WWW.IPPR.

ORG

StatesofConflict:
Acasestudyonstatebuilding
inKosovo
DominikZaum

October2009
©ippr2009

InstituteforPublicPolicyResearch
Challengingideas– Changingpolicy
2 ippr|StatesofConflict:AcasestudyonstatebuildinginKosovo

Contents
Aboutippr ............................................................................................................................ 3
Abouttheauthor ................................................................................................................ 3
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................. 3
‘StatesofConflict’................................................................................................................. 3
Abbreviations........................................................................................................................ 4
Introduction........................................................................................................................... 5
Backgroundandcontext ....................................................................................................... 6
Reconfiguringtheinternationalpresence ............................................................................. 7
ThechallengeoftheNorth................................................................................................... 9
Kosovo’sdevelopmentchallenge........................................................................................ 10
Thepriceofstability............................................................................................................ 11
Conclusion:lessonsandrecommendations......................................................................... 13
References ........................................................................................................................... 14
3 ippr|StatesofConflict:AcasestudyonstatebuildinginKosovo

Aboutippr
TheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(ippr)istheUK’sleadingprogressivethinktank,
producingcutting-edgeresearchandinnovativepolicyideasforajust,democraticand
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Since1988,wehavebeenattheforefrontofprogressivedebateandpolicymakinginthe
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ThispaperwasfirstpublishedinOctober2009.©ippr2009

Abouttheauthor
DrDominikZaumisaReaderinInternationalRelationsattheUniversityofReading,UK.

Acknowledgements
TheauthorwouldliketothankEngjellusheMorinaoftheKosovarStabilityInitiative(IKS)for
herhelpfulcommentsonanearlierdraftofthispaper.ipprisgratefultotheUKDepartment
forInternationalDevelopmentandtheSwedishForeignMinistryfortheirgenerousfunding
ofthispieceofwork.

‘StatesofConflict’
Thispaperisoneofaseries.TheotherpaperscoverMacedonia,Bosnia,Afghanistanand
Haiti.DueforpublicationinAutumn2009,theywillbeavailablefrom
www.ippr.org/publicationsandreports
4 ippr|StatesofConflict:AcasestudyonstatebuildinginKosovo

Abbreviations
EU EuropeanUnion
EULEX Europeanruleoflawmission
ICJ InternationalCourtofJustice
ICO InternationalCivilianOffice
IMF InternationalMonetaryFund
IPA InstrumentforPre-AccessionAssistance
JIAS JointInterimAdministrativeStructure
KFOR KosovoForce
KLA KosovoLiberationArmy
MUP SerbianMinistryoftheInterior
NATO NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganisation
OHR OfficeoftheHighRepresentativeinBosniaandHerzegovina
OSCE OrganisationforSecurityandCooperationinEurope
PISG ProvisionalInstitutionsofSelf-Governance
UN UnitedNations
UNMIK UnitedNationsInterimAdministrationMissioninKosovo
5 ippr|StatesofConflict:AcasestudyonstatebuildinginKosovo

Introduction
On17February2008,KosovodeclareditsindependencefromSerbia.Thisbroughttoan
endalmostnineyearsofinternationaladministrationbytheUnitedNationsInterim
AdministrationMissioninKosovo(UNMIK),establishedintheaftermathofNATO’s
operationinYugoslaviaovertheregime’satrocitiesagainsttheterritory’sAlbanian
population.However,thedivisionsintheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilbetweenthe
UnitedStatesanditsEuropeanalliesontheonehandandRussiaontheother–the
samedivisionsthathadshapedpoliticaldynamicsduringtheKosovoWarin1999–
preventedtheclosingdownofthemissionitself.
Inthe18monthsfollowingindependence,Kosovonotonlypassedanewconstitution(in
June2008)andjoinedtheInternationalMonetaryFundandtheWorldBank(inJune
2009),butUNMIKwas‘reconfigured’fromanadministrationwithsweepingexecutive
andlegislativepowerstoamuchsmallerpoliticalmission.AEuropeanruleoflawmission
(EULEX),andanInternationalCivilianOffice(ICO)havebeendeployedtocontinuethe
internationalpost-conflictstatebuildingandpeaceconsolidationefforts.ByJuly2009,60
countrieshadrecognisedKosovoasastate.
Despitetenyearsofextensiveinternationalinvolvementandunprecedentedamountsof
donoraid,Kosovocontinuestofaceenormouspolitical,social,andeconomicchallenges
thatthreatenthesustainabilityandintegrityofthenewstate.Serbiachallengedthe
legalityofitsdeclarationofindependence,andthroughitscontinuedsupportforparallel
institutionsinSerbmunicipalities(particularlyintheNorthofKosovo)hascontributedto
thedefactopartitionofthecountry.InternationaldivisionsoverKosovo’sstatushave
hamperedtheeffectivedeploymentoftheICOandEULEX.ManyofKosovo’sinstitutions
remainfragile,anditseconomyisdramaticallyunderdeveloped.Havingattained
independence,theunityofpurposeoftheKosovoAlbanianpoliticalelitehasalmost
entirelyvanished,revealingadeeplydividedpoliticalclassthattendstoengagein
personalrivalriesratherthanworktowardsprogrammaticsolutionstoKosovo’ssocio-
economicandpoliticalchallenges.

Aimsofthispaper
Thiscasestudyofpost-conflictstatebuildingfocusesinparticularontheperiodsincethe
declarationofindependence.Itidentifiesthreekeychallengestoasuccessfulandlasting
transitionfromconflicttoself-sustainingpeaceinKosovo:
• ThedifficultiesofreconfiguringtheinternationalpresenceinKosovoandtheimpact
ofthisoninternationalauthority
• TheeffectivedivisionofKosovoandthechallengeposedbythecreationofSerb
parallelstructuresintheNorthtogovernanceintheterritory
• ThethreatstostabilityanddevelopmentposedbyKosovo’sdireeconomicsituation,
exacerbatedbyitshighrateofpopulationgrowth.
ItarguesthatinternationalinvolvementinKosovohasbeenshapedbyapreferencefor
stability,evenifthishasmeantacceptingandattimesembeddingastatusquothat
underminesthelong-termprospectsforawell-governed,peacefulKosovo.Whilethis
mightbeapragmaticapproachminimisingtheriskofrenewedconflict,andnecessaryto
sustainsupportamongdonorcountriesandtroopcontributors,thedangerofsucha
policyisthatitmakesaninternationalpresenceaconditionofstability,ratherthanan
instrumenttoattainself-sustainingpeace.
6 ippr|StatesofConflict:AcasestudyonstatebuildinginKosovo

Backgroundandcontext
ThesourcesoftheconflictinKosovoarecomplex,andhavebeendiscussedindetail
elsewhere(seeforexampleJudah2002,Malcolm1998).Itsimmediatecauseswerethe
revocationofKosovo’sautonomyfromSerbiabySlobodanMilošović in1989andthe
impositionofwhatcanbestbedescribedasanapartheidsystem,systematicallyexcluding
theAlbanianmajoritypopulationofKosovofromallinstitutionsofpoliticalandsociallife.
WhileAlbaniansresistedpeacefullyatfirstbyestablishingaparallelstatewithitsown
provisionalhealthcareandeducationsystem(seeClark2000,Hockenoos2003),the
responsetoSerbrulegrewincreasinglyviolentwiththeemergenceoftheKosovoLiberation
Army(KLA).
ThecrackdownbySerbpoliceagainsttheKLAin1998,whichledtothedisplacementof
morethan200,000Albanians,movedKosovoontotheinternationalagenda,leadingfirstto
thedeploymentoftheOrganisationforSecurityandCooperationinEurope’s(OSCE)Kosovo
VerificationMissionofunarmedobservers(whichfailedtohalttheviolence),andthentothe
peaceconferenceatRambouillet,calledbytheContactGroup1 tonegotiateapolitical
settlementforKosovobetweentheKosovoAlbaniansandtheYugoslavauthorities.
Milošović’srefusaltosigntheaccordsinMarch1999precipitatedNATO’sbombing
campaignagainstYugoslavia.ThewarendedwithhisacceptanceofaContactGroup
proposalforeseeingtheestablishmentofatemporaryinternationaladministrationover
Kosovothatwouldworktowardsaresolutionofthestatusquestionandbuildgovernmental
institutions.Withindays,on12June1999,theUNSecurityCouncilpassedResolution1244,
establishingUNMIKandendorsingthedeploymentofaNATO-ledsecuritypresencein
Kosovo(KFOR[KosovoForce]).Importantly,Resolution1244wasdesignedtoendthewar
ratherthanprovidearoadmapforstatebuildinginKosovo,anddeliberatelyleftthequestion
ofKosovo’sstatusunresolved,paperingoverthedivisionswithintheUNSecurityCouncil.
UNMIKwasmadeupoffourpillars–PoliceandJustice,CivilAdministration(bothledbythe
UN),InstitutionBuilding(ledbytheOSCE),andReconstruction(ledbytheEuropean
Union).2 Itquicklyestablishedgovernmentalstructuresinconsultationwithlocalpolitical
elites,gradually‘kosovarised’thembyhandingoveradministrativeandpoliticalresponsibility
tolocalinstitutions,anddemocraticallylegitimisedtheinstitutionsthroughelections.Thusin
December1999UNMIKcreatedtheJointInterimAdministrativeStructure(JIAS),
establishingextensivelocalconsultationmechanismsanda‘doubledesk’structureoflocal
andinternationalco-headsofmunicipaladministrationsandcertainministries.Thiswas
followedbylocalelectionsinOctober2000,thecreationofa‘ConstitutionalFrameworkfor
SelfGovernance’inMay2001,andthefirstKosovo-wideelectionsforthe‘Provisional
InstitutionsofSelf-Governance’(PISG)inNovember2001(KingandMason2006,Zaum
2007).WhilegraduallyhandingoverauthoritytoKosovars,UNMIKretainedcertainpowers
consideredcentraltopeaceconsolidation(suchaspoliceandjustice),orthosewhichwould
bethepreserveofthestateandwouldhavetoawaitstatusresolution(suchastherightto
signinternationalagreements).
ThroughoutthefirstthreeyearsofUNMIK,theinternationalcommunitystudiouslyavoided
addressingthequestionofKosovo’sstatus.Onlyinlate2002thethenheadofUNMIK,
MichaelSteiner,broughttheissueontothepoliticalagendabyintroducinghis‘standards
beforestatus’policy,makingstatusresolutionconditionaluponthefulfilmentofsixbroad
governancestandardsrelatedtorespectforhumanrights,thedevelopmentofdemocratic
institutions,theestablishmentofafreemarketeconomy,andthepromotionoftheruleof
lawbytheKosovars.

1.France,Germany,Italy,Russia,UnitedKingdomandUnitedStates.
2.Originally,PillarIwasledbytheUNRefugeeAgency(UNHCR),andaddressedhumanitarianaffairs.
UNHCRleftUNMIKinJune2000,afterwhichPillarIdealtwithPoliceandJustice,ledbytheUN.
7 ippr|StatesofConflict:AcasestudyonstatebuildinginKosovo

OnlyinDecember2003didUNMIKandthemaindonorcountriesreluctantlyadoptthe
‘standards’asthemechanismtoworktowardsasettlementofthestatusquestion(UNMIK
2003).Ratherthanthefulfilmentofthestandards,however,itwastheoutbreakofviolence
againsttheSerbminorityandUNMIKinMarch2004,whichleft19peopledeadandover
900injured,thatacceleratedinternationaleffortstoresolvethestatusquestion(Judah
2005).ThefearofmanyWesternstatesthataddressingKosovo’sstatuswoulddestabilise
theregionandfuelsecessionisminBosniaandMacedoniawasreplacedbythe
understandingthatanunresolvedstatusquestionwasabiggersourceofinstability.Status
waseffectivelydecoupledfromtheimplementationofthemoredifficultstandards(Kingand
Mason2006).WhentheSpecialEnvoyoftheUNSecretary-General,KaiEide,reviewedthe
implementationofthestandardsinOctober2005,herecommendedthatstatusnegotiations
shouldbegindespiteimportantshortcomingsintheirimplementation(UnitedNations2005).
NegotiationsstartedundersupervisionoftheformerFinnishPresidentMaartiAhtisaari,the
UNSecretaryGeneral’sSpecialEnvoyforKosovo’sstatus(Weller2008a).Hisfinalproposal,
publishedinFebruary2007,envisagedanindependentKosovosupervisedbyan
InternationalCivilianOffice(ICO)withexecutiveauthoritytoimposemeasurestoprotectthe
implantationoftheAhtisaariplan,andaEuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicy(ESDP)
mission(EULEX)promotingtheruleoflawthroughassistanceandsomeexecutiveauthority
inpolicing,justice,andthecustomsservice(UnitedNations2007,seealsoWeller2008b).
AdeeplydividedUNSecurityCouncilwasunabletoendorsetheAhtisaariplan,andin
coordinationwiththeUSandmostEuropeanstates,Kosovodeclaredindependenceon17
February2008,amoveangrilyrejectedbyRussiaandSerbia,whorequestedanadvisory
opiniononthelegalityofthedeclarationofindependencefromtheInternationalCourtof
Justice(seealsoTanseyandZaum2009).Arulingisexpectedinearly2010.AsofJuly2009,
60stateshadrecognisedKosovo,including22ofthe27membersoftheEU.

Reconfiguringtheinternationalpresence
Thedeclarationofindependenceprecipitatedamajorreconfigurationoftheinternational
presenceinKosovo.OnlyNATO-ledKFORandtheOSCEdidnotsignificantlychangetheir
sizeandmandateafterFebruary2008,thoughinJune2009KFORannouncedagradual
reductionoftroopsfrom13,800toaround2,000overtwoyears,andonRussianinsistence
theOSCEmission’smandatecurrentlyhastoberenewedonamonthlybasis.Threeissues
withregardtotheinternationalpresencestandout:
•TheroleofUNMIKsinceFebruary2008
•IssuesaroundthedeploymentofEULEX
•TheweaknessoftheInternationalCivilianOffice(ICO).
TheroleofUNMIKafterFebruary2008,whoseclosurebytheSecurityCouncilhasbeen
preventedbytheRussianrejectionofKosovo’sdeclarationofindependence,remains
controversial.UNMIKwassuccessfulwithregardtomanyaspectsofitsmandate,in
particulartheestablishmentofawidearrayofpublicinstitutionsacrossKosovothat
generallyenjoywidesupportofthe(Albanian)majorityoftheterritory,andinparticularthe
successfulreformofthepolice.However,itsrapidlydecliningauthorityoncestatus
negotiationscommenced,anditscontestedroleafterFebruary2008,havegiventhe
impressionofamissionwithoutarealmandate.ButjudgingUNMIKbyitscontributionto
theresolutionofKosovo’sstatusignorestherealitythatwhileitwasexpectedtowork
towardsthisgoal,itdidnothavethepowertodeliverit,especiallyoncethestatusquestion
becamecaughtupinthedivisionsoftheSecurityCouncil.
DespitefierceresistancefromRussiaandBelgrade,UNMIKwas‘reconfigured’fromJune
2008onwards,toreflectthenewconditionsontheground.Inreality,thisreconfiguration
8 ippr|StatesofConflict:AcasestudyonstatebuildinginKosovo

amountedtothecompleteabandonmentofitsexecutivemandate(withtheexceptionofthe
UNMIKmunicipaladministrationinNorthMitrovica3),thereductionofthemission’ssizeby
90percent,andthemoveoutofthecentreofthecapitalPristinatoalogisticsbaseinthe
depthofthecity’sindustrialzone–symbolisingitsshifttothemarginsofKosovopolitics.
Secondly,EULEX,whichhadbeenauthorisedbyaJointActionoftheEuropeanCouncilon
theeveofKosovo’sindependence,tookalongtimetodeployintoKosovo,andonlybecame
fullyoperationalinApril2009.ThiswascompoundedbythelackofaEULEXpresenceinthe
NorthuntilDecember2008,afterallsideshadacceptedtheUNSecretary-General’sso-called
‘Six-pointplan’ambiguouslyplacingthemissionunderaUNumbrellawithoutdirectly
reportingtotheUN(UnitedNations2008).EULEXtookoverkeyfunctionsfromUNMIK,in
particularpolicing,thejudiciary,andthecustomsservice.Whilepredominantlyamonitoring
andassistancemission,italsohassomeexecutiveresponsibilitieswithregardtothejudiciary
andthepolice,forexampleinthecontextoforganisedcrimeandsensitivecourtcases
(EuropeanUnion2008).
WhilethemissionanditsoperationalplanhavebeenapprovedbyallEUmemberstates,the
factthatfiveofthemhavenotrecognisedKosovo’sindependence(Cyprus,Greece,
Romania,Slovakia,andSpain)hasplacedsomeconstraintsonthemission,especiallywith
regardtothequestionoftheapplicablelaw:forexample,shouldEULEXjudgesapplylaw
passedbyKosovarinstitutionsafterindependence?ItremainstobeseenwhetherEULEX’s
mandateisrobustenoughinpracticetotakepotentiallycontroversialexecutiveaction,such
asagainstindividualswithcloselinkstothegovernmentallegedtobeinvolvedinorganised
crimeandcorruption,oragainsttheleadershipoftheparallelSerbinstitutionsintheNorth.
Thirdly,whiletheothernewinternationalinstitutioninKosovo,theInternationalCivilian
Office(ICO),alsohasastrongmandateonpaper,itisinherentlyweakinpractice,basednot
ontheauthorityofanestablishedmultilateralinstitutionsuchastheEUortheUN,buton
theAhtisaariAgreement(whichisnotrecognisedbySerbia)andtheconsentoftheKosovo
government.Whileitspowerstoimposelegislationaremodelledonthe‘BonnPowers’of
theHighRepresentativeinBosnia(OHR),inpracticetheICOhasnotmadeformaluseof
them,reflectingtheexperienceinBosnia,wheretheliberaluseofthesepowershasmadeit
exceedinglydifficultfortheOHRtomanageitsexit.TheproblemofthependingICJ
decision,andthepossibilitythatanyuseoftheICO’spowerscouldbeconstruedasan
indicationthatKosovoisnotreallysovereignandindependent,andcouldputinquestion
thepremiseoftheAhtisaariproposalandtheICO’smandate,hasalsomadetheICO
reluctanttouseitsexecutivepowers.
IttooktheinternationalcommunityalmostayeartoreorganiseitspresenceinKosovo,
despiteextensiveplanningbasedonassumptionsthatintheendprovedoverlyoptimistic–
inparticularthatRussiaandSerbiawouldaccepttheAhtisaariplan.Theslowdeploymentof
EULEXcontributedtotheeffectivepartitionofKosovoalongtheIbarriver,underminingthe
sustainabilityofanindependentKosovo,anobjectiveintowhichthemajordonorsand
politicalsupportersofKosovo,especiallytheUSandmajorEuropeanstates,hadinvested
substantialpoliticalcapital.
Itwouldbefacetioustosuggestthatthetransitionshouldhavebeenplannedbetter;after
allanEUplanningmissionhadbeeninplaceforalmostthreeyearsbeforeindependence.
However,thecontestedmandatesoftheICOandEULEXhavecontributedtoapolicyof
‘stabilityfirst’,whichhasmadetheinternationalpresencereluctanttoconfrontbothhardline
SerbsintheNorthandsomeoftheexcessesofthegovernmentintheSouthhead-on.

3.MitrovicaisamunicipalityinNorthernKosovoofonetownand49villages.Sincethe1999conflict,
thetownhasbeenethnicallydividedalongtheIbarRiver.
9 ippr|StatesofConflict:AcasestudyonstatebuildinginKosovo

Withitsreorganisation,theinternationalpresencealsoshifteditsfocusawayfromseeing
Kosovothroughthelensofethnicconflicttowardsseeingitasaruleoflawproblem,a
perspectiveinformedbythequestionableinternationalperceptionofKosovoasa‘black
hole’riddledwithcorruptionandorganisedcrime(IKS2008).Suchaperspectivethreatens
tomarginalisesomeofthemostimportantchallengestothelong-termstabilityand
developmentofKosovo,inparticularsocio-economicchallenges.Theseissueswillbe
discussedinthefollowingsections.

ThechallengeoftheNorth
OneofthekeychallengestoapeacefulandstableKosovoistheeffectivepartitionofthe
countryalongtheRiverIbarfollowingindependence,whenSerbparallelinstitutionstookover
themunicipalstructuresintheNorth.Theabsenceofeffectivebordercontrolsforalmost10
monthsafterthedestructionoftwocustomspostsbetweenSerbiaandKosovobySerb
demonstratorsinFebruary2008meantthatsmugglingandracketeeringflourishedin
NorthernKosovo(CrisisGroup2008).AlbanianofficersoftheKPShavebeenwithdrawnfrom
theNorth,andtheremainingKosovoSerbofficersnolongerreporttotheKPShierarchybut
toUNMIK(sinceDecember2008toEULEX).Ithasbeenallegedthatthislattergroupare
underthecontroloftheSerbianMinistryoftheInterior(MUP),whichalsopaysthemsalaries
(ibid).InthemunicipalitiesofZubinPotokandLeposavicthecourtseitherdonotfunctionat
allordosoaspartoftheSerbiansystem.ThesituationintheNorththusposesa
fundamentalchallengetotheruleoflawandtheterritorialintegrityofKosovo.
EvenunderUNMIK’sgovernance,thecontrolofinternationalinstitutionsandthePISGover
thenorthernmunicipalitieswaslimited,withmanyservices–suchaseducationand
healthcare–fundedbyBelgrade.ThelackofeconomicdevelopmentmadeSerbsinthese
municipalitieshighlydependentonfinancialtransfersfromtheSerbiangovernment.
Accordingtooneestimate,63percentofthemonthlycashincomeinNorthMitrovicais
providedbysalariesandtransfersfromSerbia(EuropeanStabilityInitiative2004).Thishas
enhancedthepowerofpatronageofthosecontrollingtheparallelinstitutions(suchasthe
hospitalinNorthMitrovica)throughwhichmanyofthesefundsaredisbursed.
TokeepSerbsinKosovo,andtodiscouragetheirparticipationinKosovo’sinstitutions,
BelgradecontinuedtopayoftendoublesalariestoSerbsworkingintheparallelinstitutions,
andencouragedthetakeoverofmunicipalstructuresfollowingindependence.InMay2008,
SerbiaheldmunicipalelectionsinKosovo,whichweredeclaredillegalbytheKosovo
governmentandtheinternationalpresenceinKosovo,includingUNMIK.Theofficialschosen
intheseelectionshavecontrolledtheparallelmunicipaladministrationssincethen(though
intheSerbenclavessuchasStrpceintheSouththeircontrolhasbeencontestedbytheSerb
officialspreviouslyelectedtotheformalKosovarmunicipalstructures).
Theinternationalresponsetotheparallelstructureshasbeencautious,partlybecauseofthe
contestedmandatesofboththeICOandEULEX.TheICOwasforcedtocloseitspresencein
theNorthaweekafterindependenceandhasnotre-establishedaformalpresencesince,as
SerbiaandKosovoSerbinstitutionsrefusetohaveanydirectcontactwithit.EULEXdidnot
deployintotheNorthuntilDecember2008,afterthesix-pointplanwasagreedandittook
overfromUNMIKpolice.EffortstointegratetheNorthernmunicipalitiesintoKosovo’s
institutionalframeworkhavealsobeenlimitedbyconcernsoverstability,shouldtheparallel
institutionsbedirectlyandforcefullychallenged.Indeed,theinternationalpresencehasonly
respondedwithanyvigourwhenSerbshaveviolentlyconfrontedtheinstitutionsofthe
state.4 Generallythough,KFORandEULEXhavesoughtacourseoflimitingconfrontation

4.Forexample,overtheburningdownoftwocustomspointswithSerbiainthedaysafterthe
declarationofindependence,theoccupationoftheMitrovicacourthousebySerbsforseveraldaysin
March2008,ortheviolentprotestsagainstattemptsbytheKosovogovernmenttofacilitatethereturnof
AlbanianrefugeestotheirhousesinNorthMitrovicainSpring2009(UnitedNations2009).
10 ippr|StatesofConflict:AcasestudyonstatebuildinginKosovo

withtheparallelstructures,seekingtoendobstructionsthroughnegotiationratherthan
enforcement,andonlyverygraduallypushingtobringtheNorthbackintoKosovo’s
institutions.
Ironically,thebiggestchallengetotheparallelinstitutionshascomefromBelgrade.Asa
resultoftheglobaleconomiccrisis,theSerbiangovernmentcuttheextrasalariesitpaysto
SerbsinKosovoby50percent,andhastriedtoremovesomeofthemostradicalleadersof
theKosovoSerbslinkedtothepreviousgovernmentofKostunica.Forexample,ithassacked
oneofthekeyKosovoSerbleadersintheNorth,MarkoJaksic,fromhispositionasheadof
theMitrovicahospital,apositionheusedforpatronageandpoliticalinfluence(UNMIK
2009).However,thismightbeasmuchtheconsequenceofastruggleinBelgradeover
controloftheparallelinstitutionsasthebeginningofamorecooperativeapproachwith
regardtoKosovo.

Kosovo’sdevelopmentchallenge
ThefocusofinternationalstatebuildingeffortsinKosovohasbeenpredominantlyon
politicalandsecurityissues,andsince2008inparticulartheruleoflaw.However,oneofthe
majorlong-termchallengestosocialstabilityandasustainablepeaceinKosovoisthedire
stateofitseconomy.Whiledonorshavearguedthatpromotingtheruleoflawisacondition
forforeigndirectinvestmentandeconomicgrowth,overallquestionsofeconomic
developmenthavereceivedlessattentionandfundingfromaninternationalpresence
concernedinparticularwithstability.Withoutsubstantialchange,thepoorstateofKosovo’s
economyislikelytofuelarangeofsecuritythreats,suchasillegaltrafficking,migration,and
organisedcrime.
Kosovoisaruralsociety,withalmost70percentofthepopulationlivinginthecountryside.
Themajorityofthisruralpopulationmaketheirlivingfromagriculture(predominantly
subsistenceagriculture),almosthalfofthemhaveonlyprimaryeducationorless,andvery
fewwomenparticipateinthelabourmarket.Despitetheimportanceofagriculturefor
Kosovo’seconomyandthemajorityofitscitizens,itisneitherapriorityfortheKosovo
government(forseveralyearsafter2001theMinisterforAgriculturewasaSerb,highlighting
thelowprioritythatthegovernmentassignstoit)northeinternationaldonorcommunity.
Between1999and2007,only4percentofdonoraidwasallocatedtoagriculture(European
Commission/WorldBank2008).
Sinceindependence,agriculturehasnotbecomeahigherpriorityforeitherthegovernment
ordonors:forexample,ofthe184.7millionEUinstrumentforpre-accessionassistance
(IPA)forKosovo,forexample,justover7millionwasdirectlyallocatedtoagriculture-
relatedprojects.Bycontrast,morethan28millionofIPAwasdirectlyallocatedforruleof
lawactivitiesoverthesameperiod(EuropeanCommissionLiaisonOfficetoKosovo2009).
Formal,taxedemploymentisverylow,totallingaround160,000outofaworkingage
populationofaround1.38million(MinistryofEconomyandFinance2008).5 Outofthese,
75,000workforthepublicsector.Unsurprisingly,suchasmallbasefordirecttaxationhas
meantthat65percentoftaxrevenuesarecollectedattheborder,intheformoftaxesand
dutiesonimportedgoods(ibid).Theabilitytofinanciallysustaintheinstitutionsofthestate,
toprovidebasicpublicservices,andtoinvestinthecountry’sinfrastructureishighly
dependentonoutsidetransfers,eitherintermsofdonorfundingorthroughremittancesthat
sustainconsumptionandtherebyindirecttaxrevenues.In2007,morethan40percentof

5.Totalemploymentishigher,thoughestimatesvarywidely.However,onlyformalemployment
contributestodirecttaxrevenuesandsustainsthedeliveryofpublicservices.
11 ippr|StatesofConflict:AcasestudyonstatebuildinginKosovo

Kosovo’sGDPwasmadeupofforeignassistance,remittancesandforeigndirectinvestment
–mostlyprivatisationproceedsandtheissuingofasecondmobilephonelicence.Allof
theseoutsidecontributionsarelikelytodeclinesubstantiallyasaconsequenceoftheglobal
financialcrisis,withdireconsequencesforKosovo’sbudget.
ThepooreconomicperformanceofKosovoisexacerbatedbyademographicchallenge:
KosovohasEurope’syoungestandfastest-growingpopulation.Eachyear30,000more
youngpeoplereachworkingageandjointhelabourmarketthanthenumberthatleaveit,
whileKosovo’seconomyhasneitherthestructurenorthedynamismtoabsorbthem(World
Bank2008).Youngpeoplearemostlyfailedbyaneducationsystemthatispoorlygoverned,
poorlyresourced,andpronetocorruption.Hardlyanyofthe30privateuniversitiesin
Kosovo,forexample,havemetaccreditationcriteria(BritishAccreditationCouncil2008),and
withsomenotableexceptionstheyprovidesub-standardeducation.Thisleavesawhole
generationofKosovarswithoutmarketableskillsandwithverylimitedeconomic
perspectives.
Unsurprisingly,morethan60percentofKosovoAlbaniansandnon-Serbminoritiessee
economicproblemsasthemainthreattostabilityinKosovo(UnitedNationsDevelopment
Programme2008).Thislackofeconomicdevelopmentthuscontainsahighpotentialfor
socialconflict.Inthepast,migrationintoWesternEuropehelpedtomitigatethe
consequencesofthispopulationgrowth,butstricterlimitsonmigrationinEUcountrieshave
effectivelyclosedthispressurevalve.Assomeanalystshavehighlighted,economic
developmentinKosovoneedstobecomplementedwitharethinkingofEuropean
immigrationpolicy.AllowingyoungKosovarstofindlegalworkinanageingEurope,and
activelytrainingtheminEuropeancountriesinskillsthatwouldhelpwitheconomic
developmentbackinKosovoisacheaperandmorecredibledevelopmentpolicythantrying
topoliceanincreasinglyfrustrated,impoverished,anddesperateyoungpopulation
(EuropeanStabilityInitiative2006).

Thepriceofstability
Inmanyways,Kosovohasbeenasuccessfulinternationalintervention.Since1999,a
substantialmilitaryandpolicepresencebyNATO,theUNandlatertheEUhaskeptKosovo
peaceful,andhasforthemostpartminimisedviolentconflict.Withextensivedonorsupport,
UNMIK,theEUandOSCEhavemanagedtobuildstateinstitutionswhich,whileweak,
generallyhavethesupportofAlbaniansandnon-Serbminorities.Overtime,the
internationalpresencehasbeensubstantiallyreducedandgovernmentalresponsibilitieshave
beenhandedtolocalinstitutions.WesternsupportersofKosovohavemanagedavery
contentioustransitiontoindependencewithsomesuccess,andhavecreatedasituation
where,despiteSerbianandRussianeffortstostemthetide,anindependentKosovoisthe
onlyrealisticframeworkforanyfurtherstatebuildinganddevelopmentactivities.
ThemostvisibleproblemsfacedbyUNMIKanditssuccessoroperationshavehadlittletodo
withdevelopmentsinKosovoitself,butwithdivisionsbetweenmajorpowersintheUN
SecurityCouncil.Traditionally,UNpeacekeepingoperationswereenvisagedasawayof
insulatingaconflictfromthewiderColdWardynamics(Berdal2008).InthecaseofKosovo,
however,theSecurityCouncil’sinvolvementleftKosovo’sfuturehostagetothechanging
relationsbetweenmajorpowers.Thisdynamicwasthesourceoftheambiguitywithregard
tobothUNMIK’smandateandKosovo’sfinalstatus;madeitimpossibletocloseUNMIK
down;andhasledtoweakenedandcontestedmandatesofthekeysuccessormissionsto
UNMIK,EULEXandtheICO.Russia’sstanceonKosovohaslittletodowithaprincipled
argumentaboutthedangersofsecessionism,givenitsrecognitionofAbkhaziaandSouth
Ossetia.Instead,Kosovohasbecomecaughtupinthewiderpoliticalstrugglebetweena
resurgentRussiaandtheWest.
12 ippr|StatesofConflict:AcasestudyonstatebuildinginKosovo

Throughoutitspresence,oneofthemainconcernsoftheinternationalcommunityhas
beenthemaintenanceofstabilityinKosovo,fortworeasonsinparticular.Firstly,Western
states,NATO,andtheUNhaveinvestedsubstantialpolitical,reputationalandfinancial
capitalintomakingKosovoasuccess.EULEXhasbeendescribedastheEU’sflagship
mission,wherefailurewouldputintoquestionthefeasibilityofacommonsecuritypolicy.
Anothermajoroutbreakofviolencewouldseriouslyaffectthereputationofthesestates
andorganisations.Secondly,instabilitycouldaffecttheabilityofKosovotoobtain
internationallegitimacythroughfurtherrecognitions,andmightaffecttheICJ’s
assessmentofthelegalityofthedeclarationofindependence.Itisthereforeunsurprising
thattheKosovogovernmenthasnotmadeanyseriousattemptstotrytoassertits
presenceintheNorth.
However,thisemphasisonstabilityhascomeataprice.Mostobviously,itraisesthe
dangerthatsystematicdevelopmenteffortsaremarginalisedbyafocusonstabilityand
theruleoflaw.Thelimiteddonorfundingavailableforagricultureandforeducationare
justtwoindicatorsofsuchatrend.
IntheNorth,stabilitydependsonsomeformoftacitrecognitionandcooperationwith
informalstructuresthatarguablyhavelinkstocrimeandthateffectivelycontrolthese
municipalities.Butthisapproachrisksfurtherembeddingthesestructures,andinthe
longrunmightmakeitmoredifficulttoestablishthecapacityandlegitimacyofthestate
toexercisecontroloverallitsterritory.Moreimportantly,astherelationshipbetweenthe
NorthernSerbmunicipalitiesandtheKosovogovernmentismediatedthroughthe
internationalpresence,theinternationalcommunitywillfindithardtoleaveKosovo.
Ratherthancreatingtheconditionsforpeaceandstability,theinternationalpresence
mayyetbecomeaconditionforthemaintenanceofpeaceandstability.
ThisisnotonlyanissuewithregardtotheNorth.Therehavebeenagrowingnumberof
reportsabouttheprominentroleplayedbyseveralmembersoftheformerKLA
intelligenceserviceK-SHIKinthecurrentgovernmentofformerKLAleaderHashimThaci
(CrisisGroup2008).Inasocietywheretherehasbeenlittleopendissentuntil
independencein2008,thegovernmenthasbeenincreasinglythin-skinnedaboutcritical
mediareporting.Ithasreportedlyuseditseconomicmuscleasthemainadvertiserin
Kosovotoencouragemorepro-governmentreporting,andthelargestcableproviderin
Kosovohastakenachannelcriticalofthegovernmentoffitsairwaves(TheEconomist
2009).Therehavebeenseveralcasesofjournalistsbeingthreatened,mostprominently
JetaXharra,whowassubjectedtoamediacampaignbyapro-governmentnewspaper
callingheraSerbianagentandeditorialisingthatshehadshortenedherownlifewithher
criticalreportingonthemayorofSkenderaj,whoisamemberoftheprimeminister’s
PDKparty(Xharra2009).UNMIKsetaworryingprecedentforsuchbehaviourwhenit
arrestedtheleaderofthepro-independencemovementVetevendosje,AlbinKurti,after
demonstrationsagainstUNMIKin2007forsixmonthsandthenputhimunderhouse
arrestforafurthersixmonths.Histrial(conductedbyinternationaljudges)wascriticised
byhumanrightsorganisationsaspoliticisedandriddledwithproceduralproblems
(AmnestyInternational2007).
ThechallengestosustainablepeaceinKosovowillremainsalientforyearstocome,and
internationalinvolvementinKosovowillcontinue,bothwithasecurityandacivilian
presencethatwillevolveovertheyears.ThefactthatKosovo’swiderneighbourhoodis
theEuropeanUnionmeansthatmajordonorstatesretainaninterestinareasonably
stableandprosperousKosovo,andwillbewillingtocontinuetocommitresourcestoit.
ThepossibilityofmembershipintheEUultimatelyprovidesanincentiveandaprocessto
continueontheroadtowardsthesegoals.ThissetsKosovoapartfrommostotherstates
ofconflict,andtheirinternationallyassistedtransitionsfromwartopeace.
13 ippr|StatesofConflict:AcasestudyonstatebuildinginKosovo

Conclusion:lessonsandrecommendations
TheinternationalpresenceinKosovohashadastrongmandateandhasbeenverywell
resourcedcomparedwithmoststatebuildingoperationsinpost-conflictcountrieswhere
developmentshaveonlylimitedimplicationsforthesecurityinterestsofWesterncountries.
ThisinherentlylimitstheapplicabilityofanylessonsfromKosovotosuchcases.
Nonetheless,the10yearsofinternationalstatebuildingeffortsinKosovohighlightthree
generallessonsthatareofrelevanceforsuchoperationsmoregenerally.
Firstly,statebuildinginpost-conflictcountriesisadeeplypoliticalexercise,requiring
fundamentallypoliticaldecisionstobemadeaboutthedistributionofpowerandresources.
UNMIKwasneverthearbiterbetweendifferentgroupscompetingforpowerinKosovo.
Instead,itsmandatemadeitanactiveplayerandpartoftheterritory’spoliticaldynamics.
HadUNMIK(between1999and2008)andEULEX(sincelate2008)followedstatus
neutralitytotheletter,theywouldhavebeenparalysedandunabletoexercisevaluable
aspectsoftheirstatebuildingmandates.Ifstatebuildingoperationsaffectthelocalpolitical
order,morethoughtneedstobegiventotheirimpactonthesedynamics,astheycanshape
themforbetterorworse,withimplicationsforpoliticalstabilityandultimatelysecurity.In
particular,itcanmakeexitingfromanoperationverydifficult,asamission’spresencecan
becomeaconditionforlocalstability(seealsodeWaal2009).
Importantly,amission’sparticipationinthepoliticalprocessalsoaffectsthesecurityof
statebuildingoperationsanditsstaff:iftheyareseenaspartofthepoliticallandscapeand
notasneutralarbiters,theyarelikelytobedrawnintolocalconflicts,includingviolentones.
ThetargetingofUNMIKduringthe2004riotshighlightshowthemissionhadcometobe
seenaspartoftheconfrontationoverKosovo’sindependence,andasanobstacleto
obtainingthisgoal.
Secondly,thecaseofKosovohighlightsthefactthatstatesandinternationalorganisations
interveninginpost-conflictsituationsneedtoberealisticaboutwhatsocio-political
transformationstheycanactuallyachieve.Despiteunprecedentedresourcesandavery
strongmandate,thecapacityoftheinternationalpresenceinKosovotoshapethe
statebuildingprocesshasbeenlimited,anditspolicieshavebeenmostlyresponsive.Thiswas
evidentwhentheeruptionofviolenceinMarch2004pushedtheinternationalcommunity
towardsaddressingthestatusquestion,andevenmoresointheinternationalresponseto
thechallengeposedbytheSerbsintheNorthofKosovointheaftermathofthedeclaration
ofindependence.Post-conflictenvironmentsarenotablankcanvasontowhichinterveners
canprojecttheirinstitutionalvisions,andcoercivelyforcingchangeontounwillingelites
eitherrequiresresourcesnotavailableormethodsmostWesternpublicswouldfindhardto
accept.Assuch,statebuildingoperationsneedtoengagestrategicallywithlocalparties,
identifyingwherechangestopracticesandinstitutionscanbemade,andwhereresistance
willbesubstantial.
Finally,Kosovoisagoodexampleofthekindofstatethatinternationalinterventionshave
builtasaconsequenceoftheirfocusonstability:anunbalancedstatedominatedbya
powerfulexecutiveandweaklegislativeandbyjudicialinstitutionsthatlackthecapacityto
holditaccountable.Thefocusofcapacity-buildingeffortshasbeenonexecutiveinstitutions
–inparticularthePrimeMinister’sOfficeandtheMinistryofInternalAffairs–withfew
concomitanteffortstostrengthentheinstitutionsofoversightandcivilsociety.InKosovo,
thecontroloftheexecutivecurrentlyrestspredominantlywithinternationalactors,in
particulartheICOandEULEX,asituationthatultimatelythreatenstoweakenthecountry’s
stillfragiledemocracy.
Facilitatingtheemergenceofanexecutive-dominatedandlargelyunaccountablestatehas
madeKosovoanattractiveprizeforcaptureandhascreatedopportunitiesforrent-seeking
andpatronage,conditionsassociatedwitharrestedeconomicdevelopment,mounting
14 ippr|StatesofConflict:AcasestudyonstatebuildinginKosovo

inequalityandpoliticalviolence.Intheirdesiretoquicklystrengthensecurityinstitutions,
statebuildersrunaseriousriskofcreatingtheconditionsforlatentinsecurity.Thereare
criticalpolicychallengesherearoundhowbesttodesignandimplementpost-conflict
peacebuildingmissions:theexperienceinKosovoshowsthatthereisalongwaytogo
beforetheselessonsarefullylearned.

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