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How to be a Fallibilist Author(s): Stewart Cohen Source: Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 2, Epistemology (1988), pp. 91-123 Published by: Ridgeview Publishing Company Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214070 . Accessed: 14/02/2011 09:50
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1988 Philosophical Perspectives, 2, Epistemology,

HOW TO BE A FALLIBILIST
Stewart Cohen Princeton University

offallibilism in epistemology The acceptance is virtually univerofknowledge sal.Any that endorses the that S knows theory principle r only ifr entails toa skeptical q on thebasisofreason q, is doomed conclusion. Fallibilist theories this entailment reject principle thereby offallibilism avoiding this immediate skeptical result. Theacceptance from thewidely heldviewthat derives whatwe seek in construca theory ofknowledge isan account that with ourstrong ting squares intuition that we know Ofcourse, few believe that many things. skepis to be avoidedat all costs. theentailment ticism Butwhile princilookattractive intheabstract, itdoesnot command thekind plemay ofassentsufficient to withstand theoverwhelming it case against intuitions what we know. provided byoureveryday concerning Any with residual worry associated denying the principle isfar outweighed senserejection ofitsskeptical byourcommon consequences. Thus, a fallibilist S can knowq on thebasisofr where theory allowsthat r onlymakesq probable. Other is notso easily Unfortunately, skepticism dispatched. printo reject threaten to reinstate ciples that look very difficult that lead toskeptical for fallibilist skepticism-principles paradoxes ofknowledge theories. evenfallibilist theories are forced to Thus, ofa stubborn confront intheform rather albeit skepticism, paradox thanas a seemingly result. inescapable ofrelevant can be viewedas providing The theory alternatives theories with a wayoutofskeptical fallibilist paradoxes.' However, while thetheory initsbroadoutline, believe lookspromising many

92 / Stewart Cohen ofdetail. Even on critical matters that itfaces difficulties intractable ofthesoluproponents ofthetheory disagree overtheprecise nature tionto skeptical Becauseofthese paradoxes thetheory provides. problems, there is considerable worry that thetheory is unableto provide a satisfactory I protreatment oftheskeptical paradoxes. posetoshow that byrestructuring thetheory ofrelevant alternatives, we canobtain a satisfactory solution tothese paradoxes. Theprecise nature ofthesolution will become clearoncewe see howthetheory can handleother related puzzlesthatarisefora fallibilist theory. Depending on your defend perspective, theviewI ultimately may be considered a development within oftherelevant either thespirit alternatives approach or a departure from it.
I. Problems for Fallibilism

We can begin thepuzzles andparadoxes that conbyexamining front theories of knowledge. One kindof puzzleresults fallibilist S toknow from theweaker which directly accepting principle permits r makesq sufficiently q on thebasisofr provided probable. S holds a ticket ina fair with n tickets, where the Suppose lottery n- 1/nofS losing probability isvery high. DoesS know that histicket will n issuitably lose? tobelieve Although (if large) S hasgoodreasons he willlose,itdoesnotseemright tosaythat S knows he willlose.2 Thisremains trueforarbitrarily largen. from S learns theperson thelottery, Now, suppose Jones, running that Jones intends tofix thelottery so S will lose.DoesS,then, know that hewill lose?Better S reads inthepaper that another still, suppose has won.In bothofthesecases we are inclined ticket to say that S does knowthathe loses. Thissetofintuitions a puzzle.In thefirst presents us with case, itseemed, to fallibilist that as longas there contrary assumptions, that nomatter howsmall, isa chance S wins, he doesnotknow that twocasesindicate he loses.Buttheother otherwise. There we said on thebasisofhisreasons, that S can know, thathe willlose. But his reasonsdo notentailthathe loses.Generally surely reliable intentions sources makemistakes, etc.The lie,havetheir thwarted, that S losesconditional on thesereasons is lessthan1. probability do we attribute toS inthese casesbutnotinthe Why knowledge first case?Ineachcase,hisreasons makehisconclusion highly prob-

How to be a Failibilist / 93

Andbyincreasing theconclusion. ablewithout entailing thenumber in thelottery oftickets in thefirst case,we can makeitmoreprobablethathe losesin thefirst case thanin thelatter two.3 a related doesnot Consider puzzle discussed byGilbert Harman.4S know that Smith losesthelottery ifS's reason issimply that theprobability thathe losesis n-1/n.ButifS knows Smith is generally andSmith hisintention togotoNewYork reliable announces tomorwillbe in NewYork row,S can thereby cometo knowthat Smith even though S knows that thisentails that Smith tomorrow, loses thelottery ifhe wereto win,he wouldbe inNewJersey (since actheprize). thatSmith willbe in NewYork cepting So, S knowing wouldseemto involve S knowing that Smith losesthelottery. But oftheprobS doesnotknow that Smith losesthelottery (onthebasis abilities alone). consider Finally, skeptical paradoxes. fallibilist Although theories theentailment can plausibly other with reject principle, principles considerable clout are notso easily skeptical Consider the rejected. thesetofknown principle that (byS) propositions is closedunder known (byS) entailment: (1) IfS knows q and S knows thatq entails not-h, then S knowsnot-h. this strikes most it While closure principle peopleas compelling, presents difficulties for a fallibilist view.5 Sincefallibilism the rejects entailment S mayknowq on thebasisofr,eventhough principle, r butincompatible there is a proposition with with h,compatible q. IfS fails fallibilism willrunafoulofprinciple to knownot-h, (1). Thisis howskeptical problems arise for a fallibilist view. Exploiting theappealof(1),theskeptic outthat, points e.g.,S knows thathe that he is notdeceived sees a tableonlyifS knows bya Cartesian theformer entails thelatter). Butsinceour Demon, (since obviously would be just as itiswerewe tobe deceived experience bya CartesianDemon, most tosaythat S knows that he peopleare reluctant is notso deceived. Butthen S does notknowthathe sees a table. we wouldordinarily and Where claimto know q is a proposition h is a skeptical whosedenial is entailed hypothesis byq, theskeptic with employs (1) in conjunction (2) S does notknownot-h to infer thedenialof

94 / Stewart Cohen (3) S knows q to resist haveattempted by comSomephilosophers skepticism Others haveargued that (2) is false.6 bining (1) with (3) to conclude is of (1). Ofcourse, theproblem from (2) and (3) to therejection Assuch, anyofthese propositions. precisely that itisdifficult todeny to reject on simply one ofthem itseemsarbitrary andunsatisfying two. thebasisoftheother a paradox-a set We should view(1),(2),and (3) as constituting indepenofinconsistent allofwhich haveconsiderable propositions has The puzzleconcerning Smith and thelottery dentplausibility. that willbe in thesamestructure q is theproposition Smith (where winsthe that Smith NewYorktomorrow and h is theproposition lottery).7 is to resolvethese puzzles and The burdenof the fallibilist the truth of our everyday paradoxesin a way thatpreserves an exattributions. Buta satisfying resolution requires knowledge ofwhy theparadox arises-anexplanation ofwhy we have planation inthecase theintuitions that saddle theparadox. As I noted, us with oftheskeptical itis notenough tosimply (3) with conjoin paradox, andthen thedenial a second oftheinconsistent triad infer proposition ofthethird. wouldnottellus howtheparadox Sucha "resolution" arisesin thefirst place.
II. The Theory of Relevant Alternatives

I wish todefend isderived from ofthese Theresolution paradoxes first a theory byFred developed thetheory ofrelevant alternatives, we needto works, Dretske. Before we can see howtheresolution ofrelevant in somedetail. alternatives examine thetheory Letan alternative to a proposition incompatiq, be a proposition we aretoconsider S knows q relative blewith saysthat q. Thetheory to a setofrelevant Ofcourse, 'relevance' is usedhere alternatives. as a technical term. On Dretske's view,whereh is an alternative ifS knows toq, h is relevant S knows q only justincase necessarily, to Dretske not-h.8 alternatives according are notrelevant. Skeptical do skeptical Whatmakesan alternative relevant? Whatcriteria havebeenvery alternatives fail tomeet? these Notoriously, questions This or generality. difficult to answer with ofprecision anydegree For hasledcritics toviewthetheory as ad hocorobscure. difficulty

How to be a Failibilist / 95

itconstitutes many, themost serious obstacle toaccepting thereleWhile I agreethat there is a problem vantalternatives account.9 in criteria ofrelevance, I willlaterarguethatthis specifying precise inanywaydiminish does-not theanti-skeptical force ofthetheory. Fornow, with we must work the admittedly problematic characterizations thatare available. Thekind offactors that aretypically taken toaffect relevance can an examplediscussed be illustrated through Goldman.10 by Alvin S seesa barn andbelieves hedoes,onthebasisofvery Suppose that good perceptual evidence. Whenis thealternative thathe sees a barn Ifthere papier-mache relevant? replica aremany suchreplicas intheimmediate this area,then alternative canbe relevant. Inthese to know S fails that circumstances, he sees a barnunless he knows thatit is notthecase thathe sees a barnreplica. Where no such replicas this willnotbe relevant exist, alternative (ceterus paribus). S can knowthathe sees a barnwithout that he does not knowing a see a barnreplica. ofrelevance Thissuggests that a criterion is something likeprobconditional on S's evidence and certain ofthecirability features we couldsaythat an alternative is relecumstances.11 Alternatively vantifS's evidence ofthecircumstances and certain features conIftheprobability a reasonto believeh.12 to in the stitute referred first formulation isepistemic orinductive then these two probability, formulations cometo roughly thesamething. Ofcourse, there isconsiderable here. Forexample, how vagueness barn must be?Theanswer isthat there there isa conmany replicas ofcaseswith tinuum a range ofclearcasesofrelevance at one end, a range ofclearcase ofnon-relevance at theother end,anda range ofunclear casesinthemiddle. Butthere isnoreason relevance why cannot be a vaguenotion thatskeptical alternatives are provided remote ineveryday circumstances tocount sufficiently as clear cases ofnon-relevant alternatives. isa lackofprecision there inthesuggested formulaUnfortunately, ofthecriterion tion ofrelevance that appears more Theprobserious. ofan alternative conditional ontheevidence ability andcertain other ofthecircumstances features will ofcourse, as the other vary, features andthere is no apparent vary, ingeneral waytospecify what those other features are. Consider a case where we wanttheresult that thebarnreplica alternative is clearly relevant, viz.,a case where thecircumstances are suchthat there are numerous barnreplicas

Cohen 96 / Stewart inthearea.Does thesuggested criterion giveuswhat we want? The that S sees a barn replica given his evidence probability in an area wherethere and hislocation are many barnreplicas is that on hisevidence high. However, sameprobability conditional andhisparticular visual orientation toward a realbarnis quite low. Thuswe wanttheprobability to be conditional on features ofthe ofthecircumstances circumstance liketheformer butnotfeatures likethelatter. Buthowdo we capture thedifference in a general formulation? At leastthismuchis true. Thereis somestandard according to which, thealternative that S sees a barnreplica is relevant in certain circumstances if, e.g.,there are many barn replicas inthearea, ifthere andnotrelevant is justone barnreplica ofmiles thousands I will that away(ceterus paribus). Again later argue this lackofprecisionshould notconcern us. Anessential ofthetheory ofrelevant aspectoftheversion alternatives I wish todefend is that thestandards that govern relevance How probable an alternative mustbe in are context-sensitive.13 orderto be relevant in whichthe will dependon the context is made.To say simply that knowledge attribution skeptical alternatives is tofail todo justice totheapparent are notrelevant threat itis true claims. While skeptical arguments pose to ourknowledge that believethat alternatives are tooremote to we often skeptical at other times we find them threaten ourknowledge claims, quite ofrelevance that thestandards are senworrisome. By supposing to thecontext ofattribution we can explain ourtendency to sitive thestandards are vacillate inthis way.Innormal everyday contexts, suchthat are notrelevant ofcourse, skeptical alternatives (unless, thecircumstances aresuch that arehighly skeptical alternatives probthere exist barn This ourconable,e.g., many replicas). explains fidence in the truth of our everyday of knowledge. attributions when we areconfronted with However, skeptical arguments, we may cometo consider skeptical alternatives as relevant, thereby lowerhowprobable ingourstandards (for an alternative must be). Skeptical areforceful arguments precisely becausethey can havethis effect on us. In thesecontexts, attributions ofknowledge which are truein everyday contexts, are false.Butwe are notthereby constrained to use skeptical for standards ourknowledge attributions. further we may decide that alternatives Upon consideration, skeptical are tooremote to count as relevant, thestandards thereby shifting

How to be a Failibilist / 97

we vacillate between oncemore. Again, sometimes considering skepas relevant and dismissing them ticalalternatives as irrelevant. By ofan attribution ofknowledge that thetruth-value isconsupposing injustthis to boththeundeniable text sensitive way,we do justice ofskeptical and ourstrong to say that force arguments inclination we knowthings in everyday life. Thus,thetheory I wishto defend construes "knowledge" as an to a subAs such, one speaker indexical. mayattribute knowledge another denies to that samesubject, jectwhile speaker knowledge without contradiction.14 III. Closure and SkepticalParadoxes Ifthetheory a resolution ofthe ofrelevant alternatives provides which oftheinconsistent triad member does it skeptical paradox, thetheory reject? On Dretskes' view, rejects (1),theclosure princih isan alternative toDretske, toq),if S knows ple.According (where thenS knows q and S knows q entails not-h, not-h, justin case h Dretske would that the alternative.15 is a relevant Presumably argue from ourfailure todistinguish itfrom itsqualified appealof(1)results He observes that when Consider a case discussed by Dretske.16 thezebraexhibit, we are at thezoo and encounter we can come we see there are zebras.He thennotes to knowthattheanimals that their that are notcleverly beingzebrasentails they disguised theproposition that are cleverly mules mules. Thus, they disguised is an alternative. Provided that there are no facts concerning, e.g., on thepartofthezoo keepers, this alternative deceptive practices is notrelevant, andso we know that are zebras.But, Dretske they we do notknowthat are notcleverly mules. insists, they disguised He claims that we fail to knowthat they are notcleverly disguised tobelieve that mules becausewe lacksufficiently goodreason they are not.The evidence for are zebrasdoes notcount thinking they mules. While arecleverly against thinking they disguised conceding for this that we havesomestatistical reasons denying alternative, thenormal ofzoo keepers, denies that these behavior etc.,Dretske reasons aresufficient for that thealternative isfalse. ustoknow They ofbeing fall short ofknowledge reasons we might thesort yielding obtain outthat the theanimals. Dretske byclosely inspecting points
version.

98 / Stewart Cohen to exploit this fact inconjunction with skeptic attempts (1) to deny that we knowthat we see a zebra.He proposes that we resist this movebyaccepting morethan therestricted version of(1). nothing Sincethealternative that theanimals are mulesis notrelevant in thecontext, we canknow they arezebras eventhough ourevidence does notgiveus knowledge thatthey are notdisguised mules. While the G. C. Stinedisputes Dretske's conclusion.17 endorsing ofrelevant that theory alternatives, Stine thetheory is most argues plausibly construed as notentailing thefalsity of(1),theclosure prinSheaccusesDretske ofpresupposing ciple. that itis always thecase that whenknowledge ofp is attributed to S, thenegation ofp is a relevant alternative. This allows Dretske todeny (1),since h(the skepticalalternative) fails to be relevant whentheissueis whether S knows q,while relevant when the iswhether remaining issue S knows not-h. While Stine concedes that this presupposition is normally correct, shedenies that itis always correct. Inparticular, inthespecial context ofmaking a deductive closure thenormal argument, presupposition that thenegation ofa proposition isrelevant is"cancellable". Andifthis is cancelled, to be relevant, presupposition i.e.,ifh fails then we should S knows not-h. Moregenerally, saythat S knows a proposition inanycontext where itsnegation is notrelevant. Thus, ina context where we know q, becauseh is notrelevant, we know not-h as well.18 Stine's account theclosure to a fixed relative preserves principle Ifh is relevant, setofrelevant alternatives. to knownot-h, S fails to knowq as well.Ifh is notrelevant, butS fails S knows q, butS knows not-h as well.On this therelevant interpretation, alternatives totheskeptical toa denial approach paradox amounts of(2)(relative to thestandards that in everyday In thoseconoperate contexts). sinceh is (normally) notrelevant, texts, S knows as wellas not-h, This is true even q. whenwe consider whether S knows a though alternative likeh to be false, we maybe led to consider skeptical h relevant (thereby shifting ourstandards) andso fail toknow not-h Stinenotesthat to objectto closure (inthat on thebasis context). ofexamples where thesetofrelevant alternatives is notheldfixed is "to commit somelogicalsinakinto equivocation".19 Stineis certainly correct in characterizing theargument she atto Dretske tributes as a form of equivocation. If attributions of knowledge are context-sensitive in thewaywe havebeensupposing, i.e.,if"knowledge" isan indexical, then the content ofknowledge

How to be a Failibilist / 99

willvary across contexts. What we attribute toS inone attributions willbe different that S knows, from what whenwe assert context whenwe assert that S knows. we attribute to S inanother context and consequent of(1) are evaluated in As such,iftheantecedent to evenview(1) as expressing different contexts, itis problematic which set is supposed a closure to be closed? principle. Exactly there would tobe a problem with Stine's appear Ontheother hand, to knownot-h is right, we fail (intheexample view.ForifDretske welacksufficient for ustoknow not-h. because evidence hediscusses) evidence certainly does notcountin favor The purely perceptual are disguised and there is ofitnotbeingthecase that mules they to Dretske's contention thatthe purely considerable plausibility we haveregarding thebehavior ofzoo keepers statistical evidence isinsufficient togiveusknowledge that arenot they cleverly disguised mules. theevidence is insufficient, shecontends While Stine agreesthat theevidence infact, that Dretske hasgeneralized requirement when, evidence isnotrequired. somecasesofknowledge aresuchthat She isnota relevant that "if thenegation ofa proposition altercounters without needingto provide native,thenI know it-obviously, for preserving closure becomes Here,I think that Stine's strategy that somepropositions counter-intuitive. Evenifitis true strongly is nottrue without this ofthepropocanbe known surely evidence, thatS is notdeceived mule. sition disguised by a cleverly it is notclearthatStinehas mademuchprogress in Moreover, closure sinceshe(as wellas Dretresisting skepticism bydefeu:ding that we do nothaveevidence that that yields knowledge ske)claims But do not-h while we haveevidence that yields knowledge that q.21 thenbothshe and Dretske committed to the denial of are (4): to knowq and S knows evidence thatq (4) IfS has sufficient to know not-h. entails then S hassufficient evidence not-h, this is as plausible as (1).22 Moreover, many peoSurely principle that doubts about knowledge are,atroot, doubts plethink skeptical So itispeculiar for todefend about evidence. Stine (1)while implicitly committing thesame equivocadenying (4). Is Stineinadvertently tionin (implicitly) in denying commits (1)? denying (4) as Dretske Itis clearthat theissueconcerning whether however we resolve rethefundamental skeptical paradox knowledge requires evidence,
evidence..."20

100/ Stewart Cohen mains ifwe combine (4) with (5) and (6). evidence to knownot-h. (5) S does nothavesufficient evidence to knowq. (6) S does have sufficient Ifthetheory ofrelevant we sayaboutthis What should paradox? theresoluis tomakeanyheadway skepticism, alternatives against oftheparadox ofthis theresolution contion paradox must parallel for S hasevidence sufficient knowledge relative cerning knowledge; to a set ofrelevant determined by thestandards that alternatives evidencegives us operatein the context. So, our perceptual theirrelevance ofq (theanimals are zebras) knowledge only given ofthealternative h (they are cleverly mules). disguised ofthis Butnowwe must askwhich member newinconsistent triad thetheory toprovide isdenied fails a satisfacbythetheory. Again, oftheskeptical itdelivers unless a precise tory resolution paradox we should Butnow, reject. this result concerning which proposition totheevidence issue shifted from theknowledge hasmerely paradox ofthetheory for are theimplications (4) andtheatparadox. What for(1)? tendant consequences indiscussing this we must now There is a difficulty issuetowhich an alternative turn. thetheory, h,toq, is releAs Dretske sketches S knows ifS knows not-h. Thus vant justincase,necessarily, q only h is notrelevant that bothS knows q and justin case itis possible inthis not-h. thetheory formulated S doesnotknow With way,the failure ofclosure follows from theclaimthat that skeptical (orfor all proponents matter are notrelevant. Butwhile any)alternatives ofrelevant ofthetheory alternatives wantto claimthat skeptical this isoneoftheprimary arenotrelevantmotivations alternatives for those thetheory-there is a dispute among proponents holding overwhether closure is preserved by thetheory. thetheory We haveseenthat Stine Dretske's viewthat disputes holds involves closure. Butshecanclaim that closure only rejecting becauseshe redefines whatit is foran alternative to be relevant. Stinepresupposes theviewthat an alternative h, to q, is relevant incase,necessarily, ifS knows not-h S knows on thebasis just q only of evidence.23 Givenherview thatknowledge does notrequire itdoesnotfollow from thefact h is notrelevant that evidence, that for closure fails. Allthat follows is that itis possible both S toknow S notto know not-h on thebasisofevidence. Thisallows q andfor Stine areknown toholdtheviewthat thenon-relevant alternatives

How to be a Failibilist / 101 closure to be falsewithout evidence, thereby preserving principle relevance (1).However her wayofdefining (aswellas Dretske's) does that that alternatives havetheresult theclaim skeptical arenotrelevantentails that closure principle (4) fails (provided that q is known on thebasisofevidence). To resolve theclosure issue, we needa wayofformulating thetheory ofrelevant alternatives that doesnot prejudge theissue.We needa wayofformulating thetheory that retains theanti-skeptical force without either denying or affirming closure in thevery formulation. We can then whatiminvestigate has fortheclosure plication thetheory principles. Thisis whatI propose todo. Itis important toremember that the in which we are engaged, is to rescuefallibilism from project the On a fallibilist skeptical paradox. view,S can knowq on thebasis rdoesnotentail of(hisreason) allows r,eventhough q. So fallibilism that S can knowq on thebasisofr eventhough there existalterr.Ofcourse, isnot tosaythat natives toq consistent with this S knows whenever there aresuchalternatives. Under certain conditions, S's willpreclude with to suchalternatives S epistemic position respect from knowing q on the basis of r. Thus,a fallibilist theory, at iscommitted toa distinction between conditions inwhich minimum, to alternatives r S's epistemic with consistent with position respect inwhich andconditions S's epistemic precludes knowledge, position withrespect to alternatives consistent withr does not preclude intheselatwhether knowledge. We neednotdecideat this point, with to the terconditions, thereason S's epistemic position respect knows is that S are alternatives does notpreclude knowledge they it or not know are false(Stine); that S does although they false, is inorder for him to know notrequired that he knowthey are false q (Dretske). a releLetus callan alternative in conditions ofthis latter kind, vantalternative: an alternative (to q) h is relevant (for S) = dfS's epistemic with to h precludes S from position respect knowing q. which Nowwe can hold alternatives arenotrelevant, that certain committed either as fallibilists we must, without thereby being way whatS's epistemic on theclosure issue.We leave it openexactly alternatives. situation is with to thenon-relevant respect ofthis for reformulated Before closure we develop theimplications ofrelevance. Whether thecriteria we needtosaymore about theory,

102/ Stewart Cohen to q are S knowsq will dependon whether any alternatives relevant-whether theconditions are suchthat S's epistemic position with respect toanyalternatives precludes knowledge ofq. Thus ofrelevance should the criteria reflect ourintuitions concerning under S doesknowq. Theseintuitions are influenced what conditions by that are internal to S's evidence that conditions and byconditions Theexternal conditions arereflected toS's evidence.24 areexternal in theprobabilistic ofrelevance we discussed criterion earlier. iftheprobability (i) an alternative (to q) h is relevant, of h conditional on reasonr and certain ofthe features is sufficiently circumstances high (where thelevelof thatis sufficient is determined probability by context). The externality ofthiscriterion is exemplified in itsapplication toGoldman's barnreplica case. The merefact that thereplicas exwhether or notS has anyevidence that is sufficient ist, they exist, torender that S seesa barn thealternative replica relevant (ineveryday contexts) by thiscriterion. Ifthetheory ofrelevant alternatives istocapture theinternal conditions that then itmust affect ourintuitions, havean internal criterion ofrelevance, is sensitive toconditions i.e.,a criterion that concernandDretske alone.Both Stine overlook thefact that ingS's evidence h playsa roleinS coming to knowq because S's evidence against think thisevidence is notsufficient forS to knownot-h. But they evenif turn outtobe right inholding that thestatistical they evidence ofzoo keepers thebehavior is notsuffipossessed byS regarding for S to knowthat he does notsee a cleverly cient disguised mule, nonetheless itissurely true that thefact that S possesses this evidence this alternative is crucial to thealternative notbeingreleagainst vant.IfS wereto haveno evidence thebehavior at all regarding ofzoo keepers even in which count would (or people general) against this as itwould alternative-if as far S's evidence wereconcerned, be as likely as notthat heseesa disguised S would mule-then surely fail toknow that he seesa zebra.Thatis tosay,thealternative that heseesa mule would be relevant. Theconditions would be suchthat S's epistemic with tothealternative would position respect preclude that S from he sees a zebraon thebasisofhisperceptual knowing evidence. Theconditions that makethealternative relevant here aredistinct from theconditions It maybe governed bytheexternal criterion.

How to be a Failibilist / 103

itis very tofacts that relative beyond S's evidence, improbable that mule.Butifgiven S's evidence S sees a cleverly disguised alone,it he sees a disguised muleas that he sees a zebra, is as likely that S does notknowthathe sees a zebra. The point is, perhaps, even moreclearwhenwe consider nonthat is a zebraat there perceptual examples.25 SupposeS believes thezoo on thebasisofJones' testimony (alone).Is thealternative himrelevant? One factor thatwillaffect thatJonesis deceiving relevance hereis theactualfrequency with which Jones (orpeople ingeneral) Thiskind offactor actually provide deceptive testimony. Butclearly, ifas faras S's is governed criterion. by theexternal is concerned, evidence itis as likely as notthat doesdeceive Jones ofJones him-if S hasnoevidence thereliability concerning (orpeople in general)-then S does notknowthat there is a zebraat the zoo on thebasisofJones' factors extestimony. Again, pertaining whether toS'sownevidence affect alternatives become releclusively theneedfor whatI havecalledan internal vant.Thisunderscores Onecoulddeny theneedfor sucha criterion criterion ofrelevance. of thereliability only bydenying that, e.g.,S's evidence concerning isnotrelevant towhether S comes toknow on the Jones' testimony basisofJones' testimony.26 in the required thetheory We can augment way by including criterion (ii): ifS lackssufficient (ii) an alternative (to q) h is relevant, to denyh,i.e.,to believenot-h. evidence (reason) oftheinternal ofrelevance It is a consequence criterion that S's h is,in effect, an essential ofS's total evidence against component ofq . Thus, we canviewtheinterreasons that givehim knowledge that howstrong nalcriterion as determining a standard S's governs for totalreasons to believeq must be in order S to knowq.27We noted earlierthatin orderto explainthe appeal of skeptical that whatI am nowcalling theexwe needtosuppose arguments, Thevery ofrelevance iscontext-sensitive. sameconternal criterion will totheinternal criterion. siderations So there be nogeneral apply todeny an alterofwhat evidence constitutes sufficient specification nativein orderforit notto be relevant, and as such,no general toknow ofwhat constitutes sufficient evidence specification q. Rather, this will inwhich ofknowledge onthecontext theattribution depend occurs.

Cohen 104/ Stewart Dretske to theissueofclosure that divided We can nowreturn S may closure (1) is false. Dretske that principle argues and Stine. toq) where not-h (where h isan alternative toknow know q, butfail OnDretske's thefact view, toknow not-h. evidence S lacks sufficient ofq, hisknowledge does notundermine that S fails to knownot-h alternative. thath is nota relevant provided closure willholdprovided that Stine defends principle (1) arguing alterwe keep theset ofrelevant we don'tequivocate-provided fixed. Whenh is releofrelevance) thestandards natives (andthus and q, and whenh is notrelevant, S willfailto knowbothnot-h worry toDretske's andq. Stine responds know both not-h vant S will when toknow not-h byclaiming that that sufficient evidence S lacks We notedthat not-h without evidence. h is notrelevant, S knows on therejection of ofbothDretske and Stinehinge thearguments (4). closure principle willenableus to assessmore criterion ofrelevance The internal is context-sensitive, we thestatus of(4). Sincethis criterion clearly of(4) is basedon therejection be alert tothepossibility that should with refers toinconnection the ofequivocation Stine thesamesort be this: The issue would seem to external criterion andprinciple (1). hisan alterwhere S believes q onthebasisofhisevidence, Suppose todenyh,topreevidence toq. IfS doesnothavesufficient native incontext thewayI have (given h from relevant c, then being vent to know q on thebasisofhisevidence, S fails defined "relevance") for evidence is notsufficient evidence inc. Thatis to say,S's total for evidence in Thus if total evidence is sufficient to know c. S's S q of that is sufficient know in then some subset S to evidence, e, q c, h from a relevant alternative to denyh,to prevent being evidence in evidence, inc. What we needto knowis whether e is sufficient S know not-h. to that same context c, for claimthat thestatistical evidence recallDretske's (Forexample, evidence for ofzookeepers isnotsufficient thebehavior concerning mule.I have S to knowthathe does notsee a cleverly disguised that that thisevidence certainly playsa rolein S knowing argued thathe sees a cleverly he sees a zebra-it keepsthealternative The issuewe are confronting mulefrom beingrelevant. disguised S to knowthathe sees a which enables is whether thisevidence, disguised thealternative that heseesa cleverly zebrabypreventing for S to knowthat from is sufficient evidence mule being relevant, disguised mule). he does notsee a cleverly

How to be a Failibilist / 105

for S to knownot-h in context evidence c, then Ife is sufficient toboth Dretske I will closure principle (4) holds contrary andStine. forS to knownot-h evidence in c.28The arguethat e is sufficient is straightforward: evidence to argument SupposeS has sufficient hisan alternative toq. I just that itfollows know q inc,where argued ofthat evidence to deny that somesubset evidence, e, is sufficient inc. Thusin conh,to prevent h from being a relevant alternative text c, h is nota relevant alternative tonot-h.29 Thatis tosay(given in c, e is sufficient evidence to thewayI havedefined relevance), ofnot-h from But denyh,to prevent knowledge beingprecluded. Thus, theevidence to denyh justis theevidence to believenot-h. tobelieve toprevent e issufficient evidence knowledge ofnot-h not-h, toknow from being precluded. Itfollows that e issufficient evidence not-h(since,if e were not sufficient evidenceto know not-h, knowledge ofnot-h wouldbe precluded). relative toa conWe can nowsee that closure principle (4) holds, ofequivocation that text. Thedenial of(4)isbasedonthesamekind of(1).The reason Stine with Dretske's denial allegedinconnection we wantto say that while S has sufficient evidence to knowq, he isthat shift lacks sufficient evidence toknow not-h, we inadvertently ofrelevance theformer attribution thestandards as we movefrom to thelatter. on the ofclosure Moreover, sincethestatus principle (1) depends IfS knows toa context. status of(4),(1)remains intact as well, relative S does then toDretske) that q andS knows q entails not-h, (contrary not-h on thebasisof knownot-h, but(contrary to Stine) S knows hisevidence.30 I amproposing thetheory handles the paradox conThus, skeptical evidence andtheskeptical concerning knowledge cerning paradox inprecisely thetheory denies thesameway.Inthe evidence paradox, ineveryday to know evidence not-h) (5) (S does nothavesufficient toknow while evidence contexts, denying (6)(S doeshavesufficient Intheknowledge thetheory denies contexts. q) inskeptical paradox, while denying (3) (2) (S doesnotknownot-h) ineveryday contexts, Innocontext doesthetheory deny (S knows q) inskeptical contexts. either orclosure princiclosure principle (1) concerning knowledge forknowledge. ple (4) concerning evidence sufficient

106/ Stewart Cohen Shifts IV. Contextual q and to sayboththat S knows that ourtendency I haveargued from to holdthestannot-h results ourfailure that S doesnotknow toshift these standards Sinceourtendency fixed. dards ofrelevance a satisfactory resoluparadoxes, is whatgivesriseto theskeptical ofhowthis an account shift occurs. tionoftheparadoxes requires I mentioned earlier aregermane. thefallibilist puzzles Hereiswhere for S's reasons heloses Where believing Consider thelottery puzzle. ofJones that he willfix ofthetestimony thelotthelottery consist that lists ticket as thewinner, another report tery, orthenewspaper knowon thebasisofthe S can knowthathe loses.ButS cannot thenumber oftickets, eventhough statistical information concerning on thebasisofthelattheprobability that he losesmaybe greater should this be? Why terevidence thanon thebasisoftheformer. of thetestimony or the In thecases wherethereasonsconsist do notentail theconclusion that he thereasons newspaper report, with thereasons, e.g.,the loses.Thereare alternatives consistent is mistaken. is deceptive, Sinceorthenewspaper report testimony in these these alternatives we attribute cases, knowledge dinarily in thosecontexts. are notrelevant consist of inthecase where thereasons The situation is different Likethe other thestatistical information. cases, thereasons(the thatS loses. n-I /nprobability theticket loses)do notentail that which isconsisisthealternative that S's ticket wins, there Trivially, an equalchanceofwinning. with tickets having tent then- I other that S knows that he loses,this alterSinceherewe ordinarily deny in thosecontexts. is relevant native itrelevant? I propose that theexplanation liesinthe makes What we allow statistical nature ofthereasons. as fallibilists, Although, oferror that there isa chance (i.e.,there S canknow q, eventhough with hisreasons), whenthechanceof are alternatives compatible is salient, we are reluctant to attribute Statistical error knowledge. in thelottery case makethe reasonsof thesortthatS possesses oferror that S'sreason isthen- 1/n chance salient. Thespecification to the1/nprobabiltheticket loses,callsattention probability that is focused theticket on thealternative that wins. Ourattention ity we arerelucthat wins inwhich theticket andthis creates a context toattribute unless S hassomeindependent ground tant knowledge, for Butin this case S has no insufficient thealternative. denying

How to be a Failibilist / 107

Inthecaseswhere we ordinarily attribute knowledge, viz., where ofthetestimony or thenewspaper S's reasons consist report, the isnot chance oferror salient. there arenorelevant alternatives. Here, The standards in thesecontexts that operate are suchthat S does have sufficient reasonto deny the alternatives, e.g., deceptive testimony, newspaper misprint. But thereasons for denying thealternatives neednotbe anystronger herethan for thereasons denying inthestatistical thestrength thealternatives case,since we canmake in thestatistical ofthereasons case arbitrarily great byincreasing It follows the number of tickets. thatthe contexts in whichwe evaluate thetwocasesaredifferent, ofrelevance i.e.,thestandards The explanation thatoperate are different. for whythestandards differ that inthestatistical liesinthefact case,unlike theother cases, thenature ofthereasons makethechanceoferror salient.32 Itmight seemas ifthealleged difference between thecasesdoes notreally exist. Surely facts abouttestimony or newspaper reports with about constitute reasons facts (evidence) onlyin conjunction oftestimony and surely this thereliability or newspaper reports, reliability willbe lessthanperfect. Thusthereasons are moreacdescribed is n/mreliable curately as, e.g.,Jones saysq and Jones n But if the reasons inthis (where < m). areultimately statistical way, thechanceoferror whydoesn't becomesalient? Whyisn't ourattention on them- n/mchancethatJones is lying? focused Theanswer is that ofthereasons we do notnormally think inthis way.Ifwe did,we might notsay that S knows. Howdo we think We know ofthis case so that thechanceoferror is notsalient?33 that Jones heintends tofix thelottery that saysthat toensure S loses. Thissuggests tous a scenario: Jones hisintention tofix announces thelottery in becausethat is, fact, whathe intends, and hisintenwill tion leadhim will toavoiddrawing andS thereby lose. S's ticket Consider the case wherethereasonsconsist of thenewspaper thata different wins.Newspapers are notperfectly report ticket reliable. Ifthereasons weredescribed interms ofthenewspaper's

both).3'

h isjustthecontradictory dependent grounds. Sincethealternative for hjustarethe ofthebelieved proposition q, thegrounds denying grounds for accepting q. Thusthealternative remains relevant and to S thathisticket we do notattribute knowledge loses.The standardsofrelevance either are suchthat S lackssufficient reasonto inthecircumstances ofh is toogreat denyh,or theprobability (or

108/ Stewart Cohen we might beginto wonder reliability, high, butless thanperfect is true. We say that we really knowthatwhatit reports whether we do notthink ofthecaseinthis way.Rather, S doesknow because a scenario where theinforinsofar as we think aboutit,we imagine to thepaperin one losesis transmitted mation aboutwhich ticket thedrawing andthen witnesses oftheusualways, e.g.,thereporter it. who prints phones it in to theeditor Becausewe Inthese thechanceoferror is notsalient. scenarios, we arenotledtoconthink ofthecasesinterms ofthese scenarios, alter thestandards). as relevant (andthereby sider certain alternatives interms of thecase where thereasons are described Thisis unlike makes the explicit probabilities. Thatverydescription statistical thealternatives andleadsus toconsider salient thechanceoferror as relevant. of"know" that requires isnothing inthesemantics However, there inthis would usfrom prevent that we setthestandards way.Nothing in theexplicit thestandards case insucha way probability setting ofknowledge Ifone reflects that an attribution wouldbe correct. that S losescouldbe greater on thefact that theprobability based that he loses oftickets then theprobability on thenumber simply on thetestimony, one couldbe led from thetendency conditional inthetestimony toattribute case toattribute knowledge knowledge the information. One might feelthat on thebasisofthestatistical is tooremote as a relethat be drawn tocount chance S's ticket.will vantalternative.34 ofthereasons interms ofthestatistical While a description probbe what leads to a of the standards of can relevance, lowering ability can havethesameeffect. When we are certain scenarios imagining where someone told that a lottery is fair, we mayimagine a scenario in with thesituation Viewing draws from a binfilled tickets. blindly drawn-it thisway underscores that could be thefact any ticket condiIndeedthevery makes thealternative that S winsrelevant. in is the tionthat chance motivates peopleto participate lotteries their that ticket maywin.35 work. howskeptical Wecannowgain into someinsight arguments makealternatives relevant Ineffect, byforcing arguments skeptical thechance oferror salient. ustoviewthe ina waythat makes reasons a contake ofrelevance standards creating thereby effect, Skeptical textwhereattributions ofknowledge are incorrect. in everyday As we have noted, Consider thecase oftestimony.

How to be a Failibilist / 109 wewill attribute onthebasis oftestimony. Thus, contexts knowledge that histicket S knows willlose basedon we ordinarily allowthat The skeptic ofJones or thenewspaper report. poses thetestimony itis notthecase that Jones is thequestion: Howdoes S knowthat Ifhe is persistent we can lying or that thenewspaper is mistaken? to say thatS knows thathe willlose. becomehesitant he What this shift? When theskeptic poseshischallenge, explains of ourattention on thechanceoferror-ontheexistence focuses with S's reasons. Whenalternatives alternatives consistent become in this to attribute knowledge unless salient way,we are reluctant hassufficient reason todeny thealterthesubject oftheattribution to meettheskeptical we are Butwhenwe try challenge, natives. that thereasons to confront thefact S hasfor these forced denying viz.,peopledo notusually lie, alternatives are basically statistical, ofthis etc..Butreasons newspapers generally do notmakemistakes themselves servethecauseoftheskeptic well, sincethey type very Thisis whywe are reluctant to makethechanceoferror salient. statistical he willlose on thebasisofthepurely say thatS knows To saythat peopledo notusualreasons (the number oftickets etc..) make mistakes is to ly lie or thatnewspapers do notgenerally thefact that sometimes do. Inthis these alterway, underscore they A skeptical is createdand the context nativesbecomerelevant. arenotsufficient relative tothe reasons for denying thealternatives inthis newcontext. Assuch, we become relucstandards that apply toS that he loseson thebasisofJones' tant to attribute knowledge to becausewe are reluctant testimony (or thenewspaper report), isnot toS that Jones thenewspaper lying (orthat attribute knowledge is notmistaken). report The sameaccount to Dretske's zebracase. The explanaapplies thathe does not to say that S knows tionfor whywe are hesitant is reasons for that he mule that S's see a cleverly denying disguised in elaborate seesonearestatistical-people engage deceptions. rarely thefact that do and a skeptical Thismakessalient sometimes they We context is createdwherethisalternative becomesrelevant. becomereluctant tosaythat S knows that he sees a zebrabecause that we do notthink that heknows hedoesnot see a cleverly disguised mule. aresuch Ineveryday thestandards ofrelevance contexts, though, and thatwe willattribute knowledge on the basis of testimony perception.

110/ Stewart Cohen thefact that certain considerations Skeptical arguments exploit can inthestandards ofrelevance. leadtoa shift Failure torecognize the We attribute shift can leadus into to S that paradox. knowledge he on thebasisoftestimony butwe deny losesthelottery that S knows is notmistaken. In Harman's thatthereport puzzle,we attribute to S thatSmith willbe in NewYorktomorrow knowledge on the basisofSmith's announced that intention, yetwe deny S knows that will winthelottery itisnotthecase that Smith andbe inNewJersey instead. Both Dretske andStine attribute knowledge toS that hesees a zebraon thebasisofhisvisualevidence whiledenying thathis him evidence gives knowledge that hedoesnot see a cleverly disguised mule. that he knows (Stine contends without evidence). Thispattern ofattributions theappearance creates ofclosure failure which toaccept. Thus wearehard pressed weareledtoreassess ouroriginal between andcommon judgments often vacillating skepticism sense. isthat What I amproposing we canexplain this ofattribupattern tions interms ofthemechanism ofcontext-sensitivity ina waythat endorses ouroriginal thetruth of knowledge attributions, preserves the closureprinciples, and accountsforthe powerof skeptical Inall ofthese for hisbelief arguments. cases,S's reason q giveshim ofq, relative that tothestandards Under knowledge ordinarily apply. we areled toviewS's reasons for alterskeptical pressure, denying h as notsufficient we have native forS to knownot-h. However, seen thatrelative to thesame standards thatordinarily applyto h ofq, S's reasonfor forhimto knowledge denying are sufficient knownot-h. Ifwe keepthecontext S knows fixed, q on thebasis ofhisevidence evidence allowshim to knownot-h. onlyifthat So, theskeptical results ina shift to a different context where pressure different totheskeptical constandards Oncewe haveshifted apply. on the theskeptic willexploit theappealofclosure andinsist text, in getting us to modus tollens inference. Thustheskeptic succeeds ustoshift the ouroriginal attribution question knowledge bygetting oftheskepcontext. Whenwe are confronted with theconclusion ourorticalargument he sees a zebra), (e.g.,S doesnotknowthat theskepstandards often reassert themselves andwe resist dinary S doesknowq. Butthen we are faced ticalinference, insisting that with And the modus once again theclosure principle. ponensinis thwarted ference totheconclusion that S doesknow not-h bythe it hardto resurgence oftheskeptical standards. Although we find S we endup asserting boththat S knows denyclosure, q and that

How to be a Failibilist / 111 does notknownot-h. ofrelevant Thetheory alternatives Thuswe areledinto paradox. tothetheory, attribuAccording provides a wayoutoftheparadox. are context-sensitive. The apparent closure tionsof knowledge areillusions that result from inattention tocontextual shifts. failures S does knowq, butinthosesamecontexts, S In ordinary contexts Inskeptical S fails toknow both q andnot-h. knows not-h. contexts V. Radical SkepticalHypotheses werelikethose we havebeenconsiderIfallskeptical hypotheses that thetreatment casesgeneralizes be satisfied ofthese ing, we could solution to theskeptical Unfortunately, paradoxes. to a complete in skeptical hypotheses thatcannotbe handled thereare certain this between moderate andradical precisely way.Letus distinguish A moderate is immune hypothesis skeptical skeptical hypotheses. kind ofevidence. Forexamtorejection on thebasisofa particular that theanimals arecleverly mules candisguised ple,thehypothesis available to evidence on thebasisoftheperceptual notbe rejected that Smith at thesupposed distance. The hypotheses theobserver wins thelottery on thebasisofJones' testimony cannotbe rejected remains that he willbe in NewYork.In thesecases,thepossibility these other evidence which counts against that thesubject possesses ofdecepevidence aboutthelikelihood alternatives, e.g.,statistical ina fair ofa particular ticket winning lottery. tion, orthelikelihood torejection on thebasis areimmune hypotheses Radical skeptical that could ofanyevidence. Therewouldappearto be no evidence thehypothesis we are deceived countagainst that bya Cartesian Radical or thehypothesis that we are brains-in-a-vat. skepdemon, that could anyevidence toneutralize ticalhypotheses aredesigned be adducedagainst them. solution of the paradoxis If thisis correct, thenthe proposed theskeptic hypotheses, threatened. Whereh is a radical skeptical to deny sufficient can arguethat we failto haveevidence trivially toeveryday tohaveanyevidence standards sincewe fail h,relative h.Wewill as we didregardthat counts notbe abletoargue, against we do have that theevidence skeptical hypotheses, ingthemoderate Thus to denyh really is sufficient to everyday standards. relative andwe will h will criterion) be a relevant alternative (bytheinternal failto knowq.36

112/ Stewart Cohen Where doesthis leave us?The skeptic wouldseemto be correct in claiming thatwe do lack evidenceagainstradicalskeptical hypotheses. itdoesnotfollow However, that itis notreasonable or rational to denysuchhypotheses. I am not,here, referring to nonepistemic sensesofrationality (e.g.,prudential rationality). Rather I am referring to a wayin which itcan be rational (orreasonable) tobelieve a proposition without possessing evidence for thebelief. We can call beliefs ofthis sort rational. intrinsically While we may concedeto theskeptic that we lackevidence against radical skeptical I do notthink hypotheses, we should be willing toconcede that itis notrational to denythesehypotheses (believe they are false). Ifso we canviewthedenials ofthese hypotheses as intrinsically rational. Forexample I think itis clearthat we wouldthink itis that rational tobelieve that youarenot systematically deceived-deceived in a waythatcannot in principle be detected. Is ittrue we viewmatters inthis that that way?Notice we would characterize someone whobelieved a radical skeptical hypotheses as crazy, as profoundly irrational. One might claimthat we regard of such hypotheses acceptance in thisway becausewe consider ofjudgment suspension as theonly rational attitude totaketoward thesepropositions. On this viewitwouldnotbe rational to either acceptor denyh (theradical skeptical alternative). this issurely However, an implausible characterization oftheway we viewtheepistemic status ofskeptical hypotheses. we Typically think itappropriate to suspend belief abouta proposition q, when q andnot-q areequally reasonable. Inaddition, ofbelief suspension canbe theappropriate attitude toward a proposition q evenifthere is an asymmetry between thedegreeofreasonability ofq and the degreeof reasonability It maybe thatwhileq is more of not-q. reasonable than not-q, not-q isstill sufficiently reasonable topreclude acceptance ofq. Butthis is notoursituation with respect toradical skeptical hypotheses. Herethere isan extreme Wethink asymmetry. itwould be crazy tobelieve a radical skeptical hypotheses. This sugwe think it is rational geststhat to denysucha hypotheses. Perhaps whenwe are dealing with that are paradoxical, matters itis possible to think thatitis crazyto either acceptq or denyq. So itwould notfollow from itiscrazy thefact that we think tobelieve a skeptical hypotheses that think it we is rational to deny skeptical hypotheses. However, this isnotourattitude toward accepting skeptical hypotheses. We do not think it is crazyto denysuch a

How to be a Failibilist / 113 holds that Noteventheskeptic view.So itmust hypotheses. be that todeny itis rational we think skeptical hypotheses eventhough we it. thatwe lackevidence recognize against this Butdoesn't just begthequestion against theskeptic? Ina sense than theskeptic itdoes,butnomore begsthequestion against comWhile theskeptic monsense. mayhavean argument that we possess radicalskeptical no evidence against hypotheses likethedemon itis notrational he has no argument that hypotheses, (intheway Allhe can do is insist I haveindicated) to denythem. that rational which is justthepoint belief at issue. requires evidence, We need to be veryclearaboutthenature oftheenterprise in we areengaged. What we areconfronted with which isnotan argumentthatforces us to be skeptics. Rather we are facedwitha toaccept eachmember ofa setofproposiWeareinclined paradox. What tions we know tobe inconsistent. we seekis a wayoutofthe ofourinconsistent Itisnota coninclinations. paradox-aresolution ofa resolution that itappealtotheskepstraint on theacceptability what that tic.On thecontrary, we seekis a resolution rescues commonsensefrom theskeptical worries Ifthis posedbytheparadox. itisperfectly oftheproblem, then isthenature toappeal acceptable to certain sense framework in orderto aspectsof our common To resolve theparadox is not achievea resolution oftheparadox. to demonstrate to the skepticthatwe know. Ratherit is to demonstrate toourselves that we canclaim toknow without paradox. it in outthat avoidtheparadox to point However, does not itself we viewthedenialofradical For as rational. skeptical hypotheses theproblem remains that most ofus woulddeny that theextent to itis rational is sufficient alterwhich for us to knowthat skeptical natives are false. Ifitis notsufficient, then byclosure principle (1), fail we toknow we think thecommon sensepropositions we know. Whatthisobservation aboutintrinsic does is provide rationality us with in themeansfor theresolution that generalizing proceeds terms ofcontext-sensitive closure. Let us say thatit is reasonable for a subject S tobelieve a proposition sufq justincase S possesses ficient insupport ofq, orq is intrinsically We can evidence rational. then h isrelevant amend theinternal so that an alternative criterion ifitis notsufficiently h for S to deny (tobelievenot-h). reasonable In everyday contexts whereS believes an ordinary proposition q, on thebasisofreason h willnotbe alternative r,a radical skeptical relevant. Thestandard inthose criterion conyielded bytheinternal

114/ Stewart Cohen thereasonability texts is suchthat (viz.,theintrinsic rationality) of hissufficient for S toknow denying q onthebasisofr.Thisexplains thatwe knowq. ourintuition theparadox is generated Ofcourse, because, uponreflection, we it is sufficiently do notthink reasonable forS to denyh so thatS hjust isthereasonabilknows not-h. Butthereasonability ofdenying not-h. oftheprevious in ityofbelieving By theargument section, wherethe standards are such thatnot-h is sufficiently contexts S toknow tothose reasonable for q, according samestandards, noth is sufficiently for reasonable S to know not-h. Thusclosure holds, relative to a context, and theparadoxis avoided.37 to saythat itis notsufficiently are we reluctant reasonable Why for to believenot-h S to knownot-h? Again, focusing on skeptical alternatives canleadus toconsider them relevant. Inthecase ofthe we discussed we sawthat moderate the skeptical hypotheses earlier, is statistical, that theevidence thosehypotheses makes fact against this thechanceoferror salient. Clearly, explanation doesnotapply we arecurrently As totheradical skeptical hypotheses considering. we have noted, we have no evidence against them, statistical or we viewitas intrinsically to deny otherwise. Rather rational them. Buttheveryfactthattherationality ofdenying radical skeptical is salient. The fact hypotheses intrinsic makesthechanceoferror is notsupported that thedenialofthehypotheses byanyindepenourultimate Theskeptic dent considerations, underscores fallibility. that S has no suchindependent concallsourattention to thefact on thechanceoferror. ourattention siderations, thereby focusing Thisleadsus toconsider alternatives as relevant. these Bythestanit is not sufficiently dardsthatapplyin thisskeptical context, S to denyh and S fails to knowq (as wellas not-h). reasonable for to thestandards Buthisdoesnotchange thefact that relative that for ineveryday itissufficiently reasonable S todeny apply contexts, h so that we often vacillate beS knows q (as wellas not-h). Again, andnon-skeptical contexts. Theparadox arises from tween skeptical theillusion ofclosure failure that results from theshifting contexts. Letus be moreprecise oftheclosure aboutthestatus principles. Asbefore, holds relative toa conprinciple (1)concerning knowledge text. Consideration alternatives hasforced us to ofradical skeptical for even reject principle (4)concerning evidence sufficient knowledge, relative to a context. ourrejection of(4) is mitigated However, by closure ouracceptance to a of the (relative context) corresponding

/ 115 How to be a Fallibilist

reasonability: principle concerning reasonable forS to knowq, and S (4') Ifq is sufficiently thennot-h is sufficiently thatq entails not-h, knows forS to knownot-h. reasonable is sufficient to givehim e.g., evidence knowledge, ThusS's visual if is it reasonable for S to deny sufficiently that heseesa zebra, only demon so that S knows he is not that he is deceived bya Cartesian so deceived. VI. Objectionsand Replies Itrehowtobe a fallibilist. regarding myproposal Thiscompletes I propose twoobjections. against thetheory mainsto defend toprovide a general ofthe ourinability account concerns Thefirst theearlier discussion oftheprobabilistic ofrelevance. Recall criteria The result delivered of ofrelevance.38 bytheapplication criterion And on howthereference classis specified. depends thecriterion howthereference that we are unabletostatein general we noted tohavegrave doubts about Thishasledcritics classistobe specified. response to skepticism.39 alternatives therelevant ifwe lacka general ofthecriteria account Whyis ita problem But willremain occult."40 unacceptably defense vantalternatives to define alternatives theorist for therelevant whyis itnotenough thatcan and thento pointout some of the factors "relevance" ingeneral what must hestate sometimes for relevance? Why account criteria heprovide general Why must for relevance? factors account ofrelevance? inthis way:an alternative "relevance" Forexample I havedefined with respect position (for S) = dfS's epistemic (to q) h is relevant that we can acto h precludes S from knowing q. I havealso noted relevance byappealing count for someofourintuitions regarding way.Is itinto"probabilistic" inan imprecise considerations-albeit todo oftherelevant alternative theory cumbent uponthedefender more? the on howwe construe The answer willdepend to this question thereleOne wayfor to skepticism. response relevant alternatives vantalternative to arguewouldbe to beginby appealing theorist
of relevance?ErnestSosa objects thatbecause of this"... the rele-

116/ Stewart Cohen tocriteria ofrelevance intheabstract. Theclaimwouldhaveto be on theconcept ofrelevance that one can see simply by reflecting whatitis aboutalternatives that theproposed criteria that capture assent onthecorrectness makethem relevant. Having gained ofthe theorist would therelevant alternatives then proposed criteria, prothat when we apply ceedbyarguing these criteria toskeptical alterwe gettheresult that alternatives arenotrelevant. natives, skeptical inthis ofcourse, Ifwe weretoproceed thefailure toproway,then videa precise statement ofthecriteria would undermine thewhole toappealina vaguewaytoprobabilistic approach. Moreover, considerations and then adjust thereference classas required to yield thedesired result for each case wouldrender thewholeapproach ad hoc.41 Butwe should notconstrue therelevant alternatives theorist as thisargumentative Evenifwe did notworry employing strategy. this would about theprecision be hopeless. problem, surely strategy ofrelevance We cannot outofthin air.We formulate pullcriteria ofourintuition such criteria byreflecting onthedeliverances regardtodevise criteria that those intuitions. ingcases.We try capture We all haveintuitions about relevance borderline casesnotwithstan(the interms Since"relevance" is defined ofknowledge, ourintuiding). tions aboutrelevance areat root, intuitions aboutknowledge. Even the oftherelevant alternatives demonstrate that critics approach they have suchintuitions whenthey various criticize proposed criteria for results. yielding counterintuitive So we should not construe therelevant alternatives theorist as argualternatives are notrelevant becausethecriteria ingthat skeptical showit.Thenon-relevance ofskeptical is a datum alternatives providedbyourintuitive judgments concerning what Itis ilwe know. to advert luminating to various factors that for relevance account anditwould be desirable to havea general ofthe certainly account criteria ofrelevance. Butsurely itdoesnotfollow ourinability from toprovide a general account, that we cannot the legitimately apply Ourinability to provide a general ofthecriteria concept. account ofrelevance derives from ourinability toprovide a general account ofthecriteria ofknowledge. Ifourinability to formulate a general account madeit illegitimate to applya concept, theskeptic could establish hisposition tothefact that simply byappealing philosophers havebeenunableto formulate a general ofknowledge.42 account onemight that itbegsthequestion theskepAgain, object against

How to be a Failibilist / 117 intuitions aboutrelevance. Andthere ticto appealtoanti-skeptical is a senseinwhich itdoes.Butofcourseno morethan theskeptic therelevant alternatives begsthequestion against theorist by apto hisskeptical intuitions aboutrelevance. In this pealing sense,it sideofthedispute notto beg thequestion for either is impossible theother side.Attherisk ofbeingredundant, I stress that against totheskeptic is nottodemonstrate that we know. theproject What Whatwe seek is a solution we faceis a skeptical thatis paradox. to us. satisfying one final One might Let me conclude by considering objection. that I amproposing doesnotprovide think thetheory a reply really thesubject. butinstead After toskepticism, changes all,theskeptic thathe deniesthatwe everknowrelative might complain to the we know standards.43 to argue that strictest Thus, relative to looser is notto address theskeptic at all. standards The problem with this is that itgetsthings objection backwards. ofrelevant alternatives is correct, itis theskeptic Forifthetheory oureveryday whodoesnotaddress attributions. Itisthe knowledge who changes thesubject. skeptic is truly istheclaim What about that allalong, startling skepticism, in ourdayto daylives, whenwe haveclaimed to know we things, that are havebeenwrong-wehavebeenexpressing propositions Iftheskeptic's is interesting, itis becausehe false. literally position Thetheory ofreleoureveryday attributions. challenges knowledge that oureveryvant alternatives addresses thechallenge byarguing correct. The dayknowledge attributions-properly interpreted-are we actually andhavebeenexpressing allalong propositions express areliterally true. tothestandards that Wedo know relative ordinarily thoseattributions. govern Nowitis ofconsiderably lessinterest notdevoidofin(although that is someother stricter stanterest) there proposition involving is false. we knowrelative to skepdardsthat Itis notthecase that ticalstandards. Thisa fallibilist Whata fallibilist readily concedes. deniesis thatskeptical standards our everyday normally govern knowledge attributions. Ifwe wantto be fallibilists, thechallenge is tomakethat inthefaceoftheskeptical position stick, paradoxes. The theory showsus ofrelevant alternatives, properly construed, howto do justthat.44

118 / StewartCohen Notes Stine[201, Lewis[131, 1. See Dretske Goldman [41, [51, [7]. that helosesbecausehedoesnotbelieve 2. Perhaps S doesnotknow that heloses.But, wewould feel thesamereluctance tosayofsomeone else that whobelieves that S loses,thathe knows S loses. motivated Somephilosophers, havedenied that bythelottery paradox to believe thathe willlose.See Lehrer S evenhas goodreasons [121, so as toavoidtheconPollock Buttheexample couldbe changed [161. theparadox, that S believes siderations that raise e.g.,wecould suppose from onthebasisofhisknowledge a redballwill be drawn an urn that n- I/n oftheballsin theurnare red. on Jones 3. Theprobability that S losesconditional testimony is notwellForpurposes ofmaking thecomparison, defined here. we canviewthe inboth probability casesas epistemic, andassume that as thestatistical in thewell-defined case increases, so does theepistemic probability probability. 4. See Harman [81, [101. tocertain Forexample, 5. Thisclosure principle maybe subject quibbles. on thebasisof histotalevidence. S must believenot-h But,surely, something very closeto it is veryintuitive. See Nozick [141. 6. See Pollock Klein[11]. [151, 7. Thisshows theimplausibility ofthemodus ponensstrategy (inferring of(2),from no one would thedenial (1) and(3))sinceI presume argue that Jones willlosethelottery itfrom that S couldknow byinferring Jones' intention thathe willbe in NewYork. announced in[41, 8. Thisis Dretske's account he doesnotputitinjust these although In [51 ofa relevant words; see pp. 1022-23. Dretske's characterization in[201, Stine's alternative closetoStine's (p.371)isvery p. 253.I discuss characterization laterin this paper. 9. See Brueckner Shuger[181, Yougrau[241.Yougrau [21,Sosa [191, thinks there that are moreserious perhaps problems. 10. See Goldman [7]. 11. See Dretske Swain[221. Goldman Harman [41, [71, [91, 12. See Stine[201. 13. See Dretske Stine[201. Goldman Lewis[131, [71, [41, 14. Somemay think that that ofknowledge arecontheclaim attributions I argue text In [31, sensitive is an ad hoc maneuver theskeptic. against ofskeptical thatcontext can be motivated sensitivity independently issues. isan indexical, SinceontheviewI amdefending, "knowledge" many oftheissues Thustheissue be stated really should metalinguistically. as theissue ofwhether S knows ina context be formulated should really ofwhether context. thesentence "S knows q" is truein that If The closure principle, as well, should be s,tated metalinguistically: "S knows thesentence "S knows incontext q" istrue c,andthesentence not-h" is inc, then "S knows that not-h" thesentence q entails is true different closure truein c. As such,sentence (1) expresses principles

How tQ be a Failibilist / 119 a different in different contexts, each involving knowledge relation involve relations different (where different knowledge standards). Becausethemetalinguistic formulations aresomewhat cumbersome, thereader notbe misled I will notalways But should usethem. bythis. 15. Dretske p. 1023. [41, 16. Dretske p. 1016. [41, 17. Stine[201. willhavenoticed Dretske's definition of 18. Thecareful reader that, given tosaythat thenegation ofa pro"relevance", itappears contradictory I discuss in thetext. is notrelevant. this further position 19. Stine[201, p. 256. 20. Stine[201, p. 258. onthebasisofevidence 21. Actually, Stine denies that we know inpercepwecould thecasetoa non-perceptual one tual cases.Obviously, change where Stine wouldagreethat we do haveevidence. Perhaps, Stine's combined with herfocus on percepviewabout perceptual knowledge for herfailure to recognize that hergeneral view tualcasesaccounts entails thedenialofprinciple (4). (See text.) 22. Thewaythat I havestated this principle, itmay appear as if Stine's view Ifno evidence is required to know satisfies theprinciple vacuously. q, toknow evidence waspointed out then trivially S hassufficient q. (This to me byScott Soames.) Ife is sufficient I intend evidence theprinciple tobe readas follows: for S to knowq (on thebasisofe),...then e is sufficient evidence for viewdenies S to know not-h (onthebasisofe). Readthis way,Stine's theprinciple. in Thisclosure principle, likeprinciple (1),mayneedtobe restricted on likeprinciple not-h certain believe ways.Forexample, (1),S must inorder for theevidence to be sufficient for thebasisoftheevidence to(4),pointed not-h. This restriction avoids S toknow counter-examples that thefact that S mayknow each outto mebyJohn Pollock, exploit link ofa chain ofentailment that thefirst member of without knowing therestriction, iterated thechainentails thelast.As such, without apin counter-examples. ofprinciple plications (4) wouldresult 23. Stine[201, p. 253. 24. This "internal/external" is currently terminology popular in I am doubtful cf.Bonjour Pollock Goldman epistemology, [61, [171. [11, thatthisdistinction can be made veryprecise.Nonetheless, it is suggestive. 25. Somepeoplefind externalist ofknowledge purely analyses plausible. Others viewsuchanalyses as plausible for only perceptual knowledge. I think areplausible insofar as we that purely externalist analyses only viewknowledge Thisis why externalist acas notbasedon evidence. canseemmore for SinceI view counts plausible perceptual knowledge. I take as basedon evidence, knowledge (evenperceptual knowledge) ofexternalist theories. Forcritical discussion a dimviewofexternalist see Bonjour theories, [11and Pollock [171. ofanyaccount of demonstrates theimplausibility 26. A further example

120 / StewartCohen ofrelevance: criterion Suppose S believes relevance that lacks aninternal bya large meteorite onthebasisofhavthat theearth wasoncestruck ina certain ofiridium geological stratum. ingdiscovered large amounts correlation between concentrations As itturns out, there isa significant of iridium in thestratum and meteor strikes. However as faras S's evidence is concerned thereis no significant correlation-S has no for thepresence competing explanations evidence that counts against know that themeteor strikes oftheiridium. S doesnot occurred. Clearly it. and I willlater haveto weaken 27. Actually this principle is toostrong with itandsee exactly where itgoes But, itwill be instructive towork wrong. interchangeably. Also,I use "reason" and "evidence" ontheinternal criterion, I will later 28. Because theargument will depend 27). of(4)as a general principle (seenote havetotakebackthedefense will as a defense of(4)against theDretske/ Theargument remain sound FornowI willcontinue toassume Stine thecorrectcounter-example. criterion and so I willpresent theargument as a nessoftheinternal of(4) as a general defense principle. I should notassume that eachcontext selects one 29. Onemight object that how forevery pair,thatdetermines standard proposition-alternative in order for must be to denythealternative, S to strong S's evidence will know theproposition. we might assume that thestandard Rather, on theproposition and thealtervarywithin one context depending for how atissue. standard the evidence strong native So,incontext C,the from the for h must be in order for S to knowq, maydiffer denying h must theevidence for be inorder standard for howstrong denying for S to knownot-h. that would exThisviewassumes a very semantics complex greatly But ofhowthecontext determines thestandards. acerbate theproblem for even this viewallows this principle (4)tofail leaving problem aside, insucha way (4)tobe construed relative toa context, only byallowing and a closure Foriftheantecedent that itdoesnotexpress principle. of(4) express different knowledge involving consequent propositions to different then we can relative standards, relations, i.e.,knowledge set which notview(4)as expressing a closure principle. Again, exactly is supposed to be closed? is usedhere bearin mind that"relevance" should Also,thereader there isnothing of"relevance", as a technical Given definition term. my a relevant alterofa proposition odd aboutthenegation q notbeing native to q. it(without onemight take this but 30. Stine mentions that view, rejects briefly See [201, explanation.) pp. 258-59. is relevant whether thealternative by 31. I am notsurewhat determines or both. or theexternal standard theinternal standard account. at a similar 32. Jonathan independently, Vogel[24]has arrived, conclusion. he draws a different However, 33. HereI am indebted to Gilbert Harman (inconversation). he willlosethe to S that 34. Somepeopleobject to attributing knowledge

How to be a Failibilist / 121 whyhe buysa ticket. lottery sinceitwouldthenbe hardto explain he is thinking aboutthepossibility of However, whenS buys a ticket, notattribute that andso he willprobably knowledge he loses winning that he wins willmakethat Thesalience ofthealternative to himself. inthat context. Sincehe doesnotbelieve that he alternative relevant inexplaining why hebuys the knows he will lose,there is no difficulty ticket. tohimself knowledge that heloses Moreover, evenifhedoesattribute tothestandards ofthat is correct relative context), (andtheattribution hislosing, forhimto bet against provided it might still be rational actual that theoddsthat hegetsarefavorable (unlike lotteries). Notice ofthecase where S comesto know that he loseson thesameis true Eventhough heknows that heloses(inthat conthebasisoftestimony. he wins ifheis given itmight still be rational tobelieve that odds text), offalsetestimony. thatare favorable to theprobability relative inreconciling thefact that there is no difficulty we can know Finally S willlose with thefact that S buysa ticket. this observation (inconversation). 35. I am indebted to DavidLewisfor is a demon on theexternal criterion? 36. Willh be relevant If, e.g.,there this alternative willbe relevant. whooften Barring deceives us,then itwillnotbe relevant. Does this showthat we circumstances likethis, know weknow because these do not whether (ineveryday contexts)? No, willfail to whether we alternatives to be relevant (inthosecontexts) knowthatwe know, as well. skeptical arguments exploit Theseconsiderations makeitclearthat ofrelevance and thus demonstrate whypurely theinternal criterion to skepticism are so unsatisfying. externalist "solutions" I haveargued alternatives are we know radical skeptical 37. Ineffect, that incontexts are notrelevant. Do I, false without where they evidence, after all? then, agreewith Stine non-relevant alternatives are Stine hasa general viewthat we know I haveargued that with theexception ofradical false without evidence. are false on non-relevant alternatives skeptical alternatives, we know Itstrikes that we know, meas highly implausible thebasesofevidence. thezebrasare notcleverly disguised mules, yetnoneofour e.g.,that ofsucha deception a roleinour evidence abouttheprobability plays knowing. 38. Becauseofthewaythat relevant alternative theories havebeenforintheliterature theexternal thediscussions haveconcerned mulated, criterion. 39. See Bruckner Sosa [191, Yourgrau Shuger [251. [21, [181, 40. See [191, p. 585. 41. See Sosa [191. of 42. It is important in thecriteria to notethatifthelackofprecision for itis a problem for theskeptic relevance is a problem thefallibilist, as well.Fortheskeptic for thefact that ineveryday life, must account Sincetheseinwe are strongly inclined to saywe know many things. theskeptic, he must tuitions areprima against explain facieevidence

122 / StewartCohen them away. [21], (seeStroud available totheskeptic strategy promising Themost false that itis literally that inthese is to claim cases,while Unger [231) somesocial (serves itisinsomewayappropriate nonetheless we know, ifthere inGoldman's example, for us to saywe know. Thus, function) S knows, false that although itis literally around, are no barnreplicas itisuseful such todistinguish for which purposes canstill be many there there arelots ofreplicas around. So according caseswhere a casefrom marks ofknowledge attributions to theskeptic, pattern oureveryday itisappropriate tosaywe know and caseswhere a distinction between itisliterally itisnot. maintains, caseswhere Butinallcases,theskeptic falsethatwe know. anditishard tosee howhecanavoid Iftheskeptic inthis way, argues does. as thefallibilist as much ofrelevance it,thenhe needscriteria distinguished bythecriteria isthat thealternatives difference Theonly of knowledge attributions, relevant to thetruth are forthefallibilist of are relevant to theappropriateness fortheskeptic, they whereas needs ofrelevance as Since theskeptic criteria attributions. knowledge thecriteria about tobe precise much as thefallibilist does,ourinability share Ifboth sidesofa dispute us toward skepticism. notincline should favor oftheproblem cannot one sideofthe a problem, theexistence theother. against dispute [21]p. 188. 43. See Yourgrau David Gilbert Harman, Keith Lehrer, to Jamie Dreier, 44. I am indebted andScott for discusMichael Soames helpful John Smith, Pollock, Lewis, inI am especially indebted toJonathan Vogelfor issues. sionofthese havehelped ofmany discussions that overthecourse comments sightful me to construct pressing me to clarify and develop myideas,and for he wouldnot acceptmy closure(although a view thatpreserves conclusions.) References [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] ofEmpirical "Externalist Theories Knowledge," Laurence: Bonjour, Peter Vol.V,53-73 1980), inPhilosophy, (Minneapolis, Midwest Studies Howard K. Wettstein, (editors). A. French, E. Uehling, Jr., Theodore L.: "Skepticism and Epistemic Closure," Anthony Brueckner, 89-117. Topics, (Fall,1985), Philosophical andSocial Standards," Synthese Stewart: Context, "Knowledge, Cohen, 3-26. 1987), (October, ofPhilosophy, Journal (Dec. Fred:"Epistemic Operators", Dretske, 1970),1007-23. ofKnowledge", Dimension Philosophical Fred:ThePragmatic Dretske, 40 (1981), 363-78. Studies, Midwest ofJustification", Alvin: "TheInternalist Conception Goldman, in Philosophy, Vol. V, 27-51, 1980),PeterA. Studies (Minneapolis, K. Wettstein, (editors). E. Uehling, Howard Jr., Theodore French,

How to be a Fallibilist / 123 Alvin: "Discrimination andPerceptual " Journal [7] Goldman, Knowledge, ofPhilosophy, 73.20(1976),771-91. Gilbert: [8] Harman, Thought, (Princeton, 1974). and Evidence One Does NotPossess," [9] Harman, Gilbert: "Reasoning inPhilosophy, Vol.V,163-82, Peter A. French, Studies Midwest Theodore Howard K. Wettstein, E. Uehling, Jr., (editors). in View(MIT,1986). Gilbert: [10]Harman, Change ofMinnesota, [11]Klein, Peter: Certainty, (University 1981). Keith: [12]Lehrer, Knowledge, (Oxford, 1974). in a Language Game,"Journal of [13]Lewis, David: "Scorekeeping Philosophical Logic,8 (1979)339-59. [14]Nozick, Robert: Philosophical Explanations, (Harvard, 1981). and Justification, [15]Pollock, John: Knowledge (Princeton, 1974). John: andProbability", [16]Pollock, "Epistemology Synthese, (May, 1983), 231-52. ofKnowledge. [17]Pollock, John: Contemporary Theories American [18]Shuger,Scott: "Knowledgeand its Consequences", Philosophical Quarterly, (April, 1983). [19]Sosa,Ernest: "OnKnowledge'And Context," Journal ofPhilosophy (Oc584-85. tober, 1986), andDeductive [20]Stine, G.C.: "Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, Closure," 249-61. Philosophical Studies, 29 (1976), ofPhilosophical [21]Stroud, Barry: TheSignificance Skepticism (Oxford, 1974) [22]Swain, Marshall: "Reasons,Causes, and Knowledge," Journal of Philosophy 75 (1978). [23]Unger, Peter: Philosophical Relativity (Minneapolis, 1974) "AreThereCounterexamples to theClosure Princi[24]Vogel, Jonathan: ple" (forthcoming) [25]Yourgrau, Palle: "Knowledge andRelevant Alternatives," Synthese, (May, 1983),175-90.