THE RUSI JOURNAL

LESSONS UNLEARNED
A FORMER OFFICERS PERSPECTIVE ON THE BRITISH ARMY AT WAR
Patrick Little

The British Armys capacity for internal reection and rapid change has been sapped by an insular, conformist culture. While the US Army has undergone a marked period of transformation after a period of open critical appraisal, no exercise, analogous in size and scope, has taken place in the UK. Here, the author argues that this orthodoxy must be challenged and a new ethos of creative tension instilled in the military.

Photo courtesy of US Department of Defense.

RUSI JOURNAL JUNE 2009 VOL. 154 NO. 3 pp. 1016 DOI: 10.1080/03071840903097589

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ubris in the British Army has caused too little concern for too long. This article lays down a challenge for those who share the fear that, behind the faade, all is not well in the British Army and has not been for some time. A popular Chinese proverb, often employed as a curse, invites its target to live in interesting times. The curse is being lived through today in Britain a serious economic recession, withdrawal from Iraq, failing confidence in the route chosen in Afghanistan, and a fin de sicle government. Calls for an inquiry into the road to war in Iraq and its subsequent conduct are beginning to converge with an impending Strategic Defence Review, potentially led by an opposition party already choosing to make clear that all current big-ticket defence projects are open to review. The media criticism of the conduct of the UKs campaign in Iraq and Afghanistan is becoming increasingly perceptive and acute, and is all the more so in the absence of public reflection by the military on what it has done well at and badly at in both conflicts. Recent editorials in The Economist, in terms of both quality and quantity, illustrate this point all too clearly.1 The UK and its military are therefore at a critical moment one in which an urge to protect individual (political and senior military) and collective legacies will either follow one of two routes. The route of least resistance is to pass blame for all shortcomings on to a lame duck government. The second option, in the case of the British Army specifically and defence more generally, is to turn the critical mirror on itself. This mirror will lead to an acknowledgement of shortcomings. It will demonstrate unequivocally a willingness to learn, pay the price of failings, and a determination to adapt. The first of these choices fits a public appetite for blaming this government; it is convenient and follows a well worn military tradition and narrative. What it will not do is begin the journey, through a recognition of the UK militarys hubris over the last ten years, to recover the ground lost with other professional armies who are too used to having been preached at and biting their tongues. The second of these choices begins,

and only begins, what may be a long and painful journey. It would be deeply uncomfortable for many senior officers as it should be. It may, if mishandled, deflect some of the blame from government but this is no excuse for failing in this critical exercise.

The Background
There is a more immediate backdrop to these reflections in this article which provides an obvious starting point. At the end of 2005, Brigadier Aylwin-Foster offered the US military in its own in-house publication, the Military Review, some searing insights into its culture, organisation and approach to operations in Iraq. Not only did the US military publish without amendment this blunt and no holds barred appraisal;2 not only was AylwinFoster invited to speak about it further to a high-level US conference on counterinsurgency; but it then published in the following edition of Military Review a surprisingly measured and considered response.3

All is not well in the British Army

At about the same time, a number of middle-ranking serving US Army officers began to give voice to their own fears for their institution. To what extent it was influenced by Brigadier Aylwin-Foster and other outsiders is difficult to ascertain. But what is now clear, however, is that in the period that followed from 2005 to the present day the US Army has undergone a quite remarkable transformation. It has been led by a minority of the senior leadership, encouraged by a previously ignored middle management layer, and coloured by an unusually strong understanding of how it was perceived by partners, allies and adversaries. Amongst the most prominent of those given voice was then Field Artillery Lieutenant Colonel, John Nagl, whose book4 has since become the counter-insurgency primer. In it, he directly compared the culture and capacity for learning displayed by the British Army in Malaya and the US Army in Vietnam by extension, it was a direct criticism of the dominant US Army culture. Indirectly, it had lessons about learning that the British Army should have been

equally conscious of, but did not appear ready to reflect on. But more trenchant still was an article by Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling, another serving officer, on the failings of his senior leadership, entitled A Failure of Generalship.5 The consequence of this movement was a significant internal blood letting exercise at the highest levels of the US Army, recognising that its existing culture did not produce officers attuned to the demands of counter-insurgency. This led to a turnabout in almost every aspect of the US Armys performance in Iraq. The long-term impact of the change in the US approach in Iraq and Afghanistan, is, of course, still unclear and remains the subject of enormous speculation. Indeed there may be some in the UK content to see it falter, because to see it succeed so obviously challenges the whole UK military approach to both theatres. But this should not overshadow just how difficult it is to do what General Petraeus and others have sought to do to the US Army. Yet the reality appears to be that none of these different themes whether the confidence to accept external criticism, the courage to publicise painful internal reflection, the momentum built up by more junior officers for change seem to have counterparts of such significance in the UK. The preparedness to accept external criticism, such as that most obviously voiced by AylwinFoster, contrasts uncomfortably with the absence of any such exchange of views in British professional literature. When was an equally critical appraisal of the UK military by an American or European officer last published in the British Army Review or any other British defence publication? The answer is never. However, cracks in the faade, as indicated by General David Richards in a recent Channel 4 documentary,6 suggest the state of denial is changing at last. But this does not explain why a process, underway in the US Army for the last four years, has had so little impact on the British Army for so long. This paper attempts, albeit briefly, to explore these issues, fleshing out the principal charges, before offering one view as to how matters might be improved. It seeks to do so by first exploring the importance of perspective before examining the why; in this case,

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a climate for command and communication has not enabled the sort of radical adaptation required. It then concludes with some measures meant to revitalise the internal reflexive capability of the British Army, by making fundamental improvements to its culture and thereby to its ability to understand itself, and how it is perceived by friends and allies.

tion, training, structures, the selection of senior officers the list could go on.

Searching for New Perspectives

Generations of US and European partners have grown up with the notion developed inside the British Army that it had more to teach than it had to learn. Generations too of foreign students at the UK Staff College have grown accustomed to the little or no interest paid to their own experiences, and still less to their unique perspective on the British approach. One has to wonder therefore what might be written by a foreign observer, if invited to produce an Aylwin-Foster type critique. It could be drawn from what an overseas officer might have been taught at the UK Staff College, what he or she might have understood from UK colleagues on operations, and what is all too readily available in open sources.7 Whatever the sources, it is clearly apparent that they would not be short of material. They might look at equipment procurement, doctrine, crossgovernment co-operation, officer educa RUSI JOURNAL JUNE 2009

The route of least resistance is to pass blame for all shortcomings on to a lame duck government
One example of the sort of external observer to whom one might go for an illuminating external perspective is Lieutenant Colonel Brian Mennes, the previous commanding officer of US Task Force 1/Fury in 2007, an 82nd Airborne Division battalion, and now commander of a Ranger battalion. Not only was he already an extremely experienced operator even before his battalions deployment to Afghanistan, but by the time of the operation to re-take Musa Qala, he and his battalion had amassed unrivalled counter-insurgency experience across Afghanistan. This included having worked for two British brigade commanders prior to the arrival 52 Brigade and Brigadier Mackay. His role in Operation Snakebite gave him a quite unique vantage point, exposed, as he was, to the workings of Task Force Helmand, and to its subordinate (but his peer) battle groups. Whilst

extensively and informatively interviewed by Stephen Grey for his book on Operation Snakebite, no process of critical debrief was undertaken by the UK. Indeed, suggestions to the UK Operational Lessons Identified and Post Operational Interview staffs8 that Colonel Mennes was the ideal candidate to draw out some of these unique perspectives were not followed. The comment was made that the organisation was so busy gathering UK perspectives that it lacked the resources irrespective of how much more valuable, in a relative sense, such an external perspective might be. At a more strategic level, Thomas Rickss account in The Gamble of two advisers appointed to Generals Petraeus and Odierno is salutary. One adviser, a British woman, Emma Sky, simply cannot imagine a British Army general having space or appetite for her approach. Yet a closer analogy still is to imagine a senior British officer employing a foreign national, most obviously a US civilian, as his main adviser surely an even less likely proposition. The other adviser is Sadi Othman: an ex-taxi driver, PalestinianJordanian by upbringing, born in Brazil, and re-naturalised as an American. He was undoubtedly key to the way that Petraeus thought about and engaged with his Iraqi counterparts. Again, as

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be more systematically addressed. In the absence of meaningful internal debate, external perspectives are as good a tool as any.

The Epicentre: Command Climate

The Chief of the General Staffs frequent controversial comments to the press on overstretch and valuing the nations soldiers will seem to many external observers to represent a useful pressure valve.12 Equally, the steady outbursts by retired senior officers on similar issues will also come across as not unwelcome.13 But, crucially, they do not deal with or reflect the root causes of pressures that appear to have built up. Most importantly, there seems to be a feeling amongst middle tier officers that they are not listened to, are largely expendable and that their own hierarchy does not adequately reflect their concerns. This contrasts markedly with the very direct criticism by US officers of their own leaders generalship, where in Paul Yinglings article the hierarchy is accused of failing to deliver on its responsibilities to Congress and the state, and requires significant reform as a body to be fit for purpose.14 By contrast, in and amongst the noise generated by retired senior officers sounding off about resource shortages, there has been too little equivalent internal reflection on and acknowledgement of these same issues of command and hierarchy.

The new school: COIN theorists David Kilcullen (left, opposite page) and John Nagl (above). Photos courtesy of US Department of Defense.

with Sky, it is not easy to imagine a British pro-consul employing a figure with such a background, and then promoting them against considerable resistance to such an influential position as that held by Othman. To conclude this brief reflection on the importance of external perspectives, it is worth pondering John Nagls recent comments to Stephen Grey about the British Army:9
 ntil you admit that you have a probU lem, until you admit that you are not doing everything as well as you can, its really, really hard to get better. I havent seen that same spirit of self criticism in the British Army. That sort of rigorous analysis would be enormously helpful The British Army which has such a proud history in counter-insurgency campaigns has not done everything right in Helmand Province, did not do

everything right in Basra. It needs to think hard about these lessons. I believe it needs to think publicly.

John Nagl forms part of a rather unusual cohort of middle ranking military authors, along with Thomas Hammes and David Kilcullen,10 all of whom appear to have had significant influence in the development of new US doctrine and the change in its underlying culture. If one accepts this, and acknowledges that the UK has not managed to produce any published officers of a similar rank or influence, then it follows that his comments above should be taken very seriously indeed. These comments, if accepted, make a significant contribution to what William Owen, a regular contributor to the British Army Review, describes as the comforting myths that sustain the glib and unreflective.11 They are part of a perspective, currently unwelcome, that needs to

The US Army has undergone a quite remarkable transformation

This is an issue at the very heart of the British Armys view of itself, and of what style or environment it believes will be most militarily productive. As with a number of issues, it is generally assumed that its friends and allies envy the UK militarys command style and climate. Certainly, the UK often expects commanders at all levels to make full use of the latitude given them, something often assumed absent in other armed forces. It is also the case that the relationship between

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lessons unlearned

officers and NCOs in the British Army is widely admired, for generally producing a very effective command climate at unit level. But this is where much of it ends, for there is just as much anecdotal evidence that at more senior levels effective communication becomes more, not less, difficult. Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Tootals description of senior officers trying to perhaps dilute the objective raw military advice15 is sadly telling in this respect. Language in briefing becomes more bland and insipid, and in particular relies on extensive euphemism, leading to great difficulty in communicating the undesirable. The way in which formal questions to visitors are controlled at Staff College offers some insight as to how this looks in practice. Middle ranking officers, albeit Staff College trained and highly experienced, have been directed quite threateningly to stay in your lane in their dealings with media, indicating a quite extraordinarily defensive attitude by senior military officers who paradoxically do not have remotely the equivalent operational experience that their subordinates have amassed over the last eight years. In another example, the Chief of the General Staff told journalist Stephen Grey that only senior officers with a specific level of experience were equipped to properly interpret the judgement of a Board of Inquiry into the death of Captain Jim Phillipson in 2006, a statement that may have caused disquiet amongst those who have had to take similar risks.

One has to wonder what might be written by a foreign observer

Perhaps of still greater concern than the deterioration in the ability to communicate the unwelcome is the sense that the British Armys ability to manage a system full of aggressive and ambitious commanders seems to be struggling. In places there are indicators of the presence of symptoms associated in the US with toxic leadership. The key characteristic of this term is that destructive styles of leadership in a hierarchy are tolerated over the short term because they produce immediate results
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in spite of their harm.16 Almost every officer serving or retired has examples of seriously toxic commanders, who have bred deeply dysfunctional command climates, and yet have seen their careers sail on undisturbed. With no systematic approach to its eradication, such as a robust 360 appraisal system, a climate that encourages the ambitious to mimic these behaviours is sustained. There is little wonder that external observers could be forgiven for believing that this is as much a problem in the UK as it is anywhere. The processes meant to govern and manage complex decision-making, policy formulation, and doctrine writing are equally under pressure. The UK staffing system, by process and culture, is one in which documents travel along complicated web-like chains of command, hitting repeated road blocks, and suffering delays. Senior officers are capable at any stage of reversing the advice of their staff. On occasion, this is paralysing. It has certainly been partly the cause of the tortuous gestation of the UKs own counterinsurgency doctrine in contrast to the extraordinarily brief staffing process required to write and endorse the US equivalent. The outcome of this climate and associated processes is what business describes as destructive consent17 and is the antithesis of an organisation so proud of its conversion to and adoption of mission command. The final issue in this section is that of senior officer performance. Again, there are worrying historical parallels, as well as contemporary parallels, with the US Army. In the UK, outside commentators have expressed doubts as to the rectitude of senior officers too busy pursuing the next rung on the ladder to speak out with sufficient conviction and vigour to have an impact,18 whilst at the same time internally nothing is said or done. A process of Darwinian selection has typically occurred inside all successful armies at senior officer level during conflict. Any military historian will be able to identify large numbers of senior officers during the Second World War who were found wanting and sacked. Equally, any serving middle ranking officer will know of commanders at sub unit

level and below who have been relieved of command, or (more euphemistically) short toured. But few will have evidence of the same process applying at senior officer level today. So should external observers really be expected to believe that this adaptive process, a historical reality regardless of how well selection and training has improved since the Second World War, and which has affected the US Army,19 is not applicable to the British Army of today? Consider these strands together and it is impossible not to conclude that there have been, and still are, serious systemic shortcomings in the system. It should be impossible for the senior leadership to ignore this strongly held perception, not least since it is one increasingly played out in the media, and is therefore all too evident to external observers.20 It has led to a command climate in which bad news is routinely camouflaged and where the ability of junior officers to influence a future which they will be inheriting is distinctly limited. It is one described by Tim Collins as one in which obsequious behaviour by career-conscious senior officers on the ground21 contributes to a sadly muddled picture in Whitehall. Being unable to accept being submerged, their views diluted or just unheard, many of the more talented officers will probably have been long lost to the armed forces altogether through departure to less stratified civilian employment. It is certainly not unusual to hear UK contemporaries express the view that there are no heretics left, few non-conformists and not enough original thinkers. And since the British Army monitors only its quantitative losses in manpower, it simply has no feel for how much of its quality has left prematurely. There is meanwhile a smug satisfaction that in the teeth of a recession it knows that the numbers are fine, but this cannot hide what many middle ranking officers and ex-officers know is the truth far too many high quality officers have in fact left for precisely the reasons described above. In summary, a range of observed phenomena gives rise for concern. The current climate, with themes of deteriorating communication, intolerance of dissent, tolerance of toxicity, poorly designed processes and perceived

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tolerance of inadequate senior officer performance, is a real obstacle to learning and adapting. It plagues the UK military every bit as it does many other militaries. The climate needs redressing urgently.

The Response
The US Armys response to its cultural and institutional problems required the coming together of some very unusual circumstances: a retired four-star general, Jack Keane, able to circumvent the chain of command; a growing groundswell of opinion amongst middle ranking US officers that neither the strategy nor the tactics on the ground were coherent and consistent with each other; enough space for middle ranking officers to experiment successfully (McMaster in Tal Afar); and a willingness by key senior officers to reach out, accept and absorb external criticism, and react to it with real despatch. The key catalyst in this endeavour was the role played by General Petraeus: most evidently his humility in reaching out, his confidence in accepting and embracing debate, and his wisdom in harnessing what his more junior officers now understood on the ground. And so a set of questions for the British experience arises: if the British Army has now reached, or perhaps passed, an analogous crisis point, how should it respond? Even more critically, what can it do to ensure that a crisis point, borne of an insular culture, a belief in its omniscience and rectitude,22

In the absence of meaningful internal debate, external perspectives are as good a tool as any
is never reached at any future point? There are solutions available that will help ameliorate the situation now and begin to cure it over the long term, and that are far beyond the reversible tinkering that the British Army is currently involved in (Operation Entirety23). Some of this tinkering will be productive and should be welcomed, particularly within the training domain but it has avoided

looking more critically at how it has taken so long to arrive at its principal conclusions, and is therefore insufficient. The most significant missing piece is the view from the outside in. The British Army and the defence sector need to encourage writing on the strengths and weaknesses of British strategy, tactics and doctrine from unique foreign perspectives whether from UK-based exchange and liaison officers, operationally subordinate attached commanders or the overseas student population. Regardless of it being an experienced one-star general writing after immersion in a UK HQ, unit commanders (the Lieutenant Colonel Brian Mennes for example) who have served inside UK formations, or officers at OF3-level writing after the Advanced Command and Staff Course, is not the issue all should be welcome and encouraged. Re-invigorating the standard of critical writing in our professional journals would be another piece of the jigsaw. The editors of the British Army Review and the Navy Review recently reflected in print a comparison of the relative strengths and weaknesses of their publications. Both agreed that British Army Review showed a slightly greater degree of institutional rectitude24 than its naval companion. This needs to be re-cast as a matter of urgency. The next part of the puzzle is solved by demanding more from the armys own liaison and exchange posts spread across the UKs friends and allies. This could go further than it does in encouraging greater interest in developments abroad in doctrine, structures, training and technology. The army can also generate and invigorate red teams25 from the brightest and best Intermediate Command and Staff Course graduates (land, air, and maritime), designed to engage the senior commanders of the next decade more formally in the validation of concepts and policy. Equally, red teams of sub unit commanders immediately after operational tours may provide Permanent Joint Headquarters with far better qualitative analysis than any they receive from their deployed formation staffs an equivalent to the US Council of Colonels, but set as a Council of Majors. Additionally, the US practice of employing retired officers also seems

to offer some merits. Whether as used as mentors or conscience, they must be radically minded. A career spent as a conformist will not be a qualification for this position. Officer education must also be overhauled, shifting emphasis towards developing the educational base for war amongst the people. In this context, which will not disappear soon, sociology, social anthropology and international development should all become critical military disciplines. In concert, every young officer should be invited to study a language at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and formally associate with a region to pursue as a career-long speciality. Finally, it is time that 360 appraisals were introduced. Toxicity in command structures, brought about by commanders ill-suited for their roles, is something the army can no longer afford particularly in a world where the softer skills of being able to operate successfully in such complex human terrain (reconcilables and irreconcilables, accidental guerrillas,26 sceptical military partners, suspicious civilian development organisations and so on) is so paramount.

There seems to be a feeling amongst middle tier officers that they are not listened to
Put together, these new steps would help challenge orthodoxies and, above all, reform a flagging institutional culture that has been too slow to adapt to present challenges. They would offer an environment in which competing philosophies, strategies, processes and structures would flourish. In short, a creative tension should exist at the heart of the British Army, in which orthodoxies survive only under great and continuous pressure. Constructive dissent would be allowed to play a fuller part whilst destructive consent27 would be bred out. And in this regard, the conformism of much military writing would be erased. Continuous re-invention is a difficult solution for any regular military to accept, even if it works for some commercial brands. The sustained dynamism required to survive and succeed in tomorrows environment is the single

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greatest challenge that faces the British military, and it demands an intellectual integrity that currently evades it. Hiding behind tradition is no answer. In short, if the British Army wishes to recover its former pre-eminence, it must stop evangelising and start reflecting more deeply on the outsiders view.

Patrick Little is a recently retired infantry officer and Advanced Command and Staff graduate, who left the Army last year after a sixteen year career.He has served on operations in Northern Ireland, Bosnia and Afghanistan. He has

also worked in South Africa and Ghana on security sector reform projects.His last job as a serving officer was as a desk officer at the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre in Shrivenham.

NOTES
1  For example, Britains armed forces: losing their way?, The Economist, 29 January 2009; Overstretched, overwhelmed and over there, The Economist, 29 January 2009. 2  Nigel R F Aylwin-Foster, Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations, Military Review (Vol. 85, No.6, NovemberDecember 2005). 3  Kevin Benson, Turning the Other Cheek: A Rebuttal to Brigadier AylwinFoster, Military Review (MarchApril 2006). 4  John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 5  Paul Yingling, A Failure of Generalship, Armed Forces Journal (May 2007). David Richards in Channel 4 Dispatches, 6  Afghanistan Mission Impossible, 6 April 2009. This might for instance include the 7  Army Rumour Service website (www.arrse.co.uk), which is now heavily mined by the media looking for defence stories. 8  The UK maintains an extensive organisational and procedural architecture ostensibly to capture operational lessons (mistakes and successes), analyse them and disseminate them, in order to prevent units from repeating mistakes or being unaware of successes. 9  John Nagl in Channel 4 Dispatches, op. cit. 10  Respectively a US Army Lieutenant Colonel, a US Marine Lieutenant Colonel and an Australian Army Lieutenant Colonel. 11  William Owen, The Possible Superiority of Symmetric Warfare, British Army Review (No. 135, Autumn 2005). 12  See, for example, Michael Evans, Army chief predicts a generation of conflict, The Times, 28 August 2007. The period beginning 22 November 13  2007 has been marked by unprecedented levels of criticism by retired senior officers now sitting in the House of Lords. See Richard Norton-Taylor, Under-strength and under strain as experienced soldiers queue to quit, Guardian, 23 November 2007. 14  See also Yingling, op. cit. 15  Stuart Tootal in Channel 4 Dispatches, op. cit. Denise Williams, Toxic leadership in 16  the US Army, US Army War College Strategic Research Project (January 2005), <http://www. strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/ pdffiles/ksil3.pdf>. 17  Keith Grint quoted in interview with Clare Gascoigne, Leading from the front the end of traditional management?, The Times, 6 February 2005, <http://business.timesonline. co.uk/tol/business/article512815.ece>. 18  See Rod Liddle, General takes aim at Brown and shoots himself in the foot, Sunday Times, 25 November 2007. Noting the very recent and very public 19  short touring of General McKiernan, former COMISAF. 20  Thomas Harding, Major declares war on lies and negligence, Daily Telegraph, 7 March 2009. Tim Collins, Were going and good 21  riddance, Guardian, 10 December 2008. John Kiszely, Learning about Counter22  Insurgency, RUSI Journal (Vol. 151, No. 6, December 2006). A name given to an internal unfunded 23  army exercise to bring about major changes to the scope, focus and flavour of its training being unfunded it has major limitations, but will bring about some short term improvements in preparation for operations. 24  Jeremy Blackham, British Army Review (No. 136, Spring 2005). 25  Aggressive red teams challenge emerging operational concepts in order to discover weaknesses before real adversaries do. Red teaming also tempers the complacency that often follows success. Memorandum for Chairman, Defense Science Board, quoted in Defense Science Board Task Force on The Role and Status of [Department of Defense] Red Teaming Activities (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, September 2003). 26  David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (London: Hurst & Co, 2009). 27  Keith Grint quoted in interview with Gascoigne, op. cit.

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