Link between a constitutions authority, identity and interpretation thus, for instance if it gets its authority because it is accepted

d by those who are governed then, it should be so interpreted as to give interpretation to what they believe to be true at that point in time therefore, it all depends on what we accept and should accept as supreme talks about how the rules which are finally accepted are those which are not optimal by anyones standards but good enough for everyone else also, it is accepted to what degree they might be entrenched and who, if anyone, can change/alter them in the future (Legislature). hey also decide not only on the words but also what is meant by those words thus, they also have to decide who decides what they meant by those words. (!udiciary) "eparates constitution from metaconstitution (basic agreed upon norms like what is the constitution, who interprets it etc.) #onstitutional amendments normally change the actual constitution without changing the metaconstitution. "econdly, a revolution might take place when the people decide that they want a new metaconstitution and therefore, a brand new constitution. hirdly, the symbolic constitution might remain the same and the metaconstitution might change, thus, giving a different interpretation to the actual constitution. $hy should % follow rules even if % dont want to follow them& 'ecause the rules might not be optimal for me but they are better than what otherwise, might happen. hen, he talks about ( contributors) *ay, +ichelan, ,erry and -a. are essentially orthodo/ who broadly believe in what 0le/ander says while -ubenfeld, "ager and $aldron divert from it. -ichard *ay is probably closest to analysis according to him, the purpose of constitution is to lay down fi/ed rules to regulate human conduct and keep government in order brings predictability and security by defining in advance what should be he says risking fle/ibility is better than risking security *ay says ma1oritarianism and allowing people to do what and as and when they like might not only trample certain peoples rights prefers a single privileged 1udgment to the inconsistency of shifting democratic decisions. 2e believes in the intention of the framers 3oes not believe in interpretation according to times believes it undermines the raison d etre. 4rank %. +ichelman talks about the 5author6authorship syndrome why should % do something merely because someone says % should 0le/ander says that because good enough practical reasons for us to assume good enough rules for everyone as pointed above might be sub6optimal but better for society as whole also talks about why % should do something now 1ust because % said so then& +.!. ,erry agrees with *ay and 0le/ander also talks about how ma1ority rules are clearly there for practical purposes and how the metaconstitutional norm that 0mericans follow the constitution made in 7(89 gives it authority norms can change without the actual constitution changing and therefore, things like 1udicial review are read into it alks about how the framers intention is important in the recognition of a norm but not in its specification or what it entails that is determined by changing circumstances basically norms and application are different norms belong to the realm of fact and application to the realm of evolution disagrees with *ay and 0le/ander as to the application of the norm being decided by the intention of the framers.

-a. talks about what gives authority to the constitution although he agrees with -ay and 0le/ander about what gives authority to the constitution i.e. morality, co6ordination and symbolism he does not believe that such authority can help to sustain over time and that sometime or the other, innovative interpretation will be needed according to 0le/ander, this is an o/ymoron he believes that can only be a constitutional revolution (metaconstitutional change) this is probably he believes that if you are 5changing, then you are making a constitutional change and not an 5interpretation which would involve keeping the constitution the same on the other hand, if you are interpreting something differently it is a metaconstitutional change which can only mean, according to him, constitutional revolution. -ubenfeld asks the same :uestion that +ichelman does, basically $2; should % follow something which someone says but his answer was not the same as the others he talked about reconciling past acts (then) and right reason (now) he talks about interpretation being more important as dependent on the right reason than past will feels that we are bound to the #onstitution being the same 5people if not the same individuals he calls this feature its 5writenness does he thus, court originalism and actually subordinate reason to past will& he says that commitment is not the same thing as choice or consent. "ager talks about historicist and 1ustice6seeking interpretations believes in the latter because it talks about broad principles that need to be followed talks about two types of 1ustice 1udicially enforced and legislatively protected basically, his principle is to say that while the te/t might constrain 1ustice in some cases, the framers main intention was to ensure it however, here is saying then that we are still bound to it because they said it 0le/ander asks many :uestions of him like why be bound at all then& $hy be bound by the marks and not the meanings& 0nd if not be bound by meanings, why be bound at all& 2owever, "ager says in <"0, both historicist and 1ustice6seeking possible together because te/t is very broad and can be interpreted either way. $aldron basically has a problem with constitutionalism obstructing democratic decision6 making because irrespective of what the ma1ority or the people think now, what has to be followed is the intention of the framers or at least, the basic principles which were established by them so basically if more than 8=> people believe today that freedom of ,ress is elemental, if people ?== years ago thought that ,arliament autonomy is more important than freedom of ,ress constitutionalism leads to the following of the latter however, 0le/ander says that why should democratic decision making always be better than other principles of 1ustice (% think this links to ma1oritarianism which "udhir talked about in class in the first few classes) gives e/ample of two thugs wanting to take my right over my property should they because they are two and % am one be allowed to do so. 2ow democratic ma1ority can be thwarted) 7. !udicial supremacy upholding of moral rights irrespective of legislative acceptance or re1ection. @. +ight accept rights made by past ma1orities instead of those wanted by present ma1orities because you dont want shifting ma1orities rights. 'oth of these are considered undemocratic by $aldron.

2ow to determine what framers intended) 7. Let legislature decide what they intended historically should not be about the present peoples view. @. #ourts could interpret it historically.

?. Legislature decides to put to vote present peoples view. A. #ourts could interpret it according to what it thinks in the present. 0mongst these, only ? considered democratic by $aldron. hen, 0le/ander says that there has to be some sort of entrenchment even in democratic societies against the democratic will analogous, % think, to the basic structure doctrine.