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Vietnam’s Armed Forces: 

Vi t ’ A dF
Domestic and External Roles
Domestic and External Roles

Professor Carl Thayer
Research Seminar, School of Humanities and Social Sciences
Australian Defence Force Academy
C b
Canberra, 29 October 2009
29 O b 2009
Vietnam’s Armed Forces: Domestic and External Roles

Professor Carl Thayer


HASS Research Seminar, 29 October 2009
Project on Military Politics in Southeast Asia
Project on Military Politics in Southeast Asia

• Led
Led by Marcus Mietzner 
by Marcus Mietzner
(ANU)
• Update country 
Update country
chapters in Muthiah 
Alagappa’s 2001 study
• ‘Vietnam: From 
Revolutionary Heroes to 
Red Entrepreneurs’ by 
Thaveeporn Vasavakul
Introduction
• ‘Military
Military politics
politics’ in Vietnam mirrors that of 
in Vietnam mirrors that of
communist systems in general
• The Party controls the military through dual
The Party controls the military through dual‐
role elites
• The military has political representation in the 
The military has political representation in the
Party, State and society
• Party
Party‐army
army relations appear stable over time
relations appear stable over time
• But fluctuations in the military’s political 
influence do occur
influence do occur
Military Representation on the 
y p
Central Committee, 1986‐2006

Congress VPA Percent


6th 1986 9 f 124
9 of 124 7 3%
7.3%
7th 1991 13 of 146 8.9%
8th 1996 17 of 170 10.0%
9th 2001 14 of 150 9.3%
10th 2006 17 of 160 10.6%
average ‐‐ 9 2%
9.2%
Political Bureau
Political Bureau
10th Party Congress 2006

To Huy Rua appointed in 2009
Active Duty Military Are Elected to the
N ti
National lA
Assembly
bl
External Variables as Drivers
External Variables as Drivers
• Strategic readjustment
Strategic readjustment
– Withdrawal from Cambodia (Sept 1989)
– Massive demobilization/role in state‐building
Massive demobilization/role in state building
• Collapse of socialism in Europe and 
di i t
disintegration of the Soviet Union 1989‐01
ti f th S i t U i 1989 01
– Peaceful evolution and de‐politicization of the 
military viewed as one of the main causes
ilit i d f th i
• Asian Financial Crisis, 1997‐98
Le Duc Anh
Le Duc Anh
From Defence Minister
From Defence Minister To State President
To State President

1987-92 1992‐97
Le Kha Phieu
Le Kha Phieu
From Head General Political Dept To Party Secretary General
From Head General Political Dept To Party Secretary General

1988-91 1997‐2001
Ninth Party Congress April 2001
Ninth Party Congress April 2001
• General
General Directorate 2 
Directorate 2
(military intelligence) 
implicated in wire 
tapping of Politburo 
i f li b
members
• 12th plenum party 
plenum party
Central Committee 
rebukes Defence 
Minister and Chief of 
the General Staff Le Kha Phieu is replaced by 
Nong Duc Manh as Party
Nong Duc Manh as Party 
Secretary General
Military Representation on the 
y p
Politburo Reduced by Half
Congress VPA Percent
6th 1986 2 of 13
2 of 13 15 4%
15.4%
7th 1991 2 of 13 15.4%
8th 1996 2 of 19
f 10.5%
%
9th 2001 1 of 15 6.7%
10th 2006 1 of 14 7.1%
average ‐‐ 11%
Vietnam’ss Military circa 2001
Vietnam Military circa 2001
• Two crises overcome
Two crises overcome
• Thaveeporn Vasavakul concluded:
– 1986
1986‐01 period was 
01 period was ‘aa process of defining power 
process of defining power
sharing’ and ‘continued party control of the army’
• Future trajectory:
Future trajectory:
– VPA to be run by ‘political generals’ who would not 
become spokespersons for professional officers’
p p p
– VPA was ‘red and entrepreneur’ and would continue 
to play important role in national development 
Military Politics After 2001
Military Politics After 2001 
• Ideological
Ideological justification for political role 
justification for political role
of the military remained unchanged
• Consensus VPA should continue to play 
role in state‐building
• Economic development and global 
integration became key drivers of
integration became key drivers of 
national security policy
Drivers Behind New Roles
Drivers Behind New Roles
• Regional integration
Regional integration
– International defence cooperation
• Global integration 
Global integration
– Divestiture of military‐run business enterprises
• Economic development and national security 
intertwined in South China Sea
• Force modernisation
– Technology driver of military professionalism
gy yp
The Military in Domestic Politics
The Military in Domestic Politics
• Military
Military‐owned
owned Enterprises
Enterprises
– Commercial operations, joint ventures
• Economic Defence Zones
Economic Defence Zones
– ‘economy and defence should be combined’
• Military Professionalism
– Greater emphasis on educational requirements
• Military and Society
– Conscription and defence education
p
Military‐Owned
Military Owned Enterprises
Enterprises
• Decree 46 (1989) 
Decree 46 (1989) – legal basis for MOEs 
legal basis for MOEs
– 9 construction units converted to corporations or 
general corporations
general corporations
• By 1993: 335 MOEs including 67 joint ventures
– First wave of restructuring N = 193
First wave of restructuring N 193
– Second wave of restructuring N = 164
• 4th Plenum (Jan 2007) divestiture by 2012
l ( )d b
– National security enterprises exempted
Economic‐Defence
Economic Defence Zones
Zones
• 12
12 economic
economic‐defence
defence zones (khu kinh te quoc 
zones (khu kinh te quoc
phong) established 1998
– 17 EDZs reported in 2006
17 EDZs reported in 2006
• Boost socio‐economic development and 
contribute to national defence and security in
contribute to national defence and security in 
strategic and border areas
• Create ‘clusters of villages to form a belt along 
‘l f ll f b l l
the border’
Economic-Defence
Zones
Khu Kinh Te-Quoc Phong

1. Muong Cha, Lai Chau


2. Song Ma, Lai Chau and
Son La
3. Bat Xat, Lao Cai
4. Xin Man, Ha Giang
5. Ky Son, Nghe An
6 Dak
6. D k Lak-Binh
L k Bi h Phuoc
Ph
Binh Doan 15
7. Tan Hong, Dong Thap
17 E
Economic-Defence
i D f Z
Zones in
i
total
Military Professionalism
Military Professionalism
Law on Officers 1999
Law on Officers 1999
• Educational requirements for entry into 
Offi C
Officer Corps
• Age and time in rank requirements for 
promotion
• After April 2000, all officers must have a 
university degree or equivalent
• Regimental officers must have a PG degree
Regimental officers must have a PG degree
Military Relations with Society
Military Relations with Society
• Military Service Law amended (2005)
Military Service Law amended (2005)
– Eligibility and length of service lowered
• Defence Education
Defence Education
– Compulsory at senior high school & university
• Military Intelligence (General Directorate II)
– Allegations of domestic political interference
• Disaster assistance and relief
General Directorate II
General Department II
General Department II
• GD
GD II implicated in wire 
II i li t d i i
tapping in 2001
• 2004 renewed 
2004 renewed
allegations of 
interference brought by
interference brought by 
retired generals Vo 
Nguyen Giap and 
Nguyen Nam Khanh
General Nguyen Chi Vinh
Current Developments
Current Developments

• SSecurity Challenges
it Ch ll
• Defence Expenditure and 
p
Procurements
• Force Modernisation
Force Modernisation
• Future Plans
Security Challenges
Security Challenges
Defence White Paper (2004)
White Paper (2004)
• Threat of peaceful evolution
• Border, land and maritime disputes
d l d d ii di
– East Sea
• Non‐traditional threats
– Illegal drug trafficking, weapons smuggling, piracy, 
transnational organised crime, terrorism, illegal 
migration, environmental degradation
Off Shore Oil Platforms
Off Shore Oil Platforms
Bach Ho oil field
Bach Ho oil field
Maritime Strategy to 2020
•Exxon Mobile
•China applies 
pressure on foreign 
oil companies to stop 
exploration and 
development
•Vietnam agrees to 
joint development
Defence Expenditure USD
p
Army Modernisation
Army Modernisation

•Upgrade T-54/55
Main Battle
Tanks
Overhaul of fifty
•Overhaul
M113 APCs
Air Force Modernisation
Air Force Modernisation

Overhaul
and
upgrading
of Su-22s
and MiG-
21s
Air Force Modernisation
Air Force Modernisation
12 Su-27
Su 27
FLANKER
and 4 Su
Su-
30MK2V
FULCRUM
Air Defence Modernisation
Air Defence Modernisation

Two batteries S-300 PMU1 SAM


Naval Modernisation
Naval Modernisation

4 Tarantul II + 2 Tarantul V Corvettes


BPS 500 Missile Corvette
BPS 500 Missile Corvette
Procurements
• Air‐to‐air
Air to air (AA
(AA‐12)
12), anti
anti‐ship
ship (AS
(AS‐17)
17), air
air‐to‐
to
surface (AS‐18) missiles
• Eight Sukhoi Su‐30MK2s by 2010 plus four
Eight Sukhoi Su 30MK2s by 2010 plus four
• Surface to air missiles (S‐300 PMU1)
• Air defence radars
• Two kits BPS 500 missile corvettes
• Assemble 8 Tarantul V (Molnya) Corvettes
• Build two Gepard‐class guided missile frigates
Build two Gepard class guided missile frigates
Future Plans
Future Plans
• Increased international defence cooperation
Increased international defence cooperation
• Possible contribution to UN Peacekeeping
– Medical or mine clearance
M di l i l
• More self‐reliant national defence industry
– Co‐production and off‐set agreements
• Purchase of up to six Project 636 Kilo‐class 
diesel‐powered submarines
– Package valued at US $3 billion
g
Explaining Military Politics
Explaining Military Politics
• Historical legacies
Historical legacies
– Subordination to the party
– Engagement in economic construction 
Engagement in economic construction
• Quality of civilian governance
– High economic growth rates
– Administrative reforms of state apparatus
– General political stability
– Divestiture of military‐owned enterprises
Explaining Military Politics
Explaining Military Politics
• Internal military factors
Internal military factors
– Corporate interests
– Force and technological modernisation
Force and technological modernisation
– Military professionalism
• International influences
I t ti l i fl
– Socialisation within ASEAN
– Socialisation within ASEAN Regional Forum
– Greater international military engagement
Tentative Conclusions
Tentative Conclusions
• Vietnam
Vietnam will not follow China
will not follow China’ss path from 
path from
‘symbiosis’ to ‘conditional compliance’
• Defence doctrine of 
Defence doctrine of ‘all
all people
people’ss national 
national
defence’ ensures broad role in society
– Militia, self‐defence and reserves
Militi lf d f d
– Defence education
• Less entrepreneurial/commercial orientation
– Post‐global financial crisis
Phung Quang Le Van Dung 
Nguyen Khac
Thanh Head 
Nghien Chief 
Chief
Mi i
Minister of 
f G
General l
of the 
National  Political 
General Staff
Defence p
Department

Generals Promote Military


y Professionalism
Tentative Conclusions
Tentative Conclusions
• Trade off between size of regular armed forces 
and technological modernisation
• ‘old professionalism’
p
– External defence task = military professionalism
• expertise, responsibility, corporateness
p , p y, p
• ‘new professionalism’
– Legitimate government & firm political control 
Legitimate government & firm political control
over military in assignment of domestic roles
– Less 
Less ‘red
red and entrepreneurial
and entrepreneurial’, more khaki and 
more khaki and
professional
Professor Carl Thayer
Vietnam’s Armed Forces: Domestic and External Roles

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