US v. pineda G.R. No.

L-12858 January 22, 1918

FACTS: Feliciano Santos, having some sick horses, presented a copy of a prescription obtained from Dr. Richardson, and which on other occasions Santos had given to his horses with good results, at Pineda's drug store for filling. (Santiago Pineda, the defendant, is a registered pharmacist) Under the supervision of Pineda, the prescription was prepared and returned to Santos in the form of 6 papers marked Botica Pineda Santos, under the belief that he had purchased the potassium chlorate which he had asked for, put two of the packages in water the doses to two of his sick horses. Another package was mixed with water for another horse, but was not used. The two horses, to which had been given the preparation, died shortly afterwards. Santos, thereupon, took the three remaining packages to the Bureau of Science for examination. Drs. Pea and Darjuan, of the Bureau of Science, on analysis found that the packages contained not potassium chlorate but barium chlorate. At the instance of Santos, the two chemists also went to the drug store of the defendant and bought potassium chlorate, which when analyzed was found to be barium chlorate. (Barium chlorate, it should be noted, is a poison; potassium chlorate is not.) Dr. Buencamino, a veterinarian, performed an autopsy on the horses, and found that death was the result of poisoning RTC: held Pineda liable

ISSUE: W/N Pineda should be liable for negligence

HELD: YES. The judgment of the lower court, sentencing the defendant to pay a fine of P100, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs, is affirmed with the cost of this instance against the appellant, without prejudice to any civil action which may be instituted Every pharmacist shall be responsible for the quality of all drugs, chemicals, medicines, and poisons he may sell or keep for sale; and it shall be unlawful for any person whomsoever to manufacture, prepare, sell, or administer any prescription, drug, chemical, medicine, or poison under any fraudulent name, direction, or pretense, or to adulterate any drug, chemical, medicine, or poison so used, sold or offered for sale. Any drug, chemical, medicine, or poison shall be held to be adulterated or deteriorated within the meaning of this section if it differs from the standard of quality or purity given in the United States Pharmacopoeia. The same section of the Pharmacy Law also contains the following penal provision: "Any person violating the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollar." The Administrative Code, section 2676, changes the penalty somewhat by providing that: Any person engaging in the practice of pharmacy in the Philippine Islands contrary to any provision of the Pharmacy Law or violating any provisions of said law for which no specific penalty s provided shall, for

each offense, be punished by a fine not to exceed two hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than ninety days, or both, in the discretion of the court. As a pharmacist, he is made responsible for the quality of all drugs and poisons which he sells. And finally it is provided that it shall be unlawful for him to sell any drug or poison under any "fraudulent name." It is the one word "fraudulent" which has given the court trouble. What did the Legislature intend to convey by this restrictive adjective? Were we to adhere to the technical definition of fraud, which the appellant vigorously insists upon, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to convict any druggist of a violation of the law. The prosecution would have to prove to a reasonable degree of certainty that the druggist made a material representation; that it was false; that when he made it he knew that it was false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of its truth and as positive assertion; that he made it with the intention that it should be acted upon by the purchaser; that the purchaser acted in reliance upon it, and that the purchased thereby suffered injury. Under one conception, and it should not be forgotten that the case we consider are civil in nature, the question of negligence or ignorance is irrelevant. The druggist is responsible as an absolute guarantor of what he sells. Instead of caveat emptor, it should be caveat venditor.

People v. Irang, 64 Phil 285 (1937)

Facts: After barging into her home, a man ordered Maximiniana Vicente to bring out her money and jewelry. As she turned over the items, she looked at the man's face and saw that he had pockmarks and a scar on his left eyelid. Irang was identified by Maximiana from a police line-up and was charged. During the trial, Maximianas neighbor, Juana de la Cruz, testified that on the night in question, her house was assaulted by malefactors. de la Cruz noticed that one of them had pockmarks and a scar on the left eyelid. She identified that man to be Irang.

Held: The testimony of Juana de la Cruz indirectly corroborates Maximinianas testimony that the man of the same description was the one who went to her house and demanded delivery of her money and jewelry. While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to show his presence at the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time charged, or when it is evidence of a circumstance connected with the crime.

US v. Soliman Facts: Soliman, testifying in his on behalf in the course of another criminal case in which he, with several others, was charged with estafa, swore falsely to certain material allegations of fact. He testified falsely that a sworn statement offered in evidence in support of the charge of estafa, which was in effect an extrajudicial confession of his guilt, had not been executed voluntarily, and that its execution had not been procured by the police by the use of force, intimidation and prolonged torture. The trial judge who presided in the former case acquitted him on the ground that there was room for reasonable doubt. Soliman is however, guilty of perjury as defined and penalized in Section 3 of Act No. 1697. However, since judgement was entered on November 1915, section 3 of Act No. 1697 was expressly repealed by the enactment of the Administrative Code which was effective on july 1, 1916 and it has been suggested that the judgement convicting and sentencing the accused under the provisions of that statute should not be sustained and the repeal of the statute should be held to have the effect of remitting and extinguishing the criminal liability of the accused incurred under the provisions of the repealed law prior to the enactment of the Administrative Code.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the repeal of Section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the enactment of the Administrative code had the effect of providing new and distinct penalties for the commission of the crime of perjury. (2) Whether or not the new penalties are more favorable to the convict in the case at bar than those imposed by the trial judge.

Held: (1) Section 3 of Act No. 1697, which defined and penalized the crime of perjury, repealed the provisions of the Penal Code defining and penalizing the crime of perjury, not expressly, but by implication, and we are of opinion that the repeal of Act No. 1697 revived those provisions of the code. The old rule continues in force where a law which repeals a prior law, not expressly but by implication, it itself repealed; and that in such cases the repeal of the repealing law revives the prior law, unless the language of the repealing statute provides otherwise. In the case at bar, the express repeal of section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the enactment of the Administrative Code (Act No. 2657) revived the provisions of the Penal Code touching perjury, which were themselves repealed, not expressly but by implication, by the enactment of Act No. 1697. (2) The penalties prescribed in the Penal Code is less than that imposed in Section 3 of Act # 1697. Hence, the penalty imposed by the court below must be revoked and the penalty prescribed in the Penal Code should be imposed.

People v. Babiera G.R. No. 28871 September 19, 1928

This is an appeal taken by Clemente Babiera, Justo Babiera and Dominga Bores from the judgment of the CFI finding them guilty of the crime of murder, the first as principal, and the last two as accomplices, sentencing the former to life imprisonment with the accessories of article 54 of the Penal Code, and each of the latter to fourteen years, eight months and one day cadena temporal, with the accessories of article 54 and 59 of the Penal Code, respectively, and all three to indemnify the family of the deceased Severino Haro in the sum of P1,000 jointly and severally, and each of them to pay one-third of the costs of the action in the justice of the peace court and CFI Before discussing the evidence adduced by both parties and determining its weight and probatory value, it is well to decide the questions raised by the appellants on the admissibility of evidence. The first question of this nature refers to the character of the document Exhibit I, which is a statement made by Severino Haro in Saint Paul's Hospital of Iloilo on the morning after the crime was committed. Although said statement in itself is inadmissible as an ante-mortem declaration, inasmuch as there is nothing to show that at the time he made it Severino Haro knew or firmly believed that he was at the point of death, nevertheless, having ratified its contents a week later when he was near death as a result of his wounds, said declaration is admissible as a part of that which he made ante-mortem "A statement made under circumstances which would not render it admissible as a dying declaration becomes admissible as such, it is held, if approved or repeated by the declarant after he had abandoned all hope of recovery."

Passing now to a consideration of the evidence, the prosecution tried to proved the following facts: On August 21, 1927, Severino Haro, as usual, went to visit his land in the barrio of Bita, accompanied by Gregorio Torrija, Benito Carreon and Pedro Tauro. On arriving there Fermin Bruces, his copartner on shares, told him that the day before he had found Clemente Babiera's cow grazing on that land. It happened at that moment Clemente Babiera and Dominga Bores were passing by. Severino Haro then informed Clemente Babiera of what his cow had done on the former's land and told him to take better care of his cow in future and not to let it run loose. He then ordered Fermin Bruces to take the animal to where the Babiera family lived. Severino Haro was not able to return to town until almost 7 o'clock in the evening. As it was already dark, he and his companions had to make use of a torch made out of split bamboo to light them on their way. Severino Haro went ahead, followed by Pedro Tauro, who carried the torch, some 8 brazas behind, with Gregorio Torrija and Benito Carreon following. On Coming to a place in the road near Rosendo Paycol's house, Clemente Babiera suddenly sprang from the cogon grass, went after Severino Haro and struck him with his bolo in the back. On turning his head to see who had attacked him Severino Haro received another bolo blow in the forehead near the right eyebrow. In trying to defend himself with his hand he was wounded between the index finger and the thumb. He then tried to grasp his assailant but did not succeed and he fell to the ground. Then Justo Babiera appeared and placing himself upon Severino Haro's stomach, held the latter's hands. Later, Dominga Bores appeared on the scene and held both knees of the wounded man. When Justo Babiera arrived, a voice was heard saying: "Hold him, papa," and at the same time, Severino Haro's voice was heard saying: "Help! help!" Pedro Tauro wished to come near in order to help Severino Haro, but Clemente Babiera raised his bolo in the air and kept on brandishing it to warn everybody off. Pedro Tauro, in fear, stepped back, dropping the torch he carried. Not far from there were also Buenaventura Gabalfin and Gregorio Paycol, who threatened to kill Severino Haro's companions if they helped him. After the torch had been extinguished they heard a voice which they recognized as Severino Haro's saying: " Uncle Justo, have patience with me, for I have done no wrong." Then they heard another voice, that of Dominga Bores, which said: "Here is the revolver; let us return." Before the assailants left two or three revolver shots were heard. When Severino Haro's companions saw that their assailants had already departed, they drew near to where Severino lay stretched out to see what had happened to him. Severino Haro told them not to fear for he did not feel as if he were going to die, and calling his copartner on shares, Fermin Bruces, directed him to bring a cot and take him to town. Pedro Tauro and Gregorio Torrija did as Severino Haro wished, and on arriving at the barrio of Santa Monica, they by chance came upon a truck in which were some policemen. They place the wounded man in the same truck and took him to Saint Paul's Hospital in the City of Iloilo. When Severino Haro was taken to the town he did not have his revolver and the cartridge belt, without the holster, was found by Gregorio Torrija near where the incident took place. When Severino Haro was already in Saint Paul's Hospital he was examined by Dr. Mariano Arroy, who issued a certificate stating that he found the following wounds:

Three on the right frontal regions; one on the right forehead taking in the soft parts up to the auditory arch; on the right palmar arch; another on the left arm; a deep one reaching down to the spinal column on the four slight wounds on the right thigh; the ones on the forehead and the dorsal region being mortal of necessity. All the wounds were caused, in the doctor's opinion, by a sharp-edged and pointed weapon, and while the combatants were on the same plane, except the wounds on the middle of the calf which must have been caused while the assaulted party was on a lower plane than his assailant, and the wounds on the right thigh, which must have been inflicted while the assailant was on a horizontal plane. The only question to determine in the present appeal is whether, as the prosecution contends, Severino Haro was suddenly and treacherously attacked by Clemente Babiera, aided by his father and his mistress Dominga Bores; or, as the defense contends, Severino Haro notwithstanding the agreement between himself and Clemente Babiera by which the latter was to indemnify him for the damages caused by his cow, wanted to take the animal to town; that in trying to prevent it, Clemente Babiera was grasped by the hand by Severino Haro and pulled to one side; that in disengaging himself Clemente Babiera received a bolo cut from Margarito Mediavilla that wounded the little finger of his right hand; and that Severino Haro then unsheathed his revolver and fired several shots, in view of which Clemente Babiera struck right and left with his bolo, thus causing the former's wounds. In order to decide the question thus raised, it is necessary to take into account all the circumstances, previous, coetaneous and subsequently to the incident in question, and to determine who had, or could have had, motives to assault the other. It has been contended by the defense that the defendant-appellant, Clemente Babiera, only acted in defense of his life and property, having been obliged to resort to arms on seeing his life endangered, contending that the provocation consisted in that after Severino Haro had agreed to an indemnity of P2 for the damage caused, the latter wanted to take Clemente Babiera's cow to the town, and that the attack consisted in that Margarito Mediavilla gave him a bolo blow on the little finger of the right hand, and that Severino Haro threatened him with his revolver and fired several shots at him. Examined in the light of the ordinary conduct of men, Severino Haro's alleged attitude, in having tried to take Clemente Babiera's cow after having agreed to accept P2 for the damages, and having ordered that the animal be returned to its owner, is highly illogical, and not a scintilla of evidence has been presented to explain this change of determination, as unexpected as it is unreasonable. With respect to the allegation that Margarito Mediavilla and Severino Haro began the attack, inasmuch as it has not been proved that they were the instigators, it cannot be conceived that they committed said unlawful aggression, for he who has no reason to provoke, has no reason to attack unlawfully. To rebut the evidence of the prosecution that Dominga Bores was the one who by order of Clemente Babiera took Severino Haro's revolver from him on the night in question, the defense tried to prove that on the following morning attorney Buenaventura Cordova, a relative of the Babieras, told Dominga Bores to return to the place of the incident and look for said weapon, and that she found it in a furrow near the place and took it to the office of the Constabulary in Iloilo between 9 and 10 o'clock in the morning. But the rebuttal evidence of the prosecution disproved this contention and showed that Dominga Bores did not have to look for the revolver in the field, since at half past five in the morning she was already in the provincial building of Iloilo carrying a package under her arm. With regard to the small wound at the base of the little finger of the right hand which Clemente Babiera showed to the Constabulary physician as having been caused by Margarito Mediavilla, we are convinced that the latter was not in the company of Severino Haro on the night in question and could not have inflicted such a wound. Bearing in mind the plan of the defense, it may safely be said that in order to cast an appearance of reality on the concocted plea of an unlawful attack and self-defense, Clemente Babiera

inflicted on himself the slight wound; since, if in order to escape military service there were men who mutilated themselves, who would not wound himself slightly in order to escape a life penalty? The facts related above have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and constitute the crime of murder defined in article 403 of the Penal Code, there being present at the commission of the crime, the qualifying circumstance of treachery, consisting in the accused Clemente Babiera having attacked Severino Haro suddenly while the latter had his back turned, inflicting various wounds on his body as a result of which he died a week later, said Clemente Babiera being criminally liable as principal by direct participation. Justo Babiera and Dominga Bores are also liable but as accomplices, because, while they did not take a direct part in the infliction of the wounds that caused Severino Haro's death, or cooperated by acts without which they could not have been inflicted, or induced Clemente Babiera to inflict them, yet they took part in the commission of the crime by simultaneous acts consisting in the former having mounted Severino Haro's body and held down his hands, while the latter sat on his knees while he lay stretched out on the ground in order to allow Clemente Babiera to search the body for his revolver, Justo Babiera and Dominga Bores cannot be held as accomplices of the crime of murder, inasmuch as it does not appear to have been proven that they knew the manner in which Clemente Babiera was going to assault Severino Haro, in accordance with the provision of article 79 of the Penal Code, to the effect that the circumstances which consist in the material execution of the act, or in the means employed to accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of those persons only who had knowledge of them at the time of the act or their cooperation therein. Although in the instant case the treachery is not considered a generic aggravating, but a qualifying circumstance, nevertheless, it does not fail to produce a special aggravation.

US v. Mercado [G.R. No. 8332. November 13, 1913. ]

Facts: COERCION; IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES BY QUESTIONS RELATING TO CHARACTER. Held, under the facts stated in the opinion, that the defendants are guilty of the crime of coercion. Generally speaking, a witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been called, except by showing: (a) That he has made statements contradictory to the statements which he is then making to the court; or (b) by showing that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.) It may be shown by an examination of a witness himself or from the record of the judgment that he has been convicted of a high crime. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.) High crimes are generally defined as such immoral and unlawful acts as are nearly allied and equal in guilt to felonies. These defendants were charged with the crime of coaccion in the CFI On the 13th of March, 1912, one Claro Mercado presented a complaint against the defendants in the court of the justice of the peace of Baliuag. The justice of the peace conducted a preliminary examination and found that there was probable cause for believing that the defendants were guilty of the crime charged and held them for trial in the CFI. "That the said accused on December 22, 1911, in the municipality of Baliuag, Province of Bulacan, P. I., did willfully and criminally, without legitimate authority therefor, and by means of violence or force employed upon the person of Claro Mercado, prevent the latter from rendering aid to Maria R. Mateo in order that Santiago Mercado might at his pleasure maltreat the said Maria R. Mateo, in violation of law." To that ruling of the court the defendant duly excepted. Said exception is assigned here as the first assignment of error. The only argument which the appellant presents in support of his assignment of error

is that the question had no relation to the question which was being discussed by the court and did not tend to show that the defendants were either guilty or not guilty of the crime charged; that questions tending to disclose the character of a witness are immaterial. In reply to the argument of the appellant, the Attorney-General contends that the question was a proper question, because it tended to impugn the credibility of the witness and that such questions were for that purpose material and pertinent. It will be remembered that the complaint charged that on the occasion when the alleged crime was committed Santiago Mercado was attempting to and did assault and illtreat one Maria R. Mateo. In answer to said question, the witness admitted that complaint had been presented against him for the offense of assault and battery. The prosecution, in order to show the circumstances under which the crime charged here was actually committed, showed that this witness, Santiago Mercado, had assaulted and illtreated Maria R. Mateo, under the circumstances described in the complaint. That was an important fact. If the said assault did not actually take place, then the theory of the prosecution must fail. If there was no assault or attempted assault, there was no occasion for the alleged interference on the part of the said Claro Mercado to prevent it, and the probability of the guilt of the defendants is greatly lessened. If the witness who had committed the alleged assault, had assaulted other persons and had been prosecuted therefor, may that fact be considered by the court in weighing the proof and in testing the credibility of the witness? It was an important fact to prove that Santiago Mercado, at the time and place mentioned in the complaint, had assaulted or attempted to assault or illtreat Maria R. Mateo, in order to show that there was occasion for the interference of Claro Mercado. Generally speaking, a witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been called, except by showing (a) that he has made contradictory statements; or (b) by showing that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.) The question to which the defendant objected neither attempted to show that the witness had made contradictory statements nor that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity was bad. While you cannot impeach the credibility of a witness, except by showing that he has made contradictory statements or that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, yet, nevertheless, you may show by an examination of the witness himself or from the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of a high crime. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.) In the present case, the other offense to which the question above related was not a high crime, as that term is generally used, and we assume that the phrase "high crime," as used in section 342, is used in its ordinary signification. High crimes are generally defined as such immoral and unlawful acts as are nearly allied and equal in guilt to felonies. We believe that the objection to the above question was properly interposed and should have been sustained. The question now arises, did the admission of the question prejudice the rights of the defendants? If there was proof enough adduced during the trial of the cause, excluding the particular proof brought out by this question to show that the defendants are guilty of the crime, then the question and answer and the ruling of the court upon the same did not affect prejudicially the interests of the defendants. Errors committed by the trial court, which are not prejudicial to the rights of the parties, should be disregarded by the court. In our opinion the evidence clearly shows that the witness committed the assault to which reference is made in the complaint in the present cause. Whether he had committed other assaults or not was a matter of no importance in the present action. The admission or rejection, therefore, of the proof to which such question related could in no way prejudice the rights of the defendants. The second and third assignments of error relate to the sufficiency of the proof adduced during the trial of the cause to show that the defendants were guilty of the crime charged. A question of fact only is raised by these assignments of error. After a careful examination of the proof, we are convinced that the same shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendants are each guilty in the manner and form charged in the complaint. We find no reason for modifying the conclusions of fact reached by the lower court.

Even admitting that the accused, had they testified, would have made the same declarations as those made by the only witness, Santiago Mercado, we are of the opinion that such declarations would not have been sufficient, inasmuch as they would have added nothing to the record, except an accumulation of proof, to have shown that the defendants were not guilty of the crime charged. We find no reason in the fourth assignment of error for modifying the conclusions of the lower court. After a careful examination of the record, we are persuaded that the same shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendants were guilty of the crime charged and that the sentence of the lower court should be affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

People v. umbana [G.R. Nos. 146862-64. April 30, 2003] On automatic review is the JudgmentRTC, finding Gaudencio Umbaa y Duran, guilty of three counts of rape, committed against his daughter, complainant Cheril L. Umbaa That on the 3rd day of September, 1999 at about 1:00 oclock in the early morning, more or less, accused armed with a kitchen knife enter[ed] the room where his daughter Cheril Umbaa was sleeping and once inside, threaten[ed] the victim not to shout, remove[d] her pants and underwear and with lewd designs, with force, and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and felon[i]ously have sexual intercourse with his daughter Cheril Umbaa against her will.

That on the 4th day of September, 1999 at about 1:00 oclock in the early morning, more or less, accused armed with a kitchen knife enter[ed] the room where his daughter Cheril Umbaa was sleeping and once inside, threaten[ed] the victim not to shout, remove[d] her pants and underwear and with lewd designs, with force, and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and felon[i]ously have sexual intercourse with his daughter Cheril Umbaa against her will. That on the 5th day of September, 1999 at about 1:00 oclock in the early morning, more or less, accused armed with a kitchen knife enter[ed] the room where his daughter Cheril Umbaa was sleeping and once inside, threaten[ed] the victim not to shout, remove[d] her pants and underwear and with lewd designs, with force, and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and felon[i]ously have sexual intercourse with his daughter Cheril Umbaa against her will. Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued. Through testimonial evidence, The defense presented a different version, through four witnesses, namely, appellant GAUDENCIO UMBAA, his brothers CELESTINO and GERARDO UMBAA and a childhood friend, ALBERTO POLANCOS. Appellant GAUDENCIO UMBAA interposed the defenses of alibi and denial. He completely denies the rape charges against him. He avers that complainants testimony is a lie and a mere concoction Appellant further testified that on the night of September 2, 1999, he was at his mother Teodula Umbaas house in Barobo.Also staying in the house were his mother Teodula, his daughter Cheril, his two nephews Dhondever and Domingo Umbaa. He slept on a folding bed in the sala, along with his two nephews. Cheril slept by herself in one of the rooms, while Teodula also occupied the other room adjacent to Cherils. Each room had a door from the sala.After watching television that night, he went to sleep and woke up at 5:00 a.m. the following day, September 3, 1999. On the alleged occurrence of the first rape, or at 1:00 a.m. of September 3, 1999, he was in fact fast asleep. He did not wake up from midnight of September 2, 1999 to 5:00 a.m. of September 3, 1999 After waking up, he had breakfast and then left the house to go to the mountain of Sudlon. His mother owned a parcel of land there and he intended to make copra so that he can use the proceeds for Cherils fare in going to Manila. He was with Celestino Umbaa, Salome Umbaa, Bebi Umbaa and two other companions including the coconut climber. He also mentioned the names of Ally Polancos and Virgilio Maraan as additional companions. On cross-examination, appellant further testified that it was his custom to smoke during nighttime. When he would wake up during midnight, he smoke[s] to breath[e] fresh air.[64] He knew that Cheril sleeps alone in her room and that the room is closed only with a plywood door. In addition to appellants testimony, the three other witnesses testified, thus: ALBERTO POLANCOS and CELESTINO UMBAA corroborated appellants testimony as to his whereabouts on September 3, 1999. Alberto[66] confirmed that he saw the brothers appellant and Celestino Umbaa gathering coconuts in the morning of September 3, 1999.[67] Later that day, as Alberto was on his way back home, he again saw the two, still hard at work.[68] That night, Alberto proceeded to Anghel Umbaas house where appellant and Celestino were staying. They talked about old times, after which Alberto left Anghels house at around 10:00 p.m. Alberto assumed that both appellant and Celestino spent the night at Anghels house.[ RTC convicted the accused Accused appealed

On the Sufficiency of the Evidence Appellant contends that Cherils testimony is incredible. Cheril and her mother Lilia allegedly have the propensity to concoct stories. In addition, he claims that they had the motive to fabricate the charges against him and Cheril harbored ill-feelings towards him for years. Appellant insists that his defense of alibi was sufficiently corroborated by his witnesses. For appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that contrary to appellants assertion, the prosecutions evidence amply established appellants guilt. Appellee points out that, as found by the trial court, complainant did not waver in her testimony. Finally, appellee asserts that the testimonies of the defense witnesses showed bias in appellants favor. In the review of rape cases, we have been guided by certain precepts. First, an accusation of rape can be made with facility. It may be difficult to prove, but it is even more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove. Second, the complainants testimony must be scrutinized with extreme caution. This principle finds its basis in the very nature of the crime where usually only two persons are involved. Third, the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense With these in mind, Cherils testimony was carefully scrutinized and we are co nvinced that her testimony is credible, and unmarred by any hint of untruth or prevarication. We agree with the observations of the trial court that [s]he was young, educated and intelligent. The way she answered the questions pro[p]ounded [to] her indic ated all sincerity and truthfulness. The trial court saw sincerity in her eyes when she declared that she had lost respect for her father because what he had done to her cannot be eaten by the dog.[91] In contrast, the trial court found that the evidenc e for the defense was concocted and fabricated. Time and again, we have accorded high respect to the trial courts evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses, the trial judge being the person best-equipped to appreciate testimonial evidence and assign values to the declaration of different witnesses. On several occasions, we have explained: Long settled in criminal jurisprudence is the rule that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will not disturb the findings of the trial court. This rule is justified by the fact that the trial court is in a better position to decide the question. Having the advantage of directly observing witnesses, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between fact and prevaricatio n that will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down in confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears were shed in anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see all these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned verdict. Even the testimony adduced by the defense portraying Cheril as a disrespectful and wayward child does not detract from her credibility as a witness narrating her ordeal in the hands of her father. Moral character is immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of persons accused of rape, as even prostitutes can be the victims of rape.[94] Moreover, we recognize that a rape victims testimony against her father is

entitled to great weight, since reverence and respect for elders is deeply ingrained in Filipino children and is recognized by law Under the threat of the knife and the shock of being violated by her own father, even a grown-up like Cheril cannot be expected to put up a fight. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and she submits herself against her will to the rapists lust because of fear for life and personal safety. With regard to the alleged motive of the complainant in pinning her father down for grievances in the past, we find that the same has been sufficiently debunked by Cheril in her testimony, Although appellant stresses that his alibi was corroborated by Alberto Polancos, the latter was only with appellant until 10:00 p.m. of September 3, 1999.[108] Thus, at the time in question, that is, 1:00 p.m. of September 4, 1999, Alberto Polancos testimony does not help appellants cause at all. We also do not look with favor upon Celestino Umbaas testimony. Although he testified that he was together with appellant the whole night of September 3, 1999 up to the morning of September 4, 1999, and that they slept side by side, we find the same testimony to be biased. Where the appellants alibi is established only by himself and by his relative, his denial of culpability does not deserve consideration in the face of the affirmative testimony of a credible prosecution witness Thus, we agree with the trial court that appellants alibi was not sufficiently corrob orated and that he was indeed in Barobo when the three rape incidents were alleged to have occurred. Unavailing, too, is appellants defense of denial. All we have are the bare and uncorroborated protestations of appellant that he did not rape his daughter. No evidence was adduced to support it. Like the defense of alibi, denial is inherently a weak defense. To be believed, it must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, such denial is purely self-serving and has practically no evidentiary value RTC affirmed by sc

PEOPLE v. JUAN BRIOSO, ET AL. 37 SCRA 336 (1971)

Facts: On December 23, 1966, the spouses Silvino Daria and Susana Tumalip were in their house when Cecilia Bernal, a niece and neighbor, was alarmed by the barking of the dogs. When she peeped through a crack in the wall of her house she saw Juan Brioso, who was carrying a long gun, and Mariano Taeza walking in the direction of the Darias house. Bernal saw them point the gun at the bamboo wall of the house. Two detonations followed and Bernal heard Silvino moaning and his wife crying for help. Bernal went to the house and found Silvino prostrate, wounded, and unable to speak. Susana, however, right after being shot, rushed to her husbands side and he told her that he was shot by Brioso and Taeza. Silvino died one hour later. A few days later, Susana and Bernal executed affidavits pointing to the Brioso and Taeza as the killers. Antonio Daria, the son of Silvino, meanwhile, executed an affidavit clearing Taeza. The court, however, disregarded said affidavit.

Issues: Was Antonios affidavit clearing Taeza hearsay? Held: Yes. The affidavit of Antonio, which was presented to corroborate the testimony of Taeza, was hearsay. Said affidavit was never identified by Antonio, the supposed affiant, and there was no opportunity for the prosecution to cross-examine him. Affidavits are generally not prepared by affiants themselves but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiants statemen ts, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. For this reason, and for further reason that the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants, affidavits are generally rejected in a judicial proceeding as hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are place on the witness stand to testify thereon. Antonio Darias affidavit, therefore, has no probative value.

Doctrine: For the reasons that affidavits are generally not prepared by the affiants themselves and that the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants, affidavits are generally rejected in a judicial proceeding as hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are place on the witness stand to testify thereon.