Brandom: TMD--7

Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegels Idealism: Negotiation and Administration in Hegels Account of the Structure and Content of Conceptual Norms

This paper could equally well have been titled Some Idealist Themes in e!el"s #ra!matism"$ Both idealism and pragmatism are capacious concepts% encompassin! many distin!uishable theses$ I will &ocus on one pra!matist thesis and one idealist thesis 'thou!h we will come within si!ht o& some others($ The pra!matist thesis 'what I will call the semantic pra!matist thesis"( is that the use o& concepts determines their content, that is% that concepts can have no content apart &rom that con&erred on them by their use$ The idealist thesis is that the structure and unity o& the concept is the same as the structure and unity o& the self. The semantic pra!matist thesis is a commonplace o& our )itt!ensteinean philosophical world$ The idealist thesis is% to say the least% not. I don"t believe there is any serious contemporary semantic thin*er who is pursuin! the thou!ht that concepts mi!ht best be understood by modelin! them on selves. Indeed% &rom the point o& view o& contemporary semantics it is hard to *now even what one could mean by such a thou!ht what relatively unproblematic &eatures o& selves are supposed to illuminate what relatively problematic &eatures o& concepts+ )hy should we thin* that understandin! somethin! about% say% personal identity would help us understand issues concernin! the identity and individuation o& concepts+ ,rom a contemporary point o& view% the idealist semantic thesis is bound to appear initially as somethin! between unpromisin! and cra-y$

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My interpretive claim here will be that the idealist thesis is e!el"s way o& ma*in! the pra!matist thesis wor*able% in the conte0t o& several other commitments and insi!hts$ My philosophical claim here will be that we actually have a lot to learn &rom this strate!y about contemporary semantic issues that we by no means see our way to the bottom o& otherwise$ In the space o& this essay% I cannot properly 1usti&y the &irst claim te0tually% nor the second ar!umentatively$ I will con&ine mysel& o& necessity to s*etchin! the outlines and motivations &or the comple0% sophisticated% and interestin! view on the topic I &ind e!el puttin! &orward$ I The topic to which that view is addressed is the nature and ori!ins o& the determinate contents of empirical conceptual norms. 2& course e!el tal*s about lots o& other thin!s$ This is merely the strand in his thou!ht I"m !oin! to pursue here$ But it may seem perverse to identi&y this as so much as one o& e!el"s concerns$ 3&ter all% what he spends most o& his pa!es tal*in! about 'in both o& the boo*s he published durin! his li&etime% the Phenomenology and the Science of Logic) is the pure, logical, or formal concepts 'the pure &orm-determinations o& the 4oncept(% that are the successors in his scheme to 5ant"s cate!ories: concepts such as particularity, universality, and individuality and the distinction between what thin!s are in themselves and what they are for consciousness or &or another$ But one o& the overarchin! methodolo!ical commitments that !uides my readin! o& e!el is that the point o& developin! an adequate understandin! o& these cate!orical concepts is so that they can then be used to ma*e e0plicit how ordinary empirical concepts wor*$ I would say the same thin! about 5ant$ 3nd I thin* that one o& the thin!s that ma*es these philosophers hard to understand is that

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they devote relatively too much time to developin! and motivatin! their 'in the transcendental sense( lo!ical apparatus% and relatively too little time to applyin! it to the use o& !round-level concepts$ In both cases I thin* one does well to *eep one"s eye at all times on the si!ni&icance o& what is bein! said about pure concepts &or our understandin! o& the use o& ordinary empirical concepts$ 3!ain% e!el"s idealist thesis is directed in the &irst instance towards what he calls the 4oncept: the holistic in&erential system o& determinate concepts and commitments articulated by means o& those concepts$ But we will see that the abstract structural claim embodied in the idealist thesis holds o& both the system and its elements7and holds o& the elements in part because it holds o& the system% and vice versa$ 3s I read him% e!el thin*s that 5ant has been insu&&iciently critical re!ardin! two important% intimately related issues$ ,irst% he has not inquired deeply enou!h into the conditions o& the possibility o& the determinateness o& the rules that speci&y the contents o& ordinary empirical concepts$ Second% 5ant is virtually silent on the issue o& their origins. e has not presented a developed account o& how those determinate empirical concepts become available to *nowers and a!ents in the &irst place$ 5ant ta*es over &rom 8eibni- the rationalist understandin! o& *nowled!e and action as consistin! in the application o& concepts$ 3wareness% 8eibni-"s apperception"% whether theoretical or practical% consists in classi&yin! particulars by universals7that is% &or 5ant% brin!in! them under rules. e!el inherits &rom 5ant a &undamental philosophical commitment 'I"m prepared to say insi!ht"(: a commitment to the normative character o& concepts$ 2ne o& 5ant"s most basic and important ideas is that what distin!uishes 1ud!ements and actions &rom

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the responses o& merely natural creatures is that they are thin!s we are in a distinctive way responsible &or$ They are underta*in!s o& commitments that are sub1ect to a certain *ind o& normative assessment% as correct or incorrect$ The norms9 that determine what counts as correct or incorrect% he calls concepts"$ So the !enus o& which both 1ud!ement and action are species is understood as the activity o& applying concepts: producin! acts the correctness or incorrectness o& which is determined by the rule or norm by which one has implicitly bound onesel& in per&ormin! that act$ By ta*in! this line% 5ant initiates a shi&t in attention &rom ontological questions 'understandin! the di&&erence between two sorts o& &act: physical &acts and mental &acts( to deontological ones 'understandin! the di&&erence between &acts and norms% or between description and prescription($ This move entailed a correspondin! shi&t &rom 4artesian certainty to 5antian necessity$ This is the shi&t &rom concern with our !rip on a concept 'is it clear+ is it distinct+( to concern with its !rip on us 'is it valid+ is it bindin!+($ ':ecessary" &or 5ant 1ust means accordin! to a rule"$( The ur!ent tas* becomes understandin! how it is possible &or us to commit ourselves% to ma*e ourselves responsible to a norm that settles the correctness o& what we do$; The problem o& understandin! the nature and conditions o& the possibility 'in the sense o& intelli!ibility( o& conceptual normativity moves to centre sta!e$ 'This view about the nature o& the practice o& usin! concepts mi!ht be called normative pra!matism"$( 5ant tells us rather a lot about the process o& applyin! concepts in ordinary 1ud!ements and actions$ 3nd I ta*e it that his account o& the ori!in% nature% and &unctionin! o& the pure concepts o& the understandin!% whose applicability is implicit in the use o& any empirical concept% is intended to serve as a transcendental e0planation o& the bac*!round conditions with respect to which alone normativity in !eneral is

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intelli!ible$ But he says very little about how *nowers and a!ents should be understood as !ettin! access to the determinate empirical concepts they deploy$ )hat he does say is lar!ely pro!rammatic and architectonic$ It is clear% however% that one important structural dimension distin!uishin! 5ant"s &rom e!el"s account o& conceptual norms concerns the relation between their production and their consumption% that is% between the process by which they become available to a *nower and a!ent% on the one hand% and the practice o& usin! them% on the other$ ,or 5ant tells a two-phase story% accordin! to which one sort o& activity institutes conceptual norms% and then another sort o& activity applies those concepts$= ,irst% a re&lective 1ud!ement 'somehow( ma*es or &inds. the determinate rule that articulates an empirical concept$ Then% and only then% can that concept be applied in the determinate 1ud!ements and ma0ims that are the ultimate sub1ects o& the &irst two 4ritiques$/ >ery rou!hly% 5ant sees e0perience% the application o& concepts% as be!innin! with the selection o& concepts$ The potential *nower has available a myriad o& di&&erent possible determinate rules o& synthesis o& representations$ ?0perience requires pic*in! one% and tryin! it out as a rule &or combinin! the mani&old o& presented intuitions$ I& it doesn"t quite &it"% or permits the synthesis only o& some o& the intuitions that present themselves% then a mista*e has been made% and a related% overlappin!% but di&&erent determinate concept is tried in its place$ Thus% althou!h it is up to the *nower what concept to try out% the success o& the attempted synthesis accordin! to that rule is not up to the *nower$ The e0ercise o& spontaneity is constrained by the deliverances o& receptivity$6

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The wor*ability o& a story alon! these lines depends on its bein! settled somehow% &or each rule o& synthesis and each possible mani&old o& representations% whether that mani&old can be synthesi-ed success&ully accordin! to that rule$ This mi!ht be called the condition o& complete or ma imal determinateness o& concepts$ 2nly i& this condition obtains -only i& the empirical concepts made available by 1ud!ements o& re&lection are fully and finally determinate7does the 5antian account ma*e intelli!ible the application o& concepts as bein! constrained by the deliverances o& sense% the correctness o& 1ud!ements as constrained by the particulars to which we try to apply the universals that are our determinate empirical concepts$ e!el wants us to investi!ate critically the

transcendental conditions o& the possibility o& such determinateness o& concepts$ e does not &ind in 5ant a satis&actory account o& this crucial condition o& the possibility o& e0perience$7 The question is how we can understand the possibility o& applyin!% endorsin!% committin! ourselves to% or bindin! ourselves by one completely determinate rule rather than a sli!htly di&&erent one$ This problem is related to the one 5rip*e attributes to )itt!enstein$< It is the issue o& understandin! the conditions o& the possibility o& the determinateness o& our conceptual commitments% responsibilities% and obli!ations$ I don"t want to dwell on what I ta*e e!el to see as the shortcomin!s o& 5ant"s answer$ ,or my purposes it su&&ices to say that e!el ta*es a di&&erent approach to understandin! the relation between the institution and the application o& conceptual norms$ In &act I thin* e!el"s idealism is the core o& his response to 1ust this issue% and it is here that I thin* we have the most to learn &rom him$@ 3 !ood way o& understandin! the !eneral outlines o& e!el"s account o& the relation between the activity o& institutin! conceptual norms and the activity o& applyin!

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them is to compare it with a later movement o& thou!ht that is structurally similar in important ways$ 4arnap and the other lo!ical positivists a&&irmed their neo-5antian roots by ta*in! over 5ant"s two-phase structure: first one stipulates meanings, then e0perience dictates which deployments o& them yield true theories.9A The &irst activity is prior to and independent o& e0perienceB the second is constrained by and dependent on it$ 4hoosin! one"s meanin!s is not empirically constrained in the way that decidin! what sentences with those meanin!s to endorse or believe is$ Cuine re1ects 4arnap"s sharp separation o& the process o& decidin! what concepts 'meanin!s% lan!ua!e( to use &rom the process o& decidin! what 1ud!ements 'belie&s% theory( to endorse$ ,or him% it is a &antasy to see meanin!s as &reely &i0ed independently and in advance o& our applyin! those meanin!s in &ormin! &allible belie&s that answer &or their correctness to how thin!s are$ 4han!in! our belie&s can chan!e our meanin!s$ There is only one practice -the practice o& actually ma*in! determinate 1ud!ements$ ?n!a!in! in that practice involves settlin! at once both what we mean and what we believe$ Cuine"s pragmatism consists in his development o& this monistic account in contrast to 4arnap"s two-phase account$ The practice o& usin! lan!ua!e must be intelli!ible as not only the application o& concepts by usin! lin!uistic e0pressions% but equally and at the same time as the institution o& the conceptual norms that determine what would count as correct and incorrect uses o& lin!uistic e0pressions$ The actual use o& the lan!ua!e settles -and is all that could settle -the meanings o& the e0pressions used$99 e!el is a pra!matist also in this monistic sense$ e aims at a conception o&

e0perience that does not distin!uish two di&&erent *inds o& activity% one o& which is the application o& concepts in 'determinate( 1ud!ement and action% and the other o& which is

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the institution or discovery o& those concepts 'by 1ud!ements o& re&lection"($ ,or e!el% empirical 1ud!ement and action is not 'as &or 5ant and 4arnap( 1ust the selection o& concepts to apply% or the replacement o& one &ully &ormed concept by another$ It is equally the alteration and development o& the content o& those concepts$ 4onceptual content arises out o& the process o& applyin! concepts7the determinate content o& concepts is unintelli!ible apart &rom the determination o& that content% the process o& determinin! it$ 4oncepts are not &i0ed or static items$ Their content is altered by every particular case in which they are applied or not applied in e0perience$ 3t every sta!e% e0perience does presuppose the prior availability o& concepts to be applied in 1ud!ement% and at every sta!e the content o& those concepts derives &rom their role in e0perience$9; e!el o&ten couches this point in terms o& a distinction between two metaconcepts o& the conceptual: Deason 'his !ood% dynamic% active% livin! conception(% and Enderstandin! '5ant"s% and everyone else"s% bad% static% inert% dead conception($ Enderstandin! concepts in terms o& the cate!ories o& the Enderstandin! is treatin! them as &i0ed and static$ It allows pro!ress only in the sortin! o& !udgements into true and &alse% that is% in the selection &rom a repertoire &i0ed in advance o& the correct concepts to apply in a particular instance$ But e!el wants to insist that i& one i!nores the process by which concepts develop"what other concepts they develop out o&% and the &orces implicit in them% in concert with their &ellows% that lead to their alteration 'what e!el will call their ne!ativity"(7then the sort o& content they have is bound to remain unintelli!ible$9= II My principal aim in this essay is to show how the idealist thesis that I put on the table at the outset contributes to the wor*in! out o& e!el"s pra!matist strate!y &or

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understandin! the nature and ori!ins o& the determinateness o& the content o& empirical concepts$ That idealist thesis% recall% is the claim that the structure and unity o& the concept is the same as the structure and unity o& the sel&-conscious sel&$ Some o& the clearest statements o& this central e!elian thou!ht are in the Science of Logic: It is one o& the pro&oundest and truest insi!hts to be &ound in the #riti$ue of Pure %eason that the unity which constitutes the nature o& the &otion FBe!ri&&G is reco!ni-ed as the original synthetic unity o& apperception, as unity o& the I thin', or o& sel&-consciousness $ $ $9. Thus we are 1usti&ied by a cardinal principle o& the 5antian philosophy in re&errin! to the nature o& the I in order to learn what the &otion is$ But conversely% it is necessary &or this purpose to have !rasped the &otion o& the ( $ $ $9/ )hat I want to do ne0t is to s*etch e!el"s notion o& the structure and unity characteristic o& sel&-conscious selves7the &i0ed end o& the idealist analo!y by means o& which we are to come to understand the structure and unity o& concepts% includin! the 4oncept 'which is what this passa!e o&&icially addresses($ e!el ta*es over 5ant"s &undamental idea that to call somethin! a sel&% to treat it as an I"% is to ta*e up an essentially normative attitude toward it$ It is to treat it as the sub1ect o& commitments, as somethin! that can be responsible7hence as a potential *nower and a!ent$ The question then is how to understand the nature o& the normative attitudes and statuses that distin!uish bein! a who &rom bein! a what. 2ne o& e!el"s most basic ideas is that normative statuses such as bein! committed and bein! responsible7and so *nowled!e and a!ency7must be understood as social achievements$ :ormative statuses are a *ind o& social status$ 5ant thou!ht normativity

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could be made intelli!ible only by appeal to somethin! beyond or behind our empirical activity$ ,or e!el all transcendental constitution is social institution$96 The practical attitude o& ta*in! or treatin! somethin! as able to underta*e commitments and be responsible &or its doin!s7in the sense articulated by concepts, that is the sense in which at least part o& what one is committed to or responsible &or is bein! able to !ive reasons" e!el calls reco!nition" F3ner*ennun!G$ The core idea structurin! e!el"s social understandin! o& selves is that they are synthesi-ed by mutual recognition. That is% to be a sel&7a locus o& conceptual commitment and responsibility7is to be ta*en or treated as one by those one ta*es or treats as one: to be reco!ni-ed by those one reco!ni-es$ Merely biological bein!s% sub1ects and ob1ects o& desires% become spiritual bein!s% underta*ers 'and attributors( o& commitments% by bein! at once the sub1ects and the ob1ects o& reco!nitive attitudes$ 3t the same time and by the same means that selves, in this normative sense% are synthesi-ed% so are communities, as structured wholes o& selves all o& whom reco!ni-e and are reco!ni-ed by each other$97 Both selves and communities are normative structures instituted by reciprocal reco!nition$ This is a social theory o& selves in the sense that selves and communities are products o& the same process% aspects o& the same structure$ But it is a social theory in a stron!er sense as well$ ,or bein! a sel& in this sense is not somethin! one can achieve all on one"s own$ 2nly part o& what is needed is within the power o& the candidate sel&$ It is up to the individual who to reco!ni-e$ But it is not up to the individual whether those individuals then in turn reco!ni-e the ori!inal reco!ni-er$ 2nly when this movement" is completed is a sel& constituted$ I thin* the structure is clearest when one considers specific reco!nition7that is% attribution o& some speci&ic normative status% not 1ust

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treatin! someone as havin! some normative status or other 'as the sub1ect o& some responsibilities% or entitlements% commitments% or authority% which is reco!nition in !eneral($ ,or instance% it is up to me whom I reco!ni-e as a !ood chess player$ I can settle &or reco!ni-in! any old wood pusher who can play a le!al !ame% or I can set my standards so hi!h that only Hrand Masters quali&y$ But it is not then up to me 'certainly not up to me in the same sense( whether those I reco!ni-e as !ood players reco!ni-e me as a !ood player$ I& I"ve set my si!hts low enou!h% it will be easy to quali&y$ But i& my aspirations &or the sort o& sel& I want to be% and so to be reco!ni-ed as% are hi!her% it will be correspondin!ly more di&&icult &or me to earn the reco!nition o& those I reco!ni-e$ This account o& what it is to be a !ood chess player% in the various senses that term can ta*e7and more !enerally% what it is to have some speci&ic normative status7!ives the candidate a certain sort o& authority: the authority to constitute a community by reco!ni-in! individuals as members o& it$ But doin! that is also cedin! another sort o& authority to those one reco!ni-es: the authority to determine whether or not the candidate quali&ies as a member o& the community so constituted by the standards to which I have sub1ected mysel&$ avin! a normative status in this sense is an essentially social

achievement% in which both the individual sel& and the community must participate$ 3nd both the sel& and the community achieve their status as such only as the result o& success&ul reciprocal reco!nition$ So when we tal* about the structure and unity o& the I" or o& sel&-conscious selves accordin! to e!el% we are tal*in! about the structure and unity produced by this process o& reciprocal reco!nition% by which normative communities and community members are simultaneously instituted$ This is what the idealist thesis proposes to use as

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a model &or understandin! the structure and unity o& concepts.

ere is a hint% to be

&ollowed up below$ In reco!ni-in! others% I in e&&ect institute a community7a *ind o& universal common to those others% and i& all !oes well% to me too$ I& they reco!ni-e me in turn% they constitute me as somethin! more than 1ust the particular I started out as7a *ind o& individual 'sel&(% which is that particular ' or!anism( as a member o& the community% as characteri-ed by that universal$ The 'reco!ni-in!( particular accordin!ly e0ercises a certain sort o& authority over the universal% and the universal then e0ercises a certain sort o& authority over the individual$ It is at somethin! li*e this level o& abstraction that we will &ind a common structure between the social institution o& selves and communities by reciprocal reco!nition% and the relation between concepts% as universals% and the particulars that &all under them% yieldin! the characteri-ed individuals 'particulars as &allin! under universals( that are presented by 1ud!ements$ I thin* we can understand the &orce o& this idealist line o& thou!ht by situatin! it in the tradition o& thou!ht about the nature o& normativity out o& which it !rew$ ?nli!htenment conceptions o& the normative are distin!uished by the essential role they ta*e to be played by normative attitudes in institutin! normative statuses. 4ommitments and responsibilities are seen as comin! into a disenchanted natural world hitherto void o& them% as products o& human attitudes o& ac*nowled!in!% endorsin!% underta*in!% or attributin! them$ ' obbes" and 8oc*e"s social contract theories o& the basis o& le!itimate political authority are cases in point$( The version o& this idea that 5ant develops &rom his readin! o& Dousseau has it that the distinction between &orce% coercion% or mere constraint on me% on the one hand% and le!itimate authority over me% on the other% consists in the latter"s dependence on my endorsement or ac'nowledgment o& the

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authority as bindin! on me$ This way o& demarcatin! a *ind o& normativity mi!ht be called the autonomy thesis. It is the basis &or 5ant"s distinction between the realm o& nature% whose deni-ens are bound by rules in the &orm o& laws o& nature% and the realm o& &reedom% whose deni-ens are bound rather by their conceptions o& rules7that is% by rules that bind them only in virtue o& their own ac'nowledgment o& them as bindin!$ In this distinctive sense% rules !et their normative &orce% come to !overn our doin!s% only in virtue o& our own attitudes$ 2ne is !enuinely responsible only &or that &or which one ta'es responsibilityB one is !enuinely committed only to that to which one has committed onesel&$ To be a self% a *nower and a!ent% is% accordin! to 5ant"s ori!inal normative insi!ht% to be able to ta*e responsibility &or what one does% to be able to underta*e or ac*nowled!e commitments$ It is to be bound by norms$ 3ccordin! to the autonomy thesis% one is in a strict sense bound only by rules or laws one has laid down &or onesel&% norms one has onesel& endorsed$ )hat ma'es them bindin! is that one ta'es them to be bindin!$ Maintainin! such a view is a delicate matter$ ,or a question can arise about how% i& I mysel& am doin! the bindin! of mysel&% what I am doin! can count as binding mysel&$ I& whatever I ac*nowled!e as correct7as &ul&illin! the obli!ation I have underta*en7is correct% then in what sense is what I did in the &irst place intelli!ible as binding mysel&+ '4ompare )itt!enstein"s claim that where whatever seems ri!ht to me there&ore is ri!ht% there can be no question o& ri!ht or wron!$( The autonomy thesis says that one only is committed to that to which one has committed onesel&$ But this must not be allowed to collapse into the claim that one is committed to e0actly whatever one then ta*es onesel& to be committed to% on pain o& so emptyin! the concept o& commitment o&

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content as to ma*e it unreco!ni-able as such$ The authority o& the sel&-binder !overns the force that attaches to a certain rule: it is endorsement by the individual that ma*es the rule a rule &or or bindin! on that individual$ But that authority must not be ta*en to e0tend also to the content o& the rule: to what is and isn"t correct accordin! to the rule one has endorsed$ ,or i& it does% then one has not by one"s endorsement really bound onesel& by a rule or norm at all$ )hat is chosen7the rule or law I bind mysel& to by applyin! a concept7must have a certain independence o& the choosin! o& it$ 2nly so can we ma*e sense o& both sides o& the idea o& autonomy: o& ma'ing onesel& sub1ect to a law by ta'ing onesel& to be so$9< Maintainin! su&&icient distinction between what one does, in bindin! onesel& by applyin! a concept% and the content o& the commitment so instituted is particularly challen!in! &or any theorist committed to what I"ve called semantic pra!matism"$ ,or that is 1ust the view that it is what one does in applyin! concepts7 underta*in! commitments7that determines their content$9@ I hope it is clear that this problem is a version o& the question I earlier pictured e!el as raisin! about the determinateness o& the contents o& the concepts I apply$ I& I have available a rule 'one o& many( with a content that is determinate% in the sense that it is already settled &or any particular whether or not the particular &alls under it 'whether or not applyin! the concept to it would be correct(, then I can bind mysel& by applyin! the concept$ ,or the concept will then settle what I have obli!ed mysel& to do$ But e!el thin*s 5ant leaves it mysterious how I could have access to concepts% rules% or norms that are determinate in this sense$ In e&&ect% 5ant 1ust assumes there can be such thin!s$ e!el thin*s a ri!orously critical thin*er should inquire into the conditions o& the possibility o& such determinateness$

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e!el"s idea is that the determinacy o& the content o& what you have committed yoursel& to7the part that is not up to you in the way that whether you commit yoursel& to it is up to you7is secured by the attitudes o& others, to whom one has at least implicitly !ranted that authority$;A is thou!ht is that the only way to !et the requisite distance

&rom my ac*nowled!ments 'my attitudes% which ma*e the norm bindin! on me in the &irst place( while retainin! the sort o& authority over my commitments that the Dousseau5ant tradition insists on% is to have the norms administered by someone else$ ( commit mysel&% but then they hold me to it$ ,or me to be committed% I have to have ac'nowledged a commitment% and others must attribute it to me$ 2nly so is a real% content&ul commitment instituted$ 2nly so can I really be understood to have bound mysel&$ This is% at base% why the possibility o& my &reedom 'in the normative sense o& the autonomy thesis: my capacity to commit mysel&% to bind mysel& by norms( depends on others. Thus e!el maintains the apparently parado0ical view that the possibility o& my autonomy depends on others adoptin! attitudes toward me$ But the parado0 is merely apparent: autonomy does not on this conception collapse into heteronomy$ avin! a commitment with a de&inite content is intelli!ible% e!el thin*s% only in the conte0t o& a division o& labor between the one who underta*es the commitment and those who attribute it and hold the underta*er to it$ I !et to decide which piece in the !ame I will play7say% the one labeled That metal is molybdenum%" or I promise to drive you to the airport tomorrow mornin!%"7but I do not then !et to decide what I have committed mysel& to thereby% what &urther moves are appropriate or obli!atory &or one who has played that piece$ My authority is real% but it is partial$ 3nd the same can be said o& the others% who play the !ame with me and simultaneously re&eree it$ ,or they

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have no authority over my ac*nowled!in! o& commitments$ Their authority is only operative in the administration o& those commitments7holdin! me to a commitment with a determinate content to which they are responsible no less than I$ '4ompare: the le!islative and 1udicial &unctions o& !overnment$( 3s e!el puts it% I have a certain independence, in which commitments I embrace$ 3part &rom my ac*nowled!ment% they have no normative &orce over me$ But in e0ercisin! that very independence% I am at the same time dependent on the attitudes o& others% who attribute and hold me to the commitment% and thereby administer its content$ 3nd the others% reciprocally dependent on my reco!nition% display a correspondin! moment o& independence in their attitudes o& attribution and assessment o& my commitments and responsibilities$ Independence" and dependence" are &or e!el always normative independence and dependence$ In &act% these are ways o& tal*in! about authority and responsibility.;9 The actual content o& the commitment one underta*es by applyin! a concept 'paradi!matically% by usin! a word( is the product o& a process o& negotiation involvin! the reciprocal attitudes% and the reciprocal authority% o& those who attribute the commitment and the one who ac'nowledges it$;; )hat the content o& one"s claim or action is in itsel& results both &rom what it is for others and what it is for onesel&$ I see the account e!el o&&ers o& this process o& normative ne!otiation o& reciprocally constrainin! authority by which determinate conceptual contents are instituted and applied as his main philosophical contribution% at least as assessed &rom the &rame o& re&erence o& our contemporary concerns$ This process o& ne!otiation o& competin! normative claims is what e!el calls e0perience" F?r&ahrun!G$ Ma*in! e0plicit what is implicit in this process is sayin! how the institution o& conceptual norms is related to their actual

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application in ac*nowled!in!% attributin!% and assessin! speci&ic conceptually articulated commitments in 1ud!ement and action$ It is this relationship that &ills in e!el"s sin!leleveled% uni&ied monistic notion o& e0perience% the aspiration &or which I have ta*en him to share with Cuine% in contrast to the two-phase% bi&urcated approach common to 5ant and 4arnap$ It is also what the notion o& reciprocal reco!nition is o&&ered as a model o&$ The idealist claim we are considerin! is that concepts are instituted in the same way% and hence have the same structure and unity% as sel&-conscious selves$ III e!el thin*s o& Spirit7the realm o& the normative7as produced and sustained by the processes o& mutual reco!nition% which simultaneously institute sel&-conscious selves and their communities$ I have presented this picture as motivated by the problem o& how to construe autonomy in a way compatible with the determinateness o& conceptual contents% while seein! those conceptual contents as instituted in the same process o& e0perience in which they are applied 'the pra!matist"s &undamental commitment($ I have su!!ested that e!el thin*s that the boundaries around what one has and has not committed onesel& to by usin! a particular concept 'and what is and is not a correct application o& it( are determined by a process o& negotiation amon! actual attitudes o& application and assessments o& applications$;= This motivation &or understandin! selves7the sub1ects o& determinately content&ul commitments and responsibilities% concept users% and hence sub1ects o& e0perience% *nowers and a!ents7in terms o& mutual reco!nition e0plains why the process o& reciprocal speci&ic reco!nition should be ta*en to provide the conte t within which concepts are both applied and their contents instituted and determined$ But it does

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not yet evidently e0plain why the structure and unity imparted to selves and communities by their institution by reciprocal reco!nition should be ta*en to provide a model &or concepts7to e0plain their structure and unity$ The reason that the process o& reciprocal reco!nition% and so the structure and unity o& selves% provides not only the conte t o& but the model &or the institution and application o& conceptual norms is that it is not 1ust one e0ample o& how norms are constituted by reciprocal authority 'mutually dependent moments($ )herever a norm can properly be discerned% there must be distinct centers o& reciprocal authority and a process o& ne!otiation between them$ ,or this% e!el thin*s% is the nature o& the normative as such: the only way in which determinate contents can be associated with norms accordin! to the conception o& the normative embodied in the autonomy thesis$ The commitment one underta*es by applyin! a concept in 1ud!ement or action can be construed as determinately content&ul only i& it is to be administered by others distinct &rom the one whose commitment it is$ So in ac*nowled!in! such a commitment% one is at least implicitly reco!ni-in! the authority o& others over the content to which one has committed onesel&$;. But how% e0actly% are we to understand the structure and unity o& concepts on the model o& reciprocal reco!nition amon! selves+ ,or e!el% as &or 5ant% all norms are conceptual norms: tal* o& norms and tal* o& concepts are alternatives &or addressin! one &undamental common phenomenon$ The &irst thin! to reali-e is that e!el understands concepts% the contents o& norms% as essentially inferentially articulated$;/ e!el discusses

this in&erential articulation 'in the Phenomenology be!innin! in the section on #erception( under the headin!s o& mediation" F>ermittlun!G and determinate ne!ation"$ The paradi!m o& mediation% the case responsible &or this choice o& terminolo!y% is the

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role played by the middle term in a syllo!ism$ The application o& the mediatin! concept serves as the conclusion o& one in&erence% and the premise o& another$;6 The claim that mediation, the capacity to play this role% is essential to concepts is the claim that bein! able to &i!ure both in the premises and in the conclusions o& inferences is essential to concepts$ This is what I mean by tal*in! about their essential in&erential articulation"$;7 In a similar way% when e!el tal*s about determinate ne!ation" he means material incompatibility relations amon! concepts: the way the applicability o& one concept normatively precludes the applicability o& another$ 3n e0ample would be the way callin! a patch o& paint red" precludes callin! it !reen"$;< ,ormal or lo!ical ne!ation 'what e!el calls abstract" ne!ation( is de&inable &rom the determinate or material version$ The abstract ne!ation o& p is its minimum incompatible: what &ollows &rom everythin! materially incompatible with p. It abstracts &rom the determinate content o& those incompatibles% and so is merely incompatible$;@ To!ether the material in&erential and material incompatibility relations 'relations o& mediation and determinate ne!ation( articulate the contents o& conceptual norms$=A )e are now in a position to approach the central question$ The model o& the sort o& reciprocal reco!nition that institutes selves and their communities applies to the institution and application o& concepts in e0perience at two levels$ ,irst% it describes the relations o& reciprocal authority that relate particulars to the universals or determinate concepts that they &all under: the way in which determinate concepts are instituted and the 1ud!ements that present characteri-ed individuals are made$ Individuals% which are particulars characteri-ed by concepts% and determinate concepts are simultaneously instituted or synthesi-ed71ust as in the model% individual sel&-conscious selves% as

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members o& a community 'as characteri-ed by a universal(% and their communities 'universals( are simultaneously instituted or synthesi-ed$ Second% it describes the relations o& reciprocal authority that relate determinate concepts to each other$ 3t this level% determinate concepts and what e!el calls the 4oncept"% the !reat holistic% in&erentially articulated system o& determinate concepts and 1ud!ements articulated by those concepts7a sort o& universal or community comprisin! them all7are simultaneously instituted or synthesi-ed$ Iud!ements% acts o& 1ud!in!% come in two &lavors: mediate and immediate. The mediate ones are the results o& inferences &rom other 1ud!ements7that is% &rom the application o& other concepts one has already made$ The immediate ones are nonin&erentially elicited% paradi!matically perceptual 1ud!ements or observations$=9 Desirin! animals already sort their world by respondin! di&&erentially to it7treatin! somethin! as &ood% &or instance% by &allin! to without &urther ado and eatin! it up$"=; Immediate 1ud!ements are ones that a properly trained and tuned animal who has mastered the responsive use o& the relevant concepts will ma*e automatically% when con&ronted with the perceptible presence o& a reportable or observable state o& a&&airs$ These nonin&erential applications o& concepts 'J immediate 1ud!ements( are wrun! &rom or elicited by the particulars to which the concepts are on that occasion applied$ By contrast% responsibility &or 'J authority over( inferentially elicited applications o& concepts 'J mediate 1ud!ements( is vested in the concepts or universals, whose in&erential relations underwrite the 1ud!ement that is the conclusion$ (mmediate 1ud!ements e0press a dimension alon! which particulars e0ert an authority over the universals or concepts that apply to them$ *ediate 1ud!ements e0press

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a dimension alon! which universals or concepts e0ert an authority over the particulars to which they apply$ The characteri-ed individuals7particulars as &allin! under universals 7that are presented by 1ud!ements 'Japplications o& concepts( emer!e as the product o& negotiation between the two reciprocal dimensions o& authority 'each with its own dual% correlative sort o& responsibility($ This is the &eature o& concept use and development7 the process o& e0perience that is &or this reason intelli!ible at once as the application and as the institution o& conceptual norms7that is modeled by reciprocal reco!nition$ e!el"s Logic aims to be the completed story o& how this wor*s$ ?vidently the two sorts o& authority may collide$ 2ne may &ind onesel& immediately with commitments incompatible with those to which one is in&erentially committed$ Then one must alter some o& one"s commitments7either those that are authori-ed by the particulars 'immediately( or those that are authori-ed by the universals 'mediately($ This necessity is normative: one is obliged by the incompatibility o& one"s 1ud!ements% by the commitments one has onesel& underta*en% to ad1ust either the authority o& the particulars or o& the universal$ Ma*in! an ad1ustment o& one"s conceptual commitments in the li!ht o& such a collision is what is meant by negotiating between the two dimensions o& authority$== The process o& ad1ustin! one"s dispositions to ma*e immediate and mediate 1ud!ements in response to actual con&licts arisin! &rom e0ercisin! them is the process e!el calls e0perience"$ It drives the development o& concepts$ It is the process o& determining their content$ It is how applying conceptual norms is at the same time the process o& instituting them$ 4onceptual contents are determinate only because and in so &ar as they are the products o& such a process o& determining them by applyin! them in in&erential concert with their &ellows$=.

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This process o& negotiation between ac*nowled!ed authorities upon their disa!reement is the process o& administering the sometimes opposed authorities o& particulars and universals$ It is constitutive o& both the 4oncept% as the holistic system o& all the determinate universals 'empirical concepts( related by material in&erence and incompatibility 'mediation and determinate ne!ation(% and the characteri-ed particulars presented by a set o& 1ud!ements% a set o& commitments that are actual applications o& universals to particulars$ 4oncepts and 1ud!ements% meanin!s and belie&s% lan!ua!es and theories% are two sides o& one coin% intelli!ible only to!ether% as elements o& the process o& e0perience$ This view should sound &amiliar: it is Cuine"s in Two Do!mas o& ?mpiricism"$ Seein! chan!e o& meanin! and chan!e o& belie& as aspects o& a sin!le process o& e0perience% o& ad1ustin! our belie&s 'includin! those we &ind ourselves with perceptually( to one another% is Cuine"s way o& wor*in! out his pra!matist commitment$ )e are now in a position to see it also as e!el"s way o& wor*in! out his idealist commitment$=/ IV e!el o&ten discusses the relation between selves and concepts in the lan!ua!e o& identity. ,or instance: The :otion FBe!ri&&G% when it has developed into a concrete e istence that is itsel& &ree% is none other than the ( or pure sel&-consciousness$ True% I have notions% that is to say determinate notionsB but the I is the pure :otion itsel& which% as :otion% has come into e istence.+, )e have seen how the (% sel&-conscious selves in !eneral% as the normative sub1ects o& conceptually articulated commitments--1ud!ements 'and actions(7are synthesi-ed as essential aspects ' e!el says moments"( o& the process o& e0perience whose other

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essential elements include both those 1ud!ements and the concepts that are applied in them$ 3nd we have seen that the structure and unity o& this process in all its aspects should be understood in terms o& the *ind o& reciprocal authority relations e!el calls reco!nitive"$ Still% the di&&erent aspects o& this process and o& reco!nitive structures !enerally remain distinct and distin!uishable$ They are not identical to one another in a strict or lo!ical sense$ e!el ac*nowled!es this$ The passa!e above continues with a

characteri-ation o& reco!nitive structures that is abstract in the way characteristic o& the 8o!ic% concludin!: $ $ $ this FstructureG constitutes the nature o& the ( as well as o& the :otionB neither the one nor the other can be truly comprehended unless the two indicated moments are !rasped at the same time both in their abstraction and also in their per&ect unity $=7 The unity o& the reco!nitive structure leads e!el to tal* 'in my view% un&ortunately( o& the essentially related moments o& that structure as identical$ They are not identical in the ordinary sense% since they are also essentially distinct$ But he wants us to reco!ni-e them nonetheless as identical in a speculative sense$ In this speculative sense% elements o& a reco!nitive structure o& reciprocal authority that are intelli!ible only as elements related to one another in such a structure are described as identical" with one another$ It is in this sense that e!el tal*s about selves as bein! identical with their communities% about particulars as identical with the universals that characteri-e them% about determinate concepts as identical with the holistic 4oncept that comprises them as a system o& in&erentially related elements% and so on$ 2nly con&usion results i& this speculative sense o& identical" is con&used with the ordinary notion o& identity$ ,or then the speci&ic structure o& reco!nition by which these di&&erent elements are at once distin!uished and

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related is in dan!er o& collapsin!$ 4ollapsin! them renders unintelli!ible determinately content&ul normative statuses: the 1ud!ements 'and actions( that ma*e up e0perience% the selves that underta*e% attribute% and are responsible &or them% their reco!nitive communities% the determinate concepts that articulate those responsibilities by the relations o& material in&erence and incompatibility that ma*e up the !reater universal that is the 4oncept% the particulars to which 1ud!ements have a responsibility mediated by immediate 1ud!ements% and so on$ It remains to consider one &inal dimension o& the reco!nitive structure within which the relation between selves and concepts must be understood$ This is a dimension e!el also discusses in the lan!ua!e o& identity% but in a way that should be understood% I thin*% neither in the strict nor in the speculative sense$ I have in mind here the considerations that are raised by e!el"s claim7which looms lar!e &or instance in the #re&ace to the Phenomenology7that Spirit as a whole should be understood as a self. I understand the !eisti!" as the realm o& conceptually articulated norms% o& authority and responsibility% commitment and entitlement$ Spirit as a whole is the reco!nitive community o& all those who have such normative statuses% and all their normatively si!ni&icant activities$ It is% in other words% the topic o& the pra!matist"s enquiry: the whole system o& social practices o& the most inclusive possible community$ 4laimin! that Spirit has the structure and unity o& the sel& is another idealist thesis% and it% too% should be understood in terms o& e!el"s pra!matism$ In ma*in! this second idealist claim% e!el obviously does not mean &or us to thin* that Spirit as a whole is 1ust one more o& us ordinary selves% an element o& some community o& which we are also members$ But neither% I thin*% does he 1ust mean that

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Spirit is an element o& the reco!nitive structure o& which we individual selves are elements7so that we could tal* about us and the !reat community that comprises us reco!nitively as identical in the speculative sense$ e means that Spirit as a whole7the

whole reco!nitive community o& which we individual selves are members% and all o& its activities and institutions7has the structure and unity characteristic o& the sel&-conscious sel&$ In that technical sense% it is an individual% thou!h not one associated with a particular or!anism% as we human selves are$ I thin* that there is all sorts o& evidence that e!el means his remar*s about Spirit as Sel& to have somethin! li*e this import$ 4ertainly that is the way he is usually read$ It is much less o&ten remar*ed that attributin! such a view to e!el in the Phenomenology raises a substantial interpretive problem$ ,or e!el clearly subscribes there to the &ollowin! three claims: 9$ Spirit is a sel&-conscious sel&$ ;$ Sel&-conscious sel&-hood is an essentially social achievement% requirin! actual reco!nition of and by an other, to whom the individual sel& achievin! sel&consciousness in this way is then bound in a reco!nitive community. =$ Spirit has no otherB there is nothin! outside" it$ The trouble is o& course that these claims are 1ointly incompatible$ But e!el commits himsel& to them all7not 1ust casually or in a way that could represent a slip% but as essential elements o& his view$ :ow much o& what I have said in this essay does not represent conventional wisdom about e!el"s views$ But attributin! these three claims is not an idiosyncratic &eature o& my readin!: it is conventional wisdom$ Ket discussion o& the conceptual problems these theses present does not loom lar!e in the secondary

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literature$ 'The claim one sometimes hears that e!el is in the end a *ind o& sub!ectivist is% I ta*e it% at least an indirect ac*nowled!ment o& these di&&iculties$( It seems to me that the e0tent to which a readin! ac*nowled!es and provides a convincin! response to this issue should serve as a &undamental criterion o& adequacy &or assessin! it$ The account I have been s*etchin! o& the nature and si!ni&icance o& reciprocal reco!nition &or understandin! the nature o& normative statuses provides the raw materials &or such a response$ ,urther% in doin! so it &ills in an important piece o& the story about how applying conceptual norms by ma*in! 1ud!ements can be understood as a process o& determining their content% and so as instituting those norms$ In so &ar as it does% it o&&ers a &inal respect in which e!el"s idealism and his pragmatism 'in the senses I have been discussin!( illuminate one another$ Deciprocal reco!nition% I have claimed% is &or e!el the structure that ma*es the normative intelli!ible as such$ In its paradi!matic social &orm% it institutes both individual sel&-conscious selves 'the sub1ects o& commitments and responsibilities( and their communities 'the selves bound to!ether by attributin! and assessin! commitments to each other% holdin! each other responsible($ In its inferential &orm% this structure characteri-es the relationship between particulars and universals in the process o& ma*in! !udgements that is e0perience: the application o& determinate concepts$ It is e0hibited as well in the relations o& reciprocal authority by which applications o& some determinate concepts condition the applicability o& other% in&erentially related concepts% thereby constitutin! the community" o& all determinate concepts% structured by relations o& mediation and deten9linate ne!ation% that is the 4oncept$ In addition to these two &orms o& reciprocal reco!nition% we should reco!ni-e a third: the historical. It arises because

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ne!otiatin! and ad1udicatin! the claims o& reciprocally conditionin! authorities% administerin! conceptual norms by applyin! them in actual cases 'to particulars that immediately present themselves( is a process. In that process o& e0perience% conceptual norms develop, alon! with the body o& claims or 1ud!ements e0pressin! the commitments that arise &rom applyin! those concepts$ This developmental process o& pro!ressively determinin! the content o& concepts by applyin! them in concert with their &ellows is to be understood as the way determinately content&ul conceptual norms are instituted. ?0perience7at once the application and the institution o& conceptual norms7is not merely a temporal process% but a historical one$ By this I mean that it e0hibits a distinctive recognitive structure that is the product o& the reciprocal authority e0ercised on the one hand by past applications o& concepts over &uture ones% and on the other hand by &uture applications o& concepts over past ones$ 3ll there is to institute conceptual norms% to determine what we have committed ourselves to by applyin! a concept% is other applications o& the concept in question% to!ether with applications o& concepts in&erentially related to it$ Thus the applications o& the concept 'and its relatives( that have actually been made already have a certain sort o& authority over candidate &uture applications o& that concept 'and so o& its relatives($ The prior applications are authoritative re!ardin! the meanin! or content o& the concept$ This is the authority o& the past 'applications o& concepts( over the &uture 'applications o& concepts(7providin! a sense in which &uture applications are responsible &or their correctness to the past ones$ But authority needs to be administered$ 3pplications o& norms instituted by prior applications need to be assessed &or their correctness% accordin! to the norms they answer to$ ,or current applications o& a concept to be responsible to prior applications o& that

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concept 'and its relatives(% they must be held responsible% ta*en or treated as responsible$ That is the lesson o& e!el"s analysis o& the conditions under which the bindingness o& norms is intelli!ible% accordin! to what he made o& the 5ant-Dousseau insistence on autonomy as a condition o& !enuine normativity7the lesson that is the basis &or the model o& reciprocal reco!nition$ ,or we can as* in the present conte0t: ow is it possible &or an application o& a concept to count as incorrect accordin! to the commitments implicit in prior applications+ I& there is nothin! to the content o& the concept e0cept what has been put into it by actual applications o& it 'and its relatives(% how can any actual application be understood as incorrect accordin! to that content+ I& it cannot% then no norm has been instituted$ ere% I thin*% is e!el"s answer: The authority o& the past applications% which instituted the conceptual norm% is administered on its behal& by future applications% which include assessments o& past ones$ It is &or later users o& a concept to decide whether each earlier application was correct or not% accordin! to the tradition constituted by still earlier uses$ In doin! so% the &uture applications e0ercise a reciprocal authority over past ones$ The model o& this process that I &ind it most use&ul to *eep in mind 'thou!h it is not one e!el ever su!!ests( is the development o& concepts o& common law by precedent$ 4ommon law di&&ers &rom statute law in consistin! entirely o& case law$ It is not the interpretation o& e0plicit &oundin! laws% rules% or principles$ -ll there is to it is a sequence o& applications o& concepts to actual sets o& &acts$ It is &or this reason o&ten thou!ht o& as 1ud!e-made law$ 4onsider an ideali-ed version o& this process$ ?ach 1ud!e inherits a tradition o& cases% which can be thou!ht o& as a set o& particulars 'the &acts o& the case% described in

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non-le!al vocabulary( to which le!al universals such as tort"% strictly liable"% and so on have been applied 'or withheld($ The 1ud!e is in turn con&ronted with a novel particular case 'set o& &acts(% and must decide whether to apply or withhold application o& one o& those universals7classi&yin! the actions in question as constitutin! a speci&ic tort% or as involvin! the assumption o& strict liability$ The authority o& the tradition consists in the &act that the only reasons the 1ud!e can appeal to in 1usti&yin! his decision are precedential: the &act that the universal in question was actually applied or withheld in previous cases that resemble the one in question in respects the 1ud!e speci&ies 'while o& course di&&erin! in other respects($ The concepts the 1ud!e is char!ed with applyin! have their content entirely constituted by the history o& their actual application 'alon! with the history o& actual application o& any other le!al concepts that have in the tradition actually been ta*en to be in&erentially related to them($ It is this tradition to which the 1ud!e is responsible. The contents o& those concepts have been instituted entirely by their bein! applied$ The reciprocal authority o& the 1ud!e includes=< the authority to sort the previous cases into those that are and those that are not precedential. These are the previous applications that% accordin! to the 1ud!e% demarcate the content o& the concept$ 3 prior decided case can be treated as not precedential% as not potentially authoritative with respect to the case in question% because the 1ud!e sees it as mista'en, !iven the decisions that articulate the content o& the concept% that is% in li!ht o& the qualitative or quantitative preponderance o& precedent$ ' ere the in&erential connections to other concepts the 1ud!e ta*es to have been established by prior decisions% to!ether with the precedents &or applyin! those concepts can wei!h in as well$( This sort o& assessment must itsel& be 1usti&ied% by a sort o& rational reconstruction o& the tradition o& applyin! the le!al concept

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in question% alon! with the precedents selected as most relevant% in &ramin! the rationale &or decidin! the case one way rather than the other$ It is because every decision o& a case has this shape% involves the e0ercise o& this sort o& discretion or authority% and there is nothing more to the content o& the le!al concepts bein! applied than the content they acquire throu!h a tradition o& such decisions% that the principles that emer!e &rom this process are appropriately thou!ht o& as 1ud!e-made law"$=@ But the contents the 1ud!es in this sense ma'e is also constrained by what they find, the precedential applications o& concepts 'both immediate and in&erential( whose authority the 1ud!es are sub1ect to% at the same time that they inherit it and administer it$ Sensiti-ed as I hope we are by now to the structure o& reciprocal authority 'and so o& responsibility( e!el calls mutual reco!nition"% we should be able to discern it in the ideali-ed 1udicial process I have s*etched$ #ast applications o& concepts 'decisions o& cases( e0ercise an authority over &uture ones$ ,or they supply the precedents that constitute the only rationales available to 1usti&y &uture decisions$ They are the source o& the content o& the concepts later 1ud!es are char!ed with applyin!$ This is the moment o& independence% o& reco!nition% o& constitutive authority o& the past over the &uture% and so the &uture"s dependence on its past$ But reciprocally% later applications o& concepts by the 1ud!es who inherit the tradition e0ercise an authority over the earlier ones$ ,or the si!ni&icance o& the authority o& the tradition% what conceptual content e0actly it is ta*en to have instituted% is decided by the 1ud!es currently ma*in! decisions$ They administer the norms% ma'e them determinately bindin!$ This is the moment o& independence% o& reco!nition% o& constitutive authority o& the &uture over the past% and so o& the past"s dependence on its &uture$ ,or e0cept in so &ar as the current 1ud!e recogni.es or

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ac*nowled!es the authority o& some prior decision% it has none$ )hat the norm really is 'what it is in itsel&( is the product o& reco!nitive negotiation between these two poles o& reciprocal authority 'what the content is for the past 1ud!es and what it is for the present one($ :ow it may seem that the situation here is not symmetric$ ,or the present 1ud!e may seem to have the last word$ 3&ter all% the 1ud!e decidin! a case now can i!nore or at least dismiss inconvenient prior decisions% treatin! them as misapplications o& the concepts in question7as wron!ly decided cases7or as irrelevant because dissimilar &rom the case at issue in the respects the present 1ud!e has decided to treat as most important$ So it seems that the current 1ud!e owes to the past only the debts she hersel& decides to ac*nowled!e$ 3nd i& and in so &ar as that is true% the authority o& the past decisions% the content they have con&erred on the le!al concepts% is empty and indeterminate$ The &act that the 1ud!e must 1usti&y her present decision by appealin! to prior decisions then would impose a merely formal constraint$ er discretion in choosin!

and applyin! precedents7in e&&ect% retrospectively reconstructin! the tradition by selective omission and selective emphasis--wouldrender that constraint contentless$ The voice o& the past cannot be thou!ht o& as havin! authority over the present% i& the present can decide both which bits to listen to% and how to interpret them$ This is an intelli!ible description o& the situation% and the worries it en!enders have properly en!a!ed 1urisprudential theorists$ But in &act symmetry o& authority% !enuinely reciprocal reco!nition% is achieved in this process$ Henuine authority % I have claimed on e!el"s behal&% must be administered. Tal* o& my bein! responsible to somethin! is appropriate only where there is someone to hold me responsible to it$ The

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current 1ud!e administers the norms instituted and determined by past applications$ But who is there to hold the current 1ud!e responsible to the tradition o& prior applications% to assess the &idelity o& her decision to the content actually con&erred on the le!al concepts by the tradition she inherits+ The appearance o& asymmetry o& authority between past and present is the result o& not considerin! the answer to this question$ But it is clear what the answer is$ The current 1ud!e is held accountable to the tradition she inherits by the 1ud!es yet to come$ ,or her decision matters &or the content o& the concept in question only in so &ar as its precedential authority is ac*nowled!ed or reco!ni-ed in turn by &uture 1ud!es$ I& they ta*e her case to have been misdecided% !iven their readin! o& the tradition she inherited% then the current 1ud!e"s decision has no authority at all$ The authority o& the past over the present is administered on its behal& by the &uture$ Since this process has no endpoint in principle% no &inally authoritative authority not dependent in turn on its ac*nowled!ment or reco!nition% the normative situation is entirely symmetrical$ 3nd to say that is to say% accordin! to e!el"s way o& wor*in! out the 5ant-Dousseau autonomy thou!ht in terms o& reciprocal reco!nition% that !enuine% determinately content&ul conceptual norms are instituted by a process o& applyin! them that has this historical structure$.A Determinate conceptual norms are intelli!ible only as &eatures o& an actual tradition that is structured reco!nitively% havin! reciprocal authorities ne!otiatin! and administerin! alon! all three reco!nitive dimensions: social% in&erential% and historical$ e!el"s pra!matism% I have claimed% consists in his commitment to understandin! determinately content&ul empirical conceptual norms as instituted by e perience, the process o& using those concepts by applyin! them in practice: ma*in! 1ud!ements and

76

per&ormin! actions$

is idealism consists in understandin! this process o& e0perience as

e0hibitin! a constellation o& reciprocal authority whose paradi!m is mutual reco!nition: the structure and unity o& the sel&-conscious individual sel&$ Thus we are to use the same concepts in terms o& which we understand selves to understand concepts. The reco!nitive structure o& reciprocal authority necessary to ma*e intelli!ible the bindin!ness o& determinately content&ul norms has three dimensions: social% in&erential% and historical$ In this essay I have not been able to pursue the intricate interactions amon! these dimensions that e!el delineates &or us$ But I have tried to s*etch what I ta*e to be e!el"s most basic thou!ht: his way o& wor*in! out the 5ant-Dousseau insi!ht about a &undamental *ind o& normativity based on autonomy accordin! to the model o& reciprocal authority and responsibility whose paradi!m is mutual reco!nition$ I thin* this is the master idea that animates and structures e!el"s metaphysics and lo!ic$.9 3nd as a sort o& a bonus% we have also% I hope% seen enou!h to *now how to respond to the pu--le I raised about how to understand e!el"s tal* o& Spirit as a whole as a sel&-conscious individual self, in the conte0t o& his insistence on the irreducibly social character o& the achievement o& sel&-consciousness$ The reciprocal reco!nitive structure within which Spirit as a whole comes to sel&-consciousness is historical. It is a relation between di&&erent time slices o& Spirit% in which the present ac*nowled!es the authority o& the past% and e0ercises an authority over it in turn% with the ne!otiation o& their con&licts administered by the &uture$ This is the reco!nitive structure o& tradition, which articulates the normative structure o& the process o& development by which concepts acquire their contents by bein! applied in e0perience$ This process is what e!el"s pra!matism and his idealism aim ultimately to illuminate$ Ma*in! that structure

77

e0plicit is achievin! the &orm o& sel&-consciousness e!el calls" 3bsolute 5nowled!e"% some o& the outlines o& which I have tried to convey here$

7<

:2T?S

7@

5ant usually says rules" but he means somethin! that% thou!h statable% can be implicit% not 1ust what

is already e0plicitly stated$

;

To be able to do that is to be free. To be &ree is accordin!ly to be able to bind onesel& by the norms

that are concepts$ The only thin! that 5antian a!ents can do, in the strict sense o& do that involves the e0ercise o& &reedom% is apply concepts -- whether theoretically in 1ud!ement% or practically in action$ 3ctivity that consists in the application o& concepts is rational activity$ So we are &ree e0actly in so &ar as we are rational$
=

LIud!ment in !eneral is the &aculty o& thin*in! the particular as contained under the universal$ I& the

universal 'the rule% the principle% the law( be !iven% the 1ud!ment which subsumes the particular under it $ $ $ is determinate FbestimmendG$ But i& only the particular be !iven &or which the universal has to be &ound% the 1ud!ment is merely reflective./ 5ant 97@A '#riti$ue of 0udgment, Introduction% Section I>% &irst para!raph$(
.

Hiven 5antLs other commitments% neither term can be applied without quali&ication% which &act sets up

the problematic o& the third 4ritique$

/

2nly the LultimateL sub1ects% since the role o& the pure concepts in ma*in! them possible is the

pro0imate sub1ect$
6

I"ll indicate brie&ly below how e!el sees immediacy as e0ercisin! an authority that constrains the

application o& concepts% and so how particulars are !iven a normatively si!ni&icant voice that must ne!otiate with the reciprocal authority o& mediatin! universals% all o& it administered by those who attribute determinately content&ul conceptual commitments$
7

It should be noticed in this connection that invo*in! the temporal schematism o& concepts is not a

responsive answer to this challen!e 'quite apart &rom the obscurity o& the details($ ,or the schematism o& the understandin! at most e0plains how a concept could !et a !rip on 'apply or not apply to( a particular intuition$ But the question re!ardin! determinateness is rather what it is &or us to !et a hold o& one completely determinate universal rather than a closely related one that applies to almost% but not

quite all the same particulars$

<

Saul 5rip*e% )ittgenstein on %ules and Private Language. 4ambrid!e% M3: arvard Eniversity

#ress% 9@<;($ 2nly Lrelated toL because 5rip*e imports constraints on the problem that e!el would not share$ It is &air to as* what it is about how we have actl1ally applied concepts in the past that determines how we ought to apply them in the &uture% what deter- mines how we have committed ourselves to do so$ ,or to as* that is to as* how the actual practice o& application mana!es to institute one norm rather than another$ But there is no le!itimate standpoint &rom which one is entitled to restrict oneLs speci&ication o& that practice o& application% as 5rip*e implicitly does% to what can be stated in a nonnormative vocabulary$ Esin! an e0pression correctly or incorrectly is also somethin! we actually do$
@

The ori!ins o& this way o& thin*in! about e!elLs problems lie in Dobert #ippinLs pathbrea*in! wor*%

2ege34s (dealism: 5he Satisfactions of Self-#onsciousness. '4ambrid!e Eniversity #ress% 4ambrid!e% 9@<@($
9A

3mon! the many nontrivial di&&erences between them is that 4arnapLs is a globally two-phase picture%

while 5antLs is only locally two-phase$ That is% nothin! in 5antLs account su!!ests the possibility o& ma*in! all oneLs re&lective 1ud!ements &irst% only then to be!in ma*in! determinant 1ud!ements$ The structural similarity consists only in the common commitment to there bein! two quite di&&erent sorts o& thin!s one is doin!% in ma*in! meanin!s or concepts available% and then in employin! them$
99

:otice that this is not yet to say anythin! about the vocabulary in which the use is to be speci&ied by

the theorist$ In particular% &ocusin! on use is not the same thin! as &ocusin! on use specified in a non normative vocabulary.
9;

So one o& e!elLs &undamental claims is that a suitable dynamic account o& the relation between

conceptual contents and e0perience% the institution o& concepts and their application% can reconcile the rationalist insi!ht and the empiricist insi!ht 'that the content o& empirical concepts must be understood as derivin! &rom e0perience(% while re1ectin! both innateness and abstractionism$ This pragmatist

strate!y loo*s to the development o& concepts throu!h their use in e0perience% that is% in the practices o& 1ud!in! and actin!$
9=

Deco!ni-in! that every concept actually applied in any empirical 1ud!ement is only a more or less

adequate e0pression o& the implicit articulation o& thin!s entails ac*nowled!in! that no determinate 1ud!ement ou!ht to be ta*en to be unquali&iedly true$ ',or e!el% it is di&&erent with the concepts o& lo!ic% whose distinctive e0pressive tas* it is to ma*e e0plicit the process by which the system o& determinate concepts and 1ud!ements the 4oncept -pro!resses and develops$( So to ta*e the 1ud!ement to be the unit o& co!nition 'as 5ant does% because it is the minimal unit o& co!nitive responsibility) is already to commit onesel& to an unsustainable view o& the nature o& the determinateness o& conceptual content$
9.

e!el% H$)$,$% 2ege34s Science of Logic, translated by 3$ >$ Miller ':ew Kor*: umanities #ress erea&ter SL. #$/<.$

International% 9@6@($
9/

SL p$ /</$ The phrase is &rom Iohn au!eland% eide!!er on Bein! a #erson: in &ous 96% 9@<;$ 2& course% the

96

social institution is not unconstrained$ 3s we will see% the history o& previous applications o& a concept% includin! those immediately elicited by the particulars to which they are applied% e0ercises a crucial authority over such an institution$
97

,or e!el% true !eneral reco!nition is an equivalence relation: symmetric% re&le0ive% and transitive$ The discussion o& the 8aw o& the eart in the Phenomenology is one place where this issue o& the

9<

conditions o& the possibility o& determinately bindin! onesel& is e0plored$

9@

So it would be a mista*e to assert a strict identity between the application and the institution o&

determinately content&ul concepts: to say% &or instance% that meanin! is use$ It is essential to see the identity that is !enuinely involved 'accordin! to the pra!matist( as what e!el calls a speculative" identity -that is% one that essentially incorporates a di&&erence$

;A

Thou!h to say it is secured" by others is not to say that it is &ully determined by them$ 3s will

emer!e below% the authority o& particularity% asserted throu!h immediate 1ud!ements% accordin! to the other two reco!nitive dimensions 'in&erential and historical(% constrains the community % and constitutes an essential element o& the content they administer7the content o& the norms that have reciprocal authority over them$
;9

I& M has some sort o& authority over K% then y is in so &ar such responsible to M$ But e!el"s way o&

wor*in! throu!h the Dousseau-5ant understandin! o& autonomy as the essence o& normative bindin!ness 'validity% HNlti!*eit( requires that i& M has some sort o& authority over K% then M also has some sort o& responsibility toward y -- that is% that y has a reciprocal authority over 0$ This is a claim about the very nature o& authority and responsibility: the nature o& the normative as such$ 3 commitment to the coherence o& construin! M as havin! authority over y 'dually: K"s responsibility to M( that is not balanced by K"s reciprocal authority over M 'dually% M"s responsibility to K( is an inde0 o& thin*in! that remains at the meta-conceptual level e!el calls Enderstandin!% &ailin! to advance to the meta-conceptual level he calls Deason$ It is &ailin! to ma*e the cate!orical conceptual move &rom independence to freedom, in the sense o& autonomy: bein! bound by norms% but by e0actly those one has bound oneself by$ 3naly-in! commitments and other normative statuses as products instituted by attitudes o& both ac*nowled!ment and attribution 'and so two sorts o& independence or authority% and two correspondin! sorts o& dependence or responsibility( is appealin! to the idea o& mutual reco!nition$ But the reco!nition involved is specific, rather than general. To reco!ni-e someone in the !eneral sense is to ta*e her to be a normative sub1ect o& commitments and responsibilities$ 2ne does that by attributin! speci&ic commitments and responsibilities$ That is% reco!nition in !eneral is an abstract notion$ It is what is common to all instances o& speci&ic reco!nition$ To be a sel&% one must have some actual% speci&ic commitments and responsibilities$ Deco!nition in !eneral is 1ust an abstract way o& tal*in! about what is common to all speci&ic reco!nition$ 2ne cannot merely reco!ni-e someone$ Deco!ni-in!

someone is always attributin! some speci&ic commitments and responsibilities -- thou!h perhaps di&&erent ones in each case$ This is why actual reciprocal reco!nition is required &or me to be a sel& in the normative sense$
;;

Tal* o& negotiation is bound to sound &ar too irenic a renderin! &or the sort o& stri&e and con&rontation

o& inconsistent demands e!el depicts$ But% thou!h the issue cannot be pursued here% I thin* there are !ood reasons to treat the martial% uncompromisin! lan!ua!e e!el is &ond o& as misleadin! on this point$ :othin! is absolutely other% nor are any claims or concepts simply inconsistent% &or him$ It is always material incompatibilities o& content 'rather than &ormal inconsistencies( whose mutual con&rontation obli!es an alteration o& commitments$
;=

This ar!umentative structure has not been obvious to e!el"s readers% and I thin* one reason is the

order o& e0position he adopts in the Phenomenology. ,or e!el starts by introducin! a notion o& general reco!nition 'in the section on Sel&-4onsciousness( that is% ta*in! or treatin! someone as a normative sub1ect o& commitments and responsibilities in !eneral$ e asserts the essentially social character o& reco!nition% and e0plores some consequences o& not appreciatin! the essentially reciprocal structure that can alone ma*e sense o& normative statuses$ But the content o& the concept does not really emer!e until later 'in the section on Deason(% when he discusses specific reco!nition -that is% the ac*nowled!ment and attribution o& the speci&ic% determinate commitments and responsibilities involved in the use o& particular% determinately content&ul concepts, in 1ud!ement and action$ It is only loo*in! bac* &rom this vanta!e point 'at the end o& the discussion o& %eason) that we can see reco!nition in !eneral as an abstraction &rom speci&ic reco!nition% as what all speci&ic reco!nitive attitudes 'the only ones that are actual( have in common$ 3nd it is at this level that the account o& reco!nition as essentially social and reciprocal must be motivated$ ,or this reason% the social dimension o& reco!nition% with which I be!an my e0position% in the end shows itsel& not to be &ully intelli!ible apart &rom the in&erential and historical dimensions% since the determinately content&ul conceptual commitments that are attributed by speci&ic reco!nitive attitudes are not$

;.

It is up to me both what concept I apply in 1ud!in! or actin!% and who has the authority to administer

it$ ,or a norm to be intelli!ible as binding, as havin! !enuine normative force, thou!h% the moment o& independence 'authority( e0ercised by the one on whom it is bindin! 'in virtue o& 6.is ac*nowled!ment o& that normative status( must be understood as balanced by a moment o& dependence on 'responsibility to( those who attribute and assess it$ 3nd as we"ll see% this is not the only moment o& normative dependence in play$ Those who attribute and assess the commitment are obli!ed also to ac*nowled!e the authority o& prior applications 'which includes the authority o& immediacy(% in their administration o& the content those applications institute$
;/

Deaders o& my boo* *a'ing It 7 plicit are liable% at this point% to suspect me o& simply readin! my

own views into e!el% startin! with a socially perspectival normative approach to pra!matics% and now movin! on to an in&erential approach to semantics$ The similarity is not coincidental% but the order o& in&luence runs in the other direction: I came to these thou!hts &rom readin! e!el% and went on to develop them in my own way$ I construe what I"m doin! now as tryin! to ac*nowled!e the debt% rather than &oistin! my views on e!el$
;6

In the syllo!ism: Iud!ements are applications o& concepts% 3pplications o& concepts are in&erentially articulated% there&ore Iud!ements are in&erentially articulated%

the concept application of concepts plays the role o& the middle term% which mediates the in&erence &rom the applicability o& the concept !udgement to the applicability o& the concept inferentially articulated. The mediatin! concept &ormulates the conclusion o& the in&erence &rom M is a 1ud!ement" to M is the application o& a concept" and the premise o& the in&erence &rom M is the application o& a concept" to M is in&erentially articulated"$
;7

The in&erences in question are not '1ust( &ormally or lo!ically !ood in&erences% such as the syllo!ism%

but also the materially correct in&erences that are implicit in their premises$ These are in&erences whose

!oodness depends on and articulates the nonlogical content o& the concepts involved$ In the e0ample above% that 1ud!ements 'and actions( are applications o& concepts is an element essential to the contents o& those particular concepts$ 3n e0ample would be the in&erence &rom #ittsbur!h is to the )est o& :ew Kor*: to :ew Kor* is to the ?ast o& #ittsbur!h"$ Hiven material% that is% content-articulatin!% proprieties o& in&erence% various sorts o& &ormally valid in&erences can be understood as material proprieties that are robust under correspondin! *inds o& substitution$
;<

3nother e0ample mi!ht be the incompatibility involved in a :ewtonian mass acceleratin! in the

absence o& imposed &orces$

;@

2ne can derive relations o& mediation &rom those o& determinate ne!ation7that is% relations o&

material inference &rom those o& material incompatibility. ,or p incompatibility entails $ 1ust in case everythin! incompatible with $ is incompatible with p 'thou!h perhaps not conversely($ Thus bein! a do! entails bein! a mammal% because everythin! incompatible with bein! a mammal is incompatible with bein! a do!$ e!el o&ten tal*s as thou!h negation were the &undamental content-articulatin! notion$
=A

It is ultimately in terms o& them that we must understand the analo!ue o& reco!nitive relations &or

concepts: what plays the role &or concepts that reciprocal reco!nition in the paradi!matic sense plays &or individual sel&-conscious selves% accordin! to the idealist thesis$ But we must remember the pra!matist thesis as well$ That thesis% common !round between e!el and Cuine% says that instituting conceptual norms and applying them are two sides o& one coin% two aspects o& one process$ Doin! the &ormer is settlin! meanings, determinin! the boundaries distin!uishin! correct or appropriate application &rom applications that would be incorrect or inappropriate$ Doin! the latter is ma*in! 1ud!ements 'and per&ormin! actions(% and assessin! such per&ormances -in practice ta'ing particular applications to be correct or incorrect% treating them as appropriate or not$ Thus Cuine insists that settlin! one"s meanin!s is not a process separate &rom settlin! one"s belie&s$ ,or e!el% it is in ma*in! and assessin! 1ud!ements and actions -that is% in e0perience -that we determine the contents o& the

conceptual norms that !overn that process$ The coordinate status o& concepts and 1ud!ements is an essential &eature o& the monistic approach to which these pra!matists are committed$ So material in&erential and incompatibility relations amon! concepts must be understood as &eatures o& the process o& adoptin! actual attitudes% actually applyin! those concepts: ta*in! or treatin! some applications as appropriate by underta*in! conceptually articulated commitments in the &orm o& 1ud!ements 'or actions(% and by assessin! the appropriateness o& such commitments$ It is this process that% accordin! to the idealist% can use&ully be construed as involvin! constitutive relations o& mutual reco!nition$
=9

2& course% even these are in&erentially articulated: they are applications o& concepts% and so

essentially somethin! that can serve as premises &or in&erence$ Their immediacy consists in their bein! non in&erential only in the sense that commitment that is the 1ud!ement was not underta*en as the result o& a process o& in&erence$ That this is the only sense in which 1ud!ements can be nonin&erential is one o& the central lessons o& the #erception section o& the Phenomenology, and o& )il&rid Sellars" seminal essay ?mpiricism and the #hilosophy o& Mind"$ See my discussion in Sellars% )$% 7mpiricism and the Philosophy of *ind with an Introduction by Dichard Dorty and a Study Huide by Dobert Brandom$ 4ambrid!e% M3: arvard Eniversity #ress% 9@@7$
=;

e!el% H$)$,$ '9<A7(% Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by 3$>$ Miller '9@77($ 20&ord: 20&ord

Eniversity #ress% 9@77($ O9A@% p$ 6/$

==

,or empirical concepts% at any rate% I don"t thin* that e!el is committed to there bein! in every case

a unique answer that can be settled in advance to the question o& how such con&licts ou!ht to be resolved% which commitments should be modi&ied or relinquished$ Such a concrete con&lict mi!ht be resolved% &or instance% by 1ud!in! that one cannot reliably nonin&erentially apply colour terms i& the ob1ects in question are illuminated only by incandescent electric li!hts% or that the applicability o& C is entailed only by the applicability o& P89, not o& # by itsel&$
=.

Tal* o& this process o& e0perience as driven by the restless ne!ativity" o& concepts is an appeal to the

role played in it by the &act that ma*es our empirical concepts permanently sub1ect to the possibility o&

revision: their potential to !ive rise to determinately incompatible 1ud!ements 'immediate and mediate($ 3nd thou!h the point cannot be pursued here% it is o& the utmost si!ni&icance that because concepts develop and become more determinate in this way immediacy, contingency, and particularity are incorporated into the contents o& those concepts$ Suppose we have well-developed di&&erential responsive dispositions leadin! us immediately to classi&y particulars as sour and as red or blue, and in&erential commitments to the propriety o& in&errin! the applicability o& the universal acid &rom that o& sour, and to acids turnin! 8itmus paper red$ Then upon bein! con&ronted with somethin! that tastes sour and turns 8itmus paper blue 'which by our own li!hts a!ain is incompatible with its bein! red(% we are committed to chan!in! our commitments$ )hether it is our nonin&erential di&&erential responsive dispositions% or our in&erential commitments that we ad1ust% the world"s immediacy has been incorporated into our concepts by this development$ )hat is required by our concepts is denominated necessary"% so what is here incorporated is also intelli!ible as the contingency o& the world$ 3nd it is the authority o& particulars over our universals that is thereby e0ercised by the 1ud!ements we &ind ourselves with immediately$
=/

Deco!nitive relations model the reciprocal dimensions o& authority in play here at two levels$ 2n the

one hand% the 4oncept stands to its constituent determinate empirical concepts as community to individual sel&$ 2n the other hand% the determinate empirical universal stands to the characteri-ed individual as community to sel&$ It is 1ud!ements that tie to!ether the two limbs o& this structure$ In &act this one process o& e0perience is -- not 1ust is modelled on -- the process by which self-conscious selves are synthesi-ed$ Selves in the normative sense introduced by 5ant are the loci o& responsibility &or sortin! out incompatibilities$ The transcendental unity o& apperception is what is responsible for 1ud!ements% its obli!ation to sort out incompatibilities amon! applications o& concepts bein! what ma*es them its 1ud!ements$ So it is misleadin! to thin* o& the mutual reco!nition synthesi-in! selves as available in principle in advance o& understandin! the in&erentially articulated reciprocal authority o& universals and particulars$ ,or !eneral reco!nition is an abstraction &rom speci&ic reco!nition% which

involves ne!otiatin! the potentially competin! authority o& particulars and universals$ That requirement constrains and ma*es determinate the content those who attribute a commitment administer$ The responsibility you and I have to ne!otiate the claims o& di&&erent authorities so as to eliminate incompatibilities between your empirical 1ud!ements and mine, while real% is in principle secondary to and derivative &rom the responsibility each o& us has to sort out incompatibilities amon! our own commitments$ '3lthou!h I cannot pursue the matter here% in the #erception section o& the Phenomenology, e!el develops an account o& ob!ects 'particulars( -- what our 1ud!ements are responsible to on the side o& particularity -- as units o& account &or the responsibilities tri!!ered by incompatibilities in a parallel &ashion$ To say that two colours are incompatible properties is to say that no one particular can e0hibit both% not that two di&&erent ob1ects cannot e0hibit them severally% 3nd it is in terms o& 1ust this &act that we are to draw boundaries around particulars$ 3 correspondin! dual condition applies to the individuation o& properties or concepts$( The sel&-conscious individual sel& is the sel& who e0erts speci&ic reco!nitive authority and is sub1ect to speci&ic reco!nitive responsibility% the sel& who underta*es and attributes determinately content&ul conceptual commitments by ma*in! 1ud!ements 'includin! assessments o& the 1ud!ements o& others($ )e understand the structure and unity o& such selves% and o& their communities% in terms o& reciprocal reco!nition$ 3nd it is in e0actly the same terms that we understand the structure and unity o& both the characteri-ed individuals that are the topics o& 'the most basic &orm o&( 1ud!ement% and the determinately content&ul concepts or universals that are applied in ma*in! those 1ud!ements$ This is e!el"s &undamental idealist thesis$
=6

F e!el SLG p$ /<=$ F e!el SLG p$ /<=$ 2nly includes" because it has other dimensions as well$ ,or instance% the 1ud!e has the authority to

=7

=<

sort the various respects o& similarity and dissimilarity between the &acts o& the present case and the &acts o& the previously decided cases% treatin! some as more important than others &or the issue o& whether the le!al concept in question should be applied or withheld to the present &acts$ This ma*es

some o& the prior cases already classi&ied as properly decided more% and others less% relevant to the decision in question$ That in turn a&&ects the authority o& prior applications o& in&erentially related concepts$
=@

5ant"s two-phase account would correspond to an insistence that every tradition o& common or case

law be !rounded in some prior statute$ This is a *ind o& intellectualism% which insists that behind every norm implicit in a practice there must be a norm e0plicit in a rule$ '#ra!matism is the converse o& intellectualism in this sense% insistin! that any sort o& e0plicit% theoretical *nowin! that have as its bac*!round some sort o& implicit practical *nowin! how.) The intellectualist thin*s that only if fully and finally determinate norms have already been instituted has any distinction between their correct and incorrect application been made available &or the ne0t phase$ e!el% the pra!matist% denies that any concepts are &ully and &inally determinate in this sense% that is% independently o& the actual course o& the practice o& applyin! them$ ,or e!e9"s purposes 'and mine( the details 'such as they are( o& 5ant"s account o& the institution or discovery o& conceptual norms in 1ud!ements o& re&lection doesn"t matter at all$ -ll that is important is the two-phase structure he envisa!es$
.A

e!el thin*s that because concepts acquire determinate content only as a result o& their role in such a

tradition o& bein! applied% their contents can only be presented or conveyed by o&&erin! a rationally reconstructed tra1ectory by which they mi!ht have developed$ This is what he does &or his most basic lo!ical concepts in both the Phenomenology and the Science of Logic. The proprieties that !overn the use o& the vocabulary e!el uses to ma*e e0plicit the wor*in!s o& ordinary concepts are conveyed by e0plorin! various misuses and misunderstandin!s% which while capturin! some o& the eventual content% still lead to discordant and incompatible commitments$ In ta*in! the e0planatory tac* that I do in this essay% I am implicitly disa!reein! that this procedure is necessary$ I thin* the lo!ical concepts are di&&erent &rom ordinary empirical concepts ' e!e9"s determinate" concepts(% since they !et their content &rom their e0plicitatin! role$ I thin* it is possible to bypass the rehearsal o& a path o& development o& their content and directly present the contents those concepts are ta*en to have at the

end o& e!e9"s two boo*s$ My strate!y here has been to use the model o& reciprocal reco!nition to do that$
.9

Thou!h the emphases are di&&erent in each o& the !reat systematic wor*s -more on the social and

historical dimensions in the Phenomenology, more on the in&erential in the Science of Logic -I thin* the whole three dimensional structure is present throu!hout$ The bi! test &or this readin! will be the sense it can ma*e o& e!el"s radically new construal o& the relation o& reciprocal authority 'and so responsibility( between sub1ect and ob1ect 'certainty and truth% what thin!s are for consciousness and what they are in themselves% concept and bein!(% which articulates the structure at once o& consciousness 'includin! the relation between spontaneity and receptivity% ma*in! and &indin!( and o& the Idea$ I thin* that we can learn a lot about this central relation by e0aminin! the interactions amon! the three dimensions o& reciprocal authority that I have e0amined here$ I hope to be able to tell this story on another occasion$