Contention 1: Inherency

The U.S.-Mexico Trans-boundary agreement has been approved by all parties but the United States Congress
(Roberta, Reuters, U.S.-Mexico deal on expanded Gulf oil drilling still in limbo, 4- !-"#, $ttp%&&'''.reuters.com&article& ("#&(4& !&usa-mexico-oil-idUS) *(+G(,- ("#(4 !.

ampton 1!

More t$an a /ear after t$e United States and Mexico signed a muc$-lauded deal t$at 'ould remo0e obstacles to expanding deep'ater drilling for oil in t$e Gulf of Mexico, t$e agreement still $as not been finali1ed b/ t$e United States. 2$e dela/, for '$ic$ people close to t$e administration blame ,ongress '$ile Republicans in ,ongress blame t$e administration, is certain to be discussed '$en 3resident 4arac5 6bama 0isits Mexican 3resident 7nri8ue 3ena *ieto in Mexico ,it/ on 2$ursda/. Mexico immediatel/ ratified t$e pact in 9pril (" , but t$e United States $as so far been unable to pass a simpl/ 'orded, one-page la' to put t$e agreement into force. 2$e deal, formall/ 5no'n as t$e 2ransboundar/ :/drocarbons 9greement, pro0ides legal guidelines for deep'ater drilling in t$e ".; million acres (<((,((( $ectares. of t$e Gulf t$at straddle t$e U.S.-Mexico boundar/. =t is seen as t$e 5e/ to opening a ne' era of cooperation on oil production bet'een t$e t'o countries. Mexico>s state-o'ned oil compan/ 3emex needs tec$nolog/ and in0estment to boost its stagnant production, and U.S. companies are eager to $elp. ?2$e U.S. $as a real opportunit/ no' to put energ/ bac5 on t$e agenda 'it$ Mexico in a 'a/ t$at it reall/ $asn>t been able to be on t$e agenda for t$e last se0eral /ears,? said *eil 4ro'n, '$o 'or5ed on t$e issue during t$e last ,ongress as lead Republican international energ/ aide in t$e Senate. 4ut t$e final step of implementing t$e deal $as languis$ed. ?=>m not a'are of strong opposition to it. = t$in5 it>s been a little more inertia,? said @ason 4ordoff, a top energ/ official at t$e A$ite :ouse until @anuar/ '$o
no' runs ,olumbia Uni0ersit/>s ,enter on Global 7nerg/ 3olic/. =n t$e past se0eral 'ee5s, t$ere $a0e been some signs t$at t$e implementing legislation ma/ mo0e for'ard, but t$ere also could be ne' complications related to disclosure re8uirements. +79) ,6U)+ 637* 2:7 +66R 6il is critical for t$e Mexican econom/, pa/ing for a t$ird of t$e go0ernment>s budget. 4ut production pea5ed in ((4 at #.4 million barrels per da/ and $as slipped belo' .< million bpd. 37M7B sa/s it can re0i0e production 'it$ deep'ater 'ells in t$e Gulf, but needs

tec$nical and financial $elp. 2$e cross-border agreement 'ould be t$e first step to'ard Coint proCects for reser0oirs t$at cross t$e boundar/, pro0iding a 'a/ for 37M7B and ot$er oil companies to s$are production and creating a frame'or5 to sol0e disputes t$at could arise. ?Ait$out t$e agreement, it creates a barrier to in0estment,? said 7ri5 Melito, a director at t$e 9merican 3etroleum =nstitute, t$e oil industr/>s lobb/ group. 2$e agreement could $elp calm Mexico>s
fears about '$at is termed t$e ?popote? or drin5ing-stra' effect - fears t$at U.S. oil companies are going to drain reser0oirs t$at extend into Mexico>s side of t$e border, robbing Mexico of its s$are, said +a0id Gold'/n, a former State +epartment official '$o $elped launc$ negotiations. ?2$is $as been an urban m/t$ in Mexico for decades,? said Gold'/n, no' president of Gold'/n Global Strategies, a consulting firm. 3ena *ieto is 'or5ing to'ard reforms for 37M7B t$at 'ould allo' for more production and cooperation in proCects generall/ - a delicate issue in a countr/ '$ere 37M7B and oil are s/mbols of national pride. ?=f t$e/ can see some success $ere ('it$ t$e transboundar/ deal., t$at>s going to c$ange

t$e political con0ersation in Mexico,? Gold'/n said. Dailing to implement t$e deal, t$oug$, 'ould be a maCor setbac5 for U.S.-Mexico energ/ relations, former U.S. Senator Ric$ard )ugar 'arned in +ecember, in one of $is final reports as t$e top Republican on t$e Senate Doreign Relations ,ommittee before $e left ,ongress. *7A 2A=S2 =* 2:7 +79) 2o finali1e t$e deal, ,ongress needs to pass legislation t$at gi0es t$e =nterior +epartment t$e aut$orit/ it needs to implement t$e tec$nical aspects of t$e agreement. 4ut in t$e Senate last /ear, dissension o0er an unrelated )a' of t$e Sea treat/ and t$e $eated politics of t$e U.S. presidential election effecti0el/ put t$e deal on $old. =n t$e 'aning da/s of t$e last ,ongress,
+emocrats in t$e Senate t$oug$t t$e/ $ad found a 0e$icle to mo0e t$e bill, but t$e/ 'ere foiled b/ procedural obCections, said former Senator @eff 4ingaman, a +emocrat '$o at t$e time 'as t$e c$airman of t$e Senate 7nerg/ ,ommittee. 2$e administration $as sent its proposed

text to t$e Republican-led :ouse of Representati0es, '$ic$ is in fa0or of expanded oil drilling. )a'ma5ers from t'o :ouse committees, natural resources and foreign affairs, promptl/ crafted a bill . ?=t 'as t$e administration t$at failed
until fi0e 'ee5s ago to gi0e us t$e guidance t$at 'e needed to implement t$e language,? said +oug )amborn, a Republican congressman from ,olorado, at a :ouse natural resources $earing 'it$ administration officials last 'ee5. =n a ne' t'ist, t$e bill includes a measure t$at 'ould exempt U.S. oil companies drilling in t$e area from certain disclosure rules t$at 'ere part of t$e ("( +odd-Dran5 financial reform la'. 2$ose disclosures are strongl/ bac5ed b/ t$e A$ite :ouse and +emocratic senators. 9imed at curbing corruption, t$e rules re8uire oil and mining

companies to report pa/ments to an/ foreign go0ernment to t$e Securities and 7xc$ange ,ommission. 6il and business lobb/ groups are fig$ting t$e rules in court. =nterior and State +epartment officials did not directl/ comment on t$e pro0ision
at a $earing last 'ee5, sa/ing onl/ t$at t$e administration 'ants to 'or5 'it$ t$e :ouse on details of t$e bill so t$at t$e deal can be in place in time for t$e next sale of drilling leases for t$e Gulf, expected to be $eld in 9ugust. 4ingaman said t$e exemption ?complicates t$ings significantl/? for 8uic5 passage of t$e bill. ?2$e/>0e added in some t$ings t$at are going to ma5e it difficult to pass in t$at form,? $e said, referring to t$e exemption. )ast 'ee5, t$e Senate energ/ committee 8uietl/ filed a one-page bill reflecting t$e administration>s suggested language, 'ord for 'ord, 'it$ no mention of t$e disclosure exemption. 2$e timing of next steps is unclear. ?=t 'ould reall/ be unfortunate if t$at

process pro0ed to be a protracted one,? said Mic$ael 4rom'ic$, 6bama>s former U.S. offs$ore drilling regulator, '$o $elped negotiate t$e deal. ?2$ere>s no purpose t$at>s ser0ed b/ furt$er dela/ing.?

"o# is $ey%Mexico #ill leave the deal i& #e delay passage

'senaro 1! (9lberto, o0er "; /ears of la' practice, 9lberto 7senaro $as $elped man/ US, 7uropean and 9sian companies doing business in
Mexico for industries suc$ as telecom, =2, energ/, p$armaceutical, $ealt$ ser0ices and medical de0ices, entertainment, ports, financial ser0ices, automoti0e and o0erseas trading. :e $as 'or5ed as in-$ouse attorne/ for a maCor financial ser0ices corporation. )i5e'ise, $as $elped Mexican Go0ernment in matters of energ/, telecom and ports t'o 3ost-Graduate Specialisations from =nstituto 2ecnolEgico 9utEnomo de MFxico (=29M., one in 7nerg/ Regulation and one in 2elecom, M7B=,6GS 3627*2=9) 6=) 466M% R7S7R-7S =*,R79S7 9*+ =*+US2RH R7D6RMS 3R636S7+, 9pril I, ("#, $ttp%&&before/oudobusiness.com&arc$i0es&I;J.

Mexico could be on its 'a/ to an oil boomK along 'it$ t$e increase in reser0es, t$e current go0erning part/ of Mexico, t$e =nstitutional Re0olutionar/ 3art/ (3R=. $as been aggressi0el/ proposing reformsin its $/drocarbons sector. A$ile it 'ill 5eep 37M7B as a state-o'ned compan/ '$ic$ 'ill continue to enCo/ a monopol/, t$e go0ernment 'ill allo' foreign in0estment, participation and limited partners$ips if t$e reforms are appro0ed. 2$e
onl/ ca0eat is t$at t$e oil 'ill remain in Mexican $ands. A$ile t$is ma/ not be ideal for man/ foreign oil companies, it is far more t$an '$at $as been offered before, '$ic$ 'as not$ing at all. Se0eral companies 'ill be eager for t$e c$ance to access MexicoGs 0ast oil

reser0es, e0en if it means t$e/ 'ill onl/ be 'or5ing in a consulting role to $elp Mexico moderni1e its anti8uated oil infrastructure. 6ne deal '$ic$ got 8uic5 appro0al in t$e Mexican Senate 'as t$e 2ransboundar/ :/drocarbons 9greementK t$e deal 'ill allo' Coint oil exploration in t$e Gulf of Mexico . 7xperts in t$e energ/ sectors of bot$ countries state t$at if t$e U.S. acts 8uic5l/, 9merican companies 'ill $a0e a $ead start o0er ot$er foreign companies in accessing MexicoGs oil. =f t$e deal is not acted upon b/ t$e summer of t$is /ear, Mexico could li5el/ renege on t$e deal due to public disappro0al, again s$utting its energ/ industr/ off from muc$-needed in0estment. Mexico $as a gold mine in oilK reser0es are on t$e rise, but t$e countr/ needs $elp 'it$ e8uipment moderni1ation and extraction tec$nolog/ for a true boom to occur. =ndustr/ reforms could cause foreign capital to pour inK companies t$at are 'illing to s$are information and act in a consulting role rat$er t$an o'ners$ip role 'ill find t$at plent/ of profitable opportunities 'ill exist.

Contention (: )'M'*

)'M'* is &ailing because o& declining exploitable reserves and lac$ o& technological expertise
+ood et al 1( (+uncan, +irector of t$e Mexico =nstitute at Aoodro' Ailson =nternational ,enter for Sc$olars, also 'or5ed on b/ 7rnesto Marcos
+a0id S$ields +a0id 7nrL8ue1 Miriam Grunstein )ourdes Melgar @uan 7ibensc$ut1 @a0ier 7strada Marcelo Mereles 7nri8ue :idalgo Dlu0io Rui1 ,arlos 4erdeCa @uan 3ardinas @osefina ,ortFs 2ania 6rti1 =sidro Morales 7duardo 9ndrade @o$n 3adilla but to be $onest =Gm not going to read all t$ose names in a cite, 9 *e' 4eginning for Mexican 6il% principles and recommendations for a reform in MexicoGs national interest, *o0ember (" , $ttp%&&'''.'ilsoncenter.org&sites&default&files&'oodMne'MbeginningMmexico.pdf.RA 9lt$oug$ t$e purpose of t$is paper is not to pro0ide a compre$ensi0e diagnosis of t$e c$allenges facing t$e oil and gas sector and t$e national oil compan/ in Mexico, it is nonet$eless important t$at 'e state clearl/ '$at bot$ t$e s$ort- and long-term problems are, so t$at 'e can t$en mo0e on to discuss potential solutions. =n recent /ears, t$ese problems $a0e become 'ell-5no'n to t$e Mexican public and to t$e political and economic elites in t$e countr/. 2$e most notable, and most pressing energ/ problem facing Mexico, of course, concerns t$e rapid

decline in oil production experienced b/ t$e compan/ o0er t$e past J /ears. Drom a $ig$ point of #.4 million barrels a da/ in ((4, crude production $as fallen to a lo' of .;; million in (" , t$at is to sa/ t$at t$ere $as been a ( percent drop in national production. 9lt$oug$ 3emex $as $ad success in ("" in stabili1ing production at t$is le0el, t$e outloo5 for t$e next fe' /ears is 'orr/ing, as experts are predicting significant declines in t$e nationGs t'o most producti0e fields, Nu Maloob Oaap and ,antarell, e0en at faster rates t$an t$ose predicted b/ official sources. +eclines at t$ese fields could cut as muc$ as $alf a million barrels per da/ from national production. 2$e significance of t$e decline in production to date is a stor/ t$at $as been told man/ times% not onl/ does t$e extraction of less oil impact 3emex as a compan/, it $its national finances $ard since oil re0enues continue to account for around #(P of t$e Dederal go0ernmentGs income. MexicoGs d'indling pro0en reser0es present a similarl/ 'orr/ing picture. 9lt$oug$ no one no' doubts t$at Mexico $as $uge remaining reser0es of oil to be disco0ered in t$e national territor/, o0er t$e past decade Mexico $as failed to add to existing pro0en reser0es. =t is onl/ in (" t$at 3emex $as been able to claim a "((P restitution rate, $elped in part b/ a slo'er rate of exploitation of existing reser0es. 9t t$e present rate of extraction, t$e nation $as enoug$ oil to last for ! /ears, a number t$at is acceptable for a compan/, but '$oll/ insufficient from t$e perspecti0e of t$e Mexican econom/ and t$e national interest. =f
production is to be boosted and t$en sustained in t$e medium term, t$e disco0er/ and certification of massi0e ne' reser0es must be ensured at rates muc$ $ig$er t$an '$at is currentl/ being ac$ie0ed. 2$ese t'in drops in reser0es and production $a0e come at a time '$en t$e eas/ oil on land and in s$allo' 'aters in t$e Gulf of Mexico no longer represents t$e future. :a0ing used up most of its reser0es in t$ese areas, Mexico

no' faces t$e prospect of disco0ering and extracting more difficult oil reser0es in t$e deep 'aters of t$e Gulf
and tr/ing to extract oil from complex ons$ore reser0es suc$ as ,$icontepec, '$ic$ $as pro0en difficult and costl/ to produce. Ae $a0e passed from a 'orld in '$ic$ extracting oil from ,antarell cost onl/ a fe' dollars a barrel, to one in '$ic$ oil can cost as muc$ as I( dollars a barrel to produce . 2$is

difficult oil represents a gro'ing drain on t$e budget of 3emex as 'ell as an e0ol0ing tec$nological c$allenge.
2$e current model, '$ic$ gi0es 3emex all of t$e responsibilit/ as operator, gi0es t$e =nstituto Mexicano del 3etrEleo all of t$e responsibilit/ for tec$nological de0elopment, and puts all of t$e economic cost of extracting oil on t$e budget, is not ade8uate for t$e era of difficult oil. Under

t$e current model, Mexico is incapable of in0esting in t$e disco0er/ of ne' reser0es, in t$e de0elopment of ne' exploration and production (7Q3. tec$nologies, and in t$e maintenance and construction of t$e infrastructure needed to guarantee t$e future of t$e sector. 3emex $as ne0er been allo'ed to operate as an independent compan/, operating instead
on t$e basis of generating rents rat$er t$an generating 0alue, and 0er/ often $a0ing to pa/ exorbitantl/ $ig$ tax rates. 2$e mil5ing of 3emex $as meant t$at resources are stripped a'a/ from t$e firm in a 'a/ t$at lea0es it 'it$out t$e necessar/ funds to be able to replace reser0es, or e0en to co0er its o'n costs in t$e present time. 2$e fact t$at 3emex $as fre8uentl/ $ad to pa/ more t$an "((P of its profits to t$e

go0ernment in t$e form of taxes and c$arges is clearl/ an entirel/ unsustainable and irresponsible situation, but increasing its a0ailable financial resources alone 'ould not sol0e t$e problem. 9 ne' model is needed in '$ic$ 3emex is responsible for its o'n destin/, and t$at promotes Mexican economic gro't$, as 'ell as granting t$e Mexican state t$e fiscal resources it needs to reduce ine8uit/ and po0ert/. 2$e strict controls placed on 3emex spending b/ t$e Mexican
2reasur/ +epartment (SecretarLa de :acienda / ,rFdito 3Rblico. $a0e also meant t$at t$e national oil compan/ is essentiall/ pre0ented from ma5ing its o'n strategic business decisions, and from t$e inno0ation and ris5 ta5ing t$at are fundamental to ac$ie0ing success in t$e oil industr/. 2$e close political controls placed on t$e firm are understandable in t$e context of t$e fiscal importance of 3emex to t$e federal go0ernment, but t$e/ pre0ent 3emex from ac$ie0ing success and pre0ent t$e countr/ from reali1ing its potential. *ot onl/ does 3emex lac5 t$e independent abilit/ to in0est in its future, but it is also tec$nicall/ ban5rupt due to t$e immense burden of its debt, ac8uired from /ears of tr/ing to re0erse t$e decline in production and exploration, as 'ell as from its pensions and benefits liabilities. +ecades of /ielding to demands b/ t$e oil 'or5ersG union, combined 'it$ a failure to put aside funds to co0er future outla/s mean t$at, at t$e present time, 3emex 'ill need to ma5e an extraordinar/ effort and ac$ie0e $ig$ le0els of success in order to co0er its liabilities. Unless a radical c$ange in t$e current model is broug$t about, it 'ould be irresponsible for t$e Mexican state to absorb t$ese liabilities, as it 'ould create a moral $a1ard encouraging 3emex to repeat its error. 3emexGs dismal record is matc$ed b/ its lac5 of

tec$nological and tec$nical resources. Mexico, and 3emex in particular, $a0e not in0ested in t$e de0elopment of ne' RQ+ and ne' 5no'ledge in t$e $/drocarbons industr/, despite $a0ing recei0ed record budgets from t$e federal go0ernment in recent /ears. Moreo0er, due to t$e nature of t$e national oil sector, 3emex $as remained isolated from ne' 'a/s of t$in5ing and tec$nological cooperation t$at $a0e re0olutioni1ed t$e global oil industr/. 4/ pre0enting 3emex from 'or5ing 'it$ pri0ate and foreign firms '$o are on t$e cutting edge of $/drocarbons tec$nologies, t$e firm $as been condemned to tec$nological obsolescence and dependenc/. 9t t$e same time, t$e
Mexican go0ernment $as failed to gi0e sufficient financial and tec$nical support to national researc$ organi1ations, suc$ as t$e =nstituto Mexicano del 3etrEleo and uni0ersit/-le0el engineering, la' and polic/ programs t$at focus on t$e energ/ industr/. Moreo0er, due to t$e extreme limitations

on pri0ate participation in t$e sector, t$e incenti0es for in0estment in RQ+ b/ t$e pri0ate sector are fe' and far

bet'een. More in0estment from bot$ public and pri0ate organi1ations is urgentl/ needed in de0eloping national researc$ capacit/, and incenti0es must be created to attract cutting edge tec$nologies to Mexico, along 'it$ t$e experience and 5no'ledge needed to operate t$em.

)'M'* decline #ill trigger instability throughout Mexico , time&rame is 1- years

.ohl 1( (Neit$, Managing 7ditor, 7nerg/ and ,apital, 9 true insider in t$e energ/ mar5ets, Neit$>s researc$ $as $elped t$ousands of in0estors
capitali1e off t$e rapidl/ c$anging face of energ/. Dor o0er a /ear, Neit$ co0ered t$e massi0e domestic 4a55en oil formation S and t$e companies t$at 'ould ra5e in profits S before ne's bro5e to t$e mainstream press. :e 'as t$ere for t$e :a/nes0ille s$ale formation and also for t$e Marcellus natural gas formation, tal5ing to compan/ execs and insiders, unco0ering t$e real stories on t$e ground, and t$e real in0estment opportunities. Neit$ is one of t$e onl/ financial reporters around '$o>s actuall/ 0isited 9lberta>s remote tar sands region to personall/ meet e0er/ maCor pla/er in t$e booming ,anadian oil operation. ,risis of ,onsumption, $ttp%&&'''.energ/andcapital.com&articles&mexican-oil-crisis& J##. 6f course, 'e all 5no' t$e stor/ be$ind t$e ,antarell field>s do'nfall. 6nce production started to decline, 3emex began inCecting nitrogen to boost output. 4ut t$is strateg/ 'as s$ort-li0ed, and production at t$e field $as been dropping s$arpl/ since S roug$l/ "4P eac$ /ear for t$e last six /ears. ,antarell>s decline mar5ed t$e beginning of t$e end for Mexican oil production. 2$e countr/>s ne' finds $a0e also pro0en under'$elming. 2$e recent disco0er/ b/ 3emex in Sout$ern Mexico is a perfect example. 9ccording to 3emex, t$e ne' field $olds up to ;(( million barrels of crude oil, a trifle compared to t$e billions of barrels ,antarell once $eld. 4ut t$ese da/s, Mexico 'ill ta5e '$ate0er it can get... and pra/ it can $old off t$e decline. ,risis of ,onsumption Mexico>s declining oil production means t$ere>s less oil a0ailable for export. 2$ose .; million barrels flo'ing from

3emex>s 'ells dail/ are crucial to t$e countr/>s stabilit/. A$en almost 4(P of /our go0ernment budget is paid from oil re0enue, exporting less oil is not an option S but t$at>s exactl/ '$at>s $appening +uring t$e first eig$t mont$s
of (" , Mexican oil exports to t$e United States 'ere slig$tl/ abo0e one million barrels per da/. )ast Ma/ oil exports fell below one million barrels per dayfor t$e first time in I /ears. 4arring

some miracle ta5ing place in Mexico>s oil industr/, = belie0e t$e countr/ 'ill be a net oil importer 'it$in ten /ears.

Scenario 1: Terrorism

Mexican instability causes a &lood o& re&ugees/ resulting in terrorism.

0ro#n 1

(Mic$ael 4ro'n, Undersecretar/ of 7mergenc/ 3reparedness and Response in t$e +epartment of :omeland Securit/, 4order ,ontrol% ,ollapse of Mexico =s 9 :omeland Securit/ Q *ational Securit/ =ssue, "&"4& ((!, $ttp%&&mic$aelbro'ntoda/.com&Cournal& ((!&"&";&border-controlcollapse-of-mexico-is-a-$omeland-securit/-nat.$tml.

4/ failing to secure t$e borders and control immigration, 'e $a0e opened oursel0es up to a frig$tening scenario. The United States could &ace a &lood o& re&ugees &rom Mexico i& it #ere to collapse/ over#helming state and local governments along the U.S.-Mexico border. +uring a time of economic duress, t$e costs 'ould be o0er'$elming and 'ould simpl/ add to t$e alread/ burgeoning costs at t$e federal le0el. =mmigration and border control ne0er 'as nor s$ould it e0er be about racism. =mmigration and border control are national securit/ and $omeland securit/ issues. Sleeper cells from numerous terrorist groups could , and probabl/ alread/ $a0e, infiltrated t$e United States, Cust la/ing in 'ait to attac5 at an appropriatel/ 0ulnerable time.

2eads to nuclear and bioterror attac$s

Timmerman 1-

(Nen 2immerman, *e'smax correspondent, D4= +irector Mueller% 9l-Taida Still Aants *uclear 4omb, #&"J& ("(, $ttp%&&ne'smax.com&*e'sfront&mueller-fbi-al8aida-nuclear& ("(&(#&"J&id&#;#"<!. D4= +irector Robert Mueller 'arned ,ongress on Aednesda/ of ongoing al-Taida efforts to ac8uire 'eapons of mass destruction to attac5 t$e United States. 9l-Taida remains committed to its goal of conducting attac5s inside t$e United States, Mueller told a :ouse appropriations subcommittee. Durt$er, al-TaidaGs

continued efforts to access c$emical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material pose a serious t$reat to t$e United States. 2o accomplis$ its goals of ne' attac5s on t$e 9merican $omeland, al-Taida see5s to infiltrate o0erseas operati0es '$o $a0e no 5no'n nexus to terrorism into t$e United States using bot$ legal and illegal met$ods of entr/, Mueller said. =n Debruar/, S$ei5$ 9bdulla$ al-*asifi, a 5no'n al-Taida recruiter in Nu'ait, boasted on al @a1eera tele0ision t$at MexicoGs border 'it$ t$e United States 'as t$e ideal infiltration point for terrorists see5ing to attac5 9merica. Dour pounds of ant$rax U in a suitcase t$is big U carried b/ a fig$ter t$roug$ tunnels from Mexico into t$e U.S., are
guaranteed to 5ill ##(,((( 9mericans 'it$in a single $our if it is properl/ spread in population centers t$ere, al-*asifi said.

0ioterror leads to extinction

Steinbruner 13 , 0roo$ings senior &ello# and chair in international security (@o$n +. Steinbruner, 4roo5ings senior fello' and c$air in
international securit/, 0ice c$air of t$e committee on international securit/ and arms control of t$e *ational 9cadem/ of Sciences, Ainter "!!I, Doreign 3olic/, 4iological 'eapons% a plague upon all $ouses, n"(! pJ;(" ., infotrac. 9lt$oug$ $uman pat$ogens are often lumped 'it$ nuclear explosi0es and let$al c$emicals as potential 'eapons of mass destruction, t$ere is an ob0ious, fundamentall/ important difference% 3at$ogens are ali0e, 'eapons are not. *uclear and c$emical 'eapons do not reproduce t$emsel0es

and

do not independentl/

obser0ation $as immense implications. 2$e use of

aftereffects,
timing

'$ate0er t$e/ ma/ be, nuclear 'ar$ead is detonated, for instance, it is possible to estimate t$e extent of t$e subse8uent damage and t$e li5el/ le0el of radioacti0e fallout. Suc$ predictabilit/ is an essential component for tactical militar/ planning. 2$e use of a pat$ogen, b/ contrast, is an extended process '$ose scope and

engage in adapti0e be$a0iorK pat$ogens do bot$ of t$ese t$ings. 2$at decepti0el/ simple a manufactured 'eapon is a singular e0ent. Most of t$e damage occurs immediatel/. 2$e deca/ rapidl/ o0er time and distance in a reasonabl/ predictable manner. 70en before a
Dor most potential biological agents, t$e predominant dra'bac5 is t$at t$e/ 'ould not act s'iftl/ or

cannot be

precisel/

controlled.

pat$ogens - ones most li5el/ to $a0e a decisi0e effect and t$erefore t$e ones most li5el/ to be contemplated for deliberatel/ $ostile use - t$e ris5 runs in t$e ot$er direction. 9 let$al pat$ogen t$at could efficientl/ spread from one 0ictim to anot$er 'ould be capable of initiating an intensif/ing cascade of disease t$at mig$t ultimatel/ t$reaten t$e entire 'orld population. 2$e "!"J influen1a epidemic demonstrated t$e potential for a global contagion of t$is sort but not necessaril/ its outer limit.
decisi0el/ enoug$ to be an effecti0e 'eapon. 4ut for a fe'

"uclear terror leads to extinction

4yson 1- - 3rofessor of Strategic Studies and +irector of t$e ,entre for Strategic Studies% *e' Oealand at t$e -ictoria Uni0ersit/ of Aellington
(Robert, @ul/. 9fter a 2errorist *uclear 9ttac5% 7n0isaging ,atal/tic 7ffects. Studies in ,onflict Q 2errorism, -ol. ##, =ssue I. =nformaAorld.. 4ut t$ese t'o nuclear 'orldsSa non-state actor nuclear attac5 and a catastrop$ic interstate nuclear exc$angeSare not necessaril/ separable. =t is Cust possible t$at some sort of terrorist attac5, and especiall/ an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a c$ain of e0ents

leading to a massi0e exc$ange of nuclear 'eapons bet'een t'o or more of t$e states t$at possess t$em. =n t$is context,
toda/Gs and tomorro'Gs terrorist groups mig$t assume t$e place allotted during t$e earl/ ,old Aar /ears to ne' state possessors of small nuclear arsenals '$o 'ere seen as raising t$e ris5s of a catalytic nuclear #ar bet'een t$e superpo'ers started b/ t$ird

parties. 2$ese ris5s 'ere considered in t$e late "!;(s and earl/ "!<(s as concerns gre' about nuclear proliferation, t$e so-called nV" problem. =t
ma/ re8uire a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especiall/ plausible situation '$ere an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to suc$ a massi0e inter-state nuclear 'ar. Dor example, in t$e e0ent of a terrorist nuclear attac5 on t$e United States, it mig$t 'ell be 'ondered Cust $o' Russia and&or ,$ina could plausibl/ be broug$t into t$e picture, not least because t$e/ seem unli5el/ to be fingered as t$e most ob0ious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. 2$e/ 'ould seem far too responsible to be in0ol0ed in supporting t$at sort of terrorist be$a0ior t$at could Cust as easil/ t$reaten t$em as 'ell. Some possibilities, $o'e0er remote, do suggest t$emsel0es. Dor example, $o' mig$t t$e United States react if it 'as t$oug$t or disco0ered t$at t$e fissile material used in t$e act of nuclear terrorism $ad come from Russian stoc5s,4( and if for some reason Mosco' denied an/ responsibilit/ for nuclear laxit/W 2$e correct attribution of t$at nuclear material to a particular countr/ mig$t not be a case of science fiction gi0en t$e obser0ation b/ Mic$ael Ma/ et al. t$at '$ile t$e debris resulting from a nuclear explosion 'ould be spread o0er a 'ide area in tin/ fragments, its radioacti0it/ ma5es it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a 'ealt$ of information can be obtained from its anal/sis% t$e efficienc/ of t$e explosion, t$e materials used and, most important X some indication of '$ere t$e nuclear material came from.4" 9lternati0el/, if t$e act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and 9merican officials refused to belie0e t$at a terrorist group 'as full/ responsible (or responsible at all. suspicion 'ould s$ift immediatel/ to state possessors. Ruling out Aestern all/ countries li5e t$e United Ningdom and Drance, and probabl/ =srael and =ndia as 'ell, aut$orities in Aas$ington 'ould be left 'it$ a 0er/ s$ort list consisting of *ort$ Norea, per$aps =ran if its program continues, and possibl/ 3a5istan. 4ut at '$at stage 'ould Russia and ,$ina be definitel/ ruled out in t$is $ig$ sta5es game of nuclear ,luedoW =n particular ,

if t$e act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a bac5drop of existing tension in Aas$ingtonGs relations 'it$ Russia and&or ,$ina, and at a time '$en t$reats $ad alread/ been traded bet'een t$ese maCor po'ers, 'ould officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the #orstW 6f course, t$e c$ances of t$is occurring 'ould onl/ seem to increase if t$e United States 'as alread/
in0ol0ed in some sort of limited armed conflict 'it$ Russia and&or ,$ina, or if t$e/ 'ere confronting eac$ ot$er from a distance in a prox/ 'ar, as unli5el/ as t$ese de0elopments ma/ seem at t$e present time. 2$e re0erse mig$t 'ell appl/ too% s$ould a nuclear terrorist attac5 occur in Russia or ,$ina during a period of $eig$tened tension or e0en limited conflict 'it$ t$e United States, could Mosco' and 4eiCing resist t$e pressures t$at mig$t rise domesticall/ to consider t$e United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of t$e attac5W Aas$ingtonGs earl/ response to a terrorist nuclear attac5

confrontation 'it$ Russia and&or ,$ina. Dor example, in t$e noise and confusion during t$e immediate aftermat$ of t$e terrorist nuclear attac5, t$e U.S. president mig$t be expected to place t$e countr/Gs armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a $ig$er stage of alert. =n suc$ a tense en0ironment, '$en careful planning runs up against t$e friction of realit/, it is Cust possible t$at Mosco' and&or ,$ina mig$t mista5enl/ read t$is as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibl/ nuclear force. against t$em. =n t$at situation, t$e temptations to preempt suc$ actions mig$t gro', alt$oug$ it must be admitted t$at an/ preemption 'ould probabl/ still meet 'it$ a de0astating response. 9s part of its initial
on its o'n soil also (and nuclear aided. response to t$e act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier. Aas$ington mig$t decide to order a significant con0entional (or nuclear. retaliator/ or disarming attac5 against t$e leaders$ip of t$e terrorist group and&or states seen to support t$at group. +epending on t$e identit/ and especiall/ t$e location of t$ese targets, Russia and&or ,$ina mig$t interpret suc$ action as being far too close for t$eir comfort, and potentiall/ as an infringement on t$eir sp$eres of influence and e0en on t$eir so0ereignt/. 6ne far-fetc$ed but per$aps not impossible scenario mig$t stem from a Cudgment in Aas$ington t$at some of t$e main aiders and abetters of t$e terrorist action resided some'$ere suc$ as ,$ec$n/a, per$aps in connection 'it$ '$at 9llison claims is t$e ,$ec$en insurgentsG X long-standing interest in all t$ings nuclear.4 9merican pressure on t$at part of t$e 'orld 'ould almost certainl/ raise alarms in Mosco' t$at mig$t re8uire a degree of ad0anced consultation from Aas$ington t$at t$e latter found itself unable or un'illing to pro0ide. 2$ere is also t$e 8uestion of $o' ot$er nuclear-armed states respond to t$e act of nuclear terrorism on anot$er member of t$at special club. =t could reasonabl/ be expected t$at follo'ing a nuclear terrorist attac5 on t$e United States, bot$Russia and ,$ina 'ould extend immediate s/mpat$/ and support to Aas$ington and 'ould 'or5 alongside t$e United States in t$e Securit/ ,ouncil. 4ut t$ere is Cust a c$ance, albeit a slim one, '$ere t$e support of Russia and&or ,$ina is less automatic in some cases t$an in ot$ers. Dor example, '$at 'ould $appen if t$e United States 'is$ed to discuss its rig$t to retaliate against groups based in t$eir territor/W =f, for some reason, Aas$ington found t$e responses of Russia and ,$ina deepl/ under'$elming, (neit$er for us or against us. mig$t it also suspect t$at t$e/ secretl/ 'ere in ca$oots 'it$ t$e group, increasing (again per$aps e0er so slig$tl/. t$e c$ances of a maCor exc$ange. =f t$e terrorist group $ad some connections to groups in Russia and ,$ina, or existed in areas of t$e 'orld o0er '$ic$ Russia and ,$ina $eld s'a/, and if Aas$ington felt t$at Mosco' or 4eiCing 'ere placing a curiousl/ modest le0el of pressure on t$em, '$at conclusions mig$t it t$en dra' about t$eir culpabilit/

mig$t

raise t$e possibilit/ of an un'anted

Scenario (: 5eg

Mexican stability is critical to U.S. po#er

.aplan 1( U c$ief geopolitical anal/st at Stratfor

(Robert +., Ait$ t$e Docus on S/ria, Mexico 4urns, Stratfor, #- J(" , $ttp%&&'''.stratfor.com&'ee5l/&focus-s/ria-mexico-burns.

A$ile t$e foreign polic/ elite in Aas$ington focuses on t$e J,((( deat$s in a conflict in S/ria -- $alf a 'orld a'a/ from t$e United States -- more

t$an 4I,((( people $a0e died in drug-related 0iolence since ((< in Mexico. 9 deepl/ troubled state as 'ell as a demograp$ic and economic giant on t$e United States> sout$ern border, Mexico 'ill affect 9merica>s destin/ in coming decades more t$an an/ state or combination of states in t$e Middle 7ast. =ndeed, Mexico ma/ constitute t$e 'orld>s se0ent$-largest econom/ in t$e near
future. ,ertainl/, '$ile t$e Mexican 0iolence is largel/ criminal, S/ria is a more clear-cut moral issue, en$anced b/ its o'n strategic conse8uences. 9 calcified aut$oritarian regime in +amascus is stamping out dissent 'it$ guns and artiller/ barrages. Moreo0er, regime c$ange in S/ria, '$ic$ t$e rebels demand, could deli0er a pi0otal blo' to =ranian influence in t$e Middle 7ast, an e0ent t$at 'ould be t$e best ne's to U.S. interests in t$e region in /ears or e0en decades. *e0ert$eless, t$e S/rian rebels are di0ided and $old no territor/, and t$e toppling of pro-=ranian dictator 4as$ar al 9ssad mig$t concei0abl/ bring to po'er an austere Sunni regime e8uall/ a0erse to U.S. interests -- if not lead to sectarian c$aos. =n ot$er 'ords, all militar/ inter0ention scenarios in S/ria are fraug$t 'it$ extreme ris5. 3recisel/ for t$at reason, t$at t$e U.S. foreign polic/ elite $as continued for

mont$s to fe0eris$l/ debate S/ria, and in man/ cases ad0ocate armed inter0ention, '$ile utterl/ ignoring t$e 0aster panorama of 0iolence next door in Mexico, spea5s 0olumes about Aas$ington>s o'n obsessions and interests, '$ic$ are not al'a/s aligned 'it$ t$e countr/>s geopolitical interests. S/ria matters and matters momentousl/ to U.S. interests, but Mexico ultimatel/ matters more, so one 'ould t$in5 t$at t$ere 'ould be at least some degree of parit/ in t$e amount
'ritten on t$ese subCects. = am not demanding a s'itc$ in ne's co0erage from one countr/ to t$e ot$er, Cust a bit more balance. 6f course, it is eas/ for pundits to $a0e a fer0entl/ inter0entionist 0ie' on S/ria precisel/ because it is so far a'a/, '$ereas miscalculation in Mexico on 9merica>s part 'ould carr/ far greater conse8uences. Dor example, '$at if t$e Mexican drug cartels too5 re0enge on San +iegoW 2$us, one mig$t e0en argue t$at t$e 0er/ noise in t$e media about S/ria, coupled 'it$ t$e relati0e silence about Mexico, is proof t$at it is t$e latter issue t$at actuall/ is too sensiti0e for loose tal5. =t ma/ also be t$at cartel-'rac5ed Mexico -- at some rude subconscious le0el -- connotes for 7ast ,oast elites a sout$ of t$e border, I-7le0en store culture, reminiscent of t$e crime mo0ie ?2raffic,? t$at $olds no allure to people focused on ancient ci0ili1ations across t$e ocean. 2$e concerns of 7urope and t$e Middle 7ast certainl/ seem closer to *e' Hor5 and Aas$ington t$an does t$e sout$'estern United States. =ndeed, )atin 9merican bureaus and studies departments simpl/ lac5 t$e cac$et of Middle 7ast and 9sian ones in go0ernment and uni0ersities. Het, t$e fate of Mexico is t$e

$inge on '$ic$ t$e United States> cultural and demograp$ic future rests. U.S. foreign polic/ emanates from t$e domestic condition of its societ/, and not$ing 'ill affect its societ/ more t$an t$e dramatic mo0ement of )atin $istor/ nort$'ard. 4/ (;(, as muc$ as a t$ird of t$e 9merican population could be :ispanic. Mexico and ,entral 9merica constitute a gro'ing demograp$ic and economic po'er$ouse 'it$ '$ic$ t$e United States $as an inextricable relations$ip. =n recent /ears Mexico>s economic gro't$ $as outpaced t$at of its nort$ern neig$bor. Mexico>s population of """ million plus ,entral
9merica>s of more t$an 4( million e8uates to $alf t$e population of t$e United States. 4ecause of t$e *ort$ 9merican Dree 2rade 9greement, J; percent of Mexico>s exports go to t$e United States, e0en as $alf of ,entral 9merica>s trade is 'it$ t$e United States. A$ile t$e median age of 9mericans is nearl/ #I, demonstrating t$e aging tendenc/ of t$e U.S. population, t$e median age in Mexico is ;, and in ,entral 9merica it is muc$ lo'er ( ( in Guatemala and :onduras, for example.. =n part because of /oung 'or5ers mo0ing nort$'ard, t$e destin/ of t$e United States could be nort$-sout$, rat$er t$an t$e east-'est, sea-to-s$ining-sea of continental and patriotic m/t$. (2$is 'ill be amplified b/ t$e sc$eduled ("4 'idening of t$e 3anama ,anal, '$ic$ 'ill open t$e Greater ,aribbean 4asin to megas$ips from 7ast 9sia, leading to t$e furt$er de0elopment of Gulf of Mexico port cities in t$e United States, from 2exas to Dlorida.. Since "!4(, Mexico>s population $as increased more t$an fi0e-fold. 4et'een "!I( and "!!; it nearl/ doubled. 4et'een "!J; and ((( it rose b/ more t$an a t$ird. Mexico>s population is no' more t$an a t$ird t$at of t$e United States and gro'ing at a faster rate. 9nd it is nort$ern Mexico t$at is crucial. 2$at most of t$e drug-related $omicides in t$is current 'a0e of 0iolence t$at so muc$ d'arfs S/ria>s $a0e occurred in onl/ six of Mexico>s # states, mostl/ in t$e nort$, is a 5e/ indicator of $o' nort$ern Mexico is being distinguis$ed from t$e rest of t$e countr/ (t$oug$ t$e 0iolence in t$e cit/ of -eracru1 and t$e regions of Mic$oacan and Guerrero is also notable.. =f t$e militar/-led offensi0e to crus$ t$e drug cartels launc$ed b/ conser0ati0e 3resident Delipe ,alderon falters, as it seems to be doing, and Mexico ,it/ goes bac5 to cutting deals 'it$ t$e cartels, t$en t$e capital ma/ in a functional sense lose e0en furt$er control of t$e nort$, 'it$ concrete implications for t$e sout$'estern United States. 6ne mig$t argue t$at 'it$ massi0e border controls, a functional and 0ibrantl/ nationalist United States can coexist 'it$ a d/sfunctional and some'$at c$aotic nort$ern Mexico. 4ut t$at is mainl/ true in t$e s$ort run. )oo5ing deeper into t$e "st centur/, as 9rnold 2o/nbee notes in 9 Stud/ of :istor/ ("!4<., a border bet'een a $ig$l/ de0eloped societ/ and a less $ig$l/ de0eloped one 'ill not attain an e8uilibrium but 'ill ad0ance in t$e more bac5'ard societ/>s fa0or. 2$us, $elping to stabili1e Mexico -- as limited as t$e United States> options ma/ be, gi0en t$e

complexit/ and sensiti0it/ of t$e relations$ip -- is a more urgent national interest t$an stabili1ing societies in t$e Greater Middle 7ast. =f Mexico e0er does reac$ co$erent Dirst Aorld status, t$en it 'ill become less of a t$reat, and t$e $ealt$/ melding of t$e
t'o societies 'ill 8uic5en to t$e benefit of bot$. 2oda/, $elping to t$'art drug cartels in rugged and remote terrain in t$e 0icinit/ of t$e Mexican frontier and reac$ing sout$'ard from ,iudad @uare1 (across t$e border from 7l 3aso, 2exas. means a limited role for t$e U.S. militar/ and ot$er agencies -'or5ing, of course, in full cooperation 'it$ t$e Mexican aut$orities. (3redator and Global :a'5 drones fl/ deep o0er Mexico searc$ing for drug production facilities.. 4ut t$e legal frame'or5 for cooperation 'it$ Mexico remains problematic in some cases because of strict interpretation of "!t$ centur/ posse comitatus la's on t$e U.S. side. A$ile t$e United States $as spent $undreds of billions of dollars to affect $istorical outcomes in 7urasia, its leaders and foreign polic/ mandarins are some'$at passi0e about '$at is $appening to a countr/ 'it$ '$ic$ t$e United States s$ares a long land border, t$at 0erges on partial c$aos in some of its nort$ern sections, and '$ose population is close to double t$at of =ra8 and 9fg$anistan combined. Mexico, in addition to t$e ob0ious c$allenge of ,$ina as a rising great po'er, 'ill $elp 'rite t$e 9merican stor/ in t$e "st

centur/. Mexico 'ill partl/ determine '$at 5ind of societ/ 9merica 'ill become, and '$at exactl/ 'ill be its demograp$ic and geograp$ic c$aracter, especiall/ in t$e Sout$'est. 2$e U.S. relations$ip 'it$ ,$ina 'ill matter more t$an an/ ot$er indi0idual bilateral relations$ip in terms of determining t$e United States> place in t$e 'orld, especiall/ in t$e economicall/ crucial 3acific. =f polic/ma5ers in Aas$ington calculate U.S. interests properl/ regarding t$ose t'o critical countries, t$en t$e United States 'ill $a0e po'er to spare so t$at its elites can continue to focus on serious moral 8uestions in places t$at matter less.

5eg solves nuclear #ar

0roo$s et al 1! YStep$en G. 4roo5s is 9ssociate 3rofessor of Go0ernment at +artmout$ ,ollege.G. @o$n =5enberr/ is t$e 9lbert G. Milban5
3rofessor of 3olitics and =nternational 9ffairs at 3rinceton Uni0ersit/ in t$e +epartment of 3olitics and t$e Aoodro' Ailson Sc$ool of 3ublic and =nternational 9ffairs. :e is also a Global 7minence Sc$olar at N/ung :ee Uni0ersit/.Ailliam ,. Ao$lfort$ is t$e +aniel Aebster 3rofessor in t$e +epartment of Go0ernment at +artmout$ ,ollege. +on>t ,ome :ome, 9merica% 2$e ,ase against Retrenc$ment, Ainter ("#, -ol. #I, *o. #, 3ages I-;", $ttp%&&'''.mitpressCournals.org&doi&abs&"(.""< &=S7,MaM(("(IZ 9 core premise of deep engagement is t$at it pre0ents t$e emergence

of a far more dangerous global security environment. Dor one t$ing, as noted abo0e, t$e United StatesG overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners &rom ta$ing provocative action. 3er$aps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states 'it$ aspirations to regional $egemon/ from contemplating expansion and ma5e its partners more secure, reducing t$eir incenti0e to adopt solutions to t$eir securit/ problems t$at t$reaten ot$ers and t$us sto5e securit/ dilemmas. 2$e contention t$at engaged U.S. po'er dampens t$e baleful effects of anarc$/ is consistent 'it$ influential 0ariants of realist t$eor/. =ndeed, arguabl/ t$e scariest portra/al of t$e 'ar-prone 'orld t$at 'ould emerge absent t$e 9merican 3acifier is pro0ided in t$e 'or5s of @o$n Mears$eimer, '$o forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete 'it$ securit/ competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated pre0enti0e 'ar temptations, regional ri0alries, and e0en runs at regional $egemon/ and full-scale great po'er 'ar. I :o' do retrenc$ment ad0ocates, t$e bul5 of '$om are realists, discount t$is benefitW
2$eir arguments are complicated, but t'o capture most of t$e 0ariation% (". U.S. securit/ guarantees are not necessar/ to pre0ent dangerous ri0alries and conflict in 7urasiaK or ( . pre0ention of ri0alr/ and conflict in 7urasia is not a U.S. interest. 7ac$ response is connected to a different t$eor/ or set of t$eories, '$ic$ ma5es sense gi0en t$at t$e '$ole debate $inges on a complex future counterfactual ('$at 'ould $appen to 7urasiaGs securit/ setting if t$e United States trul/ disengagedW.. 9lt$oug$ a certain ans'er is impossible, eac$ of t$ese responses is nonet$eless a 'ea5er argument for retrenc$ment t$an ad0ocates ac5no'ledge. 2$e first response flo's from defensi0e realism as 'ell as ot$er international relations t$eories t$at discount t$e conflict-generating potential of anarc$/ under contemporar/ conditions. I# +efensi0e realists maintain t$at t$e $ig$ expected

costs of territorial con8uest, defense dominance, and an arra/ of policies and practices t$at can be used credibl/ to signal benign intent, mean t$at 7urasiaGs maCor states could manage regional multipolarit/ peacefull/ 'it$out t$e 9merican pacifier. Retrenc$ment 'ould be a bet on t$is sc$olars$ip, particularl/ in regions '$ere t$e 5inds of stabili1ers t$at nonrealist t$eories point toSsuc$ as democratic go0ernance or dense institutional lin5agesSare eit$er absent or #ea$ly present. 2$ere are t$ree ot$er maCor bodies of sc$olars$ip, $o'e0er, t$at mig$t gi0e decisionma5ers pause before ma5ing t$is bet. Dirst is regional expertise. *eedless to sa/, t$ere is no consensus on t$e net securit/ effects of U.S. 'it$dra'al . Regarding eac$ region, t$ere
are optimists and pessimists. De' experts expect a return of intense great po'er competition in a post-9merican 7urope, but man/ doubt 7uropean go0ernments 'ill pa/ t$e political costs of increased 7U defense cooperation and t$e budgetar/ costs of increasing militar/ outla/s. I4 2$e result mig$t be a 7urope t$at is incapable of securing itself from 0arious t$reats t$at could be destabili1ing 'it$in t$e region

and be/ond (e.g., a regional conflict a5in to t$e "!!(s 4al5an 'ars., lac5s capacit/ for global securit/ missions in '$ic$ U.S. leaders mig$t 'ant 7uropean participation, and is 0ulnerable to t$e influence of outside rising po'ers. A$at about t$e ot$er parts of 7urasia '$ere t$e United States $as a substantial militar/ presenceW Regarding t$e Middle 7ast, t$e balance begins to s#ing to#ard pessimists concerned t$at states currentl/ bac5ed b/ Aas$ingtonS notabl/ =srael, 7g/pt, and Saudi 9rabiaSmig$t ta5e actions upon U.S. retrenc$ment t$at 'ould intensif/ securit/ dilemmas. 9nd concerning 7ast 9sia, pessimism regarding t$e regionGs prospects 'it$out t$e 9merican pacifier is pronounced. 9rguabl/ t$e principal concern expressed b/ area experts is t$at @apan and Sout$ Norea are li5el/ to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase t$eir militar/ commitments, '$ic$ could sto5e a destabili6ing reaction &rom China. =t is notable t$at during t$e ,old Aar, bot$ Sout$ Norea and 2ai'an mo0ed to obtain a nuclear 'eapons capacit/ and 'ere onl/ constrained from doing so b/ a still-engaged United States. I; 2$e second bod/ of sc$olars$ip casting doubt on t$e bet on defensi0e realismGs sanguine portra/al is all of t$e researc$ t$at undermines its conception of state preferences. +efensi0e realismGs optimism about '$at 'ould $appen if t$e United States retrenc$ed is 0er/ muc$ dependent on its particularSand $ig$l/ restricti0eSassumption about state preferencesK once 'e relax t$is assumption, t$en muc$ of its basis for optimism 0anis$es. Specificall/, t$e prediction of post-9merican tran8uilit/ t$roug$out 7urasia rests on t$e assumption t$at securit/ is t$e onl/ rele0ant state preference, 'it$ securit/
defined narro'l/ in terms of protection from 0iolent external attac5s on t$e $omeland. Under t$at assumption, t$e securit/ problem is largel/ sol0ed as soon as offense and defense are clearl/ distinguis$able, and offense is extremel/ expensi0e relati0e to defense. 4urgeoning researc$ across t$e

social and other sciences, $o'e0er, undermines t$at core assumption% states $a0e preferences not onl/ for securit/ but also for prestige/ status/ and other aims/ and they engage in trade-o&&s among t$e 0arious obCecti0es. I< =n addition, t$e/ define securit/ not Cust in terms of territorial protection but in 0ie' of man/ and 0aried milieu goals. =t follo's t$at e0en states t$at are relati0el/ secure ma/ ne0ert$eless engage in $ig$l/ competiti0e be$a0ior. 7mpirical studies s$o' t$at t$is is indeed sometimes t$e case. II =n sum, a bet on a benign postretrenc$ment 7urasia is a bet t$at leaders of maCor countries 'ill ne0er allo'
t$ese nonsecurit/ preferences to influence t$eir strategic c$oices. 2o t$e degree t$at t$ese bodies of sc$olarl/ 5no'ledge $a0e predicti0e le0erage, U.S. retrenc$ment 'ould result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of t$e

'orldGs 5e/ regions. Ae $a0e alread/ mentioned t$e t$ird, e0en more alarming bod/ of sc$olars$ip. 6ffensi0e realism predicts t$at t$e 'it$dra'al of t$e 9merican pacifier 'ill /ield eit$er a competitive regional multipolarity complete 'it$ associated insecurity/ arms racing/ crisis instability/ nuclear proli&eration, and t$e li5e, or bids for regional $egemon/, '$ic$ ma/

be beyond

the capacity o& local great po#ers to contain (and '$ic$ in an/ case 'ould generate intensel/ competiti0e be$a0ior,

possibl/ including regional great po#er #ar.. :ence it is unsurprising t$at retrenc$ment ad0ocates are prone to focus on t$e second argument noted abo0e% t$at a0oiding 'ars and securit/ dilemmas in t$e 'orldGs core regions is not a U.S. national interest. De' doubt t$at t$e United States could sur0i0e t$e return of insecurit/ and conflict among 7urasian po'ers, but at '$at costW Muc$ of t$e 'or5 in t$is area $as focused on t$e economic externalities of a rene'ed t$reat of insecurit/ and 'ar, '$ic$ 'e discuss belo'. Docusing on t$e pure securit/ ramifications, t$ere are t'o main reasons '$/ decisionma5ers ma/ be rationall/ reluctant to run t$e retrenc$ment experiment. Dirst, o0erall $ig$er

le0els of conflict ma5e t$e 'orld a more dangerous place. Aere 7urasia to return to higher levels o& interstate military competition, one 'ould see o0erall $ig$er le0els of militar/ spending and inno0ation and a $ig$er li5eli$ood of competiti0e regional prox/ 'ars and arming of client statesSall of '$ic$ 'ould be concerning, in part because it 'ould promote a faster diffusion of militar/ po'er a'a/ from t$e United States. Greater regional insecurit/ could 'ell feed proliferation cascades, as states suc$ as 'gypt/ 7apan/ South .orea/ Tai#an/ and Saudi 4rabia all mig$t c$oose to create nuclear forces. IJ =t is unli5el/ t$at proliferation decisions b/ an/ of t$ese actors 'ould be t$e end of t$e game% t$e/ 'ould li5el/ generate pressure locall/ for more proliferation. Dollo'ing Nennet$ Aalt1, man/ retrenc$ment ad0ocates are proliferation optimists, assuming t$at
nuclear deterrence sol0es t$e securit/ problem. I! Usuall/ carried out in d/adic terms, t$e debate o0er t$e stabilit/ of proliferation c$anges as t$e numbers go up. 3roliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationalit/ and narro' securit/ preferences. =n social science, $o'e0er, suc$ assumptions are ine0itabl/ probabilistic. 6ptimists assume t$at most states are led b/ rational leaders, most 'ill o0ercome organi1ational problems and resist t$e temptation to preempt before feared neig$bors nucleari1e, and most pursue onl/ securit/ and are ris5 a0erse. ,onfidence in suc$ probabilistic assumptions declines if t$e 'orld 'ere to mo0e from nine to t'ent/, t$irt/, or fort/ nuclear states. =n addition, man/ of t$e ot$er dangers noted b/ anal/sts '$o are concerned about t$e destabili1ing effects of nuclear proliferationSincluding t$e ris5 of

accidents and t$e prospects t$at some ne' nuclear po'ers 'ill not $a0e trul/ sur0i0able forcesSseem prone to go up as t$e number of nuclear po'ers gro's. J( Moreo0er, t$e ris5 of unforeseen crisis d/namics t$at could spin out o& control is also $ig$er as t$e number of nuclear po'ers increases. Dinall/, add to t$ese concerns t$e en$anced danger of nuclear lea5age, and a 'orld 'it$ o0erall $ig$er le0els of securit/ competition becomes /et more 'orrisome. 2$e argument t$at maintaining 7urasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. 6n 'idel/ accepted realist assumptions, ac5no'ledging t$at U.S. engagement preser0es peace dramaticall/ narro's t$e difference bet'een retrenc$ment and deep engagement. Dor man/ supporters of retrenc$ment, t$e optimal strateg/ for a po'er suc$ as t$e United States, '$ic$ $as attained regional $egemon/ and is separated from ot$er great po'ers b/ oceans, is offs$ore balancing% sta/ o0er t$e $ori1on and pass t$e buc5 to local po'ers
to do t$e dangerous 'or5 of counterbalancing an/ local rising po'er. 2$e United States s$ould commit to ons$ore balancing onl/ '$en local balancing is li5el/ to fail and a great po'er appears to be a credible contender for regional $egemon/, as in t$e cases of German/, @apan, and t$e So0iet Union in t$e midt'entiet$ centur/. 2$e problem is t$at ,$inaGs rise puts t$e possibilit/ of its attaining regional $egemon/ on t$e

table, at least in t$e medium to long term. 9s Mears$eimer notes, The United States #ill have to play a $ey role in countering China, because its 9sian neig$bors are not strong enoug$ to do it b/ t$emsel0es. J" 2$erefore, unless ,$inaGs rise stalls, t$e United States is li5el/ to act to'ard ,$ina similar to t$e 'a/ it be$a0ed to'ard t$e So0iet Union during t$e ,old Aar. J =t follo's t$at t$e United States s$ould ta5e no action t$at 'ould compromise its capacit/ to mo0e to ons$ore balancing in t$e future. =t 'ill need to maintain $ey alliance relationships in 4sia as 'ell as t$e formidabl/ expensi0e military capacity to inter0ene t$ere. 2$e implication is to get out of =ra8 and 9fg$anistan, reduce t$e presence in 7urope, and pi0ot to 9siaS Cust '$at
t$e United States is doing. J# =n sum, t$e argument t$at U.S. securit/ commitments are unnecessar/ for peace is countered b/ a lot of sc$olars$ip, including $ig$l/ influential realist sc$olars$ip. =n addition, t$e argument t$at 7urasian peace is unnecessar/ for U.S. securit/ is 'ea5ened b/ t$e potential for a large number of nast/ securit/ conse8uences as 'ell as t$e need to retain a latent ons$ore balancing capacit/ t$at dramaticall/ reduces t$e sa0ings retrenc$ment mig$t bring. Moreo0er, s'itc$ing bet'een offs$ore and ons$ore balancing could 'ell be difficult. 4ringing toget$er t$e t$rust of man/ of t$e arguments discussed so far underlines t$e degree to '$ic$ t$e case for retrenc$ment misses t$e underl/ing logic of t$e deep engagement strateg/. 4/ suppl/ing reassurance, deterrence, and acti0e management, t$e United States

lo'ers securit/ competition in t$e 'orldGs 5e/ regions, t$ereb/ pre0enting t$e emergence of a $ot$ouse atmosp$ere for gro'ing ne' militar/ capabilities. 9lliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also pro0ide le0erage to pre0ent militar/ transfers to potential ri0als. 6n top of all t$is, the United States8 &ormidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. ,urrent great po'er militar/ expenditures as a percentage of G+3 are at $istorical lo's, and t$us
far ot$er maCor po'ers $a0e s$ied a'a/ from see5ing to matc$ top-end U.S. militar/ capabilities. =n addition, t$e/ $a0e so far been careful to a0oid attracting t$e focused enmit/ of t$e United States. J4 9ll of t$e 'orldGs most modern militaries are U.S. allies (9mericaGs alliance s/stem of more t$an sixt/ countries no' accounts for some J( percent of global militar/ spending., and t$e gap bet'een t$e U.S. militar/ capabilit/ and t$at of potential ri0als is b/ man/ measures gro'ing rat$er t$an s$rin5ing. J;

Scenario ! is oil competition

9eclining Mexican oil production #ill &orce the US to compete #ith China Clemente 1- (Dran5, 3rofessor at 3enn State Uni0ersit/ '$ere $e speciali1es in researc$ on t$e socioeconomic aspects of energ/ polic/, "&<&"(
MexicoGs declining oil production 'ill impact t$e United States, 7Q3 Maga1ine, $ttp%&&'''.epmag.com&3roduction&Mexicos-declining-oil-productionimpact-United-StatesM;(;!J &&2A. =n ((J, t$e United States imported more t$an "( percent of its oil from Mexico U o0er".# million barrels per da/ (Mb&d.. =n ((;, Mexico produced #.I Mb&d of oil and sold ".I Mb&d to t$e United States. 4/ ( (, $o'e0er, Mexican production 'ill onl/ be about ".J Mb&d and one of our most stable and secure sources of oil suppl/ 'ill be gone. 4ot$ t$e United States and Mexico 'ill $a0e to adCust to t$e $ars$ geological

realit/ of depletion. 3ea5 oil is staring us in t$e face. ,antarell, not so long ago t$e 'orld>s second-largest oilfield, $as traditionall/ accounted for
<( percent of Mexican production. 4ut ,antarell is in terminal decline and Mexico>s future is deteriorating before our e/es -- re0enues from oil sales account for 4( percent of Mexico>s federal budget. 2$e potential confrontation bet'een gro'ing demand and declining suppl/ 'ill impact not onl/ Mexico but t$e United States as 'ell. 2$e *ational 9cadem/ of Sciences recentl/ 'arned% ?2$e securit/ and sustainabilit/ of our nationGs energ/ s/stem $a0e been perennial concerns since AA==... especiall/ our gro'ing dependence on imported petroleum.? 2$ere is little 8uestion t$at 'it$ t$e demise of

Mexico as a 5e/ supplier, 9mericaGs fragile oil suppl/ c$ain 'ill become e0en more tenuous. *ort$ Sea production is
in establis$ed decline and ,anada>s potential o0er t$e next decade is increasingl/ limited gi0en t$e cancellation of so man/ tar sands facilities because of t$e econom/. 6ur o'n deep'ater production is 0er/ expensi0e (e.g. @ac5 Dield.. 4ra1il is t$e onl/ brig$t spot in our $emisp$ere and costs are rising t$ere too. Ae 'ill $a0e to go fart$er afield for suppl/ and it 'ill be at increased ris5 and intense competition from

,$ina and ot$er nations. 6ur oil situation $as continued to deteriorate '$ile camouflaged b/ t$e recession and t$e decline of our most stable sources of suppl/ is 'orrisome indeed.

China-U.S oil competition causes #ar

:#eig and 7ianhai ; (+a0id and 4i, +irector of t$e ,enter on ,$ina>s 2ransnational Relations at t$e :ong Nong Uni0ersit/ of Science and
2ec$nolog/ 9*+ postdoctoral fello' at uni0ersit/, September&6ctober ((;, ,$inaGs Global :unt for 7nerg/, ,ouncil on Doreign Relations , $ttp%&&'''.cctr.ust.$5&materials&'or5ingMpapers& ((;(!-"(M'or53aper;.$tm && 2A.

9n unprecedented need for resources is no' dri0ing ,$ina >s foreign polic/. 9 booming domestic econom/, rapid
urbani1ation, increased export processing, and t$e ,$inese people>s 0oracious appetite for cars are increasing t$e countr/>s demand for oil and natural gas, industrial and construction materials, foreign capital and tec$nolog/. Twenty years ago, ,$ina 'as 7ast 9sia >s largest oil

exporter. *o' it is t$e 'orld>s second-largest importerK last /ear, it alone accounted for 31 percent of global gro't$ in oil demand.
*o' t$at ,$ina is t$e 'or5s$op of t$e 'orld, its $unger for electricit/ and industrial resources $as soared. ,$ina>s combined s$are of t$e 'orld>s consumption of aluminum, copper, nic5el, and iron ore more t$an doubled 'it$in onl/ ten years, from 7 percent in 1990 to 15 percent in (((K it $as no' reac$ed about 20 percent and is li5el/ to double again b/ t$e end of t$e decade. +espite calls b/ 3rime Minister Aen @iabao and ot$er politicians to cut consumption of energ/ and ot$er resources, t$ere is little sign of t$is appetite abating. @ustin Hifu )in, director of t$e ,$ina ,enter for 7conomic Researc$ at 3e5ing Uni0ersit/ , in 4eiCing , sa/s t$e countr/>s econom/ could gro' at 9 percent per year for t$e next 20 years. 2$ese

ne' needs alread/ $a0e serious implications for ,$ina >s foreign polic/. 4eiCing >s access to foreign resources is necessar/ bot$ for continued economic gro't$ and, because gro't$ is t$e cornerstone of China >s social stabilit/, for t$e sur0i0al of t$e ,$inese ,ommunist 3art/ (,,3.. Since ,$ina remains a relati0el/ centrali1ed, go0ernment-dri0en
econom/, 4eiCing $as been able to adapt its foreign polic/ to its domestic de0elopment strateg/. 2raditional institutions, suc$ as t$e Doreign 9ffairs )eading Small Group of t$e ,,3, are still ma5ing t$e 5e/ decisions, but a more pluralistic en0ironment is emerging and allo'ing business leaders to $elp s$ape foreign polic/. 2$e ,$ina =nstitute for =nternational Studies, a go0ernment t$in5 tan5, $olds numerous conferences bringing toget$er academics and leaders in business, t$e militar/, and t$e go0ernment to de0ise strategies for t$e top rung of t$e ,ommunist 3art/.[ 3artl/ on t$ese people>s ad0ice, 4eiCing $as been encouraging representati0es of state-controlled companies to secure exploration and suppl/ agreements 'it$ states t$at produce oil, gas, and ot$er resources. Mean'$ile, it $as been courting t$e go0ernments of t$ese states aggressi0el/, building good'ill b/ strengt$ening bilateral trade relations, a'arding aid, forgi0ing national debt, and $elping build roads, bridges, stadiums, and $arbors. =n return, ,$ina $as 'on access to 5e/ resources, from gold in 4oli0ia and coal in t$e 3$ilippines to oil in 7cuador and natural gas in 9ustralia . ,$ina >s resources $unt $as been a boon to some states, especiall/ de0eloping countries, as it $as allo'ed t$em to exploit as /et untapped resources or gain le0erage to negotiate better deals 'it$ older customers. 4ut for ot$er states, particularl/ t$e United States and @apan , ,$ina >s

insatiabilit/ is causing concern. Some go0ernments 'orr/ as 4eiCing enters t$eir sp$eres of influence or stri5es deals 'it$ states t$e/ $a0e tried to marginali1e. =n some 8uarters in Aas$ington , including t$e 3entagon, t$e intelligence ser0ices,
and ,ongress, t$e fear t$at ,$ina could c$allenge U.S. militar/ dominance in 7ast 9sia and destabili1e t$e region is rising. A$ate0er t$e prognosis, ,$ina>s boom can no longer be understood in regional terms aloneK as 4eiCing>s economic influence brings it international political influence and t$e potential for more militar/ po'er, ,$ina>s gro't$ 'ill $a0e 'orld'ide repercussions.[ 9lt$oug$ ,$ina >s ne' energ/ demands need not be a source of serious conflict 'it$ t$e Aest in t$e long term, at t$e moment, 4eiCing and Aas$ington feel especiall/ uneas/ about t$e situation. A$ile ,$ina

struggles to manage its gro'ing pains, t$e United States , as t$e 'orld>s $egemon, must some$o' ma5e room for t$e rising giantK ot$er'ise, 'ar 'ill become a serious possibilit/. 9ccording to t$e po'er transition t$eor/, to maintain its dominance, a $egemon 'ill be tempted to declare 'ar on its c$allengers '$ile it still $as a po'er ad0antage. 2$us, easing t$e 'a/ for t$e United States and ,$ina -- and ot$er states -- to find a ne' e8uilibrium 'ill re8uire careful management, especiall/ of t$eir mutual perceptions.[ 4ecause ,$ina >s extraordinar/ gro't$ also increases its dependence on foreign resources, t$e ,$inese go0ernment $as de0eloped a ne' sense of insecurit/ 0is-a-0is t$e United States . 9n
article publis$ed last @une in t$e 4eiCing-bac5ed :ong Nong ne'spaper 2a Nung 3ao suggested t$at Aas$ington mig$t resort to economic tactics to contain ,$ina . Gi0en t$e A$ite :ouse>s current penc$ant for unilateral inter0ention and t$e loud 0oices in ,ongress calling ,$ina a militar/ t$reat, 4eiCing mig$t reasonabl/ begin to fear t$at t$e United States 'ill tr/ to bloc5 its purc$ases of natural resources to destabili1e it. Aas$ington must be mindful of t$ese 'orries and not exacerbate t$em needlessl/.[ =nterstate competition is natural, of course, but it need not be ele0ated to t$e le0el of conflict. 9nd concerns o0er ,$ina >s impressi0e rise, '$ile understandable, s$ould not detract from t$e 0ast room for cooperation t$at t$e countr/>s ne' energ/ needs allo'. 9fter all, t$e United States and ,$ina s$are an interest in 0iable oil prices, secure sea-lanes, and a stable international en0ironment, all of '$ic$ can $elp sustain t$eir economic prosperit/ and t$at of t$e rest of t$e 'orld.

4 #ar bet#een the US and China #ould independently collapse the global economy and U.S. 5egemony that escalates

2iu ; (:enr/, =n0estment Group ,$airman and 9sia 2imes Ariter, J&
$ttp%&&atimes.com&atimes&GlobalM7conom/&G: (+C(".$tml &&2A. 2$e danger of trade 'ars US

(&;, 2rade 'ars can lead to s$ooting 'ars, 9sia 2imes,

geopolitical $ostilit/ to'ard ,$ina 'ill manifest itself first in trade friction, '$ic$ 'ill lead to a mutuall/ recriminator/ trade 'ar bet'een t$e t'o maCor economies t$at 'ill attract opportunistic trade realignments among t$e traditional allies of t$e United States. US multinational corporations, unable to steer US domestic politics, 'ill increasingl/ trade 'it$ ,$ina t$roug$ t$eir foreign subsidiaries, lea0ing t$e US econom/ 'it$ e0en fe'er Cobs, and a condition t$at 'ill furt$er exacerbate anti-,$ina popular sentiments t$at translate into more anti-free-trade policies generall/ and anti-,$ina policies specificall/. 2$e resultant global economic depression from a trade 'ar bet'een t$e 'orld>s t'o largest economies 'ill in turn $eig$ten furt$er mutual recriminations. 9n external curb from t$e US of ,$inese export trade 'ill accelerate a redirection of ,$inese gro't$ momentum in'ard, increasing ,$inese po'er, including militar/ po'er, '$ile furt$er encouraging anti-US sentiment in ,$inese polic/ circles. 2$is in turn 'ill 0alidate US appre$ension of a ,$ina t$reat, increasing t$e prospect for armed conflict. 9 'ar bet'een t$e US and ,$ina can $a0e no 'inners, particularl/ on t$e political front. 70en if t$e US 'ere to pre0ail militaril/ t$roug$ its tec$nological superiorit/, t$e political cost of militar/ 0ictor/ 'ould be so se0ere t$at t$e US as it currentl/ exists 'ould not be recogni1able after t$e conflict and t$e original geopolitical aim be$ind t$e conflict 'ould remain elusi0e, as t$e -ietnam Aar and t$e =ra8 'ar $a0e demonstrated. 4/ comparison, t$e -ietnam and =ra8 conflicts, destructi0e as t$e/ $a0e
been to t$e US social fabric, are mere minor scrimmages compared 'it$ a 'ar 'it$ ,$ina. US polic/ma5ers $a0e an option to ma5e ,$ina a friend and partner in a peaceful 'orld for t$e benefit of all nations. 2o do so, t$e/ must first recogni1e t$at t$e 'orld can operate on t$e principle of plentitude and t$at prosperit/ is not somet$ing to be foug$t o0er b/ 5illing consumers in a 'orld plagued 'it$ o0ercapacit/.

"uclear #ar 5arris and 0urro#s/ 1

(Matt \counselor in t$e *ational =ntelligence ,ouncil, t$e principal drafter of Global 2rends ( ;, @ennifer \\member of t$e *=,Gs )ong Range 9nal/sis Unit Re0isiting t$e Duture% Geopolitical 7ffects of t$e Dinancial ,risis, Aas$ington Tuarterl/, $ttp%&&csis.org&files&publication&t'8(!aprilburro's.pdf.
=ncreased 3otential for Global ,onflict[ 6f course, t$e report encompasses more t$an economics and indeed belie0es t$e future is li5el/ to be t$e result of a number of intersecting and interloc5ing forces. Ait$ so man/ possible permutations of outcomes, eac$ 'it$ ample opportunit/ for unintended conse8uences, t$ere is a gro'ing sense of

the <reat 9epression is not li5el/ to be repeated, t$e lessons to be dra'n from t$at period include t$e $armful effects on fledgling democracies and multiet$nic societies (t$in5 ,entral 7urope in "! (s and "!#(s. and
insecurit/. 70en so, $istor/ ma/ be more instructi0e t$an e0er. A$ile 'e continue to belie0e t$at on t$e sustainabilit/ of multilateral institutions (t$in5 )eague of *ations in t$e same period.. 2$ere is no reason to t$in5 t$at t$is 'ould not be true in t$e t'ent/-first as muc$

the potential &or greater con&lict could gro' 'ould seem to be e0en more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as t$e/ 'ould be if c$ange 'ould be steadier.[ =n sur0e/ing t$ose ris5s, t$e report stressed t$e
as in t$e t'entiet$ centur/. Dor t$at reason, t$e 'a/s in '$ic$ li5eli$ood t$at terrorism and nonproliferation 'ill remain priorities e0en as resource issues mo0e up on t$e international agenda. 2errorismGs appeal 'ill decline if economic gro't$ continues in t$e Middle 7ast and /out$ unemplo/ment is reduced. Dor t$ose terrorist groups t$at remain acti0e in ( ;, $o'e0er, t$e diffusion of tec$nologies and scientific 5no'ledge 'ill place some of t$e 'orldGs most dangerous capabilities 'it$in t$eir reac$. Terrorist groups in ( ; #ill li$ely be a combination of descendants of long establis$ed groups in$eriting organi1ational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessar/ to conduct sop$isticated

sel&-radicali6ed, particularl/ in t$e absence of economic outlets t$at 'ould in an economic do#nturn.[ The most dangerous casualty o& any economically-induced dra#do#n o& U.S. military presence #ould almost certainly be the Middle 'ast. 9lt$oug$ =ranGs ac8uisition of nuclear 'eapons is not ine0itable, #orries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop ne# security arrangements #ith external po#ers/ ac=uire additional #eapons/ and consider pursuing t$eir o'n nuclear ambitions. =t is not clear t$at t$e t/pe of stable deterrent relations$ip t$at existed bet'een t$e great po'ers for most of t$e ,old Aar 'ould emerge
attac5s and ne'l/ emergent collections of t$e angr/ and disenfranc$ised t$at become become narro'er naturall/ in t$e Middle 7ast 'it$ a nuclear =ran. 7pisodes of lo' intensit/ conflict and terrorism ta5ing place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines bet'een t$ose states in0ol0ed are not 'ell establis$ed. 2$e close proximit/ of potential nuclear ri0als combined 'it$ underde0eloped sur0eillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable =ranian missile s/stems also 'ill produce in$erent difficulties in ac$ie0ing reliable indications and 'arning of an impending

The lac$ o& strategic depth in neig$boring states li5e =srael, short #arning and missile &light times/ and uncertainty o& =ranian intentions may place more &ocus on preemption rather than de&ense/ potentially leading to escalating crises.[ Types o& con&lict that the #orld continues to experience/ such as over resources/ could reemerge/ particularly i& protectionism gro#s and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. )erceptions o& rene#ed energy scarcity #ill drive countries to ta$e actions to assure their &uture access to energy supplies. =n t$e 'orst case, this could result in interstate con&licts if go0ernment leaders deem
nuclear attac5. assured access to energ/ resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stabilit/ and t$e sur0i0al of t$eir regime. 70en actions s$ort of 'ar, $o'e0er, 'ill $a0e important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are pro0iding a rationale for na0al buildups and moderni6ation e&&orts, suc$ as ,$inaGs and =ndiaGs de0elopment of blue 'ater na0al capabilities. =f t$e fiscal stimulus focus for t$ese countries indeed turns in'ard, one of t$e most ob0ious funding targets ma/ be militar/. 4uildup of regional na0al capabilities could lead to

increased tensions/ rivalries/ and counterbalancing mo0es, but it also 'ill

create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. Ait$ 'ater also becoming scarcer in 9sia and t$e Middle 7ast, c$anging 'ater resources

cooperation to manage is li5el/ to be increasingl/ difficult bot$ 'it$in and bet'een states in a more dog-eat-dog 'orld.

Contention !: Spills

9eep#ater oil accident inevitable in the <ul& o& Mexico sans the plan
Shields 1( U independent energ/ consultant
(+a0id, Tand9% =s Mexico 3repared for +eep'ater +rilling in t$e GulfW, =nter-9merican +ialogueGs )atin 9merican 7nerg/ 9d0isor, & (& (" ,$ttp%&&repositor/.unm.edu&bitstream&$andle&"! J& (4II&=sP (MexicoP (3reparedP (forP (+eep'aterP (+rillingP (inP (t$e P (Gulf.pdfWse8uence]". 2$e/ sa/ t$at if

a countr/ does not defend its borders, t$en ot$ers 'ill not respect t$ose borders. 2$at is probabl/ $o' 'e s$ould understand 3emex>s decision to drill t$e Maximino-" 'ell in #,((( meters of 'ater in t$e 3erdido Dold 4elt, rig$t next to t$e s$ared maritime boundar/ 'it$ t$e United States. =t is a decision t$at does not ma5e sense in terms of competiti0eness or production goals. =t is about defending t$e final frontier of national so0ereignt/ and stic5ing t$e Mexican flag on t$e floor of t$e Gulf of Mexico to ad0ise U.S. companies t$at t$e/ $a0e no rig$t to drill for oil in t$e ultradeep 'aters on t$e Mexican side. 2$e recentl/ signed deep'ater agreement obliges bot$ countries to 'or5 toget$er and s$are t$e spoils of t$e de0elopment of transboundar/ reser0oirs, if t$e/ actuall/ exist. Dor no', 3emex, in line 'it$ constitutional restrictions, is going alone on t$e Mexican side. Safet/ is a maCor concern as 3emex and its contractors $a0e no experience in suc$ $ars$ en0ironments. =n fact, 3emex $as ne0er produced oil commerciall/ an/'$ere in deep 'ater. =t does not $a0e an insurance polic/ for 'orst-case scenarios nor does it $a0e emergenc/ measures in place to deal 'it$ a maCor spill. =t does not full/ abide b/ existing Mexican regulation of its
deep'ater acti0it/, '$ic$ cannot be enforced. 6n t$e U.S. side, pro$ibition of ultradeep'ater drilling, enacted after t$e +eep'ater :ori1on spill, $as come and gone. 2$e next disaster is Cust 'aiting to $appen.

<ul&8s ecosystems on the brin$%plan $ey to solve another accident

Craig 11 U 9ttorne/sG 2itle 3rofessor of )a' and 9ssociate +ean for 7n0ironmental 3rograms at Dlorida State Uni0ersit/ (Robin Nundis, )egal
Remedies for +eep Marine 6il Spills and )ong-2erm 7cological Resilience% 9 Matc$ Made in :ell, 4rig$am Houng Uni0ersit/ )a' Re0ie', ("", $ttp%&&la're0ie'.b/u.edu&articles&"# <4(;"##M(#craig.fin.pdf. 2$ese results suggest t$at 'e

s$ould be 0er/ concerned for t$e Gulf ecos/stems affected b/ t$e Macondo 'ell blo'out. Dirst, and as t$is 9rticle $as emp$asi1ed t$roug$out, unli5e t$e 7xxon -alde1 spill, t$e +eep'ater :ori1on oil spill occurred at great dept$, and t$e oil be$a0ed unusuall/ compared to oil released on t$e surface. Second, considerabl/ more toxic dispersants 'ere used in connection 'it$ t$e Gulf oil spill t$an t$e 9las5a oil spill."<4 2$ird, $umans could inter0ene almost immediatel/ to begin cleaning t$e roc5/ substrate in 3rince Ailliam Sound, but $uman inter0ention for man/ of t$e important affected Gulf ecos/stems, especiall/ t$e deep'ater ones (but e0en for s$allo'er coral reefs., remains impossible. Dinall/, and per$aps most importantl/, t$e 3rince Ailliam Sound 'as and remains a far less stressed ecos/stem t$an t$e Gulf of Mexico. =n ((J, for example, *699 stated t$at YdZespite t$e remaining impacts of t$e Ystill t$enZ largest oil spill in U.S. $istor/, 3rince Ailliam Sound remains a relati0el/ pristine, producti0e and biologicall/ ric$ ecos/stem."<; 2o be
sure, t$e Sound 'as not completel/ unstressed, and Y'Z$en t$e 7xxon -alde1 spill occurred in Marc$ "!J!, t$e 3rince Ailliam Sound ecos/stem 'as also responding to at least t$ree notable e0ents in its past% an unusuall/ cold 'inter in "!JJUJ!K gro'ing populations of reintroduced sea ottersK and a "!<4 eart$8ua5e."<< *e0ert$eless, t$e Gulf of Mexico is besieged b/ en0ironmental stressors at anot$er order of

magnitude (or t'o., reducing its resilience to disasters li5e t$e +eep'ater :ori1on oil spill. 9s t$e +eep'ater :ori1on ,ommission detailed at lengt$, t$e Gulf faces an arra/ of long-term t$reats, from t$e loss of protecti0e and producti0e 'etlands along t$e coast to $urricanes to a gro'ing dead 1one ($/poxic 1one. to sediment star0ation to seale0el rise to damaging c$anneling to continual (if smaller. oil releases from t$e t$ousands of drilling operations."<I =n
t$e face of t$is plet$ora of stressors, e0en t$e ,ommission c$ampioned a 5ind of resilience t$in5ing, recogni1ing t$at responding to t$e oil spill alone 'as not enoug$. =t e8uated restoration of t$e Gulf to restored resilience, arguing t$at it represents an effort to sustain t$ese di0erse, interdependent acti0ities Yfis$eries, energ/, and tourismZ and t$e en0ironment on '$ic$ t$e/ depend for future generations."<J 9 number of commentators $a0e catalogued t$e failure of t$e legal and regulator/ s/stems go0erning t$e +eep'ater :ori1on platform and t$e Macondo 'ell operations."<! 2$e +eep'ater :ori1on ,ommission similarl/ noted t$at t$e +eep'ater :ori1onGs demise signals t$e conflicted e0olutionSand se0ere s$ortcomingsS of federal regulation of offs$ore oil drilling in t$e United States."I( =n its opinion, YtZ$e +eep'ater :ori1on blo'out, explosion, and oil spill did not $a0e to $appen."I" 2$e ,ommissionGs o0erall conclusion 'as t'o-fold. Dirst, YtZ$e record s$o's t$at 'it$out effecti0e go0ernment o0ersig$t,

t$e offs$ore oil and gas industr/ 'ill not ade8uatel/ reduce t$e ris5 of accidents, nor prepare effecti0el/ to respond in emergencies."I Second, go0ernment o0ersig$t, alone, cannot reduce t$ose ris5s to t$e full extent possible. Go0ernment
o0ersig$t . . . must be accompanied b/ t$e oil and gas industr/Gs internal rein0ention% s'eeping reforms t$at accomplis$ no less t$an a fundamental transformation of its safet/ culture."I#

)lan spills over past the border to environmental standardi6ation in the entire <ul& o& Mexico
>elarde 81( U attorne/ and counselor-at-la' (Rogelio )ope1, $eld 0arious positions at 3emex during "!JJ-"!!#, including t$at of
Dinancial 9d0isor to t$e Dinance +epartment, =n-:ouse ,ounsel in :ouston, 2exas, =n-:ouse ,ounsel in *e' Hor5, and :ead of t$e =nternational )egal +epartment of 3emex. :e 'as $onored 'it$ t$e Most +istinguis$ed 9ttorne/ 9'ard of 3emex for t$e period "!!(-"!!", former ,$airman of t$e 7nerg/ ,ommittee of t$e Mexican 4ar 9ssociation, and currentl/ $e is t$e 3resident for t$e )atin 9merica ,$apter of t$e 9ssociation of t$e =nternational 3etroleum *egotiators (9=3*., as -isiting 3rofessor of @udicial 3rocess on t$e Mexican )egal Studies 3rogram at t$e Uni0ersit/ of :ouston )a' ,enter, and $e is currentl/ t$e director of t$e 7nerg/ )a' Seminar organi1ed bet'een t$e Uni0ersidad =beroamericana and t$e Mexican 4ar 9ssociation. USMexican treat/ on Gulf of Mexico transboundar/ reser0oirs, =nternational )a' 6ffice, #-"!(" ,$ttp%&&'''.internationalla'office.com&ne'sletters&+etail.aspxWg]b!# <bfJ-f If-4#ff-b4;a-"b bI(ccb "Iandredir]". 3emex $as indicated t$at it $as no information to confirm t$e existence of a transboundar/ field. :o'e0er, it is unli5el/ t$at bot$ countries 'ould ta5e t$e step of concluding suc$ a treat/ 'it$out $a0ing geological information to suggest t$e existence of suc$ a field. 6ne of t$e co0enants included in t$e treat/ is particularl/ significant in t$is context. =t re8uires t$e t'o federal go0ernments to adopt common norms and

standards concerning safet/ and en0ironmental protection for t$e ?acti0it/ contemplated under t$is agreement?. 7ffecti0el/, t$is means a $armonised s/stem of offs$ore tec$nical standards for exploration and production in t$e Gulf of Mexico - it seems $ig$l/ unli5el/ t$at t$e rele0ant aut$orities in t$e United States(". and Mexico( . 'ould agree to $armonise applicable standards onl/ in respect of transboundar/ reser0oirs.

'ven i& spills happen/ )lan solves cooperation that ensures a spill is contained
)hilbin 1( U director of crisis management at Regester )ar5in 7nerg/ (@o$n 3. 3$ilbin, Tand9% =s Mexico 3repared for +eep'ater +rilling in t$e
GulfW, =nter-9merican +ialogueGs )atin 9merican 7nerg/ 9d0isor, & (& (" ,$ttp%&&repositor/.unm.edu&bitstream&$andle&"! J& (4II&=sP (Mexico P (3reparedP (forP (+eep'aterP (+rillingP (inP (t$eP (Gulf.pdfWse8uence]".

3emex is not prepared for ris5s suc$ as a spill or ot$er serious accident t$at could $appen as it plans to drill t'o 'ells in ultradeep 'aters of t$e Gulf of Mexico, said @uan ,arlos Oepeda, t$e $ead of Mexico>s *ational :/drocarbons ,ommission, in a Deb. "; inter0ie' 'it$ 2$e Aall Street @ournal. 9ccording to Oepeda, $is agenc/>s resources amount to about percent t$e si1e of its U.S. counterpart>s budget. 3emex officials, $o'e0er, sa/ t$at t$e compan/ is capable
of carr/ing out its plans safel/. :o' prepared is Mexico to deal 'it$ a serious accident in t$e Gulf of MexicoW =s t$e compan/ sacrificing safet/ in its bid to impro0e competiti0eness and meet production goalsW 9% @o$n 3. 3$ilbin, director of crisis management at Regester )ar5in 7nerg/% ?9mong t$e lessons learned from t$e +eep'ater :ori1on incident, t'o are fundamental in determining response preparedness. Dirst is t$e importance of $a0ing a consistent national doctrine at federal, state and local le0els. Significant gaps surfaced during t$e Macondo blo'out response because t$e U.S. ,oast Guard operated under t$e United States> *ational ,ontingenc/ 3lan (*,3., '$ic$ uses a top-do'n approac$ to manage t$e response, '$ile state, local and elected officials operated under t$e Stafford 9ct, '$ic$ is a bottom-up approac$. 2$e second fundamental concern is a'areness and 5no'ledge of t$e doctrine for t$ose 'it$ an/ role in preparedness and response. Response plans and procedures de0eloped from national

doctrine must account for t$e complexit/ t$at 'ill ensue, in0ol0ing man/ Curisdictions and response elements. 9de8uate resources and pre-agreed collaboration mec$anisms among resource pro0iders are e8uall/ important. *ote t$at t$e U.S. ,oast Guard deplo/ed some <( boats and aircraft to assist in Macondo response efforts, along 'it$ o0er #,((( ot$er
boats and " I sur0eillance aircraft and $undreds of indi0iduals in0ol0ed in t$e command and control structure. Mexico>s na0/, 'it$ some (( s$ips total, 'ould be se0erel/ taxed to respond to an incident, despite $a0ing some doctrine in place to deal 'it$ a spill and despite some simulations. 2$e fact

t$at t$e United States and Mexico signed an agreement t$is 'ee5 to collaborate on safet/ and response mec$anisms in t$e Gulf of Mexico is a critical step to'ard safer Gulf operationsSfor bot$ Mexico and t$e United States.?

<ul& ecosystems are critical biodiversity hotspots and have a $ey e&&ect on the #orld8s oceans
0renner ?@ (@orge 4renner, Guarding t$e Gulf of MexicoGs 0aluable resources, Sci+e0*et, #-"4t$e-gulf-of-mexico-s-0aluable-resources.$tml. ((J, $ttp%&&'''.scide0.net&en&opinions&guarding-

2$e Gulf of Mexico is ric$ in biodi0ersit/ and uni8ue $abitats, and $osts t$e onl/ 5no'n nesting beac$ of Nemp>s Ridle/, t$e 'orld>s most endangered sea turtle. 2$e Gulf>s circulation pattern gi0es it biological and socioeconomic importance% 'ater from t$e ,aribbean enters from t$e sout$ t$roug$ t$e Hucatan ,$annel bet'een ,uba and Mexico and, after 'arming in t$e basin, lea0es t$roug$ t$e nort$ern Dlorida Strait bet'een t$e United States and ,uba to form t$e Gulf Stream in t$e *ort$ 9tlantic t$at $elps to regulate t$e climate of 'estern 7urope.

esiliency is #rong speci&ically &or the <ul& o& Mexico%any shoc$ can be the tipping point
Craig 11 U 9ttorne/sG 2itle 3rofessor of )a' and 9ssociate +ean for 7n0ironmental 3rograms at Dlorida State Uni0ersit/ (Robin Nundis, )egal
Remedies for +eep Marine 6il Spills and )ong-2erm 7cological Resilience% 9 Matc$ Made in :ell, 4rig$am Houng Uni0ersit/ )a' Re0ie', ("", $ttp%&&la're0ie'.b/u.edu&articles&"# <4(;"##M(#craig.fin.pdf.

7cological resilience and resilience t$eor/ ac5no'ledge t$at ecos/stems are d/namicSnot, as prior t$eories $ad assumed, in$erentl/ stable s/stems tending to'ard an e8uilibrium."4 Resilience t$eor/ recogni1es t$at t$ere are at
least t$ree different 'a/s in '$ic$ ecos/stems experience and respond to c$ange and perturbationSt$ree different aspects of resilience."4# 2$e first and most common understanding of resilience refers to an ecos/stemGs abilit/ to absorb c$ange and persist in function and relations$ips."44 2$is sense of resilience refers to t$e rate or speed of reco0er/ of a s/stem follo'ing a s$oc5."4; 9s a practical matter in t$e la' of natural resource management, t$e la' tends to expect t$at ecos/stems 'ill be resilient in t$is first senseSt$at is, t$e la' assumes t$at ecos/stems 'ill generall/ successfull/ absorb an/ $uman-induced perturbations of t$e s/stem. 9s a result, natural resources la' is '$at = 'ill term first sense resilience dependence, but t$at dependence reflects a truncated understanding of ecos/stemsG resilience and capacit/ for c$ange. =mportantl/, $o'e0er, t$e second aspect of

resilience t$eor/ ac5no'ledges t$at ecos/stems can exist in multiple states rat$er t$an stabili1ing around a single e8uilibrium stateK as a result, c$anges and disturbances can pus$ ecos/stems o0er t$res$olds from one ecos/stem state to anot$er."4< 2$is second sense of resilience assumes multiple states (or ^regimesG. and is defined as t$e magnitude of a disturbance t$at triggers a s$ift bet'een alternati0e states."4I Dor example, t$e boreal forests of
,anada can exist in at least t'o states 'it$ respect to spruce bud'orms% a no outbrea5 state c$aracteri1ed b/ lo' numbers of bud'orm and /oung, fastgro'ing trees, and an outbrea5 state c$aracteri1ed b/ $ig$ numbers of bud'orm and old, senescent trees."4J 2$e s$ift bet'een t$e t'o appears to relate to an increase in canop/ 0olume, '$ic$ in turn affects bird populations and t$e birdsG abilit/ to control t$e pest."4! Regime-s$ift models can also $elp to explain outbrea5s of some $uman diseases.";( :o'e0er, natural resources la' and polic/ generall/ do

not ac5no'ledge t$is second sense of resilience, and, as a result, it generall/ does not incorporate mec$anisms for ac5no'ledging, responding to, or e0en tr/ing to a0oid ecological regime s$ifts. Dinall/, resilience
t$eor/ also ac5no'ledges t$e surprising and discontinuous nature of c$ange, suc$ as t$e collapse of fis$ stoc5 or t$e sudden outbrea5 of spruce bud'orms in forests.";" =n ot$er 'ords, t$e long-time persistence of an ecos/stem (or collection of multiple ecos/stems.

li5e t$e Gulf of Mexico in an apparentl/ stable, producti0e ecos/stem state is absolutel/ no guarantee t$at $umans can continue to disturb and abuse t$e s/stem and expect onl/ a gradual or linear response. 9s 'as true
for t$e second sense of resilience, natural resource la' in general and marine resources la' in particular do not deal 'ell 'it$ t$e possibilit/ of sudden and dramatic ecos/stem c$anges. *e0ert$eless, suc$ regime s$ifts $a0e been documented for a number of marine ecos/stems. Dor example, =n @amaica, t$e effects of o0erfis$ing, $urricane damage, and disease $a0e combined to destro/ most corals, '$ose abundance $as declined from more t$an ;( percent in t$e late "!I(s to less t$an ; percent toda/. 9 dramatic p$ase s$ift $as occurred, producing a s/stem

dominated b/ fles$/ macroalgae (more t$an !( percent co0er.. =mmediate implementation of management procedures is necessar/ to a0oid furt$er catastrop$ic damage."; Similarl/, t$e presence or absence of sea otters can significantl/ influence t$e
structure and function of 9las5an 5elp forests because t$e otters, '$en present, control sea urc$in populations, allo'ing for more extensi0e coral gro't$.";# =n some locations, moreo0er, sea urc$in population c$anges in response to sea otter predation 'ere rapid and extreme and could result in s$ort-term c$anges in 5elp densit/.";4 2$e current la', polic/, and remed/ regime for offs$ore oil drilling effecti0el/

presumes t$at marine ecos/stems $a0e 0irtuall/ unlimited first-sense resilience 'it$ respect to oil spillsSin crudest terms, t$at restoration 'ill al'a/s be possible, and per$aps e0en t$roug$ entirel/ natural means.";; 6ur
experience 'it$ t$e last large oil spill in U.S. 'aters, $o'e0er, suggests ot$er'ise.

Ma$es extinction inevitable

Craig @ (Robin Nundis, 9ttorne/s> 2itle =nsurance Dund 3rofessor of )a', Dlorida State Uni0ersit/ ,ollege of )a', 2alla$assee, Dlorida, ,)=M927
,:9*G7, R7GU)926RH DR9GM7*292=6*, 9*+ A927R 2R=9G7, Summer, I! U. ,olo. ). Re0. J ;, lexis.

Marine ecos/stems $a0e immense 0alue. 6ceans co0er more t$an I(P of our planet, #"4 support 0ast reser0es of biodi0ersit/ (in all senses., #"; produce at least $alf of t$e 7art$>s atmosp$eric ox/gen, #"< dri0e t$e planet>s $/drological c/cle, #"I se8uester carbon dioxide, #"J and pla/ a significant role in t$e eart$>s climate and 'eat$er. #"! 9s suc$, oceans and estuaries are critical pro0iders of ecos/stem ser0ices - t$ose ?m/riad of life support functions, t$e obser0able manifestations of ecos/stem processes t$at ecos/stems pro0ide and 'it$out '$ic$ $uman ci0ili1ations could not t$ri0e.? # ( 9ccording to a compre$ensi0e stud/ t$at appeared in *ature in "!!I, ?about <#P of t$e estimated 0alue Yof t$e 'orld>s ecos/stem ser0icesZ is contributed b/ marine ecos/stems,? especiall/ coastal ecos/stems. # " Specificall/,
?coastal en0ironments, including estuaries, Y\J! Z coastal 'etlands, beds of sea grass and algae, coral reefs, and continental s$el0es ... co0er onl/ <.#P of t$e 'orld>s surface, but are responsible for 4#P of t$e estimated 0alue of t$e 'orld>s ecos/stem ser0ices.? #

)lan:

The United States &ederal government should increase its oil cooperation #ith the United Mexican States as per the Auter Continental Shel& Trans-boundary 5ydrocarbon 4greements 4uthori6ation 4ct.
Contention B: Solvency

U.S.-Mexico Trans-boundary $ey%Congressional con&irmation is the last remaining step

0ro#n and Meacham 1! (*eil and ,arl, Cournalists for 2$e :ill, 2ime for U.S.-Mexico 2ransboundar/ 9greement, (<&(;&"#,
$ttp%&&t$e$ill.com&opinion&op-ed&#(#I#!-time-for-us-mexico-transboundar/-agreement.RA

2$e United States-Mexico 2ransboundar/ 9greement (249. 'ould enable cooperation bet'een our t'o federal go0ernments and our companies to unloc5 t$e potential for oil and natural gas reser0es t$at extend across our Gulf of Mexico maritime boundar/. ,ongressional appro0al of t$e 249 'ould enric$ U.S.-Mexico relations in t$e near term '$ile la/ing t$e foundation for impro0ed energ/ securit/ and en$anced en0ironmental protection for t$e Gulf ,oast. 4ilateral relations 'it$ Mexico $a0e impro0ed dramaticall/ in recent /ears, /et energ/ cooperation $as lagged . 6il $olds a pri0ileged position of national pride and constitutional protection in Mexico, $istoricall/ putting it off limits for domestic reform and bilateral cooperation 'it$ t$e U.S. 2$e 249 is, t$erefore, more t$an Cust an energ/ agreement. =ts appro0al b/ t$e Mexican go0ernment is a political statement opening a 'indo' to ric$er relations. A$ile t$e area under future Curisdiction of t$e 249 could pro0ide incremental domestic oil production, a far greater pri1e for t$e U.S. oil portfolio is t$e prospect of more reliable oil trade 'it$ our all/ Mexico. 2$e 249 'ould, for t$e first time, allo' oil maCors to 'or5 in Coint production arrangements 'it$ 37M7B and support t$e confidence building
necessar/ to enable t$ose arrangements more 'idel/ in Mexico. 2$at is not onl/ good for oil maCor s$are$olders, it is good for our nationGs energ/ securit/. 70en as U.S. domestic oil production increases, t$e sources of our imports remain critical for economic

stabilit/ and national securit/ flexibilit/. Recentl/, Mexico 'as supplanted b/ Saudi 9rabia as our second largest foreign oil source after ,anada. Mexican oil production $as dropped b/ more t$an a 8uarter o0er t$e last decade, and U.S. refiners geared for $ea0/ oil $ad to loo5 else'$ere to ma5e up t$e difference. ,anadian $ea0/ crude production is increasing in t$e countr/Gs oil sands region, but pipeline infrastructure is insufficient. 2$erefore, in effect, t$e U.S. $as $ad to increase imports of Middle 7ast crudes in order to ma5e up for s$ortfalls in Mexico. 2$e 249 alone 'ill not structurall/ re0erse MexicoGs oil decline, but it is li5el/ a necessar/ first step along t$at pat$. Regardless of 249 appro0al, MexicoGs 37M7B 'ill continue its deep'ater exploration near t$e U.S. border. Ait$ memories of +eep'ater :ori1on still fres$, it is 'orrisome t$at MexicoGs oil safet/ regulator, 5no'n as ,*:, $as almost no capacit/ to pro0ide independent on-site inspections. 9ll facilities operating under t$e 249 'ould be subCect to U.S. inspectors 'it$ t$e abilit/ to stop operations. Moreo0er, U.S. and Mexican regulators 'ould 'or5 $and in $and, offering support for more s/stematic impro0ement. Gi0en t$e foreign polic/, energ/ securit/, and en0ironmental benefits of t$e 249 signed in Debruar/ (" , it is disappointing t$at t$e 6bama administration $as dela/ed ta5ing steps necessar/ for ,ongress to appro0e t$e agreement. 2$at dela/
does not ma5e it an/ less important for ,ongress to appro0e t$e agreement soon. ,ongress $as a critical role in clarif/ing certain pro0isions of t$is international agreement. +ispute resolution mec$anisms 'arrant particular attention. 9lread/, it $as been mista5enl/ argued t$at t$e 249 re8uires greater secrec/ in pa/ments of oil deals, encouraging an effort to exempt t$e agreement from t$e ,ardin-)ugar transparenc/ la'. *o suc$ secrec/ is re8uired b/ t$e 249, '$ic$ subordinates its confidentialit/ rules to domestic la'. 2$e longer t$e 249 sits on t$e s$elf, t$e more li5el/

it 'ill be $amstrung as a prox/ for more rancorous energ/ disputes. 3rompt ,ongressional acti0it/ could be a useful 0ote of confidence in t$e upcoming domestic energ/ sector reform in Mexico. Mexico needs ne' oil production from more complex fields to counterbalance its declining fields, let alone increased production. )eaders in MexicoGs t'o largest political parties 5no' t$at under current capital and management constraints, 37M7B alone is extremel/ unli5el/ to turn MexicoGs oil and natural gas abundance into prosperit/ for t$e Mexican people. =nternational oil maCors are needed, but t$at 'ill ta5e political courage. ,ongressional appro0al of t$e 249 'ould tangibl/ demonstrate t$at t$e U.S. go0ernment and our companies are 'illing partners. 2$at is good for Mexico and for t$e U.S.

Solves )'M'* and the 'nvironment

"avarro 1(

(,arlos, 7ditor at Uni0ersit/ of *e' Mexico )atin 9merica +atabase, Mexico, U.S. Reac$ )andmar5 9greement on +eep'ater 6il 7xploration, - -" , $ttp%&&repositor/.unm.edu&bitstream&$andle&"! J&"!4"4&SourceMex.Mexico.US.Reac$.)andmar5.9greement. . ." .pdfW se8uence]".RA

Mexico and t$e US completed most of t$e negotiations on t$e 2ransboundar/ 9greement in ("", but t$e pact 'as onl/ formali1ed 'it$ t$e signatures of Mexican Doreign Relations Secretar/ 3atricia 7spinosa and US Secretar/ of State :illar/ Rod$am ,linton at t$eG ( meeting in )os ,abos. 6ne of t$e most important benefits of t$e agreement is an end to t$e current moratorium on oil exploration and production in t$e Aestern Gap portion of t$e Gulf of Mexico. 2$e US =nterior +epartment estimates t$at t$e area contains as muc$ as "I million barrels of oil and #(( billion cubic feet of natural gas, but t$ese are relati0el/ modest amounts '$en compared 'it$ t$e potential t$roug$out t$e Gulf of Mexico. ?2$ese reser0oirs could $old considerable reser0es t$at 'ould benefit t$e United States and Mexico ali5e,? ,linton told reporters in )os ,abos. 2$e accord 'ould also $elp facilitate Coint exploration arrangements bet'een 37M7B and US oil companies. 9nd, in t$e absence of Coint exploration agreements, eac$ countr/ $as t$e rig$t to exploit its s$are of $/drocarbons '$ile protecting t$e ot$er nationGs interests. 2$e agreement also contains se0eral clauses t$at allo' t$e t'o countries to cooperate more closel/ in pre0enting and reacting to oil spills. 2$ese include creating Coint inspection teams to ensure compliance 'it$ safet/ la's and en0ironmental rules. Until no', neit$er 'as aut$ori1ed to o0ersee t$e en0ironmental and safet/ practices of t$e ot$er, e0en t$oug$ oil spills do not respect international borders. 2$e clauses 'ere included in t$e agreement partl/ in response to t$e massi0e oil spill at t$e +eep Aater :ori1on drilling rig in t$e Gulf of Mexico in 9pril ("(. ?7ac$ of t$e nations 'ill maintain so0ereignt/ and t$eir o'n regulator/ s/stems,?
=nterior Secretar/ Nen Sala1ar told reporters at t$e G (meeting. ?4ut '$at t$is signifies, and '$at ma/ be t$e most significant part of t$e agreement, is t$at 'eGre mo0ing for'ard Cointl/ 'it$ Mexico to ensure 'e $a0e a common set of safet/ protocols.? Sala1ar and

t$e cooperation on safet/ 'ill especiall/ benefit 37M7B. ?Mexico doesnGt $a0e t$e resources to combat a maCor oil spill, and t$e United States does,? said energ/ expert @orge 3i_on, a researc$ fello' at t$e Uni0ersit/ of 2exas. ?,oordination and s$aring communications, training, personnel, e8uipment, and tec$nolog/ are essential for safe and producti0e drilling.?
Mexican 7nerg/ Secretar/ @ord/ :errera Dlores 'ere on $and in )os ,abos for t$e signing of t$e agreement. 7xperts belie0e