect social status,and theyhave rather rigidnotionsabout the correlation between occupational status and pay.As a result, wagesoffered by inthesupply A employers arenotentirely free torespond tochanges ofworkers. variety of informal social expectations and formal institutional mechanisms (suchas unioncontracts, civilservice rules, bureaucratic regulations, company job classifications) ensures thatwagescorrespond to thehierarchies ofprestige and status that and expect. peopleperceive Ifemployers seekto attract workers for unskilled jobs at thebottom ofan occupational hierarchy, theycannotsimply raisewages.Raising wagesat the bottom of the hierarchy between would upsetsocially defined relationships status If wages are increased willbe and remuneration. at thebottom, there to raisewagesbycorresponding amounts at other levelsofthe strong pressure in response ofentryIfthewagesofbusboys hierarchy. areraised to a shortage levelworkers, for example, they mayoverlap withthoseofwaitresses, thereby their status and undermining socialhierarchy. Waitthreatening theaccepted in turn, resses, demanda corresponding wage increase, whichthreatens the ofcooks, a raise. whoalsopressure for Workers position employers maybe aided in their efforts byunionrepresentatives or contracts. Thusthecostto employers ofraising workers is wagestoattract low-level morethanthe cost of theseworkers' typically wages alone; wages mustbe inorder in tokeepthem increased proportionately throughout thejob hierarchy linewith socialexpectations, a problem known as structural inflation. Attracting is thus nativeworkers by raising entry wages during timesof laborscarcity and disruptive, witha strong incentive to seek expensive providing employers ofmigrant easierand cheaper suchas theimportation workers who solutions, willaccept low wages. forthe Motivational hierarchies are also critical problems Occupational motivation ofworkers, the sincepeopleworknotonlyfor butalso for income, and maintenance accumulation of socialstatus. Acutemotivational problems arise at the bottomof the job hierarchy because thereis no statusto be The problem is maintained and thereare fewavenuesforupwardmobility. from the inescapable and structural becausethebottom cannotbe eliminated labormarket. classof to eliminate thelowest and leastdesirable Mechanization a of that used to be just create new bottom tier jobs willsimply composed jobs ofanyhierarchy, abovethebottom has tobe a bottom Sincethere rung. always who motivational areinescapable. Whatemployers needareworkers problems
442
THEORIES
OF
INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION
viewbottom-level jobs simply as a meansto theendofearning money, and for whomemployment is reduced to income, with for solely no implications status or prestige. For a variety of reasons,immigrants satisfy thisneed, at least at the beginning of their migratory careers. Most migrants beginas target earners, seeking to earnmoney for a specific goal that willimprove their status or wellforschool,buying beingat home-buildinga house,paying land,acquiring in living consumer goods.Moreover, thedisjuncture standards between develevenlow wagesabroadappearto be oped and developing societies meansthat ofthehomecommunity; and eventhough a migrant generous bythestandards mayrealize that a foreign job isoflow status abroad, he doesnotviewhimself as as a member Rather he seeshimself ofhis beinga partofthereceiving society. homecommunity, within whichforeign laborand hard-currency remittances carry considerable honorand prestige. Economic dualism Bifurcated labor markets come to characterize adlaborand vancedindustrial economies becauseoftheinherent duality between capital. Capital is a fixed factor ofproduction that can be idledbylowerdemand butnotlaidoff; owners ofcapital must bearthecosts ofits Labor unemployment. is a variable factor ofproduction that canbe released whendemand falls, so that workers are forced own unemployment. Whenever to bear the costsof their ofdemand possible, therefore, capitalists seekoutthestable, permanent portion andreserve ofequipment, of itfor theemployment whereas thevariable portion ismet methods areusedtomeet demand byadding labor. Thus, capital-intensive basic demand,and labor-intensive methodsare reserved forthe seasonal, Thisdualism leadcreates distinctions fluctuating component. amongworkers, ofthelaborforce. ingto a bifurcation in the capital-intensive Workers sector primary get stable,skilled jobs to invest in and tools.Employers are forced withthebestequipment working Their and education. are theseworkers by providing specialized training jobs and experience to perform and require considerable complicated knowledge offirm-specific humancapital. totheaccumulation well,leading Primary-sector withcontracts that workers tendto be unionized or highly professionalized, ofthecosts share oftheir idlement require employers tobeara substantial (inthe form Becauseofthese costs and ofseverance payand unemployment benefits). in theprimary to let workers sector becomeexpensive continuing obligations, becomemorelikecapital. go; they In thelabor-intensive workers holdunstable, secondary sector, however, unskilled or no costto the jobs; theymaybe laid off at any timewithlittle losemoney workers theemployer willgenerally employer. Indeed, byretaining duringslack periods.Duringdown cyclesthe first thingsecondary-sector in this do is cuttheir As a result, force workers employers payroll. employers sector tobearthecosts oftheir remain a variable factor of unemployment. They and are,hence,expendable. production
DOUGLAS
S.
MASSEY
ET
AL.
443
Thus, theinherent dualism between laborand capital extends tothelabor in theform force ofa segmented labormarket structure. Low wages,unstable conditions, and thelack ofreasonable prospects formobility in thesecondary sector makeitdifficult toattract native workers, who areinstead drawn intothe primary, capital-intensive sector, where wagesarehigher, jobs aremoresecure, and there is a possibility in of occupational improvement. To filltheshortfall demandwithin thesecondary sector, employers turn to inmmigrants. The demography of labor supply Theproblems ofmotivation and structural inflation inherent tomodemoccupational hierarchies, together with thedualism intrinsic tomarket economies, create a permanent demand for workers who are tolabor with under atlowwages, willing unpleasant conditions, great instability, and facing In the past,thisdemandwas met little chanceforadvancement. partially bytwosetsofpeoplewith socialstatuses and characteristics conducive to thesesorts ofjobs: womenand teenagers. in thelaborforce Historically womenhavetended toparticipate up to the children had grown. timeoftheir first birth, and to a lesserextent after They for ortheir families. sought to earnsupplemental income themselves Theywere notprimary breadwinners and their principal socialidentity was that ofa sister, or mother. to put up withlow wagesand instability wife, Theywerewilling becausethey as transient andtheearnings as supplemental; the viewed thework which heldwereunthreatening totheir mainsocialstatuses, were positions they grounded in thefamily. havemoved intoandoutofthelabor force Likewise, teenagers historically inorder with andtotry toearnextra togainexperience, great frequency money, outdifferent roles. occupational Theydo notviewdead-end jobs as problematic becausetheyexpectto getbetter after jobs in the future, completing school, or settling their social gaining experience, down. Moreover, teenagers derive from identities their parents andfamilies oforientation, nottheir jobs.They view work Themoney as a meansofearning andthe instrumentally spending money. that itbuysenhance their status their the things among peers; job isjusta means to an end. In advanced ofentry-level industrial societies, however, these twosources workers haveshrunk overtime becauseofthree fundamental socio-demographic trends: the risein female laborforce participation, whichhas transformed in women's work into a career for socialstatus as wellas income; therise pursued divorce whichhas transformed women'sjobs intoa sourceof primary rates, of formal incomesupport; and the declinein birth ratesand the extension whichhave produced smallcohorts ofteenagers the education, very entering labor force.The imbalancebetweenthe structural demand forentry-level workers and the limited of such workers has increased the domestic supply underlying, long-run demandfor immigrants. Dual labor market neither theory positsnor deniesthatactorsmake rational, self-interested decisions, as predicted by microeconomic models.The
444
THEORIES
OF
INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION
tolow-wage jobs, countries attach that peopleinindustrialized negative qualities to foreign workers, opportunities forexample,may open up employment to overcome risk their their expected earnings, increasing ability thereby raising income gains toachieve relative households and enabling andcredit constraints, helpsto overby employers members abroad.Recruitment family by sending on movement, eninternational and otherconstraints come informational or risk incomegeneration forfamily value as a strategy hancing migration's diversification. duallabor neoclassical economics, conflict with notin inherent Although thatare quitedifferent implications and corollaries does carry market theory models: micro-level decision from from thoseemanating 1 International andisinitiated by demand-based labor migration islargely in developed societies, orbygovernments on thepart ofemployers recruitment on their behalf. acting growsout ofthe structural 2 Sincethedemandforimmigrant workers rather than practices through recruitment andisexpressed needsoftheeconomy a necessary nor a are neither wage differentials international wage offers, haveincenfor Indeed, employers condition labormigration to occur. sufficient tives to recruit workers whileholding wagesconstant. inresponse do notrise societies 3 Low-level wagesininmmigrant-receiving in thesupply arehelddownbysocial they to a decrease ofimmigrant workers; in supply and to respond toshifts andinstitutional and arenotfree mechanisms demand. in the as a result of an increase 4 Low-level however, wagesmayfall, checks that keep ofimmigrant workers, sincethesocialand institutional supply from falling. do notprevent them rising low-level wagesfrom 5 Governments areunlikely toinfluence international migration through in wagesor employment rates; immigrants smallchanges that produce policies post-industrial builtintomodern, filla demandforlaborthatis structurally in economic and influencing thisdemandrequires majorchanges economies, organization. World theory systems has ofsociological theorists on thework ofWallerstein (1974),a variety Building ofthelabor ofinternational notto thebifurcation linked theorigins migration oftheworld butto thestructure national economies, market within particular and thesixteenth andexpanded since century (Portes hasdeveloped market that
Walton, 1981; Petras, 1981; Castells, 1989; Sassen, 1988, 1991; Morawska,
into economicrelations of capitalist 1990). In thisscheme,the penetration thatis proneto a mobilepopulation societies creates noncapitalist peripheral, abroad. migrate and greater Drivenby a desireforhigher wealth,ownersand profits oftheworld on theperiphery firms enter ofcapitalist poorcountries managers
DOUGLAS
S.
MASSEY
ET
AL.
445
In markets. andnewconsumer in search labor, ofland,rawmaterials, economy administhat bycolonial regimes was assisted this market penetration thepast, in colonizing societies. interests ofeconomic for thebenefit tered poorregions firms and multinational governments byneocolonial Todayitis madepossible in theworld who either participate elites thepowerofnational that perpetuate finns toglobal nation's resources oroffer their as capitalists themselves, economy terms. on acceptable of outgrowth migration is a natural theory, According to worldsystems occurin the processof capitalist thatinevitably and dislocations disruptions from itscore in Western has expandedoutward As capitalism development. oftheglobe ever-larger portions America, Oceania,and Japan, Europe, North intothe havebeenincorporated shares ofthehumanpopulation and growing As land,raw materials, and laborwithin peripheral worldmarket economy. are migration flows ofmarkets, and control regions comeundertheinfluence 1989). moved abroad(Massey, havealways someofwhich inevitably generated, agrarian profit fromexisting Land In orderto achieve the greatest in farmers capitalist commodity markets, within global resources andtocompete introto mechanize areasseek consolidate production, landholding, peripheral producedinputssuch as fertilizer, duce cash crops,and apply industrially systraditional destroys seeds.Land consolidation and high-yield insecticides, and commonrights of usufruct. temsof land tenurebased on inheritance manuallaborand makesmanyagrarian theneedfor decreases Mechanization of cash cropsforstaples The substitution workers redundant to production. based on subsistence social and economicrelations traditional undermines at highcropyields produces 1966); and theuse ofmodeminputs (Chayanov, All farmers outoflocalmarkets. small, noncapitalist which drives lowunit prices, from laborforce displaced ofthese to thecreation ofa mobile forces contribute to localagrarian communities. attachment thelandwitha weakened for sale on globalmarkets RawmaterialsTheextraction ofrawmaterials ofwagestoformer Theoffer that rely on paidlabor. industrial methods requires forms of social and economicorganization traditional peasantsundermines labor andcreates andfixed rolerelations basedon systems ofreciprocity incipient of individualism, gain,and social private markets based on new conceptions of labor in the geographic mobility likewisepromote change.These trends often withinternational spillovers. regions, developing to from countries developing Labor Firms corecapitalist countries enter often within of low establish that take rates, advantage wage assembly plants The degovernments. zones created by sympathetic specialexport-processing andweakens traditionlocallabor markets mandfor workers strengthens factory andthe isfemale, al productive Muchofthelabor however, demanded relations. for limits men;butsince opportunities oftheworkforce feminization resulting
446
THEORIES
OF
INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION
a isdemanding tend only towork andpoorly paid,women thenewfactory work The few years,after whichtimetheyleave to look fornew opportunities. regions thus undermines the factories intoperipheral insertion offoreign-owned by with those madelocally; goodsthat compete peasant economy byproducing factory-based employment opporwithout providing feminizing theworkforce workand modem tunities womenforindustrial formen; and by socializing a lifetime incomecapableof meeting albeitwithout providing consumption, ofa population is socially and ecothat theseneeds.The result is thecreation nomically uprooted and proneto migration. in peripheral create migrants economic processes that The samecapitalist Although some attract themto developedcountries. regions simultaneously to ofmarket moveto cities, leading penetration peopledisplaced bytheprocess of developing the urbanization inevitably manyare drawnabroad societies, links to theplaceswhere becauseglobalization material and ideological creates is economic globalization investment thatdrives capital originates. The foreign characteristics ofglobalcities, whosestructural managed from a smallnumber create a strong immnigrant labor. demandfor extract and Material links In orderto ship goods,deliver machinery, and manageexpatriate coordinate business operations, export raw materials, and in corenations buildand expandtransportation assembly plants, capitalists wheretheyhave invested. countries communication linksto the peripheral information, themovement ofgoods,products, Theselinksnotonlyfacilitate thecosts of themovement ofpeoplebyreducing and capital, they also promote and Because investment movement certain international globpathways. along of a transportation and alization are inevitably accompanied by thebuild-up of laborgenerally theinternational movement communication infrastructure, movement of goods and capitalin the opposite followsthe international direction. links The processof economicglobalization creates cultural Ideological within thedevelopand their hinterlands links between corecapitalist countries a linksare longstanding, reflecting ing world.In manycases,thesecultural and educational established adrninistrative colonial corecountries pastinwhich and exploit a peripheral thatmirrored their own in orderto govern systems atlycees, and use a for learnFrench, study example, region. Citizens ofSenegal, in economic tiedto the French franc transactions. Likewise, currency directly and join with Indiansand Pakistanis takeBritish-style degrees, learnEnglish, in a transnational Evenin others Commnonwealth. unionknownas theBritish can be theabsenceof a colonialpast,the influence of economic penetration at US universities, and Mexicansincreasingly speakEnglish, study profound: follow American consumer styles closely. andcultural arereinforced Theseideological connections bymasscommuTelevision directed thecorecountries. campaigns from nications and advertising
DOUGLAS
S.
MASSEY
ET
AL.
447
programming from theUnited States, France, Britain, and Germany transmits information aboutlifestyles and living standards in thedeveloped world, and commercials modemconprepared by foreign advertising agenciesinculcate sumer tastes within peripheral peoples. Thediffusion ofcorecountry languages and cultural patterns and thespreadofmodemconsumption patterns interact with theemergence infrastructure tochannel ofa transportation/communication international migration to particular corecountries. cities The worldeconomyis managedfroma relatively small Global inwhich number ofurban centers banking, finance, administration, professional and high-tech services, production tendto be concentrated (Castells, 1989; Sassen,1991).In theUnited States, global cities include NewYork, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Miami; in Europe,theyincludeLondon,Paris,Frankfurt, and Within these Milan;andinthePacific, Tokyo, Osaka,and Sydney qualify. global a great areconcentrated, cities, deal ofwealth and a highly educated workforce a services from unskilled workers creating strong demandfor (busboys, garAtthesametime, theshifting hotel domestic deners, waiters, workers, servants). ofheavy industrial thegrowth ofhigh-tech production overseas; manufacturing inelectronics, computers, andtelecommunications; andtheexpansion ofservice suchas health structure sectors and education create a bifurcated labormarket withstrong demandforworkers at boththeupperand lowerends,but with relatively weak demandin themiddle. ofthe Poorly educated natives resist taking low-paying jobs at thebottom a strong occupational hierarchy, creating demandfor immigrants. Meanwhile, natives and skilled dominate thelucrative well-educated foreigners jobs at the and the concentration of wealth uppertierof the occupational distribution, are amongthemhelpsto fuelthedemandfor thetypeofservices immigrants most willing tomeet. Native workers with modest educations cling tojobsinthe out of global cities,or relyon social insurance declining middle,migrate programs for support. the World that international follows thusargues systems theory migration a viewthat and economic ofan expanding political organization globalmarket, sixdistinct yields hypotheses: 1 International market is a natural of capitalist migration consequence in thedeveloping formation oftheglobaleconomy into world;thepenetration is thecatalyst international movement. peripheral regions for 2 The international theinternational flowofgoods flowoflaborfollows and capital, butin theopposite investment foments direction. Capitalist changes in peripheral that an uprooted, whilesimulcreate mobile countries population links with corecountries, taneously forging strong material and cultural leading to transnational movement. 3 International between migration isespecially likely pastcolonial powers and their investformer because cultural, colonies, linguistic, administrative, links andwere ment, transportation, and communication wereestablished early
448
THEORIES
OF
INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION
thecolonial era, leading from competition during free outside allowed todevelop markets and cultural systems. transnational to theformation ofspecific ofthemarket 4 Sinceinternational stems from theglobalization migration is byregulatrates toinfluence immigration governments economy, thewayfor internaand controlling activities of corporations ingtheoverseas investment are unlikely to be however, tionalflowsof capitaland goods. Such policies, international tendto incite to enforce, implemented becausetheyare difficult multinational and antagonize tradedisputes, riskworldeconomicrecession, to blockthem. thatcan be mobilized political resources firms withsubstantial counofcapitalist 5 Political interventions by governments and military sympaforeign governments tries abroadand to support to protect investments produce refugee whenthey fail, oftheglobalmarket, thetic to theexpansion another form of constituting to particular core countries, movements directed international migration. 6 International ultimately has little to do withwage ratesor migration it follows from the dynamics of betweencountries; employment differentials oftheglobaleconomy. and thestructure market creation
of international movement The perpetuation

for individual income for a variety ofreasons-a desire Imunigration maybegin a program ofrecruitment risks income, tohousehold gain, an attempt todiversify an international displacefor demands low-wageworkers, to satisfy employer or some within regions, peripheral mentof peasantsby market penetration thatinitiate international movement But the conditions combination thereof. it acrosstimeand space. from thosethatperpetuate may be quite different and market relative efforts, risks,recruitment Although wage differentials, in that arise to causepeopletomove,newconditions penetration maycontinue causes themselves: as independent thecourseof migration come to function movement deinstitutions transnational networks supporting spread, migrant Thegeneral inreceiving societies. andthesocialmeaning ofwork changes velop, a movement morelikely, thrust ofthesetransformations is to makeadditional causation. process knownas cumulative Network theory former are setsof interpersonal tiesthatconnect migrants, networks Migrant in originand destination areas through ties of migrants, and nonmigrants thelikelihood community origin. Theyincrease and shared kinship, friendship, and risks ofmovement lowerthecosts ofinternational movement becausethey connections Network and increasethe expectednet returns to migration. thatpeoplecan drawupon to gainaccessto constitute a form ofsocialcapital a critical reaches Oncethenumber ofmigrants threshold, foreign employment.
DOUGLAS
S.
MASSEY
ET
AL.
449
the expansionof networks of movement, reducesthe costsand risks which causestheprobability ofmigration to rise, whichcausesadditional movement, whichfurther and so on. Overtime expandsthenetworks, behavior migratory spreads outward to encompass broader ofthesending segments society (Hugo, 1981; Taylor, 1986; Masseyand Garcia Espafia, 1987; Massey,1990a, 1990b; Gurak and Caces,1992). Declining costs Thefirst migrants wholeavefor a newdestination haveno social tiesto draw upon, and forthemmigration is costly, particularly if it involves entering another country without documents. After thefirst migrants haveleft, however, thepotential costs ofmigration aresubstantially lowered for friends and relatives left behind. Becauseofthenature ofkinship and friendship each new migrant structures, createsa set of people withsocial ties to the destination area. Migrants are inevitably linked to nonmigrants, and thelatter drawuponobligations implicit inrelationships suchas kinship andfriendship to gainaccessto employment and assistance at thepoint ofdestination. Once the number of network in an origin connections area reachesa critical threshold, migration becomesself-perpetuating because each act of migration itself createsthe social structure needed to sustainit. Everynew migrant reducesthe costsof subsequent migration fora set of friends and relatives, andsomeofthese peoplearethereby induced tomigrate, which further thesetofpeoplewith expands ties abroad, inturn, which, reduces costs a new for setofpeople,causing someofthem to migrate, and so on. risks Networks Decdining also make international migration extremely as a strategy attractive risk for diversification. Whenmnigrant arewellnetworks developed, theyput a destination job within easy reachof mostcommunity andmakeemigration members a reliable and secure ofincome. source Thus, the self-sustaining growth ofnetworks that occurs theprogressive through reduction ofcosts mayalso be explained theoretically bytheprogressive reduction ofrisks. new migrant Every expands thenetwork and reduces therisks ofmovement for allthose towhomhe orsheisrelated, itvirtually eventually risk-free making and to diversify costless household laborallocations through emigration. Thisdynamic theory acceptsthe view of international as an migration individual orhousehold decision butargues process, actsofmigration that atone pointin timesystematically alterthe context within whichfuture migration decisions are made,greatly thelikelihood thatlater increasing decisionmakers willchooseto migrate. The conceptualization ofmigration as a self-sustaining diffusion has implications process and corollaries thatare quitedifferent from those derived from thegeneral equilibrium analyses tostudy typically employed migration: 1 Once begun,international tendsto expandovertimeuntil niigration network connections havediffused in a sending so widely that all people region
450
THEORIES
OF
INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION
who wish to migrate can do so without difficulty; thenmigration beginsto decelerate. 2 The size ofthe migratory flowbetween two countries is not strongly correlated to wage differentials or employment rates, becausewhatever effects thesevariables have in promoting or inhibiting migration are progressively overshadowed costsand risks by thefalling ofmovemnent from the stemming growth ofmigrant networks overtime. 3 As international migration becomesinstitutionalized through theformation andelaboration ofnetworks, itbecomes progressively independent ofthe factors that originally causedit,be they structural or individual. 4 As networks expandand thecostsand risks ofmigration fall, theflow becomesless selective in socioecononmic terms and morerepresentative ofthe sending community or society. 5 Governments can expect to havegreat difficulty controlling flows once they havebegun, becausetheprocess ofnetwork formation lieslargely outside their control and occurs no matter whatpolicy regime is pursued. 6 Certain immigration policies, suchas thoseintended however, to promote reunification between andtheir immigrants families work atcrossabroad, withthe control purposes of immigration flows, sincetheyreinforce migrant networks bygiving members ofkinnetworks specialrights ofentry. Institutional theory Once international has begun,private migration institutions and voluntary ariseto satisfy organizations thedemandcreated an by imbalance between the large number ofpeoplewhoseekentry into capital-rich countries andthelimited number ofimmigrant visasthesecountries offer. Thisimbalance, typically and the barriers thatcore countries erectto keep people out, createa lucrative economicniche forentrepreneurs and institutions dedicatedto promoting international movement for profit, a blackmarket in mnigration. yielding As this underground market creates conditions conducive toexploitation andvictimization, humanitarian voluntary organizations also arisein developed countries to enforce the rights and improve the treatment of legal and undocumented migrants. For-profit organizations and private entrepreneurs providea rangeof services to migrants in exchangeforfees set on the underground market: surreptitious across smuggling clandestine borders; transport tointernal destinations;laborcontracting betweenemployers and migrants; counterfeit documents and visas;arranged between marriages and legalresidents migrants or citizens ofthedestination and lodging, country; and other in assistance credit, countries of destination. Humanitarian groupshelp niigrants by providing socialservices, counseling, shelter, legaladviceabouthow to obtain legitimate andeveninsulation papers, from law enforcement immigration authorities. Over time, and organizations individuals, firns, becomewell-known to immigrants
DOUGLAS
S.
MASSEY
ET
AL.
451
and institutionally stable, constituting another fonnof socialcapitalthatmilabormarkets. grants can drawupon to gainaccessto foreign The recognition ofa gradual build-up ofinstitutions, organizations, and entrepreneurs dedicated to arranging immigrant entry, legal or illegal, again yields hypotheses that arealso quitedistinct from thoseemanating from microleveldecision models: 1 As organizations develop tosupport, sustain, andpromote international movement, theinternational flowofmigrants becomes moreand moreinstituthat causedit. tionalized and independent ofthefactors originally 2 Governments flows oncethey havedifficulty controlling migration have isdifficult the toregulate. Given begun becausetheprocess ofinstitutionalization efforts profits tobe madebymeeting thedemand for immigrant entry, police only in international and stricter serve to create a blackmarket movement, immigrahumanitarian tionpolicies are metwithresistance from groups. Cumulative causation In additionto the growth and the development of migrantof networks in other sustains supporting institutions, international nmigration itself waysthat make additional movement progressively more likelyover time,a process Myrdal(1957) called cumulative causation(Massey, 1990b). Causationis in thateach actofmigration within which cumulative alters thesocialcontext inwaysthat subsequent migration decisions aremade,typically makeadditional sixsocioeconomic movement morelikely. So far, socialscientists havediscussed in this fashion: the factors that arepotentially affected bymigration cumulative distribution ofincome, thedistribution ofland,theorganization ofagriculture, and thesocialmeaning theregional distribution ofhumancapital, of culture, are also possible, buthave notbeen work.Feedbacks other variables through systematically treated (Stark, Taylor, and Yitzhaki, 1986; Taylor, 1992). Thedistribution of incomeAs we have alreadynoted,people may be motivated to migrate notonlyto increase their absolute income or to diversify in their their butalso toimprove their income relative toother households risks, As a household's so does reference group. senseofrelative deprivation increases, the motivation from a community, to migrate. Before anyonehas migrated income rural is notgreat becausenearly all inequality within most poor, settings families livecloseto thesubsistence levelwithminimal outside incomes. After inforeign one ortwohouseholds havebegun participating wagelabor, however, remittances increase their incomes greatly. Giventhecostsand risks associated withinternational the first households to migrate are movement, moreover, in themiddle ofthelocalincome usually located or upperranges hierarchy. theirincomethrough Seeing some families vastlyimprove migration makes families lower intheincome distribution feel relatively deprived, inducing some of themto migrate, whichfurther exacerbates incomeinequality and
452
THEORIES
OF
INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION
increases the senseof relative deprivation amongnonmigrants, inducing still morefaniilies to niigrate, and so on. Incomeinequality and relative deprivation a seriesof phases,beinglow at first, thenhigh as the rate of go through outmigration accelerates, then low againas a majority ofhouseholds participate in themigrant workforce, reaching a minimum whenpractically all families are involved in foreign wage labor (Stark, Taylor, and Yitzhaki, 1986; Stark and
Taylor,1989; Stark,1991; Taylor,1992).
Thedistribution formigrants ofland An important spending from target rural is thepurchase communities ofland. But land is purchased by migrants abroadtypically for itsprestige valueor as a source ofretirement income rather thanas a productive investment. International migrants are likely to use their higher earnings topurchase farmland, butthey aremore likely than nonmigrants to lettheland lie fallowsinceforeign wage laboris morelucrative thanlocal agrarian production. Thispattern oflanduse lowers thedemand for localfarm labor, thereby increasing thepressures for outmigration. Themore outmigration, the morepeople have accessto the funds to buy land,leadingto necessary additional and moreland withdrawn purchases by migrants from production, creating still morepressure foroutmigration (Rhoades,1978; Reichert, 1981;
Mines, 1984; Wiest, 1984).
The Whenmigrant of production households do farm organization agrarian thelandthey own,moreover, aremorelikely thannonmigrant they families to use capital-intensive methods and (machinery, herbicides, irrigation, fertilizers, improved seeds)sincethey have accessto capital to finance theseinputs. Thus migrant households needlesslaborperunitofoutput thannonmigrant households, thereby displacing localworkers from traditional tasks and againincreasingthepressures for outmovement (Masseyet al., 1987). Themoremigration, and thegreater thedisplacement thegreater thecapitalization ofagriculture of still agrarian labor, leading to greater migration. The culture As migration of migration withina growsin prevalence inwaysthat itchanges valuesand cultural increase the community, perceptions in offuture the probability migration. Among migrants themselves, experience an advanced industrial and motivations tastes economy changes (Piore,1979). as target Although earners tomakeonetrip andearn migrants maybegin seeking for a narrow money after a stronger purpose, migrating they of acquire concept social anda taste for consumer that mobility oflife aredifficult to goodsandstyles attain local labor.Once someonehas migrated, he or she is through therefore, tomigrate andtheoddsoftaking an additional very likely again, rise with the trip number oftrips taken(Massey,1986). already At the community becomesdeeplyingrained intothe level,migration ofpeople'sbehaviors, repertoire and valuesassociated withmigration become
DOUGLAS
S.
MASSEY
ET
AL.
453
partofthecommunity's values.Foryoungmen,and in manysettings young womenas well,migration becomesa riteof passage,and thosewho do not attempt to elevate their status through international movement are considered lazy,unenterprising, and undesirable (Reichert, 1982). Eventually, knowledge aboutforeign locations and jobs becomeswidelydiffused, and values,sentiments, and behaviors characteristic ofthecoresociety spread widely within the sending region (Masseyet al., 1987; Alarcon, 1992). Theregional distribution ofhuman capital Migration is a selective process that at least, tends, initially todrawrelatively well-educated, skilled, productive, and highly communities out motivated peopleaway from sending (as pointed overtime as thecosts tends tobecomelessselective earlier, however, migration thusleads and risks fall becauseofnetwork Sustained formation). outmigration in and itsaccumulation to thedepletion ofhumancapitalin sending regions thatof receiving areas,enhancing theproductivity ofthelatter whilelowering reinforces theformer. Overtime, therefore, theaccumulation ofhumancapital in sending in receiving areaswhileitssimultaneous economic growth depletion theconditions further for areasexacerbates their stagnation, thereby enhancing migration (Myrdal,1957; Greenwood, 1981, 1985; Greenwood, Hunt,and McDowell,1987). Programs ofschoolconstruction and educational expansion in sending areas reinforce thiscumulative migration process because raising educational levelsin peripheral ruralareas increases the potential returns to and gives incentive toleavefor urban destinations at migration peoplea greater homeor abroad. Sociallabeling Within have been receiving once inimigrants societies, in significant recruited intoparticular occupations numbers, those jobs become labeledas "immnigrant workers are reluctant to fill culturally jobs" and native thestructural them, reinforcing demandforimmigrants. Immigration changes the socialdefinition as of work,causinga certain classofjobs to be defined stigmatizing andviewed as culturally inappropriate for native workers (B1ohning, 1972;Piore, 1979).Thestigma comesfrom thepresence notfrom ofimmigrants, thecharacteristics for ofthejob. In mostEuropean countries, example, jobs in in automobile cametobe considered manufacturing "immigrant jobs,"whereas theUnited States are considered "native they jobs." in dynamic international terms as a cumulative Viewing migration social process yields a setofpropositions broadly consistent withthosederived from network theory: 1 Social,economic, and cultural changes brought aboutin sending and receiving countries by international migration givethemovement ofpeoplea internal momentum resistant to easycontrol powerful or regulation, sincethe feedback mechanisms of cumulative causation lie outside thereachof largely government.
454
THEORIES
OF
INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION
2 During times ofdomestic unemployment andjoblessness, governments find it difficult to curtail labormigration and to recruit natives back intojobs A valueshift heldbyimmigrants. has occurred formerly amongnative workers, who refuse itnecessary the"immigrant" to retain or recruit more jobs,making immigrants. 3 Thesociallabeling ofa job as "immigrant" follows from theconcentrationofimmigrants within it; once immigrants have entered a job in significant numbers, whatever itscharacteristics, itwillbe difficult torecruit native workers backintothat occupational category. Migration systems theory Thevarious propositions ofworldsystems theory, network theory, institutional theory, and thetheory ofcumulative causation all suggest that migration flows a measure acquire ofstability and structure overspaceandtime, allowing for the identification ofstable international migration systems. Thesesystems arecharand peoplebetween acterized intense ofgoods,capital, byrelatively exchanges An international certain and less intense between others. countries exchanges a corereceiving whichmaybe a includes migration system generally region, and a setofspecific orgroup ofcountries, countries linked to it country sending ofimmigrants byunusually largeflows (Fawcett, 1989; Zlotnik, 1992). from Although nota separate theory so muchas a generalization following theforegoing a migration several theories, systems perspective yields interesting hypotheses and propositions: 1 Countries a system closesinceflows neednotbe geographically within ones.Although reflect political and economic relationships rather thanphysical itdoes facilitates theformation ofexchange proximity obviously relationships, them. notguarantee them nordoes distance preclude 2 Multipolar a setofdispersed corecounarepossible, systems whereby nations. tries receive from a setofoverlapping immigrants sending butmultiple 3 Nations maybelongto morethanone migration system, is morecommon thanreceiving nations. membership amongsending 4 As political and economic conditions change, systems evolve,so that a fixed structure. Countries stability does notimply mayjoin or dropout ofa inresponse orpolitical tosocialchange, economic system fluctuations, upheaval.
Evaluation of theories
theorigins Becausetheories toexplain andpersistence ofinternational proposed at manylevelsofaggregation, thevarious migration positcausal mechanisms are not necessarily unless one adopts the rigid explanations contradictory thatcausesmustoperate at one leveland one levelonly.We find no position a priori As stated itis entirely for suchan assertion. that grounds earlier, possible
DOUGLAS
S.
MASSEY
ET
AL.
455
actto diversify calculations; that households individuals engagein cost-benefit context withinwhich these labor allocations; and thatthe socioeconomic at thenational forces bystructural operating decisions are madeis determined and Martin,1991). Thus, we are and international levels (Papademetriou ofstructural conthatdenytheimportance skeptical bothofatomistic theories to and ofstructural theories thatdenyagency straints on individual decisions, individuals and families. exclusivity, we thenarrow argument oftheoretical Rather thanadopting migrathat causalprocesses relevant tointernational adoptthebroader position andthat outwhich sorting tion on multiple levels simultaneously, might operate task.Each are useful is an empirical and notonlya logical oftheexplanations examined on itsown terms and itsleadingtenets modelmustbe considered then thedata specify toderive testable Only canwe clearly carefully propositions. them empirically. and methods required to evaluate in prediction that, modelyields a clear empirical Theneoclassical economic ofinternational migration that thevolume principle, should be readily verifiable: to thesizeof related, overtime and across countries, is directly and significantly thetheories of theinternational testing Regression analyses gap in wage rates. transnational contain Lewis(1954) and Ranisand Fei (1961) shouldtherefore distance between as the leadingpredictor, withgeographic wage differentials countries as a proxy for thecosts ofmovement. perhaps entered thatthe suggest Laterrefinements of the neoclassical model,however, inmigration is theexpected earnings gap,notthe decisionmaking pertinent factor absolutereal-wage differential (Todaro,1969, 1976; Todaroand Maruszko, inthe intime, as realearnings expected earnings aredefined 1987).Atanypoint there. under ofemployment consideration multiplied bytheprobability country rate, thelikelias one minustheunemployment Although typically estimated as one minus the moreappropriately measured hoodofemployment isprobably thepervasiveness ofsporadic, part-time employunderemployment rate, given in low-skill ofinternament developing regions. Thekeypredictor jobs within wagesand tional flows isthus an interaction term that cross-multiplies migratory A statistical test for thesignificance ofthis interaction employment probabilities. constitutes model realwagesaloneappear, toa regression where term, compared of a critical testcomparison betweenthe Ranis-Feiand theTodaroversions reviews ofthe 1980,andGreenwood, 1985,for neoclassical theory. (See Todaro, substantial theTodaromodel.) research literature testing empirical A logicalcorollary movehowever, is thatinternational ofbothmodels, ment should observed gapin either notoccurin theabsenceofan international shouldcease when or expected countries between wages,and thatmovement ofmovement, and havebeenerased(netofthecosts monetary wagedifferentials International thatoccurin theabsenceofa wage gap,or flows psychological). that that endbefore a gap has beeneliminated, anomalous conditions represent constitute the assumptions of neoclassical primafacieevidencechallenging economic theory.
456
THEORIES
OF INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION
At theindividual level,theTodaromodeland itssuccessors predict that individual and household characteristics that arepositively related totherateof remuneration ortheprobability ofemployment indestination areaswillincrease returns the probability of migration by raising the expected to international movement. Hence, thelikelihood ofemigration ispredicted tobe reliably related to suchstandard humancapital variables as age,experience, schooling, marital and skill. The propensity for international is also expected to status, migration vary with a household's accesstoincome-generating resources athome(suchas a business willaffect thenet landor supporting sincethese owning enterprise), return to movement. Sincehumancapital variables affect rates ofemployment and remuthat in destination in rates neration areasalso tendto affect wage and employment placesof origin, a keyempirical issueis wheretheeffect ofhumancapitalis greater, athomeorabroad. Given thefact that international migration involves a at humancapital changeoflanguage, culture, and economic system, acquired homegenerally transfers abroadimperfectly (see Chiswick, 1979). In thiscase, suchas international migrants maybe negatively selected with respect tovariables education andjob experience. theeconomic returns to schooling Amongrural Mexicans, forexample, havehistorically beengreater inurban areasofMexicothanintheUnited States. an undocunmented witha secondary education Whereas migrant getsthesame at all, that minimum-wage job in Los Angelesas one with no schooling the same personfora clerical or whitecollar education would qualify job in and lowerMexicoCity, thelikelihood ofrural-urban thereby raising migration ingtheprobability ofinternational movement (Taylor, 1987). Thispattern of negative selectivity cannotbe hypothesized universally, however, since selection on human capitalvariables dependson the transis determined itself oftheskill orability under which ferability consideration, by In involved. and historical to thecountries conditions social, economic, specific ineither valueofhuman that affects themarket general, anysocialchange capital of the relationship has the potential of shifting the size and direction society variables and thelikelihood ofinternational movebetween specific predictor ment. of the a priori, to predict the direction Thus it is nearlyimpossible, variable and of an the relationship between individual background probability toderive a convincing test ofneoclassianditis consequently difficult migration, cal economic atthemicro levelina reduced-form theory regression-that is,one in whichthe probability as a function of migration is modeleddirectly of In general, theonly individual andhousehold variables. universal prediction that can be offered is that humancapital be reliably related to the shouldsomehow of the likelihood of international movement, but the strength and direction is impossible relationship toknowintheabsenceofhistorical information about thecountries involved. thehistorical circumstances havebeenclearly Onlyafter
DOUGLAS
S.
MASSEY
ET
AL.
457
ofhumancapital to specific forms influence on thereturns specified and their test oftheneoclassical microeconomic modelbe formucan a critical clarified, lated. strucA moreformal ofmigration alternative is to modeltheprobability and simultaneously as a function of the expected incomedifferential, turally ofindividual and housemodeltheexpected-income differential as a function In thisway,the effects variables on hold variables. of individual background can be differential their influence on theexpected-earnings migration through In addition, ofthese variables on migration tested thepossible effects explicitly. can be explored independent oftheir influence on expected earnings (Taylor, it is difficult to falsify microeconomic 1986). In theabsenceofstructural tests, The only evidencethatcould theory by examining individual regressions. of conceivably castserious doubton thevalidity ofthehumancapitaltheory migration would be the complete absenceof a relationship betweenhuman and migration. capital In contrast to neoclassical economic theory, thenew economics ofmigraas the tionfocuseson the householdor family, rather thanthe individual, relevant isa response toincome decisionmaking unit; anditposits that migration riskand to failures in a variety of markets (insurance, credit, labor),which The constrain local incomeopportunities and inhibit together risk-spreading. direct most test ofthis theory wouldbe torelate thepresence orabsence ofsuch in international market imperfections to households' propensities to participate Ifthenew economics is correct, migration. ofmigration households confronted local market by the greatest imperfections shouldbe mostlikely to adoptan international migration strategy, other things beingequal. other are not equal. Typically there is a Unfortunately, things generally high correlation between market imperfections and other variables (namely low wages and incomes)thatare the focusof the neoclassical (humancapital) model.The greatest is to isolate migration challenge ofthis direct the test, then, influence ofmarket imperfections and risk on international migration from the roleofother income and employment variables. One of the mostdistinguishing contributions of the new economics of is itsintegration ofmigration migration withmigrants' remitdecisionmaking tance behaviorand households'remittance use-aspects of migration that hitherto have been treated in theliterature. separately Ifrisks to incomeand a desire toovercome localconstraints on production arethedriving forces behind then the outcomesof migration migration, (e.g., the patterns and uses of shouldreflect remittances) thisfact.A number of indirect testsof the new economics modelare available. If riskdiversification is the underlying motivation, thenmigrant remitin households tances should be greatest mostexposed tolocalincome risks and in periodswhen thisriskis most acute (e.g., during a severedrought, as demonstrated byLucasand Stark, 1985).Ifa primary motivation ofmigration is
458
THEORIES
OF INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION
riskand credit on local production from stemming to overcome constraints should influence local market failures, then migration andremittances positively would income-generating activities (Lucas,1987; Taylor, 1992). Suchfindings becausepositive provide evidence in favor ofthenew economics ofmigration, are ruledoutby neoclassical on local production activities effects ofmigration focuses on an individueconomic theory, as arerisk effects. Neoclassical theory incomeand assumesthatmarkets are complete al's maximization ofexpected and well-functioning. within a broader The new economics ofmigration also placesmigration a household's decision to its community context, specifically linking migration in the local incomedistribution. The theory of relative deprivation position aregreater thelarger predicts that a household's oddsofsending migrants abroad income theamount above itin thereference ofincomeearnedbyhouseholds in the the incomeinequality distribution, and more generally, the greater A systematic a multi-level reference community. test ofthis proposition requires andhousehold-level statistical notonlycontains theusualindividual modelthat ofincome predictor variables, butalsoincorporates thecommunity characteristic inequality, or an operational measureof relative income.Starkand Taylor in income (1989) found that relative income was moresignificant thanabsolute withina sampleof ruralMexican international labor migration explaining households, except at thetwoextremes oftheincome distribution. level.Unlike Thenew economic modelcan also be tested at theaggregate intheabsence of theneoclassical model, risk diversification allowsfor movement in wagesor employment migrainternational differences rates, becauseitlinks in thelabormarket in thecapital and tionnotjustto conditions butto failures In regressions insurance markets as well. order to testthisconceptualization, as independent predicting international population movements should contain, ofinsurance indicators orabsence ofthepresence (e.g.,crop variables, programs the presenceor absence of key insurance and unemployment insurance), and capital levels ofmarket coverage (percapita markets (e.g.,futures markets), measures and transaction costs(e.g.,insurance and of market participation), In general, inthese markets arepredicted to interest rates). deficiencies ancillary that thesizeofinternational and to raisethelikelihood particular increase flows in the labor conditions households send migrants abroad,holdingconstant market. struca bifurcated occupational Although duallabormarket theory posits tureand a dual pattern of economicorganization foradvancedindustrial in practice it has proveddifficult to verify thissegmented market societies, structure 1982). Usuallythe empirically (Cain, 1976; Hodsonand Kaufman, distinction is arbitrary, between and "secondary" sectors to leading "primary" inempirical ofresults great instability estimates anda high degree ofdependency on thedecision rulechosen and Beck, toallocate Horan, jobs to sectors (Tolbert, 1980; Hodsonand Kaufman, 1981; Horan,Tolbert, and Beck, 1981; but see an exception Dickens and Lang,1985,for to this criticism).
DOUGLAS
S.
MASSEY
ET
AL.
459
Ratherthan attempting to verify the empirical structure of the labor market, therefore, a moreefficacious strategy might be to focus on thetheory's predictions regarding patterns of international movement, which are quite specific and objectively testable. Pioreand others arguethatimmigration is driven In statistical by conditions oflabordemandrather thansupply. models thatregress seculartrendsin international migration on changing market in sending conditions and receiving countries, one shouldtherefore a observe higher degree ofexplanatory poweramongreceiving-country indicators comwith pared those for Ifrealwagesandemployment sending countries. conditions are entered intoan equationpredicting movement between and GerTurkey many, for in terms example, German indicators shoulddominate ofpredictive power. Beingdemand-based, thedual labormarket approach also predicts that international flowsof labor beginthrough formal recruitment mechanisms rather than individual efforts. In principle, it shouldbe easy to verify this proposition simply bylisting themajorinternational migration flows that have since1950 and documenting emerged whichoneswereinitiated rebyformal If cruitment either or or all are procedures, public private. most oftheflows traceabletosomesort ofrecruitment a key marprogram, then prediction ofduallabor kettheory willhavebeen sustained. In hisbook,Pioredoes notundertake this herefers exercise; only toseveral casesthat tobeconsistent histheory happen with an example ofsuchan exercise, (for seeMassey andLiang, however, 1989). One lastprediction of dual labormarket is thatsecondary-sector theory butnotupward. Over fluctuations wagesareflexible downward, time, therefore, in wage ratesin jobs filled by immmigrants shouldnot be strongly related to in laborsupply fluctuations and demand. oflow laborimmigraDuring periods tionand highlabordemand,wages in receiving countries shouldnot riseto attract nativeworkers becauseofinstitutional butduring of rigidities, periods high imrnigration andlow demand there isnothing toprevent wagesfrom falling in response to competitive pressure. We thusexpectan interaction between changesin wage ratesand whether or not immigration was contracting or theperiod: is expected expanding theeffect tobe zeroin theformer case during in thelatter. and negative We also expect a widening these wage gap between workers overtime. jobs and thoseheldbynative Although a complex world systems theory constitutes and at times diffuse it yieldsseveralrelatively and testable conceptual structure, straightforward propositions, the first of which is thatinternational flowsof labor follow international flows ofcapital, only intheopposite direction. toSassen According and others, are created in emigrants direct investment by foreign developing countries and the disruptions thatsuch investment brings. Thus,we should observe that streams offoreign intoperipheral areaccomcapital going regions ofemigrants. outflows paniedbycorresponding Thisbasic migratory processshouldbe augmented of by the existence ideological and material tiescreated by prior colonization as well as ongoing
460
THEORIES
OF
INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION
processes ofmarket Ifone wereto specify penetration. a modelofinternational migration flowsto testworldsystems theory, one would want to therefore, includeindicators of priorcolonialrelationships, the prevalence of common languages, theintensity of traderelations, theexistence oftransportation and communication links, and therelative frequency ofcommunications and travel between thecountries. Finally, worldsystems theory specifies notonlythat international migrationshouldflowfrom to corealongpathsofcapital periphery investment, but itis directed also that to certain "globalcities" that channel and control foreign investment. Although thetheory doesnotprovide specific criteria for defining a "1global city," a setofoperational criteria might be developed from information aboutcapitalassetsand corporate headquarters. One couldthenexaminethe relative frequency ofmovement toglobal cities, as opposed toother placeswithin thedeveloped or developing world. Network leads to a seriesof eminently theory testable propositions. to Piore, According Massey,and others, once someonehas migrated internahe or sheis very tionally, likely to do so again,leading to repeated movements over time. Thusthelikelihood ofan additional should increase with eachtrip trip theprobability oftransnational taken; should be greater migration amongthose withpriorinternational than among those without experience it; and the likelihood of additional migration shouldincrease as the amountof foreign
experiencerises.
A secondproposition is that a person's controlling for individual migrant the probability experience, of international shouldbe greater migration for individuals who arerelated to someone who has prior international experience, or for individuals connected to someonewho is actually abroad.Moreliving of movement shouldincrease withthe closeness of the over,the likelihood relationship a brother in Germany (i.e.,having is more a Turk toinduce likely to there thanhaving a cousin, a neighbor, or a friend); and itshouldalso migrate risewith thequality in therelationship ofthesocialcapital embodied a (having who has livedin Germany brother for tenyears is morevaluableto a potential thanhaving one who has justarrived, and having one who is a legal emigrant is better resident thanhaving one who lacksresidence documents). Another therecognition thatinternational hypothesis stems from movement requires migrants toovercome more barriers than doesinternal movement. In addition to thenormal costsoftravel and searching for workarethecostsof and adapting learning to a new culture, the costsof acquiring appropriate documentation, and,ifacquiring isimpossible, ofevading arrest legalpapers and In general, thegreater deportation. thebarriers to movement, themoreimportant shouldnetwork tiesbecomein promoting sincethey reduce the migration, and risks costs ofmovement. that We should thusobserve network connections are systematically in predicting more powerful international than migration internal migration. Taylor(1986) finds thisdifferentiated effect of migration networks for a sampleofMexicanhouseholds.
DOUGLAS
S.
MASSEY
ET AL.
461
theeffect of social Within we shouldalso be able to detect households, on individual In general, members ofhouseholds capital migration behavior. in has already which someone abroadshould migrated display higher probabilities of movement thanthosefrom households thatlack migratory experience. If network theory is correct, forexample, a common vector bywhichmigratory behavior is transmitted is from fathers to sons(Massey etal., 1987). Dependent sonswhosefathers are active or former international migrants shouldbe more likely to emigrate thanthosewhosefathers lackforeign experience. theeffect of Finally, at thecommunity level, one should be abletoobserve tomigrate abroadif theprevalence ofnetwork ties. be more Peopleshould likely and wherea a community they comefrom wheremanypeoplehavemigrated large stock offoreign experience has accumulated than ifthey comefrom a place whereinternational is relatively uncommon(Masseyand Garcia migration Espafia, 1987). Moreover, as thestock ofsocialtiesand international migrant lessselecshouldbecomeprogressively overtime, experience grows migration ofthesocioeconomic tiveand spreadfrom themiddleto thelowersegments In general, decisions needto individual orhousehold hierarchy. then, migration a local setting, the need formulti-level be placed within suggesting analytic thecommunity. indexes connections within modelsincorporating ofnetwork Institutional theory arguesthatdisparities betweenthe supplyof and demandfor visasintocorereceiving a lucrative societies create nichefor entry to provide licit and illicit and that entrepreneurs entry services, theexploitation thatresults from thisdisparity willalso prompt humanitarian organizations to intervene on immigrants' behalf. The establishment and growth ofinstitutions dedicated to facilitating constitutes another form of socialinfraimmigration structure thatpersists over timeand increases the volumeof international movements. population it may be feasible case studiesto document Although through such institutional development anditseffect on immigration, itismore difficult tolink institutions to aggregate population flows or micro-level migration decisions in an analytically rigorous fashion. On specialsurveys, migrants and nonmigrants be asked whether to might theyare aware of institutions providing support immigrants, and responses tothis question maybe usedtopredict thelikelihood of movement. Or the presence of such organizations be documented might acrosscommunities and used to predict at thecomtherateofoutmigration munity level,or, in a multi-level model,the probability of emnigration at the or household individual level. thetheory of cumulative causation states thegeneral Lastly, hypothesis that in sucha waythat to create sustains itself tends more migration migration This hypothesis thatindividual or migration. followsfromthe proposition householddecisions are affected by the socioeconomic context within which in time aremade,and that at one point affect thecontext actsofmigration they within whichsubsequent decisions made. decisions made by are Migration families and individuals the influence social and economicstructures within
462
THEORIES
OF
INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION
community, whichinfluence laterdecisions individuals and houseby other levelincrease the odds of holds.On balance,the changesat the community cumulative subsequent movement, leading to migration's causation overtime (Masseyet al., 1987; Massey,1990b). In The systematic testing of thistheory poses substantial data demands. order totest for cumulative causation attheaggregate levelusing cross-sectional data,complicated recursive systems of structural equations mustbe specified, and these typically require instrumental variables that aredifficult to define and in international identify, especially datasets. Ideally thetheory should be tested usingmulti-level longitudinal data, which containvariables defined at the individual, household, community, and perhaps evennational levels, all meain time.Onlywithsucha data setcan thereciprocal suredat different points feedback effects of individual or householddecisions on social structure be discerned and measured. Thetheory ofcumulative causation, whileinmany waysstill rudimentary in its development, in does pointto several factors as particularly important individual behavior andcommunity structure. channeling thefeedback between The first factor is migrant the need to gather detailed networks, suggesting A andnonmigrants. infornation aboutkinandfriendship ties between migrants is incomeequality, theaccurate of secondfactor whichrequires measurement A third detailed dataon household income. is landdistribution, whichrequires A fourth, isthenature landtenure andownership. torural pertaining only areas, of agrarian whichrequires information on the use of irrigation, production, machinery, hiredlabor,herbicides, and improved seeds by both pesticides, and nonmigrant The lastand perhaps to families. mostdifficult factor migrant in testing is culture, whichrequires informameasure for cumulative causation tionaboutbeliefs, values,and nornative practices. in all ofthese be measured factors should Ideally longitudinally, although the Given somecases-culture, for wouldbe nextto impossible. example-this in theprevalence ofsecuring information on changes of difficulty longitudinal the degreeof incomeinequality, the skewnessof land migrant networks, an alterand thecapitalintensiveness of agricultural distribution, production, in thesefactors across native strategy might be to rely on geographic diversity to model the recursive structural communities, specifying equationsystems to but thisapproachraisesserioustechnical issues withrespect feedbacks, identification and instrumentation. The finalconceptual schemewe discussed was thesystems perspective, whichargues at a variety that causalforces oflevelslenda degree of operating tointernational flows and overtime leadtotheemergence ofstable pernanence mnigration systems. Thesesystems are characterized of by relatively largeflows between toflows thesystem. member countries from outside migrants compared theexistence is a straightforward matter ofsuchsystems of Verifying empirical inclusion within a systemnic somethreshold ofintensity for ofa flow establishing
DOUGLAS
S.
MASSEY
ET
AL.
463
in theworldtoday. it to identify thoseprevailing structure, and thenapplying 1992). beenattempted (Zlotnik, Some efforts alongtheselineshave already
Conclusion
processes of international contemporary Theoriesdevelopedto understand levelsof at widelydivergent thatoperate migration positcausal mechanisms from and hypotheses derived assumptions, analysis. Although thepropositions, carry very they nonetheless each perspective are notinherently contradictory, on whichmodel is Depending different forpolicyfornulation. implications recommend might a socialscientist supported and underwhatcircumstances, wages migration bychanging that attempt toregulate international policymakers in destination economic and employment countries; by promoting conditions in programs ofsocialinsurance in origin countries; byestablishing development in placesoforigin; byimprovincome inequality sending societies; byreducing of orbysomecombination markets in developing regions; ingfutures orcapital arefruitless given all ofthese programs advisethat theseactions. Or one might out ofmarket movement growing thestructural forinternational imperatives economic relations. migration Whatever the case, giventhe size and scale ofcontemporary in the and conflict inherent and given thepotential for misunderstanding flows, decisions around theworld, political multi-ethnic societies emergence ofdiverse, madeoverthe aboutinternational willbe amongthemost important rnigration for eachof empirical support sorting outtherelative next twodecades. Likewise, in light evaluation willbe them ofthat thetheoretical schemes and integrating in ensuing themost carried outbysocialscientists years. tasks among important and theleading ofinternational We hopethat theories migration byexplicating we have laid underlying assumptions and keypropositions, byclarifying their work. thegroundwork for that necessary empirical Note
The authors are members oftheIUSSP Committeeon South-North Migration, which is a systematic examinacurrently undertaking tionoftheories ofinternational migration and theevidence supporting them. TheCommittee is chairedby Douglas S. Massey,who took forwriting the textof primary responsibility buttheideas,concepts, and thispresentation, conclusions expressedin the articleare the members. collective work of all committee comments and critiThecommittee welcomes readers. cismsfrom interested
References
migration from a Mexicantown,"in Alarc6n, Rafael.1992. "Nortenizaci6n: Self-perpetuating Relations: Labor and Raul Hinojosa(eds.), U.S.-Mexico Jorge Bustamante, ClarkReynolds, University Press, pp. 302-318. Market Interdependence. Stanford: Stanford
464
THEORIES
OF
INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION
in theUnited and theEuropeanCommunity. Bohning, W. R. 1972. TheMigration ofWorkers Kingdom The ImpactofImmigrants on the U.S. Economy. Borjas, George. 1990. Friendsor Strangers: New
Press. London:Oxford University
York:Basic Books. ofsegmented labormarket theories to orthodox A Cain,GlenG. 1976. "The challenge theory:
Literature 14: 1215-1258. survey." JournalofEconomic Economic Castells,Manuel. 1989. TheInformational City: Information Technology, and Restructuring the Urban-Regional Process. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
V. 1966. Theory Alexander D. Irwin. Chayanov, ofPeasant Economy. Homewood,Ill.: Richard R. 1979. "The economicprogress ofimmigrants: Chiswick, Barry Some apparently universal in WilliamFeller(ed.), Contemporary Economic Problems. patterns," Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, pp. 357-399. Dickens, WilliamT., and KevinLang. 1985. "A testof dual labormarket theory." American Fawcett, James T. 1989. "Networks, linkages, and migration systems." International Migration Review 23: 671-680.
in the UnitedStates.New York: Greenwood, Michael J. 1981. Migrationand EconomicGrowth Economic Review75: 792-805.
Academic Press. . 1985. "Humanmigration: Theory, models, and empirical evidence." Journal ofRegional
Science25: 521-544.
and employment , GaryL. Hunt,and JohnM. McDowell. 1987. "Migration change: dimensions of the linkage."Journal Empirical evidenceon the spatialand temporal of Gurak, Douglas T., and Fe Caces. 1992. "Migration networks and the shapingof migration in MaryKritz, Lin Lean Lim,and Hania Zlotnik systems," (eds.), International Migration J.R., and MichaelP. Todaro. 1970. "Migration, Harris, unemployment, and development: A and Robert L. Kaufman.1981. "Circularity in thedual economy: Hodson,Randy, A comment on Tolbert, Journal Horan,and Beck,1980." American ofSociology 86: 881-887. and RobertL. Kaufman. 1982. "Economic dualism: A critical review." American Horan,Patrick M., CharlesM. Tolbert II, and E. M. Beck. 1981. "The circlehas no close." J.1981."Village-community Hugo,Graeme ties, village norms, andethnic andsocialnetworks: A review inGordon ofevidence from theThird World," F. DeJong and Robert W. Gardner inlessdeveloped aversion countries." Katz,E., andOded Stark. 1986."Labormigration andrisk and Oded Stark.1988. "Individualmigration as a family Lauby,Jennifer, strategy: Young womenin thePhilippines." Studies 42: 473-486. Population 1954. "Economic development with unlimited Lewis, W. Arthur. suppliesof labor." The E. B. 1987. "Emigration Lucas, Robert to South Africa's mines."American Economic Review 77: 313-330. Botswana."Journal to remit: Evidencefrom , and Oded Stark.1985. "Motivations of to the United Massey,Douglas S. 1986. "The settlement processamong Mexicanmigrants
Review51: 670-685. States." AmericanSociological . 1989. "International migrationand economic development in comparative perspecReview14: 383-414. tive." Populationand Development Political 93: 901-918. Economy Manchester SchoolofEconomic and Social Studies22: 139-191. 4: 131-149. JournalofLabor Economics DecisionMaking: Multidisciplinary toMicrolevel (eds.), Migration Approaches Studiesin DevelCountries. New York: Pergamon Press, pp. 186-225. oped and Developing American JournalofSociology 86: 887-894. Review47: 727-740. Sociological two-sectoranalysis." American Economic Review60: 126-142. A GlobalApproach.Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 150-176. Systems: RegionalScience26: 223-234.
DOUGLAS
S.
MASSEY
FT
AL.
465
. 1990a. "The social and economicorigins of immigration." Annals of the American Academy ofPolitical and Social Science510: 60-72. . 1990b. "Social structure, and the cumulative causation of migrahousehold strategies, tion." PopulationIndex 56: 3-26. ofCalifornia Press. University , and FelipeGarciaEspafia.1987. "The socialprocess ofinternational migration." Science 237: 733-738. ofa temporary worker consequences The , andZai Liang.1989."Thelong-term program: Mines,Richard. 1984. "Network migration and Mexicanrural A case study," in development:
U.S. Bracero experience." PopulationResearch and Policy Review8: 199-226. Richard C. Jones (ed.), Patterns of Undocumented Migration:Mexicoand the UnitedStates. Social Processof International Migration Mexico. Berkeley and Los Angeles: from Western
Humberto Gonzalez,and Jorge Durand. 1987. Return toAztlan:The , RafaelAlarc6n,
Totowa,N.J.:Rowmanand Allanheld, pp. 136-158. Morawska, Ewa. 1990. "The sociology and historiography ofimmigration," in Virginia YansMcLaughlin (ed.), Immigration Reconsidered: History,Sociology, and Politics.New York:
Oxford University Press, pp. 187-240. Myrdal, Gunnar.1957. Rich Landsand Poor. New York:Harper and Row. Papademetriou, Demetrios G.,and Philip L. Martin. 1991. "Labormigration and development: Research and policy issues,"in Demetrios and Philip L. Martin G. Papademetriou (eds.), wood Press, pp. 3-26. Petras, Elizabeth M. 1981. "The globallabormarket in themodern in Mary world-economy," M. Kritz, Charles B. Keely, and SilvanoM. Tomasi(eds.),Global inMigration: Trends Theory
Piore, Michael J. 1979. Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor in Industrial Societies.Cambridge: Portes,Alejandro, and John Walton. 1981. Labor, Class,and theInternational System. New York: The Unsettled Relationship: Labor Migrationand Economic New York: GreenDevelopment.
tionStudies, pp. 44-63.
and Research on International PopulationMovements. Staten Island, N.Y.: CenterforMigra-
Press. Cambridge University
Academic Press. Ranis,Gustav, and J.C.H.Fei. 1961. "A theory ofeconomic development." Economic American Review 51: 533-565. Reichert, Joshua S. 1981. "The migrant syndrome: Seasonal U.S. wage labor and rural in Central development Mexico." HumanOrganization 40: 56-66. . 1982. "Social stratification ina Mexicansending Theeffect community: ofmigration to theUnitedStates."SocialProblems 29: 422-433. Rhoades, Robert E. 1978. "Intra-European migration and rural development: Lessons from the
Spanish case." Human Organization 37: 136-147. Sassen, Saskia. 1988. The Mobility ofLabor and Capital: A Studyin International Investment and
Labor Flow.Cambridge: Press. Cambridge University . 1991. The Global City:New York,London, Tokyo.Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press. A. 1962."Thecosts andreturns Sjaastad, Larry ofhumanmigration." Journal Political of Economy 70S: 80-93. decisionmaking:A reviewarticle."Journal Stark,Oded. 1984. "Migration ofDevelopment
Economics 14: 251-259. 1991. The Migration ofLabor. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell. CulturalChange 31: 191-196.
, and D. Levhari.1982. "On migration and riskin LDCs." Economic and Development , and DavidE. Bloom. 1985."Theneweconomics oflabormigration." American Economic
Review75: 173-178. , J. Edward Taylor, and Shlomo Yitzhaki. 1986. "Remittances and inequality." The Economic Journal96: 722-740.
, J.Edward and ShlomoYitzhaki. Taylor, 1988."Migration, remittances, and inequality:
466
THEORIES
OF
INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION
JournalofPopulationEconomics 1: 57-70. Demography 26: 1-14.
A sensitivity analysis usingtheextended GiniIndex."Journal ofDevelopment Economics 28: 309-322. , and ShlomoYitzhaki. 1988. "Labor migration as a response to relative deprivation." , and J. Edward Taylor. 1989. "Relativedeprivation and international migration." Taylor. 1991."Migration , andJ.Edward incentives, migration types: Theroleofrelative
Taylor, J. Edward. 1986. "Differential migration, networks, information and risk,"in Oded
deprivation." The Economic Journal101: 1163-1178.
and Development. Greenwich, Conn.: JAIPress, pp. 147-171. . 1987. "Undocumented Mexico-U.S.migration and thereturns to households in rural
Mexico." American JournalofAgricultural Economics 69: 616-638. effects." JournalofPolicy Modeling14: 187-208.
Stark (ed.), Research in Human Capitaland Development, Vol. 4, Migration, Human Capital,
. 1992. "Remittances and inequality reconsidered: Direct, indirect, and intertemporal
Todaro,Michael P. 1969. "A model of labor migration and urbanunemployment in lessdeveloped countries." The American Economic Review59: 138-48. . 1976. InternalMigrationin Developing Countries. Geneva:International LaborOffice.
Tolbert, CharlesM. II, Patrick M. Horan,and E. M. Beck. 1980. "The structure ofeconomic A dual economy segmentation: approach."American Journal ofSociology 85: 1095-1116.
Wallerstein,Immanuel. 1974. TheModernWorld System, and theOrigins CapitalistAgriculture ofthe European WorldEconomy in theSixteenth Century. New York: Academic Press. to the United States," in Richard C. Jones (ed.), Patterns ofUndocumented Mexico Migration:
framework." Populationand Development Review13: 101-114.
ChicagoPress, pp. 361-401. . 1989. Economic Development in the ThirdWorld.New York:Longman. , andLydia Maruszko.1987."Illegalmigration andUS immigration A conceptual reform:
(ed.), Population and EconomicChange in DevelopingCountries.Chicago: Universityof
. 1980. "Internal migration in developing countries: A survey." in Richard A. Easterlin
E. 1984. "External Wiest, Raymond and theperpetuation oftemporary dependency migration andtheUnited States. Totowa,N.J.:Rowmanand Allanheld, pp. 110-135. Zlotnik, Hania. 1992. "Empirical identification of international migration in Mary systems," Approach. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 19-40.
Kritz, Lin Lean Lim, and Hania Zlotnik (eds.), International A Global MigrationSystems:

Clasico Massey

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Clasico Massey

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal Author(s): Douglas S.

Theoriesof International A Review Migration: and Appraisal

of intemational The initiation migration

of international movement The perpetuation

Press. London:Oxford University

Humberto Gonzalez,and Jorge Durand. 1987. Return toAztlan:The , RafaelAlarc6n,

tionStudies, pp. 44-63.

and Research on International PopulationMovements. Staten Island, N.Y.: CenterforMigra-

Press. Cambridge University

, J.Edward and ShlomoYitzhaki. Taylor, 1988."Migration, remittances, and inequality:

JournalofPopulationEconomics 1: 57-70. Demography 26: 1-14.

deprivation." The Economic Journal101: 1163-1178.

. 1992. "Remittances and inequality reconsidered: Direct, indirect, and intertemporal

framework." Populationand Development Review13: 101-114.

(ed.), Population and EconomicChange in DevelopingCountries.Chicago: Universityof

. 1980. "Internal migration in developing countries: A survey." in Richard A. Easterlin

You might also like