13.TANO V SOCRATES [G.R. No. 110249.

August 21, 1997] Facts The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princessa enacted ordinance no. 15-92 entitled: AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF for a period of 5 years.That the purpose and scope is to effectively free the City Sea Waters from Cyanide and other Obnoxious substance, and shall cover all persons and/or entities operating within and outside the City of Puerto Princesa who are directly or indirectly in the business or shipment of live fish and lobster outside the City. From the same point of view, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan also enacted a resolution that prohibits the catching, gathering, buying, selling and possessing andshipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for a period of 5 years within the Palawan waters. The petitioners Airline Shippers Association of Palawan together with marine merchants were charged for violating the above ordinance and resolution by the city and provincial governments. Petitioners now alleged that the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade That Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under which the Mayors permit could be granted or denied. Third, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan ,the Ordinance took away the right of petitionersfishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as petitioners-members of Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering into contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential to carry out their business endeavors to a successful conclusion. And finally, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is null and void, the criminal cases based thereon against petitioners Tano and the others have to be dismissed. Public respondents Governor Socrates and members of sanguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan defended the validity of Ordinance No.2 Issue Whether or not the enacted resolutions and ordinances by the local government units violative of the preferential rights of the marginal fishermen ? Held No, the enacted resolution and ordinance of the LGU were not violative of their preferential rights. The enactment of these laws was a valid exercise of the police power of the LGU to protect public interests and the public right to a balanced and healthier ecology. The rights and privileges invoked by the petitioners are not absolute. The general welfare clause of the local government code mandates for the liberal interpretation in giving the LGUs more power to accelerate economic development and to upgrade the life of the people in the community. The LGUs are endowed with the power to enact fishery

laws in its municipal waters which necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances in order to effectively carry out the enforcement of fishery laws in their local community. After a scrunity of the challenged Ordinances and the provisions of the Constitution petitioners claim to have been violated, we find petitioners contentions baseless and so hold that the former do not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

14. Social Justice Society (SJS), Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao, and Bonifacio S. Tumbokon vs. Hon. Jose L. Atienza, jr., in his capacity as Mayor of Manila G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007 Facts: On November 20, 2001, The Sangguniang Panglunsod of Maynila enacted Ordinance No. 8027. Hon. Jose L. Atienza, jr. approved the said ordinance on November 28, 2001. and it became effective on December 28, 2001. The said Ordinance reclassified the area of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas from industrial II to commercial I and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies Caltex, Petron and Shell. However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy entered into a memorandum of understanding with the oil companies in which they agreed that :scaling down of Pandacan Terminals was the most viable and practicable option. Under the memorandum of understanding, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy permits the Oil Companies to continuously operate in compliance with legal requirements, within the limited area resulting from the joint operations and the scale down program. The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the memorandum of understanding in Resolution No. 97. In that resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the memorandum of understanding was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13 extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the ordinance. Petitioners contend that respondent has the mandatory legal duty, under Section 455 (b) (2) of the Local Government Code (RA 7160) to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies. Instead, he has allowed them to stay. Respondents defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions.However, he also confusingly argues that the ordinance and MOU are not inconsistent with each other and that the latter has not amended the former. He insists that the ordinance remains valid and in full force and effect and that the MOU did not in any way prevent him from enforcing and implementing it. He maintains that the MOU should be considered as a mere guideline for its full implementation. Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on December 4, 2002 praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.

Issue: 1.Whether or not respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals. 2. Whether or not the MOU entered into by the respondents with the oil companies and the subsequent resolutions passed by the Sangunian have made the respondents duty to enforce Ordinance 8027,doubtful and uncertain. 3. Whether or not respondent can be compelled to enforce the said ordinance through a writ of mandamus.

Held: The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as City Mayor of Manila, to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to put into effect Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or negated by the courts. On the other hand assuming that the terms of the memorandum of understanding were contradictory with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. There is nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027. Wherefore the Court Ordered Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the city of Manila to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty that is already imposed on the respondent and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done. The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a protective measure should be delayed. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the City of Manila, is directed to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027.

HENARES V LTFRB G.R. No. 158290 October 23, 2006

FACTS: The petitioners challenged the Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus to LTFRB and DOTC to require the public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use the compressed natural gas (CNG) as an alternative fuel instead of gasoline and diesel. The petitioners cite the different statistics and studies from renowned institutions that show the bane of air pollution and related environmental hazards. The petitioners alleged that the particulate matters (PM) have caused detrimental effects on health, productivity and the overall quality of life. This PM constitutes complex mixture of dust, dirt, smoke and liquid droplets composed of harmful elements which are emitted into the air from engine combustions. Studies from the Philippine Environment Monitor in 2002 shows that over 2,000 die prematurely, 9,000 people suffer from chronic bronchitis and 51 million cases of respiratory symptoms in Metro Manila alone. The petitioners proposed the use of CNG to counter the effects. CNG is known to be the cleanest fossil fuel and 90 percent less CO emissions and cuts hydrocarbon emission by half. The petitioners assert their right to clean air as stipulated in Sec. 4 of R. A. 8749 known as Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999 and Sec. 16 Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. The Solicitor General, in his comments for LTFRB and DOTC, said that nothing in the Philippine Clean Air Act prohibits the use of gasoline and diesel by motor vehicle owners, and more sadly, the said act does not include CNG as an alternative fuel. Further, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) is the agency tasked to set the emission standards for fuel use and tasked to develop an action plan.

ISSUE: 1. 2. fuel. Whether the petitioners have the personality to bring the petition to the Supreme Court. Should mandamus be issued against LTFRB and DOTC to compel PUVs to use CNG as alternative

HELD: Yes, the petitioners have the personality to bring the petition to the Supreme Court as in the case of Oposa vs Factoran. Sec. 16 of Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution bestows on the people the right to breathe clean air in a healthy environment. The implementation of this policy is articulated in Sec. 4 of R.A. 8749. As in the decision of the Court in Oposa case, the case is an inter-generational responsibility and for inter-generational justice. The petition focuses on the legal right of the petitioners

for their right to clean air. The issue concerned is not only important to the petitioners but also of public concern. On the other issue, mandamus cannot be issued to LTFRB and DOTC because it not within the mandate of the agencies to impose the use of CNG. Their mandate is to oversee that motor vehicles prepare an action plan and implement the emission standards for motor vehicles. The DENR is the agency tasked to set the emission standards, and that the legislature should first provide the specific statutory remedy to the complex problems bared by the petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.

The petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is dismissed for lack of merit.

16. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONINO POBRE [G.R. No. 106804. August 12, 2004] Facts: Petitioner National Power Corporation is a public corporation created to generate geothermal, hydroelectric, nuclear and other power and to transmit electric power nationwide. NPC is authorized by law to acquire property and exercise the right of eminent domain. Private respondent Antonino Pobre owner of a resort-subdivision which he named as Tiwi Hot Springs Resort Subdivision..When the Commission on Volcanology certified that thermal mineral water and steam were present beneath the property,NPC then became involved with Pobres Property in three instances. First when Pobre leased to NPC for one year eleven lots from the approved subdivision plan. Second, when the first time that NPC filed its expropriation case against Pobre to acquire an 8,311.60 square-meter portion of the Property. NPC began drilling operations and construction of steam wells. While this first expropriation case was pending, NPC dumped waste materials beyond the site agreed upon by NPC with Pobre. The dumping of waste materials altered the topography of some portions of the Property. NPC did not act on Pobres complaints and NPC continued with its dumping. And third, when NPC filed its second expropriation case against Pobre to acquire an additional 5,554 square meters of the Property. This is the subject of this petition. Pobre filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint for expropriation. Pobre claimed that NPC damaged his Property. Pobre prayed for just compensation of all the lots affected by NPCs actions and for the payment of damages. NPC filed a motion to dismiss the second expropriation case on the ground that NPC had found an alternative site and that NPC had already abandoned in 1981 the project within the Property due to Pobres opposition. The trial court issued its Decision in favor of Pobre. ISSUE: Whether or not cancellation of expropriation proceedings by NPC is valid exercise of power of eminent domain?

HELD: The power of eminent domain is subject to limitations. A landowner cannot be deprived of his right over his land until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. The court must then see to it that the taking is for public use, there is payment of just compensation and there is due process of law. If the propriety of the taking of private property through eminent domain is subject to judicial scrutiny, the dismissal of the complaint must also pass judicial inquiry because private rights may have suffered in the meantime. The dismissal, withdrawal or abandonment of the expropriation case cannot be made

arbitrarily. If it appears to the court that the expropriation is not for some public use, then it becomes the duty of the court to dismiss the action. However, when the defendant claims that his land suffered damage because of the expropriation, the dismissal of the action should not foreclose the defendants right to have his damages ascertained either in the same case or in a separate action. The dismissal of the expropriation case restores possession of the expropriated land to the landowner. However, when possession of the land cannot be turned over to the landowner because it is neither convenient nor feasible anymore to do so, the only remedy available to the aggrieved landowner is to demand payment of just compensation. In this jurisdiction, the Court has ruled that if the government takes property without expropriation and devotes the property to public use, after many years the property owner may demand payment of just compensation. This principle is in accord with the constitutional mandate that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. DECISION: WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. National Power Corporation is ordered to pay Antonino Pobre P3,448,450 as just compensation for the 68,969 square-meter Property at P50 per square meter. National Power Corporation is directed to pay legal interest at 6% per annum on the amount adjudged from 6 September 1979 until fully paid. Upon National Power Corporations payment of the full amount, Antonino Pobre is ordered to execute a Deed of Conveyance of the Property in National Power Corporations favor. National Power Corporation is further ordered to pay temperate and exemplary damages ofP50,000 and P100,000, respectively. No costs.

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