JONATHAN HAAS: A BIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

James A. Davenport ANTH574: The History and Theory of Archaeology October 17th, 2011

DO NOT CITE IN ANY CONTEXT WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR

James A. Davenport, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM 87131 (jdavenp@unm.edu)

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The work of Dr. Jonathan Haas, MacArthur Curator of the Department of Anthropology at the Field Museum in Chicago, Illinois and an adjunct professor at the University of Illinois at Chicago, has been important in the definition of state-level societies and the factors that led to their creation. Haas has devoted much of his time and work to addressing the issue of determining what a state-level society is, how it evolves, and what factors contribute to the endogenous emergence of a hierarchical stratified cultural system under pristine conditions (Haas and Creamer 2006:746). Jonathan Haas received his B.A. from the University of Arizona in 1970, and several advanced degrees from Columbia University, including his M.A. (1974), M.Phil. (1976), and Ph.D. (1979) (Haas 1996:S1). While at Columbia, he worked on a graduate paper for a class on the topic of the evolution of the Olmec state, which grew into a larger paper on power and stratification that eventually became his dissertation and later, his 1982 volume (Haas 1982:ix).

THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATE It is important to note that Jonathan Haas, in his evaluation of the evolution of the prehistoric state, specifically analyzes Elman Services classifications for different levels of complexity: band, tribe, chiefdom, and state (Haas 1981:82, Haas 1982:20, Haas and Creamer 2006:745-746). Haas attempts to reanalyze the level of complexity for the world areas that Service considers (Haas 1981:82), specifically to determine if any of these areas achieved a state-level society. In Haas and Creamers 2006 article, Services four-level system is related to music: from Beethovens Fr Elise, a piece written for a piano, progressing all the way to his opera Fidelio, each increases in complexity, number of people necessary, and eventually requires a conductor or leader to organize it. Still, Haas and Creamer argue that in no way does this

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evolutionary development of more complex cultural systems represent progress, going from poor to rich or good to better, just as Fidelio does not represent progress over Fr Elise (2006:747). In accepting a definition of the term state, Haas recognizes the problems in simply accepting what others have called states, citing differences in nomenclature and conventions. Haas restricts his analysis to the earliest periods where state development occurs, postulating that if the conditions are pristine, as Morton Fried describes (1960), any development of complexity will be endogenous (Haas 1981:83, Haas and Creamer 2006:747, Haas 2001a:9-10, Haas et. al. 1987). Eventually, he determines that there are two opposing views that could allow for how state level societies emerge: through conflict or through integration (Haas 1982, 1981:80). The conflict position suggests that the state developed primarily as a coercive mechanism to resolve internal conflict that arises between economically stratified classes within a society (Haas 1981:80) while the integration position argues that the state developed as an integrative mechanism to coordinate and regulate the different parts of societies, (Haas 1981:80) that the idea of the state serves as an organizational mechanism of government that benefits a society.

CONFLICT AND THE STATE The conflict position for the rise of state-level society essentially posits that the state came about to address conflict between different classes that arise from an uneven economic distribution and division of labor. This idea has its roots in the philosophy of Karl Marx and Frederich Engels (Haas 1982:36-38). Stratification begins with increased agricultural capacity and the resulting surplus, which in turn leads to a division of labor. This division of labor causes centralized control over production and in turn leads to an uneven distribution of wealth, which

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is the source point for internal conflict. Based on Henry Morgans idea that societies are initially based solely upon kinship but evolve into being based upon sodalities, often territorial (Haas 1982:34), Engels model (1972) posits that the conflict between different stratified groups is suppressed openly by a third, separate group, a state-level government-like organization, which instead of resolving this conflict in an impartial way serves only the needs of the rich at cost to the poor (Haas 1982:37). V. Gordon Childe was one of the first archaeologists to attempt to test this theory using archaeological data in his analysis of the emergence of ancient civilization in Europe and the Near East (Haas 1982:39). By noting an uneven and restricted distribution of luxury goods in structures usually reserved for the elite or religious such as palaces, temples, and tombs, Childe argues that the state arose to address intrasociety conflict resulting from the division of labor and the concentration of the economic surplus in the hands of a theocratic ruling class, (Haas 1982:41) and that the surplus was not used to benefit all members of society. This control by the government could be manifested in the application of centralized force (Haas 1981:82,95).

INTEGRATION AND THE STATE In contrast to the conflict position, the integration position states that the state developed as a mechanism to organize and regulate different parts of societies. It draws from the work of Herbert Spencer, who compares society to a biological organism in that both are made of separate yet specialized and interdependent parts that work together for the survival of the whole, and further argues that the initial emergence of endogenous government was an adaptative response to the pressures inherent in a condition of regularized warfare (Haas 1982:60). Haas writes at length about the emergence of warfare and its role in complexity (Haas 2001c, Haas and

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Creamer 1997). Under threat of constant warfare, smaller groups would have banded together for mutual benefit in larger numbers and greater organization, under the initial leadership and agency of skilled warriors (though this skill may later be replaced by hereditary secession as this leadership cemented into a permanent institution). Economic benefits followed the military benefits, as a central governing institution provided more organization and made possible a division of labor. Emile Durkheim, however, argued that increased production was not a cause of division of labor in society, but a byproduct. Durkheim states that increased population size and density led to new conditions for a society to live and exist within, and these new conditions led to rivalry and disunity, which in turn created a division of labor as a vehicle to increase social solidarity and to maintain a peaceful coexistence within a society, with increased production as only a coincidental result of this division (Haas 1982:68). In Durkheims model, the government does not serve to resolve conflict but to be a directive force that represents the collective conscience or will of the people (Haas 1962:69). Another idea of integration is that the state began when one group subjugates another. Building on the ideas of Ludwig Gumplowicz and Franz Oppenheimer (who are referred to as conquest theorists for this idea), the newfound responsibility of having a lower class or group of subjects to govern creates a state institution as a means of social control (Haas 1982:63-64).

CONFLICT AND INTEGRATION The conflict and integration positions are thus opposed at the basic level of a chicken or the egg causality dilemma. The conflict position argues that state-level government grows out of a division of labor and an unequal distribution of wealth, while the integration position argues that state-level government arose as a mechanism for coping with stress or duress, and that a

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division of labor and unequal distribution of wealth and resources were a consequence of the increased organization this new government offered. This idea of conflict or integration as an origin for state-level complexity is examined (albeit in an unsatisfactory manner according to Haas) by Elman Service, a proponent of the integration position for the rise of state-level complexity, who tests six major world areas known for being loci of state-level society against the conflict model. Service believes that for the conflict model to be true, societies would archaeologically exhibit evidence for differential access to resources and internal conflict and the application of force (Haas 1981:83, 1982:86). Ultimately, Service concludes that these archaeological examples do not provide adequate evidence to support the conflict model, and therefore assumes it to be false the integration model to be correct. Haas (1981, 1982) reexamines Services conclusions and dismissal of the conflict model. Though in Morton Frieds (1967) writings there is a dismissal of the creation of a uniform list of basic resources that applies to all culture, Haas nevertheless believes that differential access to resources can be examined through the lens of the basic categories of food, tools, and protective devices. Haas writes that though there are cross-cultural similarities in trajectories towards increased centralization throughout the world, there are many different routes societies take in following that trajectory (Haas 2001b:235). Haas further argues that though stratification can be inferred based on an unequal access to just one resource, a pattern of differential access should be present, as stratified societies should exhibit unequal access to many resources and not just one isolated occurrence (Haas 1982:93). Haas provides archaeological evidence of differential access to food, citing a comparison between dentition of rulers and sacrificial victims

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in Chinese Shang tombs (Haas 1982:95) and strontium level analysis of different skeletons found at Chalcatzingo (Haas 1982:96, 1981:86). For tools, Haas cites the Moche city of Pampa Grande, where the elite residences had no production tools but in lower status residences, tools are a regular occurrence (Haas 1981:88), inferring that the elites at the site did not have to work to obtain their food, while the lower status persons needed to use the tools to produce and prepare their own food. For protective resources, Haas cites weaponry found in tombs, settlement patterns and fortifications in Shang China (Haas 1982:100,104). This is not an exhaustive list of Haass archaeological examples, as he provides many more from different world areas where state-level society is believed to have developed. Haas also believes that in a state-level society, for the conflict model to be validated, there will be archaeological evidence of internal conflict and the application of force. He believes that internal conflict will be manifested archaeologically in the following ways: a geographical separation between residential areas of different classes; the presence of defensive mechanisms in place for the residence of the elite, ruling or higher status class; and signs of possible rebellion by the lower class, such as violent internal measures to depose the elite group (differentiated from conquest by the lack of foreign elements and the destruction or abandonment without replacement of elite residences) (Haas 1981:91). Haas again provides archaeological examples of these elements, referencing again Pampa Grande and its separation of fortification of the elite residential areas (1981:92) as well as the apparent abandonment of the construction of a defensive structure around elite residences at the site of La Venta in Veracruz as a possible revolt of the laborers (likely the lower classes) against the higher status group (1981:94). For the application of centralized force, Haas criticizes Service for not recognizing that coercive force

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is inevitably covariable with a strong centralized government that supplies essential goods and services to a dependent population (Haas 1981:95). Citing contact-period Hawaii, Haas argues that the paramount chiefs used control over economic and environmental resources in many different ways, including for personal gain (the subsidization of craftsmen or employment of litter bearers, or an altogether increased consumption of luxury goods). With this power came the responsibility of justly distributing resources to keep the population content, but the chiefs also used their environmental control of land and water resources to deny access to subsistence for individuals who did not follow instructions, contribute labor, produce sufficient resources, or individuals who withheld resources from the state for personal gain (Haas 1981:98, Haas 1982:116).

THE NORTE CHICO More recently, Jonathan Haas has conducted field work in the north central coast of Peru (Shady et. al. 2001, Haas et. al. 2004, Haas and Creamer 2006). Haas considers the Late Archaic time period in this area to be an ideal laboratory for examining the nature of the endogenous emergence of a state-level society due to several factors: the conditions are,as Fried (1967) describes, a pristine situation; the appearance of large sites with monumental and ceremonial architecture endured for a long period of time; and the arise of these sites happened very quickly (Haas and Creamer 2006:746). A complex civilization in the north central coast, or Norte Chico, has long been known. Michael Moseley (1975) brought the area to attention with his idea concerning the maritime foundations of Andean civilization, though it is now thought that agriculture played a larger role than previously imagined (Haas and Creamer 2006:748). With the discovery and dating of the

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site of Caral, a major center (Shady et. al. 2001), Haas argues for state-level society based on an archaeological demonstration of key characteristics, such as a base of economical, physical, and ideological power (Haas et. al. 2004:42). The site of Caral is certainly argued to be one of the earliest examples of state-level society in the Western Hemisphere (Shady et. al. 2001), though Haas doubts the validity of the idea of Caral as a capital for a Late Archaic preceramic Norte Chico civilization, an idea championed by the Peruvian archaeologist Ruth Shady (Haas and Creamer 2006:751). Haas argues that Shadys definition of a state-level society is not specific enough, and her loosening of the restrictions to allow Caral to be classified as a state also allows a number of other societies in different world regions that are generally accepted as chiefdoms to be called states. Shady has also proposed the site of Caral as the earliest city in the Americas, though earlier radiocarbon dates have been found at other preceramic sites in the Norte Chico region (Haas and Creamer 2006:752). This disagreement was underscored and marred by a falling out between Jonathan Haas (and his wife, Winifred Creamer, an archaeologist at Northern Illinois University) and Ruth Shady (Atwood 2005) that included accusations of plagiarism and of academic imperialism. Shady continues to work at the site of Caral, while Haas and Creamer are currently involved in excavations in the nearby Pativilca and Fortaleza valleys in the north central coast of Peru.

CONCLUSION The contributions of Jonathan Haas to the field of archaeology in general are very important. Haass dissertation and subsequent publication of the same work (1982) was a groundbreaking study that helped clarify and define complexity, specifically at the state-level, and the indicators of it in the archaeological record. His challenge of Services dismissal of the conflict position

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was well-researched and presented, and his work on the coast of Peru has illuminated an ideal testing ground for these hypotheses of the rise of state-level complexity. Haas continues to make valuable contributions the archaeology with his ongoing work in the Norte Chico region of Peru and his continuing publications on complexity and warfare in archaeology.

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WORKS CITED Atwood, Roger 2005 A Monumental Feud. Archaeology 58(4):22-25.

Engels, Friedrich 1972 [1891] The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State. Translated by Eleanor Burke Leacock. International Publishers, New York.

Fried, Morton H. 1960 On the Evolution of Social Stratification and the State. In Culture in History: Essays in Honor of Paul Radin, edited by Stanley Diamond, pp 713-31. Columbia University Press, New York. 1967 The Evolution of Political Society: An Essay in Political Anthropology. Random House, New York.

Haas, Jonathan 1981 Class Conflict and the State in the New World. In The Transition to Statehood in the New World, edited by Grant D. Jones and Robert R. Kautz, pp 80-102. Cambridge University Press, New York. 1982 1996 The Evolution of the Prehistoric State. Columbia University Press: New York. Power, Objects, and a Voice for Anthropology. Current Anthropology 37:Supplemental.

2001a Cultural Evolution and Political Centralization. In From Leaders to Rulers, edited by Jonathan Haas, pp 3-18. Kluwer Academic, New York.

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2001b Nonlinear Paths of Political Centralization. In From Leaders to Rulers, edited by Jonathan Haas, pp 3-18. Kluwer Academic, New York. 2001c Warfare and the Evolution of Culture. In Archaeology at the Millennium: A Sourcebook, edited by Gary M. Feinman and T. Douglas Price, pp. 329-352. Kluwer Academic, New York.

Haas, Jonathan and Winifred Creamer 1997 Warfare among the Pueblos: Myth, History, and Ethnography. Ethnohistory 44(2): 235-261. 2006 Crucible of Andean Civilization: The Peruvian Coast from 3000 to 1800 BC. Current Anthropology 47(5):745-775.

Haas, Jonathan, Winifred Creamer and Alvaro Ruiz 2004 Power and the Emergence of Complex Polities in the Peruvian Preceramic. Archaeological Papers of the American Anthropological Association 14:37-52.

Haas, Jonathan, Sheila Pozorski, and Thomas Pozorski 1987 The Origins and Development of the Andean State. Cambridge University Press, New York.

Moseley, Michael E. 1975 The Maritime Foundations of Andean Civilization. Cummings Publishing Company, Menlo Park.

Shady, Ruth, Jonathan Haas, and Winifred Creamer

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2001

Dating Caral, a Preceramic Site in the Supe Valley of the Central Coast of Peru. Science 292:723-726.