SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 159738. December 9, 2004] UNION MOTOR CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ALEJANDRO A. ETIS, respondents. DECISION CALLEJO, SR., J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Union Motor Corporation of the April 10, 2003 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 73602 which affirmed the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) holding that respondent Alejandro A. Etis was illegally dismissed from his employment. On October 23, 1993, the respondent was hired by the petitioner as an automotive mechanic at the service department in the latters Paco Branch. In 1994, he was transferred to the Caloocan City Branch, where his latest monthly salary wasP6,330.00. During his employment, he was awarded the Top Technician for the month of May in 1995 and Technician of the Year (1995). He also became a member of the Exclusive P40,000.00 Club and received the Model Employee Award in the same year.

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On September 22, 1997, the respondent made a phone call to Rosita dela Cruz, the company nurse, and informed her that he had to take a sick leave as he had a painful and unbearable toothache. The next day, he again phoned Dela Cruz and told her that he could not report for work because he still had to consult a doctor. Finding that the respondents ailment was due to a tooth inflammation, the doctor referred him to a dentist for further management.[2] Dr. Rodolfo Pamor, a dentist, then scheduled the respondents tooth extraction on September 27, 1997, hoping that, by that time, the inflammation would have subsided. Upon instructions from the management, Mr. Dumagan, a company security guard, visited the respondent in his house on September 24, 1997 and confirmed that the latter was ill. On September 27, 1997, Dr. Pamor rescheduled the respondents tooth extraction on October 4, 1997 because the inflammation had not yet subsided and recommended that he rest. Thus, the respondent was not able to report for work due to the painful and unbearable toothache. On October 2, 1997, the petitioner issued an Inter Office Memorandum[3] through Angelo B. Nicolas, the manager of its Human Resources Department, terminating the services of the respondent for having incurred more than five (5) consecutive absences without proper notification. The petitioner considered the consecutive absences of the respondent as abandonment of office under Section 6.1.1, Article III of the Company Rules.

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On October 4, 1997, Dr. Pamor successfully extracted the respondents tooth. As soon as he had recovered, the respondent reported for work, but was denied entry into the companys premises. He was also informed that his employment had already been terminated. The respondent sought help from the union which, in turn, included his grievance in the arbitration before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). Pending the resolution thereof, the respondent wrote to the petitioner asking for the reconsideration of his dismissal,[4] which was denied. Sometime thereafter, the unions complaints were dismissed by the NCMB. Left with no other recourse, the respondent filed, on May 18, 1999, a complaint for illegal dismissal before the arbitration branch of the NLRC against the petitioner and/or Benito Cua, docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-05-05691-99.[5] The respondent alleged that he was dismissed from his employment without just and legal basis. For its part, the petitioner averred that his dismissal was justified by his ten (10) unauthorized absences. It posited that, under Article 282 of the Labor Code, an employees gross and habitual neglect of his duties is a just cause for termination. It further alleged that the respondents repetitive and habitual acts of being absent without notification constituted nothing less than abandonment, which is a form of neglect of duties.[6] On October 19, 2000, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint. The Labor Arbiter ruled that the respondents failure to report for work for ten (10) days

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without an approved leave of absence was equivalent to gross neglect of duty, and that his claim that he had been absent due to severe toothache leading to a tooth extraction was unsubstantiated. The Labor Arbiter stressed that unnotarized medical certificates were self-serving and had no probative weight. Aggrieved, the respondent appealed the decision to the NLRC, docketed as NLRC NCR CA No. 027002-01. He alleged therein that I THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT. II THERE ARE SERIOUS ERRORS IN THE FINDINGS OF FACTS WHICH WOULD CAUSE GRAVE OR IRREPARABLE DAMAGE OR INJURY TO HEREIN COMPLAINANT.[7] On November 29, 2001, the NLRC issued a Resolution reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The dispositive portion of the resolution reads: WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated October 19, 2000 is SET ASIDE and REVERSED. Accordingly, the respondentappellee is hereby ordered to immediately reinstate complainant to his former position without loss of seniority rights and other benefits and payment of his full backwages
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from the time of his actual dismissal up to the time of his reinstatement. All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.[8] The NLRC upheld the claim of the respondent that his successive absences due to severe toothache was known to management. It ruled that the medical certificates issued by the doctor and dentist who attended to the respondent substantiated the latters medical problem. It also declared that the lack of notarization of the said certificates was not a valid justification for their rejection as evidence. The NLRC declared that the respondents absence for ten (10) consecutive days could not be classified as gross and habitual neglect of duty under Article 282 of the Labor Code. The NLRC resolved to deny the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner, per its Resolution[9] dated August 26, 2002. The petitioner, thereafter, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 73602. It raised the following issues: Whether or not the public respondent gravely abused it[s] discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in reversing the decision of the labor arbiter a quo and finding that private respondent Alejandro A. Etis was illegally dismissed. Whether or not public respondent gravely abused its discretion in reinstating private respondent Alejandro A. Etis to his former

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position without loss of seniority rights and awarding him full backwages.[10] In its Decision[11] dated April 10, 2003, the CA affirmed in toto the November 29, 2001 Resolution of the NLRC. The CA agreed with the ruling of the NLRC that medical certificates need not be notarized in order to be admitted in evidence and accorded full probative weight. It held that the medical certificates which bore the names and licenses of the doctor and the dentist who attended to the respondent adequately substantiated the latters illness, as well as the tooth extraction procedure performed on him by the dentist. The CA concluded that since the respondents absences were substantiated, the petitioners termination of his employment was without legal and factual basis. The CA similarly pointed out that even if the ten-day absence of the respondent was unauthorized, the same was not equivalent to gross and habitual neglect of duty. The CA took into consideration the respondents unblemished service, from 1993 up to the time of his dismissal, and the latters proven dedication to his job evidenced by no less than the following awards: Top Technician of the Year (1995), Member of the Exclusive P40,000.00 Club, and Model Employee of the Year (1995). The motion for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied by the appellate court. Hence, the petition at bar. The petitioner raises the following issues for the Courts resolution:

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I WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GIVING MUCH EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT TO THE MEDICAL CERTIFICATES SUBMITTED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
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WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED.[12] As had been enunciated in numerous cases, the issues that can be delved with in a petition for review under Rule 45 are limited to questions of law. The Court is not tasked to calibrate and assess the probative weight of evidence adduced by the parties during trial all over again.[13] Well-established is the principle that findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, like the NLRC, are accorded with respect, even finality, if supported by substantial evidence.[14] However, if, as in this case, the findings of the Labor Arbiter clash with those of the NLRC and CA, this Court is compelled to go over the records of the case, as well as the submissions of the parties, and resolve the factual issues. The petitioner avers that the respondents absences were unauthorized, and that the latter failed to notify the petitioner in writing of such absences, the reasons therefor, and his (respondents) whereabouts as prescribed by the company rules. The petitioner avers that its security guard caught the respondent at home, fit to work. The petitioner further asserts

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that it was justified in dismissing the respondent under Section 6.1.1, Article III of the Company Rules which reads: An employee who commits unauthorized absences continuously for five (5) consecutive working days without notice shall be considered as having abandoned his job and shall be terminated for cause with applicable laws. The petitioner contends that the respondents dismissal was also justified under Article 282(b) of the Labor Code, which provides that an employer may dismiss an employee due to gross and habitual neglect of his duties. The contention of the petitioner has no merit. The NLRC ruled that the respondent notified the petitioner of his illness through the company nurse, and that the petitioner even dispatched a security guard to the respondents house to ascertain the reason of his absences, thus: The termination by respondent-appellee of complainants service despite knowledge of complainants ailment, as shown by the telephone calls made by the latter to the company nurse and the actual confirmation made by respondents company guard, who personally visited complainants residence, clearly establishes the illegality of complainants dismissal. The documentary testimonies of the nurse, Miss Rosita dela Cruz, regarding complainants telephone calls and the confirmation made by respondents security guard, Mr. Dumagan, are evidentiary matters which are relevant and material and must be considered to the fullest by the Labor Arbiter a quo. These
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circumstantial facts were miserably set aside by the Labor Arbiter a quo wherein he concluded that complainant committed gross neglect of duty on alleged continued absences is to our mind, not fully substantiated and ought not be given credence by this Commission. Time and again, this Tribunal impresses that, in labor proceedings, in case of doubt, the doubt must be reasonably in favor of labor. Maybe doubts hang in this case but these doubts must be resolved in favor of labor as mandated by law and our jurisprudence. From the facts of this case, it is only but reasonable to conclude that complainants service was, indeed, terminated without legal or valid cause. Where the law protects the right of employer to validly exercise management prerogative such as to terminate the services of an employee, such exercise must be with legal cause as enumerated in Article 282 of the Labor Code or by authorized cause as defined in Article 283 of the Labor Code.[15] The CA affirmed the findings of facts of the NLRC. We agree with the rulings of the NLRC and the CA. We note that the company rules do not require that the notice of an employees absence and the reasons therefor be in writing and for such notice to be given to any specific office and/or employee of the petitioner. Hence, the notice may be verbal; it is enough then that an officer or employee of the petitioner, competent and responsible enough to receive such notice for and in behalf of the petitioner, was informed of such absence and the corresponding reason. The evidence on record shows that the respondent informed the petitioner of his illness through the company nurse. The

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security guard who was dispatched by the petitioner to verify the information received by the company nurse, confirmed the respondents illness. We find and so hold that the respondent complied with the requisite of giving notice of his illness and the reason for his absences to the petitioner. We reject the petitioners contention that the medical certificates adduced in evidence by the respondent to prove (a) his illness, the nature and the duration of the procedures performed by the dentist on him; and (b) the period during which he was incapacitated to work are inadmissible in evidence and barren of probative weight simply because they were not notarized, and the medical certificate dated September 23, 1997 was not written on paper bearing the dentists letterhead. Neither do we agree with the petitioners argument that even assuming that the respondent was ill and had been advised by his dentist to rest, the same does not appear on the medical certificate dated September 23, 1997; hence, it behooved the respondent to report for work on September 23, 1997. The ruling of the Court in Maligsa v. Atty. Cabanting[16] is not applicable in this case. It bears stressing that the petitioner made the same arguments in the NLRC and the CA, and both tribunals ruled as follows: First, We concur with the ratiocination of respondent NLRC when it ruled that a medical certificate need not be notarized, to quote:

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xxx. He was dismissed by reason of the fact that the Medical Certificate submitted by the complainant should not be given credence for not being notarized and that no affidavit was submitted by the nurse to prove that the complainant, indeed, called the respondents office by telephone. After full scrutiny and judicious evaluation of the records of this case, We find the appeal to be meritorious. Regrettably, the Labor Arbiter a quo clearly failed to appreciate complainants pieces of evidence. Nowhere in our jurisprudence requires that all medical certificates be notarized to be accepted as a valid evidence. In this case, there is [neither] difficulty nor an obstacle to claim that the medical certificates presented by complainant are genuine and authentic. Indeed, the physician and the dentist who examined the complainant, aside from their respective letterheads, had written their respective license numbers below their names and signatures. These facts have not been impugned nor rebutted by respondent-appellee throughout the proceedings of his case. Common sense dictates that an ordinary worker does not need to have these medical certificates to be notarized for proper presentation to his company to prove his ailment; hence, the Labor Arbiter a quo, in cognizance with the liberality and the appreciation on the rules on evidence, must not negate the acceptance of these medical certificates as valid pieces of evidence. We believe, as we ought to hold, that the medical certificates can prove clearly and convincingly the complainants allegation that he consulted a physician because of tooth inflammation on September 23, 1997 and a dentist who later advised him to

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rest and, thus, clinically extended his tooth extraction due to severe pain and inflammation. Admittingly, it was only on October 4, 1997 that complainants tooth was finally extracted.
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From these disquisitions, it is clear that the absences of private respondent are justifiable.[17] We agree with the NLRC and the appellate court. In light of the findings of facts of the NLRC and the CA, the petitioner cannot find solace in the ruling of this Court in Maligsa v. Atty. Cabantnig.[18] While the records do not reveal that the respondent filed the required leave of absence for the period during which he suffered from a toothache, he immediately reported for work upon recovery, armed with medical certificates to attest to the cause of his absence. The respondent could not have anticipated the cause of his illness, thus, to require prior approval would be unreasonable.[19] While it is true that the petitioner had objected to the veracity of the medical certificates because of lack of notarization, it has been said that verification of documents is not necessary in order that the said documents could be considered as substantial evidence.[20] The medical certificates were properly signed by the physicians; hence, they bear all the earmarks of regularity in their issuance and are entitled to full probative weight.[21]

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The petitioner, likewise, failed to prove the factual basis for its dismissal of the respondent on the ground of gross and habitual negligence under Article 282(b) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, or even under Section 6.1.1, Rule III of the Company Rules. Dismissal is the ultimate penalty that can be meted to an employee. Thus, it must be based on just cause and must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.[22] To effect a valid dismissal, the law requires not only that there be just and valid cause for termination; it, likewise, enjoins the employer to afford the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.[23] Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes for the termination of employment by the employer: ART. 282. TERMINATION BY EMPLOYER An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes: (a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work; (b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties. To warrant removal from service, the negligence should not merely be gross but also habitual. Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid

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them.[24] The petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the respondent had willfully disobeyed the company rules and regulation. The petitioner also failed to prove that the respondent abandoned his job. The bare fact that the respondent incurred excusable and unavoidable absences does not amount to an abandonment of his employment. The petitioners claim of gross and habitual neglect of duty pales in comparison to the respondents unblemished record. The respondent did not incur any intermittent absences. His only recorded absence was the consecutive tenday unauthorized absence, albeit due to painful and unbearable toothache. The petitioners claim that the respondent had manifested poor work attitude was belied by its own recognition of the respondents dedication to his job as evidenced by the latters awards: Top Technician of the Year (1995), Member of the Exclusive P40,000.00 Club, and Model Employee of the Year (1995). IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73602 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Puno, (Chairman), Nazario, JJ., concur. Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and ChicoPage

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FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 200792 November 14, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. NEIL B. COLORADO, Accused-Appellant.

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DECISION REYES, J.: For the Court's review is the Decision1 dated August 19,2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03767, which affirmed with modification the Decision2 dated June 19, 2008 in Criminal Case No. 8-390 of the Regional Trial Court ( RTC), Burgos, Pangasinan, Branch 70 finding herein accused-appellant Neil B. Colorado (Colorado) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. The Facts Accused-appellant Colorado was charged with the crime of rape in an Information that reads: That sometime in December, 2002 in the evening in Sitio x x x, Brgy. Iliw-Iliw, Burgos, Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the brother of AAA,3 inside their house, by means of force, threats and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with AAA, a

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twelve (12) years (sic) old girl, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.4 Colorado pleaded "not guilty" upon arraignment. During the pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the following: (1) the existence of the Medico Legal Certificate and the Birth Certificate of AAA; (2) that Colorado is a full-blood brother of AAA; and (3) that Colorado and AAA lived under the same roof.5 After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. Records indicate that AAA was born on October 10, 1990. She was the second to the youngest in a family of twelve siblings. Colorado was an older brother who lived with her, their parents and two other brothers, BBB and CCC, in Burgos, Pangasinan. AAA testified that sometime in December 2002, her parents attended a wedding celebration somewhere in Hermosa, Dasol, Pangasinan, leaving behind AAA, Colorado and their two other brothers in the house. When their parents had not yet arrived in the evening, Colorado committed the dastardly act against AAA. She was twelve (12) years old at that time, while Colorado was already twenty-four (24) years old. He approached AAA, held her two hands, even threatened her with a knife and covered her mouth with a handkerchief. He then removed AAAs shorts and panty, inserted his penis into the young girls vagina, then made a push and pull movement. AAA tried to resist her brothers sexual aggression, but miserably failed despite her efforts because of her brothers greater strength. Colorado later left AAA, who put back her shorts and

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underwear, but remained awake because of fear and trauma with what she had gone through. On that same night, Colorado raped AAA twice more, unmindful of the presence of their two other brothers who were then sleeping inside the room where Colorado ravished AAA. In both instances, Colorado still threatened AAA with a knife, removed her shorts and panty, inserted his penis into his sisters vagina, then performed the push and pull movement. Colorado warned AAA that he would stab her should she report to anyone what he had done. AAA then did not dare reveal these incidents to anybody, until she had the courage to report them to their mother. Also in her testimony before the trial court, AAA disclosed that she had been raped by Colorado when she was just nine (9) years old. She also revealed having been ravished on different dates by another brother, DDD, and a brother-in-law. A Medico-Legal Certificate6 prepared by Dr. Ma. Teresa Sanchez (Dr. Sanchez), Medical Officer III of the Western Pangasinan District Hospital who examined AAA on January 10, 2003, contained the following findings: =INTERNAL EXAM FINDINGS: -Nonparous Introitus-Hymenal laceration at 6 oclock position with bleeding-Vagina admits 2 fingers with slight resistance-

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-Uterus small-(+) bleedingx x x x7 Colorado testified for his defense. He denied having raped AAA, arguing that he was not living with AAA in their parents house in December 2002. Allegedly, he was at that time staying with an older sister in Osmea, Dasol. Colorado claimed that on the night of the alleged incident, he was fishing with his brother-inlaw, and that they returned to Osmea, Dasol in the morning of the following day. The Ruling of the RTC On June 19, 2008, the RTC rendered its decision finding Colorado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to pay AAA the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P75,000.00 as civil indemnity. The dispositive portion of its decision reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds accused NEIL B. COLORADO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. In view of the enactment of Republic Act [No.] 9346 prohibiting the imposition of death penalty this Court sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.

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Further, accused shall indemnify [AAA] the amount of Php 50,000.00 as moral damages and Php 75,000.00 as civil indemnity. (People vs. Ambray, 303 SCRA 709). SO ORDERED.8 Feeling aggrieved, Colorado appealed from the RTCs decision to the CA, reiterating in his appeal the defenses of denial and alibi. He further sought his acquittal by arguing that the hymenal lacerations discovered by AAAs examining doctor, and considered by the trial court in determining his culpability, could have been caused not by him, but by the sexual aggressions committed by their brother DDD or their brotherin-law unto AAA. The Ruling of the CA The CA affirmed Colorados conviction, but modified his civil liability. The decretal portion of its Decision dated August 19, 2011 reads: WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Burgos, Pangasinan (Branch 70), dated 19 June 2008, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that, in addition to the civil indemnity of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00), appellant is ordered to pay the victim moral damages of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) instead of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), and to pay exemplary damages of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00). SO ORDERED.9

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Hence, this appeal. Both Colorado and the Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for plaintiff-appellee People of the Philippines, dispensed with the filing with the Court of supplemental briefs, and adopted instead their respective briefs with the CA.

The appeal lacks merit. Colorado was charged with the crime of rape, qualified by the victims minority and her relationship to her ravisher, as defined and penalized under Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as follows: Art. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed: 1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a. Through force, threat or intimidation; b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

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This Courts Ruling

xxxx Art. 266-B. Penalties. x x x. xxxx The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances: 1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; xxxx Both the RTC and the CA correctly ruled on the concurrence of the following elements of qualified rape, as defined in the aforequoted provisions of the RPC: (1) that the victim is a female over 12 years but under 18 years of age; (2) that the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian or relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; and (3) that the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim either through force, threat or intimidation; or when she is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or by means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority.10 The age of the victim at the time of the crimes commission is undisputed. During the pre-trial, the parties agreed on the existence of AAAs Certificate of Live Birth,11 a "certified

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As to the second element, there is no dispute that Colorado is a full-blood brother of AAA, as this was also among the parties stipulated facts during the cases pre-trial. The grounds now being raised by Colorado to justify his exoneration delve mainly on the alleged absence of the crimes third element. He denies AAAs claim that he had ravished her, raising the defense of alibi and the alleged doubt and suspicion that should be ascribed to AAAs accusations. On this matter, settled is the rule that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of a witness deserve great weight, given the clear advantage of a trial judge in the appreciation of testimonial evidence. We have repeatedly recognized that the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These are significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses, in the process of unearthing the truth. The rule finds even more stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the CA. Thus, except for compelling reasons, we are doctrinally bound by the trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses.13

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true/xerox copy" of which forms part of the records and provides that AAA was born on October 10, 1990. AAA was then only 12 years old in December 2002, a significant fact that was sufficiently alleged in the Information. In People v. Pruna,12 we held that the best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.

We then take due consideration of the trial courts findings of fact, its assessment of AAAs credibility, her testimony and the manner by which her statements were relayed, as discussed in the RTCs Decision convicting Colorado and which reads in part: AAA testified directly and categorically how she was raped by the accused Neil Colorado who is her full-blood brother sometime in the night of December 2002. That while AAA was sleeping with her older brother BBB and her younger brother CCC, accused went near her and held her two (2) hands, covered her mouth with handkerchief. Thereafter, accused removed her short pants and underwear, and inserted his penis into her vagina. After removing his penis, accused went back to sleep. AAA however could no longer sleep because she was already afraid that the accused will return which the accused did. For the second time, accused raped AAA. Accused covered her mouth with a handkerchief, inserted his penis into her vagina and accused did the push and pull movement. xxxx When AAA declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that would be necessary to show that rape did take place (PP. vs. Maglantay, 304 SCRA 272), for as long as the testimony of AAA is free from serious or major incongruence and unbridled by suspicion or doubt. The testimony of AAA is simple, candid, straightforward and consistent on material points detailing every single bestial act of her brother in

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ravishing her. Moreover, AAA on several occasions (August 1, 2006 and September 19, 2006) was on the verge of crying and in fact shed tears during her direct examination. Crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of the rape charge with the verity born out of human nature and experience (PP. vs. Agustin, 365 SCRA 167; PP vs. Garcia, supra). Though a medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of rape (PP. vs. Bares, 355 SCRA 435), but when the victims testimony is corroborated by the physicians findings of penetration (Exh. "A") or hymenal laceration as when the hymen is no longer intact, there is sufficient foundation to find the existence of the essential requisite of carnal knowledge (PP. vs. Montejo, 355 SCRA 210; PP. vs. Bation, 305 SCRA 253). Further, no young and decent woman in her right mind especially of tender age as that of AAA who is fifteen (15) years old would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by her desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her. (PP. vs. Albior, 352 SCRA 35; PP. vs. Vidal, 353 SCRA 194)14 (Emphasis ours) These observations were affirmed by the CA on appeal, as it held: A conscientious review of the records shows that AAAs testimonies in this case bear the marks of truthfulness, spontaneity and sincerity. She was crying while answering questions about the rape incident. Obviously, the process called to her mind not only the mere details of the sexual abuse but

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the lingering hurt and pain that come with it. Her tears were unimpeachable testaments to the truth of her allegations. xxxx During cross-examination, AAA remained steadfast, unwavering and spontaneous. Significantly also, her testimony is supported by the medical evidence on record, which showed that she had a laceration in her hymen and was thus in a non-virgin state.15 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours) The Court finds no cogent reasons to overturn these findings. Indeed, it was established that Colorado succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the victim, employing force, threat and intimidation that allowed him to consummate his bestial act. AAA had positively identified Colorado as her rapist. Such identification of Colorado could not have been difficult for AAA considering that Colorado was a brother who lived with her in their parents house. Even the failure of AAA to identify the exact date of the crimes commission is inconsequential to Colorados conviction. In rape cases, the date of commission is not an essential element of the offense; what is material is its occurrence,16a fact that was sufficiently established given AAAs and her testimonys credibility. Contrary to Colorados contention, AAAs claim that two other siblings were sleeping in the same room where she was raped did not render her statements incredible. Time and again, we have taken into consideration how rapists are not deterred by the presence of people nearby, such as the members of their

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own family inside the same room, with the likelihood of being discovered, since lust respects no time, locale or circumstance.17 As against AAAs credible testimony, Colorados defenses lack persuasion.1wphi1 While Colorado denied in his testimony that he lived with AAA, such fact was already admitted by the parties during the pre-trial. His defense that he was in Osmea, Dasol at the time of the crimes commission was even uncorroborated by any other witness. By jurisprudence, denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. Mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the child-victim of the identity of the appellant and his involvement in the crime attributed to him.18 Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, two requisites must concur: first, the appellant was at a different place at the time the crime was committed; and second, it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time of its commission.19 The defense failed to establish these requisites. On the contrary, Colorado testified that from Osmea, where he claimed to have lived with an older sister, he could normally reach his parents house by a three-hour walk. There were also other means of transportation in these two places,20 which then could have allowed Colorado to travel the distance over a shorter period of time. Colorado also questions the weight of Dr. Sanchezs medicolegal certificate, arguing that AAAs hymenal lacerations could

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have resulted from the sexual aggressions allegedly committed against her by DDD and their brother-in-law. Such contention, however, deserves no consideration, given that results of an offended partys medical examination are merely corroborative in character. As explained by the Court in People v. Balonzo,21 a medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of rape, as even a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Expert testimony is merely corroborative in character and not essential to conviction. An accused can still be convicted of rape on the basis of the sole testimony of the private 22 complainant. Furthermore, laceration of the hymen, even if considered the most telling and irrefutable physical evidence of sexual assault, is not always essential to establish the consummation of the crime of rape. In the context that is used in the RPC, "carnal knowledge," unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured.23 Thus, even granting that AAAs lacerations were not caused by Colorado, the latter could still be declared guilty of rape, after it was established that he succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the victim. Given the foregoing, the CA did not err in affirming the trial court's conviction of Colorado. The crime is qualified by the victim's minority and her relationship to Colorado, yet the appellate court correctly explained that the imposable penalty is reclusion pe1petua, in lieu of death, taking into account the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346 that prohibit the

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WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated August 19, 2011 of the Com1 of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03767 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accusedappellant Neil B. Colorado is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion pe1petua, without eligibility for parole. The accused is likewise ordered to pay legal interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% from the date of finality of this Decision until fully satisfied. SO ORDERED. BIENVENIDO L. REYES Associate Justice

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imposition of death penalty in criminal cases. We however clarify that Colorado shall be ineligible for parole, a requirement under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346 that was not mentioned in the assailed CA decision and which, must then be rectified by this Decision.24 The civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages, as modified and awarded by the CA, conform to prevailing jurisprudence.