HYPATI A

SPECIAL ISSUE FrenchFeministPhilosophy

WINTER1989

A Journal of Feminist Philosophy

HYPATI A
SPECIAL ISSUE FrenchFeministPhilosophy

edited by Nancy Fraser and SandraBartky

VOL. 3, NO. 3 WINTER 1989

A Journalof Feminist Philosophy

Hypatia

Hypatia (Hy-pay-sha)was an Egyptianwoman philosopher,mathematician, and astronomerwho lived in Alexandriafrom her birth in about 370 A.D. until her death in 415. She was the leaderof the NeoplatonicSchool in Alexandria and was famous as an eloquent and inspiring teacher. The journal is namedin honorof this foresister. us that although Hernamereminds Hypatia us first women we are not, after many of are the philosophersin our schools, all, the first in history. has its roots in the Society for Women in Philosophy,many of whose Hypatia membershave for yearsenvisioned a regularpublicationdevoted to feminist is the realization of that vision;it is intendedto encourage philosophy.Hypatia and communicatemany differentkinds of feminist philosophy.

Hypatia(ISSN 0887-5367) is owned by Hypatia, Inc., a tax exempt corporation, and publishedby IndianaUniversityPress,which assumeno responsibility for statements expressedby authors. Hypatiais publishedthree times a year. Subscriptionrates for 1988-89 are: Institutions$40/year; Individuals, $20/year.Foreignorderadd postage:$5/yearto Canada,Mexico, and overseas airmail.Single copies are $20 (institutions)and surface; $10/yearto oversears $10 (individuals).A 40 percent discount is availableon bulk orderfor classroom use or bookstoresales. Life-time subscriptionsare available to donor subscribers for $400. and business to the Journals Addressall subscriptions Manager, correspondence IndianaUniversityPress, 10th and MortonStreets, Bloomington,IN 47405. Notice of nonreceiptof an issue must be sent within fourweeks afterreceipt the Post of subsequentissue. Pleasenotify the Pressof any change in address; Office does not forwardthird class mail. Manuscriptsand other editorial correspondenceshould be addressedto: Editor, Hypatia, Southern Illinois Edwardsville,IL 62026-1437. University at Edwardsville, Copyright? 1989 by Hypatia, Inc. All rights reserved. Hypatiawas published in 1983, 1984, and 1985 as special annual issues of Forum. Women'sStudiesInternational

Hypatia

EDITOR at Edwardsville IllinoisUniversity A. Simons, Southern Margaret ASSISTANT EDITOR MaryEllen Blackston Amin Shen GUEST EDITORS FOR SPECIALISSUE Nancy Fraser,Northwestern University SandraBartky, University of Illinois,Chicago COPY EDITOR Toni Oplt BOOK REVIEWEDITOR JeffnerAllen, State University of New York,Binghamton ASSOCIATE EDITORS Azizah al-Hibri (Editor 1982-84), New York SandraBartky, University of Illinois,Chicago Ann Garry, California State University, Los Angeles SandraHarding, University Delaware of Helen Longino, MillsCollege Donna Semiak-Catudal,Randolph-Macon College Joyce Trebilcot, Washington University ADVISORY BOARD ElizabethBeardsley,TempleUniversity GertrudeEzorsky,Brooklyn Collegeof City University of New York ElizabethFlower, University of Pennsylvania Centerof City University Virginia Held, Graduate of New York GraciellaHierro, MexicoCity Institute JudithJarvisThompson, Massachusetts of Technology MaryMothersill, Barnard College MerrileeSalmon, University of Pittsburgh Anita Silvers, San Francisco State University EDITORIALBOARD KathrynPyne Addelson, SmithCollege JacquelineAnderson, Olive HarveyCollege,Chicago Asoka Bandarage,Brandeis University Sharon Bishop, California State University, Los Angeles LorraineCode, YorkUniversity

Hypatia

Blanche Curry, ShawCollege ElizabethEames, Southern IllinoisUniversity at Carbondale Susan Feathers, University of Pennsylvania Ann Ferguson,University Amherst of Massachusetts, Jane Flax, HowardUniversity Nancy Fraser,Northwestern University Carol Gould, Steven'sInstitute of Technology Susan Griffin, Berkeley, California Donna Haraway,University SantaCruz of California, Nancy Hartsock, University of Washington Hilda Hein, Collegeof the Holy Cross Sarah Lucia Hoagland, Northeastern IllinoisUniversity Alison Jaggar,University Cincinnati of ElizabethJaneway,New York Evelyn Fox Keller, Northeastern University Rhoda Kotzin, Michigan State University LyndaLange, University of Alberta Linda LopezMcAlister, University of SouthFlorida PatriciaMann, City Collegeof New York KathrynMorgan, University of Toronto Smith Janice Moulton, College Andree Nichola-McLaughlin,Medgar EvarsCollege LindaNicholson, State University of New York,Albany Susan Ray Peterson, New York Connie Crank Price, Tuskegee Institute Sara Ruddick,New Schoolof SocialResearch State University, Fullerton Betty Safford,California Naomi Scheman, University of Minnesota Ruth Schwarz, University of Pennsylvania ElizabethV. Spelman, SmithCollege JacquelineM. Thomason, Los Angeles Nancy Tuana, University of Texas at Dallas Caroline Whitbeck, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Iris Young, Worcester Institute Polytechnic JacquelineZita, University of Minnesota

Contents

vii Preface 1 Nancy Fraser Introduction A. Simons 11 Margaret Two Interviews withSimonede Beauvoir 28 EleanorH. Kuykendall Introduction to "Sorcerer Love," by LuceIrigaray 32 Luce Irigaray Sorcerer Love:A Reading of Plato'sSymposium, Diotima'sSpeech 45 Andrea Nye and Diotimaat Plato'sSymposium The HiddenHost: Irigaray 62 Diana J. Fuss LuceIrigaray's "Essentially Language Speaking": of Essence 81 Dorothy Leland and FrenchFeminism: Lacanian Psychoanalysis Towardan AdequatePolitical Psychology 104 Judith Butler The BodyPoliticsof JuliaKristeva 119 Nancy J. Holland Introduction to Kofman's"Rousseau's Phallocratic Ends" 123 Sarah Kofman Rousseau's Phallocratic Ends Comment/Reply 137 Kelly Oliver Keller's Gender/Science System:Is the Philosophy of Science to Scienceas Scienceis to Nature? 149 Evelyn Fox Keller to KellyOliver The Gender/Science System:Response 153 Carl Wellman DoingJusticeto Rights 159 ElizabethWolgast A Replyto Carl Wellman

vi

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Book Reviews 162 Margaret Nash Feminism and Methodology by SandraHarding 164 Monica Holland Women'sPlacein theAcademy:Transforming the Liberal Arts Curriculum, by MarilynR. Schusterand Susan R. Van Dyne 167 Notes on Contributors 170 Announcements 179 SubmissisionGuidelines

Preface

With the publicationof this eagerlyawaitedissueon FrenchFeministPhiland SandraBartky,we completeourfirstyear osophy, edited by Nancy Fraser with IndianaUniversity Press,and our third volume. The past yearhas been an exciting time for us, and the coming yearholds promiseof continuingdiscoveries and changes. As the last year of my term as Hypatiaeditor approaches,the time has come for the selection of a new editor. To initiate the ExecutiveBoardof Associate Editorsis calling for nomiprocess,the Hypatia nations for editor. The new editor will serve for a term of five yearsbeginningJuly 1, 1990. Candidatesshould have a record of publication in feminist philosophy;an academicaffiliation;some experience in editing, administration, or business; and an abilityto workwith the variousphilosophicalorientationsrepresented feministphilosophy.Nominationsfor a joint editorshipwill by contemporary be considered.Self-nominationsare encouraged.In nominatingoneself, enclose a curriculum vita; in nominating another, include the nominee's comaddress and your reasonsfor the nomination. Qualifiednominees will plete will be evaluated receive guidelinesfor developing a full proposal.Proposals and rankedby the HypatiaExecutive Boardwith assistancefrom membersof the Society for Women in Philosophy. Final selection will be made by the ExecutiveBoardin consultationwith IndianaUniversityPress.Nominations should be sent to Hypatia,Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville, EdIllinois for Deadline of nominations is 62026-1437. wardsville, receipt May 1, 1989. Contact the editorial office for additionalinformationat (618) 6922185. The 1989 volumeof Hypatia shouldalsoproveexciting.The firstissueof volume 4, the Spring1989 issue,will be the specialissueon the historyof women in philosophy,edited by LindaLopezMcAlister.Coming shortlyafterwill be the firstof two issueson feministbiomedicalethics, a generalissue edited by Helen Bequaert editor. LauraPurdywill Holmes, and LauraPurdyas assistant edit the second issue, on reproductive technology.In the futurewe can look forward to a specialissue on feminismand philosophical aesthetics,edited by Hilda Hein and CarolynKorsmeyer; and a specialissueof selectedphilosophy papersfromlast year'sMexicanFeministConference,editedby Ofelia Schutte and MariaLugones.As always we look forward to receivingyourpapers forgeneral submissions, and yoursuggestions for futurespecialissuesof Hypatia. M.A.S.

Introduction
NANCY FRASER

In this special issue, Hypatiaopens its pages to the intense and important controversiessurroundingrecent French feminist theories.1 We introduce this issue by recallinga set of distinctions introducedby JuliaKristevain the (1986) essay for which she is best known in feminist circles. In "Women's of feminist movements.2 The Time," Kristevaidentifiedthree "generations" first is an egalitarian,reformoriented, humanistfeminism aiming to secure women's full participationin the public sphere, a feminism personifiedby Simone de Beauvoir. The second is a culturally-oriented gynocentricfeminism aiming to foster the expressionof a non-male-definedfeminine sexual and symbolicspecificity,a feminismrepresented by the proponentsof ecriture feminineand parler femme. Finally, there is Kristeva'sown nominalist feminism, a radicallyanti-essentialistapproachthat claims that "women"don't exist and that collective identities are dangerousfictions. Each of these feminismsis represented source"or here, either as "primary subject of critical discussion. But they do not alwaysappearin pure form. Many contributorsmanage to combine elements of more than one of the three feminisms;and the interplayamong and within their essays is enormouslysuggestive. Humanistfeminismis represented,in the most appropriate possibleway, in Simons's interviewswith our lead-offcontribution, Hypatiaeditor Margaret Simone de Beauvoir.Publishedhere in Jane MarieTodd'stranslation,these are amongBeauvoir's last reflectionson her extraordinary legacy. Yet the significance of these interviews is by no means exclusively historical. On the contrary,their content is deeplyrelevantto ongoingconcerns. Beauvoirreaffirms her longstandinghumanist feminist commitment to a view of human being that transcendsgender difference. She rejects the misleadingtranslaSexof "larealitehumaine"as "hution by HowardM. Parshleyin The Second man nature,"thereby upholdingthe existentialist insistence on the priority of social situationover essence or nature. It is this philosophicalcommitment that informs her response to Simons's questions about feminine identity. Here, Beauvoirmarksher distancefromgynocentricfeministswho, she says, "comeback to men's mythologies. . . that woman is a being apart."She insists that it is women'ssituation, not women'sidentity, that is the properfocus of feminist scrutiny. vol. 3, no. 3 (Winter1989)? by NancyFraser Hypatia

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In her generalphilosophicalorientation, then, Beauvoirupholdsthe theory and politics of humanist feminism against the newer gynocentric approaches. But there is one respect in which her views appear to have changed. Perhaps under the influence of other currents in the women's movement, she softens her stand on motherhood. Denying that she ever wrote that "motherhooddoes not supporthuman meaning",she now affirms it to be a perfectly"validchoice," albeit one that is "verydangerous todaybefalls on the shouldersof the woman."Here the dicauseall the responsibility agnosis of the ills of motherhoodshifts from the ontological to the institutional; it is no longer anything intrinsicto the enterpriseof bearingand raising children that makesproblemsfor the second sex; it is ratherthe current social organizationof that enterpriseas "enslavedmotherhood." This shift in Beauvoir's analysis,if indeed it is a shift, suggeststhe abilityof humanistfeminismto absorbsome elements of gynocentricfeminismwithout having to posit a feminine essence. It suggeststhe possibilityof keeping the humanistfocuson the capacitiessharedby women and men alike, and on the that deny women the chance to realizemany of institutionalarrangements those capacities,while refusingto buy into androcentric valuationsthat privactivities over traditionally female-associilege traditionallymale-dominated ated ones. This wouldcertainlybe a stronger,moreconsistent, and morecritical humanistfeminism, and one with potentially a broaderappeal. But perhapseven the later Beauvoirdoes not go far enough? An alternativeemphasisemergesin Luce Irigaray's Love," essay, "Sorcerer in in for the first time Eleanor translahere Kuykendall's English published tion. This essay belongs to the critical, as opposed to the utopian, side of that of Plato'sSymposium multi-facetedoeuvre. It offersa re-reading Irigaray's is focused on the only woman whose words appearin a Platonic dialogue. Irigarayreads Diotima's speech on love as an early exercise in patriarchal metaphysics.She identifies the founding gestureof this metaphysicsas the substitutionof a teleological view of love as an instrumentin the service of The or "intermediary." for a processual view of love as a "demon" procreation is a set of hierarchical wherein beto oppositions upshot, according Irigaray, morimmortal is over the over the takes becoming, privileged ing precedence to the body. Moreover,once love is seen tal, and the soul is deemed superior in termsof productratherthan process, the way is opened for a hierarchyof better and worse productsand higher and lower loves. Irigaray suggeststhat for the Greek devaluation of women that move providesthe conceptualbasis and of heterosexualrelations. This readingof Diotima'sspeech belongs to a genre of Irigarayan critique familiarto readersof her book, Speculum of theOtherWoman(1985a). There she reads an impressivearrayof classical philosophical and psychoanalytic texts as providing the constitutive metaphysicsof a phallocentricWestern of the symbolicorder. This order, in her view, is premisedon the repression

Nancy Fraser

feminine; no genuine feminine differencecan be representedthere. What passes for femininity in Western culture is actually pseudo-femininity,the image, his negative specularconstructionof womanby man as his own mirror This or to inferior culture, according Irigaray,is founded copy. complement on "man'sdesire for the same." Diotima'sspeech on love, therefore, is an early and formativemove in the constructionof a symbolicorderthat banishes sexual differenceand feminine specificity. In the essaythat follows, AndreaNye takes issuewith Irigaray's readingof Diotima and with the largerculturaldiagnosisof which it is a part.Nye offers anotherDiotima, a powerfulpriestesswho is "The Hidden Host"of the Symworldviewon which Platonic posiumand the exponent of the pre-Classical of metaphysicsfeeds. This Diotima drawson earlierculturalrepresentations femalefecundityin orderto figuresocial life as a continuumof love-inspired, generative activities. On this continuum, activities like statecraft,friendship, and philosophy are modelled on childbearingand childrearing.Thus, far from marginalizing and denigratingthe feminine, Diotima'sphilosophy actually celebrates it, drawingon pre-Platonic religioustraditionsthat allowed for female power. The divergencebetween Irigaray's and Nye's readingsof Plato'sSymposium is emblematicof a largerdivergence.This is the divergencebetween a view of Western culture as monolithically and univocally masculinistor phallocentric and a view of it as male-dominated but plurivocaland contested. By inon the between Diotima's and Plato'sphilosophies,Nye in sisting divergence effect rejectsthe monolithic view. She impliesthat Irigaray's view of Western culture is too homogeneous, that it doesn't do justice to nonhegemoniccurrents. In actuality, it is the second-orderideological constructionof tradithe tion, ratherthan the recordof culturalproductionper se, that "represses feminine."3 On Nye's view, it is Irigaray herself who, by drawingDiotima into the supposedlyall-encompassingclosure of phallocentricmetaphysics, her "difference." suppresses Ironically,then, the feministcritic of phallocentrism unwittinglyextend it. 4 Nye's essay raises important questions about the general diagnosis that underliesthe criticalside of Frenchgynocentrictheory. Yet it need not entail a complete rejectionof Irigarayan critique.On the contrary,it holds out the of our cake and eating it too. We might enthusiasappealingprospect having embrace brilliant critical readingsof specific androcentric tically Irigaray's texts while demurring fromher globalhypothesis abouttheircollectiveimport. Forexample,feministscould applaud her stunningdeconstruction of Freud's eswithout acceptingher view that the logic deconstructed say on "Femininity" thereunderpins all symbolicexpression in Westem culture.5 Then, it wouldbe is coextensivewith all extant possibleto replacethe view that phallocentrism Wester culturewith a morecomplicated storyabouthow the cultural hegemony of phallocentric thinkinghas been, so to speak,erected.6

Hypatia

If the precedingis a promisingway of approachingIrigaray's critical side, then what should we make of her utopian side?This hotly contested issue is the focus of Diana J. Fuss'spaper, "EssentiallySpeaking." Fuss examines Irigaray's attemptsto conjureup an "otherwoman,"a woman who would incarnate neither the patriarchalfemininity of Freudiantheory nor the maledefined specularityof phallocentric metaphysics.This new woman, rather, she woulddeploy a new, feminine syntax to wouldbe beyondphallocentrism; to her give symbolic expression specificity and difference. most strikingattemptsto release, conjureup or invent this other Irigaray's woman are lyrical evocations of a nonphallic feminine sexuality. These attempts, found in essayslike "This Sex Which Is Not One" and "When Our Lips Speak Together,"7 evoke an eroticism premisedon the continual selftouching of "two lips." Neither clitoral nor vaginal, requiringthe interposition neither of hand nor of penis, this wouldbe a feminine pleasurethat escapes the phallocentric economy. Moreover, certain characteristicsof this pleasure-the way it exceeds the opposition activity/passivity, for example-suggest featuresof a postphallocentricway of thinking and speaking. connects the specThus, like her fellow gynocentristHelene Cixous, Irigaray bodies not to the of our sexual desiresand of women's only ificity specificity but also to putativelyspecificfeminine modesof symbolicexsexualpleasures pression. has provedextremely As Fuss's paperindicates, the utopian side of Irigaray controversial. Many American readershave accused her of biologism and essentialism.8 And yet, arguesFuss, these readersappearto have missed the characterof Irigaray's body-language.They have failed to register figurative the fact that her project is less to reduce social meaningsto biology than to create new, empoweringsocial meaningsfor our bodies and pleasures.Since the female body, the charge of biologism aim is to re-metaphorize Irigaray's misses the mark. The chargeof essentialism,on the other hand, is harderto assess.Fussofon the groundsthat her fers an original and interestingdefense of Irigaray essentialismis strategic,politicallyenabling, and thereforeworth the risk. By laying claim on behalf of women to an essence of our own, Irigaray disrupts those androcentricmetaphysicalsystemsthat deny our access to "the essential." Moreover,accordingto Fuss,the posit of a feminine essence may be essential to feminist politics. After all, its function within Irigaray's philosophy is precisely to provide a point of leveragefor feminist critique and political practice. "An essentialistdefinition of 'woman'impliesthat there will always remainsome partof 'woman'which resistsmasculineimprintingand socialization . . . that a woman will never be a woman solely in masculine terms, never be wholly and permanentlyannihilated in a masculine order." Here Fuss implies that unless we assume a point that escapes the culture that constructsus, we have no way of conceiving ourselvesas anythingother than

Nancy Fraser

obedientconstructsof that culture.9 Irigarayan essence, in her view, provides us with such a point. Fuss'sessay raisesthe feminist debate about essentialismto a new level of sophistication. It shifts the burden of argument back onto the antiessentialists,requiringthem to show that it is possible to conceive feminist opposition to sexism and feminist solidarityamong women without presupposing a feminine essence. The remainingessaysin this issue can be read as attemptsto do just that. 10 and FrenchFeminism: Dorothy Leland'spaper, "LacanianPsychoanalysis Towardan AdequatePolitical Psychology," concernspreciselythis issue. Leland's focus is the problemof "internalized oppression,"the inculcation in women in male-dominatedsocieties of sexist and androcentricschemas of thought, feeling and valuation. What sort of theory, she asks, can providean account of internalizedoppressionthat acknowledgesits depth and power while still allowing for the possibilityin principleof political resistanceand social change?Her answer,in brief, is no theorythat acceptsthe basicpostulates of Lacanianpsychoanalysis. Lelandcriticizesboth Irigaray and Kristevafor failingto breakfully enough with JacquesLacan. She arguesthat, becauseLacan'saccount of the Oedipal contoursof socializationthat are independentof any hiscomplex prescribes social relations, it casts women's internalizedoppressionas toricallyspecific inevitable and irreversible. The result, claims Leland, is a psychologicaldeterminismso absolutethat no feministpolitical practiceis even conceivable. Now, it was as a counter to just this sort of theory that Fussdefendedthe strategicessentialismof Luce Irigaray.But this is not Leland'stack. Rather than oppose one exorbitantconstructto another, she opts to debunkthe initial Lacanianpostulateof an autonomous,all-embracing Oedipal structuring of subjectivity.Writing from a socialist-feministperspective,Leland rejects the autonomyof psychology.Instead,she proposesto explain internalized oppressionby referenceto specific, historicallyvariablesocial relationsand institutions, and therefore to build in the possibility of change. In Leland's tacit continuation of the Lacaniantendency to bypass view, it is Irigaray's historicaland sociological analysisthat createsproblemsfor her theory. Because she does not groundinternalizedoppressionin variableculturalpracends up without a tenable foundationfor her commitment to tices, Irigaray change. If Irigaray'sproblem is her failure to develop the theoretical resources needed to underpinher political optimism, then Kristeva's problem, accorto "politicalpessimism." ding to Leland, is her surrender Here, too, the root of the troubleis misplacedfidelity to Lacan. In fact, KristevaoutdoesIrigaray in this respect, even accepting the Lacanian claim that the phallocentric symbolicorderis not susceptibleto change. With change ruledout, the best one can hope for is a seriesof endlessand fruitlessskirmishes in which asocial

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"semiotic"instinctualdrives-"feminine" vestigesof the pre-OedipalpastLaw."Moreover,like disruptbut never overthrowthe powerof "The Father's Kristeva the also Lacanian Irigaray, accepts assumption,earlierchallengedby . . . that exhaust the entire symbolic diNye, representations "patriarchal mension that mediatesexperience."Accordingto Leland, then, becauseshe assumesa monolithicallyphallocentricsymbolicorderthat is wholly impervious to change, "Kristeva rejects too much and hopes for too little." Leland's essay emphasizes the nominalist or anti-essentialist side of Kristeva's theory, the side that rejectsgynocentricattemptsto create a feminine symbolic order and that stresses instead that "women"don't exist. 1 The next paper, by contrast, emphasizesthe gynocentricside of Kristeva's theory, the side that posits a locusof feminine resistanceto the paternalLaw. In "The Body Politics of JuliaKristeva," JudithButlerarguesthat "the materal body"plays a role in Kristeva's theory not unlike that which Fussattributesto Irigarayan essence: it harborsan extra-cultural source of cultural subversion.But, claims Butler, the result is anything but emancipatory.On the contrary,while purporting to reveal the repressed foundationsof culture in the libidinal multiplicity of infants' primaryrelations to their mothers' bodies, Kristevaactuallyconstructsan ideologicallegitimationof compulsory motherhoodfor women. Butlercarefullyunpacksthe steps in this construction. She identifies the theory, the point where figureof the lesbian as the stresspoint in Kristeva's variousanxieties and contradictionscondense. For Kristeva,lesbianismis a way in which women re-experiencetheir pre-Oedipalrelationto their mothers'bodies. In this respect, it is like avant-garde poetic practiceand maternity itself, since all three are seen by Kristevaas practicesin which the subject's identity is put "on trial"as the repressedsemiotic, feminine foundationsof cultureburstonto the paternally-sanctioned symbolicscene. However, Kristeva does not value the three practicesequally. Rather, she reservesher apand poetry,claimingthat in them alone semioticmultiprovalfor motherhood to psyLesbianism, by contrast,she assimilates expression. plicityfindssymbolic beneathculture. chosis, an escapistflight fromthe symbolicand a regression In Butler'sreading,Kristeva's of deep theorethomophobiais symptomatic and Lacanian ical and political difficulties.Kristevaaccepts the structuralist dogmasequating heterosexualitywith the foundingof culture, culturewith the symbolic, and the symbolicwith "The Father'sLaw." It follows, argues Butler, that the lesbian can only appearas the "other"of culture, an archaic and chaotic force that is intrinsicallyunintelligible.But "thissaysmoreabout the fantasiesthat a fearfulheterosexistcultureproducesto defend againstits own homosexualpossibilitiesthan about lesbianexperienceitself." In failing to treat lesbianismas an alternativepossibilitywithin culture,Kristevarefuses to take up the challenge it poses to her restrictedview of culture as wholly and necessarilypaternal.

Nancy Fraser

Butler goes on to challenge Kristeva's view of the relation between naturalisticunderstandlibidinaldrives, languageand the law. To Kristeva's Butler of drives as ing prediscursivethings-in-themselves counterposesanthese "drives" arereallythemother possibility,inspiredby Foucault: perhaps drive"would not reallybe selves discursiveconstructs.Then, the "maternal prior to the paternal law; rather, that law would itself be the cause of the drive it is said to repress.Likewise,what Kristevasees as the culturalrepression of the maternalbody would reallybe the compulsoryculturalconstruction of the female body as a maternalbody. Butler concludes by proposing a Foucauldianalternative to gynocentric essentialism.She suggeststhat repressionbe understoodas a culturallycontradictory enterprise, simultaneously prohibitive and generative. Accordingly, we should not anchor our hopes for women'sliberationon a concept of the feminine seen as external to a culturethat represses it. Nor should we dreamof liberatinga naturalfemale body from the shacklesof culturalconstruction. Rather, we should think in terms of exploiting oppositions and contradictions within our male-dominatedculture. And we should situate the projectof liberatingour bodies in the horizonof "an open futureof cultural possibilities." Both Butler'spaperand the final paperin this issue offer anti-essentialist motherhood.But whereasButler'scritiqueis inspired critiquesof compulsory by Foucault, Sarah Kofman'sis an exemplarof deconstruction. Kofman'sessay, "Rousseau's PhallocraticEnds,"appearshere for the first time in English in Mara Dukats'stranslation. It providesa close readingof the various moves by which Rousseau prescribes a maternal destiny for women. Notoriously, the authorof the Emilegroundsthe socio-politicalgender arrangements he proposeson appealsto "Nature."But, claims Kofman, these appealsto "the ends of Nature"actuallydissimulate"the ends of man." Kofman scrutinizesRousseau'sclaims to found separatespheresfor men and women on "natural differences."She demonstrates that what he casts as is and that what he porgender complementarity actuallygender hierarchy as difference is As trays simple actuallyinequality. Nancy Hollandsuggestsin her "Introduction"to this essay, the method employed is deconstructive. Kofmanexposes a numberof contradictionsin Rousseau,points where what were supposedly elaborations of primary claimsturnout instead supplemental to undercutthem. In the process,Kofmanin effect poses a seriesof devastating questions. Why, when he explicitly holds women to be the weakersex, does Rousseauimplicitlycast us as the stronger? Why, when he claimswe are "naturallyreserved,"does he deem it necessaryto confine us forcibly to a "domesticreservation?" Why does it turnout to be men who arethe principal beneficiaries of "Nature's gift"of shame to women?Why, if indeed our natural destiny is motherhood,do we requirethe whip of shameand relatedsocial sanctionsto ensure that we performit? Finally, why, if men and women are

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needed really so naturallydifferent, are elaborateinstitutionalarrangements in orderto enforce that difference? Kofman'sessay can also be read as an implicit challenge to Irigaray.Her view that phallocentricmetareadingof Rousseauis at odds with Irigaray's on fear of is man's difference and desirefor the same. Accorphysics premised to is Rousseau's Kofman, ding philosophy actuallybasedon an intense fearof with women. confounded Thus, it manifestsa desirefor differenceand being a fearof the same. In general, Kofman's account of the deep structure of sexthan to Irigaray's. Fordespitethe enormous ist ideologyis closer to Beauvoir's divergence between their respective philosophical methods, both she and Beauvoirunderstanddifferenceless as a condition to be celebratedthan as a construct of domination to be demystified.12 Thus, Kofman offers yet another alternativeto gynocentrism.She managesto combine elements of humanist associatedwith deconfeminismwith the sort of nominalistanti-essentialism struction. and Fussare the odd women out The precedingmight suggestthat Irigaray in this special issue. However, that assessmentis rathermisleading.It is important to recognizethat there is a deeper level at which they are in accord with the other contributorsto this issue, since they too oppose essentialist definitionsof women as mothers. Clearly, it is a basic intention of Irigaray's philosophyto contest materalist constructionsof femininity. Indeed, that is of a feminine eros depreciselythe impetusbehind her counter-construction tached from procreation. At a time when women in North America (and of neo-materalist imagesand with a barrage elsewhere)arebeing bombarded freedomsareonce againunderopen attack, rhetorics,and when reproductive it is hearteningto encountersuch a wide rangeof feministripostes.This issue of Hypatiademonstratesthe continuing vitality of feminist theory and the enormous potential for fruitful interaction among humanist, gynocentric, and nominalist feminisms.

NOTES
aboutthis material.Foran introductionand 1. There is now a very largesecondaryliterature overview, see, for example, Duchen (1986 and 1987); Marksand de Courtivron(1981); Moi (1985 and 1987); Spivak (1981); Burke (1978); Marks(1978); and Gallop (1982). the three feminisms, I shall use terms developed by feminist theorists 2. In characterizing feminism"from other than Kristeva.I borrowthe terms"humanistfeminism"and "gynocentric Iris Young (1985) and I take the term "nominalistfeminism"from Linda Alcoff (1988). 3. For a parallelargumentconcerning the repressionof African and Semitic influences in the constructionof an "Aryan"model of the sourcesof Greek civilization, see Martin Beral (1987). 4. A similar objection could be made against Derrida insofar as he posits a totally culturalorder. Revealingly, the evidence he adducesin supportof this view "phallogocentric" comes entirely from texts by men. For example, in a recent (1988) paperhe arguesthat "the" Westernconcept of friendshipis male. Yet the only supporthe offersfor this claim is a readingof

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a text by Aristotle. The result is to renderinvisible the largeand interestingculturalrecordof female friendshipthat has been documentedby feminist scholarslike CarrollSmith-Rosenberg (1975). 5. See "The Blind Spot of an Old Dreamof Symmetry,"in Irigaray (1985a). 6. I have recently arguedfor this sort of approachin Fraser (1988). But again, the most extensive and persuasiveexemplaris Beral (1987). 7. Both of these essaysappearin Irigaray (1985b). 8. Early and influential argumentsto this effect were offered by Jones (1985) and Plaza (1980). view of West9. This assumptionappearsto be dependenton a prioracceptanceof Irigaray's ern cultureas monolithicallyphallocentric. If one followsNye in refusingthat assumption,then the problemof how oppositionis possiblelooks verydifferent.On Nye's view, resistanceto male dominance involves pitting some elements of the traditionagainstothers that contradictthem. This alternativewill be discussedbelow. 10. There have of coursebeen other attemptsto answerthe sort of challenge posed by Fuss. Among the most interestingand compellingof these is Denise Riley'srecent (1988) book. See also Linda Alcoff (1988) and Nancy Fraserand LindaNicholson (1988). 11. I have suggestedthat this nominalistic side of Kristevais actuallypostfeministin Fraser (1988). 12. In this respect, though not in others, Kofmanand Beauvoirhave affinitieswith the leading Americanexponent of this position, CatharineA. MacKinnon(1987), who arguesthat gender differenceis just gender domination.

REFERENCES

The idenAlcoff, Linda. 1988. Culturalfeminism versuspoststructuralism: tity crisis in feminist theory. Signs 13 (3): 405-436. Beral, Martin. 1987. BlackAthena.New Brunswick,N.J.: RutgersUniversity Press. Burke,Carolyn. 1978. ReportfromParis:Women'swritingand the women's movement. Signs.3(4): 843-55. Derrida,Jacques. 1988). The politics of friendship. Paperdelivered at the meetings of the American PhilosophicalAssociation, EasternDivision, Washington D.C., December30. connections: Voicesfromthewomen'smoveDuchen, Claire, ed. 1987. French mentin France.Amherst:University of Massachusetts Press. in France:FromMay '68 to Mitterand. LonDuchen, Claire. 1986. Feminism don: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Fraser,Nancy and LindaNicholson. 1988. Social criticismwithout philosophy: An encounterbetween feminismand postmodernism. Theory,Culture & Society5: 373-394. Fraser,Nancy. 1988. The uses and abusesof French discoursetheories for feministpolitics. Paperdeliveredat the meetingsof the AmericanPhilosophical Association, Eastern Division, Washington D.C., December 28. seduction:Feminism and psychoanalysis. Gallop, Jane. 1982. The daughter's Ithaca, N.Y.: Corell University Press.

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Irigaray, Luce. 1985a. Speculumof the otherwoman, Gillian C. Gill, tr. Ithaca:Corell University Press. Luce. 1985b. Thissex whichis not one, Catherine Porter,tr. Ithaca: Irigaray, Comell University Press. of Jones, Ann Rosalind. 1985. Writing the body: Towardan understanding In The new on l'ecriture criticism: literature feminine. feminist Essays women, and theory,Elaine Showalter, ed. New York:Pantheon Books. Kristeva,Julia. 1986. Women's time. In The Kristeva reader,Toril Moi, ed. New York:ColumbiaUniversity Press. MA: HarMacKinnon,CatharineA. 1987. Feminism Cambridge unmodified. vard University Press. Marks,Elaine and Isabellede Courtivron,eds. 1981. New French feminisms. New York:Schocken. Marks,Elaine. 1978. Women and literaturein France. Signs3(4) 832-42. andsexualdifPolitics, Moi, Toril, ed. 1987. French feminist thought: patriarchy ference.London: Basil Blackwell. Moi, Toril. 1985. Sexual/textual politics.London:Methuen. Plaza, Monique. 1980. 'Phallomorphic' power and the psychology of 'woman.' Feminist Issues 1 (1): 71-102. in and thecategory Riley, Denise. 1988. Am I thatname?Feminism of 'women' history.Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Press. Smith-Rosenberg,Carroll. 1975. The female world of love and ritual:Relations between women in nineteenth-centuryAmerica. Signs1 (1): 1-29. Spivak, GayatriC. 1981. French feminism in an internationalframe. Yale FrenchStudies62: 154-84. and feministpolitics. Hypatia 3, Young, Iris. 1985. Humanism,gynocentrism Forum8 (3): of Women's Studies International as a issue special published 173-183.

Two Interviewswith Simone de Beauvoir

MARGARETA. SIMONS and translated Transcribed by JANE MARIETODD

In theseinterviews aboutherphilosophical from 1982 and 1985, I ask Beauvoir with Sartre on the issues voluntarism vs socialconditioning Jean-Paul of differences andembodiment, individualism vs reciprocity, and ontology vs ethics.We alsodiscussherinfluence on Sartre's withthe current translawork,theproblems English tion of The Second Sex, her analysesof motherhood and feministconceptsof and herown experience woman-identity, of sexism.

I. INTRODUCTION

In Mayof 1982 and Septemberof 1985, I had my last interviewswith Simone de Beauvoir.My first was in the autumnof 1972. I had come to Paris on a grant to do doctoral researchwith Beauvoiron her philosophy in The SecondSex. Developmentsin the women'sliberationmovement had left me searchingfor direction and I hoped that returningto the theoreticalfoundations of feminismas Beauvoirdeveloped them in The SecondSex would help me find my way again. The SecondSex had inspiredradicalslike Ti-Grace Atkinson, Shulamith Firestone,and Kate Millett, as well as liberalslike Betty Friedan,and socialists like Juliet Mitchell. Criticizingthe male bias in traditionalphilosophy, religion, psychology, and Marxism, Beauvoir based her understandingof women's situation on descriptionsof women'sown "lived experience."She rejectedessentialistdefinitions of woman that reflectedthe oppressivemyth of woman as Other. Only women acting together, she argued,could secure with relationships of genindependencefor all women and replaceoppression uine reciprocitybetween men and women. But BeauvoirwroteThe Second Sex in 1948-9, between the firstand second wavesof the women'smovement. I was interestedthen, as now and throughI am indebtedto the editorsof this issue, Nancy Fraser and SandraBartky,for their encourthese interviewsfor publiagementand helpful suggestionsduringthe long processof preparing the tasksof transcribing them fromthe tape, transcation; to Jane MarieTodd, for undertaking lating, and editing them; to the GraduateSchool of SouthernIllinoisUniversityat Edwardsville, for supportingmy travel to France;and to Simone de Beauvoirfor generouslyagreeingto meet with me and respondto my questions. Hypatia vol. 3, no. 3 (Winter 1989) ? by Margaret A. Simons

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out my relationshipwith her, in how her experience of the contemporary movement had changed her perspective. In the interviewsthat follow, I ask her about her responseto the new form of feminist essentialism,the search for our "woman-identity" and about motherhood, an experience central to the traditonaldefinition of womanhood, and thus one chargedwith emotional ambivalence for many feminists. In The SecondSex, she describes motherhoodin negative terms, as "enslavementto the species,"a barrier to authentichumanexperience, and a burdenfor women that only society could lighten. Would she still define motherhoodin such a negative way or has her philosophicalposition changed? A studentof Beauvoir's philosophymustovercomeseveraldifficulties.One posedby our culturaldifferencesis that of translation.In these interviewswe Sex. The only transdiscussthe need for a scholarlytranslationof The Second lation currently available to English readersis by Howard M. Parshley, a zoologistwho authoreda 1930's text on sex differences.In responseto demandsfrom the publisher,Parshleymade extensive cuts, eliminatingalmost ten percent of the original French text of The SecondSex, includinghalf of one chapteron historyand the namesof 78 women in history. Unfortunately Parshleylacked any expertise in philosophy, or familiaritywith existential phenomenology, the philosophical tradition within which Beauvoir was of philosophicalterms working. As a consequence, he gave mistranslations of Beauvoir'sphilosophicalperspective. crucial to an understanding Few chroniclersof continental philosophy or existential phenomenology mention Beauvoir'swork, which may lead one to wonder whether she is a philosopherat all. This poses another problemfor scholarsinterestedin her work. When histories of philosophy deal with her at all, they ignore The SecondSex, commonlydescribingBeauvoiras a followerof Sartre.But Sartre to construct an was no feminist, and his attempt in Beingand Nothingness existential social philosophywas convincing on neither theoreticalnor practical grounds.In The SecondSex Beauvoirrejectedthe Sartreanassumptions in of absolutefreedomand radicalindividualism.Groundedepistemologically women's experience of oppressionwithin historicallydefined relationships with men, The SecondSex representedan importanttheoretical advance for existentialismas well as feminism, and inspiredwomen aroundthe world to challenge their traditionalroles. In these interviewswith Beauvoir,I explorethemes in her philosophythat differentiateit fromSartre's.I am also interestedin her influenceon him. We discussspecific areasof disagreementbetween Beauvoirand Sartre, for example, voluntarismvs. emphasison social conditions and embodiment;individualismvs. emphasison reciprocity;ontology vs. ethics. I also raise the questionsof philosophicalinfluence:whetherBeauvoirconsideredthe reconof woman'soppressiona ciling of a Sartrean"choice"with her understanding problemin The SecondSex;and whether Sartre'slater work, for example, on Genet and Flaubert,was influenced by The SecondSex.

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Beauvoirwas not alwaysreceptiveto these questions.When we firstmet in 1972, Beauvoirseemed angeredby my questionsabouther philosophyin The Second Sex, despiteher supportfor my Fulbright proposalwhich was precisely to examine this philosophy."I am not a philosopher,"she insisted, "buta literarywriter;Sartre is the philosopher. How could I have influenced him?" on The Second When I askedabout the importanceof Hegel's Phenomenology Sex, she angrilyrepliedthat, the only importantinfluenceon The SecondSex was BeingandNothingness by Jean-PaulSartre.This was certainlyan odd response, given that she tells us in her memoirsthat immediatelypriorto writing The SecondSex she had made a carefuland extensive studyof Hegel. Unher responsebecamea continuingtopic in my researchand interderstanding views with Beauvoir. Beauvoirwas a philosopherby training. She taughtphilosophyfor several years. In her memoirsshe describesher philosophicalwork on the "existenof The SecondSex. How tialist ethics" that formsthe theoretical framework was I to understand her statementthat she, unlike Sartre,was "not a philosopher"but a "literarywriter"? Her identificationas a literarywritermight be understoodas a philosophical stance, confirmingthe priorityof the concrete and experientialover the abstractand ahistorical. Her goal, shapedduringthe period of her most intense philosophical work in the 1940's, was to groundexistential ethics in historyand concrete relationshipsratherthan in abstractions.In The Second Sex she locates her ethical enquirywithin the context of specifichistoricalrelationships, and asks how, given man's historical definition of woman as Other, authentic relationshipsbetween men and women are possible. Philosopherslike Kant, Hegel, and Sartre(to use her example), build abstractsystems, meant to transcendhistory. Meaning, for Beauvoir,is alwayssituated and historical. This is a substantivephilosophicalclaim. Then why did Beauvoirinsistshe was not a philosopher? Why did she assumea position outsideof philosophy for her critique?Why did she relinquishthe right of every philosopherto redefine philosophy itself? Her memoirssuggestthat her identificationwith a literarytraditionthat had includedwomen, ratherthan with a philosophical traditionthat had excludedthem, is connected with a sense of inferiority that she herself connects with the "femininecondition." she asks herself in 1935. "Sartre "Why not try my hand at philosophy?" saysthat I understand philosophicaldoctrines, Husserl's amongothers, more
quickly and more exactly that he. ... In brief, I have solid powers of assimi-

lation, a developedcriticalsense, and philosophyis for me a living reality. I'll never tire of its satisfactions. "However,I don't considermyselfa philosopher.I know verywell that my ease in entering into a text comes preciselyfrommy lack of inventiveness. In this domain, the truly creative spiritsare so rarethat it is idle of me to ask

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why I cannot try to join their ranks. It's necessaryratherto explain how certain individualsare capableof pulling off this concerteddeliriumwhich is a which gives to their insightsthe system, and whence comes the stubborness value of universalkeys. I have said alreadythat the feminine condition does not dispose one to this kind of obstinacy"(1960, 228-9). When invited in 1943 to contributean article on existentialismto an anthology on recent work in philosophy, Beauvoirwrites that, "at first I refused, I said that where philosophy was concerned I knew my own limitations" (1960, 562). In the interviewsthat follow I ask Beauvoirabout the educationalexperiences that might have contributedto this attitude. She denies ever having suffered fromdiscriminationas a womanand claimsto have escapedwoman's tell a differentstory. Considerthis traditionalrole. But her autobiographies had in a Catholic of her education girl'sschool: "Myupbringing description convinced me of my sex's intellectual inferiority,a fact admittedby many women. 'A lady cannot hope to pass the selective examination before the fifth or sixth attempt,'" one of her teachers,who alreadyhad made two ather experience wasthat of a tempts,had told her (1974, 295). In the university domain her access to the male of philotoken woman. She felt "privileged" by with men. had not been on terms I that her access leared equal sophy,but Michele 1985 interview with On the day before my Beauvoir, LeDoeuff, the Frenchfeminist philosopher,told me about a conversationshe had once had with Beauvoiraboutphilosophy.Accordingto LeDoeuff,it hadbeen sigEcole nificant to Beauvoirthat she had not been a student at the prestigious Normale Superieure(ENS). In the highly centralizedFrenchuniversitysystem, the Sorbonne, where Beauvoirwas enrolled, providedhigher education for the mass of French students. The Ecole Normale Superieure,which was and provides open only to men, trainsthe elite of the academicprofessoriate, its students with the contacts necessaryfor major academic appointments. Both Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty had won entrance to the ENS. Beauvoirwas not permittedto matriculate there, althoughshe did attend lecfor the standardized turesthere in preparation competitiveexaminations,the in "agregation" philosophy. Sartre, who was a year ahead of her, was preparingto take his exams a second time, after having failed on his first attempt. Beauvoir'sthesis on Leibnizwon her an invitation to join his study group. When they took the exams at the end of that year, Sartreplaced first and Beauvoirsecond, making her the youngeststudent ever to pass the exams. But this successapparsense of intellectualinferiority.She saw ently could not overcome Beauvoir's of her her youth not as a sign of her brilliance, but ratheras another marker in role a she often assumed that She claims philosophical passive inferiority. discussionsamong Sartre'smale friends, offering criticism or remainingsilent, feeling that she "did not think fast enough" (1960, 35).

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Beauvoir's responsesto my questionsabouther experienceof sexism in her education and in her relationship with Sartre are often ambiguous.They point out the difficultiesin any attemptto interpretanotherperson'slife. But they also shed light on Beauvoir's experienceas a "tokenwoman"and on her innovative response to that experience. Feeling inferiorin the male-dominated domain of philosophy, she identified instead with a literarytradition her "lackof inventiveness"into a morehospitableto women and transformed critique of philosophy and a profoundly philosophical reflection on the situation of women. MAY11, 1982 II. PARIS; Sex. You wrote MS. I have a questionabout Sartre'sinfluenceon The Second in The Primeof Life that Sartre'squestionsabout your childhood, about the fact that you were raisedas a girl, not a boy, are what gave you the idea for The SecondSex. SB: No, not exactly. I had begun-well, he was the one who actually told me. ... I wanted to write about myselfand he said, "Don'tforgetto explain first of all what it is to be a women." And I told him, "But that never botheredme, I was alwaysequal to men," and he said, "yes, but even so, you were raised differently, with different myths and a different view of the world."And I told him, "that'strue".And that'show I began to workon the myths. And then, he encouragedme by saying that, in orderto understand the myths, one had to understand the reality. So I had to come back to realall of I continued on it, physiological,historical, etc. Then afterwards, ity, own on I women's situation as saw it. my MS: You wrote somewherethat you never suffered frombeing female in your childhood. SB: No, I never suffered. MS: But, was not your childhood differentfrom a boy's?When you did the research for TheSecond of yourchildSex, did that changeyourinterpretation hood? SB: Not of my own childhood, but I interpretdifferently other people'schildhood. I see manywomen whose childhoodwas unfavorable comparedto that of a boy. But for me my childhood was not unfavorable. MS: I remember a passagefromMemoirs Youwerewalkof a DutifulDaughter. ing past a [boy's]high school. ...

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SB: Ah yes, near the College Stanislas.And I thought that they had a superior education, that's true. But in the end, I adapted to mine because I thought that later on I would be able to go on to higher education. But at that moment, yes, I thought that there was something there that was more intellectual than our course of study. MS: And this was the case? SB. Yes, it was true. MS: In yourautobiography, between you wrote that there was a disagreement and Sartre literature and and life. He did one beyou concerning philosophy, fore the other, and you did the reverse? SB: Yes, that's right. MS: And somewhereyou describedsexuality and passion as overwhelming you when you were young. He alwaysthought that it was a question of will, an act of will. And you thought that the body, that passion, could overwhelm. . . . That's a differencebetween the two of you. SB: Yes, Sartrewas much more voluntarist. But he also thought that about seasickness.He thought if you got seasick, it was becauseyou had let it happen and with willpower, you could conquerseasickness. MS: I thought that perhapsthat might be a problemin The SecondSex. You used Sartre'sphilosophy, which is voluntarist,but you studiedthe body, and passion, and the training of girls. And you questioned whether there is a choice. .. . SB: All the same, there'sa choice in the Sartreansense, that is, choices are alwaysmade in a certain situation and, startingfromthe same situation, one can choose this or that. One can have differentchoices in a single situation. That is, granted,one is a girl with a certain physicaltraining, and a certain social trainingbut startingfromthat, one can choose to accept it or to escape it or to. .. . Well, naturally, the choice itself depends upon a number of things. But afterall, there is still some freedomor choice, even in resignation of course. MS: But you didn't think that was a greatproblemfor you, to reconcile the Sartrean philosophical foundation with your research in biology, on the body?

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there was a SB: But Sartrewas not so voluntarist.In Beingand Nothingness, lot of things about the body. MS: And in 1949, he also changed his ideas. which he wrote well beforethat, is full of SB: Oh no, BeingandNothingness, texts about the body. The body alwayshad a lot of importancefor him. MS: But not exactly the same importanceas for you. he speaksof masochismas well as saSB: When, in Beingand Nothingness, dism, of love etc., the bodyplaysa verygreatrole for Sartrealso. Yes, always. MS: And that wasn't a problemfor you? SB: No, not at all. MS: And you don't think he changed his ideas at that time? SB: No. MS: How did he react to your book, (The SecondSex)? SB: He read it along the way, as I was writing it, as we alwaysread each other's work. From time to time, after readinga chapter, he would tell me that there were correctionsto make, as I would sometimestell him. So that book too, he read it as I wrote it. So he was not at all surprised by the book. He was in complete agreementwith me. MS: Not long before you wrote The SecondSex, he wrote Baudelaire, mentioning very little about Baudelaire'schildhood. And afterwards,in Saint Genet, he wrote a lot about Genet's childhood. Perhapsyour interest in childhood experience might have interestedhim in it as well. SB: No, I don't think so. I think that was a development.Baudelaire waswritten very quickly and for Genet he wanted to do something more extensive. And then, Genet himselfspeaksa lot abouthis childhoodand aboutchildren so it's the subject Genet which requiredthat one speak a lot about childhood.... MS: I see differencesbetween yourperspectivein The Second Sex and Sartre's in and You have said that in social relations perspective Being Nothingness. one ought to look for reciprocity.That's a kind of optimismthat was not in

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Do you agree?Is there a difference,at least in attitude BeingandNothingness. if not in philosophy? SB: Yes, in effect, I think that the idea of reciprocitycame later for Sartre. He had it in The Critique. In BeingandNothingness, reciprocityis not his subject. But that doesn't mean that he didn't believe that reciprocitywas the best way afterall to live out humanrelationships.That waswhat he believed. It's just that it wasn't his subject in Beingand Nothingness, because in Being andNothingness he's concernedwith the individualand not so much with the relationsamong individuals.... That is, in The SecondSex, I place myself much more on a moral plane whereasSartredealtwith morality lateron. In fact, he neverexactlydealtwith In and he'snot lookingfor the moral,he'sseekinga morality. Being Nothingness, ... is. of what existence It'smore an ontologythan a morality. description MS: Now a final question on motherhood. You opened your discussionof motherhoodin TheSecond Sexwith a studyof abortionand you describedmotherhood as something rathernegative, as an inhuman activity. SB: No, I didn't say that exactly. I said that there could be a humanrelation, even a completely interesting and privilegedrelation between mother and or tyrannyor child but that, in many cases, it was on the orderof narcissism something like that. But I didn't say that motherhood in itself was always something to be condemned, no, I didn't say that. No, something that has dangers,but obviously, any human adventurehas its dangers,such as love or anything. I didn't say that motherhoodwas something negative. MS: I thought that you said that it did not supporthuman meaning. SB: No, oh no, I didn't say that motherhooddoes not supporthumanmeaning. No, I am sure that I never said that. MS: Is this a question that interestsyou now? SB: Oh yes, of course, motherhoodinterestsme a greatdeal, becauseone also discussesit a lot in feminist quarters.There are feminists who are mothers and, of course, just because one is for abortion-naturally, all feministsare for abortion-but that doesn't mean that there aren'tsome who have chosen to have children. And I find that that can be a completely valid choice, fallson the shoulwhich is verydangerous todaybecauseall the responsibility dersof the woman, because in general it's enslaved motherhood.One of my Motherhood friendshas written a book called Enslaved [LesChimeres, 1975]. But motherhoodin itself is not something negative or something inhuman.

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No, I certainly didn't write that motherhoodhad no human meaning. I may have said that one had to give it one or that the embryo,as long as it is not yet consideredhuman, as long as it is not a being with human relationships with its mother or its father, it's nothing, one can eliminate the embryo. But I never said that the relationto the child was not a humanrelation. No, no, rereadthe text, I don't have it here. the new translationof The Listen, I'mveryhappy[thatyou areundertaking of "larealitehumaine" as "the real SecondSex, and correctingmistranslation natureof man"]since the base of existentialismis preciselythat there is no human nature, and thus no "feminine nature." It's not something given. There is a presence to the world, which is the presencewhich defines man, who is defined by his presenceto the world, his consciousnessand not a nature that grants him a prioricertain characteristics.That's a gross errorto have translatedit in that way. MS: "Woman-identity" is an importantissue in America, now, with many feminists searchingfor a feminine nature. SB: There arealso women in Francewho do that, but I am completelyagainst it because in the end they come back to men's mythologies, that is, that woman is a being apart, and I find that completely in error.Better that she identifyherselfas a human being who happensto be a woman. It's a certain situationwhich is not the same as men'ssituationof course,but she shouldn't identify herself as a woman. MS: In Americathe questionof woman-identityis often connected with motherhood;a woman sometimesbecomespregnantwhen she is insecureof her identity. Was it ratherdifficultfor you becausealmostall women of yourgeneration, all of your friendswere mothers? SB: No, in general, my friends are not mothers. Most of my friends don't have children. Of course, I have friends with children but I have many friendswithout children. My sisterdoesn'thave any children;my friendOlga has no children, many, many women I know have no children. There are some who have a child and it's no big deal. They don't considerthemselves mothers. They work in addition. Almost all the women I'm connected with work. Eitherthey'reactresses,or they'relawyers.They do things besideshaving children.
III. PARIS;SEPTEMBER 10, 1985

MS: You know that in my critical study of the Parshleytranslation[of The Second Sex], I've uncoverednumerousdeletions, almosta hundredpageswere

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cut from the originalFrenchedition. This is an importantissuefor the study of your philosophy-for me it's a philosophy-because the translationdestroys the philosophical integrity of your work. But you've told me many times that you are not a philosopher.Well, he's done a popular[non-philosophical] translationof your book. What do you think of this translation? SB: Well, I think that it's very bad to suppressthe philosophicalaspect because while I say that I'm not a philosopher in the sense that I'm not the creatorof a system, I'm still a philosopherin the sense that I've studieda lot of philosophy, I have a degree in philosophy, I've taught philosophy, I'm infusedwith philosophy, and when I put philosophyinto my books it's because that'sa way for me to view the worldand I can't allow them to eliminate that way of viewing the world, that dimensionof my approachto women, as Mr. Parshleyhas done. I'm altogether against the principle of gaps, omissions, the condensationswhich have the effect, among other things of suppressing whole philosophicalaspect of the book. MS: You accepted this translationin 1952. SB: I accepted it to the extent that. . . you know, I had a lot of things to do, a creativeworkto write, and I wasnot going to readfrombeginningto end all that were being done of my work. But when I found out that the translations was omittingthings, I askedhim to indicatethe omissionsto me, Mr. Parshley and I wroteto tell him that I was absolutely againstthem, and since he insisted on the omissionson the pretextthat otherwisethe book wouldbe too long, I asked him to say in a prefacethat I was againstthe omissions,the condenhim a greatdeal. sation.And I don'tbelieve that he did that, which I begrudge MS: Yes, it's awful. We've been studying this book for more than [thirty] years, a book which is very differentfrom the book you wrote. translationto be done today. SB: I would like very much for an unabridged An honest translation, with the philosophical dimension and with all the judgedpointlessand which I considerto have a point, partsthat Mr. Parshley very much so. . .. Fromcertain things that you've told me, I think that one will have to look at passagesthat weren't cut as well to see if there are not Forexample, you tell me that he speaks mistranslations, misrepresentations. of human nature whereas I have never believed-nor Sartreeither, and on this point I am his disciple-we never believed in humannature.So it's a serious mistaketo speakof "humannature"insteadof "humanreality,"which is a Heideggerianterm. I was infusedwith Heidegger's philosophyand when I speakabouthumanrealitythat is, aboutman'spresencein the world, I'mnot speakingabout human nature, it's completely different.

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MS: Yes, exactly. These translationproblemshave been quite significantin feminist debate. American feminists have criticizedyour analysisof history and of marriage.But those discussionsin TheSecond Sexcontain the most extensive deletions. Parshleycut out the names of seventy-eightwomen from You did a history, and almost thirty-fivepagesfromthe chapteron marriage. of of the letters and he cut almost all of it. very good study Sophie Tolstoy SB: That's too bad becausereally I liked that very much. It was Sophie Tolstoy'sjournal,not her letters. It'sthe journal,well the whole relationshipwas very strange,no, not very strange,on the contrary,one could say it was very banal, very typical of Tolstoy with his wife. At the same time, she is odious, but he even more odious. There. I'm enormouslysorrythat they cut out that Sex passage. ... I would like very much for anothertranslationof TheSecond to be done, one that is much morefaithful,morecompleteand morefaithful. MS: I have another question. A Frenchphilosopherfriendexplained to me yourexperienceat the Ecole NormaleSuperieure [the institutionresponsible, under the highly centralizedFrench universitysystem, for trainingthe elite professoriate,as opposed to the Sorbonne, a more mass institution]. SB: I was never at the ENS. That's false. MS: Just a year as auditor. .. ? SB: No, No, never, never. MS: You didn't.... SB: I took coursesat the ENS like everyoneelse, I took coursesthere when I was preparing an agr6gation, my agregation. When you are preparing you have the right to take coursesthere, but I was never enrolled. MS: But Sartrewas [enrolled]there. SB: Yes, he was a student there. MS: And Merleau-Ponty? SB: Yes, he as well. MS: Were there other women who were regularstudents there?

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SB: There were some for a yearor two. There was Simone Weil, Simone Petrement, but that was after me. I was alreadyagregee,that is, I had already finished my studies, when they were at the ENS. MS: It was a normalthing for a womanto take courses,but not to be a regular student. SB: No, but takingcourseswas normal.At the time one waspreparing for the one could take certain coursesat the ENS. That was completely agregation, normal. MS: Was it forbiddenfor women to be regularstudents at the ENS at that time? SB: No. Yes, it was forbiddenand then it was allowedfor a yearor two and it wasjust at that moment that Simone Weil, Simone Petrement,perhapseven students.All that is not verypertinentbetween anotherwoman, were regular us, that is. MS: Was it an importantexclusion for you not to. . ? SB: Absolutelynot. I could have gone to Sevres if I had wantedto. But I preferredto stay, not that I loved my family, but I preferred.. . . Well, it wasn't even a matter of that . . . I didn't want to live on campusanywhere.That would have bothered me a lot. No, it wasn't exclusion. Well, it was completely normal. You studiedat the Sorbonneand that was it. That didn'tpreat a very youngage;that didn'tbotherme vent me fromgetting my agr6gation at all. to a colleaguethat you describeSartreas a philosopher, MS: I once remarked and yourselfas a literarywriter, and he replied: "Simone de Beauvoirsaid that she is a literarywriterand Sartreis the philosopher? Ah, that'sfunny, he would preferto be a literarywriter".Is that true? SB: No, it's not exactly that. He thought that among his works, he was perhaps more attached to his literaryworksthan to his philosophicalones, becausea literaryworkremainsyours[ensoil, and a philosophicalworkis always taken up and revised by posterity, it's changed and criticized, etc. MS: When I startedmy studieswith you, I was especiallylookingfor an independent woman. It was very importantto find a role model. And I looked for this role model in you. And I was angrythat men said"The GreatSartreuse."

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SB: Oh, but that, that's a joke. MS: Yes, a joke. But a lot of people told me, "Whyareyou workingwith her? Why not the man himself?She is just a follower." SB: My books are completelypersonal.Sartrenever interfered.SheCameTo all of that is mine. And The SecondSex is mine. Sartre Stay, The Mandarins, was hardlyinterestedat all in the educationof women. . . . Feministsunderstand very well that feminism is me and not Sartre. MS: I heard that in 1968 or 1970, Frenchfeministswere very unhappywith because they thought that it was againstwomen. The WomanDestroyed SB: There were critiquesby certain feministsabout it, but it was completely false because-well, I don't like "thesis"books, but-the story was that a womanshouldbe independent.The heroine of TheWoman is comDestroyed pletely destroyedbecauseshe lived only for her husbandand children. So it's a veryfeminist book in a sense since it provesfinally that a womanwho only lives for marriageand motherhoodis miserable. MS: Now, this book is being readfavorably by Americanfeministswho see it reflectingyour own experience. SB: Well, of course, one puts partof oneself into any book, but it's not at all autobiographical. MS: They referto the rage, the fearof losingyoursensualityor yourtendency to sacrificeyourself,they found all those themes in that book in you. SB: But I never had the idea of sacrificingmyself, all of that doesn't exist. at all. When one says that it's They're wrong. It's hardly autobiographical it's that I put in settings that I liked, that I place the story autobiographical, in places, etc. But the whole storyof the good wife who has sacrificedeveryand daughters,that'sjust the opposite. I'm completely thing for her marriage the idea of againstthat, sacrificingoneself for a good husbandand children. I'm completely adverse, the enemy of that idea. MS: But you don't find that in your relation to Sartre. SB: No, not at all ... I never sacrificedmyselffor Sartre,any more than he sacrificedhimself for me. MS: Have you read the review by Michele LeDoeuff [1984] of your edited collection of Sartre'sletters, Les Lettres au Castor?

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SB: There were so many articles. MS: LeDoeuffrefersto Sartreas "the only speakingsubject"in the relationship. SB: Does that mean that I didn't give them my letters? MS: No, it's not that. It's that Sartrereally dominatedthe relationship. SB: No, that'snot true. He's writingto me, so, one doesn'tsee my own stories, one doesn'tsee me, my personallife in his letters. One only sees Sartre's. That's all. MS: So it's really Sartrewho is speaking. SB: In his letters, yes. If I publishedmy own, I would be the one speaking. But in my lifetime, I won't publish my letters. MS: A friend, an American philsopher, once told me, "I am completely angryat this Simone de Beauvoir-"we, we, we"-she alwayssays "we"in Where is she?She had completely disappeared". her autobiography. SB: I'm the one speaking. Obviously, Sartredidn't write his autobiography [coveringthe periodof our relationship].If he had, he wouldhave had to say "we"also. MS: Yes, you begin a sentence and he finishes it, and afterwards you think together. SB: Yes, but it's the same thing. If I begin it, he finishes it; if he begins it, I finish it, afterwards, there's a moment .... Yes, we were very, very close. But that's nothing contraryto feminism. BecauseI believe one can be close to a man and be a feminist. Obviously, there are feminists, especiallylesbian feminists, who would not at all agree. But that's my own feminism. MS: I am surprised that you don't say that you find the tendency to sacrifice yourselfin your inner life. Because I think I saw it in your books. SB: Not in my memoirs. In my memoirs, there is no tendency to self-sacrifice, whereasin my novels, I describedwomen who perhapshad a tendency to self-sacrifice. Because I'm not speaking only about myself, I'm also speakingabout other women.

A. Simons Margaret

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MS: And yet, you have told me, "Yes, when I was very young, just before leavingfor Marseilles,I had a crisisof consciousness".[Thisquestionrefersto Beauvoir'sexperience of losing a sense of direction in her life, in the early years of her intimate relationshipwith Sartre, after finishing her graduate study and before beginning her first position in Marseilles.] him afterall. Thus, I remainedfeminist. SB: Well, in fact, I refusedto marry I did not at all want to attach myself to a man by the ties of marriage.I refused marriage.I was the one who refused.Sartreproposedto me. MS: You chose that relationshipwith Sartre?When one readsthe memoirs, it seems that it was he who defined the relationship. SB: No, not at all. I also chose Sartre.I was the one who chose him. I saw a lot of other men, I even saw men who later became famous, like Merleauetc., etc. But I was never temptedto live with them, Ponty, like Levi-Strauss to make a life together. I was the one who chose Sartre,well, we chose each other. MS: I have a question about choice. There is a theoretical tension in The SecondSex on the question of choice and oppression. In one chapter you wrote that women are not oppressedas a group.But in the next chapter,you as a group."In anotherchapter, you wrote, "Yes,women are trulyoppressed questionedwhetherone can say that a girlraisedto be the Other ever chooses to be the Other. But you also say that the woman is in complicity with her oppression.I find that there'sa tension there. It remainseven today in feminism, between choice and oppression. SB: I think that on the whole women are oppressed.But at the heartof their oppression-sometimes, they choose it because it's convenient for a boura man who has even more geois womanwho has a little bit of money to marry money than she has and who will take care of evrythingso that she can do nothing. There is a complicityon the partof women. Veryoften, not always. than to have a career,to workand be They often find it easierto get married independent. MS: And the women who arenot rich, not at all rich, and I'mthinkingabout younggirlswho were [victimsof] incest. Can one say that these women have the choice to be. . . SB: No, I think that they had very little choice. But all the same, there is a way of choosing at a certain moment, as soon as they get a little older, of choosing to stay in that incest situationor of refusingand even bringingtheir father to court.

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MS: I think that many feministsunderstand women as victims of an absolute I And find certain with that analysis.And you underproblems patriarchy. stood in The SecondSex that women are in complicity. But also there are women who are victims of oppressionbut who also seek power over their chiidren. If a woman, for example, beats her children or bums them with a cigarette. What is she doing? She is dominating. SB: She is getting revengefor her oppression.It's not a way of getting out of it. In the samewaythat makinga scene in frontof her husbandis not a wayof eliminating oppression. MS: And the way to eliminate oppressionis to... SB: To be independent. To work. to work.And what areyou doingnow in the wayof work? MS: Yes, especially SB: Well, for the moment, I am workinga lot on [the journal]LesTempsModemnes. MS: I have heard it said that the feminist movement in Franceis over. SB: That's not true, that's not true. MS: No? SB: Not at all. It's less loud than before, it's not out in the streetsbecausewe have a lot of supportfrom the Ministryof the Rights of Woman. So, we are more organized,we are doing more constructiveworknow ratherthan agitation but that doesn't mean that the movement is over. Not at all. That's something that all the anti-feministssay: "It'sno longer in fashion, it's no longer in fashion, it's over." But it's not true at all. It's lasting. On the conThere area lot of feministsin the trary,there are a lot of feministresearchers. CNRS [the National Center for Scientific Research].Well, that is, research, for doing researchon feminism.There is a lot of work, there are scholarships a lot of foundationsto help feminist or female painters, sculptors.Oh yes, yes, there are a lot of things. It's just that it's all more or less going through the Ministry. MS: Oh, that will change. SB: Alas, perhaps.BecauseYvette Roudy, who is the Ministerof the Rights socialistgovernment],is alof Woman [duringthe earlyyearsof Mitterand's

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together a dedicatedfeminist. So she helps us enormously,she gives a lot of money to magazines,exhibitions, research,feminist work. For foundations also. Yes, yes. So it is not at all true that the movement is over.

REFERENCES Beauvoir,Simone de. 1960. La Forcede l'dge. Paris:Gallimard.My translation. . 1974. Memoirsof a Dutiful Daughter.New York: Harper & Row, [1958]. Les Chimeres. 1975. Maternite esclave.Paris:UGE 10/18. Le Doeuff, Michele. 1984. Sartre;l'uniquesujet parlant. Esprit-changerla cultureet la politique, 5: 181-191.

Introductionto "Sorcerer Love," by Luce Irigaray

ELEANORH. KUYKENDALL

Love"is thenamethatLuceIrigaray "Sorcerer givesto thedemonic functionof in Plato'sSymposium. love as presented She arguesthatSocrates thereattributes two incompatible to Diotima,who in any case is not present at the banpositions is that is a or The love between lovers whichalso quet. first mid-point intermediary is that is the and teaches The second love a means to end immortality. dutyof proand thusis a meremeansto immortality whichtheloversloseone creation, through another.Irigaray arguesin favor of thefirstposition,a conception of love as demonicintermediary.

Luce Irigaray's "SorcererLove" is unique among her presentlytranslated worksbecauseit was originallycomposedas a lecture, to be spoken. As such, it formsa bridgeto written language,includingthe versionsof experimental is better known to l'ecriture feminineor feminine writing for which Irigaray delivered"Sorcerer of English(1979, 1974, 1977). Irigaray readers Love," on Diotima'sspeech in Plato's Symposium,at Erasmus University, Rotterdam, in 1982, duringher appointmentto a chair honoring the animal behaviorist de JanTinbergen. She publishedit as the second chapterof her book, Ethique also discussestexts la difference sexuelle(Irigaray,1984). In this work Irigaray and Levinas,primaby Aristotle, Descartes,Spinoza, Hegel, Merleau-Ponty, for her ethics. rily, as the title tells us, as a point of departure and seeks to disclose a female unboth presupposes In her ethics, Irigaray conscious, hidden in traditionaldiscourse,includingthe discourseof philosophers, both male and female. In her ontology, she evokes Nietzsche and Heidegger,for whom being is not fixed but constantly to be won, without, of separationand distance (1980; to their assumptions however, subscribing 1983b). In her method, Irigaray,who began her careeras a psycholinguist (Irigaray,1973), invokes Derrideandeconstructionwithout endorsingwhat in his acof gender-neutrality false presupposition she perceivesas Derrida's counts of languagelearning and morality(Irigaray,1983a; 1987). ontology, ethics, and method have been criticizedboth for her Irigaray's rendition of Freud'sviews on femininity (Kofman, 1980: 101-120) and for H. Kuykendall vol. 3, no. 3 (Winter1989) ? by Eleanor Hypatia

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her supposeddependence on Freudand Lacan (Plaza, 1980; Gallop, 1982: has attemptedto develop an alternative 38-42). But since the 1970's, Irigaray feminist account of the unconsciousorigins of languageand moralitywhich differssharplyfrom Freudand Lacan. For example, in Speculum of the Other in an unorthodox written Woman, (Irigaray,1974), literarystyle which at reversesthe direction of the times parodiesLacan as well as Plato, Irigaray the philosopher's jourjourneyin Plato'sRepublic.ForIrigaray, philosopher's the so from sun and ignorance and delusion to a ney from Plato's cave to closer understanding of the Good, prefigures a Freudian and Lacanian ontology: the philosopher'semergencefrom the cave is the son's ruptureof his bond with his mother at the father'sbehest. In her feminist alternative, Irigaray interpretsthe cave insteadas a sourceof connection and so, of moral knowledge. The connection is also magical. The ballet El Amor Brujo(1915), comSorcier posed by Manuelde Fallaand presentedon the Parisstage as L'Amour "Sorcerer Love," like (1925), culminatesin a ritualfire dance. Luce Irigaray's its namesake,also createsan atmosphere of bewitchment. Publishedten years afterSpeculum, "Sorcerer Love" is Irigaray's only other workon Plato. Here, as elsewhere,her effortis deconstructivein that it questionsboth explicit and covert presuppositionsof gender in the text and its presentation. But the Love"is also constructivein that it supports an ontology analysisin "Sorcerer in what understands as women's such as matergrounded Irigaray experience, and an with or ethic connection rather than nity, honoring among women, more for this in and ethic later argues ontology separation.Irigaray explicitly of de la sexuelle entitled "L'Amour du Meme, chapters Ethique difference l'Amourde l'Autre"["Loveof the Same, Love of the Other"]and "Ethique de la differencesexuelle" (1984: 127-141). In the Symposium, Plato reportsSocrates in turn reportinga speech by Diotima in praiseof love. This speech, Irigaray Love," suggestsin "Sorcerer suffersfrom an internal contradiction in which love is describedin two incompatibleways. On the one hand, it is saidto be a constantlymoving intermediary,neither lover nor beloved but both; on the other hand, it is said to become stabilizedin the formof a thirdperson, for example, a child, thereby claims that the dramatic separatinglover from beloved. Moreover, Irigaray setting in which Plato situates the speech underminesits overt content and thesis. Socratesattributesto Diotima a purportedly universaltheoryof love at a banquet from which she and all other women are absent, a banquet at which a high level of sexualtension developsamongthe men. Thus, the conception of love presented as universal is not universally practiced, since women cannot participatedirectly in the discourseat the banquet. Further, both the examples and the very conception of what is said to constitute love-discourse with the divine-exclude women from all but love's initial and least enlightened phase-the physicaldesire to procreate.

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Irigaray's interpretationof Diotima's speech is, of course, controversial. AndreaNye, for example, in a critical essaythat appearsin this issue, argues that Irigaray misreadsDiotima (or Socrates,or Plato) since, accordingto less literaltranslations,Diotima can be interpretedas consistentlycharacterizing love as intermediaryor demonic (Nye, 1988). And although some critics have arguedthat Diotima'svery existence was an invention, the Symposium can also be readas acknowledging the existence of an actualhistoricalfemale even that acknowledgementis somewhat ambivalent since though person, the contributionis a second-handone (Wider, 1986: 44-48). Yet Irigaray is not unawareof these issues. She herselfpoints out that the text of the Symposium presentsDiotima'sspeech in praiseof love as a quotation by Socrates-whose own speech is a quotation by Plato. Historically, Diotima'sactual presence at the banquet would have been highly unlikely. The fact that a male philosopher is speakingfor an absent woman, a fact which is supposedto be irrelevantto the explicit celebrationof love as universal, rendersthat celebrationironic. Why the all-maledramaticsetting of this banquet celebrating love, from which not only Diotima but also all women, even the flute players and dancers, were absent? Why Diotima's identificationof love between men as love's highest individualrealization,alAnd why, after Diotima'sspeech, does beit a realizationto be transcended? Plato recount the embarrassing confrontationof a disdainfulSocrates by a drunkenAlcibiadesfor whom, it turs out, Socrateshardlyprovidedan adequate ethical model? (Whitbeck,1984:393) These are some of the questions readsthem with which the feminist readerof this text must grapple.Irigaray as indicationsof conflicts of unconsciousmotives or of speech acts, as would but she also readsthem as indicationsthat the conception Lacanor Derrida; is deeply masculinist. At the end of love itself presentedin the Symposium from her deconstructionof the speech of of "Sorcerer Love", Irigaray departs Plato'sSocrates'Diotima to sketch the beginningsof an ethic of her own, one that she celebrates groundedin an alternativeontology. The transformation here and elsewherein her workcomes fromwhat she takes to be experiences does of boundarylessness specific to women, such as maternity. But Irigaray on available not intend this as a crude "essentialism" grounded experiences only to women. She ratherseeks in women'sexperiencean alternativeto the ontology of separation and desire posited by Plato through Socrates and like her readingsof philosoDiotima. Irigaray's readingof Plato'sSymposium, with with Socrates, with Diotima, Plato, phers elsewhere, opens a dialogue now and with Irigaray herself, which we are challenged to continue.
REFERENCES

seduction:feminismand psychoanalysis. Gallop, Jane. 1982. The daughter's Ithaca:Cornell University Press.

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des dements.The Hague: Mouton. Irigaray,Luce. 1973. Le langage -. 1974. Speculum of theotherwoman.Trans. Gillian Gill, 1985. Ithaca: Comell University Press. - . 1977. Thissex whichis not one. Trans. Catherine Porterwith Carolyn Burke, 1985. Ithaca:Cornell University Press. . 1979. And the one doesn't stir without the other. Trans. Helene Vivienne Wenzel. Signs7 (1981): 60-67. .1980. Amantemarine.Paris:Les Editionsde Minuit. . 1983a. La Croyance Meme. Paris:Galilee. .1983b. L'oublide l'air. Paris:Les Editionsde Minuit. . 1984. Ethique de la difference sexuelle.Paris:Les Editionsde Minuit. -- . 1985. Parlern'estjamaisneutre.Paris:Les Editionsde Minuit. . 1987. Sexeset parentes.Paris:Les Editionsde Minuit. Kofman,Sarah. 1980. TheEnigma of Woman.Trans. CatherinePorter,1985. Ithaca:Corell University Press. Luce Irigaray Kuykendall,EleanorH. 1983. Towardan ethic of nurturance: on motheringand power. In Mothering: in ed. Joyce essays feminist theory, Trebilcot. Totowa, N. J.: Rowman & Allanheld: 263-274. and Diotimaat Plato'sSympoNye, Andrea. 1988. The hidden host: Irigaray sium. Hypatia,this issue. Plaza, Monique. 1980. "Phallomorphic" Power and the Psychology of "Woman."Feminist Issues, I: 71-102. Trebilcot,Joyce, ed. 1983. Mothering: Totowa, N. J.: essaysinfeminist theory. Rowman & Allanheld. Wider, Kathleen. 1986. Women philosophersin the ancient greek world: Donning the mantle. Hypatia, 1(1) 21-62. Women's Whitbeck, Caroline. 1984. Love, knowledge, and transformation. StudiesInternational Forum4 (5): 393-405.

SorcererLove: A Reading of Plato's Symposium, Diotima'sSpeech

LUCE IRIGARAY Translated by EleanorH. Kuykendall

Love"is thenamethatLuceIrigaray "Sorcerer givesto thedemonic functionof love as presented in Plato'sSymposium.She arguesthatSocrates thereattributes two incompatible to Diotima,who in any case is not present at the banpositions or intermediary between loverswhichalso quet. Thefirstis thatloveis a mid-point The secondis thatloveis a meansto theendanddutyof proteaches immortality. and thusis a meremeansto immortality whichtheloversloseone creation, through in another.Irigaray the a argues favor of firstposition, conception of love as deE.K. monicintermediary.

In the Symposium, the dialogueon love, when Socratesfinishes speaking, he gives the floor to a woman:Diotima. She does not participatein these exchanges or in this meal among men. She is not there. She herselfdoes not speak. Socrates reportsor recounts her views. He borrowsher wisdom and power,declaresher his initiator,his pedagogue,on mattersof love, but she is not invited to teach or to eat. Unless she did not want to accept an invitation? But Socratessaysnothing about that. And Diotima is not the only example of a woman whose wisdom, above all in love, is reportedin her absence by a man. Diotima's teaching will be very dialectical-but differentfrom what we usuallycall dialectical. Unlike Hegel's, her dialectic does not workby opposithe firstterm into the second, in orderto arriveat a synthetion to transform and she sis of the two. At the very outset, she establishesthe intermediary never abandonsit as a mere way or means. Her method is not, then, a propaof two termsin orderto establisha or destructuration edeutic of the destruction synthesiswhich is neither one nor the other. She presents,uncovers,unveils the existence of a third that is alreadythere and that permitsprogression: frompovertyto wealth, fromignoranceto wisdom,frommortalityto immoralwaysleads to a greaterperfectionof and in tality. Forher, this progression love. vol. 3, no. 3 (Winter1989)? by LuceIrigaray Hypatia

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But, contraryto the usualdialecticalmethods, love ought not to be abandoned for the sake of becomingwise or learned.It is love that leadsto knowledge-both practicaland metaphysical.It is love that is both the guide and the way, above all a mediator. Love is designatedas a theme, but love is also perpetually enacted, dramatized, in the exposition of the theme. So Diotima immediatelyrebutsthe claimsthat love is a greatGod and that it is the love of beautifulthings. At the riskof offendingthe Gods, Diotima also assertsthat love is neither beautifulnor good. This leadsher interlocutor to supposeimmediatelythat love is ugly and bad, incapableas he is of grasping the existence or instance of what is held between,what permitsthe passagebetween ignoranceand knowledge. If we did not, at each moment, have somethingto learn in the encounterwith reality,between realityand already establishedknowledge, we would not perfect ourselvesin wisdom. And not to become wiser means to become more ignorant. which Therefore,between knowledgeand reality, there is an intermediary between the two. permitsthe meeting and transmutationor transvaluation The dialectic of Diotima is in four terms,at least: the here, the two poles of the meeting, the beyond, but a beyondwhich never abolishesthe here. And so on, indefinitely. The mediatoris never abolished in an infallible knowledge. Everythingis alwaysin movement, in becoming. And the mediatorof everything is, among other things, or exemplarily,love. Never completed, alwaysevolving. And, in responseto the protestationof Socratesthat love is a greatGod, that everyone so, she laughs.Her retortis not at all angry,balsaysso or thinks between contradictories; it is laughter from elsewhere. Laughing, ancing she asks Socrates who this everyone is. Justas she ceaselesslyundoesthe then, assuranceor the closureof opposing terms, so she rejects every ensemble of unities reducedto a similitude in orderto constitute a whole: "Youmean, by all who do not know?"said she, "orby all who know as well?""Absolutelyall." At that she laughed. (202)2 ("Ce tout le monde dont tu parles, sont-ce, dit-elle, ceux qui savent ou ceux qui ne savent pas?-Tous en general, ma foi!" Elle se mit a rire.) The tension between opposites thus abated, she shows, demonstrates,that a great "everyone"does not exist, nor does the position of love as eternally God. Does she teach nothing that is alreadydefined?A method of becoming wise, learned,moreperfectin love and in art [I'art].She ceaselesslyquestions Socrateson his positions but without, like a master,positing alreadyconstituted truths. Instead, she teaches the renunciation of alreadyestablished truths.And each time that Socratesthinks that he can take somethingas cer-

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tain, she undoes his certainty. All entities, substantives,adverbs,sentences are patiently, and joyously, called into question. Forlove, the demonstrationis not so difficultto establish.For, if love possessedall that he desired,he woulddesireno more.3He mustlack, therefore, in orderto desirestill. But, if love had nothing at all to do with beautifuland in a good things, he could not desirethem either. Thus, he is an intermediary a God? Not necessarhe his as therefore lose status sense. Does very specific he is between the one and the other. ily. He is neither mortalnor immortal: Which qualifieshim as demonic. Love is a demon-his function is to transmit to the godswhat comes frommen and to men what comesfromthe gods. Like to gods and to men in everythingelse that is demonic, love is complementary such a way as to join everythingwith itself. There must be a being of middling naturein orderfor men and gods to enter into relations, into conversation, while awakeor asleep. Which makeslove a kind of divination, priestly knowledgeof things connected with sacrifice,initiation, incantation,prediction in general and magic. The demons who serve as mediatorsbetween men and gods are numerous and very diverse. Love is one of them. And Love'sparentageis very particular: child of Plenty(himself son of Invention)and of Poverty,conceived the day the birth of Aphrodite was celebrated.Thus love is alwayspoor and ... rough, unkempt, unshod, and homeless, ever couching on the ground uncovered, sleeping beneath the open sky by doors and in the streets, because he has the nature of his mother. . . But again, in keeping with his father, he has designs upon the beautiful and good, for he is bold, headlong, and intense, a mighty hunter, alwaysweaving some device or other, eager in invention and resourceful, searchingafterwisdom all through life, terrible as a magician, sorcerer, and sophist. Further,in his naturehe is not immortal,nor yet mortal. No, on a given day, now he flourishesand lives, when things go well with him, and again he dies, but through the natureof his sire revivesagain. Yet his gain for ever slips away from him, so that Erosnever is without resources,nor is ever rich. As for ignoranceand knowledge, here again he is midway between them. The case stands thus. No god seeks after wisdom, or wishes to grow wise (for he alreadyis so), no more than anybodyelse seeks afterwisdom if he has it. Nor, again, do ignorant folk seek after wisdom or long to grow wise; for here is just the trouble about ignorance, that what is neither beautiful and good, nor yet intelligent, to itself seems good enough. Accordingly, the man who does not think himself in

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need has no desirefor what he does not think himself in need of. The seekersafterknowledge,Diotima! If they are [Socrates.] not the wise, nor yet the ignorant(saidI), who arethey, then? [Diotima.]The point (said she) is obvious even to a child, that they are persons intermediatebetween these two, and that Eros is among them; for wisdomfalls within the class of the most beautiful,while Erosis an erosfor the beautiful.And hence it follows necessarilythat Erosis a seekerafterwisdom [a philosopher],and being a philosopher, is midwaybetween wise and ignorant. (203-204) un va-nu-piedsqui n'a point de domicile, (rudeet malpropre; dormanta la belle etoile sur le pas des portes ou dans la rue selon la naturede sa mere. Mais, en revanche, guettant, sans cesse, embusqueles choses belles et bonnes, chasseurhabile et ourdissant continument quelque ruse, curieux de pensee et riche d'expedient, passant toute sa vie a philosopher, habile comme sorcier, comme inventeur de philtres magiques, comme sophiste, selon la nature de son pere. De plus, sa naturen'est ni d'un mortelni d'un immortel,mais, le memejour, tantot, quandses expedientsont reussi,il est en fleur, il a de la vie; tantot au contraire il est mourant; puis, derechef, il revient a la vie grace au naturel de son pere, tandis que, d'autre part, coule de ses mains le fruit de ses expedients! Ainsi, ni jamaisAmour n'est indigent, ni jamais il est riche! Entre savoir et ignorance, maintenant, Amour est intermediare. Voici ce qui en est. Parmiles Dieux, il n'y en a aucun qui ait envie de devenir sage, car il l'est;ne s'emploiepas non plus a philosopher quiconque d'autre est sage. Mais pas davantageles ignorantsne s'emploient,de leur c6te, a philosopher, et ils n'ont pas envie de devenir sages;car, ce qu'il y a precisementde facheux dans l'ignorance,c'est que quelqu'un, qui n'est pas un homme accompliet qui n'est pas non plus intelligent, se figurel'etredans la mesurevoulue;c'est que celui qui ne croit pas etre depourvun'a point envie de ce dont il ne croit pas avoir besoin d'etrepourvu.-Quels sont donc alors, Diotime, m'ecriai-je,ceux qui s'emploienta philosophersi ce ne sont ni les sagesni les ignorants? -La chose est claire, ditelle, et meme deja pour un enfant! Ce sont ceux qui sont intermediares entre ces deux extremes, et au nombredesquels doit aussi se trouver Amour. La sagesse, en effet, est evidemment parmi les plus belles choses, et c'est au beau

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qu'Amour rapporteson amour;d'ou il suit que, forcement, Amourest philosophe, et, etant philosophe, qu'il est intermediare entre le savant et l'ignorant.) Erosis thereforeintermediary between couplesof opposites:poverty-plenty, ignorance-wisdom, ugliness-beauty, dirtiness-cleanliness, death-life, etc. And that would be inscribedin love's natureas a resultof his genealogyand date of conception. And love is a philosopher,love is philosophy.Philosophy is not formalknowledge, fixed, abstracted fromall feeling. It is the searchfor love, love of beauty, love of wisdom, which is one of the most beautiful things. Like love, the philosopherwould be someone poor, dirty, a bit of a bum, alwaysan outsider, sleeping under the starsbut very curious, adept in ruses and devices of all kinds, reflecting ceaselessly, a sorcerer,a sophist, sometimesflourishing,sometimesexpiring. Nothing like the representation of the philosopherwe generallygive: learned, correctlydressed, with good manners,understanding everything,pedanticallyinstructingus in a corpusof alreadycodified doctrine. The philosopheris nothing like that. He is barefoot, going out underthe starsin searchof an encounterwith reality, seeking the embrace, the acquaintance[connaissance](co-birthing) [(co-naissance)] of whatevergentleness of soul, beauty, wisdom might be found there. This incessantquest he inheritsfromhis mother. He is a philosopherthroughhis mother, an adept in invention throughhis father. But his passionfor love, for beauty, for wisdom, comes to him fromhis mother, and fromthe date when he was conceived. Desired and wanted, besides, by his mother. How is it that love and the philosopherare generallyrepresentedotherwise? Because they are imagined as belovedand not as lovers. As beloved Love, both like and unlike the philosopher, is imaginedto be of unparalled beauty, delicate, perfect, happy. Yet the lover has an entirely differentnature. He goes towardwhat is kind, beautiful,perfect,etc. He does not possess these. He is poor, unhappy,alwaysin searchof... But what does he seek or love? That beautifulthings become his-this is Socrates'answer. But what will happen to him if these things become his?To this questionof Diotima's, she asksher quesSocrateshas no answer. Switching "good"for "beautiful", tion again. "That the good may be his," ("Qu'elles devienne siennes") Socratesrepeats. "And what happensto the man when the good things become his?" "On this," said [Socrates],"I am more than readywith an answer:that he will be happy." (204-205) ("Et qu'en sera-t-il pour celui a qui il arriveraque les choses bonnes soient devenues siennes?""Voila, dit Socrate, a quoi je serai plus a mon aise pour repondre!I1sera heureux") And happinessseems to put an ultimate end to this dialogicalrepetition between Diotima and Socrates.

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Socratesasks:what should we call what pertainsto lovers?"Bywhat manner of pursuitand in what activity does the eagernessand strainingfor the object get the name of Eros?And what may this action really be?" ("Quel est le genre d'existence, le mode d'activite pour lesquels a leur zele, a leur effort soutenu conviendrait le nom d'amour,dis-moi?En quoi peu bien consister cet acte?")And Diotima replies:"Thisaction is engenderingin beauty,with relation both to body and to soul." (205, 206) ("C'estun enfantementdans la beaute et selon le corpset selon l'ame.")But Socratesunderstands nothing of another, equally clear, revelation . . . He understands nothing about fecundity in relation both to body and to soul: The union of a man and womanis, in fact, a generation;this is a thing divine; in a living creaturethat is mortal, it is an element of immortality,this fecundity and generation. (206) (L'unionde l'homme et de la femme est en effet un enfantement et c'est une affairedivine, c'est, dans le vivant mortel, la presence de ce qui est immortel: la fecondite et la procreation.) This statement of Diotima'snever seems to have been understood.Besides, she herselfwill go on to emphasizethe procreativeaspectof love. Butfirstshe stresses the character of divinegenerationin every union betweenman and woman,the presenceof the immortalin the living mortal. All love would be creation, potentiallydivine, a path between the condition of the mortaland that of the immortal. Love is fecund before all procreation.And it has a demonic mediumlike, fecundity. Assuringeveryone, male and female, the immortal becoming of the living. But there cannot be procreationof a divine naturein what is not in harmony.And harmonywith the divine is not possible for the ugly, but only for the beautiful.Thus, accordingto Diotima, love between man and woman is beautiful,harmonious,divine. It must be in order for procreationto take place. It is not procreationthat is beautifuland that constitutesthe aim of love. The aim of love is to realizethe immortality in the mortalitybetween lovers. And the expansionwhich producesthe child follows the joy at the approachof a beautifulobject. But an ugly object leads to a turningback, the shrivelingup of fecundity, the painfullyborne weight of the desire to procreate.Procreationand generation in beauty-these are the aim of love, because it is thus that the eternity and imperishability of a mortal being manifest themselves. of one by the other, passage Fecundityof love between lovers, regeneration to immortalityin one another, throughone another-these seem to become the condition, not the cause, of procreation. Certainly, Diotima tells

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Socratesthat the creation of beauty, of a workof art [l'oeuvre] (solitarycreation this time?) is insufficient, that it is necessaryto give birth together to a child, that this wisdomis inscribedin the animalworlditself. She continues to laughat the wayhe goes lookingfor his truthsbeyondthe most obviouseverydayreality,which he does not see or even perceive. She mocksthe wayhis dialecticalor dialogicalmethod forgetsthe most elementarytruths. The way his discourseon love neglects to look at, to informitself about, the amorous state and to inquireabout its cause. Diotima speaks of cause in a surprisingway. We could note that her method does not enter into a chain of causalities,a chain that skipsover or as generativemilieu. Usually, causalityis not often forgetsthe intermediary of her She borrows it fromthe animalworldand evokes it, or reasoning. part invokes it, with respect to procreation.Insteadof allowing the child to germinate or develop in the milieu of love and fecundity between man and woman, she seeks a cause of love in the animal world:procreation. Diotima's method miscarrieshere. From here on, she leads love into a schism between mortal and immortal. Love loses its demonic character. Is There will be lovers in body and this the foundingact of the meta-physical? lovers in soul. But the perpetualpassagefrommortalto immortalthat lovers confer on one another is put aside. Love loses its divinity, its mediumlike, becomes alchemicalqualitiesbetween couplesof opposites.The intermediary the child, and no longer love. Occupyingthe place of love, the child can no longerbe a lover. It is put in the place of the incessantmovementof love. Beloved, no doubt;but how be beloved without being a lover?And is not love trappedin thebeloved,contraryto what Diotima wanted in the first place?A belovedwho is an end is substitutedfor love between men and women. A beloved who is a will, even a duty, and a meansof attainingimmortality.Lovers can neither attain nor advance that between themselves. That is the weakness of love, for the child as well. If the couple of loverscannot care for the place of love like a thirdtermbetween them, then they will not remainlovers and they cannot give birth to lovers. Something gets solidifiedin space-time milieu and of an accessible,loving, tranwith the loss of a vital intermediary scendental. A sort of teleological trianglereplacesa perpetualmovement, a perpetualtransvaluation,a permanentbecoming. Love was the vehicle of this. But, if procreationbecomes its goal, it riskslosing its internal motivation, its fecundity "in itself', its slow and constant regeneration. This errorin method, in the originalityof Diotima'smethod, is corrected only to be confirmedlateron. Surely, once again, sheis not shortlyafterward herviews. Perhapshe distortsthem unwittinglyand unthere.Socrates reports knowingly. takesup what was just asserted.It explainshow it The followingparagraph is that there is permanentrenewalin us. How there is, in us, a ceaselessloss of the old, of the alreadydead, both in our most physicalpart-hair, bones,

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blood, our whole body-and in our most spiritualpart: our character,our opinions, ourdesires,joys and pains, ourfears.None of these elements is ever identical to what they were; some come into existence while others perish. The same is true for knowledges, which are acquiredand forgotten-thus constantly renewed: " ... This is the fashion in which everythingmortal is preserved, not in being alwaysperfectlyidentical, as is divinity, and decayingobject leavesbehind but in that the disappearing it another new one such as it was. By this arrangement, Socrates,"said she, "the mortalpartakesof immortality,both in body and all else; the immortaldoes so in anotherway. So do not marvel if everythingby natureprizesits own offspring; it is for the sake of immortalitythat every being has this urgency and love." . . . (208) ce qui est mortel, non ([C'est]de cette facon qu'estsauvegarde comme ce est absolued'uneexistdivin l'identite qui par point ence eternelle, maisparle fait que ce qui s'en va, mine parson anciennete, laisse apres lui autre chose, du nouveau qui est pareil a ce qu'il etait. C'est par ce moyen, dit-elle, qui ce qui est mortel participea l'immortalite,dans son corps et en tout le reste . . Donc, ne t'emerveille pas que, ce qui est une repoussede lui-meme, chaque etre ait pour lui tant de sollicitude naturelle, car c'est en vue de l'immortaliteque font cortege a chacun d'eux ce zele et cet amour!) Here, Diotima returnsto her type of argumentation,includingher mocking of those who suspendthe presentin orderto search"foran eternityof time an immortal glory" ("pour l'eternite du temps une gloire immortelle"). She speaks-in a style that is loosely wovenbut never definitivelyknotted-of becoming in time, of permanentgenerationand regenerationhere and now in each (wo)man [chacun(e)] of what is more corporeallyand spirituallyreal. Without sayingthat one is the fruitof the other. But that, at each moment, we are a "regrowth" of ourselves,in perpetualincrease.No morequestfor immortalitythroughthe child. But in us, ceaselessly.Diotima has returnedto a path which admits love as it was defined before she evoked procreation:an intermediateterrain,a mediator,a space-timeof permanentpassage between mortal and immortal. Next, returningto an example of the quest for immortality throughfame, she re-situates(the) object (of) love outsideof the subject:reknown, immortal glory, etc. No more perpetualbecoming-immortal in us, but rathera race towardsome thing that would confer immortality.Like and unlike procreation of a child, the stake of love is placedoutsidethe self. In the beloved and

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not in the lover? The lovers cited-Alcestis, Admetus, Achilles, Codroswould not have been cited unless we alwaysremembered them. It was with the goal of eternal reknown that they loved unto death. Immortalityis the object of their love. Not love itself. Well then (said she), when men's fecundity is of the body, they turn ratherto the women, and the fashionof their love is this: through begetting children to provide themselves with immortality,reknown and happiness, as they imagineSecuring them for all time to come. But when fecundity is of the soul-for indeed there are (said she) those personswho are fecund in their souls, even more than in their bodies, fecund in what is the function of the soul to conceive and also to bring forth-what is this properoffspring?It is wisdom, along with every other spiritualvalue. . . .(208-209) (Cela etant, dit-elle, ceux qui sont feconds selon le corps se tourent plut6t vers les femmes, et leurfacon d'etreamoureux a eux-memes, c'est, en engendrantdes enfants, de se procurer d'avoirun le bonheur la suite du toute temps, pensent-ils, pour nom dont le souvenir ne perisse pas. Quant a ceux qui sont feconds selon l'ame, car en fait il en existe, dit-elle, dont la fecondite reside dans l'ame, a un plus haut degre encore que a une ame d'etrefedans le corps, pour tout ce qui appartient cela qui lui d'enfanter. conde et qu'illui appartient Or, qu'est-ce toute autre et c'est la C'est excellence) pensee, appartient? What seemed to me most original in Diotima's method has disappeared milieu of love is cancelledbetween once again. That irreducible intermediary (an inadequateword in Plato) and "belovedreality."Amorousbe"subject" coming no longerconstitutes a becomingof the lover himself, of love in the (male or female) lover, between the lovers [un devenirde l'amantlui-meme, de l'amouren l'amante(e), entre amants].4Instead it is now a teleological quest for what is deemed the highest realityand often situatedin a transcendence inaccessibleto our condition as mortals. Immortalityis put off until death and is not counted as one of our constant tasksas mortals,as a transmutation that is endlessly incumbent on us here and now, as a possibility inscribedin a body capableof divine becoming. Beautyof body and beautyof soul become hierarchized,and the love of women becomes the lot of those who, incapableof being creatorsin soul, arefecund in body and seek the immortalityof their name perpetuatedby their offspring. . . . By far the greatest and most beautiful form of wisdom (said she) is that which has to do with regulatingstates and

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and households,and has the name, no doubt, of"temperance" "justice."(209) et la plus belle manifes(. . . de beaucoupla plus considerable tation de la pensee etant celle qui conceme l'ordonnancedes Etatscomme de tout etablissement,et dont le nom, on le sait, est temperanceaussi bien que justice.) Amorousbecomings,divine, immortal,are no longerleft to their intermediary current. They are qualified, hierarchized.And, in the extreme case, love dies. In the universeof determinations,there will be contests, competitions, amorousduties-the beloved or love being the prize.The loversdisappear. Our subsequenttraditionhas even taughtus the interdictionor the futility of being lovers outside of procreation. Yet Diotima had begun by assertingthat the most divine act is "the union of man and woman, a divine affair."What she assertedthen accordedwith what she said about the function of love as an intermediary remainingintermediary,a demon. It seems that in the courseof her speech she reducesa bit this demonic, mediumlikefunction of love; so that it is no longerreallya demon, but an intention, a reductionto intention, to the teleology of human will. Alreadysubjectedto a doctrinewith fixed goalsand not to an immanent mediator,at once physical flourishingof the divine in the flesh. Irreducible and spiritual, between lovers; and not alreadycodified duty, will, desire. Love invoked as a demon in a method towardthe beautifuland good often disappearsfrom the speech, reappearingonly in art, "painting", in the form(s) of love inciting to eroticismand, perhaps,in the shape of angels. Is love itself split between erosand agape? Yet, in orderfor lovers to be able to love each other, there must be, between them, Love. There remainswhat has been said about the philosopher-love. But why wouldnot philosopherLove be a lover of the other?Only of the Other?Of an inaccessibletranscendent?In any case, this would alreadybe an ideal that love qua demonic. Love becomespolitical wisdom,wisdomin regsuppresses the state that inhabitsloversand transports ulating city, not the intermediary them fromthe condition of mortalsto that of immortals.Love becomesa sort of raisond'etat. Love founds a family, takes care of children, including the childrenwhich citizens are. The more its objective is distancedfroman individual becoming, the more valuable it is. Its stake is lost in immortalgood and beautyas collective goods. The family is preferable to the generationof lovers, between lovers. Adopted children are preferableto others. This, men is superior to love bemoreover,is how it comes to pass that lovebetween tween man and woman. Carnal procreation is suspended in favor of the engendering of beautiful and good things. Immortalthings. That, surprisingly, is the view of Diotima. At least as translated throughthe wordsuttered by Socrates.

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The beings most gifted in wisdomgo directlyto that end. Most begin with physicalbeautyand " ... must love one single object [physicalformof beauty], and thereofmustengenderfairdiscourses .. ." (210) (parn'aimerqu'un unique beau corps et par engendrera cette occasion de beaux discours.")If the teaching is right, that must be so. But whoeverbecomesattachedto one body must lear that beauty is in many bodies. After having pursuedbeauty in one perceptibleform, he must lear that the samebeautyresidesin all bodies; he will . .abate his violent love of one, disdainingthis and deeming it a trifle, and will become a lover of all fairobjects. . .. (210) ("[devenir] un amant de tous les beaux corps et detendra l'impetuositede son amoura l'egardd'unseul individu;car, un tel amour, il en est venu a le dedaigneret a en faire peu de cas.") Fromthe attractionto a single beautifulbody he passes, then, to many;and thence to the beautyresidingin souls. Thus he learnsthat beautyis not found can be univocallyin the body and that someone of an ugly bodilyappearance beautifuland gentle of soul; that to be just is to know how to carefor that perfor him. Love thus passesinsensibly son and to engenderbeautifuldiscourses into love of works [oeuvres].The passion for beautifulbodies is transmuted into the discoveryof beautyin knowledges.That which liberatesfromthe attachment to only one masteropens onto the immenseocean of the beautiful, and leads to the birth of numerous and sublime discourses, as well as to thoughts inspiredby a boundless love of wisdom. Until the resultingforce and development permit the lover to envision a certain uniqueknowledge (210). This marvelousbeauty is perceptible, perhaps, by whoever has followed the road just described,by whoever has passedthrough the different stagesstep by step. He will have, then, the vision of a beautywhose existence is " . . .eternal, not growing up or perishing, increasing or decreasing" ([dont]l'existence est etemelle, etrangerea la generationcomme a la corrupand which, besides, is abcomme au decroissement") tion, a l'accroissement solutelybeautiful: not beautifulin one point and ugly in another, nor beautifulin this place and ugly in that, as if beautifulto some, to others ugly;again, this beautywill not be revealedto him in the semblance of a face, or hands, or any other element of the body, nor in any formof speech or knowledge,nor yet as if it appertained to any other being, or creature, for example, upon earth, or in the sky, or elsewhere;no, it will be seen as beauty in and for itself, consistent with itself in uniformityfor ever, whereasall other beautiesshare it in such fashion that, while

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they are ever born and perish, that eternalbeauty, never waxing, never waning, never is impaired.. . . (210-211) (pas belle a ce point de vue et laide a cet autre, pas davantage a tel moment et non a tel autre, ni non plus belle en comparaison avec ceci, laide en comparaisonavec cela, ni non plus belle en tel lieu, laide en tel autre, en tant que belle pourcertains hommes, laide pourcertainsautres; pasdavantageencore cette beaute ne se montreraa lui pourvuepar exemple d'un visage, ni de mains, ni de quoi que ce soit d'autrequi soit une partie du corps; ni non plus sous l'aspect de quelque raisonnement ou encore quelque connaissance; pas davantage comme ayant en quelqueetre distinct quelquepart son existence, en un vivant par exemple, qu'il soit de la terre ou du ciel, ou bien en quoi que ce soit d'autre;mais bien plut6t elle se montreraa lui en elle-meme, et par elle-meme, eternellement unie a elle-meme dans l'unicite de la natureformelle, tandisque les autresbeaux objets participenttous de la nature dont il s'agiten une telle facon que, ces autresobjets venant a l'existence ou cessant d'exister, il n'en resulte dans la realite dont il s'agit aucune augmentation, aucune diminution, ni non plus aucune sorte d'alteration.) To attain this sublimebeauty, one must begin with the love of young men. Startingwith their naturalbeauty, one must, step by step, raiseoneself to subeauty:from beautifulbodies one must pass to beautifulpursuits; pernatural then to beautifulsciences, and finally to that sublimescience that is supernaturalbeauty alone, and that allows knowledgeof the essence of beauty in isolation (211). This contemplationis what gives directionand taste to life. " . . It will not appearto you to be accordingto the measureof gold and raiment, or of lovely boys and striplings. . . " (211) ("Ni l'orou la toilette, ni la beaute des jeunes garconsou des jeunes hommesne peuvent entreren parallele avec cette decouverte.")And whoever has perceived "beautydivine in its own single nature" (211) ("le beau divin dans l'unicite de sa nature formelle"), what can he still look at? Having contemplated"the beautiful with that by which it can be seen" (211) (le beau au moyen de ce parquoi il est visible"), beyond all simulacra,he is united with it and is reallyvirtuous; since he has perceived "authenticreality"("reel authentique")he becomes dear to the divine and immortal. This person would, then, have perceivedwhat I shall call a sensible tranthe materialtextureof beauty.He wouldhave "seen"the veryspascendental, tiality of the visible, the realbeforeall reality,all forms,all truthof particular sensationsor of constructedidealities.Would he have contemplatedthe "nature" ("nature")of the divine? This is the supportof the fabricationof the

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transcendentin its differentmodes, all of which, accordingto Diotima, are reachedby the samepropaedeutic: theloveof beauty.Neither the good nor the true nor justice nor the governmentof the city would occur without beauty. And its strongestally is love. Love thereforedeservesto be venerated. And Diotimaasksthat her wordsbe consideredas a celebrationand praiseof Love. In the second partof her speech, she used Love itself as a means.She cancelled out its intermediary function and subjected it to a telos. The power of her method seemsless evident to me here than at the beginning [puissance] of her speech, when she made love the mediatorof a becomingwith no objective other than becoming. PerhapsDiotima is still sayingthe same thing. But her method, in the second part, riskslosing its irreducible characterand a Unless what she to being replacedby meta-physics. proposes contemplate, beauty itself, is understoodas that which confuses the opposition between immanence and transcendence. An always alreadysensible horizon at the depths of which everything would appear. But it would be necessaryto go back over the whole speech again to discover it in its enchantment.
NOTES
1. LuceIrigaray, "L'amour Sorcier: Lecture de Platon,LeBanquet, Discours de Diotime. In:Luce of Les tditions de Minuit. 1984, pp. 27-39. Translation Irigaray, publishedby kind permission 2. This and subsequentquotationsfrom The Symposium are renderedin the English translation of Lane Cooper in Plato (1938) pp. 252-263. Referencesin French,which follow in parencitations from the French translationof Leon Robin in Platon (1950). theses, are Irigaray's 3. In this and subsquentpassages"Love"or "love"is renderedin Englishwith the masculine pronoun-a translationrequiredby Frenchgrammar."L'Amour," capitalized,means "the God of Love"-Cupid or Eros, and is alwaysmasculine in French. "L'amour" uncapitalized,means "love" and is also standardlymasculine in French. "Eros"and "Love"are interchangeablein exists in French. English translationsof most of Diotima'sspeech; a similar interchangeability was feminine in French until it was made conventionally masculineto Historically, "l'amour" accord with Latin use. In poetry, uses of "l'amour"in the feminine persist to this day; but was not grammatically feminine in the passages fromPlato that Irigaray "l'amour" was citing. Irigaray'sargumentin this essaycan be read as an explorationof the ethical implicationsof these note] grammatical points. Cf. Grevisse (1964): 190-192. [Translator's is here exploiting the very characteristics of Frenchgrammar which exemplifyher 4. Irigaray must be masculinewhen any of the lovers is male; but it is also possibleto argument."L'amant" Loverfrom the specify that the lover is female, as in the title of her AmanteMarine([Female] note] Seas), 1980. [Translator's REFERENCES

Grevisse, Maurice. 1964. Le bon usage. Gambloux: Editions J. Duculot, S.A., 8th edition. Irigaray,Luce. 1980. AmanteMarine.Paris:Les Editionsde Minuit. de la difference sexuelle.Paris:Les Editionsde Minuit. . 1984. Ethique and Symposium, with passages Plato. 1938. Phaedrus, fromthe ReIon, Gorgias, OxfordUniversity Press. publicand Laws.Trans.LaneCooper.New York: Platon. 1950. Oeuvres Completes. Trans. Leon Robin. Paris: Gallimard (Bibliothequede la Pleiade 58), I.

The Hidden Host: and Diotima Irigaray at Plato's Symposium

ANDREA NYE

Irigaray's reading of Plato'sSymposiumin Ethiquede la differencesexuelle and thelimits attenillustrates boththeadvantages of hertextual practise. Irigaray's an to thetextallowsDiotima's voiceto emerge Platonic tivelistening of from overlay and Irigaray's natureof thatlistening But boththeahistorical assumpscholarship. also makehera partyto Plato'ssabotage tionof femininemarginality of Diotima's in Platonic in historical is not an anomaly Understood context,Diotima philosophy. hostof Plato'sbanquet, but thehidden world discourse, for a pre-Socratic speaking whichclassical is asserted. in historical viewagainst Greekthought Understood context, Platois not the authoritative founderof Westernthought againstwhomonly can be mounted, buta rebellious skirmishes whomanages to transstudent marginal on personal and love into form Diotima'scomplexteaching identity,immortality, the sterilesimplicities of logical form.

Who is the "host"of that famousphilosophicalpartydescribedin Plato's Who decided that no woman would be invited so that twenty Symposium? centurieslater, when Luce Irigaray decides to imposeher feminine presence in her essay"L'amour sorcier"(Hypatia,this issue), she can only interveneas Is the host Agathon, in whose house the Syminterloperand eavesdropper? takes Is it Socrates, in whose honor the feast is held? Is it posium place? who evokes the scene for us? Plato, The root meaning of "host" is a physical body on whose flesh parasites feed. The host is the nourishmentthey steal and convert to prolong their own dependentexistences. The host is a sacrificedanimalbody offeredup to placateheaven. The host is the physicalbreadthe faithfuleat at communion to become one with an insubstantialgod. If we take "host" in these root senses, then, as I hope to show, it is Diotima and not Agathon, Socrates, or Plato who is the realhost of the Symposium. And if this is true Irigaray's presence is no intrusion. She, or any woman, enters into the discussionof love with perfect right. Irigaray,however, feels none of the confidence of an invited guest, nor
Hypatiavol. 3, no. 3 (Winter 1989) ? by Andrea Nye

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Irigaray,however, feels none of the confidence of an invited guest, nor does she recognizeDiotima'sauthority.Irigaray's Diotima is not the mistress of her own house, but an alienatedtroublerof dichotomouscategorieswhose successdepends on being clever enough to subvertPlatonic logic. Irigaray's own commitmentto this "feminineoperation" preventsher fromunderstandand its relation to Platonism. Diotima's teaching ing Diotima'sdiscourse, as reportedby Socrates as reportedby Plato, has alwhen it is his waysbeen the locus of scholarlyskirmishing.In the Symposium, tur to speakon love, Socratesdoes not speak in his own voice. He repeats the teaching of his mentor, Diotima. Most scholarshave found this puzzling and embarrassing. How can the greatSocrates,founderof philosophy,be saying that he learnedeverythinghe knowsfroma woman?In a rhetoricalcompetition between Athenian men, what is a woman doing correctingthe misAnd what is Plato doing, letting Socratesretakesof previousmale speakers? peat respectfullythe teachings of a woman, teachingsnot alwaysin keeping with Plato'sown? These anomalies have been handled in a variety of ways. Some scholars have arguedthat Diotima is a fictional priestessinvented by Plato to give divine authority to Socrates, even though this explanation must ignore the many elements in Diotima'steaching inconsistent with Platonic philosophy as well as the fact that Diotima wouldbe the only fictional characterin all of to the Platonic dialogues.Others have explainedher appearance by referring Socrateswishes to correctAgathon the romanticsubplotsof the Symposium: thereforeSocratesputs whom he wants to seduce, but without antagonizing; that he his correctionin Diotima'smouth so that he may implyingratiatingly have Still had others to be put right. too once needed instructionand argued that Plato includesDiotima'sdiscoursein orderto ridiculeits simplisticnaturalism,ignoringthe fact the SocratespraisesDiotima and reportsherridicule it is asserted withAlmost universally, of his naivete and excessiveabstraction. her and commentaries, out argumentthat Diotima is fictional. In translation with Platonicphilosophy.1 so as to be compatible teachingsare interpreted In fact, Diotima'sphilosophyof love differsboth fromthe theoryof Forms and from the mystical Pythagoreanism in Plato'sRepublic, developed in the Farfromsuggestingthat the body is a degraded Phaedrus. prison,Diotimasees bodily love as the metaphorand concrete traininggroundfor all creativeand activities.2 She arguesthat sexual love for one person knowledge-producing must be outgrown, but not because it is physicaland so imperfect.Rather, to friendship,knowledge,and politics becauseexcluthe lover must progress sive sexual love for one person is obsessional,narrow,and makesone servile is (Symposium21 c-d).Diotima does not arguethat heterosexualintercourse inferiorbut urges an expansion of loving intercoursethat will bear fruit in new thoughts, new knowledge,and new waysof living with others, as well as in physical children (209a). The beauty-in-itself that the initiate in

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Diotima'sphilosophy may experience as the culmination of her training is not a transcendentPlatonic Form. The initiate glimpsesno universal, abstracted from imperfect particulars, but an indwelling immortal divine beauty,an attractingcenter that fomentsfruitfulcreationin all areasof existence.4 Diotima identifies this center with the pre-HellenicCretan goddess, Eilethia, goddessof childbirth, and with her attendantspinnerof fate, Moira (206d). To be in touch with this divinity, she says, is to live a new enlightened existence and to be a lover of the divine. Only in this way, Diotima concludes, will we be able to avoid false imagesof virtueand achieve real virtue (212a 1-5). The initiate in Diotima's philosophy cannot dwell in the world of absolute beauty as the philosopher of Plato's Republic aspiresto dwell in the uppersunlit worldof the Forms.To cut oneself off fromthe naturalgenerativecenter of humanlife, is to be content with only abstract,unreal ideasof virtue and to fail to achieve real virtuewhich mustbe lived and generated in the visible, physical world. At first, there is much in Diotima'steaching that Irigaray approves.She applaudsDiotima's mocking of Socrates' simplistic dichotomous thinking: love is either ugly or beautiful,rich or poor, etc. She accepts Diotima'sview or third term that moves between two opposing of love as an intermediary termswhose logic is deconstructed.She endorsesDiotima'stheoryof personal identitybasedon the realizationthat the self is not unitarybut constantlyin a processof renewal and destruction. But then Irigaray withdrawsher approval.After such a promisingbeginning, she charges,Diotima'smethod "fails"(1984, 33). Diotima searchesfor a "cause" for love in a naturalimpulsetowardprocreation.She sees an "issue" and not sexualpleasureas the end of sexual intercourse.She sees non-procreative sex as only a means to the end of certain "collectivegoods."She sacrifices sexualpleasureto a teleologicalgoal. She sets up a hierarchyof goods in which an abstractphilosophicallove of beautyis "higher" than physicallove, the of her In other words, deconstruction. undermining original plurality Diotima as a feminist French to maintainthe Irigaray judges lapsed struggling "correctmethod"againstphilosophicalorthodoxy.Although Diotima begins well with an ironic onslaughton dualistic, hierarchicalcategories,she soon revertsto an orthodoxyof her own. Insteadof continuing to derail Socratic logic, Diotima becomes a Platonist. But has Irigaray listened to what Diotima says?Does she hear Diotima or the voices of Platonic scholarsand commentatorsdeterminedto show that Diotima is a Platonist?Irigaray worksfrom a text glossed by many readings that shape and distort Diotima's teaching to make it compatiblewith Platonic dogma. For example, Irigaray complainsthat Diotima thinks some external acquisitionsuch as immortalityor collective happinessis the end for which love is only a means. But this popularcriticism of Platonic love depends on a misleading translation and interpretation of the expression

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literally "to come to be for someone", or "to to someone" (204d). Why do we love? asksDiotima. What is it that happen we want? We want, the Greek reads, "the beautifulto come into being for us." Irigaray, however, accepts the misleadingbut common translation,"We want the good to be ours"(1984, 31). Possession,however, in the sense of acquiringa property,is not what loverscrave, accordingto Diotima. Instead, they long for the quickening, fertilizingcontact with someone beautifulin bodyand soul that is necessaryif, together, loversare to generatenew waysof loverof the Phaethinkingand living. Diotima'slover is not the heaven-crazed vision he druswho glimpsesin his idol the dim reflectionof an otherworldly Nor is she the Platonicteacherseekinga suitablerecepwouldlike to reclaim.5 to Diotima, of his own ideas.6Instead,according tacle for the "dessemination" the fecundity of interaction, of dialogue. whatwe seek in love is the fruitfulness of any individual.7 that resultare collective, not the possession The "goods" of Diotima'steaching, In anotherand even more seriousmisinterpretation Irigarayaccepts a Platonic reading of Diotima's theory of beauty-in-itself. Here, she follows traditionalscholarshipin taking Diotima'sfinal revelation of unchangingbeautyas a less sophisticatedversionof Plato'stheoryof hierof Diotima'sinitiate is not vertical, from archicalForms.In fact, the progress lower to higher, but lateral, from narrowsexual relations and an exclusive concern with one's own family, to "better"(not "higher"),more inclusiverelationships.8The lover comes to love souls as wellas bodies, many as wellas one. When she finally begins to sense the creativeprocessin all of life, she is on the wide sea of beauty",and can bear"magnificent "embarked thoughtsin of that does not The final vision a abundance" (201d). Beauty philosophical model for huas a seen is of a transcendent not Form, rigidconfining change man excellence. It is the very opposite. The initiate senses an inner generative impulseat the heart of life, an impulsethat continuallyfoments change and decay and so prevents the settling in of rigid form. Only when she has this insight, Diotima warns,will the lover be able to give birth to true virtue and not to false imagesof virtue (212a, 1-5).9 Diotima does not proscribe"lower"formsof love or of thought. She does et la plus la plus considerable has her say: "debeaucoup not say what Irigaray des Etats de la penseeetant celle qui concernel'ordonnonce bellemanifestation de toutetablissement" comme (by farthe most importantand the most beautiful expressionof thought being that which concernsthe governmentof states as of any establishment)(1984, p. 35). Diotima is moresubtle. She says:"Much that is most importantand best comes fromthis sort of thinking (ie. practical wisdom), both for the city and for the management of the household" (209a). The progressof Diotima's initiate, unlike that of Plato's student, formsof engendering,only a widnever requiresthe renunciationof "lower" ening circle of those with whom we have loving intercourse,and a widening of the benefits of that intercourse.
'"yevecraOtL tvrT,"

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Diotima does arguethat the point of love is the "goods"that come from harmoniousintercourse.She does not say, however, what Plato seems to imthat we use the loved one, finding in him an ideal that ply in the Phaedrus: will assist our reascent to a Platonic heaven inhabited by ideal essences. There is no equivocationin Diotima'snaturalisticview of immortality as the good we leave afterus. Her goods are not pre-existingeternalessenceswhich the lover wishes to acquireor reach. Instead, loving intercourse is creativity: it is the processby which we create new forms. When these forms-a child, an idea, a new way of life, a new theory or administrativetechnique-are identifiedwith a pre-existingideal, then Diotima'slove disappears. The child becomes the false image of the parents'imagination,the idea a spuriousabstraction, the theory an alienated intellectualism, the administrativetechnique a strategyof domination. For Diotima, the issue or outcome of loving harmoniousrelationsare goods, not "The Good." Goods are simplythe pluralityof things that make us happy. This is so obvious, Diotima says, that no more need be said about it (205a). According to some of the criteriaused in recent worksby feministwriters, Diotima'sphilosophy,with its denial of autonomousalienatedconsciousness, its recognitionof the affectiveand collective natureof knowledge, its unwillingness to separate the practical from the theoretical, might seem to be deeply feminist. Irigaray,however, sees Diotima as capitulatingto Platonic why classicalscholarschoose to inmetaphysics.It is not hardto understand terpretDiotima as a Platonist:this is one way to explain the anomalyof her and to perpetuatethe illusion that the foundaappearanceat the Symposium tions of culture are irrevocablymale. But why Irigaray would make such a mistakeneeds furtherexplanation.The sourceof the misunderstanding, I bebut in the conceptual lieve, is to be foundnot just in a misleading translation, in deconstructive infrastructure of Irigaray's feministstrategy: method and textual practise,in "ecriture and in the conceptof feminine"jouissance". feminine", as feministcritic of Westernphilosophy,adoptsa textual practise, Irigaray, a "travail du langage." She has no naive notion of refutingmale philosophers in their own terms. Instead, she approachesthem as texts, that is, as internally generated,more or less orderedsystemsof meaningwhose logical order and pretendedtruth must be deconstructed.The readerof a text must avoid being taken in both by an establishmentof authoritativetruth and by the temptation to establish a rival thesis. Autrement la machinerie dit, 1'enjeu. . . est d'enrayer theorique de sa la d'unverite d et elle-meme, suspendre pretension production d'unsenspartropunivoques. other what is at stake is words, (In to jam the theoretical machineryitself, to suspendits pretension to the productionof a too unitary truth and meaning) (1977, 75). The sourceof this strategyis, of course,JacquesDerrida.For Derrida,the pretensionto truth and unitarymeaning is theological. Logic'sclaim to self-

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evidence, the representationof physicalfact, even the presenceof a human voice in spoken words, all rest on an implicit appealto a transcendentpresence. Once such a "god"is rejected, it becomesclearthat speech is not revelatory of any transcendent truth but is an internally ordered phonemic neither priorto nor essentiallydifferentfromwriting.This is not to graphism that we can do away with a "unitary" meaning orderedin hierarchical say must Derrida continue, argues,to formthe semanticmaoppositions.These trix of thought. However, if, as in traditionalphilosophicalrefutation, the premisesof a supposedtruth are rejectedas false and an alternativesemantic orderingis assertedwhich is to be more consistent with the "facts",then the 10 theological presence of truth is reasserted. Instead, Derridaproposesa variety of deconstructivestrategies,many of them adopted by Irigaray.Hierarchicaloppositions can be turned on their heads and the supposedpresenceexposed as a lack againstwhich the opposing term is defined. Or, the deconstructormay read between the lines and discoverways in which the authorunwittinglysubvertsher or his own text. the Or she may discoverin seeminglyunimportantasidesand "supplements" core problemor issue that motivates the text. In all of these cases, deconstructivereadingsmust not claim to find themeaning, the truth of a text, or event the author'sintended meaning. Releasedfromsuch logocentricprojects, the readermay proceed to explore an infinite chain of deferralsand differences in which any supposedauthoritativeorder is alwayscompromised. In Spurs: Nietzche's Styles, a deconstruction of Nietzche's misogyny, Derridaspecificallyidentifies this subversionof the text as "feminine."For the "woman,"outside masculine appropriation,there can be no truth. As distance, leaves open a seductiveplurality feminine, she keeps an ambiguous of meanings, and so can play irreverentlywith the text, taking pleasurein phallic society tries overturningwhatever order misogynist, truth-asserting, found in these strategies to establish. Like other French feminists, Irigaray realizationthat sexismcan be built both a possibleantidote for the paralyzing sexist claim into semanticstructure,and a flatteringreversalof the proverbial that women are inferiorbecause they are illogical and incapableof consistency. Derridaseems to suggesta way in which women, excluded from and in male culture, can still undermine,if not overcome, that culture. degraded in her readings This method, however, so brilliantlydeployedby Irigaray of Aristotle, Plato, Kant, and other male philosophers,falterswhen applied to Diotima.12In Diotima'sthought, there is no hierarchicallogic to expose, no masculine/presence,feminine/absence to deconstruct. Diotima's lovers are humanswho must die and the motivation for their interactiondoes not claim Diotima as a successfully depend on their sex. But neither can Irigaray fellow deconstructionist.Diotima is not concernedwith underminingan authoritativelogic. Her tone with Socratesdoes not need to be bolsteredby the defiant irony with which Irigarayfaces down her philosophical forebears.

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Instead, she treatshim with the playfulcondescensiondue a youth who has not yet graspedthe simplestof naturalfacts. Not only does Diotima not need to deconstructa Platonic theoryof the Forms,she has doubtsthat Socratesis or mysteries of love. even capableof followingher discussionof the "erotica" To her exposure of his ignorance, Socrates responds humbly. Irigaray, however, does not approvethe masterfulway in which Diotima directs the discussion. can be found in the theory of languageon The reasonfor her disapproval which Irigaray's textual practicedepends.That theory, derivedfrom Derrida and from Irigaray's other mentor, Lacan, depends on a Saussurianview of languageas a system of signs internallyrelated.13 In the Lacanianversion, we do not use words to communicate;instead we "enter into" language, a fixed systemof meaningsstructured aroundthe mastersignifier,the Phallus, and its corollary,the Name of the Father.Once this view of languageis actactic.14 Fixed cepted, Derrideandeconstructionbecomesthe only liberatory of meaningmustbe brokenup or subvertedin orderto insurea configurations degreeof anarchicfreedom.On this view, Diotima, as speakerof a language, mustenter into the hierarchicalsystemof meaningthat structures any semantics. Like Plato, or any philosopher,she mustfind herselftrappedin a system of signifierswith phallic presence at the center. If she is not to lapse into unintelligibility,she mustrevertto the foundingoppositionsof Westernmetaphysics:subordinationof the body to the mind, of physicalappetite to rationality, of naturalexistence to spiritualheaven. Her only alternativewould be to subverttheir authorityin a "feminineoperation" of deconstruction.Because Irigaray the Lacanian view of as accepts language a systemof signs into which we enter, whether to obey or subvert, she can only understand Diotima in the same terms.Not only must Irigaray a "feminineoperperform ation" in her readingof Diotima, she must evaluate Diotima'sown method accordingto its success as an "ecriture feminine." "Ecriture de la femme"is Irigaray's version of Derrida's"feminine operation." The subversionof the text of patriarchy,she claims, requiresa new kind of feminine style. This style will be alwaysfluid, never allowingitself to be definedor restricted,never takinga fixed position. A womanwritermust: met. . . feu aux motsfetiches,aux terms auxformesbien propres, construites..etfait explosertoute forme, figure, idee, concept, solidement etablis.(put fire to fetish words,correctterms, wellconstructedforms, and explode every solidly built form, figure, idea, concept. (1977, 76) This advice may be pragmatically sound for a woman strugglingin a predominately male establishment who must negotiate concepts and rules of thought devised by men which leaves her little room for intelligible self-expression. Diotima, however, in a differentsituation, has no interest in sus-

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taining such a style. On the contrary, although she begins with a tertiary finds promisinglyelusive, Diotima proceedsto refute the logic that Irigaray views of Aristophanesand Pausaniasand to expound a thesis of her own.15 She speakswith authority,as someone who has come to knowledgethrougha difficultprocessand who can passon that knowledgeonly by urgingan initiate to travel the same road. Irigaray,however, judges Diotima within the context that gives meaning to her own deconstructivepracticeas if Diotima were a twentieth-century Parisian "intellectuelle" strugglingagainst the aumale of a academic establishment to thority producean "ecriture feminine". But the institutionalsetting for Diotima'sphilosophyis not the EcoleNormale The ahistoricalcharacterof Irigaray's intellectualinheritancepreSuperieure. vents her from seeing the difference.16 In Lacanianand Derrideanmetaphysics,the distinction between natural and/or historical reality and the linguistic terms we use to interpret, represent, or criticizethat realityis dissolved. ForLacan, the worldoutsideof lanand guage is not a human world. It is the world of animal intersubjectivity unreflectivesensation. To learn to speakis not to learn to expresssensations constitutedexperience, but to enter the world or articulateintersubjectively obof the symbolic.A split in the self betweenwatchingsubjectand mirrored ject, foundationalboth in the development of an individualand of human culture, allows the constructionof an alienatedlinguisticidentity. This identity is then articulatedwithin the context of a social language, a transpersonal symbolicnexus whose centraland primalsignifieris the phallus.Accorof any situation, ding to Lacan, our identities, as well as our understanding are fixed only within this patrifocalsymbolicorder. Although for Derridathe meanings in which we find ourselvesare more he also sees languageas radicallydiscontinambiguous,disordered,"frayed", uous with physical existence. A cry or a moan may be a natural sign, but wordscan never expressan affectiveexperience. History, literature,culture, everythinghuman, is a text. There are no facts outside of languagethat languagemay express,or correctlyor incorrectlyrepresent.There is no non-textual situationout of which one mayspeak.The transitionfromphysicalexistence to symbolicmeaning is absoluteand occursoutsideof historicaltime as the preconditionof culture itself. This is not simply to say that language, as socially constructedmeaning, mediatesan individual'sexpressionof her experience. If our wordsare never wholly our own but are taken from the mouths of others, we and they still materialsituations.The Saussurian premiseis moreradspeakfromparticular ical. Languagehas meaning not from its use in human expression,but from formal syntactical relations. Even when, as for Derrida, these relations are not rigidlyordered, meaning does not depend on who is speakingor where and why she says what she does. This is true becausefor Derridathe hierarchical oppositionsagainstwhich deconstructionoperatesarenecessary.More

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importantly,it is truebecauseeven Derrideanmetaphor,ambiguity,and paradox dependon formalpatterning:configurations of differences and deferrals, reversalsand spacings. However, to read a text in this way is to refuse to considerthe institutionalconditionsof its productionor the identityof its author. Therefore, Irigaray cannot place Diotima'sthought within a particular material historical context. Whatever her circumstancesor her identity, Diotima, as speaker,has entered the world of the text and has left material existence behind. But this is to erase the specific historical/socialsetting of the Platonic dialogues. Much has been written about the sequestered and inferiorstatusof women in classicalGreece. There has also been much feministcriticismof the misogynist thought that ratified that inferiority.17However, the subjugationof Greekwomen was not only textual, nor was it a necessaryeffect of the alienated originsof symbolicthought. Instead, it was the outcome of more than a millenium of social change in the Aegean and Mediterranean areas. Begininvadersand emigrantsbegan to arning about 2000 B.C., Greek-speaking rive in mainlandGreece. These invadersbroughtwith them the male-dominated social structures of a nomadic, illiterate, warrior society:political hierthe of a and thunder archy, worship god, the restriction of supreme sky women to the domestic sphere. In Greece they found no primitive animal subsistence, but a civilization focused on a sophisticated Minoan culture. Minoan frescoesand seals document a way of life very differentfrom that of the invaders.Women are depicted in positions of prominence, presidingat religiousceremonies, worshippinga female deity, attendingfestivalsand entertainments,participatingin the importantceremonyof bull dancing.18 In the interveningcenturies-from the fall of Crete to Mycenaeandominance, throughthe darkages, up to classicaltimes-the clash continued between a theologyfocusedon a centralfemaledivinity and naturalcycles of generation on the one hand, and one focused on a supremewarrior-father-god on the other.19By classical time, although subjectedto increasingsegregationand domestic isolation, as well as to complete political disenfranchisement, women still retainedsome of their old power in religion. They continued to fill importantsacerdotalroles as priestessesof Athena or Demeter;they participated publically in religious festivals and initiations; they celebrated women'sritualssuch as the Dionysianor the Thesmophorian; they performed as prophetessesat oracularshrines such as Delphi. In historical context, then, it is neither surprisingnor anomalous that Diotima would appearin an authoritativerole as the teacher of Socrates.22 As prophetess/priestess she was part of a religiousorderthat had maintained its authorityfrom Minoan/Mycenaeantimes. At Delphi, the sibyl still presidedas the most respectedoracle in Greece. Thousandsproclaimedthe benefits of initiation into the wisdom of Demeter at Eleusis. Socrates himself points out the respect due Diotima for preparingthe sacrifice that rescued

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Athens from the plague (201d). As Mantineanprophetess,Diotimadoes not speakas a lone womanwho has painfullymanagedto gain entranceto a male party. She speaksout of a traditionof female power and female thought still alive in Greek culture. When Socratesrefersto the propheticpower of the he taps sourcesthat sibyl or the inspiredvoices of the Musesin the Phaedrus, Christianizedlate twentieth centuryParis, may not be availablein Irigaray's wherethe connection between divinity and masculinityis axiomatic, and the "absence"of the feminine a necessarytruth. Historicallylocatable psychoanalyticformulationsof that necessarytruth are part of the conceptual underpinning of Irigaray'sfeminist method. Women's sexuality, Irigarayargues, is absent from Freudiantheory. In her view, women'sliberationis intimatelyconnected with the recognitionof and indulgence in a specifically feminine sexual pleasure. This feminine is defined in contrast with a dominant masculine sexuality.21 "jouissance" Masculinesexualityis phallic, that is, active, penetrative,aggressive, focused or orgasm.Women's pleasure,on the other hand, is self-touching, interactive, heterogeneous,plural, and flowing ratherthan gatheringto a climax. This view of feminine sexuality also has at its source the ideas of Lacan. Lacan correctedany lingeringbiologismstill inherent in Freud'saccount of women's supposed sexual disabilities only to make those disabilities even more inaccessible to feminist reform.22 In principle, biology can be circumvented by contraception or artifical methods of reproduction. But when Lacan locates women's disability in universalstructuresof linguistic meaning, he writeswomen'sinferiorityinto cultureitself. ForLacan, that inferiorityis inscribedas a kind of nonentity, as what cannot be expressed. Lacan complained with some satisfaction that when women (including women analysts)are asked about their sexuality, "they know nothing about this pleasure"(Lacan 1975, 68). like Lacan, does not questionthe contrastbetween masculineand Irigaray, and Lacan'sunanfeminine sexuality.Instead,she attemptsto answerFreud's sweredquestion (What do women want?), and to make articulatethat feminine "jouissance"which escapes masculine logic. She supplies Lacan's "Woman",the "pas-toute" (not all there), with a specificpresence.Women's be will no sexuality longer the simple negative, or lack of masculinephallic of Lacan'sapprowill nor it be the ineffableecstasy-beyond-words presence; will an kind of Saint it be alternative Bermini's Therese.23 of Instead, priation with a woman's different and connected pleasure-describable, recoverable, sexual economy. "self-touching" neo-Lacanian account of sexuality is in sharp dissonance with Irigaray's Diotima's.Diotima groundslove and sexualdesirein naturalexistence rather than in semantic configurationsof meaning. Diotimean love is the same for all, women and men, and makesno distinctionbetweenfeminine and masculine desire. Diotima'stheory of love does not focus on pleasure;genital pleas-

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ure in the sense of a privatesensation is not mentioned in her philosophy. It commitmentto the explanais not surprising, therefore,that, given Irigaray's of feminine sexual and pleasure,she can makeno sense tory liberatory power of Diotima's positive view. After a promisingbeginning, Irigaray charges, Diotima makesno distinction between our human (textual) identity and nature. She looks for a cause in naturalphenomena;she leaves intact a hierarchy in which spirituallove is better than physical. These formulations, however, do not do justice to Diotimean positions which do not share Irigaray's presuppositions.Although Diotima grounds sexualdesirein a principleof nature, that principleinvolves neither women's organsnor men's penises. Instead, it has to do with the fact of reproductive mortalityand the impulseof living things to perpetuatethemselves. Our desire to transcendour mortalityby leaving good after us is not limited to the is moresecurewhen we proengenderingof children. In fact, our immortality duce new waysof living and thinking. Diotimamakesno distinctionbetween men and women in this respect. Both men and women come together to bring up children; in her account this is not an exclusivelyfemale activity. Both men and women enter into other kinds of loving relationshipto produce virtues, ideas, new waysof management.These relationships can be between any sex, heterosexualor homosexual.24In every case, the impulseof desireis the same-cooperative generationof good things both for the couple and for others, both for the household and the community. The pursuitof sensation could not be the motive for Diotima'sdesire;a privapleasurable tized sensation of pleasurecould never account for the universalityand urgency of love as she sees it. ForDiotima, love is not a recreationbut permeates the whole of human activity. however, sees in Diotima'sphilosophyanotherattemptto deprive Irigaray, women of their specific sexual pleasure.Although Irigaray would agree that desire motivates our activities and our thought, this is for her a textual and not a naturalfact. Therefore,for her, the key to the subversion of the patriarchal order is non-textual sexual pleasure, a force outside conceptual structures, especially those generative and familial structuresthat have made women the container/envelopethat protectsand sheltersthe male. The maternity so importantfor Diotima in the lives of both men and women is, for mustdeliver Irigaray, only a trapfromwhich sexualpleasure,or "jouissance", us. Diotimean love, which has issue in humangoodness,knowledge,familial and institutional relationships, is anathema to Irigaray.It makes love, she or "moyen" says, into a "devoir" (a duty or means) (1984, 33). Love becomes "sagesse politique, sagesseordrede la cite"(political wisdom, wisdomordering the city) (1984, 36). In contrast, Irigaray's feminine pleasureinvolves a free, sensuousplay of bodies and texts, engagedin for its own sake, opposedto the establishmentof any doctrine, politics, or commitment.ForIrigaray, to allow stakesin love is to cease to be feminine. It is to found an alienatedmasculine

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order. The feminine can never be foundationalbecause its very essence is marginality,a marginalitythat is liberatingbecause it provokesa constant questioningand mockingof the masculineorderthat restrictsthe freecirculation of feminine desire.25 Diotima, on the other hand, speaks from a different perspective. As priestess,prophetess,memberof a theologicaltradition,she finds nothing inconsistent in the idea of feminine institutionsand social forms.She is not the femalestudentof an all-powerful male philosophiand repressed marginalized cal and psychoanalyticestablishment.She has not been painfullyrejectedby her master.Instead,she speaksto an audiencewhich takesfeminine divinity for grantedand for which feminine religiousleaderscontinue to commandrespect. As a result, she has a different sense of herself as feminine than a woman strugglingfor a foothold, or refusingto find a foothold, within the paranoidclosed circle of Lacanianauthority.26 rejection of Diotima'smethod is also linked to a view of the subIrigaray's theory. In Diotima'sphilosophy,the self ject inheritedfrompost-structuralist is in a constant process of change, both in mind and body (207d-208e). that conTherefore,it is clear that she cannot be accusedof the Cartesianism theto masculinist as an found so useful have feminists objection temporary view of the Diotima's the same At Flax time, 1980, Irigaray1974). ory (eg. in and that occur to mutilations any relationship loving self, constantlyopen constantlyin the processof generatingnew social forms,has little in common with the split subjectof Lacan. Lacanunderstoodthat there could be no unitaryself. Always in the self is the Other, but this Other of Lacan is not another person. It is the Other of languageruledby the Lawof the Father.We orderin which aresplitbetweenthe polymorphous feeling"me"and a linguistic we we must live out our social lives as human and not animal.This "Other" as a like Lacan,sees institutionalization have no choice but to accept. Irigaray, returnto the Other, to the Lawof the Father,and so mustposit, as the only esmust leave behind. that language sensuality cape, a libidinous in see not does Diotima, however, languagea built-in normativeorder.For initiate social orders.Talk between lovthat are discourses her, interchanges ers is not a free expressionof pure sensuouspleasure,nor is it a programmed definitionof good. Neither of these possilesson resultingin a predetermined bilities would lead to the new ideasthat Diotimaclaimsare the fruitsof love. becomchargesDiotima with moving away from an "individualized Irigaray ing" to "collective" goods. Indeed, Diotimean talk between lovers "never contemplatesan individualbecoming";sexual desire, for Diotima is not an Instead, in love the mortalsubjectmoves beimpulsetowardself-realization. yond her own individual life into the lives of others. Pregnancyand birth, whether of body or mind, occur only when there is an "engagement" and a "being together"(ovvoxrCa) (206c4-dl). (dCpjT6rrov) Irigaray,on the other hand, trappedin the metaphysicsof Lacan'ssplit self, cannot accept an interactionalview of discourse.She sees feministstrug-

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gle as an internalizedrebellion against the Law of the Father in one's own speech and thought. The goal of this strugglemust be free expressionof diffuse emotions and sensations, and a feminine speech that has affiniteswith the "illogic"of hystericsand dreamers: sans comptes,sans fin... Echangessans termesidentifiables, Sansun(e) plusun(e), sansserie,san nombre.(Exchangeswithout identifiable terms, without accounts, without end . . . without one plus one, without series, without number. (1977, 193) but the revolutionary This is a languagethat women may "parler entre-elles", resultis not the developmentof new formsof social life. It is a personalliberation that frees the subject from the symbolicLaw of the Father. ForDiotima, on the other hand, there is no "subject," split or other. There are only selves in constant dissolution and renewal as they relate to each other. The enemy of the self is not an internalized conceptualorder,but "ugliness",an uglinessnot identifiedas the oppositeof an ideal of perfectbeauty but as that which one cannot love. Ugliness can have no issue, becauseit is maybe right in thinkrigid, sterile, impotent, arid. (206d) Although Irigaray ing that we have finally internalizedsuch an ugliness, she is wrongto ignore the historical specificity of that process. I, too, read Plato yearsago with no interest in Greek geography,religion, or politics, sexual or other, I read Plato as if he were John Austin. Others readhim as if we were Frege, or more recently Kripke.We all readhim as if he were the practitionerof our own particular brandof rationality.Although we might have disagreedabout what rationalityconsisted in, we were sure that it existed and that it allowed us to readPlato on our own terms. Deconstructivereadingand ecriture femininehave been a refreshingantidote. They have made us see the veneer of rationalismand the destructivemisogynyof those we were taught to respect. Irigaray,performingher "feminine operation" has interrupted academicdiscourse,disruptedsacredAristotelian, Platonic and Kantiancategories.She has madeus see how the Lawof the Father operatesmaskedas metaphysicaltruth. If, with Diotima, her usual sure touch falters, it is because Diotima does not play the feminine role as deconstructionor Lacanianpsychoanalyticthebut the host of the oryhas conceived it. She is not the uninvitedgatecrasher, She is the spokesperson for ways of life and thought that Greek Symposium. philosophyfeeds on, ways of thought whose authorityPlato neutralizedand converted to his own purposes. In Plato's hands, Diotima's loving conversation becomes the Socratic elenchus:a programmedcourse of study in which pupil is guided towarda conclusion determinedin advance. The generative, divine source "correct" of Beautybecomesthe Formof the Good, an abstracttranscendentobject re-

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moved from the processesof the naturalworld. Diotima'sconcern that, unless we see and involve ourselveswith real generativebeauty,we may rely on of virtue is rejectedand a sterileSocraticdivisionmanufactures false "images" villains and heros. Diotima'scelebrationof erotic union as the divine mode for all creative activity becomes contempt for the body and for heterosexual intercourse. Platonic philosophy is not the primal opening of metaphysicalspace, as arguedin Speculum.It is parasiticon an earliermetaphysics,whose Irigaray characteristic idioms Plato borrowsto build a phantasmicworldof images. If showed us the necessaryflimsinessof the Platonic "symbolic",her Irigaray Derrideanand Lacanianheritage withheld from us the actual history of its fraudulent construction.To reduceDiotima to co-optedfeminine marginality is to perpetuatethis deception. To reinstateher is to carryout that necessary herselfdescribedso inspiringlyin of our perspectivethat Irigaray restructuring l'autre de Speculum femme.

NOTES
1. K.J. Dover (1978) states the typical reasoning. It is unlikely that a woman could have taughtSocrates(p. 161, footnote 11). A more recent example is MarthaNussbaum(1986) who assertsDiotima'sfictionality without argumentand furtherreducesher statusby labeling her as a woman with whom he has mental intercourse.(p. 177) Plato's intellectual "mistress", 2 At 210a, Diotima explains that to reach the firstrevelationone mustbegin while youngby falling in love with beautifulbodies. At 206c, she describesthe coming together of men and women to producechildren as a "divinityand an immortalityin the midst of human life." (Cf. Phaedrus250c, where those who have forgotten the vision of beauty from their pre-earth existences go off like "beasts"and "begetoffspringof the flesh.") Translations are my own. 3. Line citations are to Bury's (1932) text of the Symposium. 4. Most commentatorshave assumedthe identity of Diotima'spure beauty-in-itselfand the In the Phaedrus, the winged soul in its Platonic Form of Beauty as describedin the Phaedrus. preexistenceclimbs a heavenly summitto glimpsethe "truebeing"of Justice,TemPythagorean perance, Beauty, etc. Once imprisonedin the body, the soul can only dimly discernvestigesof this heavenly Beautyin actual beautifulobjects. For Diotima, the processis reversed.The lover begins by loving individualsand via a widening loving practisebegins to discernthe generative powerin all the beautifulthings to which she is attracted.Although Diotima'sfinal vision is of a divine beautynot instantiatedin any individualphysicalthing ("pure,mixed, not filled in with flesh or with the human, or with color") (21 d), there is no suggestionthat it has any ghostly residencein a heaven of Forms.Instead, it is graspedas an immortallife force, independentof any individualbeing. The vision of absolutebeautyis not an end in itself for Diotima. The goal continues to be "to bear" (TCKELV) true virtue. (212a3) (There is no good translation for which can be used both of the father'sand the mother'spart in reproduction.) "T(KTr)w" 5. Diotima refersto lovers as "he's"when generic termsare not available.Since Plato'saudiare male, it is to be expected that Plato and perhaps ence and also the audienceof the Symposium even Diotima herself would have adapted their presentations for that audience. There is, however, no reasonto think that Diotima'steaching wouldhave been meant only for men. The content of that teaching clearly refersto both women and men. in which he tracesthe patriar6. Cf. Derrida's (1981) deconstructivereadingof the Phaedrus chal motifs of successionfrom father to son. lover comes into contact with someone beautiful, she 7. Cf. 209b-c. When the "pregnant" not only embracesthe loved one's body but also they converse. The new insightswhich are the

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of this union are "broughtup" by the couple together and this "commonproject" "offspring" makestheir love even stronger.There is no suggestionthat only one of the coupleprofitsfromor possessesthe "goods"that are generatedin their relationship. 8. The one passagethat seems to suggesta hierarchicalprogressionis 211c, where Diotima saysthat "in orderto approachthe philosophyof love correctlyone must, beginningfrombeautiful things, progress for the sake of what is eternallybeautiful,like climbing stairs."In what folterms.The lover is go to lows, however, she explainswhat she means, again in nonhierarchical "fromone (beautifulbody) to two, from two to many .. . " 9. Commentatorshave had considerabledifficultyin giving a Platonic interpretationof the conclusion of Diotima'sdiscourse.She has been describingthe final vision of beauty-in-itself, the eternalgenerativecenter inherent in everythingand everyonewe love. Then she adds:"But don't you think that only this person, this seeing personforwhom the good is visible, will be able to "givebirth"not to imagesof virtuebecauseshe fastenson images,but truevirtuebecauseshe fastenson truevirtues?(212a, 1-5) In fact, Diotima'sconclusioncan be readas an implicitwarning against Platonism:if we detach ourselvesfrom real concrete beauty, we may manufacture only empty ideas of virtue and not real virtue. 10. This is the argumentof Derrida's foundationaltext, Of Grammatology (1976). 11. When Nietzsche's various pronouncementson women are examined, Derridaargues, there are severalattitudesrevealed.First,the woman is condemnedby Nietzsche as a "figure" of falsehood. Second, she is "censured,debasedand despised"as a figureof truth. But in a third kind of statement, beyond this double negation, the woman is affirmed as having moved beyond the opposition between truth and falsity. (Derrida1978, 97). 12. This project is carried out in Irigaray's de l'autrefemmewhere she reads the Speculum foundingfathersof philosophy, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Descartes,in orderto exhibit and derail their sexist logic. 13. The relationsbetween the masterLacanand Irigaray were troubled.As a Lacaniananalyst on the facultyof Lacan'sdepartmentat Vincennes, Irigaray's seminarwas abruptly cancelled as unsuitableafter the publicationof Speculum. 14. Lacan, himself, believing that the symbolicorderof the phalluswas constitutive of lincould only bringthe subguisticmeaning, promisedno escapefromthe signifier.Psychoanalysis ject backto the alienatingmomentof enteringlanguageand makehim alive to the fragilityof his symbolicexistence. 15. When Diotima chides Socratesfor employinga simplisticdichotomouslogic (love must be uglyor beautiful), Irigaray which dialectic, a "jeul'intermediare" approvesher "non-Hegelian" does not destroytwo termsto establisha synthesisbut that insertsa "third" that allowsa progression from one state to another. (1984, 27) Her analysis,however, does not recognizethe connection Diotima makesbetween the textual progression from term to term and the naturalurge that aspiresto beauty and goodness. 16. Other feminist deconstructivereadingsof Plato sufferfrom the same ahistoricalassumptions. See eg. du Bois' (1985) deconstruction of Derrida'sdeconstruction of the Phaedrus. Derrida missed, du Bois argues, the submergedfemininity in the Phaedrus,were Plato has Socratesturn into a king of "transvestite", and femalepoets. speakingin the voices of priestesses This analysisassumesthe eternally degraded,libidinal feminine, excluded from, but erupting into, the eternallydominant masculine. herself is at the forefrontwith her brilliantdeconstructivereadingsof Aristotle 17. Irigaray and Plato in Speculum. 18. Revisions of unfoundedassumptionsof male superiority by Sir Arthur Evans and others have been necessary.Cf. eg. Willetts (1977) who reviewsthe literatureand describesthe now overwhelmingevidence that women had a pre-eminentposition in MinoanCrete, and also Thomas (1973) for a more ideological, but still persuasive,argument. 19. The degree of survivalof Minoan-Mycenean"matriarchal" traditionsin Homer and the Archaic age has been controversial.Cf. Pomeroy(1973) for a discussionof the evidence and some speculationas to the causesof the virulencewith which scholarshave attackedthe ideaof a There is, however, massiveevidence for the continuationof Minoan relisurvivingmatriarchy. gious traditionsthroughoutthe Archaic age and into classical times. Cf. Dietrich (1974). 20. Cf. also Aristoxenus fr. 15 (Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (1984) frg. 278, 233): "and Aristoxenussays that Pythagorasgot most of his ethical doctrine from the Delphic priestess, Themistocleia."

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21. Difficult to translateinto English, "jouissance" implies sensuouspleasurein general, the use or possessionof an object for one's own pleasure,and, in colloquialuse, the specificpleasure of sexual orgasm. 22. Cf. Freud'sessay on "Femininity"(1953) in which Freudarguesthat, even in "normal" development, the girl'ssexualitywill be to some extent repressed,resultingin a necessarydegree of frigidity,narcissism,and failure to sublimatedesire in great works. 23. Bemini's statue of Saint Therese, pierced by the love of Christ, is the frontspiecefor Lacan'sseminaron love, Encore(1975). 24. Although Diotima'slanguagehas been adaptedby Plato for a Greek male homosexualaudience, and thereforesometimes seems to apply only to male lovers, the actual content of her teaching shows that it is meant to applyto any combinationof sexes. Her teaching was particularly useful for Plato who could adapt it to male homosexual love, or distort it to argue that pederastybetween men was superiorto heterosexuallove. seems to suggestthat this marginality 25. At one place, Irigaray is, to some degree,situational d'action pourlesfemmes"(the kind of action aujourd'hui (cf. 1977, 125-126), the "mode possible makesit clear than an unpreceIrigaray todaypossiblefor women). But in the previousparagraph de la femme" dented revolution in thought must occur beforea woman could develop a "discours or a "pratique politque." 26. See Catherine Clement (1981) for a sensitive descriptionof some of the contradictions and compromisessuch a position could entail.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bois, Page du. 1985. Phallocentrismand its Subversionin Plato'sPhaedrus. Arethusa18: 91-103. W. Hefferand Sons. of Plato. Cambridge: Bury,R.G. 1932. The Symposium de et Vies 1981. Catherine. Clement, legendes Jacques Lacon. Paris: B. Grasset. Trans. G.C. Spivak. Baltimore: Derrida,Jacques. 1976. Of Grammatology, John Hopkins University Press. Harlow. Chicago: Uni. 1978. Spurs:Nietzche'sStyles.Trans, Barbara versity of Chicago Press. Trans. Barbara . 1981. Dissemination. Johnson. Chicago: University of Press. Chicago Dietrich, B.C. 1974. The Origins of Greek Religion. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Cambridge,Mass:HarvardUniverDover, K.J. 1978. GreekHomosexuality. sity Press. Politics Flax, Jane. 1980. Mother-Daughter Relationships:Psychodynamics, ed. Hester Eisenstein and and Philosophy, in The Futureof Difference, Allice Jardine. Boston: G. K. Hall. Edition Psyof theComplete Freud,Sigmund. 1953. Femininity. The Standard Works.XXI. London: Hogarth. chological de l'autre Luce. 1974. Speculum femme. Paris:Minuit. Irigaray, . 1977. Ce sexe qui n'estpas un. Paris:Minuit.
. 1984. Ethique de la differencesexuale. Paris: Minuit.

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Lacan, Jacques. 1966. EcritsI and II. Paris:du Seuil. deJacques . 1975. Encore,Le Seminaire Lacan,LivreXX. Paris:du Seuil. Luckand Ethicsin Greek Nussbaum,Martha. 1986. The Fragility of Goodness: and Philosophy. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press. Tragedy ed: R. G. Bury. Cambridge:W. Heffer and Plato, 1932. The Symposium. Sons. on women. Arethusa.6:2. Pomeroy,Sarah. 1973. Selected bibliography . 1975. Andromacheand the Question of Matriarchy.Revuedes etudes Greques.LXXXVIII,16-19. Thomas, C.G. 1973. Matriarchyin Early Greece: The Bronze and Dark Ages. Arethusa.6: 2. Thomson, George. 1949. The Prehistoric Aegean. London: Laurence and Wishart. Willets, R.F. 1977. The Civilization of AncientCrete. London:Batsford.

"Essentially Speaking": Luce Irigaray's Languageof Essence

DIANA J. FUSS

LuceIrigaray's towards the bodyhas earned fearlessness speaking for herwork thedismissive label"essentialist." But Irigaray's femmeand Speculumde I'autre Ce Sexe qui n'en est pas un suggest thatessencemay not be theunitary,monothatanti-essentialists so oftenpresume it to be. lithic,in short,essentialist category essentialism at least two reasons: to Irigaray strategically deploys for first, reverse and to displace Lacan's to and second, Jacques phallomorphism; exposethecontraat theheartof Aristotelian diction which denies women accessto "Esmetaphysics sence"whileat thesametimepositing theessence "Woman" as non-esof precisely sential(as matter).

Perhapsmore than any other notion in the vocabularyof recent feminist has come to representboth our greatest theory, "essentialism" postructuralist The idea that men and women, for examfear and our greatesttemptation. eternal, immutable ple, are identifiedas such on the basisof transhistorical, "essences" has been unequivocally rejected by many anti-essentialist feministsconcernedwith resistingany attemptsto naturalize poststructuralist "humannature."And yet, one can hear echoing from the cornersof the debateson essentialismrenewedinterestin its possibilitiesand potential usages, or to "dare" soundswhich articulatethemselves in the formof calls to "risk" essentialism.1Essentialismhas been given new life by these invitations to considera possiblestrategicdeploymentof essence; we could even say that, in feminist theory, essentialismis the issue which simplyrefusesto die. Certainly essentialism is the charge most frequentlyheard in critiquesof Luce The presentessayparticipatesin the general Irigaray's "psychophilosophy."2 of essentialismin orderto pose the questionof how calls for a reconsideration feminist theory and essentialismmight operatein theservice of Luce Irigaray's in work? What might be is invoked her when essentialism and politics. Why In short, are at stake in the deploymentof essentialismfor strategicpurposes? there waysto think and to talk aboutessence that might not, necessarily,"always already,"ipso facto, be reactionary? In what follows it will become clear that I do believe that there are such waysto elaborateand to workwith a notion of essence that is not, in essence,
Hypatiavol. 3, no. 3 (Winter 1989) ? by Diana J. Fuss

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ahistorical,apolitical, empiricist,or simplyreductive.But beforeturningto a considerationof Irigaray's strategicuse of essentialism, it bearsemphasizing that most of the criticismslevelled againstIrigaray's work since the publication of Speculum de l'autre in are 1974 femme inevitablybasedupon or in some to this fear of A linked essentialism. way summary sampleof the most important and oft-cited of these criticisms is enough to demonstratehow impassioned and genuine the resistanceto essentialismis for many feminists, and how problematic the reassessmentof essentialism'stheoretical or political usefulnessis likely to be.
IRIGARAY AND HERCRITICS

In 1981, two critical essayson Luce Irigaray's work were publishedin the U.S., each in a well-known feminist academic journal:Christine Faure's "The Twilight of the Goddesses, or the Intellectual Crisis of French Feminism"appearedin Signs,and CarolynBurke's "Irigaray Throughthe Looking Glass"appearedin FeministStudies.Faure'scritique, a translationfrom the the more severe. She objects to a generaltrend in French, is unquestionably French feminist theory, epitomizedby Irigaray's search for a female imagiwhich marks "a retreat into aesthetics where the thrust of feminist nary, is masked the old naturalistic ideal in of supstruggle by draped the trappings 'feminine' Burke also wonders 81).3 posedly lyricism" (1981, Carolyn whetherIrigaray's workescapesthe very idealismwhich her deconctruction of selected philosophicaland psychoanalytictexts so rigorously and persistently seeks to displace: Does her writingmanageto avoid constructionof anotheridealism to replacethe 'phallogocentric' systemsthat she dismantles? Do her representations of a parler femme,in analogywith female sexuality, avoid the centralizingidealism with which she taxes Western conceptual systems?(1981, 302) Metaphysicalidealismis probablythe most damagingof the many criticisms it finds its most recent and perhapsmost powerful chargedagainst Irigaray; rearticulationin Toril Moi's SexualTextualPolitics: Any attempt to formulatea general theory of femininity will be metaphysical.This is preciselyIrigaray's dilemma:having shown that so far femininityhas been producedexclusivelyin relation to the logic of the Same, she falls for the temptation to produceher own positive theory of femininity. But ... to define 'woman'is necessarilyto essentializeher. (1985, 139) Is it true that any definition of 'woman'must be predicatedon essence?And does Irigaray,in fact, define 'woman'?Though I will later arguethat the

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problemof an idealismbasedon the body, on an essentialfemininity, is funsuffice it to say here that Moi's assumpdamentallya misreadingof Irigaray, tion that "to define 'woman'is necessarilyto essentializeher"is by no means self-evident. While Irigaray has been criticizedby both psychoanalysts and materialists the most have come from the materialike, impassionedcritiques primarily alists. Monique Plaza's " 'Phallomorphic Power' and the Psychology of 'Woman,' " first published in the French radicalfeminist publicationQuestionsfeministes and later reprintedin the BritishmarxistjournalIdeology and offersthe most sustainedand unremittingly criticalindictment Consciousness, of Irigaray's apparentessentialism. According to Plaza, Luce Irigaray's great mistake(second only to her generalfailureto interrogateadequatelypsychoanalyticdiscourse)is a tendency to confusesocial and anatomicalcategories; for the feminine 'intheorizationof female pleasureand her "search Irigaray's terior'" lead her to abjurethe categoryof the social and to practicea dangerous form of "pan-sexualismwhich is only a coarse, disguisednaturalism" (1978, 8-9). Plaza,along with MoniqueWittig and ChristineDelphy, argues is alwaysa productof social refromthe materialiststandpointthat "nature" lations and that sex is alwaysa constructionof oppressionand never its cause. It is the move to desocialize"women,"Plazainsists, which leadsIrigaray into the fallacy of essentialism: The absence of a theory of oppression,the belief in the unavoidable and irreduciblesexual Difference, the psychologistic reduction, the inflation of the notion of "women"which one finds in Luce Irigaray's investigation, can only result in this essentialistquest. In the gap left by the statementof woman's will set up a "new"conception of non-existence, Luce Irigaray woman. (28) of positivism, empiricism, and negativism Plaza goes on to accuse Irigaray (31). Toril Moi, another materialistcritic, adds two more weighty epithets: ahistorcismand apoliticism (1985, 147-48). If this were a critical barbecue, would surelybe skewered. Irigaray Luce Irigaray,however, is not without her defenders. Jane Gallop, in "Quand nos levres s'ecrivent: Irigaray's Body Politic," interpretsIrigaray's of ratherthan a reflection persistentfocus on the female labiaas a construction essentialismis thus read within a largeranti-essentialist the body; Irigaray's the body (1983, 77-83). Margaret project of re-creating, re-metaphorizing Whitford takes a similarlysympathetic(which is not to say uncritical) apwork. In "Luce Irigaray proach to the question of essentialismin Irigaray's and the FemaleImaginary: Speakingas a Woman,"Whitfordconcludesthat does sometimes blur the distinctions between the social and while Irigaray historithe biological, "this is obviouslya stategyadoptedwithin a particular

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cal and culturalsituation"(1986, 7).4 This particularresponseto the probstrikesme as the most promisingline of argulem of essentialismin Irigaray ment to follow, for ratherthan foreclosingthe discussionon essentialismbefore it has truly begun, this approach asks the more difficult question: if Irigaray appealsto a mode of feminine specificity,and if she attemptsto speak of essentithe femalebody, what might such strategicforaysinto the territory alism allow her to accomplish?What might Irigaray's work amount to if she refusedsuch admittedlyriskyventures into "this sex which is not one"?
"BYOURLIPSWEAREWOMEN"

Let me begin to answer these questions by re-examining the place and function of the "two lips" in Irigaray's theorizationof female pleasure.This concept is perhapsmost responsiblefor generatingthe chargesof essentialism. Three words neatly summarize for Irigaray the significanceof the two lips: "Both at once." Both at once signifies that a woman is simultaneously two-but not divisible into one(s)," or, singularand double; she is "already another she is "neither one nor two"(1985c, 24, 26). It is the two lips put way, which situate women's autoeroticism,their pleasure,in a differenteconomy from the phallic, in an economy of ceaselessexchange and constant flux: Woman's autoeroticismis very differentfrom man's. In order to touch himself, man needs an instrument: his hand, a woman'sbody, language. . . . And this self-caressing requires at least a minimum of activity. As for woman, she touches herself in and of herself without any need for mediation, and before there is any way to distinguishactivity from passivity. Woman "touchesherself"all the time, and moreoverno one can forbidher to do so, for her genitals are formedof two lips in continuous contact. Thus, within herself, she is already two-but not divisible into one(s)-that caress each other. (1985c, 24) It would be hard to deny, on the basisof this particular passage,that Irigaray proposesto give us an account of female pleasurebasedon the body'sgenitalia; and it would be hard to deny that her account of the phallus is any less morphological.5 Why the essentialistlanguagehere?Why the relentlessemphasis on the two lips? Let me turn first to the Irigariancritique of the phallus to demonstrate what appearsto be a strategic misreadingof male genitalia. According to Irigaray,Western culture privilegesa mechanics of solids over a mechanics of fluids because man's sexual imaginaryis isomorphic;as such, the male imaginary emphasizes the following features: "production, property (propriete),order,form, unity, visibility, erection"(1985a, 77). The features

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associatedwith a female imaginary,as we might expect, moreclosely approximate the properties of liquids:"continuous,compressible, dilatable,viscous, diffusable" conductible, (1985c, 111). The problemhere is simplythat many of the propertiesIrigaray associateswith the two lips might also describethe K.K. Ruthven As penis. points out: A good deal dependshere on the accuracyof Irigaray's characterizationof the penis as "one" in comparisonwith the "not one" of the vulva. Certainly, her theory seems to requirethe penis to be alwaysinflexiblyerect and quite without metamorphic variation,and also to be circumcised,as the presenceof a foreskinendows it with most of the properties she attributesto the labia. (1984, 100-101) Irigaray's reading of phallomorphismas a kind of isomophism,however, is as an exposure of one of the dominantmetaphorsin not so much a misreading who erects the phallusas a psychoanalysis.It is not Irigaray poststructuralist productionof an apparsingle transcendentalsignifierbut Lacan:Irigaray's ently essentializingnotion of female sexualityfunctions strategicallyas a reversal and a displacementof Lacan'sphallomorphism. critique of Lacan centers primarilyon his refusal to listen to Irigaray's women speakof their own pleasure;she finds most untenableLacan'sinsistence that, on the subject of pleasure, women have nothing to say. In his SeminarXX on women, Lacanlistens not to women but to art, not to Saint Theresa but to Berini's statue of Saint Theresa:"you only have to go and look at Bemini's statue in Rome to understandimmediatelythat she's comof The Woman," in ing, there is no doubtabout it" ("Godand the Jouissance Mitchell and Rose 1982, 147). Irigaray's interrogatory responsein "CostFan "In Rome? So far at here: Tutti" deftly unmasks the phallocentrism play To look?At a statue?Of a saint?Sculptedby a man?What pleasureare away? we talking about?Whose pleasure?" (1985c, 90-91) Her logic is irrefutable: of why woulda womanneed to go all the way to Rome to discoverthe "truth" her pleasure? Why, afterall, is "the rightto experiencepleasure... awarded to a statue" (1985c, 90)? "When Our Lips Speak Together"providesan explanatorygloss Irigaray's on Lacan'seffortsto arriveat the truthof woman'spleasurethroughan appeal to a statue:"Truthis necessaryfor those who are so distancedfromtheir body that they have forgottenit. But their truth immobilizes us, turnsus into statues .. ." (1985c, 214). If women are turnedinto statuesthroughthe process of specularization-through the agency of the look-how can this specular economy be undone?How, in other words, can women begin to speak their own pleasure?Throughoutboth Speculum of the OtherWomanand This Sex of the gaze with the logic of the WhichIs Not One, Irigaray logic supplants touch: it is the "contact of at least two (lips) which keeps woman in touch

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with herself but without any possibility of distinguishingwhat is touching fromwhat is touched"(1985c, 26). This shift of focus fromsight to touch affordsIrigaray another opportunityto challenge Lacan, this time on the subject of his obsessionwith veiling: "Veilingand unveiling:isn't that what intereststhem? What keeps them busy?Always repeatingthe same operation, every time. On every woman"(1985c, 210). A woman'sexchange of herself with herself, without the agencyof the literalpenis or the Symbolicphallus, is exactly what puts into question the prevailingphallocraticand specular economy. It is tempting to compare Monique Wittig's concept of "lesbian"and notion of the "two lips," since both work to rethink the place and Irigaray's statusof the phallus in Western culture. For Wittig, "lesbian"operatesas a new transcendental signifierto replacethe phallus;it is outsidethe systemof "two lips,"while also outside exchange and keeps the systemopen. Irigaray's of a phallic economy, do not function in the same way, since the lips articulate a female imaginaryand not a culturalsymbolic.6Still, it is not always easy to distinguish the imaginaryfrom the symbolic in Irigaray,especially since the female imaginary is repeatedlytheorizedin relation to the symbolic agencies of languageand speech. MargaretWhitford comes closest to pinaccount of female pointing Irigaray's departurefrom Lacan;in the Irigarian "what is needed is for the female imaginaryto accede to its own sexuality, specific symbolisation"(1986, 4). This symbolisationof the female imaginary is preciselywhat Irigaray seeks to elaboratethroughher conceptualization of the two lips. The sustainedfocus in her workon this particular tropeoperatesin at least two ways. First,it has the desiredeffect of historicallyforegrounding "the more or less exclusive-and highly anxious-attention paid to erection in Western sexuality" and it demonstrates"to what extent the imaginary that governsit is foreign to the feminine" (1985c, 24). Second, it poses a possibleway out of one of the most troublingbinds createdfor feminist psychoanalysts: the problemof how to acknowledge the formative role of the Symbolic, the arm of to the notion of feminine specificity. To phallocracy,while still subscribing turn once again to that lyrical lover letter, "When Our Lips Speak Together,"Irigaray's testing of the essentialistwatersbecomestotal submersion: "no event makesus women,"she explains, rather"byour lips we arewomen" (1985c, 211, 209-10). Unlike Wittig, who seversthe classification"woman" from any anatomical determinants, there can be little doubt that, for Irigaray,a woman is classifiedas such on the basis of anatomy: Your/mybody doesn't acquire its sex through an operation. Throughthe action of some power, function, or organ. Without any intervention or special manipulation, you are a woman already. (1985c, 211) The point, for Irigaray, of definingwomen from an essentialiststandpointis not to imprisonwomen within their bodies but to rescuethem fromencultu-

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ratingdefinitionsby men. An essentialistdefinitionof "woman" impliesthat there will always remain some part of "woman"which resists masculine imprintingand socialization: How can I say it? That we are women fromthe start. That we don't have to be turned into women by them, labeled by them, made holy and profaneby them. That has alwaysalready happened, without their efforts. . . . It's not that we have a territory of our own; but their fatherland, family, home, discourse,imprisonus in enclosedspaceswherewe cannot keep on moving, living, as ourselves.Their propertiesare our exile. (1985c, 212) To claim that "we are women from the start"has this advantage-a political advantage perhaps pre-eminently-that a woman will never be a woman solely in masculineterms, never be wholly and permanentlyannihilatedin a masculineorder.
UP IN METAPHORS" "ROLLED

critics is the way in which the figure Perhapswhat most disturbsIrigaray's of the two lips becomes the basis for theorizinga speaking (as) woman, a parler femme. Many American feministsare disturbedby the Frenchfeminist tendency to link languageand the body in any way, literallyor metaphorically. It bothersElaineShowalter,for example, that "whilefeministcriticism rejectsthe attributionof literal biological inferiority,some theoristsseem to have accepted the metaphoricalimplicationsof female biological difference in writing."Showalterbelieves that "simplyto invoke anatomyrisksa return to the crude essentialism, the phallic and ovarian theories of art, that oppressedwomen in the past" (1982, 17). MaryJacobusconcurs, arguingthat "if anatomy is not destiny, still less can it be language"(1982, 37), and Nancy K. Miller similarlyinsists in her criticismof the Frenchfeministsthat must be sought in "the body of her writingand not the writa "woman-text" ing of her body" (1980, 271). It is interestingto note, as Jane Gallop does, and SexualDifference that all the critics includedin Writing (a volume which includes Showalter's "FeministCriticism in the Wilderness"and Jacobus's "The Question of Language:Men of Maxims and The Mill on the Floss") have difficultyaccepting the metaphoricityof the body; they demand that metaphorsof the body be readliterally,and they then reject these metaphors as essentialistic (1982, 802).7 essentialisminevitablycomes down to this quesThe debateover Irigaray's tion of whetherthe bodystandsin a literalor a figurativerelationto language and discourse:are the two lips a metaphoror not? What I proposeto argue here is that, for Irigaray,the relation between languageand the body is nei-

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ther literal nor metaphoricbut metonymic. what Though Irigaray disparages of she calls the " 'masculine' and she is (1985b, 140), games tropes tropisms" not without her own favoritetropes, chief among them the figureof metondeconstructsthe preymy. But before examining the way in which Irigaray dominance of metaphoricityin Western culture and creates a space for metonymy, a brief considerationof what Irigaray actually says about speaking in woman is order. (as) Irigaray's project is to explore the "distinctionof the sexes in termsof the (1985c, 100); her workrepreway they inhabitor are inhabitedby language" sents "an attemptto define the characteristics of what a differentlysexualized languagewould be" (1985a, 84). This line of inquiryleads her to ask how women can "already speak (as) women." Her answer? "By going back men's 'mastery.'By speakthroughthe dominantdiscourse.By interrogating ing to women. And among women" (1985c, 119). The chapter entitled in ThisSex Which Is Not One providesus with a seriesof clarifica"Questions" tions on what a speaking (as) woman might be and how it can be put into practice: Speaking(as) woman . . impliesa differentmode of articulation between masculine and feminine desire and language. (1985c, 136) Speaking (as) woman is not speakingof woman. It is not a matterof producinga discourseof which womanwouldbe the object, or the subject. (1985c, 135) There may be a speaking-among-women that is still a speaking (as) man but that may also be the place where a speaking(as) woman may dare to expressitself. (1985c, 135) Speaking (as) woman would, among other things, permit women to speak to men. (1985c, 136) It is certain that with women-among-themselves . . . someof a woman is heard. This accounts for the thing speaking(as) desireor the necessityof sexual nonintegration:the dominant languageis so powerfulthat women do not dare to speak (as) woman outside the context of nonintegration. (1985c, 135) Parler femmeappearsto be defined not so much by what one says, or even by how one says it, but fromwhence and to whom one speaks.Locusand audience distinguisha speaking(as) woman froma speaking(as) man: "byspeaking (as) woman,one may attempt to provide a place for the 'other' as feminine" (1985c, 135). Is it only from this "place"what women can speak to can achieve a women, or is it preciselyby speakingto women that the speaker parler femme?Irigaray's responsewould be "both at once" since for a woman

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to speakshe must establisha locus fromwhich to be heard, and to articulate such a space, she must speak. Closely connected to the notion of parler femmeis Irigaray's conception of two syntaxes (one masculine, one feminine) which cannot accuratelybe describedby the number"two"since "they are not susceptibleto comparison" in their strangeness and eccen(1985b, 139). These syntaxesare "irreducible one to the other. out of different times, places, logics, 'repretricity Coming sentations,'and economies"(1985b, 139). The two syntaxescannot be comparedsince the relationbetween them is not basedon similaritybut contiguity, in other words, not on metaphorbut on metonymy.Like the "two lips," they "touch upon"but never wholly absorbeach other. Contiguity, it turns out, operates as the dominant featureof a parler femme, the distinguishing characteristicof a feminine syntax: what a feminine syntax might be is not simple nor easy to there wouldno longerbe either state, becausein that "syntax" or "oneness" would no longer be privileged, subject object, there would no longer be proper meanings, proper names, attributes. . . Instead, that "syntax"would involve "proper" nearness,proximity,but in such an extremeformthat it would preclude any distinction of identities, any establishment of ownership, thus any form of appropriation.(1985c, 134) Impactedwithin this list of what a feminine syntax is not-subject, object, and so on-a positive descriptionemerges:nearness oneness, appropriation, and proximity. We returnto the figureof the two lips as a model for a new kind of exchange: aredoubtlessquite foreignto the femOwnershipand property inine. At least sexually. But not nearness.Nearness so pronounced that it makesall discriminationof identity, and thus all forms of property, impossible. Woman derives pleasure She fromwhat is so nearthatshecannothaveit, norhaveherself. herself enters into a ceaseless exchange of herself with the other without any possibilityof identifyingeither. This puts into question all prevailingeconomies. . . . (1985c, 31) To speak (as) woman is ceaselesslyto embracewordsand persistentlyto cast them off. To touch upon but never to solidify, to put into play but never to arrive at a final telos or meaning, isn't this another way to speak about "diff6rance"?Carolyn Burke seems to think so when she proposes that fable of significationto supplement,but not reoffersus a "vaginal" Irigaray place, Derrida's"hymeneal" fable (1987, 293 and 303). I don't believe, would ever use such a term or endorsesuch a concept however, that Irigaray as "vaginalfable"since it limits female pleasureto a single erogeneouszone

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the vaginaand denyingthat a woman'ssexualityis plural: by over-privileging in fact, "a woman'serogeneouszones are not the clitoris or the vagina, but the clitorisand the vagina, and the lips, and the vulva, and the mouth of the uterus,and the uterusitself, and the breasts.. ." (1985c, 63-4). The sites of wonderswhether the qualifier woman'spleasureare so diffuse that Irigaray "genital"is still even required(1985c, 64). If the tropeof nearnessdoes not function in the way Burkesuggests,as yet "8 it does appearto facilitate a another non-synonymicterm for "differance, deconstruction of the metaphor/metonymybinarismoperative in Western philosophicaldiscourse. Roman Jakobsondefines these two polar figuresof speech in "Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturin which he demonstrates that all variebances,"a studyof speech disorders ties of aphasiacan be identifiedas an impairment either of the facultyfor "selection and substitution"(metaphor)or of the facultyfor "combinationand contexture" (metonymy). Metaphor operates along the axis of similarity whereasmetonymyoperatesalong the axis of contiguity (Jakobson and Halle 1956, 76).9 In theories of language,metaphorhas long dominatedover metonymy.'0 We see this dominance played out in Lacanian psychoanalysis where the phallus stands in a privilegedmetaphoricrelation to the body (it "standsfor"sexual difference), and where the "paternalmetaphor"emerges as the privilegedsignifier. Why is metaphorvalidatedover metonymy?Exactly what role does the paternal metaphorplay in Lacan'stheorizationof sexual differenceand its construction? JacquelineRose identifies three symbolic functions: First, as a referenceto the act of substitution(substitutionis the very law of metaphoricoperation), wherebythe prohibition of the father takes up the place originallyfiguredby the absence of the mother. Secondly, as a referenceto the status of paternity itself which can only ever logically be inferred. And thirdly,as partof an insistencethat the fatherstandsfor a place and function which is not reducibleto the presence or absence of the real father as such. (Mitchell and Rose 1982, 38-39) Rose goes on to defend Lacan againstthe chargeof phallocentrism,arguing that we must recognizethat for Lacan "the status of the phallus is a fraud" (becausecastrationis a fraud)and so we mustnot literalizethe phallusand reduce it to the level of the penis (40 and 45). While this line of argumentis compellingenough, and certainlyfaithfulto Lacan'sown conception of the phallus, still the contiguitybetween the penis and the phallus, the proximityand nearnessof these two terms, gives one pause. MaryAnn Doane puts the problemthis way: [D]oesthe phallusreallyhave nothing to do with the penis, no commercewith it at all? The ease of the descriptionby means

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of which the boy situateshimself in the mode of "having"one would seem to indicate that this is not the case. . . . There is a sense in which all attemptsto deny the relationbetween the phallus and the penis are feints, veils, illusions. The phallus, as signifier,may no longerbe the penis, but any effortto conceptualize its function is inseparablefrom an imagingof the body. (1981, 27-28)11 The problem,put anotherway, is simplythat the relationbetween the penis and the phallus is as much one of associationor metonymyas similarityor treatmentof the "two lips," metaphor.The same might be said of Irigaray's the only differencebeing that Irigaray allocates the metonymic function to the two lips and relegatesmetaphorto the realmof Lacan'sphallomorphism. has this to say about a woman'shistorical relation to metaphoriIrigaray city: a woman is "stifled beneath all those eulogistic or denigratorymetaphors"(1985b, 142-43); she is "hemmedin, cathected by tropes"(1985b, 143) and "rolledup in metaphors"(1985b, 144). One wondersto what extent it is truly possible to think of the "two lips" as somethingother than a metaphor.I would arguethat, despite Irigaray's protestationsto the contrary, the figureof the "two lips" never stops functioning metaphorically.Her insistence that the two lips escape metaphoricity providesus with a particularly clear example of what Paul de Man identifies as the inevitability of a systemof tropesat the very momentwe claim to escapefromit" "reentering (1984, 72). But, what is importantabout Irigaray's conception of this particularfigureis that the "two lips"operateas a metaphor for metonymy;through toward the deconstructionof the this collapseof boundaries,Irigaray gestures binarism.In fact, her workpersistentlyattempts classic metaphor/metonymy dominanceover metonymy; to effect a historicaldisplacementof metaphor's she "impugnsthe privilege grantedto metaphor(a quasi solid) over metonymy (which is much moreclosely allied to fluids)"(1985c, 110). If Freudwas insiststhat no analnot able to resist the seduction of an analogy,12 Irigaray her: no metaphoricoperation, completes ogy, Are we alike?If you like. It's a little abstract.I don't quite understand'alike.' Do you? Alike in whose eyes? in what terms? with referencesto what third?I'mtouching by what standards? that's you, quite enough to let me know that you are my body. (1985c, 208) Lacanwritesthat the play of both displacementand condensation(metaphor and metonymy) mark a subject'srelation to the signifier;they operate, in fact, as the laws which govern the unconscious. A question oft-repeatedin is "whetherthe feminine has an unconsciousor whether it is the unIrigaray conscious"(1985c, 73). Is it possiblethat the feminineneither has an uncon-

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man'sunconsciousbut ratherarticulatesitself sciousof its own nor represents as a specific operationwithin the unconscious:the play of metonymy?
A POLITICS OFESSENCE

favoritetopics-the two lips, parler Irigaray's femme,a feminine syntax, an economy of fluids-all seem to suggestthat she is more interestedin questions of subjectivity,desire, and the unconsciousthan in questionsof power, history, and politics. In one sense, this is true; as a "psychophilosopher," Irigarayplaces greater emphasis on the "physical"than on the "social." However, her work is not entirelywithout what one might call a certainpolitical perspicacity. Monique Plaza, Beverly Brown, Parveen Adams, and Ann RosalindJones all question whether a psychoanalyticinvestigationof the feminine can adequatelyaccount for women'ssocial oppression.As Jones puts it, feministsmay still doubt the efficacyof privilegingchanges in subjectivityover changes in economic and political systems;is this not dangling a semiotic carrot in front of a mare still harnessed into phallocentric social practices? (Jones 1985, 107)13 Plazagoes furtherand indicts Irigaray for providingnot a theoryof oppression but an oppressivetheory (1978, 24-25). While I think it is true that Irigaray does not provideus with a blueprintfor social action, I also find her workpolitically awareand even practicallyuseful. Any discussionof Irigaray's "politics of essence"must begin with her own understanding of politics and, specifically, with her comments on what a feminist politics might be. on political practice, the women'smovement in Irigaray's explicit remarks France(the MLF), and women'ssocial oppressionare largelyconcentratedin the selection from her interviews, seminarremarks,and conversationspublished underthe title "Questions" in ThisSex Which is Not One. It seemsthat readersand studentsof Irigaray most want her to talk about the political significanceof her work, its impacton social practice,and its relationto current political activism in France, perhapsbecause Speculum appears,on the surto so the of the face, jettison completely category political in favor of the and seems philosophical psychoanalytic.Irigaray eagerto respondto her critics. If Plaza and others see her work as reactionarybecause it is apolitical, is likely to respondthat they are workingwith too limited or rigid a Irigaray notion of politics, that they areperhapsthinkingonly in termsof a masculine politics: Strictly speaking,political practice, at least currently,is masculine throughand through. In orderfor women to be able to

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make themselves heard, a 'radical'evolution in our way of conceptualizingand managingthe political realm is required. (1985c, 127) For Irigaray, from the project politics-a "feminine"politics-is inseparable of puttingthe feminine into history, into discourse,and into culture. Because of the contingent, future condition of this latter project, Irigaray acknowl. .. in that fact "we cannot of a feminine but only of edges speak politics, certain conditions under which it may be possible"(1985c, 128). The nascent condition of a feminine politics, however, does not preclude discussionof a feminist politics. "Liberation" (loosely understoodby Irigaray task: as the introductionof the feminine into practice)is not an "individual" A long history has put all women in the same sexual, social, and cultural condition. Whatever inequalities may exist among women, they all undergo,even without clearlyrealizing it, the same oppression, the same exploitation of their body, the same denial of their desire. That is why it is important for women to be able to join together, and to join together "amongthemselves".... The first issue facing liberaof tion movements is that of makingeach woman "conscious" the fact that what she has felt in her personalexperience is a to thatexperience condition sharedby all women, thus allowing be politicized. (1985c, 164) A differentnotion of politics does seem to emergehere-a politics basednot so much on group militancy or open confrontation as on shared "experience." But this notion of politics sounds suspiciouslylike the popularapprovedmethod of politicizationin the earlyyearsof the Women'sMovement And as such, it is subject in both Franceand America:consciousness-raising. to many of the same criticisms-especially the charge by numerous"marginal" feminists that what white, heterosexual, middle-class,and educated women feel in their personal experience does not necessarilyrepresent"a condition sharedby all women." Irigaray might rightlybe accusedhere of a certain tendency to universalizeand to homogenize, to subsumeall women underthe categoryof "Woman."Still, her work is not alwaysinsensitive to Consider: the axes of differencewhich divide "women-among-themselves." I think the most importantthing to do is to expose the exploithat are tation common to all women and to find the struggles appropriatefor each woman, right where she is, depending upon her nationality, her job, her social class, her sexualexperience, that is, upon the formof oppressionthat is for her the most immediatelyunbearable.(1985c, 166-67) double gesture:Irigaray Here we see the typical Irigarian proposesa feminist politics politics that will workon two frontsat once-on one side, a "global"

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that seeks to addressthe problemof women's universaloppression,and on the specificityand complexthe other side, a "local"politics that will address In situation. order to accomplish "both at of each woman's ity particular believes that "it is essential for women among themselvesto once," Irigaray invent new modes of organization,new forms of struggle,new challenges" (1985c, 166). The phrase"women-among-themselves" suggestsa call for sepand indeed endorse aratism, does, cautiously, Irigaray separatismas a valid for feminists: political strategy For women to undertaketactical strikes, to keep themselves apartfrommen long enough to learnto defendtheir desire, especially throughspeech, to discoverthe love of other women which sheltered from men's imperiouschoices that put them in the position of rival commodities, to forgefor themselvesa social status that compels recognition, to earn their living in orderto escape from the condition of prostitute. . . these are certainly indispensable stages in their escape from their on the exchange market.But if their aim were proletarization to reduce the orderof things, even supposingthis to be simply would possible, history repeat itself in the long run, would revert to sameness:to phallocratism.(1985c, 33) believes that separatism can be a legitimatemeans to escape from a Irigaray phallic economy but not an adequategoal; she sees it as a tactical option ratherthan a final telos. Above all, she does not want to foreclosethe possibility that the politics of women-among-themselves might itself be a way to the feminine into put practice. Through her comments on what a feminist politics might be, Irigaray broadensthe notion of politics to include psychic resistance. She does not rule out direct political activism;she simplyinsiststhat resistancemustoperate on many levels: women mustof coursecontinue to struggle for equalwagesand social rightsagainstdiscriminationin employmentand education, and so forth. But that is not enough: women merely "equal"to men would be "like them," thereforenot women. (1985c, 165-66) seems to imply here that women both alreadyhave an identity on Irigaray which to base a politics and that they are striving to secure an identity throughthe practiceof politics. In either case, the concept of "identity"has long been a problemfor feminist poststructuralists seeking to base a politics on somethingother than "essence."Is it possibleto generatea theoryof feminine specificity that is not essentialist?How do we reconcile the poststructuralistprojectto displaceidentitywith the feministprojectto reclaimit? For

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the solution is again double: women are engaged in the processof Irigaray both constructingand deconstructingtheir identities, their essences, simultaneously.14 The processof laying claim to "essence"at first appearsto be a politically essentialismin the reactionarymaneuver;but one needs to place Irigaray's in to context of Western order historical larger philosophy comprehendhow has a she might be using it strategically.In Aristotelianphilosophy,"woman" distinct from "man's" relation to essence. relation to essence, very specific Only man properlyhas an essence; subjecthoodis attained as he strives, in words, "to realizehis essence as perfectlyas he can, to give full exIrigaray's pression to his telos"(1985b, 164).15 Because only subjectshave access to remainsin unrealized essence, "woman" potentiality;she never achieves "the wholenessof her form"-or if she has a form, it is merely"privation" (1985b, 165). Woman is the groundof essence, its preconditionin man, without herself having any access to it; she is the groundof subjecthood,but not herselfa subject: Is she unnecessaryin and of herself, but essential as the nonsubjective sub-jectum?As that which can never achieve the statusof subject, at least for/byherself. Is she the indispensable condition wherebythe living entity retainsand maintainsand perfectshimself in his self-likeness?(1985b, 165) In a phallocraticorder, woman can never be more than "the passagethat the inessentialwhims of a still sensible and materialnaserves to transform ture into universalwill" (1985b, 225). reading of Aristotle's understandingof essence remindsme of Irigaray's Lacan'sdistinction between beingand havingthe phallus:a woman does not the phallus, she is the Phallus.16 Similarly,we can say that, in Aristopossess telian logic, a woman does not havean essence, she is Essence. Thereforeto and to offer give "woman"an essence is to undo Western phallomorphism in Western women entry into subjecthood.Moreover,because this ontology existence is predicated on essence, it has been possible for someone like that without Lacan to conclude, remaining metaphysics, fully withintraditional essence, "womandoes not exist." Does this not cast a ratherdifferentlight on theorizationof a woman'sessence?A woman who lays claim to an Irigaray's essence of her own undoes the conventional binarismsof essence/accident, form/matter,and actuality/potentiality.In this specifichistoricalcontext, to essentialize"woman"can be a politically strategicgestureof displacement. To say that "woman"does not have an essence but is Essence, and at the same time to say that she has no accessherselfto Essenceas Form,seemsblatantly contradictory.Moreover, has not Western philosophyalwaysposited an essence for woman-an essence basedon biologyand, as everyoneknows, definedby the propertiesof weakness,passivity,receptivity,and emotion, to

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it is prename just a few? The problem, I would argue, is not with Irigaray; essentialism of which clarifies for us the contracisely Irigaray's deployment diction at the heart of Aristotelian metaphysics.In his philosophy, we see has become the site of this contradiction:on the that the figureof "woman" asserted to have an essence which definesher as woman one hand, woman is and yet, on the other hand, woman is relegatedto the status of matterand can have no access to essence (the most she can do is to facilitateman'sactualizingof his inner potential). I would go so far as to say that the dominant line of patriarchalthought since Aristotle is built on this central contradiction: woman has an essence and it is matter;or, put slightly differently,it is the essence of woman to have no essence. To the extent that Irigaray reopens the questionof essence and woman'saccessto it, essentialismrepresents not a trapshe falls into but rathera key strategyshe puts into play, not a dangerous oversightbut rathera lever of displacement. never actuallytells us; What, then, constitutes woman'sessence?Irigaray at most she only approximates-"touchesupon"-possible descriptions,such as the metonymicfigureof the two lips. In fact, she insiststhat "woman" can never be incorporatedin any theory, defined by any metaphysics."What I want," Irigaray writes, "is not to create a theory of woman, but to secure a for the within sexual difference"(1985c, 159). She explains feminine place that "for the elaborationof a theory of woman, men, I think, suffice. In a woman('s)language,the concept as such wouldhave no place"(1985c, 123). workstowardssecuringa woman'saccess to an essence of her own, Irigaray without actuallyprescribing what that essence might be, or without precludthe that a ing possibility subject might possessmultiple essences which may even contradictor compete with one another.Thus Irigaray sees the question "Are you a woman?"to be preciselythe wrong question. Let me conclude with her playfulchallenge to all those who would pressher to define the es" 'I' am not 'I,' I am not, I am not one. As for woman,try sence of "woman":
and find out . ." (1985c, 120).

NOTES
1. Heath (1978), Jardine(1987), Schor (1987), and Spivak (1987) have all endorseda renewed considerationof essentialism. 2. The phrase is Carolyn Burke's(1981, 289). 3. Two earlierintroductory pieces to Frenchfeminist theory also appearin Signs:see Marks (1978) and Burke (1978). 4. Foranothersympatheticreadingof Irigaray, and an applicationof her deconstructivefeminism, see Feral (1981). 5. Irigaray makesa distinction between "morphological" and "anatomical" in "Women'sExile" (1977, 64), but I agreewith Monique Plaza(1978, 31) and Toril Moi (1985, 143) that the distinction is too impreciseto be helpful. 6. The Imaginary and the Symbolicare here used in the Lacaniansense. The Imaginary refers to the primary narcissism(the illusionaryoneness with the maternalbody) which characterizes

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the child's psychicaldevelopment in the pre-oedipalstage. The symmetryof the mother-child dyadis brokenby the introductionof the Lawof the Fatherduringthe Oedipalstage, facilitating the child's accession to subjectivity through the order of language, speech, and sociality. In Lacan, the Symbolic is alwaysvalued over the Imaginary(see Lacan 1977). to reduce"the subtletyof 7. Carolyn Burkemakes a similarargumentin defense of Irigaray: Irigaray's thought to a simpleargument'fromthe body,' in orderto then point out that such arguments are, indeed, essentialist"amounts to a circularargumentbasedon a ratherquestionable initial reading(1981, 302). 8. Vincent Leitch writes that, by the early 1980's, Derridahad formulatedmore than three dozen such substitutions(see Leitch 1983, 43). 9. For a recent rereadingand applicationof akobson'sterms, see Johnson (1984, 205-19). 10. Studiesof metaphorhave also dominatedover studiesof metonymyin the comparatively in meaningconrecent historyof linguisticand semiotic research.Jakobson explains:"Similarity to. similarityconwith the symbolsof the languagereferred nects the symbolsof a metalanguage nects a metaphoricalterm with the term for which it is substituted.Consequently, when conto interprettropes, the researcher possessesmore homogeneousmeans structinga metalanguage to handle metaphor,whereasmetonymy, basedon a differentprinciple, easily defies interpretation. Thereforenothing comparableto the rich literatureon metaphorcan be cited for the theory of metonymy"(1956, 81). the penis/phallusdistinction, focussing Lacan(1985) also addresses 11. Jane Gallop'sReading specificallyon the linguistic sourcesof the confusion. See especially chapter 6, "Readingthe Same Difference"in Men by Women, Phallus,"pp. 133-156. See also Gallop's "Phallus/Penis: Womenand Literature (1981). in Analysis"(1937): "I have not been able to "Constructions 12. The referenceis to Freud's resistthe seductionof an analogy."Jane Gallop has cleverlysuggestedthat Irigaray's generalresistance to analogicalreasoningis based on a priorrepudiationof Freud's anal-logicalmodel of refusalof analogycan thus be readwithin the widerframeof a deep sexual difference. Irigaray's scepticismconcerning the anal fixation of Freud'sown theories (see Gallop 1982a, 68-69). 13. See also Plaza (1978) and Adams and Brown (1979). 14. Naomi Schor has made a similar point which I find compelling: "in both Cixous and the anti-essentialistaspect of their work is that which is most derivative, that is most Irigaray cease to mime the master'svoice and speak in their own Derridean.When Cixous and Irigaray voices, they speak a dialect of essentialese, the languageof what they construeas the feminine, and wishing it weren'tso won't make it go away. Ratherthan simplywanting to excise this unsightly excrescence, I think it would be ultimatelymore interestingand surelymore difficultto deconstructand constructfemjust how and why a Cixous and an Irigaray attemptto understand ininity at the same time" (see Schor 1986, 98-99). on Aristotle can be found in the chapterentitled "Howto Conremarks 15. Most of Irigaray's ceive (of) a Girl"in 1985b, 160-67. ForAristotle'sown commentson essence, see especiallyCatand On the Generation of Animals,all of which can be found in egories,Physics,Metaphysics, McKeon 1941. 16. For Lacan'sdistinction between being and having the phallus, see "The Meaningof the Phallus"in Mitchel and Rose 1982, esp. 82-84. Both girl and boy are the phallus in the preoedipal stage; that is, both are the phallusfor the mother. But duringthe crucial accension to sexual differencethrough the recognition and representationof lack (the castrationcomplex) the possessionof a penis allows the boy to havethe phalluswhile the girl continues to be it. For Lacan, it is this distinction between being and having the phalluswhich facilitatesthe takingon of a sexed subject position, the productionof masculineor feminine subjects.

REFERENCES

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Adams, Parveenand Brown, Beverly. 1979. The feminine body and feminist politics. m/f 3: 35-50. Burke,Carolyn. 1978. ReportfromParis:Women'swritingand the women's movement. Signs3 (4): 843-55. . 1981. Irigaray Studies7 (2): 288through the looking glass. Feminist 306. New York:ColumbiaUniDe Man, Paul. 1984. The rhetoric of romanticism. Press. versity analysis of women'sopDelphy, Christine. 1984. Close to home:A materialist Trans. Diana Leonard.Amherst:The University of Massachupression. setts Press. Doane, MaryAnn. 1981. Woman'sstake:Filmingthe female body. October 17: 23-36. Faure,Christine. 1981. The twilight of the goddesses,or the intellectualcrisis of french feminism. Signs7 (1): 81-6. 32: 52-64. Feral,Josette. 1981. Towardsa theory of displacement.Substance Same difference.In Men by women.Vol. 2 Gallop, Jane. 1981. Phallus/penis: of Womenandliterature, ed. JanetTodd. New Yorkand London:Holmes & Meier, 243-51. . 1982a. The daughter's seduction: and psychoanalysis. Feminism Ithaca, New York:Comell University Press. . 1982b. Writing and sexualdifference: The differencewithin. Critical Inquiry(Summer). . 1983. Quandnos Levress'ecrivent:Irigaray's Rebodypolitic. Romanic view 74 (1): 77-83. . 1985. Reading Lacan. Ithaca and London:Cornell University Press. Difference. Screen19 (3): 50-112. 1978. Heath, Stephen. Luce. Women's exile. Ideology 1977. andConsciousness 1 (May):62Irigaray, 76. . 1985a. Is the subjectof science sexed?Cultural 1 (Fall): 73-88. Critique . 1985b. Speculum of the otherwoman.Trans. Gillian C. Gill. Ithaca, New York:Corell UniversityPress.Trans.of Speculum de l'autre femme. Paris:Minuit, 1974. . 1985c. Thissex whichis not one. Trans. CatherinePorterwith Carolyn Burke.Ithaca, New York:Cornell UniversityPress.Trans.of Ce Sexequi n'en est pas un. Paris:Minuit, 1977. Jacobus,Mary. 1982. The questionof language:men of maximsand The mill on thefloss. In Writing andsexualdifference; ed. ElizabethAbel. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 37-52. Jakobson, Roman and Halle, Morris. 1956. Fundamentals of language.'SGravenhage:Mouton. Jardine,Alice and Smith, Paul, eds. 1987. Men in feminism.New Yorkand London: Methuen.

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Jardine, Alice. 1987. Men in feminism: Odor di uomo or compagnonsde route?In Men infeminism, eds. Alice Jardineand PaulSmith. New York: 54-61. Methuen, Johnson, Barbara.1984. Metaphor, metonymyand voice in Theireyes were andliterary ed. HenryLouisGates, watching god. In Blackliterature theory, New 205-219. York: Methuen, Jr. Jones, Ann Rosalind. 1985. Inscribingfemininity: French theories of the Feministliterarycriticism,eds. Gayle feminine. In Makinga difference: Greene and Coppelia Kahn. London and New York:Methuen, 80-112. Lacan,Jaques. 1977. Ecrits.Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York:W. W. Norton & Company. criticism:An advancedintroduction. Leitch, Vincent. 1983. Deconstructive New York:Columbia University Press. Marks,Elaine. 1978. Women and literaturein France. Signs3 (4):832-42. New York:Random McKeon, Richard,ed. 1941. The basicworksof Aristotle. House. in France:Fora dialecticsof Miller, Nancy K. 1980. Women'sautobiography and society, eds. Sally identification. Womenand languagein literature McConnell-Ginet, Ruth Borker,and Nelly Furman.New York:Praeger. Lacan Mitchell, Juliet and Rose, Jacqueline. 1982. Feminine Jacques sexuality: and the ecolefreudienne. New York:W. W. Norton and Company. Moi, Toril. 1985. Sexual/textual politics.New York:Methuen. 1978. Plaza, Monique. "Phallomorphic power" and the psychology of andConsciousness "woman."Ideology 4 (Autumn):57-76. Originallypub1 lished in Questions feministes (1978). studies:An introduction. Ruthven, K. K. 1984. Feministliterary Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press. 8. OxfordUniversity Schor, Naomi. 1986. Introducingfeminism. Paragraph Press:94-101. - . 1987. Dreaming dissymmetry:Barthes, Foucault, and sexual difference. In Men in feminism.Jardineand Smith, 98-110. and Showalter, Elaine. 1982. Feministcriticismin the wilderness.In Writing Abel. Chicago:The Universityof Chicago ed. Elizabeth sexualdifference, Press, 9-36. politics. Essaysin cultural Spivak, GayatriChakravorty.1987. In otherworlds: New Yorkand London: Methuen. and the female imaginary: Speaking Whitford,Margaret.1986. Luce Irigaray 43 (Summer):3-8. as a woman. Radical Philosophy Issues(Summer):103Wittig, Monique. 1980. The straightmind. Feminist 111. Issues(Fall): 47-54. . 1981. One is not born a woman. Feminist

LacanianPsychoanalysis and French Feminism: Towardan Adequate Political Psychology*

DOROTHY LELAND

I foThispaper examines someFrench usesof Lacanian feminist psychoanalysis. cus on two Lacanian accountsof psychological thefirst by oppression, influenced and I arguethattheseaccounts LuceIrigaray and thesecondbyJuliaKristeva, fail to meet criteria an adequate political psychology. for

The use of psychoanalysis as a feminist theoreticaltool is a precarious enIn female classical psychoanalytic theory, psychosexualdevelopterprise. discussed,is measured ment, only marginallyand infrequently againsta masculine norm and found deficient. Duringthe early 1970's, the concept of penis envy, developedby Freudin his account of the female versionof the castration complex, came to representfor many North American feministsthe misogynistbias of psychoanalytictheory. Moreover, many feminists considered this misogynya sufficientgroundfor rejectingpsychoanalysis as a feminist theoretical tool. Duringthe middle to late 1970's, feministssuch as Juliet Mitchell (1974), Gayle Rubin (1975), Dorothy Dinnerstein (1976), and Nancy Chodorow to explore its (1978) moved beyond this initial rejection of psychoanalysis feministpotential. These effortswerepremisedless on a denial of the misogynist characterof psychoanalytic of it. Gayle theorythan on a reinterpretation is jusRubin, for example, arguedthat the feministcritiqueof psychoanalysis of women'ssubortified to the extent that Freudian theory is a rationalization dination. But, Rubin proposed,this is not the only legitimateway to understand Freud'stheory. It can also be read as "a descriptionof how phallic culture domesticateswomen, and the effects in women of their domestication" (Rubin 1975, 197-98). Thus, Rubin concluded, to the extent that Freudian theory is a descriptionof processesthat contribute to women's oppression, the feminist critiqueof psychoanalysis is mistaken.
* I thank SandraBartky,Nancy Fraser,TerryWinant, and IrisYoungfor encouragingme to write this paper. Hypatia vol. 3, no. 3 (Winter 1989) ? by Dorothy Leland

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Whereasthe workof Dinnersteinand Chodorowdrawson the traditionof object-relationstheory, Rubin followed Mitchell in drawingon the psychoanalytic theory of JacquesLacan. Indeed, it was the work of Mitchell and to North American Rubin that served to introduceLacanianpsychoanalysis feminists.However, most of the effortto effect a rapprochement betweenfeminism and Lacanian psychoanalysis has been undertaken by feminists in et politique France.The adoption in the early 1970'sof the name psychanalyse Liberation is just influential of French Women's Movement an the wing by in Frenchfemione indicatorof the importanceassumedby psychoanalysis division of nist politics. This importanceis also reflected in Julia Kristeva's French feminism into two distinct generationsor phases: a first, "socialist" phase, dominatedby the politics of equalityand a second, "psychoanalytic" phase, dominatedby a politics of difference(Kristeva1981, 37-38). In this paper, I examine some Frenchfeminist uses of Lacanianpsychoanalysisin orderto evaluate its adequacyas a political psychology.On my infeminismsis with concern of Frenchpsychoanalytic terpretation,one primary or "internalized" so-called"psychological" oppression,oppressionthat results when schemas of thought and valuation are internalizedand function as intrumentsof domination. In the case of women's oppression,the relevant schemasof thought and valuation include, but are not necessarilylimited to, the sexual ideologies of male-dominatedsocieties. One central claim of Frenchpsychoanalyticfeminismsis that the psychological oppressionof women is primarily,if not exclusively, a function of the processof oedipalization.This processbegins when a child comprehendsits (e.g., kinshiprelations,the insociety'ssexualrulesand genderprescriptions are internalized or accest taboo) and ends when these rulesand prescriptions ceded to. ForFrenchpsychoanalytic feminists, then, the Oedipuscomplex is the mechanismwherebya neonate comes to recognizeitself as an I-she or an I-he and hence becomessubjectto whateversexualrulesand genderprescriptions this entails in her or his society. as a My standardsfor assessingthe adequacyof Lacanianpsychoanalysis feminist a socialist reflect familiar feminist political psychology position (Jaggar1983, 150). I invoke two criteria.1First, an adequatepolitical psyoppressionin culturally chology must recognizethe groundingof internalized and institutions and historicallyspecific practices.Second, an adequatepolitbe ical psychologymust non-deterministic;it must allow that psychological oppressioncan, at least undersome conditions and to some extent, be transcended. In what follows, I use these criteriato evaluateLacaniantheorythroughan and JuliaKristeva.My intent is not to proanalysisof worksby Luce Irigaray the writings of these French feminists. account of vide a comprehensive illustrateimportantproblemsassocithemes that I invoke selected Rather, as a feministtheoretiof Lacanian the with ated psychoanalysis appropriation

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account of internalized cal tool. I begin with a discussionof Luce Irigaray's oppressionin "Women on the Market."I examine her uncriticalappropriaand Lacanianclaims, and I argue tion of empiricallysuspectLevi-Straussian that her account of psychologicaloppressionlacks the culturaland historical specificity required by criterion one. Then, I turn to the work of Julia literatureas a model for feminist Kristeva.I examine her use of avant-garde I that her view of internalizedoppressioninand argue political practice, volves a formof determinismthat violates criteriontwo and deadendsin political pessimism. I The emergence of symbolic thought must have requiredthat women, like words, should be exchanged. ... This was the only means of overcoming the contradiction by which the samewoman was seen undertwo incompatibleaspects:on the one hand, as the object of personaldesire, thus exciting sexual and proprietorial instincts;and, on the other hand, as the subject of the desireof others, and seen as such, i.e., as the means of bending others through alliance with them." (Levi-Strauss1969, 496) "Whereon earth would one situate the determinationsof the unconsciousif not in those nominal cadresin which marriage ties and kinship are alwaysgrounded?" (Lacan 1968: 128) Lacanianpsychoanalysis,unlike object-relationstheory, ascribesa central role to the Oedipus complex in the acquisitionof sexual identity.2 Conseaccountsof internalized quently, in Lacanian-based oppression,the emphasis is less on concrete relationsbetween a motherand her infant than on the familial power of the father-in Lacanianparlance, the father's"name"and "no." Moreover, in Lacanian theory, the Oedipus complex is posited as a universalof psychosexualdevelopment. Lacaniantheory thus implicitly rejects the claim that the Oedipus complex is about or limited to the nuclear family. It also implicitlyrejects the view that the Oedipuscomplex is a psychic structure groundedin culturallyand historicallyspecificformsof praxis. For Lacan and his followers, the universalityof the Oedipuscomplex is a functionof its statusas a condition of socialityor cultureas such. Lacandraws The Elementary Structures supportfor this view from Claude Levi-Strauss's of that Kinship (1969), wherekinship is viewed as a social/symbolic organization marksthe passagefrom natureto culture. More specifically,Levi-Strauss argues that what transforms biological relationshipsinto culturalkinship systems is the institution of exogamy-the systematicexchange of women by

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men. This view is aptlysummarized by JulietMitchell, whose own appropriation of Freud draws heavily on the intersection of Lacanian and LeviStraussiantheory: The universal and priomordiallaw [of society] is that which regulates marriagerelationshipsand its pivotal expression is the prohibitionof incest. This prohibitionforcesone familyto give up one of its membersto anotherfamily;the rulesof marriage within 'primitive' societies function as a means of exsystemof comchange and as an unconsciouslyacknowledged munication. The act of exchange holds a society together:the rules of kinship . . . are the society. (Mitchell 1974, 370) play only a According to Mitchell, even though "visible"kinship structures residualrole in advanced as comparedto so-called primitive societies, they of society or cultureas such. The same is true are nonetheless "definitional" of the "subjective" expressionof exogamy, the incest taboo. Thus, Mitchell proposesthat the "myth Freudrewrote as the Oedipus complex epitomizes man'sentry into cultureitself. It reflectsthe originalexogamousincest taboo, the role of the father, the exchange of women and the consequentdifferences between the sexes" (Mitchell 1974, 377). Among the texts of French psychoanalytic feminisms, Luce Irigaray's "Women on the Market"(1985) is the most explicit attempt to provide an account of women's oppression drawing on the intersection of Leviand Lacaniantheory. Irigaray's Straussian essayturs on two theoreticalpivaccountof the passagefromnatureto Levi-Strauss's ots. First,she reinterprets or culture via the institution of exogamy as the reign of hom(m)osexualite desire for the same [homo]. Second, she drawson an (unorman's [homme] thodox) interpretationof Marx'sanalysisof commoditiesas "the elementary formof capitalistwealth"to examine the alienation of women'sdesireunder the alienation that resultswhen women'sdesireis rethis reign.3ForIrigaray, duced to men'sdesire (the desirefor the same) is constitutiveof women'spsychological oppression. Moreover, she argues, in patriarchal societies, women'salienated sexuality has the status of a commodity. use of Marxand of the concept of a commoditymight Although Irigaray's suggestthat her account is intended to cover the situationof women in capitalist societiesonly, this is not the case. Rather,her analysisis intendedto be to revealwhat remainsthe sameaboutwomen's universalin scope; it purports oppressionthroughouthistorical variationsof social regimesand productive of partriarchal societies, relations. According to Irigaray,the "organization is based and the operationof the symbolicsystemon which this organization . . . contains in a nuclearform the developmentsthat Marxdefines as chardoes not explictly exacteristicof capitalistregimes"(1985, 172-3). Irigaray plain why she thinks this is so. But her text hints at possible answers. For

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Irigaray,exogamy is itself an economic arrangement,one which subtends "the economy" in the narrowersense: The exchange of women as goods accompaniesand stimulates exchanges of other 'wealth'among groupsof men. The economy-in both the narrowand broadsense-that is in place in our societies thus requiresthat women lend themselves to alienation in consumption, and to exchanges in which they do not participate,and that men be exempt frombeing used and circulatedlike commodities. (1985, 172) Elsewhere,in "The Powerof Discourse" Irigaray proposesthat the earliestoppression, identifiedby Engelsas the oppressionof women by men via the institution of monogamy, remains in effect today, and that the problemfor feminists "lies in determininghow it is articulatedwith other oppressions" (Irigaray1985, 83). does not credit Levi-Strauss for suggestingthe analogy Although Irigaray between women and commodities, a passagefrom The Elementary Structures is its source: of Kinship likely There is no need to call upon the matrimonialvocabularyof Great Russia,where the groomwas called the 'merchant'and the bridethe 'merchandise' for the likening of women to comnot scarce but essential to the life of the group modities, only (Levi-Strauss1969, 36). Like Levi-Strauss,Irigaray proposesthat culture or society as we know it is basedon the exchange of women amongmen accordingto the rule known as the incest taboo: "whatever familialformthis prohibitionmay take in a given state of society . . . [the incest taboo] assuresthe foundation of the economic, social, and cultural order that has been ours for centuries"(1985, 170). However, Irigaray rejects Levi-Strauss's explanation of why women, not men, are the objects of exchange. According to Levi-Strauss,this is due to the "deep polygamoustendency, which exists among all men, [and which] makesthe numberof availablewomen seeminsufficient"(1969, 38). Irigaray deems this inadequatebecause it presupposesbut does not acknowledgea more fundamentalasymmetry between the sexes: it assumesthat women are the objectsof men'sdesire, but not viceversa,and that only men have a tendwrites: ency towardpolygamy.Irigaray Why are men not objectsof exchange amongwomen?It is because women's bodies-through their use, consumption, and circulation-provide for the condition makingsocial life and culture possible, although they remain an unknown 'infras-

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tructure'of the elaborationof the social life and culture .... In still other words:all the systemsof exchange that organize societies and all the modalitiesof productivework patriarchal that are recognized, valued, and rewardedin these societies aremen'sbusiness.The productionof women, signs, and commodities is alwaysreferred back to men . . , and they always pass from one man to another. The work force is thus always assumedto be masculine,and 'products' areobjectsto be used, objects of transactionamong men alone. (1985, 171)4 Irigaraythus proposesthat the exchange of women among men, an exand Lacanview as essentialfor the passagefromnachange that Levi-Strauss ture to culture, should be understoodmore fundamentallyas the institution of the reignof hom(m)osexualite. By this, she meansa social orderwhose laws are the "exclusive valorizationof men's needs/desires,of exchange among men" (Irigaray 1985, 171). More specifically, Irigaray defines as a social orderin which the value of symbolicand imagihom(m)osexualite is on and even substitutedfor the value of nanaryproduction superimposed ture and corporeal (re)production. Women's bodies, as commodities exand substitution changed by men, are also subjectedto this superimposition of value. As a result, Irigaray concludes, "in this new matrixof History, in which man begets man as man in his own likeness, wives, daughters,and sistershave value only in that they serve as the possibilityof, and potentialbenefit in, relations among men" (1985, 172). finds that women's sexual identity is deterLike Juliet Mitchell, Irigaray mined by their utilizationas exchangeobjects. Women'sbodies, sexualizedas femaleby meansof the Oedipusstructure,are held to be partof the natureor "matter" acted upon by the (masculine) subject, and women's identity, graspedas the product of this labor, is assumedto be an objectificationof finds that so-calledfemmen'sneeds and desires. In this social order,Irigaray feminine sexualityas describedby psychoanainine sexuality(i.e., "normal" lytic theory) resemblesa commodity in four main respects. First, just as a commodityis producedby subjectingnatureto "man",so feminine sexuality and laws"of masculineactivis producedby subjectingwomen to the "forms ity. Second, just as exchange functions overridethe naturalutility of things of women'sbodies when they become commodities,so the naturalproperties when they are made into objects of circulaand subordinated are suppressed tion among men. Third, just as a commodity is incapable of imaging or mirroringitself, so women's self-imagebecomes an image of and for men. Fourthand finally, just as commoditiesmust be measuredin termsof an extrinsic standard,monetaryvalue, in orderto be exchanged, so women must be submitted to the extrinsic standardof male sexual desire in order that they, too, can be exchanged among men.

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Viewed as an intertextual weaving of Marxian, Levi-Straussian, and of genderneutralLacaniantheory designedto undercuttheir presumptions 5 if we tour But examine Irigaray's is a de Market" "Women on the force. ity, own account of women'spsychologicaloppressionas the alienation through commodification (oedipalization) of women's desire, a number of critical questionsarise. Some of these concern the empiricaladequacyof her claims. societies the workforce contention that in patriarchal Forexample, Irigaray's is false. The situais alwaysmasculine(and so expressiveof hom(m)osexualite) tion of Western women during and after the industrialrevolution, when women became a relatively permanent part of the conventionally-defined could, of course, paid laborforce, providesjust one counterexample.Irigaray with claim that the of women into the labor the counterthis objection entry Or force does not negate the latter'smasculine character. she could claim that in industrialized societies, men control women'slaboreven outside the makes none of these claims. The issue of reproductivesphere. But Irigaray empiricalwarrantsdoes not enter into her analysisat all. This lack of attention to the empiricalbasesof theoreticalclaimsis characteristic of Irigaray's approach. For example, although she criticizesFreud, for not acknowledgingthat their respectivepsychoLacan and Levi-Strauss logical and anthropologicaldescriptionsare descriptionsof the situation of women under conditions of oppression, she also uncriticallyadopts claims that arecentralto these accounts. Irigaray assumesthat all cultureshave been or male-dominated,that the incest taboo is a culturaluniversal, patriarchal and that all kinshipstructures arebasedon the exchangeof women. Yet there is considerablecontroversysurrounding each of these claims.6 fails to the Similarly, Irigaray question presumeduniversalityof key LeviFreudian and Lacanian Straussian, concepts. For example, "Women on the Market"relies heavily on a genderizednature/culturedichotomy invoked both by Levi-Strauss and by Freudand Lacan, where the feminine is linked with nature and the masculine with culture. Into this framework,Irigaray deftly insertsMarx'sconception of productivelabor, accordingto which labor is seen as the means whereby"manduplicateshimself, not only in consciousness,intellectually,but also actively, in reality, [so that] he sees himself in a worldhe has created"(Marxand Engels1975, 277). By redescribing productive laboras the meanswhereby"manbegetsmanas man in his own likeness," and by calling this "the reign of hom(m)osexualite," Irigaray Marx'stendency to conceive of the human being as male, his foregrounds modeling of productivelaboron traditionalmasculineactivities, and his focus on the sphereof object productionin generaland commodityproduction in particularas the matrix and main stage of history. What she does not consider is the possibilitythat the genderizednature/culture distinction retained in her account is not a culturaluniversalbut ratherspecificto modern, Western society-a view supported studies.7As a by severalanthropological

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leaves herselfopen to the chargethat her universalgeneralizaresult, Irigaray tions about patriarchalculturesare productsof the spuriouspracticeof projecting historicallyspecific (and ideologicallysuspect) concepts onto other societies and other historical periods. claim that in patriarchalsocieties, women's alienated sexuality Irigaray's has the statusof a commodity illustratesthis problem.While it may be true sexualobjectification,it does not that women'ssexual alienation presupposes follow that men universallyvalue women as sex objects as objects in general offersno empiricalevare valuedundercapitalism-as commodities.Irigaray idence for her claim. Nor does she consider whether the sexual objectification of women assumesdifferentformsin other historicalperiodsand cultures. Instead, she develops her claim by analogy,relyingon concepts shared by Marx, Levi-Strauss,and Lacan (including the genderizednature/culture distinction), without consideringthe cultural and historical limits of these analysisof sexual objectificationas commoconcepts. Thus, while Irigaray's dification may illuminate aspects of our own sexual alienation, its claim to universalityis suspect. does not, An adequatepolitical psychology must recognize, as Irigaray's in that women'spsychologicaloppressionis rooted historicallyspecific social relationsand structures.This criteriondoes not rule out the possibilitythat some aspects of psychologicaloppressionhave remainedrelatively constant thoughout the history of, say, Western societies. But it does demand that these long-termcontinuities be situatedwith respectto the specificsocial relations and social structures that actually sustain them at various times. Irigaray's appealto "the exchange of women by men" does not meet this requirement. It does not describeany specific social structurebut serves as an abstract formulafor a system of structuralpossibilities consisting in three typesof familyrelations-consanguinity, affinityand descent. Moveover, the exchange of women by men is at best only a partialexpressionof the social and relationsthat link togethermembersof a given culture, particstructures and class stratifiedsocieties.8 Given that the industrialized in modem ularly social relationsof male dominationvary in differentsocieties and in different historical periods as well as across class and ethnic lines, explanations of women'spsychologicaloppressionthat focus on only one type of social relarelations, riskbeing either over simplifiedor case, marriage tion, in Irigaray's reductionistic. discussionof the alienation of women'sdesire highlights an imIrigaray's portantaspect of women's psychologicaloppression:the symbolicand ideological dimension of men's control of women'ssexuality, which includesthe "terms"and processesunder which women come to identify themselves as as a feasexualbeings and as women. But she views this alienation abstractly tureof socialityperse, as somethingthat ineluctablyattendsthe passagefrom does not considerthe differentways, even in to "culture."Irigaray "nature"

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modem Western societies, in which men control the expressionand direction of women'sdesireor the varietyof practicesand institutionsthat engender and reinforcewomen's sexual alienation. as a causal (if not thecausal)factorin Irigaray's appealto hom(m)osexualite women's sexual alienation illustates one importantproblemcreated by the abstract character of her analysis. As the principle of sociality governing patriarchal societies, hom(m)osexualiteis everywhere, "subtending," as Irigaray puts it, the vast and variegatedtexts of social, political, and ecois nowhere. It is nomic life. But, and for the same reason, hom(m)osexualite and pracof and institutions culturallyspecific independent any historically structure. As such, tices, a free-floating ideological and psychological how specific instilacks explanatoryforce;it cannot explain hom(m)osexualite tutions and practicescontribute to the causes and maintenanceof women's sexual alientation. Rather, of such institutions and practices, hom(m)ocan at best say: man's desire for the same resides, as it does everysexualite where, here. For Irigaray,although historicallyand culturallyspecific practicesand institutionsexpressor embodyhom(m)osexualite, they do not engenderit. Consequently, to attribute women's sexual alienation to ho(m)osexualite,as does, effectively severs this alienation, its causes and maintenance, Irigaray fromconcrete social relationsof powerand dominance, the seat of all oppression. Irigaray's to explain women'ssexual alienaappeal to hom(m)osexualite tion, interpretedas the commodificationof women's desire, is thus inadequate. Forit falselyassumesthat sexualalienation is independentof the institutions and practicesin which men'scontrol of women'ssexualityis enforced and enacted. These defects in Irigaray's account of the alienationof women'sdesireillustrate two pitfallsassociatedwith the appropriation of Lacanianpsychoanalysis as a feminist theoretical tool. The first is the questionableempiricaladeof psychic life, particuquacy of Lacanianclaims about universalstructures the understood as the larly Oedipuscomplex "subjective" expressionof exogamy. The second is the excessively abstractcharacterof Lacan'saccount of these universals. One strikingfeature of "Women on the Market"is the absence of references, even for the purposeof illustration,to concretesocial relations.This is also a striking, and troublesome,featureof Lacan'saccount of the Oedipus Lacanholds that "the primordial law [of socomplex. FollowingLevi-Strauss, ties superimposes the kingciality] is ... that which in regulatingmarriage dom of cultureon that of natureabandonedto the law of copulation"(Lacan 1977, 63). This law is the incest taboo, and its subjective, psychological pivot is the Oedipus complex, which governsfor each individualhis or her passagefrom "nature"to "culture."As viewed by Lacan, the Oedipuscomplex prescribesthe limits and possibilitiesof the socialization/humanization

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of the actualnatureof relationsbetween childrenand their processregardless of historicallyand culturallyspecaretakers,and more generally, regardless cific social relations. Fromthis perspective,the Oedipuscomplex is not only or even primarily a familialdrama,the psychic counterpart of some concrete of social relations like the nuclear organization family. Rather, it is an inexorable structuralmechanism that operatesindependentlyof the human content it organizes.The abstractcharacterof Irigaray's analysisin "Womenon the Market"is in largemeasurea consequenceof her identificationof the alienation of women's desire with Lacan'sstructuralversion of the Oedipus as the installationwithin psychic life of the reign of complex, reinterpreted hom(m)osexualite.9 In this section, I have arguedthat Irigaray's account of the alienation of women's desire through commodificationand oedipalizationrests on questionable empiricalgroundsand fails adequatelyto link internalizedoppression to culturallyand historicallyspecific institutionsand practices.Thus, it fails to meet criterionone. In the next section, I turn to my second criterion, which requiresthat an adequatepolitical psychologymust be nondeterministic. I will examine the adequacyof Lacanianpsychoanalysis with respect to this criterionthroughan analysisof selected themes fromthe workof Julia Kristeva. II "As soon as she speaks the discourse of the community, a woman becomes phallus." (Kristeva1974, 6) has been its biologistic One importantfeministobjection to psychoanalysis reflected in Freud'srethe determinism biological leanings-for instance, counterslogan, "one is markthat "anatomyis destiny."Simone de Beauvoir's not bor but ratherbecomes a woman," capturesthe spiritof feminist quarrels with the view that human sex and gender identities, behaviorsand dedifferencesnecessaryfor resiresare determinedby the anatomical/biological this a of view, growingbody feministresearchis providproduction.Against for a genderand sexualityare ing support politicallyimportantcounter-thesis: are in to and change. intervention social constructsthat principlesusceptible feminists of its the to Lacanian is Partof rejectionof psychoanalysis appeal with view that is of Freud associated the the strand "anatomy destiny."This in Lacan's treatment of the castrationand Oedipus evident rejectionis clearly and desires that have been as pertainingto interpreted complexes. Here, fears to are held instead to these actual body parts body partsonly as sympertain bolic entities or signifiers.For example, in Lacan'saccount of the castration complex, it is not the penis as an anatomicalstructurebut ratherthe "phal-

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lus"as a symbolicbearerof culturallyconferredmeaningsthat playsa causal role. Penis envy thus becomes the desire to have what the phallussignifies, namely the social prestige and power that those who lack phallic signifiers (penises) are denied. does not base sexual identity (the recogniThus, Lacanianpsychoanalysis tion of oneself as an I-he or I-she) on biology or on any other innate structures. Rather, it holds that sexual identity is acquiredthroughprocessesof identificationand languagelearningthat constitutethe psychological becoming of the social person.Lacandividesthis processinto two main stages-the to the pre-Oedipal and the Symbolic. The Imaginary Imaginary corresponds between a diadic relation mother and child. Duringthis periodgovernedby the forms its first child stage, self-conception by identifyingwith a unified to its mother'sbody.10This which more or less corresponds corporealimage identificationis gradually an identification with the object of the replacedby mother'sdesire:the child wants to be "all"for the mother, to please and to fuse with her. The Symbolic, on the other hand, corresponds to the Oedipal and post-Oedipalperiodsduringwhich the child comes to individuateitself from others and to recognize itself as an I-he or I-she. This identificatory change requiresthe child to renounce its desireto fuse with its mother. Psychic castration, then, is the awareness of this separation. According to Lacan, the Oedipal crisis occurs during the processof languageacquisition when the child learns its society's sexual rules. It ends when these rules are internalized or accededto. In takingover the identityfunctionsprescribed by the child repressesits desire for the mother and enters what Lacan society, calls the SymbolicOrderwhich, as andro-or phallocentric,is governedby the father'slaw (the incest taboo). Lacanthus rejectsbiologicaldeterminismand offersin its place an account of the social constructionof sex and gender. Normally, the political significance of the view that sexualityand genderare sociallyconstructedis linked to the assumption that socialconstructs, unlike innatebiologicalstructures, are to interventionand change. Lacan,however,is morepessimistic: susceptible Woman is introducedinto the symbolicpact of marriage as an object of exchange along basically androcentricand patriarchal lines. Thus, the woman is engaged in an order of exchange in which she is an object; indeed, this is what causes the fundamentally conflictual character of her position-I would say withoutexit. The symbolicorderliterallysubmerges and transcendsher. (1954-5, 304) [My emphasis] Here, Lacan'spessimismabout the possibilityof change is linked to his view of the relationbetween women and the SymbolicOrder.Elsewhere,his pessimism implicatesboth men and women: Symbols. .. envelop the life of man in a networkso total that they join together, beforehe comes into the world, those who

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are going to engender him 'by flesh and blood'; so total that they bring to his birth . . . the shape of his destiny; so total that they give the words that will make him faithful or the law of the acts that will follow him right to the renegrade; very place where he is not yet and even beyond his death. (Lacan 1977, 65) of sex and genderas a function Given Lacan'sview of the phallic structuring of the reigningsocial symbolics,the possibilityof transcendingor modifying the rule of phallic law is dim. JuliaKristevaputs the matterthis way:we are structural mechanismconcerningthe castingof sexual caught in a "profound . . . and [we] can't do much about it" (1986, 155). differencein the West Kristeva's pessimismconcerning the possibilityof transcendingor modifying the phallocentricSymbolicOrderis reflectedin her account of the possibilities open to us for revolutionary change. This account is developedby way of an analysisof what she calls le sujeten procesand its disruptiveeffectsas exhibited in the writingsof the late-nineteenth century avant-garde (Kristeva the to address like circuitous seem a this way problem 1984). Although may of revolutionary change, Kristevathinks otherwise.She claimsthat the "revis homoleffected in the texts of the literaryavant-garde olution in language" and in the social political sphere: "The ogous to revolutionarydisruption text is a practice that can be comparedto political revolution: [avant-garde] the one bringsabout in the subjectwhat the other introducesinto society" (1984, 17). Kristevafocuses In her analysisof the late nineteenth centuryavant-garde, on the presence in these texts of "poetic language"and its effect of "unsettling" the identity of meaning and of the speakingsubject: . . . one should begin by positing that there is within poetic to meaningand signification. language. . a heterogeneousness detected genetically in the echolalias This heterogeneousness, of infantsas rhythmsand intonationsanteriorto the firstphonemes, morphemes, lexemes, and sentences . . . operates through, despite, and in excess of [signification],producingin poetic language'musical'as well as non-sense effects that destroynot only accepted beliefs and significationsbut, in radical experiments, syntax itself, that guaranteeof thetic consciousness. (1980a, 133) For Kristeva,then, poetic languageis markedby the presenceof rhythmic, tonal, or syntacticalfeaturesthat beareither a negative or surplusrelationto modalityof languageuse. meaning and signification, that is, to the symbolic Lacanian to the This symbolicmodality,which corresponds SymbolicOrder, is languageas it is mobilizedin the circuit of social communication,a circuit

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within which the phonemic, lexemic, morphemic,and syntacticalstructures of languageare harnessedto the existing "social contract." Thus, the symbolic modalityencompassesthose featuresof languagethat enable it to function as an instrumentof communication,for instance, syntacticalstructures and grammaticalcategories, intersubjectivelyfixed and reiterableunits of meaning, establishedsocial contexts of use and sharedconventions. According to Kristeva,at workin poetic languageand giving rise to its "unsettling" effects is anothermodalityof languageradicallydistinct fromthe symbolicdimension. This modality, which she calls the semiotic, springs from the archaismsof the instinctual body. It is the manifestationin languageof instinctual drives. Kristeva's account of this semiotic modalityis elaboratedin termsof Freudian and Lacaniantheory. Her "speakingsubject"is the split subjectof psychoanalytic theory, a subject divided between psychosomaticprocessesand social constraints. Accordingly, Kristevaproposesthat the signifyingpractices of the split subject can be analyzed in terms of two dispositions or modalities-the semiotic, linked to instinctual drives, and the symbolic, linked to the installationof the subjectinto a social networkand the assumption of social identity. The semiotic refersto tensions or forcesdiscerniblein languagethat representa kind of residuefromthe pre-Oedipal phaseof develAs opment. Terry Eagletonexplains, The child in the pre-Oedipal phasedoes not yet have accessto language. . ., but we can imagineits body as criss-crossed by a flow of 'pulsions'or driveswhich are at this point relatively unorganized.This rhythmicpattern can be seen as a form of language, though it is not yet meaningful. For language as such to happen, this heterogeneousflow must be, as it were, chopped up, articulatedinto stable terms, so that in entering the symbolicorderthis 'semiotic'processis repressed. This reis not total: for the semiotic still can be dispression,however, cered as a kind of pulsionalpressure within languageitself, in tone, rhythm, the bodily and materialqualities of language, but also in contradiction,meaninglessness, disruption,silence and absence. (Eagleton 1983, 188) Kristevadescribesthis libidinal-signifying as instinctual, materorganization becausethe organizationis dicnal, and feminine. It is held to be instinctual tated by primaryprocessessuch as displacementand condensation, absorption and repulsion, rejection and stasis, all of which function as innate preconditions for languageacquisition. It is held to be maternal because of the child'sdirect dependenceon the mother. Finally, it is held to be feminine because this semiotic realmof rhythmic,corporealrapport with the motherhas been genderedas such by our culture.

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Kristevaholds that the semiotic and symbolic modalities of signification are necessarilyintertwinedin languageuse. She also assertsthat differences in the dialectical interplaybetween the two signifyingmodalitiesgive rise to importantlydifferentkinds of signifyingpractices. At one extreme is scientific discoursewhich tends to reduceas much as possiblethe semiotic component. At the other extremeis poetic languagein which the semioticgains the upperhand. More precisely, Kristevacontends that in poetic languagethe semiotic and the symbolicexist in a kind of internaltension such that poetic languagein effect "positsitself... as an undecidableprocessbetween sense and rhythm" and non-sense, between language (Kristeva1980, 135). Insofar of as it is a sociallycommunicableformof discourse,poetic languagepartakes the semantic/syntactical organizationof language.But it also displaysa "soor negative relationto which exists in either a surplus norousdistinctiveness" the symbolicdimensionof languageuse. Accordingto Kristeva,in the literthis sonorousdistinctivenessdisruptsthe flow of arytexts of the avant-garde, a signification,setting up play of unconsciousdrivesthat undercutsthe stability of received social meaning. For readersof these texts, the result of such disruptionsis a momentaryrelease of libidinal pleasure(jouissance). What is the relation between Kristeva's analysisof the "revolutionin lanviews on feminist politics? For and in texts her effected avant-garde guage" is what feminismis (or should be) to text the Kristeva, language avant-garde as element. to society-a disruptive Just poetic disruptiondependson a "perthe semiotic and symbolic, so feminist dismanent contradiction"between ruptiondependson an equallypermanentcontradictionbetween masculine/ identifications.Kristevaviews these "permapaternaland feminine/maternal of desire, a "pronent contradictions"as rooted in the Oedipal structuring found structuralmechanism"which we women "can'tdo much about." The political pessimismsuggestedby this remarkis echoed in Kristeva's analysisof the options available to women given the Oedipal structure.As presented by Kristeva, these options are bounded by two undesirableextremes, father-identification and mother-identification, which effectively createfor women a double-bind.The father identifiedwoman is exemplified by the figureof Electra,who has her mother, Clytemnestra,killed in orderto avenge her father. In so doing, Electratakes the point of view of her father vis-d-visher mother. As interpretedby Kristeva,the mother'scrime against to the worldby takinga lover, a the fatherhas been to expose her jouissance act is an expressionof her law. Electra's forbidden by patriarchal jouissance not only of her mother'sbody but also of her fear and hatredof the jouissance own. She must abhorin herselfwhat she abhorsin her motherand as a result she perpetuatesthe patriarchal social/symbolicorder. If this picture of the father-identified woman is unpalatable, Kristeva nonetheless accepts the view of Freudand Lacan that repressionof both instinctualpleasureand continuousrelationto the motheris the priceone must

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pay to enter historyand social affairs.This is why the alternativeof motheridentificationis equallyundesirable: it condemns us to "foreverremain in a sulk in the face of history,politics, and social affairs" (1986, 156). According resultsin a failureto enter the symto Kristeva,then, mother-identification bolic order,a path that ends in psychosis.On the other hand, father-identifiand valuations. In cation entails taking over patriarchalconceptualizations the extremecase, this resultsin a rejectionof attributes genderedas feminine insofaras these attributesare consideredto be incompatiblewith entry into the (masculine) realm of culture and history."1 ForKristeva,both identificatory options arecapturedin the gendercategorizationsoperative in patriarchal culture:mother-identification by feminine categoriessuch as nature, body and the unconscious, and father-identification by contrasting masculine categories such as culture, mind, and ego. While Kristevabelieves that these gendercategoriesare alwaysat workin the formationof one's identity as an I-she or I-he, she also assertsthat the extremes of mother and father identification can be avoided. Moreover, she recommendssuch an avoidance as a desirablefeminist practice. Let us refuse both extremes. Let us know that an ostensibly masculine,paternalidentification... is necessaryin orderto have a voice in the chapterof politics and history. . . . [But] let us right away be wary of the premiumon narcissismthat such an integrationcan carry;let us reject the developmentof a 'homologous'woman [i.e. an Electra],who is finally capable and virile; and let us ratheract on the socio-politico-historical stage as her negative:that is, act firstwith all those who refuse and 'swimagainstthe tide'-all who rebel againstthe existing relationsof productionand reproduction.But let us not take the role of Revolutionaryeither, whether male or female: let us on the contraryrefuseall roles to summon[a] truth outside time, a truth that is neither true nor false, that cannot be fitted into the orderof speech and social symbolism.(1986, 156) This "truth"is Kristeva'ssemiotic order-the instinctualpleasureone must domain. Thus, the polirepressin orderto gain entry into the symbolic/social tics that Kristevarecommendsrequiresan "impossible dialectic," a "permanent alternation"between the semiotic ("maternal" and the symjouissance) bolic ("pateral" power or law). This politics is supposedto be an analogueof poetic language. But there are problemsconcerningthe manifestation,aim, and efficacyof the practice Kristevarecommends.TerryEagletonarguesthat Kristeva's vision of politically revolutionaryactivity as a semiotic force that disruptsstable meanings and institutions leads to a kind of anarchismthat fosters private libidinal for failingto see the need to move beyond pleasure.He also criticizesKristeva

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to new formsof social solidarity(Eagleton1983, 190interal fragmentation Toril Moi finds that Kristeva's focus on negativityand disrup91). Likewise, anarchist tion ratherthan on buildingnew solidaritiesleadsto an undesirable I a have and subjectivistpolitical position (Moi 1985, 170-71). good deal of I sympathyfor these criticisms, for, as will argue, the aspects of Kristeva's of an untenablepolitical pessiviews they call into question are symptomatic mism. This pessimismis a consequenceof the view that the patriarchal Symbolic Order is not susceptible to feminist intervention and change. For and structure" Kristeva,as for Lacan, the Symbolic Orderis an "implacable the only escape is psychosis. For both Lacan and Kristeva,the Symbolic Order is the realm of culture and languagedefinitive of humanbeing. Hence, entry into the SymbolicOrder is identified with the processof humanization,the assumptionof social identity and social roles. What is essentialto this processis the submissionof presocialdesire to the laws of organizationand exchange within a sexually differentiatedgroup. Insofaras one successfullynegotiates the passagefrom naturalto social being, the identityfunctionsprescribed by the SymbolicOrder are inescapable. Lacanseems to hold that there is only one SymbolicOrder, that in which by the Lawof the Father.Kristeva,in conidentity functions are prescribed that the contends trast, SymbolicOrderdescribedby Freudand Lacanis specific to Western (Mosaic) monotheistic culture.12Thus, although Kristeva holds that symbolicmediation is requiredin the passagefrom nature to culto the view that all culturesarebasedon the same ture, she does not subscribe it marksa sensitivity to the problemof ethnocenBecause symbolicsystem. of culturaluniversals,this qualificaidentification to the trismwith respect it not alter Kristeva's does tion is important.However, position on the more of determination psychic life. Insofar general issue concerning the symbolic to social befrom natural the as a Westernersuccessfullynegotiates passage ing, she maintains, the identity options prescribedby the patriarchalsymbolic system specific to Western monotheism are inescapable. the Freudiandicaccount of these identity options presupposes Kristeva's tum that what is today an act of internalrestraintwas once an externalone. holds for any external restraint,FreudfoAlthough this dictum presumably cused on aggression, the so-called "primal"father's restraint of the sons, his possessionof all the primalhorde'swomen. Thus, for which presupposed of psychic life is a situaFreud,the historicaloriginof the Oedipalstructuring tion of oppressionin which women are dominatedby men. With the intemalizationof the father'sexternal restraint(the incest taboo), this situation of into one of repression.In the historyof individual oppressionis transformed of psychic life is a repetitionof this epochal persons,the Oedipal structuring event, which Freudidentifieswith the originsof civilizationproper.External restraintis replacedby its symbolicexpression:the fathercomes to represent

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the culturalrealityprinciple, the symbolic, while the mother representsthe sensualsubstratum, the semiotic, that must be repressed if a child is to enter culture at all. Since Freudviews the psychologicalmechanismof Oedipal repressionas the symbolic/psychologicalexpression of women's "primal" oppression, he in an the historical situation of opgrounds Oedipus complex hypothetical once the father's external restraint is interal(primal) pression. However, ized, the resultingpsychic structureand symbolismis severedfrom the social sphere. For Freud, this autonomy of the psychologicalfrom the social is a and prehistoricdemandhas consequenceof the hypothesisthat a "primaeval . . .become part of the organizedand inherited endowment of mankind" (Freud195-74, 13:188). What was originallysocial (the primalfather'sthreat of castration,the sons'responses,etc.) became"natural," an internaldisposition or instinctual structure.Fromthis perspective,the Oedipus complex is not exclusively or even primarilythe psychologicalcounterpart of some particularsocio-familialstructurebut ratheran autonomousfunction of psychic life. The autonomy thus ascribed to the Oedipus complex is at the root of Kristeva's political pessimism.Once set in motion, the Oedipal mechanism, like the Deist's universe, functions of its own accord. It runs on and on in both the individualand her culture, imperviousto changing social and economic relations and to ongoing feminist interventions. Given her adoptionof Lacan's"de-biologized" Freud,the implacablecharacterof the Oedipalstructuring of desiredoes not entail, for Kristeva,a crude biological determinism. Anatomy is not destiny. Instead, it is the psychic definitive of the Oedipuscomplex that playsthis desymbolismand structure role. termining Kristeva's view on this matterreflectsa hyperbolicbut nonethelessfaithful of a basic Lacanianclaim: "Images and symbolsfor the woman interpretation cannot be isolatedfrom imagesand symbolsof the woman . . . [for]it is the of sexualitywhich conditionshow [sexuality] comes into play" representation this claim is unobjectionable.In (Lacan 1982, 90). On some interpretations, fact, some version of it is central to the projectof feminist political psychology, a psychologywhose task it is to explain the processeswherebypatriarchal representations and gender-differentiated categoriestake root within our psychic lives, affecting our desires, feelings, thoughts, and valuations. This task presupposes, first, that at least some patriarchal representations of women also serve as representations for women. In addition, it presupposes, that in so serving, they function as instruments of male domination. But the project of feminist political psychologyrests on yet another, equally crucial premise. Feministpsychologyis political psychologypreciselybecause its accounts of internalized oppressionare given in the serviceof a liberatory project. It thus assumesthat psychologicaloppression,at least undersome condi-

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tions and to some extent, can be transcended.But Kristeva'sLacanianaccount of psychologicaloppressiondoes not allow for the political hope expressedby this third assumption.This is not becauseshe rejectson empirical SymbolicOrder. It is groundsthe possibilityof transcendingthe patriarchal rather a consequence of her acceptance of the Lacanian view that social personhood(at least for Western women) requiressubjectionor submission to Oedipal identity functions and laws. Lacanand Kristevaallow for only two alternatives:subjectionto the Law of the Fatheror psychosis.I-hood, having a coherent self-identityover time, is impossible without submission through oedipalizationto the patriarchal Symbolic Order, which structuresand sustainssubjectivity. Submissionto the SymbolicOrderthus is not just a diachronic,developmentalevent but a permanentcondition of social being. The political pessimismengenderedby of subjecthis view can be expressedas the claim that the Oedipalstructuring optivity is "total"-i.e., once in place, we cannot escape the identificatory tions circumscribedby patriarchalrepresentationsand gender categories. This claim, however, is unwarrented.For even if we accept the (arguable) view that we enter society via the Oedipus complex and submissionto the Law of the Father, it does not follow that we cannot subsequently reject, at least in part, our paternalheritage.13 Partof what feminismis about is breakingfreeof damagingrepresentations and gendercategories,and I see no reasonnot to believe that this projectis in principlepossibleor that, indeed, it has not alreadymet with some success. between patriarchal As long as there are slippagesor "contradictions" representationsof women and other featuresof a woman'ssymbolically-mediated do not dictate the entire lived experience, as long as such representations are such of content and structure susceptibleto feminist experience, they 14 interventions. Lacan's contention that there is no such slippage is made on a priori grounds.Yet I believe that the historyof feminist interventionsprovidesan empiricalchallenge to the view that we cannot transcendthe identity options and laws definitive of the patriarchal Symbolic Order.The practiceof aims of consciousnessraisingprovidesjust one example. One of the primary this type of feminist interventionis to help womendiscoverfacetsof internalized oppressionby "showingup" the sexual ideology that affectsour desires, and utilizes feelings, thoughts, and valuations.This processboth presupposes rethe slippagebetween this sexual ideologyand the symbolically-meditated ality of women'slives. To "showup"sexual ideologyinvolves exposing it for what it is, to make it the subject of our thoughts, feelings, and valuations ratherthan their determiningcontent. Of course, "showingup"sexual ideology in this way does not necessarilyinvolve freeing oneself from it. But to represengrantthis projectsome success, one need not deny that patriarchal tations and gendercategoriesare deeply rooted in our psychic lives, so much

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so that they can appearimplacable.Ratherit is to deny that they exhaustthe entire symbolicdimension mediatingexperience. In addition, it is to affirm that graduallywe can loosen the hold of patriarchalrepresentations,see throughthem and beyond them, and perhapsone day even overcome their domination of our psychic lives. Many of the writingsof Frenchfeminists influencedby Lacan, including can be seen as contributionsto the feminist writingsby Kristevaand Irigaray, of consciousness The site of their analysesis the unconscious practice raising. culturalsymbolism,particularly sex and gender symbolism,which subtends individualpsychic life. The aim is to make the unconsciousconsciousand in 15 Yet the doing so to assistwomen in overcominginternalized oppression. political hope presupposed by such a projectoften exists in uneasytension with the political pessimismthat Lacaniantheory engenders. JuliaKristeva's politics providesan extreme example of this pessimism.It combinesthe pessimismof the Lacanianview that the Oedipalstructuring of female subjectivity is "total" with Freud'spessimismconcerning "civilization's"demandsfor instinctualrenunciation.As a result, the feministpolitics Kristevacommendsemergesas just one expressionof an eternalwarbetween (feminine) jouissanceand (masculine) power/law, where the only possible revolutionsare temporarytransgressions, limited "returns of the repressed." ForKristeva,what makesfeminismgenuinelyrevolutionary is not its opposition to and transformationof historically specific relations of oppression. moment consists in its oppositionto the reRather,feminism'srevolutionary or sacrificial characterof sociabilityor cultureper se.16Accordingly, pressive Kristevaholds that if feminismhas a role to play in revolutionary politics, it is only by assuminga negative function: reject loadedwith meaningin everythingfinite, definite, structured, the existing state of society. Such an attitudeplaceswomen on the side of the explosion of social codes: with revolutionary moments. (1980b, 166) If everythingfinite, definite, structured, loadedwith meaningin the existing state of society contributesto women's oppression,then Kristeva's prescriptionfor feminist politics might make some sense. But there is no good reasonfor thinking this to be so. Of course, in our own society, women are to men. However,this does not mean sociallyand economicallysubordinated that all aspectsof society are harmfulto women and hence legitimatetargets of feministopposition. Moreover,feminismneeds to move beyondthe rejection of existing social codes to the constructionof new, more equitablesocial, economic, and political relations.17Kristeva'sview of revolutionary feministpolitics is thus inadequatefor two reasons:it rejectstoo much and it hopes or aims for too little.

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III In this paper,I have claimedthat an adequatefeministpoliticalpsychology must meet at least two requirements.First, it must treat internalized oppression as groundedin culturallyand historicallyspecific institutionsand pracsuch oppressionnon-deterministically tices. Second, it must understand and allow for the possibility that it could, under some circumstances,be overand Julia Kristevado come. I have arguedthat the theories of Luce Irigaray not meet these requirements.I would like to conclude on a more positive note with some briefreflectionsas to the sort of theorythat might betterprovide for an adequatepolitical psychology. I have invoked are Let me begin by observingthat the two requirements not unrelated.To see internalizedoppressionas based in historicallyspecific institutions and practices is to see it non-deterministically.It is to suppose that to dismantlethose institutionsand practicesis to begin to dismantlepsychological oppression. It is to assume, in addition, that under alternative, and non-sexist arrangements, symbolicrepresentations patriarchal egalitarian could lose their hold on our psyches. would A feminist political psychologythat began from these assumptions have an interest in investigating certain matters that Lacanian theory igof innores. Forexample, it wouldwant to examine the historyand character fant care, the concrete and variablecontexts where languagelearning and early identity formationoccurs. The point would be to uncover the actual empiricallinks between differentpracticesand differentsymbolic constructions of social identity. Moreover,an adequatepoliticalpsychologywouldsitcontext. uate the child carepracticesit studiesin their largersocial-structural It would try to understandthe connections, including the tensions, among factorsin society that contributeto the formation familialand extra-familial of sex and gender identity. Further,an adequatepolitical psychologywould attend to the experiencesand activities of the "post-Oedipal person."Here, the task would be to understandwhat social and economic relationstend to reinforceor resistearlysex and gendersocialization.Finally, an adequatepolitical psychologywould approachall of its inquirieswith a view to eventually are both possibleand dedeterminingwhat sortsof alternativearrangements sirable. In so doing, it would be committed to demystifyingthe patriarchalideological illusion that women's internalizedoppressionis inescapable.

NOTES
1. The criteriaI invoke here arenot the only relevantones. In addition, an adequatepolitical psychologymust be non-idealistic, that is, it must recognizethat social relationsof domination

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cannot be adequatelydefined in termsof ideationalor symbolicstructures.I do not discussthis criterionhere. 2. Lacaniantheorydoes not drawon the familiardistinction between sex and genderidentity featuresand gender accordingto which sexual identity is a function of differentiatingbiological identity is a function of sociallydefined meaningsand roles. For Lacan and his followers, sexual identity is itself a socially mediated phenomenon rather than a purelybiological datum. This view is reflected in Irigaray's claim that bodies are "sexualized as female [sexuefeminin]in and throughdiscourse"(Irigaray1985,90). Similarly, Kristevaassertsthat the categories'man' and 'woman'shouldbe viewed in termsof how biologicaland physiologicaldifferences are"translated by and translatea differencein the relationshipof subjects. . . to power, language,and meaning" (Kristeva1981,39). 3. Forpurposes of the presentdiscussion,it is not necessaryto take up the questionof the accuracyof Irigaray's readingof Marx. Let me simply suggestthat it strikesme as suspect. and Levi-Strauss 4. It should be noted that bothIrigaray give circularanswersto the question of why women ratherthan men are the objects of exchange. 5. In "Womenon the Market,"Irigaray uses the rhetoricalstrategyshe calls "mimickry"-a deliberateimitationof male-generated discoursethat aimsto flauntor parodyits androcentric biases. However, her essayas a whole is not a parody.The analogyit developsbetween oedipalization and commodificationis taken seriouslyby Irigaray,who also invokes it elsewhere. 6. For an extended argumentagainst the claim that all cultureshave been male-dominated, see Leacock(1982). Duley and Edwards literature (1986, 26-47) review currentanthropological on this issue. Millett (1971) and Firestone(1971) contain classicfeministcriticismsof Freudon the universalityof the Oedipus complex. Leach (1970) providesan accessiblecritical analysis account of the elementarystructures of kinship. (basedon ethnographicdata ) of Levi-Strauss's 7. Ortner(1974) invokes Levi-Strauss, amongothers, in developingthe claim that in all societies, culturehas been associatedwith masculinityand naturewith femininity. Foranthropological criticismsof this claim, see Ortner and Whitehead (1981). 8. In moder industrialized relationscannot be adequately charactersocieties, even marriage ized as an exchange of women (daughtersand wives) by men (fathersand husbands).Although some marriage ceremoniesinclude a symbolicgesturein which a father"givesaway"his daughter to some other man'sson, marriage is apt to be seen by its participants as an emotional, religious, or legal contract between free individuals.This perception is not without ideological components that maskthe extent to which marriage as an institutionis oppressive to women. Nonetheis basedon the exchangeof women by men hardlysufficesto capture less, the claim that marriage the complexityof this institution, includingthe ideologicaldimensionsthat may contributeto a woman'spsychologicaloppression. 9. Ragland-Sullivan(1986, 267-280) criticizes Irigaray,among others, for reading Lacan substantivelyratherthan structurally by equatingLacan'sSymbolic Orderwith patriarchyand the Oedipalstructure with the alienation of women'sdesireunderpatriarchy. On my interpretadoes not misread mattersshe believes he tion, in contrast, Irigaray Lacan;rather,she foregrounds slightedor overlooked,for example, the universalityof male dominationand the role playedby the Oedipalstructurein women'soppression.Thus unlike Ragland-Sullivan,Irigaray rejectsthe claim that the "Lacanian phallic signifier[is]neutralin its own right"(273) ratherthan an artifact or emblem of male domination. 10. I am assumingthat Lacan'snotion of "the mirror stage"is best understood metaphorically and that it is earlymaternalidentification, ratherthan a mirrorimage, that is at the base of the pre-Oedipal"moi." 11. I have not discussedtwo assumptions central to understanding Kristeva's claim that both mother and father identification are undesirable.The first, relativelyuncontroversialassumption, is that psychosisis undesirable.The second, more controversialassumption,is that the rejection by women of so-called "feminine" in favor of "masculine"attributes is undesirable. Kristeva's"Women'sTime" (1981) contains a useful discussionof this second assumption. 12. Kristeva's Des Chinoises(1974) is an extended argumentfor this claim. 13. Although the sex and genderstructuring of our psychiclives begins in earlychildhood, it does not end there. The social institutionsand practicesthat tend to reinforceor resistchildhood sex and gender-structuring shouldbe of specialinterestto feministsconcernedwith psychological oppression.

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14. The phrase "a woman's lived experience"does not denote a substratum of experience unmediatedby representations. My point is that our experienceor perceptionof realitydoes not of it. alwaysconform to patriarchal representations 15. See Whitford (1988) for an interpretationof Luce Irigaray along these lines. 16. Kristevadoes not deny that it is importantfor women to fight againstspecificsocial and economic oppressions.But she does not consider this fight genuinely revolutionaryunless it is also a fight against the psychologicallyrepressivecharacterof the Symbolic Order. She views feminist politics as partof a broader culturalrevolt, exemplifiedby the avant-garde revolutionary in literature,painting, and music, againstthe inhibitionsand prohibitionsof the social-symbolic order. 17. Kristevadoes have a vision of a better worldwhich is less repressive,less body-and pleasand "equalizing" than our own. However, this vision can never ure-denying,less "totalizing" find effective socialand institutional realizationif revolutionary political practiceis limited to perpetual demystificationof the statusquo. In part, it is becausethe realizationof her political vision seems to be confined to the "corporealand desiringspace" of individualsthat Eagleton (1983), Moi (1985), and others have labelled Kristeva's politics of negation or rejection "individualisticanarchism".

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. 1980b. Oscillation between power and denial. 1974. In New French feminisms. Ed. Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron. New York: Schocken. . 1981. Le temps des femmes. 1979. Women's time. Trans. Margaret Waller. Signs7, 13-35. in poeticlandu langage . 1984. La revolution poetique.1974. Revolution Waller. New York:ColumbiaUniversity Press. guage.Trans. Margaret . 1986. Des chinoises. 1974. Excerpted as About Chinese Women. Reader.Ed. Toril Moi. New York: Trans. Sean Hand. In The Kristeva ColumbiaUniversity Press, 138-159. Lacan, Jacques. 1954-55. SeminaireII. Paris:Editionsdu Seuil. . 1956. "De l'usage de la parole et des structuresde langage dans la In La psychanalyse, vol. conduite et dans le champ de la psychanalyse." 1, 202-55. . 1977. Ecrits.1966. Ecrits:a selection. Trans. and ed. Alan Sheridan. New York:Norton. New York:The Viking Press. Leach, Edmund. 1970. ClaudeLevi-Strauss. New York:MonthlyReLeacock,EleanorB. 1982. Mythsof maledomination. view Press. de la parente.Trans. elementaires Levi-Strauss,Claude. 1969. Les structures structures Boston: Beacon Press. 1949. The elementary of kinship. Karl works. 3. and Frederick Collected Vol. New York: 1975. Marx, Engels. InternationalPublishers. Millett, Kate. 1971. Sexualpolitics.New York:Avon. andfeminism.New York:Vintage Mitchell, Juliet. 1974. Psychoanalysis Toril. 1985. Sexual/textual Moi, politics.London:Methuen. Is female to male as nature is to culture?In Women, Ortner, Sherry. 1974. and M.Z. Ed. Rosaldoand L. Lamphere.Palo Alto: Stanculture, society. ford University Press. the culOrtner, Sherryand HarrietWhitehead, eds. 1981. Sexualmeanings: turalconstruction andsexuality. New York:Cambridge of gender University Press. Ellie. 1986. Jacques Lacanandthephilosophy Ragland-Sullivan, of psychoanalysis. Chicago: University of Illinois Press. Rubin, Gayle. 1975. The trafficin women: Notes on the political economy of sex. In Towardan anthropology of women.Ed. RaynaR. Reiter. New York:Monthly Review Press, 157-210. Whitford, Margaret.1988. Luce Irigaray's critiqueof rationality.In Feminist perspectives in philosophy. Ed. Morwenna Griffiths and Margaret Whitford. Bloomington:IndianaUniversity Press, 109-130.

The Body Politics of Julia Kristeva

JUDITH BUTLER

Julia Kristevaattemptsto exposethe limitsof Lacan'stheoryof language by the semiotic dimension thatit excludes.She arguesthat the of language revealing is subversive, and describes thesemiotic as a poeticsemiotic of language potential thesymbolic, thatdisrupts understood as culturally intelmaternal practice linguistic thatthesemiotic conteststhe rule-governed speech.In thecourseof arguing ligible several moveswhichendup Kristeva makes theoretical universality of theSymbolic, thepowerof the Symbolic and paternal She deconsolidating authority generally. a a instinct as maternal naturalizpre-discursive necessity, thereby biological fends In heruse of psychoanalytic thecultural of maternity. configuration inga specific the cultural lesbianism. Her distinction she ends of ory, unintelligibility up claiming a cultural and theSymbolic to foreclose thesemiotic between investigation operates a pre-diswhich claims she those into thegenesisof precisely feminine principles for that she claims the maternal naturalistic cursive, Although aspects of lanontology. in a critical and are of displacing speech provide possibility guage repressed Symbolic herverydescriptions thehegemony of thematernal appear of thepaternal/symbolic, In concluto acceptratherthancontestthe inevitable hegemony of the Symbolic. in Kristeva discourse sion, thisessayoffersa genealogical critique of the maternal not a to does constitute subversive recourse the maternal and suggests that strategy to assume. as Kristeva appears

Kristeva's theory of the semiotic dimension of languageat first appearsto engage Lacanianpremisesonly to expose their limits and to offer a specifically feminine locus of subversionof the paternallaw within language.According to Lacan, the paternal law structuresall linguistic signification, termed "the symbolic", and so becomes a universalorganizingprinciple of culture itself. This law creates the possibilityof meaningfullanguageand, hence, meaningful experience, through the repressionof primarylibidinal drives, includingthe radicaldependencyof the child on the maternalbody. Hence, the symbolic becomes possible by repudiatingthe primaryrelationwho emergesas a consequence of ship to the maternalbody. The "subject" this repressionitself becomes a beareror proponent of this repressivelaw. of that earlydependencyis now fully conThe libidinalchaos characteristic strainedby a unitaryagent whose languageis structured by that law. This lanHypatiavol. 3, no. 3 (Winter 1989) ? by Judith Butler

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the worldby suppressing multiplemeanings(which guage, in turn, structures which characterized the primary libidinal relarecall the multiplicity always tion to the maternalbody) and instatingunivocal and discretemeaningsin their place. Kristeva challenges the Lacanian narrative which assumesthat cultural meaningrequiresthe repressionof that primary relationshipto the maternal is a dimension of languageoccasioned She that the "semiotic" body. argues which maternal not refutes Lacan'sprimary that body only by primary prema source of subversion within the symbolic. but which serves as ise, perpetual ForKristeva,the semiotic expressesthat originallibidinalmultiplicitywithin the very terms of culture, more precisely, within poetic languagein which multiple meanings and semantic non-closureprevail. In effect, poetic language is the recoveryof the maternalbody within the termsof language,one that has the potential to disrupt,subvert, and displace the paternallaw. Despite her critique of Lacan, however, Kristeva'sstrategyof subversion provesdoubtful. Her theory appearsto depend upon the stabilityand reproduction of preciselythe paternallaw that she sought to displace. Although she effectivelyexposesthe limits of Lacan'seffortsto universalize the paternal law in language, she nevertheless concedes that the semiotic is invariably subordinate to the symbolic, that it assumesits specificitywithin the termsof which is immuneto challenge. If the semioticpromotesthe possia hierarchy of the paternallaw, what bility of the subversion,displacement,or disruption can those terms if have the its hegemony? meanings symbolicalwaysreasserts The criticism of Kristevawhich follows takes issue with several different steps in Kristeva'sargumentin favor of the semiotic as a source of effective subversion.First, it is unclearwhetherthe primary relationshipto the maternal bodywhich both Kristevaand Lacanappearto accept is a viable construct and whether it is even a knowableexperienceaccordingto either of their linthe semiotic constitute guistic theories. The multipledrivesthat characterize a pre-discursive libidinaleconomy which occasionallymakesitself known in language,but which maintainsan ontological statuspriorto languageitself. Manifest in language, in poetic language in particular,this prediscursive libidinaleconomy becomes a locus of culturalsubversion.A second problem emergeswhen Kristevamaintainsthat this libidinalsourceof subversioncannot be maintained within the terms of culture, that its sustainedpresence leadsto psychosisand to the breakdown of culturallife itself. Kristevathus alternatelyposits and denies the semiotic as an emancipatoryideal. Though she tells us that it is a dimensionof languageregularly she also conrepressed, cedes that it is a kind of languagewhich can never be consistently maintained. In orderto assessher seeminglyself-defeatingtheory, we need to ask how this libidinalmultiplicitybecomesmanifestin language,and what conditions its temporary lifespanthere?Moreover,Kristevadescribesthe maternalbody

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as bearinga set of meaningsthat are priorto cultureitself. She therebysafeguardsthe notion of cultureas a paternalstructureand delimits maternityas an essentiallypre-cultural reality. Her naturalisticdescriptionsof the maternal body effectivelyreifymotherhoodand precludean analysisof its cultural constructionand variability.In askingwhethera pre-discursive libidinalmulwill we is we also consider what claim to discover whether tiplicity possible, in the pre-discursive maternalbody is itself a productionof a given historical discourse,an effect of culture ratherthan its secret and primarycause. Even if we accept Kristeva's drives, it is unclearthat the theoryof primary subversiveeffectsof such drivescan serve, via the semiotic, as anythingmore and futile disruptionof the hegemonyof the paternallaw. I than a temporary will try to show how the failureof her political strategyfollows in part from her largelyuncriticalappropriation of drive theory. Moreover,upon careful scrutinyof her descriptionsof the semiotic function within language, it appearsthat Kristevareinstatesthe paternallaw at the level of the semiotic itself. In the end, Kristevaoffersus a strategyof subversionthat can never become a sustainedpolitical practice. In the final section of this paper, I will suggesta way to reconceptualizethe relation between drives, language,and which might serve a moreeffective strategyof subverpatriarchal prerogative sion. Kristeva's descriptionof the semiotic proceedsthrougha numberof problematic steps. She assumesthat drives have aims prior to their emergence or sublimatesthese drives, into language, that languageinvariablyrepresses and that such drives are manifestonly in those linguistic expressionswhich of significationwithin the symdisobey,as it were, the univocal requirements bolic domain. She claims furtherthat the emergenceof multiplicitousdrives into languageis evident in the semiotic, that domain of linguistic meaning distinct from the symbolic, which is the maternalbody manifest in poetic speech. in PoeticLanguage As earlyas Revolution (1974), Kristevaarguedfor a necthe between relation causal heterogeneityof drivesand the plurivocal essary of possibilities poetic language. Differingfrom Lacan, she maintainedthat drives. On poetic languagewas not predicatedupon a repressionof primary the contrary, poetic language, she claimed, is the linguistic occasion on which drivesbreakapartthe usual, univocal termsof languageand reveal an heterogeneityof multiplesoundsand meanings.Kristevathereby irrepressible Lacan's contested equation of the symbolicwith all linguisticmeaningby assertingthat poetic languagehas its own modalityof meaningwhich does not of univocal designation. conform to the requirements to a notion of free or uncathectedenergy subscribed she In this same work, in known itself which makes language through the poetic function. She ". . . in the interminglingof drives in language that for instance, claimed, and that in this economy, . . we shall see the economy of poetic language"

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"the unitarysubject can no longer find his place" (1984, 132). This poetic function is a rejective or divisive linguisticfunction which tends to fracture and multiplymeanings;it enacts the heterogeneityof drivesthroughthe proliferationand destructionof univocal signification.Hence, the urgetowarda highly differentiatedor plurivocalset of meaningsappearsas the revenge of drives against the rule of the symbolic which, in turn, is predicatedupon their repression.Kristevadefines the semiotic as the multiplicity of drives manifest in language. With their insistent energy and heterogeneity, these drives disruptthe signifyingfunction of language.Thus, in this early work, she definesthe semiotic as "the signifyingfunction . .. connected to the modality [of] primaryprocess." In the essaysthat compriseDesirein Language (1977) Kristevagroundher definition of the semiotic more fully in psychoanalyticterms. The primary drives that the symbolic repressesand the semiotic obliquely indicates are now understoodas maternaldrives,not only those drives belonging to the the dependencyof the infant'sbody (of mother, but those which characterize either sex) on the mother. In other words, "the maternalbody"designatesa relation of continuity rather than a discrete subject or object of desire; which precedesdesireand the subject/obindeed, it designatesthat jouissance that desire ject dichotomy presupposes.While the symbolic is predicated the the of mother, the refusalof the mother as an object of upon rejection sexual love, the semiotic, through rhythm, assonance, intonations, sound play and repetition, re-presents or recovers the maternal body in poetic in psyspeech. Even the "first echolalias of infants" and the "glossalalias chotic discourse"are manifestationsof the continuity of the mother-infant relation, a heterogeneousfield of impulsepriorto the separation/individuation of infant and mother, alike effectedby the impositionof the incest taboo (1980, 135). The separationof the motherand infanteffectedby the taboo is expressed linguistically as the severing of sound from sense. In Kristeva's words, ". .. a phoneme, as distinctive element of meaning, belongs to language as symbolic. But this same phoneme is involved in rhythmic, intonational repetitions;it thereby tends towardautonomyfrom meaning so as to maintain itself in a semiotic disposition near the instinctual drive's body" (1980, 135). The semiotic is describedby Kristevaas destroying or erodingthe symbolic; it is saidto be "before" meaning, as when a child beginsto vocalize,or "after" meaningas when a psychoticno longeruses wordsto signify. If the symbolic and the semiotic are understoodas two modalities of language, and if the semiotic is understoodto be generallyrepressedby the symbolic, then language for Kristevais understoodas a system in which the symbolicremains hegemonic except when the semiotic disruptsits signifyingprocessthrough elision, repetition, mere sound, and the multiplicationof meaning through indefinitelysignifyingimagesand metaphors.In its symbolicmode, language

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restsupon a severanceof the relationof maternaldependency,wherebyit becomes abstract (abstractedfrom the materialityof language) and univocal; this is most apparent in quantitative or purely formal reasoning. In its semiotic mode, language is engaged in a poetic recovery of the maternal body, that diffusematerialitythat resistsall discrete and univocal signification. Kristevawrites, In any poetic language,not only do the rhythmicconstraints, for example,go so faras to violatecertaingrammatical rulesof a national language. . . but in recent texts, these semioticconstraints(rhythm, vocalic timbresin Symbolistwork, but also graphicdisposition on the page) are accompaniedby nonreto reconstitutethe coverablesyntacticelisions;it is impossible particularelided syntactic category (object or verb), which decidable. .. (1980, 134). makesthe meaningof the utterance ForKristeva,this undecidabilityis preciselythe instinctualmoment in language, its disruptivefunction. Poetic languagethus suggestsa dissolutionof the coherent, signifyingsubjectinto the primary continuity which is the matemal body: Languageas symbolicfunction constitutes itself at the cost of repressing instinctual drive and continuous relation to the mother. On the contrary,the unsettledand questionablesubject of poetic language(fromwhom the wordis never uniquely sign) maintainsitself at the cost of reactivatingthis repressed, instinctual, maternalelement. (1980, 136) of poetic languagearenot wholly approreferencesto the "subject" Kristeva's priate, for poetic languageerodesand destroysthe subject, where the subject is understoodas a speaking being participatingin the symbolic. Following Lacan, she maintainsthat the prohibitionagainstthe incestuousunion with the mother is the founding law of the subject, a foundationwhich seversor breaksthe continuousrelation of maternaldependence. In creatingthe subject, the prohibitivelaw createsthe domain of the symbolicor languageas a systemof univocallysignifyingsigns. Hence, Kristevaconcludesthat "poetic the equivalentof inlanguagewouldbe for its questionablesubject-in-process of The cest" (1980, 136). breaking symboliclanguageagainstits own founding law or, equivalently,the emergenceof ruptureinto languagefromwithin its own interiorinstinctualityis not merelythe outburstof libidinalheterogeneity into language;it also signifies the somatic state of dependence on the maternalbody priorto the individuationof the ego. Poetic languagethus always indicates a returnto the maternalterrain,where the maternalsignifies both libidinal dependence and the heterogeneityof drives.

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In "Motherhood Accordingto Bellini", Kristevasuggeststhat, becausethe maternalbody signifiesthe loss of coherent and discreteidentity, poetic languagevergeson psychosis.And in the case of a woman'ssemiotic expressions in language,the returnto the maternalsignifiesa pre-discursive homosexuality that Kristeva also clearly associates with psychosis. Although Kristeva concedes that poetic languageis sustainedculturallythroughits participation in the symbolicand, hence, in the normsof linguisticcommunicability,she fails to allow that homosexualityis capableof the same non-psychoticsocial view of the psychoticnatureof homosexualexpression.The key to Kristeva's I asity is to be understood, suggest, in her acceptance of the structuralist sumption that heterosexualityis coextensive with the foundingof the symbolic. Hence, the cathexis of homosexualdesirecan only be achieved, according to Kristeva,throughdisplacementsthat are sanctionedwithin the symbolic, such as poetic languageor the act of giving birth: By giving birth, the women enters into contact with her mother; she becomes, she is her own mother; they are the same continuity differentiatingitself. She thus actualizesthe homosexualfacet of motherhood, throughwhich a woman is closer to her instinctualmemory,moreopen to simultaneously her psychosis, and consequently, more negatoryof the social, symbolicbond. (1980, 239) reestablish Accordingto Kristeva,the act of giving birthdoes not successfully that continuous relation priorto individuationbecausethe infant invariably suffersthe prohibitionon incest and is separated off as a discreteidentity. In the case of the mother'sseparationfrom the girl-child, the result is melancholy for both, for the separationis never fully completed. As opposedto griefor mourning,in which separationis recognizedand the libido attachedto the originalobject is successfully displacedonto a new substitute object, melancholy designatesa failureto grieve in which the loss is Insteadof negatingthe attachand, in that sense, refused. simplyinternalized ment to the body, the maternalbody is internalized as a negation, so that the becomes itself a kind of loss, a characteristic girl'sidentity privationor lack. The alleged psychosis of homosexuality, then, consists in its thorough breakwith the paternallaw and with the groundingof the female "ego",tenuous though it may be, in the melancholic responseto separationfrom the maternalbody. Hence, accordingto Kristeva,female homosexualityis the emergenceof psychosisinto culture: The homosexual-maternal facet is a whirlof words,a complete absence of meaning and seeing; it is feeling, displacement, rhythm,sound, flashes, and fantasiedclinging to the maternal

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body as a screen againstthe plunge ... for woman, a paradise lost but seeminglyclose at hand. . . . (1980, 239-40). For women, however, this homosexuality is manifest in poetic language which becomes, in fact, the only form of the semiotic, besides childbirth, that can be sustainedwithin the terms of the symbolic. For Kristeva,then, overt homosexualitycannot be a culturallysustainableactivity, for it would constitute a breakingof the incest taboo in an unmediatedway. And yet why is this the case? Kristevaaccepts the assumptionthat cultureis equivalentto the symbolic, that the symbolic is fully subsumedunder the "Lawof the Father",and that the only modes of non-psychotic activity are those which participatein the symbolicto some extent. Her strategictask, then, is not to replacethe symbolic with the semiotic nor to establishthe semiotic as a rival culturalpossibility, but ratherto validate those experienceswithin the symbolicthat permit a manifestation of the borders which divide the symbolic from the semiotic. Just as birth is understoodto be a cathexis of instinctualdrivesfor of a social teleology, so poetic productionis conceived as the site the purposes in which the split between instinct and representationcoexist in culturally communicableform: The speakerreachesthis limit, this requisiteof sociality, only by virtue of a particular,discursivepractice called "art".A woman also attains it (and in our society, especially) through the strangeform of split symbolization(thresholdof language and instinctual drive, of the 'symbolic'and the 'semiotic') of which the act of giving birth consists. (1980, 240)2 Hence, for Kristeva, poetry and maternityrepresentprivilegedpractices within paternallysanctionedculturewhich permita nonpsychoticexperience of the maternalterrain. of the heterogeneityand dependencycharacteristic These acts of poesisreveal an instinctualheterogeneitythat exposes the repressedgroundof the symbolic, challengesthe masteryof the univocal signifier, and diffusesthe autonomyof the subjectwho posturesas their necessary ground.The heterogeneityof drivesoperatesculturallyas a subversivestrategy of displacement,one which dislodgesthe hegemony of the paternallaw multiplicityinteriorto languageitself. Preciselybeby releasingthe repressed in and throughthe cause that instinctualheterogeneitymust be re-presented but must remain the incest taboo it cannot law, altogether, defy paternal within the most fragileregionsof the symbolic. Obedient, then, to syntactithe poetic-materal practicesof displacingthe paternallaw cal requirements, alwaysremain tenuously tethered to that law. Hence, a full-scale refusalof the symbolicis impossible,and a discourseof 'emancipation',for Kristeva,is out of the question. At best, tactical subversionsand displacementsof the

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law challenge its self-grounding presumption.But, once again, Kristevadoes not seriouslychallenge the structuralist assumptionthat the prohibitivepateral law is foundationalto culture itself. Hence, the subversionof paternally sanctioned culture cannot come from another version of culture, but interiorof cultureitself, fromthe heterogeneonly fromwithin the repressed of drives that constitutes culture's concealed foundation. ity This relation between heterogeneousdrivesand the paternallaw produces an exceedinglyproblematicview of psychosis.On the one hand, it designates female homosexualityas a culturallyunintelligiblepractice, inherentlypsychotic; on the other hand, it mandatesmaternityas a compulsorydefense againstlibidinalchaos. Although Kristevadoes not makeeither claim explicitly, both implications follow from her views on the law, language, and drives. Considerthat for Kristeva,poetic languagebreaksthe incest taboo and, as such, vergesalwayson psychosis.As a returnto the maternalbodyand a concomitant de-individuation of the ego, poetic language becomes especially threateningwhen utteredby women. The poetic then contests not only the incest taboo, but the taboo againsthomosexualityas well. Poetic languageis thus, for women, both displacedmaternaldependencyand, becausethat dependency is libidinal, displacedhomosexualityas well. For Kristeva,the unmediatedcathexis of female homosexualdesire leads unequivocallyto psychosis. Hence, one can satisfythis drive only througha series of displacements:the incorporationof maternal identity, i.e. by becoming a mother oneself, or through poetic languagewhich manifestsobof maternaldependency.As liquelythe heterogeneityof drivescharacteristic the only sociallysanctionedand, hence, non-psychoticdisplacements for homosexual desire, both maternityand poetry constitute melancholic experiences for women appropriately acculturated into heterosexuality.The heterosexual poet-mothersuffersinterminably from the displacementof the homosexual cathexis. And yet, the consummationof this desirewould lead to the psychotic unravelingof identity, accordingto Kristeva.The presumptionis that, for women, heterosexuality and coherent selfhood are indissolubly linked. How are we to understandthis constitution of lesbian experience as the site of an irretrievable self-loss?Kristevaclearly takes heterosexualityto be to prerequisite kinship and to culture. Consequently, she identifies lesbian experienceas the psychotic alternativeto the acceptanceof paternallysanctioned laws. And yet why is lesbianismconstituted as psychosis?Fromwhat culturalperspectiveis lesbianismconstructedas a site of fusion, self-loss, and psychosis? lesbian By projectingthe lesbian as "other"to culture, and characterizing Kristevaconstructslesbiansexualspeech as the psychotic "whirl-of-words", ity as intrinsicallyunintelligible. This tactical dismissaland reductionof les-

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bian experience performedin the name of the law positions Kristevawithin the orbit of pateral-heterosexual privilege. The paternallaw which protects her from this radical incoherence is preciselythe mechanismthat produces the construct of lesbianismas a site of irrationality.Significantly, this descriptionof lesbianexperience is effected fromthe outside, and tells us more about the fantasies that a fearful heterosexual culture produces to defend againstits own homosexualpossibilitiesthan about lesbianexperience itself. In claiming that lesbianismdesignatesa loss of self, Kristevaappearsto be necessaryfor individudeliveringa psychoanalytictruth about the repression to homosexualityis, then, a fearof losation. The fear of such a 'regression' ing culturalsanction and privilegealtogether.Although Kristevaclaims that this loss designatesa place priorto culture, there is no reasonnot to underculturalform. In other words, Kristeva stand it as a new or unacknowledged as libidinalstate priorto acto lesbian prefers explain experience a regressive culturationitself ratherthan to take up the challenge that lesbianismoffersto her restrictedview of paternallysanctionedculturallaws. Is the fearencoded in the constructionof the lesbianas psychoticthe resultof a developmentally necessitatedrepression,or is it, rather, the fear of losing culturallegitimacy and, hence, being cast-not outsideor priorto culture-but outside cultural still within culture, but culturally"out-lawed"? legitimacy, Kristevadescribesboth the maternalbody and lesbian experience from a position of sanctioned heterosexualitythat fails to acknowledgeits own fear of losing that sanction. Her reificationof the paternallaw not only repudiates female homosexuality, but denies the varied meanings and possibilitiesof motherhood as a cultural practice. But culturalsubversion is not really Kristeva'sconcern, for subversion, when it appears,emergesfrom beneath the surfaceof cultureonly inevitablyto returnthere. Although the semiotic is a possibilityof languagethat escapesthe paternallaw, it remainsinevitably of that law. Hence, poetic language within or, indeed, beneath the territory and the pleasuresof maternityconstitute local displacementsof the paternal subversionswhich finally submit to that againstwhich they law, temporary initially rebel. By relegatingthe sourceof subversionto a site outside of culture itself, Kristevaappearsto foreclosethe possibilityof subversionas an effective or realizableculturalpractice. Pleasurebeyond the paternallaw can only be imaginedtogether with its inevitable impossibility. Kristeva'stheory of thwarted subversionis premisedon her problematic view of the relationbetween drives, languageand the law. Her postulationof a subversivemultiplicityof drivesraisesa numberof epistemologicaland political questions. In the first place, if these drives are only manifest in languageor culturalformsalreadydeterminedas symbolic,then how is it that we can verify their pre-symbolicontological status?Kristevaarguesthat poetic languagegives us access to these drivesin their fundamentalmultiplicity,but this answeris not fully satisfactory.Since poetic languageis said to depend

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upon the priorexistence of these multiplicitousdrives, we cannot, then, in circularfashion, justify the postulatedexistence of these drives through refor languageto excourseto poetic language.If drivesmust firstbe repressed ist, and if we can only attributemeaning to that which is representablein language, then to attributemeaning to drivesprior to their emergence into languageis impossible.Similarly,to attributea causalityto driveswhich fainto languageand by which languageitself is to cilitates their transformation be explained cannot reasonablybe done within the confines of languageitself. In other words, we know these drives as 'causes'only in and through their effects and, as such, we have no reasonfor not identifyingdriveswith their effects. It follows that either (a) drives and their representationsare coextensive or (b) representations preexist the drives themselves. This last alternative is, I would argue, an importantone to consider, for how do we know that the instinctual object of Kristeva's discourseis not a construction of the discourse itself? And what grounds do we have for positing this object, this multiplicitousfield, as priorto signification?If poetic languagemust participatein the symbolicin orderto be culturallycomown theoreticaltexts areemblematicof the symmunicable,and if Kristeva's bolic, then where are we to find a convincing 'outside'to this domain?Her postulation of a pre-discursive corporealmultiplicity becomes all the more when we discover that maternaldrives are consideredpart of a problematic and are themselves manifestationsof "a non-symbolic, "biologicaldestiny" 2 This non-paternal causality". presymbolic nonpaternal causality is, for a maternal Kristeva, semiotic, causalityor, more specifically, a teleological of maternal instincts: conception Materialcompulsion,spasmof a memorybelongingto the species that either binds together or splits apartto perpetuateitwith no other significancethan the eterself, seriesof markers nal returnof the life-deathbiological cycle. How can we verbalize this prelinguistic,unrepresentable memory?Heraclitus' flux, Epicurus' atoms, the whirling dust of cabalic, Arab and Indian mystics, and the stippled drawingsof psychedelicsall seem better metaphorsthan the theoryof Being, the logos, and its laws. maternalbody is not only the locus of multipledrives, Here, the repressed but also the bearerof a biologicalteleology, one which, it seems, makesitself evident in the early stagesof Western philosophy, in non-Westernreligious beliefs and practices, in aesthetic representations producedby psychotic or artisticpractices.But why are states, and even in avant-garde near-psychotic we to assumethat these variousculturalexpressionsmanifest the self-same principle of maternal heterogeneity? Kristevasimply subordinateseach of these cultural moments to the same principle. Consequently, the semiotic

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representsany cultural effort to displace the Logos (which, curiously, she contrastswith Heraclitus' flux), where the Logos represents the univocal signifier, the law of identity. Her opposition between the semiotic and the between the principleof mulsymbolicreduceshere to a metaphysical quarrel that the of and a principleof idennon-contradiction charge tiplicity escapes based on the of that tity suppression multiplicity.Oddly, that very principle of multiplicitythat Kristevaeverywheredefendsoperatesin much the same way as a principle of identity. Note the way in which all mannerof things to the principleof the 'primitive'and 'oriental'are summarilysubordinated the chargeof orienmaternalbody. Surely, her descriptionnot only warrants talism, but raisesthe very significantquestionwhether, ironically,multiplicity has become a univocal signifier. Her ascriptionof a teleological aim to maternaldrivespriorto their constitution in languageor cultureraisesa numberof questionsaboutKristeva's political program.Although she clearlysees subversiveand disruptivepotential in those semiotic expressionsthat challenge the hegemony of the paternal law, it is less clear in what preciselythis subversionconsists. If the law is understoodto rest on a constructedground, beneath which lurksthe repressed maternalterrain, what concrete culturaloptions emergewithin the termsof cultureas a consequenceof this revelation?Ostensibly, the multiplicityassociated with the maternal libidinal economy has the force to disperse the univocity of the paternalsignifier, and seeminglyto create the possibilityof other culturalexpressionsno longer tightly constrainedby the law of noncontradiction.But is this disruptiveactivity the opening of a field of significations, or is it the manifestationof a biologicalarchaismwhich operatesaccorcausality?If Kristevabelieved that the ding to a natural and "prepatemal" does case she were the former (and not), then she would be interestedin a field of cultural in favor of a proliferating law displacementof the paternal a return a of to principle maternalhetpossibilities.But insteadshe prescribes erogeneitywhich provesto be a closed concept, indeed, a heterogeneityconfined by a teleology both unilinear and univocal. Kristevaunderstandsthe desire to give birth as a species-desire,part of a collective and archaicfemale libidinaldrivethat constitutesan ever recurring metaphysicalprinciple. Here Kristevareifies maternityand then promotes this reificationas the disruptivepotential of the semiotic. As a result, the paternal law, understoodas the groundof univocal signification,is displacedby an equally univocal signifier, the principle of the maternalbody which remanifesof its "multiplicitous" mains self-identicalin its teleology regardless tations. Insofaras Kristevaconceptualizesthis maternalinstinct as having an ontological statuspriorto the paternallaw, she fails to considerthe way in which Rather that law might well be the causeof the very desireit is said to repress. to these attest desiresmight than the manifestationof a prepatemalcausality,

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by the exigencies of maternityas a social practicerequiredand recapitulated of the Kristeva Levi-Strauss' exchange of women as analysis kinship. accepts of bonds. She understands this exconsolidation for the kinship prerequisite as the cultural moment which in the maternal however, body is rechange, the cultural construction rather than as a mechanism for compulsory pressed of the female body as a maternalbody. Indeed, we might understand the exon women's to a bodies of women as change obligation imposing compulsory Rubin's of efto reading Levi-Strauss,kinship reproduce.According Gayle fects a "sculpting of. . . sexuality"such that the desireto give birth is the result of social practiceswhich requireand producesuch desiresin orderto effect their reproductiveends (Rubin 1975, 182). What grounds,then, does Kristevahave for imputinga maternalteleology to the female body priorto its emergenceinto culture?To pose the question in this way is alreadyto question the distinction between the symbolicand the semiotic on which her conception of the maternalbodyrests.The maternal body in its originarysignificationis consideredby Kristevato be priorto signification itself; hence, it becomes impossiblewithin her frameworkto consider the maternal itself as a signification, open to cultural variability. Her argumentmakesclear that maternaldrivesconstitutethose primary processes that languageinvariablyrepresses or sublimates.But perhapsher argument could be recast within an even more encompassingframework: what culturalconfigurationof language,indeed, of discourse, generatesthe tropeof a pre-discursive libidinal multiplicity, and for what purposes? By restricting the paternal law to a prohibitive or repressivefunction, Kristevafails to understandthe paternalmechanismsby which affectivityitself is generated.The law that is said to repressthe semiotic may well be the governingprincipleof the semiotic itself, with the resultthat what passesas "maternal instinct"maywell be a culturallyconstructeddesirewhich is interpretedthrougha naturalisticvocabulary.And if that desireis constructedaccording to a law of kinship which requiresthe heterosexualproductionand reproductionof desire, then the vocabularyof naturalisticaffect effectively rendersthat "paternal law"invisible. What Kristevarefersto as a "pre-paternal causality"would then appearas a paternal causalityunder the guise of a naturalor distinctively maternalcausality. Significantly, the figurationof the maternalbody and the teleology of its instinctsas a self-identicaland insistentmetaphysical principle-an archaism of a collective, sex-specificbiologicalconstitution-bases itself on a univocal conception of the femalesex. And this sex, conceived as both originand causality, poses as a principle of pure generativity. Indeed, for Kristeva, it is is equatedwith poesisitself, the activity of makingthat in Plato'sSymposium held to be an act of birth and poetic conception at one. 3 But is female generativity truly an uncaused cause, and does it begin the narrativethat takes all of humanityunder the force of the incest taboo and into language?

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Does the prepatemalcausalitywhereof Kristevaspeakssignify a primaryfemale economy of pleasureand meaning?Can we reversethe veryorderof this this semiotic economy as a productionof a priordiscausalityand understand course? In the final chapterof Foucault's firstvolumeof TheHistory he of Sexuality, cautions against using the category of sex as a "fictitious unity . . . [and] causalprinciple",and arguesthat the fictitiouscategoryof sex facilitatesa reversalof causalrelationssuch that "sex"is understoodto cause the structure and meaning of desire: . . . the notion of 'sex' made it possibleto grouptogether, in an artificialunity, anatomicalelements, biological functions, conducts, sensations, and pleasures, and it enabled one to make use of this fictitious unity as a causalprinciple, an omnipresent meaning: sex was thus able to function as a unique signifierand as a universalsignified. (1980, 154). ForFoucault,the body is not 'sexed'in any significantsense priorto its determinationwithin a discoursethroughwhich it becomes investedwith an 'idea' of naturalor essential sex. As an instrumentand effect of power, the body only gains meaningwithin discoursein the context of powerrelations. Sexuality is an historicallyspecific organizationof power, discourse,bodies, and by Foucaultto produce'sex' as an affectivity.As such, sexualityis understood artificialconcept which effectively extends and disguisesthe powerrelations responsiblefor its genesis. Foucault'sframework suggestsa way to solve some of the epistemological view of the female body. and political difficultiesthat follow from Kristeva's assertionof a "prepatemal We can understandKristeva's causality"as fundaKristeva a maternal Whereas inverted. body priorto discourse posits mentally of drives, I wouldarguethat which exerts its own causalforce in the structure is a tactic in the discursiveproductionof the maternalbody as pre-discursive the self-amplificationand concealment of those specific power relations by which the trope of the maternalbody is produced.Then the maternalbody would no longerbe understoodas the hidden groundof all signification, the tacit causeof all culture. It wouldbe understood,rather,as an effect or conseto assume quence of a systemof sexualityin which the femalebody is required its self and the law of desire. of its as essence the maternity the mawe are compelledto redescribe Fromwithin Foucault's framework, of a an as libidinal ternal historicallyspecific organization economy product of sexuality. Moreover,the discourseof sexuality, itself suffused by powerrematernal the of the of true the becomes lations, pre-discursive ground trope the reversal: a formulation suffers Kristeva's symbolic thoroughgoing body. and the semiotic are no longer interpretedas those dimensionsof language which follow upon the repressionor manifestationof the maternallibidinal

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economy. This very economy is understoodinsteadas a reificationthat both extends and conceals the institution of motherhood as compulsory for women. Indeed, when the desires that maintain the institution of motheras prepatemaland precultural hood are transvaluated drives, then the instituof the female tion gains a permanentlegitimation in the invariantstructures and the law that sanctions requiresthe female clearlypaternal body. Indeed, in function is interms of its be characterized to reproductive body primarily as the law of its natural And scribedon that body Kristeva,safenecessity. guardingthat law of a biologicallynecessitatedmaternityas a subversiveoperationthat preexiststhe paternallaw itself, aidsin the systematicproduction of its invisibility and, consequently, the illusion of its inevitability. In conclusion, becauseKristevarestrictsherselfto an exclusivelyprohibitive conception of the paternal law, she is unable to account for the ways in which the paternallaw generates certain desiresin the formof naturaldrives. The femalebody that she seeks to expressis itself a constructproducedby the very law it is supposed to undermine. In no way do these criticisms of Kristeva'sconception of the paternal law necessarilyinvalidate her general position that culture or the symbolic is predicated upon a repudiationof women'sbodies. I want to suggest,however, that any theory that assertsthat of a female principle significationis predicatedupon the denial or repression to consider whether that femaleness is to the cultural external ought really normsby which it is repressed.In other words,on my reading,the repression of the feminine does not requirethat the agencyof repressionand the object of repression be ontologicallydistinct. Indeed, repression may be understood to producethe object that it comes to deny. That productionmaywell be an elaborationof the agency of repressionitself. As Foucaultmade clear, this culturallycontradictory enterpriseof repressionis prohibitiveand generative at once, and makes the problematicof 'liberation'especiallyacute. The female body that is freed from the shacklesof the paternallaw may well prove to be yet another incarnationof that law, posing as subversivebut operating in the service of that law's self-amplificationand proliferation.In order to avoid the emancipationof the oppressorin the name of the oppressed,it is necessaryto take into account the full complexityand subtletyof the law and to cureourselvesof the illusionof a truebody beyondthe law. If subversionis possible, it will be a subversionfromwithin the termsof the law, throughthe possibilitiesthat emergewhen the law turs against itself and spawnsunexpected permutationsof itself. The culturallyconstructedbody will then be liberated,not to its 'natural' past nor to its originalpleasures,but to an open futureof culturalpossibilities.

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NOTES
1. For an extremelyinterestinganalysisof reproductive metaphorsas descriptiveof the process of poetic creativity, see Wendy Owen, 1985. . .. of the spirit",he writesthat it is the 2. See Plato'sSymposium, 209a: of the "procreancy specificcapacityof the poet. Hence, poetic creationsare understoodas sublimatedreproductive desire.

REFERENCES

Foucault, Michel. 1980. The historyof sexuality.Vol. I. An introduction. Trans. Robert Hurley. New York:Vintage. in poeticlanguage. Trans. Margaret Walker. Kristeva,Julia. 1984. Revolution New York:Columbia University Press. a semiotic to literature andart. Trans. -- . 1980. Desirein language, approach ThomasGorz, Alice Jardin,Leon S. Roudiez.New York:ColumbiaUniversity Press. Owen, Wendy. 1985. A riddle in nine syllables:Femalecreativityin the poetry of Sylvia Plath. Ph.D. diss., Departmentof English. Yale University. Rubin, Gayle. 1975. The traffic in women: Notes on the "Political Econan anthropology of women. omy"of sex. In RaynaR. Reiter, ed., Toward New York:Monthly Review Press.

Introductionto Kofman's PhallocraticEnds" "Rousseau's

NANCY J. HOLLAND

Sarah Kofmancame to Berkeleyat a point in my graduatecareerwhen I was much in need of role models, and it might providesomethingof an introduction if I can accuratelyrepresentthe effect her lectureshad on me then. A small, intense woman, she would quietly enter the lecturehall or classroom, wait for the hour to begin, and then explode into an almost overwhelming of rapid-fire French. As she deconstructed both Freudand Nietzsche, barrage she used all those wordsthat I still found so hard to say: "phallus","penis", "vagina".Listeningto her, it became easier to see myself using those words and those methods in studyingphilosophicaltexts. In short, Sarah Kofman playeda significantrole in my becoming comfortableas a woman and a philosopherwho did deconstruction. Part of the problemof introducingKofman'swork to American philosophers, however, is exactly how to introducedeconstructionitself, since in this country it is most often seen as a literary,ratherthan a philosophical, insofaras deconstructionis theory. The confusion is perhapsunderstandable often presentedas a way of "reading" texts, not as a way of determiningtheir "truth".When the text that is "read"is Plato, Aristotle, or Kant, however, one calls the reading "literary", and hence irrelevantto the "truth"of the text, only at considerablerisk to both philosophyand literature. Kofman'schoice of Rousseauas a subject in the paper that follows only complicatesthis problem. Since Rousseauis most often considereda minor literary figurein the United States, Kofman's philosopher,or worse, a "mere" a with assumes Rousseau that many philosophersmay argument familiarity lack. This makes it difficult to evaluate her "reading",especially since the links between her conclusions and the text are occasionallysomewhat obscure. Furthermore, given what we do know about Rousseau and what Kofmanhas to say abouthim, one obviousquestionis why a feministphilosoRousseauat all. Kofmantells us why: she is interpher would want to "read" ested in supportinga thesis about how referencesto naturefunction in various phallocratic(that is, patriarchal)texts to rationalizeand naturalizethe subordination of women. That this processof rationalization can be shown to on irrational an rely very logical "phallacies" provides excellent example of the use of deconstructivemethod in the feminist"reading" of a philosophical text. vol. 3, no. 3 (Winter1989)? by NancyJ. Holland Hypatia

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Kofman's"reading"of Rousseau illustratesat least three common techniques of deconstructionwhich are closely relatedto Freud'smethod of psychoanalytic interpretation.First, there is her allusion to "cauldronlogic." The expressioncomes fromFreud's workon dreams,althoughhe himself uses this form of "logic"as often as anyone. The cauldronstory involves a borrowedcauldronthat is retured with holes in it. Asked about the holes, the borrower says: (1) "The holes were in it when I borrowedit"; (2) "Thereare no holes in the cauldron";and (3) "I never borrowedyour cauldron."This formof "protestingtoo much"frequentlyappearswhen a phallocratictext is confrontedwith its own internalinconsistencies:as in the psychoanalyticinof a dream, the logical "holes"aredenied in a multitudeof mututerpretation ally contradictoryways. Kofman exposes another form of patriarchal denial in what she calls that is, question-beggingargumentsthat are persuasivebecause "sophisms," the (male) audiencewants to believe them true. One obviouscase of this can be found almost every time (patriarchal)metaphysicshas proven that the sexes must be separatedand one sex secludedto create the restrictedsexual by our culture. There is never any areconomy (scarcityof pleasure)required gumentto show why it is womenwho mustbe cloistered,but simplythe claim that someone must be, and surelyis cannot be the men. Kofmanmakesthis point with regardto Rousseauin the following essay;elsewhereshe makes it with regardto Kant (1982) and Freud(1985) as well. Kofmanalso makesuse of a thirdformof argumentwhich should be familiarfromJohn StuartMill and HarrietTaylor'sTheSubjection of Women:if the and inferiority of women (or the aversionto incest or to homosubordination sexuality, to take two other frequentlycited cases) is "natural,"then why does (phallocratic)metaphysicsinsist that people must be madeto act in the for them to act?Why do these treatisesalwaysbecome way that it is "natural" Kofmanfinds this slide fromthe postulation well as as descriptive? prescriptive in of a natural"femininereserve"to women's"confinementon a reservation" of in The well as Rousseau. as and others, Freud,Kant, possibility "reading" such a large range of thinkers as exemplifying this fairly obvious logical "phallacy" (as well as the others mentioned above) is taken by feminist deconstructionto be the sign of a shareddenial that marksa deep anxiety in phallocraticmetaphysics. Having situated Kofman'swork in the context of deconstruction, it remainsnecessaryto situate it in the context of feministthought as well. While the successof her paperon Rousseauin exposingat least one facet of the idewomen will be clear to all who readit, its relationshipto ology that oppresses feminismis harderto characterize.One way to approachthis problemmight overvacuriouscomment that Rousseau's be throughKofman's compensatory makes his luation of women, his turning women into goddesses, phallocraaboutKant (1982) Since she makessimilarremarks tism a sort of "feminism."

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and Hegel (1981), it is importantto know exactly what kind of "feminism" she has in mind here. that KofmanattribThe most obvious meaningof the kind of "feminism" utes to Rousseauderives from the fact that deconstructionrejects any putative "overcoming" of metaphysicsthat would consist in a simple reversalof a hierarchy.This is becausea reversalwould only producea new metaphysical a new version of (phallocratic)metaphysics.Kofman, thereand hierarchy fore, is wary of an "essentialist" feminism that would reproduce the phallocraticovervaluationof women, and, so, remainpartof the same patriarchaltext. Women will have made no advance if their "feminism" follows Rousseau(or Kant or Hegel) in merelychanging which side of the goddess/ whore duality is to be emphasizedin the essentialculturaldefinition of femininity. At the same time, in her recently translated book on Freud (1985), Kofmanalso takes issuewith a kind of feminismthat would simplyreject the workof Freud,and of other phallocraticthinkers,without any regardfor the use that feminist thought might make of their insights in deconstructingthe metaphysicaltradition itself. She notes that Freud, like other phallocratic writers,forces women to play the role either of accomplicesof the Freudian logos,the word of the Father, or of criminals,outside the law createdby the Father's word. Kofmanrejectsthe view, which she attributes to LuceIrigaray, that the best response to this dilemma is to accept the role of criminal. Instead, she denies that there are only two options. Kofmanpoints out that we can choose a third course', namely, to use the deconstructivecharacterof Freud's workfor our own feministpurposes.Thus, she developswhat is really a psychoanalysis of Freud'swork on women. Turning one side of Freud againstthe other, she implies, allowsher more independencefromthe Freudian text than does a simple rebellion against it. What will American feminists make of Kofman'swork?Many of us share her deconstructivereservationsabout a feminist critique that tries to reject phallocraticmetaphysicsby appealingto a counter "truth"defined in traditional philosophicalterms. Many of us also shareher distastefor a new feminist "essentialism," which, in establishing,say, a mothergoddess,merelyreversesthe traditionalmetaphysicalhierarchies,or worseyet, leaves us, barefoot and pregnant again, on Rousseau'spedestal. Beyond that, however, many of us are ambivalentabout our relationshipto male discourse.Should we continue to teach and use, even if critically,the texts of Plato, Aristotle, Or shouldwe reDescartes,and Kant, not to mention Nietzsche and Freud? deconstruction ject them entirelybecauseof their phallocraticbias?Kofman's of Rousseaugives Americanreadersan opportunity to evaluatethe usefulness of her strategyof turningphallocraticdiscourseagainstitself. It suggeststhat, in simplyrejectingsuch discourses,we may depriveourselvesof usefulmethods for doing what we, as feministsand as philosophers,want and need to do.

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REFERENCES A partir du travail de Kofman,Sarah. 1981. "(a cloche" in Lesfinsde l'homme: Derrida.(89-112). Paris:Galilee. Jacques -. 1982. "The Economyof respect:Kant and respectfor women".Trans. Nicola Fisher,SocialResearch. 49:2. (383-404). (This is an excerptfrom desfemmes. 1982. Paris:Galilee.) Le Respect - . 1985. The Enigma of woman.Trans. CatherinePorter.Ithaca:Cornell University Press.

PhallocraticEnds Rousseau's
SARAH KOFMAN Translated by MARA DUKATS

thatwomen'sroleas mothers the KofmantracesRousseau's requires argument thatwomen'slustis subordination argument of womento men, and thecompanion the confinement a threatto the (male) socialorder,whichalsojustifies of women withinthehome.Shethenrelates theclaimthatwomenso confined exerta powerof with dominant,but maternal,women. theirown to Rousseau'seroticobsession is seento be botha reflection Thus, the "Nature"to whichRousseau appeals of his in its defense own specific natureand representative discourse of all phallocratic of maledomination.

knows it: Rousseauis very free in calling on Nature, on good Everybody MotherNature. It'salwaysin Her name that he coucheshis claims.Justas he and just as identifieswith his motherwho died bringinghim into the world;1 he attemptsto supplantthat one indispensable woman,2to bringher back to life by himself becomingwoman and mother;3so in the same way he tries to speakin the place of Nature, the motherof us all, the Naturewho is not dead even though her crieshave been muffledby the philosophyfashionablein the that Rousseau cities, that is, by an artificialand falsifyingculture.4It appears in this has understood her and has rushedto alone, voice, depravedcentury, the rescue in order to protect her from the fashionablephilosophers,who have joined forceswith those citified and denaturedwomen, women in name only, for they have become dolls and puppets, and have decked themselves out as a bastard sex. They areno longerwomen since they deny their one and only natural destiny: childbearing.Therefore, it is necessaryto resuscitate and disseminatenature'ssuppressed of their voice, remindingthese "women" one and only duty: motherhood. "Women have ceased to be mothers;they no longerwill be mothers;they no longerwant to be mothers."5 The family and the whole moralorderof societydependon this duty. "As soon as women become mothers again men will quickly become fathers and husbands" (Emile,p. 48). This single but fundamentalduty thus has multiple implications. Rousseauclaims to deduce from it the entire temperament,the entire physicaland moral constitution of women, as well as an entire educational program.For, in orderto conformto nature, the educationof women would have to differradicallyfrom that of men. vol. 3, no. 3 (Fall1988)? by Sarah Kofman Hypatia

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Thus, naturalteleology alone wouldlegitimateall the inequalitiesof develattributedto sexualdifference.However, insoopment, all the dissymmetries far as these dissymmetriesfavor the masculine sex, as they alwaysdo, we might wonderif good MotherNature doesn't serve as a mere pretext here, if the ends of Nature don't in fact dissimulatethe ends of man (vir), rationalizing his injusticesand violences. Several of Rousseau's texts come close to acknowledging this. In the "Entretiensurles romans"("Reflectionson the Novel"), which precedesthe second edition of La NouvelleHeloise(The New Heloise), he writes:"Letus give women their due: the cause of their disorderis less in themselvesthan in our faulty institutions."In "Surles femmes"("On Women"), his unfinished essay on the "Evenements importants dont les femmes ont ete la cause secr&te" events of which women were the secret cause"), Rous("Important seau accuses men of having preventedwomen from governingand thereby, fromdoing everythingthat they could have done in politics, moralsand literature. In all areasof life, the law of the strongesthas enabledmen to exercise a veritable tyrannyover women, preventing them from evincing their true virtues. Relatively speaking, women would have been able to present more and better examples of noble-mindednessand love of virtue than men, had our injusticenot deprivedthem of their liberty, and of the opportunityto manifest these qualities to the world. . . [I]fwomen had had as largea shareas we've had in handling affairsand governing empires, they might have carried heroism and courage to greaterheights and more of them might have distinguishedthemselves in this regard.6 Rousseau'sstory "LaReine fantasque"("The CapriciousQueen") shows, in a comic vein, how men alwaysexclude women from power. They prefer the stupidest man, even an animal, "a monkey or a wolf," to the wisest woman, since they think women should alwaysbe subject to men's will. It is probablynot just a coincidence that such writingsremainedunfinished, are considered "minor" and are usually ignored. Rousseau usually adoptsa very differentlanguage,a languageof Nature which partakesof the This is especiallythe case in Lettre d most traditionalphallocraticdiscourse.7 to as is on and Emile, where he "hardest" women, opposed La d'Alembert NouvelleHeloisewherehe adoptsa moreconciliatorytone.8 Thus, at the very moment when he claims to speakin the name of Nature, to oppose the "philosophers"and their prejudices,he can only repeatthe most hackneyedand symptomaticallymasculinist philosophical discourse. For example, that of Aristotle, who also claimed, of course, to write neutrallyand objectivelyand to found an intellectual, moraland political hierarchyon a naturalontological hierarchy.At the top of this hierarchyis divinity, followedby the philos-

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opher and men in general. As for woman, she ranksbelow the child of the masculinesex, for whereashe is male in potentiality, if not yet in actuality, she remainsbrandedthroughouther entire life with an "indelibleinferiority" because of her sex. She is and always will be a "mutilatedmale," even a "monster,"a flaw of nature, a male manque. Rousseaurepeats the discourseof Aristotle as well as that of the Bible, which, although it stems from another tradition, is no less phallocentric. to providea rationaldeductionof the So, in Book V of Emile,he purports temperament,constitution, duties and education of women. A sophistic argument, actually, in which the pseudo-voiceof Nature becomes the vehicle for the expressionof Rousseau's prejudices.It is significantthat the question of women and their education is not approacheduntil Book V. In the dramatic fiction of Emile,women are grantedonly one act of the play, the last one. This gesture is emblematicof the subordinationof woman-the weak sex, the second sex-to the strong sex-the sole referentand prototypefor humanity.It reenactsthe gestureof divine creationin which the firstwoman is made fromthe rib of the firstman, in which she is derivedfromhim and is createdfor him. It is not good for man to be alone; I shall makefor him a companion similarto him [Genesis11,8].It is not good that man be alone. Emile is a man;we promisedhim a companion;now we must give her to him [Emile,p. 465]. As a pedagogicalnovel, Emilesets out to re-createwomen so as to perfect and improve upon divine creation. An appropriate education, one in conwith should the of sort woman who can now only be nature, formity beget found in some mythical naturalpreserve,untouched by civilization-a wise and perfectwoman, Sophie, a womanwho knowshow to staywithin the limits Nature has assignedto her, in the place befitting her sex, subordinate to man, the one and only king of creation. Rousseautakes Sophie, not Eve or Lilith, as this model woman. Certainlynot those corruptand seductiveParisian women who are the sourceof all of men'swoes, those women who have failed to respect the natural hierarchybetween the sexes, who have abandoned their place and their reserve, who have aspiredto Knowledge, and who have not hesitated to show themselves in public and to mix with the other sex. Accordingto Rousseau,all disorders,abusesand perversions originate in the "scandalous confusion"of the sexes. Thus, Rousseau,in his divine magnanimity,gives Emile a companionand a helpmeet "madefor him" but not "similarto him." No, she must certainly not be "similar to him," and it will be up to educationto see to that, on pain of the direst disasters.For if it is true that "in everythingnot having to do with sex, the woman is a man," and that she contains within herselfa divine model just like he does, it is no less true that "in everythingthat does have to

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do with sex, . . . man and woman alwayshave both similaritiesand dissimilarities"[Emile,p. 465-66]. Thus, if it is to fulfill its naturaldestiny in the physical and moral order, each sex must be subject to its own sex-specific model. "A perfect man and a perfect woman must no more resembleeach other in mind than in face, and there is no such thing as being more or less perfect"[Emile,p. 466]. Although in Genesis,woman'sname (icha)derivesfromthat of man (ich), Rousseauis carefulnot to derive the name of the perfectwomanfromthat of the perfectman. Her name is not Emilie, but Sophie. In his overt discourse, he never claims to establish any derivation or hierarchy,only differences. Neither sex is to be superiorto the other, nor even comparable to the other. Each is to be perfect of its own kind, incomparableto the other insofaras they differ,equal to the other insofaras they are similar.If each remainedin the place nature assignedto it, perfectharmonyand happinesswould reign, just like at Clarens. The two sexes would then be like a single person: Woman would be the eye and man the arm. They wouldbe so dependenton one another that womanwould learnfromman what should be seen and man would learn from woman what must be done. . . . Each would follow the impetus of the other; each would obey and both would be masters[Emile,p. 492]. Although, shades of Aristotle, the temperaments, tastes, inclinations, tasksand duties of the two sexes varyas a function of their respectivenatural destinies, they nonetheless "participatein a common happiness"albeit by differentroutes [Emile,p. 466]. "Thisdivision of laborand of responsibilities is the strongestaspect of their union."9 "Commonhappiness,"he says. Yet this alleged equalitysurelyconceals a profoundhierarchicalinequality,a profoundunhappinesswhich can only be interpretedas happinessif one postulatesthat women enjoy subordination, subjectionand docility. And in fact, Rousseaudoes not recoil from asserting this. FollowingAristotle, he contends that women are made to obey. "Since dependence is women's naturalcondition, girls feel they are made to obey" [Emile,p. 482]. The rigidsegregationof sexes and the sexual division of laborresultin the extensive confinement of women. In the name of their naturaldestiny, they are condemned to a sedentaryand reclusive life in the shadowsof domestic enclosure.There they are excludedfrom knowledgeand public life. The latter are reservedfor men who are destined for the active life, life in the open airand in the sun. Thus Rousseau,as earlyas Book I of Emile,deemsthat, if a man were to engage in "a typical stay-at-homeand sedentaryoccupation" like sewingor some other "needletrade,"he wouldbe reducedto a crippleor a eunuch because these occupations"feminizeand weaken the body." They

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"dishonor the masculine sex" for "the needle and the sword cannot be wieldedby the samehands." (Moreover,in Book V, Hercules,forcedto spin near Omphale, is deemed, despite his strength, to be dominated by a woman.) How, then, does Rousseaujustifythe domesticlot of women and their confinement?He claims to groundthese in the feminine temperamentas he deduced it, in the most naturalway, in the beginning of Book V: In the union of the sexes, each contributesequallyto the common goal, but not in the same manner. From this diversity comes the firstmajordifferencebetween our moralrelationto the one and to the other. One shouldbe active and strong,the other passiveand weak. It follows that the one shouldbe willing and able; that the other shouldnot resisttoo much [Emile, p. 466]. And it seemsobvious that it is the womanwho mustbe passiveand weak and not the reverse.So obvious, in fact, that only the authorityof Aristotle can guaranteeit. "Once this principle is established,"-but is it?-it would follow naturallythat woman'sspecificfunction is to pleaseman and to be subjuhis adgated. Fromthat, in turn, it wouldfollow that woman should "resist" vances in order to be agreeable to man and to arouse his strength. Man, however, turs out not to be that strongsince an elaboratefeminine strategy is requiredto actualizehis potentiality, to awakenthe flamesof a ratherfeeble fire. Hence the audacityof the masculinesex and the timidityof the other sex, "the modestyand the shame with which Nature armedthe weak in orderto subjugatethe strong"[Emile,p. 467]. Timidity, modesty, decency, or again, reserve and a sense of shame These are the naturalvirtues, the cardinalvirtues,of women. This (pudeur). premiseis essentialto Rousseau's argument.Fromit he infers-not without a certainslippage-the necessityof confiningwomen. Fromtheir pseudo-natural reservehe deduces their forcible relocation to a reservation. Here, a sense of shame is cast as a brakegiven to the feminine sex in order to make up for the animal instinct it lacks, an instinct which naturallymoderates animals'sexual avidity. Once "the cargo is loaded"and "the hold is full," female animals reject their mates. Human women, by contrast, can never get enough, and if it were not for this sense of shame, they wouldpursue these poor men to their deaths. For although men are held to be the strong and active sex, they have no real sexual need; whereaswomen, supposedlythe weak and passive sex, have a lust which knows no bounds.10 Given the facility women have for exciting men's senses and for awakening, deep in their hearts, the remnantsof a most

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feeble disposition, if there existed some unfortunateclimate on earth where philosophy might have introduceda practice [whereby women initiate aggression], especially in hot climates where more women than men are born, men would be women'svictims, tyrannized by them, and they would all end to their death without up dragged any means of defense. [Emile,467] Nature would thus have granted women a supplement of shame not so much to compensate for their weakness as to compel man to "find his strengthand use it," that is, in orderto give him the illusion that he is the strongest.The point is not so much to preventthe downfallof both sexes and to save the human race, although without this feminine reservethe species would "perish by the means established to preserve it" [Emile,467]. It is rather, above all, to save the male sex. This whole economy of shame is aimed at sparingthe male some loss or narcissisticwound. If it were indeed "Nature" that had "given"women a sense of shame, then the generosityof Nature would be entirely at the service of man. But is this sense of shame really a gift of Nature? Doesn't Nature's generosity rather discourse? serveas a pretextand a cover for the phallocraticaim of Rousseau's The demonstrationof the naturalcharacterof shame, whether in Emileor in Lettre d d'Alembert, is highly shaky. In vain does Rousseaumultiplyhis arguments and respondto the philosophes' objections;he remainscaught in a web he tries to show that, contraryto of sophisms.Thus, in Lettred d'Alembert, shame is not a prejudicebut a natthe fashionableopinion of the philosophes, ural virtue. Natural because necessary to the sexual economy of the two sexes! Necessary to preserve feminine charm so that man can be sexually arousedwithout ever being fully satisfied. The sense of shame, then, would be the naturalveil that introducesa beneficialdistance into the economy. It that Natureprovidedfor the sakeof both sexes wouldbe the sharedsafeguard advanceswhen in a "state in orderthat they not be subjectto indiscriminate It wouldbe the sense of shamethat hides of weaknessand self-forgetfulness." the pleasuresof love from the eyes of others, just as the shade of night conceals and protects sexual relationships. is it womanwho must have But why, if it is a matterof a sharedsafeguard, natural if it a is matter of of shame? a sense virtue, is there a difference Why, behavior? human and animal between Pushedinto a comer, Rousseaurespondsto the firstobjection with a true only Nature, the Makerof the humanrace, could answerthis, petitio principii: since it is She who has endowed woman, and only woman, with this sentiment. Then, taking the place of Nature, identifyinghimselfwith Her, as always, Rousseautries to supply the natural reasonsfor this difference:both sexes have equal desires, but they don't have equal means to satisfythese. If

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the order of advance and defense were changed, then chance would rule. and its bane. Love wouldno longerbe the supportof Nature, but its destroyer Equallibertyof the two sexes, by overcomingevery obstacle, would suppressamorousdesire. Finally, and above all, shame is reservedfor woman because the consequences are not the same for the two sexes: "A child must have one father." Becausewomen'sproperdestiny is to bear children (even if they don't alwaysdo so), because the lot of women is motherhood,Nature and manners mustprovidefor this by generallaws such as that of shame. In Emileit is this same "lot"of women which justifiesthe view that the duty of conjugalfidelity, and that of a reputation for fidelity, fall upon women only. It is on women that Naturehas conferredexclusiveresponsibility forprotectingnatural family ties; it is to women that Nature has confided the sacred trust of children:"when a woman gives a man childrenwho are not his own, she beand traysboth of them, she combinesperfidywith infidelity."All "disorders" "crimes" are linked with this one. Thus, a womanmustbe "modest,attentive and reserved"; she must displayto the eyes of the worldthe "evidenceof her virtue"so that children can esteem and respect their mothers. "Honorand reputationare no less necessarythan chastity."'1 It is indeed Nature, then, who intended to adom women with the veil of shame and it is a crime to stifle Her voice. Once this constraintis removed, women will cease to have any reticence whatever. Woman can't attach any importanceto honor, she can't respect anything anymore, if she doesn't respect her own honor.12 Just look, says Emile,at Ninon de Lenclos! Experiencewould confirm this reasoning:the closer women are to their naturalstate, the more susceptiblethey are to shame. Don't think that the nakednessof savagewomen disprovesthis, for it is not the sign of an absence of shame. On the contrary,it is clothing that arousesthe senses by exciting the imagination.As pointed out in Emile,nakedness,that of children,for exmaidensused to dance ample, is alwaysa sign of innocence. Lacedaemonian naked: this is a scandal only for depravedmoder man. Do we really believe that the skillful finery of our women is less dangerousthan an absolutenakednesswhich, if habitual, would soon turn first impressions into indifference, maybe even into disgust! Don't we know that statues and paintings offend our eyes only when the combinationof clothes renders nakednessobscene?The greatestravagesoccurwhen imagination steps in.13 Do not assume,however, that Rousseau condemnsclothing and finery.On the contrary, they are necessaryin order that woman preserveher charm, that she continue to excite man's imagination. In this sense, "clothing"is partof sexualstrategy.It is in the serviceof shameand its ends. The taste for

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finery, ornament, mirrorsand jewels is part of feminine nature. A girl "has more hunger for finery than for food" [Emile,p. 479]. In this argument,aimed at demonstrating the naturalcharacterof shame, a and has function a clothing complex plays strategicrole. Rousseaustill has to justifythe differencebetween human and animalbehaviorwith respectto shame. At this point, he resortsto a true "cauldronargument."14 On the one hand, man is preciselynot an ordinaryanimal like any other; he alone is capable of conceiving of honesty and of beauty. On the other hand, animals are more susceptibleto shame than one would think, even though they too, like children, are naked. ... In any case, even if we grant that shame is not a naturalsentiment to d'Alembertand the other philosophes but, rather, a conventional virtue, the same essential consequenceremains: women ought to cultivate the virtues of shame and timidity. Their lot is to lead a secludeddomestic life, a life hidden in a cloister-likeretreat.Woman shouldnot be showy nor should she put herselfon show. Her home is her ornament;she is its soul. Her place is not in public. Forher to appearthere is to usurpman's place and to debase him, to degradeboth her sex and his. women in the home, that he demands If you objectthat Rousseau imprisons fromthem an excessivereserve,he will respondlike Lucreceto Pauline: Do you call the sweetness of a peaceful life in the bosom of one's familya prison?As for me, my happinessneeds no other society, my gloryneeds no other esteem, than that of my husband, my father and my children.15 It's no coincidence that, when Rousseaudoes concede that shame might be a culturalprejudice,there is a slide in his logic. He slides from an insistence on women'sreticence to a demandfor female seclusion, fromfeminine reserveto the confinement of the feminine on a reservation.In this slippage Rousseaurepeatsa familiarsocial operationof masculinedomination. Under voice and of defendingNathe pretext of giving back Nature her suppressed ture's ends, what is really being advocated, as always, are the phallocratic ends of man. It is the voice of man (vir)-stifled by women, those wickedand degeneratewomen-that Rousseaurestores. These maxims, these naturalor conventional maximswhich demand the isolation and domestic confinement of women, would be doubly confirmed conversely, by experience:whereverwomen arefree, low moralsarerampant; frommen. wherevermoralsare regulated,women are confined and separated and their union. Inis for their of the sexes This separation necessary pleasure is no union without deed, there separation. Every communication, every commercebetween the sexes is indiscreet, every familiarityis suspect, every liaison dangerous! Thus, it is in orderto insurea lastingbond between them fromSophie. Thus, the "admirable" ordermaintained that Emile is separated In this well-rundothe of the sexes. Clarens is on at based byJulie separation

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mestic economy, there is little commerce between men and women. They live apartfrom one another like men and women everywhere,be they civilizedor savage. The very universalityof this practiceprovesits conformityto nature. Even among savages, men and women are never seen indiscriminatelymixed. In the evening the family gathers, every man spendsthe night with his woman;the separationresumes with the light of day and the two sexes have nothing but meals, at the most, in common.16 Lettre d d'Alembert privilegesthe people of Antiquity (for they are the closest to nature):Rome and Spartawould be the best models of this admirable domestic economy where, when men and women do see each other, "it is very brieflyand almost secretly."17 Thus, nothing justifiesthe naturalcharacterof shame, the slippagefrom feminine reserve to the confinement of the feminine on a reservation,and the strictsegregation of the sexes, unlessit is Rousseau's phallocraticaim. But isn't the latter itself basedon Rousseau's libidinaleconomy, on a certainparanoiac structure? Isn't it basedon his desireto be confusedwith women, and at the same time, on his fearof being contaminatedby women, the very women to whom he feels himself so very close? Isn't it this very proximitywhich compels him to erect barriers,to emphasizethe differencesand the separations? Considerthe passagein Lettre d d'Alembert where, for once, Rousseau declaresthat if women are brave enough they should, like Spartanwomen, imitatethe masculinemodel. This passageis symptomatic of his desire/fear of woman. It shows that this whole discourseis motivatedby that debecoming sire/fear.Now we see what is really at stake in the segregationof sexes: the point is not so much to avoid the generalconfusionof the sexes;it is ratherto avoid the contamination of the masculine by the feminine and a general effeminization. Among barbaric peoples, men did not live like women because women had the courageto live like men. In Sparta, women became robust and man was not enervated. . . . Unable to make themselvesmen, women make us women, [a frightening perversion,degradation,and denaturation] especiallyin a Rewhere men are needed. public The thesis that Rousseau defends is always already anticipated by his libidinaldrives;the voice of Nature is equallythe echo of hisnature.That the singularityof his nature resonateswith the universalityof traditionalphilosophic discourseis not an objection to, but rathera proof of, the complicity or, as Freudwould say, the secret kinship between philosophic Reason and madness.18 On this subject,we mustproceedwith caution. Let's "paranoiac"

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restrictourselveshere to emphasizingthe "kinship"between the apparently or the Dialogues. non-biographicaltexts and the Confessions The "theoretical"insistence on virile mobility and activity is inseparable from Rousseau'sfantasiesof being suffocated,paralyzed,and imprisonedin the maternalwomb. We can read this fantasywhen Rousseaudescribesthe doll-woman,the Parisienne,who illegitimatelyreversesthe relationof domisweetnessof voice and delicate featureswerenot given to nation. "[Flragility, herselfwith anher in orderthat she may be offensive, insulting, or disfigure Thus, when she assumesthe right to command, woman fails to heed ger."19 the voice of the master;seeking to usurphis rights, she unleashesdisorder, misery, scandal, and dishonor. Farfrom guaranteeinghis freedom, the new empire of women enslaves, deforms, and emasculates man. Henceforth, of her enclosure.Insteadof bewomanconfines him in chains in the darkness him into the light of day, she tries to the of into a mother, world, ing bringing him by deto suffocate in to him back into her him her womb, cave, put keep air him and mobility. nying Terms like these abound in Lettred d'Alembert, Emile, and La Nouvelle "feminine" and perverseis this stiflingand paralyzing So "unnatural" H&loise. it cannot obliterate as it feminizes even man, every "vestige" operationthat, itself in his desirefor mobilof his realnatureand destiny. His viriltyreasserts ity, in the involuntary agitation and anxiety he experiences whenever woman, by nature sedentary and indolent, reclines tranquillyon a chaise parlor. lounge, suffocatinghim behind the closed doorsof some over-stuffed is especiallytrue in Paris, This, as Rousseaudescribesin Lettred d'Alembert, where women harborin their rooms a true seraglioof men (more feminine than masculine) whose automatic instinct strugglesincessantly against the bondagethey find themselves in and drivesthem, despite themselves, to the active and painstakinglife that nature imposesupon them. Likewisein the theatersof Paris, men stand in the orchestrastalls as if wanting to relax after having spent the whole day in a sitting room. Finally, overwhelmed by the ennui of this effeminate and sedentaryidleness, and in order to temper their disgust, to involve themselves in at least some sort of activity, they give their placesto strangersand go looking for the women of other men.20 However, these vestiges of man's formernature are laughable.They exdesireto reclaimhis nature.They don't preventhim pressonly a half-hearted from dribblingaway his strength in the idle and lax life of a sex-junkie, nor fromkeepingto the "abodeand reposeof women,"wherehe is enervatedand loses his vigor. Such passages from Lettrea d'Alembert,Emile, or La Nouvelle Heloise, which depict the sadisticspectacleof the male paralyzed, suffocated,and im-

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How can one not prisoned,call to mind certain passagesof the Confessions. states that for him to where for of the think, Jean-Jacques passage example, remainseated in a room, armscrossed,inactive, chatting with others, "movtorture"?21 How, in general, can one ing only his tongue," is an "unbearable fail to recall Rousseau'sclaustrophobia,his taste for the outdoor life, his hikes, his disgustat traveling in a poste chaise, which he likens to a small, locked cage whereone is bound and blinded, an obscureprisonwhich no free man could tolerate? One does not acquirea taste for prisonby virtueof residingin one. . . . Active life, manualwork, exercise, and movement have become so necessary that man couldn't give them up without suffering.To suddenlyreducehim to an indolent and sedentarylife would be to imprisonhim, to put him in chains, to keep him in a violent and constrainedstate. No doubt his disposition and health would be equally altered. He can scarcely breathe in a stuffy room. He needs the open air, movement, and fatigue . . ; he is disturbedand agitated;he he staysbecausehe is in chains. [Emile, seems to be struggling; 567-68] These are the wordsof Emile'sprivatetutor. But they betrayall the fantasies of Jean-Jacques as endlesslyrepeatedin the Dialogues: his fear, his horror of the dark, the belief that his persecutors him with a "triple have surrounded enclosureof darkness," entombedhim behind impenetrable wallsof darkness; his fantasyof being weigheddown with chains, of being unableto say a word, take a step, move a fingerwithout the knowledgeand permissionof his enemies;of being enclosed in an immenselabyrinthwheretortuousand subterranean falsepaths lead him furtherand furtherastray; and finally, the fantasyof being buriedalive. All of these persecutionfantasiesexpressnot only horror but also desire:the desire "to be beaten." Caught in the gripof his persecutors, he barelytries to escape. Surrounded by falsityand darkness,he waits, without a murmur of protest,for truthand light. Finally,buriedalive in a coffin, he lies still, not even thinking of death. Is this the tranquilityof innocence? Or the tranquilityof masochisticpleasureat being punished, immobilized, possessedlike a woman and by women, the pleasureof being suffocated and humiliatedby women, of being made into their thing, their property? In the Confessions, we learn that the episode with Mile Lambercier determined the shape of the remainder of Jean-Jacques' love life. Her severitywas for him a thousandtimes sweeterthan her favorswould ever have been. She treatedhim "asa thing that belongedto her," possessinghim as one possesses private property.Their encounter becomes a prototype:to kneel before an mistress,obeyingher orders,beggingher forgiveness-these always imperious remain very sweet pleasuresfor him. Mile Goton, who deigns to act the

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school mistress,showershim with joy. On his knees before Mme Basile, silent and still, afraidto do or say anything,Jean-Jacques finds this state ludicrous but delightful."Nothing I ever experienced in possessing a woman could rival the two minutes I spent at her feet without even daringto touch her dress."22It's the same with Sophie d'Houdetot who, for six months, floods his heart with a delight he defies any mere sensualistto match. "Am I not your possession?Have you not taken possession?" he writes to her.23 Now, all of these captivatingwomen, these castrating women, arealso maternalfigures,figuresof and substitutesfor the motherwho died bringinghim into the light of day. It is perhapsin orderto still the reproaches for this death "which cannot be atoned," that Rousseaueffects an inversion. Man will no longerbe the causeof the death of women or mothers.Rather,womenwill be responsiblefor the death of man. By refusingmotherhood, refusingto put themselves entirely at his service, to be filled with pity and tendernessfor him, women will be responsiblefor his degeneration,perversion,emasculation, and depropriation. This masterful inversion displaces all aggression onto the "dolls." At the same time, it preserves,or rather constructsand internalizes,the image, intact and pure, of an idealizedand divine Mother, a Motherwho could only be the best of mothers-even if she nearlysuffocated him in her womb, causing him to be born "disabledand sickly." Thus, there is a split between two motherfigures-the whore and the Virthe domesticenclosure(the gin-between public women unafraidto trespass comediennes, the Dolls, the prostitutes,the Parisiennes,all "publicwomen" in Rousseau's eyes) and the women who live within the shadowof the enclosure, the respectable Mothers, surrounded by their husbandsand children be a This there more (can pleasingsight?). split suggeststhat the phallocraticism of Rousseauis also, as always, a feminism.24 The sense of shame, whose corollaryis the enclosureof women, is in effect for the "natural" inversionof domination:throughit, the strongresponsible est become dependenton the weakest, the weakesttrulyruleover the strongest. The respectablewoman, reservedand chaste, the womanwho knowsher of place, incites a love which verges on enthusiasm, on sublime transports emotion. Admittedly, she does not govern, but she reigns. She is a queen, an idol, a goddess.With a simple sign or wordshe sends men to the ends of the world, off to combat and to glory, here, there, wherevershe pleases. A note in Emilecites the case of a woman who, duringthe reign of Fran;ois I, imposed a vow of strict silence upon her garrulouslover. For two-and-a-half yearshe kept it faithfully. One thought that he had become mute through illness. She cured him with a single word: speak! Isn't there something grandand heroic in such love? Doesn't one imaginea divinity

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giving the organ of speech to a mortal with a single word?

[Emile, p. 515].
The empireof women-these women, the "true"women, the respectable mothers- is not fearedby men becauseit doesn't debasethem. On the contrary,it enables them to fulfill their duties, to prove their heroismand their virility. For men, there is "no sweeter"or more respected"empire."If only women really wanted to be women and mothers, their uncontested power would be immense. Mothers, "be all that you should be and you will overcome all obstacles."25 Women are thus wrongto demandequal rightsand the same educationas men. If they aspireto become men, they can only fail. They would surelybe inferiormen and in the bargainthey would lose the essentialthing-the empire in which they naturallyreign. Obviously, this reign is conditional upon women'snaturalqualities, their submission,docility, and gentleness. It is given to them on the condition that, from childhood on, they be schooled in constraints and permanent state"is to be dependent, to be subjectedto discomforts,since their "natural man and at the service of man. Since men are, from the beginning, dependenton women, the education of women must be relative to men. Here in a nutshell is the sophism. The formationof childrendependson the formationof mothers, the first educationof men dependson the care of women; the manners,passions,tastes, pleasures and even happinessof men dependson women. Thus the entire educationof women must be relative to men. To please men, to be usefulto them, to be loved and honoredby them, to raisethem when they are young, care for them when they are grown-up, to console them, to make their lives agreeableand gentle-these are the duties of women in all times and this is what they must be taughtfromchildhood. Unless we returnto this principle, we will stray from the goal, and all of the precepts we give to women will serveneither their happinessnor our own. [Emile,

475]
No confessioncould be clearer:he who claims alwaysto "followthe directions of Nature," is really following the best of guides. In fulfilling his own "nature" to the maximum,he serves the interestsand ends of man (vir). NOTES
1. "Iwasborndisabled andsickly; I costmymother herlife, andmybirth wasthefirstof my misfortunes." ed. Livre de Poche,t. I, p. 8. Thisandallothertranslations of RousConfessions, seauaremyown-M.D.

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2. On the death of Julie'smother he writes in La NouvelleHeloise,Part III, LetterVI: "a loss which cannot be restoredand for which one never finds consolation once one has been able to reproachoneself for it." And in Emile,Book I: "Maternalsolicitude cannot be supplied." 3. See S. Kofman, Le Respect des femmes,Galilee, 1980. d d'Alembert, "At this very instant the short-livedphilosophythat 4. See, for example, Lettre is bor and dies in the comer of a great city, this philosophythat seeks to suppressthe cry of Nature and the unanimousvoice of humankindis going to rise up againstme." ["a l'instantva s'elevercontre moi, cette philosophied'un jour ... (Gamier-Flammarion p. 168)], and further: "Thusit was willed by nature,it is a crimeto suppress her voice" ["Ainsil'a voulu la Nature, ... (p. 171)]. 5. Emile,ed. Gamier-Flammarion, p. 48. All page numbersgiven in this text for Emilerefer to the Gamier-Flammarion edition. Translationsare my own-M.D. 6. "Surles femmes"in Oeuvrescompletes, Pleiade, t. II, p. 1255. and "minor" 7. One could find this contrastbetween "major" texts, between texts of "youth" in other philosophers.This is the case with Auguste Comte, another and those of "maturity" phallocrat,whose early letter to Valet, dating from Sept. 24, 1819, espousesa position which will laterbe that of his adversary, le devenir-femme John StuartMill. See S. Kofman:Aberrations, d'A. Comte (Aubier-Flammarion p. 230 and following). des femmes,Galilee, 1980. 8. See Kofman, Le Respect 9. La NouveUeHeloise, Part IV, Letter X. 10. The Rousseauisticdescriptionis the opposite of that of Freudfor whom libido is essenSee Kofman,The Enigma of Woman,Cornell UniversityPress, 1985. Despite tially "masculine." to justifythe sexualsubjugation of women, the this difference,both appealto the same "Nature" essential point of the whole argument. 11. Emile,p. 470-71. See also La NouveUe Heloise,PartII, LetterXVIII, whereJuliewritesto Saint-Preuxabout the marriedwoman:"She not only invested her faith, but alienatedher freedom. (. . .) It is not enough to be honest, it is necessarythat she be honored;it is not enough to do only what is good, it is necessarythat she refrainfromdoing anythingthat isn't approved.A virtuouswoman must not only merit the esteem of her husband,but obtain it. If he blamesher, she is blameful;and if she were to be innocent, she is wrongas soon as she is suspect-for appearance itself counts as one of her duties." death to the loss of honor, is quotedby Rousseauas being among 12. Lucrece,who preferred and La Mort de Luthe heroines comparableand superiorto male heros. (See "Surles femmes" crce, O.C., II). ed. Garier-Flammarion, p. 246. 13. Lettrea d'Alembert, 14. See Nancy Holland's"Introduction," Hypatia,this issue, for an explanationof this reference to "cauldron" logic (tr.). 15. La Mortde Lucrece 16. La NouvelleHeloise, Part IV, Letter X. discourseon decency 17. It wouldbe interestingand very enlighteningto compareRousseau's des lois (Books XVI, X, XI, XX). In particular,one would with that of Montesquieuin L'Esprit find clarificationfor the allusion to warmcountrieswhere climate rendersfeminine sexual avidity fearsome.Montesquieuovertly groundsdecency and the domestic confinement of women in the sexual dangerthat these representfor men in warmcountries. In contrast, where climate is with them for the temperate, it is unnecessaryto confine women. Men can "communicate" of both men and women. pleasureand "entertainment" le devenir-femme d' A. Comte (Aubierin Aberrations, de la psychanalyse; 18. See De l'interet between a phiFlammarion,1978) Kofmanoffersa detailed analysisof the possiblerelationships losopher'sdeliriumand his philosophicalsystem. 19. Emile, Book V. 20. La NouveUeHeloise, Part IV, Letter X. Book XII. 21. Confessions, 13. ForMile Goton, Book desConfessions, see Book I and L'Ebauche 22. for Mile Lambercier, I. For Mme Basile, Book II. 23. Letter of October 15, 1757. use of'feminism'in this passage,see Nancy Holland's"In24. Foran explanationof Kofman's troduction,"Hypatia,this issue (tr.). 25. La NouvelleHeloise, Part V, Letter III.

COMMENT/REPLY

Keller's Gender/Science System: of Science to Science Is the Philosophy as Science is to Nature?

KELLY OLIVER

I arguethatalthough in "TheGender/Science toformuintends System,"Keller in orderto openscienceto feminist latea middle criticisms without ground position it intorelativism, shestepsbackintoobjectivism. Whilesheendorses thedyforcing modelfor science,she endorses thestatic-object modelfor philosophy namic-object thatbymodeling hermethodology on hermethodof science.I suggest forphilosophy wouldbetterserveherfeministgoals. ologyfor scienceherphilosophy

Feminist theorists have played majorroles in contemporary discourseson and dominance. how and dominance are conpower Understanding power structedand eventuallydeconstructed,is a centralconcern for feminists.The notion that power has one unified source has been called into question by both feminists (eg., Hartsock, Balbus, Cixous, Spivak) and nonfeminists (eg., Foucault, Delueze). This model of power has been seen as part of a or logocentric discourseon power. Many theorists are exploring patriarchal new waysin which to conceive of poweraltogether.In this context of controversies, Evelyn Fox Keller has not adequatelychallengedtraditionalnotions of power and dominance. Although Keller describesa new model for conceiving of powerrelationswithin scientific research,I will maintainthat she adoptsa traditionalmodel of powerin her philosophyof science. In Evelyn Fox Keller'srecent work, she has tried to reconcile feminism and science. Her goal has been to open science to feminist chargesof male bias without risking scientific knowledge altogether. In "The Gender/Science System," she gracefullywalks the balance beam on the fundamentaldilemma: if we open science to feminist scrutiny, which discloses biases in what we have heretoforeheld as scientific truth, how can we be surethat there is any truth in science? And, if there is truth in science, how can we distinguishit from bias or parochialism?'

Hypatiavol. 3, no. 3 (Winter 1989) ? by Kelly Oliver

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Keller would like to formulatea middle groundbetween objectivismand relativism,between dualismand universalism(1987, 39, 44). She hopes to make science a human, ratherthan masculine, project by rejectingobjectivism (1985, 178; 1987, 46). She hopes to preservethe integrityof scientific truth by rejecting relativism(1987b, 46).2 Due to recent "dynamicinstability,"arguesKeller, in the categoriesof science and gender, science shifts its weight fromobjectivismback to relativism and visa versa. Kellercontends that this instabilityis both "politicallyand intellectually-an obstacle to productiveexchange" (1987b, 38). I will argue, however, that her latest attempt to reconcile feminismand science does not stabilizethese categories. In fact, while her ambiguous position may, on the surface,preservescience, it conceals a threat to feminism. Keller stabilizes science by side-steppingher middle groundback into objectivism. My central argumentis that while as a scientist Kelleradvocateswhat she calls the dynamic-objectmodel, as a philosophershe practicesthe opposing model in static-objectmodel. I maintain that if she used the dynamic-object philosophytoo, she would better serve her feminist goals. I will begin by demonstratingthat Keller, as a philosopher, views nature and ultimatelyscience as static-objects.My argumentrevolves aroundthree issues.First, I will arguethat Keller'sconception of the dialectic between nature and culture always favorsnature and thereforehas no real moment of synthesisbetween culture and nature. Second, I will arguethat Keller'snoof nature"implies an absolutetruth. Third, I will tion of the "recalcitrance Keller's that suggestion that there is no differentscience, just differargue ences within science, perpetuatestraditionalconceptions of dominance. a Next, I will describe why this view of nature and science presupposes Fifeminist Keller's which undermines monodimensionalauthority project. nally, I will create an alternativeview of nature and science out of Keller's own descriptionof a dynamic-object.I will drawout the implicationsof the dynamic-objectmodel when appliedto science itself. I will conclude by exfor a femimodel in orderto assessits advantages tending the dynamic-object nist philosophyof science.
KELLER'S OBJECTIVISM: DIALECTIC

In her latest work, "The Gender/Science System,"which inches towards relativismonly to recoil at the last minute, Kellertakes what she sees as the obvious post-Kuhnianposition, that science is not a mirrorof nature. It is, rather, the result of a "dialectic"between nature and culture (1987b, 48). This dialectic, however, as it unfolds, is a ratherone-sided operation. Kellernever describesthe dynamicof this dialectic-what does she mean "Dialectic"carrieswith it the weight of a traditionand unless by "dialectic"?

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Keller, too, wants to carrythat weight, she must separateherselffrom traditional formulationsof the dialectic. Therefore, before consideringKeller's specificdialectic betweennatureand culture, I would like to raisesome suspicions of the traditionalHegelian dialectic. The goal of the dialectic, I will argue, is unity (in Hegel's case, Absolute Knowingor in Keller'scase, the stabilityof science). Traditionally,all difference is subsumedin the synthesisstage of the dialectic. In other words, alof both the though the synthesis is, in the Hegelian scenario, the aufhebung positing and the negating (or in Keller'sterms, natureand culture), the dialectic alwaysmoves this synthesisback into the position of positingand never back into the position of negating. That is, the synthesis alwaysbecomes a new positing against which a new negating arises. Negating, or difference, then, is always turned back into a positing. Thus, the negating is always becomes merelya reaction. With the dialectic, then, the multidimensional once again the monodimensional,differencebecomes sameness. Even in Marx'sdialectic in Capital,the synthesis assumesthe same moment in the dialecticalstructure as what we might call the "thesis" so that the dialecticaldynamiccan occur again. We can see this more concretelyby examining a particulardialectical interaction. For example, in CapitalMarx identifies M-C-M' as the generalformulafor capital (1977, 257). Although M' is the resultof the movementfromM to C, as M' it immediately takesthe place of M so that the circuitcan being again (1977, 253). Also, in the tradition of Hegel, Marx, and even Plato, the dialectic is teleological. Which means that it aims towarda final moment where all conflict/difference is resolved. The telos of Keller'sdialectic is Nature. In Keller's scenario, culture is merely a reaction to nature, a reaction which becomes partof anotherpositing, a reactionwhich becomesencorporatedinto nature. In other words,the structure of Keller'sdialectic is Naturewhere every N' assumesthe position of N so that the cycle Culture-Nature; begins again until scientific knowledgereaches its goal and the conflict between culture and nature is resolved. In the synthesisof Keller'sdialectic, then, natureout-weighsculture. Science, it turs out, is bound by nature, but ultimatelynot by culture (1987b, 48; 1982, 117, 123). In "The Gender/Science System," Keller takes up a somewhat Kantian position when she arguesthat "despite its unrepresenof nature,"she tability, naturedoes exist" (48). And it is the "recalcitrance argues,which providesthe ultimateconstrainton science (9). It is this recalcitranceof nature, I wouldargue,which also providesthe telos of Keller's dialectic. Culture, on the other hand, in Keller'stheory, providesno such absolute constraint.In fact, earlier,in "Feminism and Science," she claims that "neither science nor individuals are totally bound by ideology" (1982, 123).

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Thus, while science is not totally boundby culture, it is totally boundby the recalcitranceof nature. Already the dialectic scale tips in favor of nature.
TRUTH

It is nature, suggestsKeller, that provideswhat is "constantand indispensible"in science (1985, 11-12). If "science"has any meaning, arguesKeller, that meaning "mustderive from the sharedcommitmentof scientists to the of nature, pursuitof a maximallyreliable (even if not faithful) representation there is however shared under the equally elusive, only one assumptionthat, nature"(1987b, 46). Earlier,Keller stated, with less qualification,that: scientists' shared commitment to the possibility of reliable knowledgeof nature, and to its dependence on experimental prereqreplicabilityand logical coherence, is an indispensable uisite for the effectivenessof any scientificventure(1985, 11). The goal of science, then, as Kellerdescribesit, is to discoverthe objective truthof naturewhile drainingoff the deceptive biasof culture. If there is a dialectic between natureand cultureat work in the practiceof science, we can conclude fromKeller'sprescription,that the naturepole of the dialectic must silence the culture pole in normative science.3 In orderto preservescience, Kellerholds onto the belief in one truthabout one nature, towards which science aims. She wants to justify scientists' claims to different, and even better, knowledgethan other practitionersand theoreticians.If, as Kellersuggests,"scienceis divorcedfromnatureand married instead to culture," then scientific theories are not differentfrom any other kind of cultural theories (1987b, 45). Although Keller suggeststhis new union as a possibility, she quickly recoils. Afraid to give up the privileged position of science with regardto truth and nature, she can't allow culture to break up the happy marriage.Science perhapshas a on-going affair with culture, but it is still marriedto nature. Keller, in order to prevent science from collapsing into cultural theory, claims that science has a commitment to truth which other theory doesn't have. Science strivesfor the one objective truth about the one nature. Two conflicting truths cannot coexist. Everytheory, then, competes with every other. Kellersuggeststhat this is not trueof other theoreticalpursuits.Other types of theories, she argues,do not challenge and engage each other in the same kind of search for objective truth (1987a).4 This, however, is simply not the case. Other types of theories, nonscientific theories, even philosophies, make truth claims which exclude any opmust be explained and posing truth claims. Even here the counter-examples in any field where the is the case This be falsified. competing theories must

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"truenature"of something (whethernature, or culture, or literature,or histo be described.5 tory, etc.) is "supposed"
UNITY

Another argumentKeller uses in order to preservethe "structural integrity"of science is that there can be no differentscience, i.e., no feminine science. Rather, there can only be differenceswithin science (1987b, 40, 46, 48; 1985, 165, 173; 1982, 125). Kellersees a differentscience as a threat to the structural integrity of science. She wants to celebrate the differences which alreadyexist within science.6 Part of Keller'spoint is that if there is a differentway of doing science, it still has to describereality. It, too, must try to tell the truth about nature. Moreover, Keller argues,what is called "science"is part of a social system. And if this differentscience is still called "science,"then it is science.7 There is, then, only one science just as there is only one nature. One might arguethat Keller'sinsistenceon differences within both science and natureshowsthat she is not committedto one science or one nature. It is truethat Kellerarguesthat both natureand science aremultidimensional and diverse. In fact, one of the majortheses of "The Gender/ScienceSystem"is that we can use nature's diversity-within-unity as a model for science. However, Kellermakesit clear that she is not arguingin favorof differentnatures (or differentsciences), but only differenceswithin nature (1987b, 40, 46, 48). According to Keller, the multiplicityof nature or science does not underminethe unity of natureor science. Therefore,while both natureand science are composedof diverse parts, they are both unified. Nature'srecalcitrance may limit in diverseways, but nature itself is still the absolutelimit of science.
AUTHORITY

Keller wants a variety of methods within science which are differentyet not divided. She wants a science which, like nature, is multidimensional yet unified. Her view of science, however, prevents this. Her view of science fuels the unitarydefinition of powerwhich she claims leads to the instability of science, and causesall differencesto be collapsedinto samenessor opposition. Her attempts to save science from its associationwith culturaltheory stems from the "us versusthem" power strugglewhich she criticizeswithin science (1987b, 44): Throughtheir specialconnection to the truthaboutnature, scientists are more objective than other theorists. Before developing this criticism, let me explain Keller'sargument. The reasonwhy science can exclude diversityand perpetuatemale bias, argues Keller, is because power has one source and differentmethods/theories

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become opponents vying for that one power: As long as power itself remainsdefined in the unitaryterms that have prevailed,the struggles for powerthat ensue provide on the one for the fuel, hand, collapse between science and and and and on the other, for the repudianature, sex, gender tion of nature and/or sex. In other words, they guaranteethe very instabilityin the concepts gender and science that continues to plagueboth feministand science studies. (1987b, 48) Kellersuggeststhat this unified sourceof powercausesdualismswhich are "obstaclesto productiveexchange"(1987b, 38). We can inferfromthis that a unified source of power could not legitimateand empower,both sides of a that there is one conflict at once; thus the conflict. Yet Keller'sassumption natureand one truth about that natureprovidesthis unifiedsourceof power. nature"is leThe theorywhich can maintainits affiliationwith "recalcitrant gitimate, while all conflicting theories, insofaras they cannot at the same time maintainan affiliationwith this one nature, are illegitimate. In Keller's scenario, it seems, scientific theory is acceptedif it is empowered by the truth of recalcitrantnatureand rejectedif it is not. Kelleris right that this unified powersourcemakesdifferenttheories into opposingtheories. With the truth of one natureas the goal, differenceswithin science necessarilylead to diviand unity of nature,which Kelleridentifies,providea sion. The recalcitrance unified power source. for the impulseto domiMoreover,this unifiedpowersourceis responsible nate which Kelleridentifieswith the masculinebias in science. In fact, Keller suggeststhat it is the prevailingunitarydefinitionof powerwhich has perpetuated domination (1987b, 44). It is the unity of powerthat bringswith it absoluteauthority.If there is one natureand one truth about that nature, that truthhas the absoluteauthority to dominate all other "truths."If, on the other hand, there is more than one truth, or even more than one nature, then no one truth can seriouslyclaim the authoritywith which to dominate all of the others. In other words, if there are severalauthorities,severalpowersources,one theorycannot maintain an affiliationwith an overridingauthorityor power.With severalsources of power there would be diverseaffiliationsand no one affiliationcould give the license to dominate. At bottom, contraryto her intentions, in Keller'ssystem it is all or nothing: It is science or it is not. It is recalcitrantnatureor it is not. In principle, in Keller'ssystem, theory either describesnature or it doesn't. In fact, it has been patriarchy'suse of the absolute authority of nature which has servedto perpetuatemale dominance. Traditionally,nature is into woman-women are inferior,or subjecvoked to prove man's superiority

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tive, or passive, etc., by nature. Male dominancehas been justifiedin terms of women's "natural" physiologicalor psychologicalinferiority. In orderto prevent the absoluteauthorityof nature,we mustdo awaywith its unity. Why must, as Keller suggests, nature's unity be primaryand its diversitybe secondary,or subsumedinto, this unity?Contraryto her intentions, Keller'ssystemcannot preventthat any theory, no matterhow oppressive, can claim to innocently describe recalcitrantnature; and, that that claim can circumventany challenge to it. Of course, that theory'sauthority can be challenged by challenging its allegiance with recalcitrant nature. However, if it can maintainthat allegiance, throughwhatevermeans, it can successfullymaintain its authority.After all, the way in which science goes naaboutfalsifyingtheories is also dependenton an allegianceto recalcitrant ture.8 The centralproblemwith Keller'ssystem, in spite of her intentions, is that theauthority The questionis never "whymust structure itselfis neverchallenged: someone have absoluteauthority?" Rather, the only questionis "whowill get the absolute authority?" Keller wants to empowerdifferenceswithin traditional science without changing the power-structure of that science. Alshe sees the though dangersof that power structure,she does not proposea new way in which to empowertheories, methods, or individualscientists. Keller uses the authority of recalcitrant nature to counter relativism. However, she also recognizesthe dangerof associatingany one theoryor concept with that authority. She suggeststhat we can somehow maintain the awarenessthat our names for nature and gender are not themselvesnatural; and that they are social constructions.9 However, given her version of scientific realism, our scientific concepts musthave some relation to nature, even if they'renot the "mirror of images" traditionalrealism. Recalcitrantnature is still the source of their power regardlessof their actual status. In other words, as long as the scientific enterprisedictatesthat we aimfor absoluteauthorityin science, it doesn'tmatterif we succeed or not. Although historymay alwaysunderminethe truth claims of past theories with new discoveries,as long as the structure of absoluteauthority exists (one nature, one truth), some theory can dominate all others. Without an absoluteauthorityto empowerany one perspective,that perspective cannot dominate every other. The masculinebias, then, cannot dominate science without unified nature. They are conspiratorsin the quest for power. Now, it becomesunclearwhere to locate Keller'scritiqueof science. '0 The goal of Keller'sscience, like traditionalscience, is to discoverthe one truth about nature. The practiceof science, then, must be the problem.Scientists have failed to drain off their culturalinterests. While this may be the case, Keller has argued that the practice of science is more truly what science

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should be than the dominant ideology of science (1985, 17, 48, 125, 173; 1982, 124). Where, then, is Keller'scritique?
KELLER'S ALTERNATIVE: DYNAMIC-OBJECTS

I will suggestthat what Kellercould do is applythe methodologywhich she endorsesin scienceitself to the philosophy of science.Why not applythe nonagmethod of gressive,participatory, analysisto the bodyof scienceitself as well as bodieswithinscience?l Since her workon Barbara McClintock, Kellerhas made a distinction between two typesof methodsemployedin science. In Reflections on Gender and Keller characterizes the two as a to methods relation either a Science, dynamic-object or a static-object. In the McClintock example, Keller points out that in biologythere are two differentwaysof conceiving of genes, as well as DNA. Quoting David Nanney, she associatesthe dynamic-objectview with the "SteadyState" concept and the static-objectview with the "Master Molecule"concept: The first we will designate as the 'MasterMolecule' concept . . This is in essence the totalitariangovernment . .. The second concept we will designate as the 'Steady State' concept. By this term ... we envision a dynamicself-perpetuating organizationof a varietyof MolecularSpecies which owes of any one kind its specific propertiesnot to the characteristic of molecule, but to the functional interelationshipsof these species. (1985, 184) Keller arguesthat McClintock, for example, sees the gene as a dynamicresults in the action of object where the part'sfunctional interrelationship molecule"dictatingthe action of the whole. the whole-there is no "master Kellergives another example fromher own theory of aggregationin cellularslime-mold.In 1970, Keller, along with Lee Segel, publishedan articlearguing against the pacemakerconcept in theories of aggregationin cellular on Gender slime-mold.The importanceof this for Keller'spoint in Reflections and Scienceis that while other scientists were proposingpacemakercells, or initiatorcells (types of mastercells which control the whole), predetermined Kellerand Segel were proposinga dynamicinteractionbetween cells (1985, view, then, does not divide the object into master 152). The dynamic-object and slave elements. Rather, the object is composedof partswhose interrelationshipsequally account for the activity of the whole. I am suggestingthat Keller views science itself as a static-object,while it may be more useful to follow her slime-moldexample and view it as a dynamic-object. In other words,Kellerdoes not applyher critiqueof the meth-

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withinscienceto the methodology in philosophy odology of science.Why can't we view our object, science, in the same way McClintock views genes or Keller views cellular slime-mold? Recall that for Keller certain elements of science are constant and indespensible(1987b, 46-48; 1985, 11-12). We could saythat these arestatic elements. They representwhat is constant or static in nature. What happens,however,if we takethe truthaboutscienceor natureas a dynamicobject?Here is whatwe get if we revisethe previous and takescipassage of a dynamic-object: ence as the exemplary object in Nanney'sdescription . . . we envision a dynamicself-perpetuating of a organization variety of scientific theories/truths which owes its specific of any one kind of scienpropertiesnot to the characteristics tific theory/truth, but to the functional interrelationships of these theories/truths.
IMPLICATIONS

This gives us a much differentview of science than Keller'sview as I have presentedit. If we view science (especiallynormativescience) itself, even in its relation to nature, as a primarilydynamic-objectratherthan a primarily static-object, then we can effectivelydo awaywith the subjectivity/objectivwhich ity dichotomy. Objectivityaboutnatureis no longerthe "master-cell" dominatesthe movement and growthof science. Rather, the science system includes nature as a functionally interrelatedpart. Nature no longer stands outside of science, just out of its reach, as its telos. The powerof science no longer comes from this external legitimation. Objectivity itself, then, is a part of the system, defined by its relationshipto the rest of the system. This is not to say that science is subjective.Science is a systemwhose operation is not solely definedby the subjectsworkingin it. Rather, it is a system whose operationis defined by complex relationshipsbetween scientists, ideologies, theories, traditions,experiments,modes of technology and production, economic factors,etc. To say that science is a social system, or a social practiceor construction,is not to say that it is subjective.Here, I think Keller to the one she criticizes. She criticizes the fear mayfall preyto a fearanalogous that a gender-free science is a femininescience;yet, she seemsto fearthat a science which is not objective,in the traditional sense, is subjective(1987b, 43). This view of science as a dynamic-object,in the sense of Keller'scellular slime-mold or McClintock's with Keller's view of obgenes, is morecompatible science.It also seemsmorecompatible within with Keller's feministtheory. jects
EXTENSIONS

Science, in this scenario, is a system of functionally interrelatedparts whose goal is part of, and defined by, the system. Scientific theories and ex-

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perimentsare strategiesfor doing something. This is not to say that all theoriesor experimentssucceedequally.Some maybe moreefficient, or appropriate, or coherent, when meeting particular goals, than others. However, no one theorycan legitimatelyclaim allegiancewith the absoluteauthorityof recalcitrantnature. Multiple strategies("truths")will alwaysbe a possibility. Authoritywill not be global, but merelylocal; it will dependon the problem to be solved, data to be interpreted,calculation to run, etc. Now, given this view of science, how do we account for the male bias in science? If science is a social practice, traditionally,it is the practiceof men. Kellerprovidesus with severalpossibleexplanationsof why men might view science as an instrumentof domination rather than an instrumentof care which throughparticipation.One reasonis simplyto perpetuatethe structure insures that someone is dominant. Without such a structure,no one can dominate. By first maintaining this power structure,and then invoking it againstcertain groupsof people, science itself can become an instrumentof patriarchy. However, if science is cut off from this fictional power source, it cannot claim the same kind of monodimensionalauthoritylinked, in a straightline, to the absoluteauthorityof nature. Rather, there would be no one sourceof power for science. It would be the productof variousinterrelatedfunctions within the system. So, unlike Keller'sscenariowhere theories are multifarious but empoweredby the same source, here, even the sourcesof power are multifarious. Also, now the feminist project no longer has to contend with this allegiance to a nature which cannot be changed. In other words, women's oppression can no longer be justified as a fact of nature. Rather, gradually, women can make science the practiceof human beings and not just men, by strugglingto become practitionersand theoreticiansof science. In this way, gradually,not without resistance,the ideologyof science can change in relation to the changing practice of science. Feminist theory, then, does not monodimensionalpowersource in orderto requireallegiance to patriarchy's is not to It be effective. necessary arguethat feminist theoryor feministcrititruth" about science. Rather, feminist theory ought to chalcisms "tell the lenge our (patriarchy's) very conception of theory itself. This is where Keller'stheorystopsbeing critical. Kellerdoes not examineher own theoretias a philosopherof science. (Of course, no one can examcal presuppositions ine all of their own presuppositions.) feministtheorycannot claim to I proposethat in orderto be revolutionary, describewhat exists, or, "naturalfacts." Rather, feminist theories should be political tools, strategiesfor overcomingoppressionin specificconcrete situatheotions. The goal, then, of feminist theory, shouldbe to develop strategic This but theories. not false ries-not true theories, theories, strategy strategic for theory making does away with the monodimensional power structure

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which polarizesall theories as either true or false. Theory legitimation no longer restswith the absoluteauthorityof the Truth of nature. Nature itself becomes a function of a complex network of strategiesof individual, and communities of, scientists and theorists. This is not to suggestthat all of these strategiesare consciousor intentional to all of those who employthem. Feministtheories, on the other hand, can be consciousstrategieswith which to undermineand dissolvethe oppressive"strategy" of patriarchy, one partof which is the constructionof the absoluteauthorityof recalcitrantnature.

NOTES
1. Most of Keller'sargumentsin "The Gender/ScienceSystem,"are attributedto some group of feminist theoristsor another (1987). This makesit somewhatdifficultto extract Keller'sown position. I hope that if this essaydoes not do justice to her position in that article, then at least it will inspireher to clarifyher position. 2. Cf. Keller'ssuggestionthat the feminist criticismscan make science moreobjective (1982, 113). Here she claims that a "feministtheoretic" can distinguishwhat is "parochial from that whichis universal" in the "scientific impulse"(117). 3. I am using "normativescience" to referto how science oughtto be practicedas opposedto how science actuallyis practiced.This distinction is relatedto a distinction made by Kellerbetween the ideology and practiceof science (1985, 17, 48, 125, 173; 1982, 124). 4. At the Dickenson symposium(West VirginiaUniversity April 3, 1987), in responseto a question, Kellermadethe extremelyenlighteningsuggestionthat the problemwhich leadsto oppressionin science is not the adherenceto truth. Rather, the problemis that some voices or theories are merelyignoredor silenced insteadof taken seriouslyand falsifiedthroughargumentor research.This impressiveinsight could providethe answerto many of my problemswith "The Gender/ScienceSystem"(1987b). 5. Keller is making truth claims as a philosopher,not as a scientist; yet she too, is tryingto objectively describethe nature of the Gender/ScienceSystem. 6. It is interestingto note the evolution of Keller'sthoughtson a differentscience. Forexamand Science," she suggeststhat the differencewithin science can encourageus ple, in "Feminism in our "questfor a differentscience, a science undistortedby masculinebias"(1982, 123, 125). 7. It seems that Keller has some ideas about what she thinks science ought.to be and what science fromother disciplines.If, however, we accept her thesis here, it seemsthat distinguishes there is no normativescience. Rather, science is whateverwe call "science."Would Kellersay that if we start callingpainting "science," that it is science? I don't think that she is willing to accept the implicationsof her argument. 8. Methodswith which to falsifytheoriesare selected accordingto their allegianceto recalcitrant nature. That is, if they are methodswhich producethe truth about nature, they are good. They must confirm truetheories and falsifyfalse theories. 9. For example, she arguesthat contemporary physics suffersfrom cognitive repressionbecause its relativismisn't radicalenough (1979). 10. It is interestingto note that although, in her recent work, SandraHardinghas done an extensive categorizationof feminist epistemologists into three categories "empiricist,""standpoint," and "postmoder," she never attempts to classify Keller. In footnotes in The Science Questionin Feminism, HardinggroupsKeller with others whom she identifiesas standpoint, or postmoder, theorists (1986). However, she never attaches one of her three labels to Keller. I will suggestthat perhapsthis is becauseKellerdoesn'tfit neatly into any one of these categories. Keller'ssuggestionthat we can readscience as a text echoes postmodemtheories (Keller 1984). Her post-marxistanalysisof the history of gender bi-polarization puts her squarelywithin the nature"maybe an empiricist standpointtheorists(Keller 1986, 61, 64). While her "recalcitrant hold-over (Keller 1987b).

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11. I am not suggestingmy own alternativeto Keller'sepistemology.Rather, I am suggesting an epistemologyextrapolatedfromKeller'sown model for objects in science. However, I am curfor its uses in developing an alternative rently exploring Foucault'sepistemologicalframework feminist epistemology.The dynamic-objectview which I attributeto Keller is similar, in some respects, to Foucault'sview of objects (Foucault 1972).

REFERENCES

TransA.M. Sheridan Foucault,Michel. 1972. TheArchaeology of knowledge. Smith. New York:Pantheon Books. in feminism. Ithaca:Comell Uniquestion Harding,Sandra. 1986. The science Press. versity Keller,EvelynFox. 1987b. The gender/sciencesystem:Or, is sex to genderas nature is to science. Hypatia2 (3): 37-49. . 1987a. Dickenson Symposium lecture, West Virginia University, April 3, 1987. . 1985. Reflectionson genderand science. New York: Yale University Press. -- . 1982. Feminismand science in Feministtheory,ed. N. Keohane, M. Rosaldo, and B. Gelpi. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. "Feminism and Science" originallyappearedin Signs, 1981. -- . 1979. Cognitive repressionin contemporary Journal physics. American 718-721. 47(8): of Physics.

COMMENT/REPLY

The Gender/Science System: Oliver Responseto Kelly

EVELYNFOX KELLER

I welcome to KellyOliver'scritique theopportunity to respond pubof mypaper in thisjournal out of respect lished earlier reasons: for thetradition for at leastthree to whichOliver'sinvitation becausetheistacitlyappeals; of intellectual exchange andout of fisuesareof quitegeneral even feminist importance, far beyond theory; I central which take to be the to the to feministtheory, delity goalsof contemporary commitment me to dichotomies. This thecurclassical protest unravelling inspires of to name the renttendency some critics under tacitly among feminist reinforce (often and I the between relativism which of "deconstruction") verydichotomy objectivism as the and othershavesoughtto undermine. tell-tale marks such Here, always, of reconstructions are to be foundin the collapse and obliteration oppositional of distinctions to the categories internal underquestions.

I welcome the opportunityto respondto KellyOliver'scritiqueof my paper publishedearlierin this journalfor at least three reasons.First, I respectthe traditionof intellectualexchange to which Oliver'sinvitation tacitly appeals: by definition, her difficultieswith my argumentmeritseriousattention, especially to the extent that they are sharedby others. Secondly, the issuesare of quite general importance:neither my own, nor, finally, Oliver's concerns, are restrictedto feminist critiquesof science, but ratherbelong to the larger endeavor of crafting a viable alternative to traditionalphilosophies of science. And finally, my fidelity to the goals of contemporary feminist theory, centralto which I take to be the unravellingof classicaldichotomies, inspires me to protestthe currenttendency among some feminist critics to tacitly reinforce (often under the name of "deconstruction") the very dichotomy between objectivism and relativismwhich I and others have sought to undermine. Here, as always, the tell-tale marksof such oppositional reconstructions are to be found in the collapse and obliterationof distinctions internal to the categoriesunder question. To illustrate, I begin by identifyingsome problematicconflations in Oliver's own discussion. vol. 3, no. 3 (Winter1989)? by Evelyn FoxKeller Hypatia

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A central concern of Oliver's appearsto be with the notion of "truth",a term she uses (without quotes) no less than 35 times (not counting footnotes). In fairness, however, it must be said that she invokes the term to characterize that, in the main, she is againstit my own claims, demonstrating (truth, that is). But even though, like many contemporary scholars,I am far fromclear what the wordmeans, I do retain somethingof a "traditionalist's" concern with fidelity to a text. Another way of sayingthis is that, while the difficulty in defining "truth"may be enormous, it is considerablyeasier to identify statements or claims that are untrue, even if triviallyso. Trivially, then, "truth"is Oliver'sterm, not mine. PreciselybecauseI am so uncertain of its meaning, I use the term only once, in quotes, to describenot an attribute of theory, nor of science, but rather, something that many (probably most) workingscientists believe in. In attributingclaims of "scientifictruth" to me (as in, e.g., "she hopes to preservethe integrityof scientific truth"(p. 2), or, "Kellerholds onto the belief in one truth about one nature, toward which science aims"(p. 6); or, "Keller's assumptionthat there is one nature and one truth about that nature"(p. 9), etc., etc.), Oliver engages in two sorts of conflation at once: first, between my descriptionof the beliefs (or claims) of workingscientists and my own beliefs (or claims), and secondly, between claims about nature and claims about scientific theories (or representations) of nature. Since the first distinction is relativelystraightforward, let me turn to the second for furtherclarification,both about the distinction between the terms "science" and "nature",and about my own particular claims regardingeach term. To be perfectlyblunt, I have not arguedfor, indeed, do not believe in, the of nature. I explicitly reject "truth"of scientific theories or representations of nature",and call insteadfor an account of the view of science as "mirror scientific knowledge that does justice to the wide diversityof intereststhat have informedthe constructionof the differentformsof knowledgewe call "scientific".At the same time, however, I also argueagainst an account of scientific knowledge that reduces those forms of knowledge to the interest that inform them. I invoke the term "nature"to refernot to any particular of reality, but to that which pre-existsus as cultural, linguisrepresentations tic beings, and accordingly,that providesa kind of ultimate (although perhaps not "absolute")resistance to the free invention of culturallyspecific are equally imagination. The fact is that not all theories or representations an And even undeniable,aspect of durable,or equallysatisfying. important, to what I call the the contractionof scientific theories is their responsiveness of nature."None of this is to say that it is possibleto achieve "recalcitrance anythingone could reasonablycall "truth",but only that scientists can and do sometimes discardtheories because of their failureto provide efficacious guidesto the interactionswe engage in with the world I call "nature"-i.e.,

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with thosenon-symbolic objectswith whichwe live even thoughthey can neverbe adequately named. In short,I findwoefully thoseaccounts of sciencein whichininadequate teractions with naturehave disappeared (suchas, e.g., Oliver's altogether own on p. 16). Withoutquestion, scienceis a socialendeavor, constructed human in with interaction with each other, theories, by beings ideologies, cultural traditions andeconomicinterests, but it is distinguished frommany othersocialendeavors in interacting alsowitha nonby a special"interest" socialworld on whichtheirveryexistence ashuman beings,withall theirattendantideologies, culture,andeconomicinterests, depends. But there is also another sense in which science is a social enaresocially (orconventionaldeavor-namely,that it, andits practitioners, aredistinguished charly) named.The peoplewe call "scientists" by various institutional affiliations-and acteristics-training, also,by ceroccupation, taincommitments thatarecritical to theirself-identification. It is theselatter that I soughtto identify in my reference (quoted by Oliveron p. 6) to the "shared commitment of scientists to the pursuit of a maximally reliable (even if not faithful) of nature, under the equally shared representation assumption that, however elusive,thereis only one nature" (Keller: 46). I claimthat suchcommitments, as articles of faith,alsoserveto distinguish the scientific from othersocialgroups. ButOliver's confusion of mydescription community of suchbeliefs withbeliefs I myself holdmayin partbe fedbyotherarguments I have madeelsewhere-e.g., that "scientists" shared commitment to the of reliable of to its and on possibility knowledge nature, dependence experimentalreplicability and logicalcoherence,is an indispensable prerequisite for the effectiveness of any "scientificventure"(Keller, 1985). In other I haveelsewhere thatat leastsomeof theseshared commitwords, suggested mentshaveconsequences forthe efficacy of scientific theories. I holdto this butwishto note thatsucha claimdoesnot imply,asOliversays, suggestion, that"thenature mustsilencethe culture poleof the dialectic polein normative science" it seems (p. 6). Indeed,despitethe faithof working scientists, evidentthat suchsilencing can neverbe complete. fairly However scientists theirarticles of faith,they diligent maybe in executing andby culture. Theirnamings of nature remain, always, caught by language withOliver,always "onthe problem are,andhereI agree to local,depending be solved,datato be interpreted, calculations to run,etc."(p. 16). Theyalso on the particular aimsof a givenscientific depend discipline-on whatsortof interactions with (or interventions toward. in) naturethat scientists aspire And this lastformof dependency, the determination of the directionality of scientific is inextricably social,economic,andpolitical-involving pursuits, not onlydiscursive structures of power,butmaterial onesas well. Although the influence of suchstructures changeable, is, perhaps sadly,inescapable. so too mustthe same Thus, if I makethe claimthat natureis recalcitrant,

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claim be made for the fact of culture. Science is born and developed out of the interactionbetween these two kinds of constraints. It may not be possible for feminists (or anyone else) to "tell the truth" about science, any more than it is possible for scientists to "tell the truth" aboutnature. Nonetheless, it is possiblefor feministsand other critics to take on the obligationof avoiding"untruths" aboutscience as best they can, comto the that scientists on in relationto nature. In possitake obligation parable ble contradistinction to Oliver (p. 18), I obviously feel this to be important-primarily out of respect for the participantsof the culture we seek to describe. But there is a political point here as well. Those of us who believe change is possible, and who are committedto effecting that change, will inevitably worry about the danger of forfeiting what opportunitieswe might otherwise have through the loss of credibility. Oliver seems to think that feministscan reclaim the scientific project by abandoningits "allegianceto nature."I would say that in doing so, they can only hope to effect discursive strategiesfar removedfrom the scientific endeavor-indeed, abandoningthe pursuitof science to the social and discursivestructuresof power that presently exist. Fortunately,however, feministsdo have anotherchoice: they can enter into the scientific project, reclaiming"allegianceto nature"to effect strategiesbetter suited to human, and to feminist, goals. in the last partof Oliver'spaper,it is posfromsome of the remarks Judging sible that our differencesmay not finally be quite irreconcilable.But in making her argument,she has set up somethingof a fictive opponent, deforming much of my own argumentand even manyof my wordsin an effortto createa sense of opposition considerablygreaterthan what may really exist.

REFERENCES

andScience.New Haven:Yale on Gender Keller,EvelynFox. 1985. Reflections University Press. . 1987. The gender/sciencesystem:Or, is sex to gender as nature is to science? Hypatia2(3): 37-49. Oliver, Kelly. Keller'sgender/sciencesystem. Hypatia,this issue.

COMMENT/REPLY

DoingJusticeto Rights
CARL WELLMAN

On the very first page of the chapter entitled "WrongRights"(originally publishedin Hypatia,Winter 1987) in her challenging and perceptivenew book, The Grammar of Justice, ElizabethWolgast asserts "Although it is a and useful tool, still the schema of rights is sometimesunfit for the powerful uses we make of it" (28). I heartilyand completelyagree. Still, one wonders and why. Wolgast explains just when the appeal to rights is inappropriate that three kinds of problemscan arise when rights are invoked too freely. The firstproblemconcernsthe applicationof rightsto people, for example hospital patients or young children, who are not in a position to exercise them because they are too weak to claim their rights against those upon whom they are dependent for medical or parentalcare. It is true that the importanceof rightsconsistsprimarily,althoughnot exclusively, in the freedomand control they conferon the right-holder.Therefore, they do impose an active role on their possessorand do lose much of their value when he or she is not in a position to exercise this freedomand control effectively. This is often true of patients and childrenfor the reasons Wolgastexplainsso convincingly. Still, a right-holder maybe only temporarof his her or One should rememberthat the ily incapable exercising rights. is a a claim to the percore of double-barreled claim, defining any claim-right formanceof some correlativeduty or to remedyfor nonperformance of this duty. this, but addsthat this remedyis "no remedyat all" Wolgast acknowledges Now it is not true that an ex postfactoremedyis no remedyat all. To be (35). it does not solve the practicalproblemof the maltreatmentof sure, directly But it it. does do something, often too little and too patients by preventing the to done and may indirectlyhelp late, repair damage by such maltreatment in some measureto remind physiciansof their responsibilitiesto their patients and to motivate them to provide competent treatment when it is needed. that when we invokerightsin the case of patientsor dependWolgastargues ent children, our moral focus is wrong. She recommends that we deal with

vol. 3, no. 3 (Winter1989)? by CarlWellman Hypatia

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medicalmalpractice and the abuseof childrenby lookingto the responsibilities of doctorsand parentsratherthan the rightsof patientsand children. rather thanthe responsible However, rightsdo not focuson the right-holder it true is that is some everyright possessedby right-holder,it party.Although is also and equallytrue that every right holds againstsome second party.The language of rights presupposessome possible confrontation to which any specified right is relevant. The practicalsignificanceof any right is that it conferssome sphereof dominion upon the firstpartyin face of some second partyin a potential conflict of wills. Therefore,rightsby their verynaturefocus upon second-partyresponsibilitiesas much as upon first-party exercise. It is even more to the point to note that rights also involve third parties, personsin a position to intervenein any confrontationbetween the firstparty and the second partyof the right. Bystanders, includingsociety itself, areperof a right and to act to premitted or even requiredto side with the possessor vent the violation of any right by a second party. Thus, it is simplynot true that rightslose all their value in the handsof the relativelyweak. In point of becausethey providea fact rightsare especiallyvaluableto the disadvantaged basis for the intervention of third partiescapableof overcomingthe imbalance of powerbetween, for example, patient and physicianor child and parent. If my conception of rightsis correct, or even close to the truth, this first problemis genuine and serious, but not alwaysinsurmountable. The second problem concerns people in situations that vitiate other assumptionsimplicit in the application of rights, as the situations of women these are assumptionsbuilt into the Hobbesian and fetuses do. Presumably model of social atomism. One alleged assumption is that moral rights belong to atomic individuals-separate self-containedpersonsessentiallyindependentof other individuals and of their social relations. But a workingmother, whose right to a maternity leave is highly controversial,is not a social atom. Realistically,maternityleaves areneeded becausechildbirthis exhaustingand because a newbornbaby and its mother need care. In part it is the child's needs that dictate that its mother shouldn'tworkfull time just afterits birth. But if we introduce the mother-child complex into the argument, we lose the of individualrights. (p. 40) framework Apparently, to debate the justice of mandatedmaternityleaves in the languageof rights is wrong becausethe situation of the workingmother invalidates the social atomism presupposed by the languageof individualrights. does The language of rights presupposesome sort of individualism, for some individual right-holder.But these individuals everyright is possessedby need not be social atoms-self-contained, independentand isolatedpersons. Indeed, for reasonswe have alreadyexplained, any individualcapableof pos-

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sessingmoral rights cannotbe a social atom. This is becausethere are three roles implicit in the very concept of a right-that of the firstpartywho holds the right, the second partyagainstwhom the right holds, and the thirdparty who might intervene in any confrontationbetween the right-holderand the second party. Farfrom assumingthe existence of atomic individuals,the asa social nexus in which individualsinteract sertion of any right presupposes and stand in essentiallysocial relations. A second assumptionbuilt into the model of social atomismis that all human beingshave equalrights.Justas any two atomsof carbonor hydrogenare so any two atomic individualsare essentiallysimilar.Since indistinguishable, all personsare equal by nature, their moral rights must be equal also. Unfortunately,the appeal to equal rights does not alwaysassure,or even advance, the cause of justice for women. Consider the "equalrights"guaranteedto women who have committed substantialparts of their lives to raising a family and managinga home, and who then need to work. The theory saysthat they have equalrightsto a job, an equalopportunity in a free, competitive labormarket.The imageoperating here is that of similar units-men and women of all ageswouldbe idensituated,and in that case fairtreatment similarly tical treatmentof them all. A woman is discriminated against and paysa penaltyfor her sex only if she is denied a job when otherfactorsareequal. But if we suppose her situationto be as I have described it, then other factorsare not equal. (p. 39) Since workingmothers are not to be equatedwith the males againstwhom they compete for jobs, it is wrong to look to their equal rights as a guide to how they ought to be treated. Let us proceedwith caution, for there is a mixtureof truth and falsehood here. It is essential to recognizethat an individualpossessesany right by virtue of possessingthe relevant status. For example, it is as a citizen of the United States that I have the right to participatein its elections and as a memberof the APA and I have the right to submita paperfor the program of its Pacific Division. Now it is usually assumedthat all human beings are equallyhuman. This seems to imply that every individual-parent or child, man or woman-has equal human rights. If the justice of affirmative action is to be decided by an appeal to specificallyhuman rights, then it programs would appearthat the second problemof concern to Wolgast is genuine and serious. I would add, however, that one must distinguishbetween equal rightsand rights to equality. Equalhuman rights may imply unequaltreatmentfor human beingsbecauseof the definingcontent of some specificrights. The Universal Declaration affirms that all humanbeingshave an equal of HumanRights

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of living, includingmedicalcare. Now it might right to an adequatestandard of living in an inflarequirea higher income to providean adequatestandard tionary economy than in a society with a lower cost-of-living index. Similarly, since differentindividualswill need very differentkinds and quantities of medical care to maintain or returnthem to reasonably good health, their human to medical care will rights necessary equal imply unequal medical treatment.Thus, the assumptionof equal humanrightsneed not ruleout different treatmentfor differentlyconstituted or situated human beings. Even more to the point is the observationthat not all our moralrightsare rightswe possessas human beings. It is entirelypossible, indeed quite probain emble, that women possessa moralright to affirmativeaction programs ployment by virtue of some status, or complex of statuses, other than their humanity. Perhapsas membersof a society they have a right to their fair share of the advantagesand other goods distributedby its economic system. Perhapsas mothersburdenedwith the majorshareof the social responsibility of raisingchildren, they have a right to compensationfor the employment disadvantagesimposedby this responsibility.I honestly do not know where the truth lies here. But I am confident that the equality of human rights, even if granted, does not necessarilyimplythat special treatmentfor women is unjust. It may turn out that affirmativeaction programsfor women are justicizedeither by the definingcontent of certainspecifichumanrightsor by unequalmoral rights of other species. A third assumptionof social atomism is that individualsare autonomous agents, beings capableof the rationalpursuitof their interests.This assumption is vitiated by a very common way of looking at the situationof the pregnant woman. The debate about abortion also shows the inadequaciesof a to reproduction.It is a subjectof seritheoryof rightsin regard ous debatewhetherthe fetus is an autonomousindividualwith equal rights. If so, then it has all the rightsof any personand should be able to claim its rightsagainstits mother-to-be.But how can we imagine such a thing? (p. 41-42) The problemis not our lack of imagination;it is the wrongnessof ascribing moral rights to the human fetus. It is a mistake to attributerights to the fetus. Such attributionsare not of the lanfalse; they are meaninglessbecause a semantical presupposition arerationalagents. But why do rightspreguageof rightsis that right-holders supposethis?Not simplybecauseonly a rationalagent can claim its rights,for and The existenceof liberty-rights, not all rightsare claim-rights. power-rights showsthe need for some moregeneralexplanation. even immunity-rights There are, in fact, two explanations adequate for a general theory of rights-a macroexplanationand a microexplanation.A right is a complex

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structureof Hohfeldian positions that as a whole confers, if it is respected, freedomand control upon its possessor.Since only a rationalagent is capable of possessing either freedom or control, only a rational agent can possess rights.The elements out of which any right is constitutedare Hohfeldianpositions, especiallyliberties,powers, claims, and immunities.Since only a rational agent could conceivablyexerciseeither a libertyor a power, it is meanlibertiesor powersto any being other than a rationalagent. inglessto attribute And since only rationalagentscan be significantly saidto possessthese essential partsof any right, only rationalagentscan be said to be right-holders. Now I do not believe that the humanfetus is a rationalagent. Therefore,I agreewith Wolgast that is is wrongto debate the justice or injusticeof abortion on demand in terms of the conflict between the rights of the pregnant woman and the rightsof the fetus. To be sure, the humanfetus is a potential rational agent. But all that this implies is that the fetus has the potential to acquirerights, not that it now possessesthose rightsit will come to have as its capacitiesfor rational choice and action gradually develop. The second problem that can arise when rights are invoked too freely is that they are attributedin situationsthat vitiate the presuppositions of the of This does when are ascribed to human felanguage rights. rights happen tuses. I am not convinced, however, that there is any conceptual confusion in debatingthe justice of mandatedmaternityleaves or preferentialaffirmative action programs for women in termsof individualrights. In my view, this second problemis very real, too often ignored,but not presentin all the situations where Wolgast imagineswrong rights. The third problemthat can arisewhen rightsare invoked too freelyhas to do with the attempt to justify the condemnation of offenses whose moral wrongnessis perfectlyclear and unequivocal. Wolgast asks why we feel impelled to appealto some right wheneverwe deal with a wrongfulact or practice and surmises that we imaginethat rightsarepriorto and morebasic than the duties with which they are correlated.Thus, rightsproliferateas we seek justificationsfor every condemnationof wrong action. How should we solve this problem of the proliferationof wrong rights? to jusWolgast suggeststhat we should recognizethat it is often unnecessary tify our judgmentthat certain sortsof acts are morallywrong. "Callingmurder wrong is here like calling a certain color red, that is, what justifiesus in using these terms is that the word means what it does" (p. 47). Unfortunately, the analogybetween moralattributionsand color attributessuggested here does not hold. The justificationof my assertionthat my pen is red may well come to an end when I show you the color of my pen. This is becausewe learnand teach the meaningof the word"red" by ostensive definition so that in the end, as in the beginning, the word"red" just means thiscolor. But we do not learn or teach the meaning of the expression"morally wrong"by ostensive definition. It is closer to the truth, althoughnot the whole truth, to

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say that we learn the meaningof the word"wrong" by being told why this or that act is to be condemned. Therefore,the chain of reasonsnever stopswith the judgmentthat some act is wrong, and moralcondemnationsalwaysstand in need of some justification. How, then, can we avoid the proliferation of wrong rights? Although Wolgasthas not solved this problemfor us, she has diagnosedits sourcecorrectly. We are tempted in fartoo many instancesto justifyour condemnation of some wrong act by assertingthat it violates some duty correlativewith some prior right. The beginning of wisdom is the recognition that not all wrongacts violate duties. It may be morallywrongfor me to refrainfromdoing a favorfor a friendor to refuseto give some of my sparecash to a destitute strangereven though I have no duty to do favorsfor anyone or to provide charity to this individual. Our wisdom increaseswhen we realize that not every duty is groundedin a correlativeright. Some duties are relativeduties, duties to some right-holder.Forexample, my duty to repaya loan is correlative to and groundedin the creditor'sright to repayment. But absolute or nonrelativeduties do not reflectany correlativeright. Thus, my duties to develop my talents and to refrainfromtreatingmy cats cruellyare not owed to any identifiableright-holders.Accordingly,only underspecialcircumstances could one plausiblyattempt to justify the moral condemnationof an act by the appealto some violated right, only when the act is wrongbecauseit violates some duty imposedby that right. In other cases the invocation of a right merely adds to the proliferationof wrong rights. In the end, then, I accept more than I rejectof Wolgast'sdiscussionof the third problemthat can arisewhen rightsare invoked too freely. Although it is not true that the justificationof the condemnationof wrongacts is often unnecessary,it is true that the appealto rightsis often irrelevantto any such justification. What conclusions should we draw concerning Wolgast's treatment of There arewrongrightsor, to speakless enigof Justice? rightsin TheGrammar of uses the languageof rights. The invocation of are there wrong matically, the when often ineffective is right-holderis not in a position to exerrights cise his or her right actively and fully. It is meaninglessto ascriberightsto individualswhose natureor situationinvalidatesthe semanticalpresuppositions of unrealor irrelevantrightsresults of the languageof rights. A proliferation when we attemptto justifyevery condemnationof wrongaction by appealing to some right violated. By identifyingthese problemsand warningus of their import, her treatment of wrong rights makes an importantcontribution to moral theory and applied ethics. of these wrong At the same time, Wolgast has not defined the boundaries or explainedfully in exactlywhat ways of rightsaccurately usesof the language and for what reasonsthese invocationsof individualrights are mistaken.To achieve this we need a more adequatetheory of the nature and groundsof rights.

COMMENT/REPLY

A Replyto CarlWellman
ELIZABETH WOLGAST

Carl Wellman'scommentson "WrongRights"are those of a sophisticated rights theorist, and I find them both astute and welcome. Since my paper didn't supportto give a sustainedand generalattack on rightsor expound a theory of rights (for which it is not nearly scholarly enough) and since Wellmanwouldnot defendthe widestapplicationssometimesmadeof rights, it's possiblefor us to be in much agreement.He is reassuringly in sympathy with the overall thrust of my argument,towardincreasedwarinesswith respect to the invocation of rights, and sharesmy uneasinesswith some of the troublesome examplesthat I cite. On specifics,both of us supportdifferential rights for pregnant women; neither of us wants to grant that fetuses have rights;we agree that rights are spoken of much too loosely and more care in their use is in order.Our disagreements nonetheless concern importantissues that need to be carriedfurther. What I argueis that certain applicationsof rightssuggestthat we need to use more common sense, and should keep one eye on their suitabilityto any given kind of injustice. My broadestclaims were that (a) we have a reflex tendency to deal with wrongs in termsof violations of rights; (b) this tendof atomism;and (c) we do this partlyin ency reflectssome of the assumptions the belief that a reasonfor wrong is alwaysneeded, and a violated right appears to supply such a reason. I offered a few instances where addressinga wrongby referringto a right seems to me illogical and incongruous.Let me turn now to the main disagreements between Wellman and me. On the connection of with 1) atomism, I do not say that it is one of rights entailment-that rightsfollow fromthe assumptions of atomism,those of the and independence, autonomy, equality competitivenessof individuals.And atomism doesn't follow from obviously rights:you needn't be an atomist to hold a doctrine of rights, though without atomismthe theory would be very different. What I said was that "individual rights is a natural adjunct to atomism,"meaning that there is a logical affinity between the languageof rights and these assumptions' (1987, 28). Individualrights fits neatly with atomism'sassumptionof human independenceand equality, and supportour preferencefor rightsthat are equal. Wellman shows his attachmentto equal
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rightswhen he defends the idea that equal rightsneed not be the same; but this seems a cover up for the admissionthat some rightssimplyare different, and how equality accordswith that is still unclear to me. 2 I arguethat atomismnaturallyleadsus to talk aboutpeople as autonomous individuals,without the bonds of blood and blind commitmentand geography which are not undertheir control. The fact that real humanshave many bonds of these kinds does not show that atomismhas no effect on our thinking, as Wellman suggests.What it may show, as I propose, is a gap between model and reality that badly needs addressing. 2) In responseto my assertionthat rights imply the opposition of two unconnected parties, the one pressingher right againstthe other, Wellman argues that on the contrary,for rights to exist there must be a third partywho "is in a position to intervene . .. Bystanders, includingsociety itself. . . are permittedor even requiredto side with the possessorof a right and to act to preventthe violation of any rightby a second party."Instancesare the way a patient'srelative or patient advocatecan pressa patient'sclaim in herbehalf, or the way an adult may advocate the rights of a child, or a public attorney prosecute a violator of rights. Such possibilities show that rights are not which do atomisticcreaturesand that there are remediesto rights-violations not fit the two confrontingparties-model. I grant certainly that a third partymay take a hand, helping to press the claim of one personagainstanother. But even this usuallyrequiresthe third partyacting in thenameof the one wronged,acting in her place, in her stead, Wellman's which is preciselywhat atomismdictates. So the imageunderlying is still of which the dialectic in the functions, referee, rights setting helpful nexus" that of confrontingindividuals."Society"in the abstractor the "social to defenda person's of which a personis partarenot required rights.And if sofrom be would it's role this take did role, indistinguishable the pateralisciety tic one that atomismand rightstheoryareboth designedto avoid. The practical use of rightsis a do-it-yourself craft,and those engagedin it need to be both free and capableto practiceit. The incompetentand helplessrequiresuppleand the questionis why we shouldinsist in thatcase that mentarymachinery; we are dealingwith individualrights. If someone is needed to be concerned, e.g., with respectfor patients,why not startwith the medicalcommunity? 3) I find Wellman'smost interestingcriticismto be his objection to my argument that some wrongsdo not need justification. He quotes my assertion that calling murderwrong is like calling a certain color red where a further justificationcan't meaningfullybe given. He agreesthat this is true normally of our use of red, that " 'red'just means this color." But we do not lear or teach the meaning of the expression "morallywrong" by ostensive definition. It is closer to the truth . . . to say that we learn the meaning of the word

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by being told whythis or that act is to be condemned. "wrong" Thereforethe chain of reasonsnever stops with the judgment that some act is wrong,and oral condemnationalwaysstand in need of some justification. If justifications never stop with the judgment that some kind of act is wrong-e.g. murderis wrong-then there mustbe a whole languageunderlying the languageof morality;and this would be disanalogouswith the language of color which does not rest on anything further.And are we to suppose that the more fundamentallanguageis a languageof rights?That would suggestthat masteringthe terminologyof rightswas fundamentalto learning the languageof moralityand wrongdoingin general. But that flies in the face of our experience. Moreover,it seems to implythat a languagewhich did not referto rights (as ancient Greek is said not to) would necessarilyrelate to a differentmorality,one which restedon a differentfoundation. But this also seems counter-intuitive. What proof is there that some justifyinglanguageis fundamentalto the languageof right and wrong, justice and injustice?Perhapsonly our desireto givejustifications,our insecurityin the face of the question, "whydo you say that?".But as Wittgenstein said, the difficultthing maybe to startat the beginning and not try to go furtherback. In the last two chaptersof The Grammarof JusticeI try to show how the languageof morality,and moralityitself, really are learned-and may fail to be learned. I arguethat it is moral condemnation that forms the bedrockupon which justificationsstand, and not the reverse.Thus the languageof right and wrongis more fundamentalthan that of justifications,as it formsthe beginningof moraltraining.Demandsfor justificationscome later and sometimes, when facetious, need to be rejected ratherthan answered. Here my responseshows how deep and complex issuesare the issuesraised by Wellman'scritique, for I have had to take as context my entire book, The Grammar ofJustice,ratherthan the limitedessayon rights.HoweverI believe with Wellman that the theory of rightsand the rest of our moralvocabulary are so connected that short answersto the importantquestionsare impossible, and any good answersare very hard to come by. I believe that critiques like his help advance the cause of workingsuch answersout.
NOTES
1. The Grammar of Justice(Ithaca, N.Y.: Corell University Press, 1987), p. 28. 2. As it was when I wrote Equality and theRights of Women(Ithaca, N.Y.: Corell University Press, 1980), see especiallyChapter II.

Book Reviews

Feminismand Methodology. By SANDRA HARDING. Bloomington:Indiana University Press. 1987. Nash Margaret SandraHarding'smost recent anthology, Feminism andMethodology, comprises an excellent collection of essaysfocusing on feminist approachesto theory and researchin the social sciences. Feministinquiryhas changed not but only the questions and problemsthat social science raisesand addresses also the very way we conceptualizeknowledgeand the possibilityof it. The essaysin this text illustratein diverseways these shifts in theoreticalunderstandingand social practiceand exhibit the breadthof feminist social analyses and their impact acrossdisciplinary boundaries.Hardinghas selected ten influentialessayswhich span the last fourteenyearsand include a rangeof social science disciplines (psychology, sociology, history, political theory, economics and jurisprudence). Hardingframesthis selection of essayswith an introductionand a conclusion that addressthe issues of methodology and epistemologyrespectively. What guidesher approachis considerationof the question, "What has been responsiblefor producingthe most widely acclaimed feminist social analyses?"(vii). The temptation has been to appeal to a method of feminist inquiry. Against this, Harding argues that there is no distinctive feminist method. Her reasonsfor eschewing the recourseto method are several. The methodology issue is wrongly posed. It conflates research methods, methodologies, and epistemologieswhich in turn generatesmore confusion than clarity and mystifies the really distinguishingfeaturesof feminist research. By unravelingthe distinct meaningsof these termsand the activities they referto, Hardinghopes to sharpenour abilityto decipherthese factorsin how these factorsinthe essayswhich follow and to enable us to understand createsa spacefor both toleratingand explainteract. Such an understanding ing pluralismwith respect to feminist inquiry.Hardingproposesthree (nonexhaustive) features that the best research exhibits. These include: using women'sexperiencesas a resource,both to generateand to informthe problems for research; providingexplanationsfor womenwhich meansthat the researchis designedto answerquestionsor to highlight issuesthat women want in the same criticalplane and placing the researcher and need to understand; as the subject matter under investigation which means including in one's analysisthe presuppositions(gender, race, class, etc.) that constitute one's
Permissionto reprinta book review from this selection may be obtained only from the author

Book Reviews

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andnot a "feminist method" areresponsible Thesefeatures for perspective. research andthe concomitant forceof feminist the explanatory of implosion traditional socialtheory. in thiscollection exhibitthe abovefeaall the articles To varying degrees in how obtain evidence andwhatthey turesthoughthey differ widely they Feminists of diverse are countasevidence. The conpersuasions represented. Marcia Millman andRosabeth tributors includeJoanKelly-Gadol, Kanter, Sherif,CarolGilligan, Smith,BonnieDill, Dorothy Carolyn JoyceLadner, and Nancy Hartsock.Harding CatharineMacKinnon, Heidi Hartmann, and situates summarizes each of the selectionsin a way brieflyintroduces, thatis veryuseful forextending the critique and/or thatthe author's analysis workbegins.WhileI do not intendto comment on eachselection,it is imto note that, though in the portant manyof thesearticles originally appeared works andessential forthose seventies, theyarestillgroundbreaking reading of feminist The critiques the terrain socialanalysis. of the methodoentering biasesthat guideresearch in history,sociology, and logicaland theoretical Millmanand Kanter,Sherif)are excellent for psychology(Kelly-Gadol, howfeminism undermines traditional andchanges what showing assumptions asin needof interpretation. The perspecival nature of knowledge getsviewed and the genuine sense of objectivity that such an acknowledgement is especially Smith,andDill. A welcome engenders by Ladner, emphasized addition herewould be Lugones andSpelman's We GotA jointwork("Have for You! Feminist Cultural and The Demand for Theory Theory, Imperialism 'TheWoman's Voice'" (1983), whichconcretely how to work out explores the authorizing of women's withouterasing cultural, ethnic,raexperiences The problem of how to writetheoryandof what cial, or classdifferences. even constitutes theoretical and Spelman address inquiry,which Lugones wouldcontribute to the epistemological withwhichHarding discussion concludes the book.BothMacKinnon's andHartsock's are concered with essays the engaged butground theirepistemologjustifying positionof the knower ical standpoints differently. The tensions withinfeminist areperhaps mostnotable withrespect theory to epistemology andthe justification of knowledge claims.Harding coinsthe term'transitional to referto two epistemologies that she laepistemologies' bels "feminist and "feminist This is a goodwayto empiricist" standpoint". characterize the statusof theseepistemological anda goodwayto positions avoidthe tendencyto forcecommitments into one campor another.But moreimportantly, as Harding modem suggests: everylegitimate "Perhaps is transitional" anddynamic nature of (186). The transitional epistemology the knower andthe knownwouldseemto leadus to sucha conclusion andI thinkHarding is rightto leaveopenandunresolved the contradictions and the tensions betweenthesetwo 'transitional the traditional epistemologies', ones undercritique and the feminist of the unitary postmodemist critiques

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feministperspectiveimpliedby the 'transitional epistemologies'.Clearly, the 'transitionalepistemologies' have empoweredwomen and have broadened our understanding of social relationsand the possibilitiesfor changingthese. I am not surethat there is as much conflict between some of these epistemologies and the postmodernists' critique as Harding suggests. While the calls into question the universalizing claims to truth, objectivpostmodernist in ity, etc., grounded unified theories and selves, such skepticismregarding the old terms of discourseserves the interestsof those carvingout locations previouslyunseen and thwartsthe imperialistclaims of the omnipotent seer. counterto the postmodemcritic that "it is premature for women to Harding's be willing to give up what they never had" ignoresthe obvious rejoinder:In what sense can one be said to give up somethingif they never had it? Desires can be deceptive as well as modifiable.The longed for object may be the archaic lost object of desire that no one has ever had. Rather than continue questing for power masked as objectivity, legitimated by totalizing truth claims, the feministpostmoderist chooses to subvertand delimit it. I do not think that such a projectundercutsthe desireto know or to authorizeour experience. as well This text is very readable,and will be accessibleto undergraduates as graduatesand useful in a varietyof courses.
REFERENCES

Lugones,Mariaand ElizabethV. Spelman. 1983. Have we got a theory for you! Feminist theory, cultural imperialismand the demand for 'The StudWoman'sVoice!' Hypatia1, publishedas a special issueof Women's Forum6(6): p. 573-581. ies International Women's Place in the Academy: Transformingthe LiberalArts Curriculum. Edited by MARILYNR. SCHUSTER and SUSAN R. VAN DYNE. Totowa, NJ: Rowan & Allanheld, 1985. The Impact of Feminist Research in the Academy. Edited by CHRISTIE FARNHAM. Bloomington, IN: IndianaUniversity Press, 1987. Holland Monica in the Research Women'sPlace in the Academyand The Impactof Feminist reporton feminist scholarshipin the acAcademy togetherprovidea progress ademic world. The first is about how some educatorshave begun transforming traditionalliberalarts curriculainto curricularesponsiveto the needs of women studentsand informedabout the feminist researchbeing done in traditional disciplines.The second book focuseson the state of feministresearch in these disciplines and the impact this researchhas had on their assump-

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tions, methodological precepts and directions. The primaryvalue of these booksfor feministphilosophersis that they give us a chance to comparenotes with feminists in other disciplines. By helping us see the largerpicture for women'sscholarship,these books can help us place ourselvesas teachersand in the largercontext of a communityof feminist scholars. They researchers thereby help us formulate strategiesfor teaching, doing research, and the traditionalliberalartscurriculaand largerinstitutionalprojectof reassessing the missionsof institutions of higher education. Women's Placein theAcademy is interestingand fun to read, in partbecause it's a "how to" book. Schuster and Van Dyne have collected reportsfrom feministscholarsin differentdisciplineson how they have madetheir courses and/ortheir institutions'curricularesponsiveto the rapidlygrowingbody of feminist scholarship,and how they have heightened awareness of the white, and disciplines. male, elitist biases entrenched in the traditionalcurriculum The contributionsfall into four categories:(1) assessments of the abilitiesof coeducationalinstitutionsand women's institutionsto meet the educational needs of women students;(2) commentson the relationbetween Blackstudies and women'sstudies;(3) reportson intra-and inter-institutional attempts to reshapecurricula in responseto the needs of women and minoritystudents; coursesin response (4) reportson how scholarshave transformed particular to feminist and Black scholarship,and in responseto the need to examine pedagogyfrom a perspectivesensitive to feminist and racial concerns. One of the recurring themes is the inclusionof genderas a categoryof analwe don't ysis. Though get any quick answersabouthow to createwomen-oriented courses,we do lear from the experiencesof people who have experimentedwith, and to varyingdegreessucceededin, includinggenderas a category of analysis in particularcourses. We find descriptionsof how people have developed courses in American literature,French literature,political science, communication,philosophy, and biology. Since the only way to effect institutionalchange in the curriculumis throughreorientingparticular courses, these contributionsconstitute the core of this book. As is the case with most anthologiesthough, the qualityof the contributionsis mixed. But overall, the papersare sufficientlyinformativeto warranta carefulreadingby transformation or anyone feeling anyone interestedin largescale curriculum isolated in her attempts at feminizingtraditionalcourses. TheImpact Research in theAcademy does not makefor light readof Feminist because ing; it requiresa substantialcommitmentfrom the reader,primarily the papersin it describethe impactof feminist researchfromwithinthe disciplines. Though jargonis never a problem,I don't imagineany readerwill feel at home in the wide rangeof disciplinesrepresented. None of the papersdeals directly with the impact of feminist researchon philosophy, but there is plenty to interest a feminist philosopher. Because feminist research has tended to be inter-disciplinary, there is a lot of overlap between the disci-

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plines surveyedand our own. Also, many of these scholarsinsist that whole structures of inquiryand theorizingmust be revampedbefore the traditional disciplinescan begin to accommodatefeminist questionsand answers.One example of a distinctly philosophical issue arisingfrom the essays is the reshift. One has peated invocation of Thomas Kuhn'snotion of the paradigm to wonderwhether Kuhn'smodel is as adequateto the needs of the academic feminist movement as it is commonly taken to be. Another interestingmethodologicalaspect of the book is that a disagreement almostsurfacesover whether what is wrongwith much of the "masculine" canon is that it is too objective or not objective enough. Carol Nagy Jacklin and Ruth Bleier suggest that we can rid the traditionaldisciplines biasesby consideringmore (some of them? all of them?) of their androcentric information-information concerningwomen and arisingfrom women'sexperiences-and by more carefullychoosing (or at least makingexplicit) our of the investigatory enterassumptions.They seem to hold that the structure all relevant is is not information considsound, currently being though prise ered. Carol Christ, on the other hand, insists that the "ethosof objectivity" shouldbe rejectedin favorof the "ethosof eros and empathy."Christ thinks the full emotional force of the personalmust be broughtto bearon methods of inquirybefore feminist concerns can really be addressed.This disagreement poses questions for feminist methodology that are perhapsbest addressedby philosophers:Is there a method of feminist inquirythat underlies feminist inquiriesin the differentdisciplines?If so, is it what Christ calls the Can the personalbe heeded too much in a fem"ethosof eros and empathy"? inist inquiry?Isn't this last question especially troublinggiven the committo presentingwomenkindas the highly diversiment of feminist researchers fied group it is? Although these essaysstressthat a great amount of feminist researchhas been done, no one seems readyto claim victory. The following conclusions are explicit in some essaysand implicit in others: (1) Feministresearchhas of most traditionaldisciplines. As a had little influence on the mainstreams have developed. (2) Consequently,feminist research rule, feminist subfields coursesor their texthas not had much impacton the content of introductory to mainstreams. bookssince these function as introductions (3) The ultimate impactof feminist researchin the academyawaitsa new generationof scholars, educated in departmentswhich are sensitive to feminist research.

Notes on Contributors

SANDRA BARTKY is an associate professorof philosophy and women's studies at the University of Illinois at Chicago. She is currentlya Bunting Fellow at Radcliffe College where she is completing an essay collection in thePhenomenology andDomination: Studies entitled Femininity of Oppression to be publishedby Routledge in 1990. JUDITH BUTLERteaches philosophyat George WashingtonUniversity in Washington, D.C. She is the authorof Subjects of Desire:Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth France (Columbia University Press, 1987) and is curCentury on the politics of genderidentitytheoryto be rentlycompletinga manuscript in 1989. She has written articles in continental published by Routledge French and feminism, theory. philosophy, poststructuralist NANCY FRASER teaches philosophy, comparativeliteratureand theory, and women'sstudiesat NorthwesternUniversity. She is the authorof Unruly Practices: SocialTheory(UniPower,Discourse,and Genderin Contemporary versityof Minnesota Press). DIANA J. FUSS is assistantprofessor of Englishat PrincetonUniversity.She is the author of a forthcoming book on feminist theory called Essentially Speaking (Routledge, 1989) and she is currentlyat workon a book on gay and lesbian theory, tentatively titled, The ThirdSex. MONICA HOLLAND is doing doctoralwork in philosophyat IndianaUniversity, Bloomington. She is interestedin issuesin epistemology,philosophy of mind and feminist theory, and is writing a dissertationentitled "Emotion and Belief: ExpandingOur Theories of Knowledge."She has workedas the editorial assistant of Nous, and is currently the editorial assistant of the Journalof Philosophical Logic. NANCY J. HOLLAND is associateprofessor of philosophyat Hamline University in St. Paul, Minnesota. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Californiaat Berkeley.She has publishedseveralarticleson contemporary French philosophy and recently completed a manuscriptthat comparesthe usefulnessof Anglo-Americanand continental philosophyfor doing feminist theory. LUCE IRIGARAY holds doctorates in literature, linquistics, and philosophy. She is trained as a psychoanalyst.She is a directorof researchat the Centre Nationale de la RechercheScientifiquein Paris.Her workcenterson

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artsand language.She has written numerousworks, of which two are translated into English:Speculum of the OtherWomanand This Sex WhichIs Not One. Another, "The Ethics of Sexual Difference,"is undertranslation.Her and a collection on Levinasedited articleshave appearedin Signs,Paragraph A. Cohen. Richard by has worked in theoretical physics, molecular and EVELYNFOX KELLER mathematicalbiology, but she is perhapsbest known for her two books, A McClintock(W.H. Feelingfor the Organism:The Life and Workof Barbara Freeman, 1983) and Reflectionson Genderand Science (Yale Univ. Press, 1985). She is currentlya memberof The Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, and has just joined the faculty at the University of California, Berkeley. SARAH KOFMANteaches philosophyat Paris1-Sorbonne.She has written eighteen books of which the following deal specificallywith questions peras TheEnigma de la femme(1980), translated of taining to feminism:L'Enigme Woman (Comell University Press, 1985); Le respectdes femmes (Galilee, Comte (Flammarion,1978); le devenir-femme 1982); Aberrations: d'Auguste de Derrida in Lectures cloche" "Baubo,perversionthe1984); (Galilee, "Qa la in et scene et fetichisme" Nietzsche (Galilee, 1986). philosophique ologique de l'Art, was recentlytranslatedas, TheChildfirstbook, L'Enfance Kofman's hoodof Art (ColumbiaUniversityPress, 1988). Her last two booksare Paroles (Galilee, 1987), a reflectionon concentrationcamps, and Conversuffoquees de Venisesous le signede Sature (Galilee, 1988). marchand le sions, who holds a Ph.D. fromColumbiaUniverELEANORH. KUYKENDALL, sity, is chair of the philosophydepartmentand coordinatorof the linquistics program,SUNY College at New Paltz. From1979 to 1981 she wasdirectorof the Parisphilosophyprogram,SUNY New Paltz, in affiliationwith l'Universite de ParisIV (Sorbonne). DOROTHYLELANDteaches philosophyat PurdueUniversity, where she is Doctoral Programin Philosophyand English. Although directorof Purdue's most of her publications have been in mainstream German and French phenomenology, she is looking forwardto doing more work on feminist issues. MARGARETNASH received her Ph.D. in philosophyfrom the University of Massachusetts,Amherst. She is currentlyan assistantprofessorof philosophy at SUNY Cortland. Her philosophical interest include continental philosophy, psychoanalysis,philosophy of the social sciences and feminist philosophy.

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ANDREA NYE teaches philosophyand feminist theory at the Universityof Wisconsin-Whitewater.Her most recent publishedpapersexplore the intersections of feminism and philosophy of language, with special emphasison She is the authorof Feminist poststructuralism. Theoryand thePhilosophies of Man, (Croom Helm, 1988) distributedby Routledge, Chapmanand Hall. KELLY OLIVERis currentlya visiting assistantprofessor of philosophyat Miami University of Ohio. She receivedher Ph.D. fromNorthwesternUniversity in 1987. Her dissertation,is entitled "Woman'sVoice, Man'sLanguage: A Reading of Gender and Languagein Nietzsche." MARGARET A. SIMONS is an associate professor of philosophy at Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville,and editor of Hypatia.She is currentlyworkingon a book on Beauvoir'sphilosophy. JANE MARIE TODD has taught French, comparative literature, and women'sstudies at Miami University of Ohio, University of Illinois at Chicago, and Reed College. She has published articles on Rousseau, Derrida, Freud,de Man, Genet, and on feminist theory. CARL WELLMANis the Hortense and Tobias Lewin DistinguishedProfessor in the humanitiesat WashingtonUniversityin Saint Louis.His two more recent books are Welfare Rights (1982) and A Theoryof Rights (1985). He is a vice presidentof the internationalassociationfor philosophyof law and social philosophy and serves on the editorial boardsof Ethicsand Archivfur Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie. ELIZABETH WOLGAST is professor of philosophyat CaliforniaState University, Hayward.A graduate(B.A. and M.A.) of Corell University, and of the University of Washington (Ph.D.), she is the author of Paradoxes of and theRights Knowledge, Equality of Women,and recentlyof The Grammar of Justice.

Announcements
Call for Papers:Iyyun a PhilosophicalQuarterlypublishedin Hebrew since 1946 at the Hebrew University of Jerusalemannounces that as of Vol. 38, 1989 it will publish two additional issues in English each year. Iyyun will accept articles and critical studies in all areas of philosophy, irrespective philosophical school, style or method of inquiry. Papersshould be sent to E.M. Zemach, Editor, Iyyun, The S. H. BergmanCenter for Philosophical Studies, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem,91905, Israel. The May, 1989 issueof the American PhilosophicalAssociation'sFeminism and Philosophy Newsletter,edited by Maxine Sheets-Johnstone and Nancy Tuana will focus on Feminism, Sexuality, and the Body. The issue will be devoted to investigationsof the relationshipof feminismto the sexual body, feminismto the technological body, feminismto the clinical body, feminism to the visual body, feminism to the social body (the body as social subject/ social object), feminismto the felt body, feminismto the reproductive body, and so on. The focus will be on the concrete flesh and bone body, but in different guises, settings, and/or with specific emphasis. For this issue the Newsletteris seeking:(1) Essays(no more than 10 pages); (2) Book reviewsof related works; (3) Relevant bibliographies of philosophical interest; (4) Curriculardiscussions and suggestions regarding the use of materials on feminism, sexuality, and the body in philosophy courses. All submissions shouldbe submittedin duplimust be limitedto ten manuscript pages. Essays cate with the author'sname on the title page only. The deadlinefor submisto Nancy Tuana,Arts and Humanisions is January 1, 1989. Send manuscripts TX 75083-0688. Texas at of Dallas, Richardson, ties, JO 3.1, University The September,1989 issue of the American Philosophical Association's Feminismand Philosophy Newsletter, edited by Laurie Shrage and Nancy Tuana, will focus on Feminism and Aesthetics. Submissions on feminist literarytheory, film criticism, art criticism, and feminist theories of art and aesthetic judgment are welcome. Also welcome are book reviews, literture surveys, ideas for mainstreamingfeminist aesthetic theory in philosophy on (1) the writingsof women aestheticians, courses,and short commentaries and art of (2) the politics reception production, (3) feminist aesthetics and theories of meaning and representation.All submissionsmust be limited to ten manuscript pages. Essays should be submitted in duplicate with the is May 1, author'sname on the title page only. The deadlinefor submissions 1989. Send manuscriptsto Nancy Tuana, Arts and Humanities, JO 3.1, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson,Texas 75083-0688. and The futureissuesof the American PhilosophcalAssociation's Feminism Newsletter will focus: (1) open issue: All topics welcome. (2) Philosophy feminismand moral theory. (3) feminismand the environment.

Announcements

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Conference:The 8th Berkshire Callfor Papers for 1990 Berkshire Conference Boundaries on the Historyof Women, "Crossing in FeministHistory",will be held on June 7-10, 1990, at Douglass College, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ. Submit proposals in Triplicateby February1989 to Jane Caplan, Departmentof History, BrynMawrCollege, BrynMawr,PA 19010, or Nancy Cott, American Studies Program, 1504A Yale Station, New Haven, CT 06520. Furtherdetails availablefrom either. The National Women's StudiesAssociationwill hold its 1989 conference, "FeministTransformations," at Towson State University in Baltimore,June 14-18, 1989. Brill'sStudiesin Epistemology, and Psychiatry is devoted to the Psychology, of in publication recent philosophicalworks these disciplinesand, especially, in the aeas in which these disciplines intersect. Such works may be of contemporaryor historical interest, and of theoretical or practicalsignificance. But they are related in their treatment of philosophical issues and of the humanmind, its acquisition, problemspertainingto ourunderstanding validation,and use of knowledge,and the conditionsunderwhich such acquias rational.Should you sition, validation, and use are or should be regarded wish to submita manuscript for this series,pleasewriteto: E. J. Brill,attention Elisabeth Erdman,P.O.B. 9000,2300 PA Leiden,The Netherlands. Aunt Edna'sReading List-a monthly reviewof feministbooks is a brief,down to earth review with an emphasison connecting feminist readerswith the works of authorswho usuallydon't receive mainstreampublicity. Included are books of feminist theory, social commentary, internationalaffairs,and lots of novels and just good reads. Also inlcudes orderinginformationfor hard-to-findbooks. Subscriptionsare $10.00 a year; a free sample copy is availablefromAunt Edna'sReadingList, 2002-H-27 Hunnewell, Honolulu, HI 96822. BookSubmissions One foundingmemberof the groupJewishLesbian Sought: Daughtersof Holocaust Survivors,an internationalnetworkingand support group, seeks submissions for an anthology of writings by Jewish Lesbian Daughters of Holocaust Survivors. Tentatively titled "The Hour of the Rooster, The Hour of the Owl", from a prose-poemof the same name, this collection will include poetry, photos, b/w art/graphics and short stories all focused around life of a Jewish Lesbian Daughter of Holocaust Survivors. and other appropriate Fiction, historical fiction, biography,autobiography styles will be considered.Forfurtherinformationplease write:JLDHSBook, P.O. Box 6194, Boston, MA 02114 for more information.

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Lesbians Announced: NationalNewsletter Submissions,Contribufor Disabled tions sought. A unique effort to link disabled lesbians nationally (and possibly internationally) has begun. "Dykes, Disability and Stuff" is one answer to the dearth of communication between membersof this sizeable community. "Dykes, Disability & Stuff" will be a readers'forum and is expected to address the gamut of concerns women dealing with chronic disabilitiesare thinking about. Contirbutionsof art/graphics, news, discusP.O. Box sent to should be and letters sions 6194, Boston, MA "DD&S", are available on a slidingscale for this 02114. Subscriptions start-upquarterly of send SASE. Brailleand tape +. first issue For (print) sample from $8-20 free the courtesyof the through copies of the premiereissuewill be available MN Women's Braille Press, POB 8745, Minneapolis, 55408. announces that on The University of Iowa WomenAgainstRacismCommittee April 6-9, 1989, they will sponsor their first national conference entitled "Parallelsand Intersections:A Conference on Racism and Other Formsof Oppression."For more informationplease contact: Women Against Racism Committee, c/o Women's Resourceand Action Center, The University of Iowa, 130 N. Madison Street, Iowa City, Iowa 52242. Feminist Callfor papers: Essaysin Papersare soughtfor an anthologyof Critical to be publishedby the SUNY press in its the Historyof WesternPhilosophy "FeministPhilosophy"Series. The anthologywill have two partsone addressing ancient Greek philosophyand the other Modem philosophy. Papersfor the firstpartshouldfocus on some aspectof Plato'sor Aristotle'swork. Papers for the second part should focus on some aspect of Cartesianphilosophyor Hobbes', Locke's, Hume's, Mill's, Rousseau's,Kant's, Hegel's, Marx'sand Nietzche's work. Critical overviews of a philosophical field or trends and their developmentsduringthe two periodsare also welcome. Send proposals, draftsand inquiriesto: Bat-Ami Bar On Departmentof Philosophy, SUNY College at Oswego, Oswego, NY 13126. A special topics issueof GENDER & SOCIETYwill focus on Callfor papers: physical and psychological violence against women and children. We are of the interestedin papersshowingthe systemicinterrelationship particularly threat variousformsof violence, the impactof institutionalviolence, and the of violence as a means of social control over women and children. We submissionsand are especially looking for articles welcome interdisciplinary backgrounds. dealingwith women and childredof color or fromworking-class Reports of research grounded in a structuralanalysis of violence against women and childrenarewelcome, but this issuewill not be limited to articles writtm in standardacademic style. Experientialdata, poetry, drawingsand photographs, used as illustrative material in analytic pieces or as separate

Announcements

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are also welcome,but we cannotacceptfiction. Deadlinefor submissions date of publication: December submissions: 1990. July 1, 1989. Expected fee. ALLSUBMISSIONS Pleasesend five copies and a $10 submission BESENTTO:Judith SHOULD CUNY Lorber, Editor, Dept.of Sociology, 33 Graduate New West NY 42 10036. Center, Street, York, SisterWisdomIssue 38: Italian-American Call for papers: Guest Lesbians, in duplicate.SASE Editor: Rose Romano.All workshouldbe submitted MUST BE ENCLOSED. Pleasemarkenvelope-Att: RoseRomano.Deadline:Februry 1989. 15, Callfor papers: The Department of Religious Studiesin The University of South Floridais pleased to announce a new publicationsseries, USF IN RELIGION MONOGRAPHS & PUBLIC whichreflectsthe POLICY, educationaland intellectualdirectionsof the Department. Manuscripts between10,000and 25,000 wordsin length(that is, longerthana journal articlebut shorter thana book)areinvitedforconsideration by an internationaladvisory board.We areinterested in manuscripts whichdescriptively or normatively the interrelations betweenreligions andsuchpublic analyze as: culture; socialand professional ethics;politics;issuesof policydomains peace and war;science and technology;economics;ethnicity;women's human church-state andforeign anddomestic issues; relations; rights; policy. should be and in conformancewith rigorousanalytically Manuscripts standard witha variety of issues scholarly style.We seekmanuscripts dealing and whichreflectthe diversity of religious and cultural contextsin which or engage.The policyissuesarise.Manuscripts maybe eitherdispassionate are in an occasional of the first which series, monographs published appeared during1986. Callfor papers: Second International Conferenceon Ethicsand DevelEconomic Alternatives. Place:Uniopment. Crisis-Ethics-Development versidad Autonoma de Yucatan, Mexico.Date:July2-8, Merida, Yucatan, 1989. Sponsors: Interational Development EthicsAssociation (IDEA)& Universidad Autonoma de Yucatan. Themes:AuthenticDevelSuggested EndsandMeans.Autonomy andAusterity: NationalSovereignity opment: andthe IMF.LatinAmerican Debt:Whatis the Solution? Poverty-focused VersusExport-led Alternatives and Authentic Development. Agricultural Development.Democracyand DevelopingSocieties. Sex Equalityand Authentic Development. Ecologyand SustainableDevelopment:The Mexican Case.StateandMarket: Rolesin Authentic U.S.A. Development. and U.S.S.R., and LatinAmerican NationalDevelopment Development. andRegional Peace: Central America. LatinAmerican Values: Obstacles or Aids to Development? The GapBetween Rich andPoor:Explanations and

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Solutions. Is There a Moral Right to Development?Human Rights Versus BasicNeeds. DevelopmentEthicsand Ethnocentrism.Development, Liberation, or Revolution? Development Ethics: Religious or Secular?Deadlines: Abstracts:February 28, 1989; Papers:April 30, 1989. Inquiries,Abstracts, and Papers(3 copies) should be sent to: David Crocker,IDEA, Department of Philosophy, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO 80523 USA. The Institute for Women's Policy Reaearch(IWPR) is a recently formed independentnonprofit researchinstitute dedicatedto conductingand disseminatingresearchthat informspublicpolicy debatesaffectingwomen. IWPR state seeks to bridgethe communicationgap between scholarlyresearchers, and federalpolicymakers,and advocates. In its firstyear, IWPRhas focussed on economic justice issues affecting women (welfare reform, family and medical leave, and child care). Projectedareas of researchinclude health care and internationalrelations. In all its work, IWPRseeks to addressissues of ethnicity, race, and class as well as genderby recognizingthe full diversity of women's situations. For further informations, contact: Institute for Women's Policy Research, 1400 20th Street, NW Suite 104, Washington, DC 20036. (202) 785-5100. Rita Nakashima Brock Wins $5000 Women's Studies Award. Crossroad/ Continuum is presenting its first annual Women's Studies Award to Rita Nakashima Brock for her work Journeysby Heart: A Christology of Erotic to be Studies Women's Power. The Crossroad/Continuum Award, given annually in May, is designed to encourageand rewardoutstandingscholarand ship and other writingin Women'sStudiesvitally importantto literature the arts, to psychologyand social thought, and to spiritualityand religious studies. A suitablecandidatefor the awardwould include any manuscriptin Women's Studies, widely defined, to be publishedas a scholarlymonograph or Herder& or a general tradebook for seriousreadersunder the Crossroad Herderimprintsfor religiousstudiesand spirituality,or underthe Continuum or Frederick Ungar imprintsfor literatureand the arts, psychologyand social thought. The AdvisoryCommittee for the Award includesSusan Thistlethwaite, Professorof Theology and Culture, Chicago Theological Seminary; of English, Universityof Maine;and Elizebeth JosephineDonovan, Professor by Rechtschaffen,Vice President,The OmegaInstitute, Rhinebeck.Journeys Heartwill be publishedin November. Formanyyearsnow mentorshiphas been used by businessto promoteindividual development of job-related competencies. More recently, formal have increasinglybecome a part of education, as one mentorshipprograms way of achieving increased student learning and excellence. Recently a broad-based MentoringAssociation was formed.The Association, housed at

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Western Michigan University, Office of Special Program, is devoted to national and international promotion of the mentorshipconcept: through annual conferences, continuing professionalconsultation and training, the furtheranceof researchin the area, as well as the developmentof a Mentoring Association Journal and other publications. For more information, contact: Kipling D. Forbes, P.O. Box 3565, Mansfield, OH 44907. (419) 756-1717. announces a new fund, the Corinne The Elizabeth Cady StantonFoundation GuntzelMemorialFund, to supportprojectsand researchin women'shistory. Named for Corinne Guntzel, a much-loved feminist scholar, teacher, and organizer, the Guntzel Memorial Fund is now accepting applications for awards. Any project in women's history research or education may be submitted.Proposals may relateto the teachingof women'shistoryin schools for out-of-schooladults, or to basic research and colleges, to public programs and publicationof scholarlymaterials.Affiliation with an academicinstitution is not required,and we hope that a broad range of people will apply. Awardswill range from $250 to $500. For more information,contact: Harlene Gilbert, c/o The ElizabethCady Stanton Foundation,Box 603, Seneca 15, 1989 (Susan Falls,New York13148. Deadlinefor applicationsis February B. Anthony;s birthday). The first awards will be made during women's history month, March 1989. For informationon membershipin regional Society for Womenin Philosophy. divisions which include programannouncement and a subscriptionto the national SWIP Newsletter, as well as a subscriptionto Hypatia,contact: SWIP:Executive SecretayRita Manning, UC San JoseState, San Jose, Pacific CA 95192. Treasurer Ruth Doell, San FranciscoState University, Dept. of Biological Science, 1600 HallowayAve., San Francisco,CA 94132. MidwestSWIP:Excutive SecretayJean Rumesy, Dept. of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Steven's Point, Steven's Point, WI 54481. Treasurer Carol Van Kirk, 1401 N. 58th St. Omaha, NE 68106. Eastern SWIP:ExecutiveSecretayLibbyPotter, Dept. of Philosophy,Harverford College, Haverford, PA 19041. Co-Executive SecretaryJoan Ringelheim, Apt. la, 150 W. 74th St., New York, NY 10023. Treasurer Jana Sawicki, Dept. of Philosophy,Univ. of Maine, Orono, ME 04469. The Directory of Women in Philosophy is available from the Executive Secretaryin each division. Cost is $2.00. Callfor papers: Society for Women in Philosophy,MidwestDivision. Spring Meeting:March 17-19, 1989, IndianaUniversity, Indianapolis.Papersin all

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areasof Femnist Philosophyare welcome. Please send one copy (two if you can manageit) to either: Chris Cuomo, 91 DairyLane, Verona, WI 53593. Carol A. Van Kirk, Department of Philosophy, 301 Gordy Hall, Ohio University, Athens, OH 45701. Deadline for submission: January10, 1989. will be mailedto SWIP membersat Information local arrangements regarding a date closer to the time of the meeting by the local arrangements chair, Anne Donchin of IndianaUniversity, Indianapolis.Partof the program will be devoted to discussionof SarahHoagland's new book Lesbian Ethics-Toward New Value (forthcoming, December 1, 1988). If copies are not available throughyour local feminist bookstore,you can obtain a copy fromthe Institute of LesbianStudies, P.B. Box 60242, Palo Alto, CA 94306, or, for faster service, by sending a check ($14.95 plus postage) to: SarahLuciaHoagland, Departmentof Philosophy,NortheasternIllinois University, 5500 St. Louis Avenue, Chicago, IL 60625. and Gathering will be held The SecondAnnual LesbianSeparatist Conference Wisconsin. The four-dayconJune 15 through 18, 1989 near Milwaukee, ference will provide LesbianSeparatiststhe opportunityto exchange ideas, present papers, participate in workshops and discussions, play, expand Separatistnetworksand sparknew friendships.The sliding scale registration fee of $85 to $150 covers everything,includinglodgingand meals. A limited numberof workexchange slots are available. Formore information,contact: BurningBush, P.O. Box 3065, Madison, WI 53704-0065, USA. errorsthat occurredin volERRATA:The Editorregretsthe typographical ume 3, number2 of Hypatia.In ClaudiaCard's,"FemaleFriendship: Separations and Continua," the sentence beginning on line 8, page 124, should read as follows: conHer central chaptersare two case studies, the medievalEuropean and to rule of the thirteenth enclosure, vent, especiallyprior century the nineteenth and early twentieth-centuryChinese vegetarianhouses and spinsters'houses createdby women who refusedmarriage,women to whom she refersas "marriage resisters,"citing as groundof Topley'sPh.D. dissertation,Univerbreakingthe research Marjorie in 1958. sity of London The final line is missingfrompage 131, of MarilynFriedman's, "Individuality A Passion Review of Janice Raymond's Without Individualism: for Friends." The final sentence on page 131 and the first sentence on page 132 should read as follows: Convent life "at its best"featureswhat Raymondconsidersan "instructive tension between individuality and community." "Individual

Announcements

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growth"and "personalachievement" are balanced with "community purpose"and "cooperativewell-being." The editorsgratefullyacknowledgethe contributionsof the following scholars in readingmauscriptsfor Hypatiaduring 1987-1988. Annette Baier Asoka Bandarage ElizabethBeardsley Joanne Beil-Waugh Joann Benson Susan Bordo MarilynBoxer ClaudiaCard Arlene Dallery Natalie Z. Davis Sarah Deats Nancy Frankenberry MarilynFriedman Charlotte Frisbee MarilynFrye Diana J. Fuss MoiraGatens Joan Gibson LisaJardine NarrerlO. Leohane Eva FederKittay Noretta Koertge Annette Kolodny EleanorH. Kuykendall William McBride MaryMahowald Diana T. Meyers Julie Murphy MarilynMyerson Andrea Nye Judith Ochshom Onora O'Neill Christine Pierce MaryVarey Rorty KathrynRussell KristineSchrader-Frechette Stephanie Shields Linda Singer Christina Sommers MaryEllen Symmons MaryAnne Warren JuanitaWilliams Wilson Margaret Winant Terry BeatriceZedler

SubmissionGuidelines
solicits paperson all topics in feministphilosophy.We regularly pubHypatia lish generalissuesas well as special issueson a single topic, or comprising the in feminist a conference All of should conproceedings philosophy. papers form to Hypatiastyle using the Author/Datesystemof citing references(see the ChicagoManualof Style). Papersshould be submittedin duplicatewith name on the title pageonly for the anonymous the author's reviewing process. The HypatiaBook Review Section aims at increasingthe visibility and readershipof books in feministphilosophy.At present,three generalbook review guidelineshave been developed: 1. To promote dialogue between books, reviewersare asked to discuss, when possible, more than one book in feminist philosophy. Several books might be clusteredarounda theme, or a single book might be highlightedand its relation to other books in feminist philosophy might be mentioned in brief. 2. Book reviewersare asked to discussthe majorclaimsof the book(s) reviewed and to present the reviewer'sown reflections. 3. Book reviews will be either Short Reviews or Review Essays: will be two to three text pages, that is, three to fourtyped ShortReviews double-spacedpages in length. Review Essayswill be approximately eight to twelve text pages,or ten to twenty typed double-spacedpages in length. Books which will be the shouldbe proposedin advanceto the Book Resubjectof Review Essays view Editor. For furtherinformation,contact the HypatiaBook Review Editor:Jeffner Allen, Departmentof Philosophy, SUNY Binghamton, Binghamton,New York 13901.

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