T.I.

Oizerman

The Main Trends in Philosophy

. I. Oizerman, member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, is head of the sector of the history of philosophy of West European Countries and America of the Academy's Institute of Philosophy. He is well known throughout the world for his many fundamental works on the history of pre-Marxian, Marxian, and contemporary West European philosophy, and on the theory of the history of philosophy, which are noted for their deep theoretical approach to the problems studied, and their clear, brilliant manner of expounding the most complicated problems. Prof. Oizerman's main works (in Russian) are the following: The Development of Marxian Theory on the Experience of the 1848 Revolution (1955); German Classical Philosophy One of the Theoretical Sources of Marxism (1955); Hegel's Philosophy (1956); The Principal Stages in the Development of Pre-Merxian Philosophy (1957); The Main Stages in the Process of Knowing (1957); The Main Features of Modern Bourgeois Philosophy (1960); Fichte's Philosophy (1962); Problems of Historico-Philosophical Science (1969, 2nd ed. 1982); The Crisis of Contemporary Idealism (1972); The Forming of the Philosophy of Marxism (1974); Dialectical Materialism and the History of Philosophy. HistoricoPhilosophical Essays (1979).

This monograph is a theoretical investigation of the process of the history of philosophy. The author examines the polarisation of philosophical systems in their main trends, viz., the materialist and on the basis idealist. He traces the struggle between materialism and idealism of the dialectical-materialist conception of the history of philosophy, and brings out the scientific and cultural-historical significance of dialectical materialism in present-day world philosophical thought.

T.I.Oizerman The MainTrends in Philosophy

A Theoretical Analysis of the History of Philosophy

Translated by H. Campbell Creighton, M. A. (Oxon)

PROGRESS PUBLISHERS Moscow

Designed

by

Yuri

Yegorov

. .

Printed 0301030000-464 o 014(01 )-88

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1984

ISBN

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English translation of the revised Russian text Progress Publishers 1988

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION Part One. THE BASIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION AS A PROBLEM OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY I. THE SENSE AND MEANING OF THE BASIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION 1. The Basic Philosophical Question and the Problematic of Philosophy 2. Self-Awareness and the External World. The Epistemlogical Necessity of the Basic Philosophical Question 3. On the Origin and Development of the Basic Philosophical Question 4. The Basic Philosophical Question: Objective Content and Subjective Form of Expression. The Real Starting Point of Philosophical Inquiry II. THE TWO SIDES OF THE BASIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION 1. The Ontological Aspect: the Materialist Answer to the Basic Question 2. The Ontological Aspect: a Contribution to the Delineation of the Idealist Answer t o the Basic Philosophical Question . . . . 3. The Epistemological Aspect. The Principle of Reflection and the Idealist Interpretation of the Knowability of the World . . . 4. The Epistemological Aspect. The Principle of the Knowability of the World and Philosophical Scepticism Part Two. PHILOSOPHICAL TRENDS AS AN OBJECT OF RESEARCH IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY III. THE DIVERGENCE OF PHILOSOPHICAL DOCTRINES AND ITS INTERPRETATION. METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANTITHESIS BETWEEN MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM ' 1. Dispute about Trends or Dispute of Trends? . . ' 2. Metaphysical Systems. Spiritualism and the Naturalist Tendency 3. Materialismthe Sole Consistent Opponent of Speculative Metaphysical Systems . . 3

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19 19 22 33 37 54 54 74 87 104

138 138 155 165

4. Kant's Transcendental Dualist Metaphysics 5. T o w a r d a Critique of Irrationalist Speculative Metaphysics . 6. T h e Dispute between Materialism and Idealism and Differences in Understanding Speculative Metaphysics IV. T H E G R E A T C O N F R O N T A T I O N : M A T E R I A L I S M VS IDEALISM. T H E A R G U M E N T S A N D C O U N T E R A R G U M E N T S . . 1. T h e Struggle of Materialism and Idealism as an Epochal Cultural and Historical Phenomenon 2. Idealism vs Materialism. Materialism vs Idealism. Results and Prospects 3. T h e Dialectical-Materialist Critique of Idealism. T h e Epistemological Roots of Idealist Fallacies 4. T h e Dialectical-Materialist Critique of Idealism. T h e Principle of the Partisanship of Philosophy CONCLUSION LITERATURE NAME INDEX SUBJECT INDEX

173 184 195 215 215 234 262 274 296 306

INTRODUCTION

T h e r e is no doubt a b o u t the ideological significance of a t h e oretical analysis of the history of philosophy. F o r philosophy is the sole field of knowledge in which a g r e e m e n t a m o n g its leading spokesmen is the exception r a t h e r than the rule. In t h e sciences usually called exact or special, the a r e a of disagreement is a comparatively small p a r t of the vast t e r ritory already mastered, in which p e a c e and h a r m o n y seemingly reign. W h o e v e r studies any of these sciences to some extent lacks choice; he assimilates established t r u t h s that will, of course, be refined, supplemented, and in p a r t even revised, but hardly refuted. It is not so in philosophy, in which there is a host of doctrines, trends, and directions each of which, as a rule, has not only historical justification but also a certain actual sense. In philosophy one has to choose, to soak oneself in a specific a t m o s p h e r e of philosophical thinking, by n a t u r e polemical, so as to find one's point of view, refuting all others that a r e incompatible with it. But a search of that kind presupposes study of the whole variety of philosophical d o c trines, a condition that is obviously not practicable. In c o n c r e t e historical social conditions this situation of course has a certain, obligatory c h a r a c t e r . He who studies philosophy (or is beginning to) is not, of course, like t h e person browsing in a s e c o n d h a n d bookshop looking for something suitable for himself. T h e moment of choice is inseparable from the purposive activity by which any science is mastered. Since the history of philosophy investigates the real gains of philosophy, this choice becomes an intellectual conviction and ideological decision. T h e aim of my book is to investigate t h e initial propositions of the history of philosophy. This c o n c e r n s t h e basic philo1

sophical question and the main trends and directions in philosophy, themes that are organically connected with one another; special study of them makes it possible to understand philosophy as law-governed developing knowledge whose final result is dialectical and historical materialism. T h e present work is a direct continuation of my Problems of the History of Philosophy, the subject of which was such inadequately studied (in the general view) and largely debatable problems as the specific nature of the philosophical form of knowledge, the distinguishing feature and ideological function of the problematic of philosophy, and the n a t u r e of philosophical argument and dispute. In this new monograph, at least in its first part, on the contrary, I examine problems that are usually only treated in textbooks, i.e. that do not constitute the subject of research at all. But since these problems are of fundamental significance, they deserve m o r e than the attention just of teachers. Problems that are usually called elementary are basic ones, the starting point of research, and the answers to them in no small way predetermine its direction and results. Lenin, stressing that politics 'is a concentrated expression of economics' and that 'it must take precedence over economics', noted in this connection that 'it is strange that we should have to return to such elementary questions' (142:83). It is well known that this elementary question has proved to be not so simple, so matter-of-fact as not to need investigation. Roughly the same can be said of the basic philosophical question. T h e Marxian proposition ' T r u t h is a process' (143:201) also relates to elementary but, I should say, fundamental truths that do not remain invariable since they are enriched by new scientific data. Textbooks that expound the main philosophical question in popular form and provide a correct idea of the struggle of trends in philosophy, do a very useful job. But they often, unfortunately, create a deceptive impression of excessive simplicity and very nearly absolute clarity about matters that are by no means simple and clear. This fault is seemingly the obverse of the methods standards that a textbook has to meet, since it is limited to exposition of simply the fundamentals of the science. T h e sole means of overcoming these shortcomings of popular expositions is to investigate the theoretical fundamentals of the science. It was not just these general considerations, however, whose importance should not be overestimated, that determined my theme. T h e point is that the basic philosophical question, and likewise the problem of the main trends in philo1 3

sophy, are not truisms but quite special problems for research in t h e history of philosophy. W h a t m a k e s t h e m so? T h e aim of my i n t r o d u c t i o n is to p r o v i d e a p r e l i m i n a r y a n s w e r to that, w h i c h will, a t t h e s a m e t i m e , p o s e t h e p r o b l e m . F i r s t o f all, let m e p o i n t o u t t h e i n d i s p u t a b l e b u t f a r f r o m a l w a y s realised truth that the M a r x i a n proposition about the basic philosophical q u e s t i o n is n o t simply a s t a t e m e n t of an e m p i r i c a l l y o b v i o u s f a c t , b u t a t h e o r e t i c a l f o r m u l a t i o n of a definite discovery m a d e by F r e d e r i c k Engels. Only a few pre-Marxian philosophers came near to theoretical awareness that t h e r e is a basic question c o m m o n to various philosophical doctrines, including opposing ones. Most of them r a t h e r assumed t h a t e a c h d o c t r i n e w a s c h a r a c t e r i s e d b y its o w n m a i n p h i l o sophical question precisely because it largely diverged from others. T h a t is also, a n d even m o r e so, t r u e of c o n t e m p o r a r y n o n - M a r x i a n philosophers. Albert C a m u s , for instance, claims lhat
t h e r e is only one truly serious philosophical problem, that of suicide. To decide w h e t h e r life is, or is not worth the t r o u b l e of living, is to answer t h e f u n d a m e n t a l question of philosophy (28:15).
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T h e s e p a r a t e exceptions only confirm this prevailing tendency. T h e question posed by C a m u s must not be underestimated, e v e n if o n l y b e c a u s e it f o r m s p a r t of a d e f i n i t e p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n w h o s e b e g i n n i n g w a s laid b y t h i n k e r s o f t h e A n c i e n t East and philosophers of the Hellenistic era. T h e alienation o f h u m a n a c t i v i t y a n d o f its p r o d u c t , a n d t h e a l i e n a t i o n o f n a t u r e regularly e n g e n d e r it and give it p r o f o u n d sense. Yet it is n o t t h e b a s i c p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n , if o n l y b e c a u s e it is n o t s u c h f o r t h e m a j o r i t y of p h i l o s o p h i c a l d o c t r i n e s . B u t p e r h a p s it is a t r a n s m u t e d f o r m of it, s i n c e it is a m a t t e r of t h e attitude of h u m a n consciousness to h u m a n existence? Or is it the b a s i c issue of e x i s t e n t i a l i s t p h i l o s o p h y ? It is still i n c u m b e n t o n u s , h o w e v e r , t o i n v e s t i g a t e w h e t h e r e a c h p h i l o s o p h y h a s its special basic question. N e o p o s i t i v i s t s , h a v i n g got rid o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m s as i m a g i n a r y and in fact not real p r o b l e m s , long a g o c o n c l u d e d that the question of the relation of the spiritual to the m a terial was a typical p s e u d o p r o b l e m , since it was quite u n c l e a r w h e t h e r w h a t a r e called m a t t e r a n d spirit existed a n d w h e t h e r these verbal names were abstractions without meaning.
Mind and matter alike a r e logical constructions [Bertrand Russell, for example, w r o t e ] , the particulars out of which they a r e constructed, or from which they a r e inferred, have various relations, some of which are studied by physics, others by psychology ( 2 3 0 : 3 0 7 ) . 7

This point of view, expressed h a l f - a - c e n t u r y ago, has received unexpected support in o u r day from those w h o suggest that no psyche exists, as cybernetics is alleged to demonst r a t e . A m o n g those w h o s h a r e this conviction one must also n a m e the a d h e r e n t s of the philosophy of linguistic analysis, who try to show that t h e material a n d spiritual a r e not facts that theory should be guided by, but only logical spectres. As for t h e philosophical question that they call basic, it (in the opinion of the analytic philosophers) was generated by incorrect word-use: meanings were ascribed to words of the o r d i n a r y c o m m o n l a n g u a g e that did not belong to them, with the c o n s e q u e n c e that disputes arose a b o u t t h e sense of words that was quite clear until they b e c a m e philosophical terms. C o n t e m p o r a r y idealist philosophy, especially in its existentialist and neopositivist variants, h a s had considerable influence on s o m e w h o think themselves Marxist philosophers, and who have u n d e r t a k e n a revision of dialectical and historical m a t e rialism. T h e fact that the basic philosophical question does not lie on the surface serves them as convenient g r o u n d s for denying its real significance. But it is found here that those w h o claim to h a v e created a ' n e o - M a r x i s t ' philosophy have not engaged in serious research. T h e y simply proclaim it. T h e Yugoslav philosopher Gajo Petrovi, for instance, declares:
I do not m a i n t a i n t h a t t h e basic p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n , as u n d e r s t o o d by E n g e l s , P l e k h a n o v , a n d L e n i n , is m e a n i n g l e s s . B u t e v e r y t h i n g that is m e a n i n g f u l is not ' b a s i c ' ( 2 0 4 : 3 3 1 ) .

T h a t quite c o m m o n idea is supplemented by a consideration of an ontological c h a r a c t e r :

Division int m a t t e r a n d spirit is not the basic division of t h e world we live in, n o r is this basic division within m a n . H o w then c a n the basic question of p h i l o s o p h y be t h e question of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n m a t t e r a n d spirit? ( 2 0 4 : 3 3 2 ) .

T h e 'spirit-matier' relationship is not, in fact, the primary, initial one; it presupposes the rise of the spiritual, which, though a result of the material, is not a property of matter in any of its states. It is that c i r c u m s t a n c e , in spite of Petrovi's conviction, that makes it possible to realise t h e significance of the question of the relationship of the spiritual and material, the sense of which consists in f o r m u l a t i n g t h e dilemma: which is primary, the material or the spiritual? Petrovi, however, does not allow for the fact that the basic philosophical question d e m a r c a t e s two main, mutually exclusive t r e n d s in philosophical research. He proclaims t h a t only the problem of man has f u n d a m e n t a l philosophical significance.
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He accompanies that with sweeping declarations about socialist humanism, the humanist mission of philosophy, the significance of philosophical anthropology, etc. T h e r e is no arguing that the problem of man (especially in its concrete historical posing, i.e. as that of the social emancipation of the working people) has a central place in the world outlook of Marxism. But to counterpose the problem of man to the question of the relationship of the spiritual and material means not to understand the decisive point that this question began to be called basic first of all because it theoretically predetermined the polarisation of philosophy into two main trends. It is also not difficult to understand that the existence of materialist and idealist solutions of the problem of man also indicates why, precisely, the relation of the spiritual and material became the basic question of philosophy. It is to Engels' credit that he singled out this question, the answer to which forms the theoretical basis for tackling all other philosophical questions, from a host of philosophical problems. In summing up my introductory remarks on the problem that constitutes the object of investigation in the first part of my book, I must note that disputes around the basic philosophical question also take place among philosophers who defend and develop the dialectical-materialist outlook. A point of view is often expressed in Soviet philosophical literature that the basic philosophical question is, properly speaking, the subject-matter of philosophy, since all the problems considered philosophical in the past have passed into the province of special sciences. That point of view has been formulated most definitely by Potemkin:
T h e s t a t e m e n t that t h e question of the relation of thought to existence is the great basic question of all philosophy has been a consistently scientific g e n e r a l definition of the s u b j e c t - m a t t e r of philosophy from the moment it a r o s e ( 2 1 4 : 1 2 ) .

Stressing in every way possible the special place occupied by the basic philosophical question in determination of the specific nature of the philosophical form of knowledge, he criticised those workers who suggest that even though this question, and that of the subject-matter of philosophy, overlap, they are still different problems. But he does not explain, unfortunately, what is the relationship between the basic philosophical question and the Marxian doctrine of the most general laws of development of nature, society, and knowledge. P r e - M a r x i a n philosophy, he says, considered 'the world as a whole its subject-matter' ( ibid .). Marxian philosophy, he suggests, does
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not include any conception of the world as a whole. But don't the materialist and idealist answers to the basic philosophical question form two opposing views of the world as a whole? I shall limit myself here simply to asking the questions, since they call for developed answers that I propose to set out in the respective chapters of my monograph. Some Marxist philosophers consider the basic philosophical question as a most important aspect of the subject-matter of philosophy.
T h e relationship of m a t t e r and consciousness [Alfred Kosing writes] f o r m s a f u n d a m e n t a l aspect of t h e s u b j e c t - m a t t e r of M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t philosophy, and the basic question of philosophy, a f u n d a m e n t a l p a r t of its c o n t e n t , as t h e t h e o r e t i c a l formulation of this relationship. T h e o r e t i c a l l y it is t h e s u p r e m e question of philosophy, b e c a u s e t h e t w o possible trends in p h i l o s o p h y m a t e r i a l i s m and idealismfollow from the different a n s w e r s to it, a n d that d e t e r m i n e s both the materialist a n d idealist solution of all philosophical p r o b l e m s and the c o r r e s p o n d ing i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of all philosophical categories ( 1 2 4 : 9 0 2 ) .

Kosing does not limit the subject-matter of philosophy to investigation of the 'spiritual-material' relation, since the subject-matter of any science cannot be confined once and for all to an established round of questions. He stresses the principled ideological significance of the question, which formulates the basic philosophical dilemma, and as such forms the basic philosophical question. In stating that fact I cannot help asking, however: in what way is philosophy, especially in our day, concerned with investigation of the 'spiritual-material' relation. For this relationship is studied in its specific forms primarily by the appropriate scientific disciplines. Historical materialism, an integral part of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, of course examines the relation of social consciousness and social being, but the particular forms of social consciousness also constitute the object of study of several special sciences. So, for a proper understanding of the sense and meaning of the basic philosophical question, it is necessary to investigate its real extension and its relation to the psychophysical problem with which the physiology of higher nervous activity and psychology are primarily concerned. What does one have in mind when calling the question of the relation of consciousness and being, the spiritual and the material, the basic philosophical question? It is necessary to clarify the sense of the term 'basic' employed in a definite context in particular because some Marxian philosophers consider the philosophical question being discussed to be a problem subject to investigation (and, moreover, the main p r o b l e m ) , while others treat it (or
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rather its materialist answer) as a firmly established scientific premiss, with the significance of a principle, in knowledge of everything that constitutes the subject-matter of philosophy. Understanding of the real meaning of the basic philosophical question calls for investigation, in my view, of its epistemological necessity. Only such investigation can demonstrate the legitimacy of the statement that it is precisely this question that constitutes the necessary premiss of all philosophical problems that are not deducible from one or other of its answers. T h e expression 'basic question of philosophy' points to there being other philosophical problems that also constitute the subject-matter of philosophy. But can one consider them simply derivatives of the basic philosophical question? T h e problem of the particular and the general, essence and phenomenon, change and development are all problems, of course, that do not logically stem from the content of the basic philosophical question. I said above that the problem of man is undoubtedly one of the chief philosophical themes. T h e same must seemingly also be said of the problem of the unity of the world. What is the relation of the basic philosophical problem to these? That requires special investigation which, it is to be hoped, will show that the concept of the basic philosophical question has a specific sense and that the meaning of other philosophical problems is consequently in no way diminished. T h e second part of my book will comprise an analysis of philosophical trends as natural forms of the existence and development of philosophy. Since the basic philosophical question formulates a dilemma, its alternative answers theoretically predetermine the polarisation of philosophy into materialism and idealism. But there are other trends in philosophy besides materialism and idealism. Why do we single out materialism and idealism precisely as the main philosophical trends? It is necessary, in my view, to make a special investigation of the whole diversity of trends in philosophy and of their relation to materialism and idealism. Philosophical trends must seemingly be distinguished from doctrines, schools, and currents. A doctrine, as a system of definite views, logically connected with one another, can be treated as the primary phenomenon of the historico-philosophical process. Since one doctrine or another, created by an individual philosopher or group of like-minded ones, finds its continuers who develop or modify it, philosophical schools
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take shape. T h e aggregate of the various modifications of one and the same philosophical doctrine, developed by various, sometimes competing, schools can be called a c u r r e n t . Such, for example, are the most influential currents in contemporary bourgeois philosophy: viz., existentialism, neopositivism, 'critical rationalism', philosophical anthropology, and Neothomism. Each of them is built up from a n u m b e r of doctrines and schools that usually enter into polemics with one another in spite of their community of basic theoretical premisses. A trend represents an aggregate of philosophical currents (and, consequently, of doctrines), which for all their differences with one another defend certain common positions of principled significance. T r e n d s usually exist over very long historical periods, and some of them have existed right from the rise of philosophy to our day. Rationalism, empiricism, metaphysical systems, dualism, pluralism, naturalism, 'realism', nominalism, phenomenalism, supranaturalism, scholasticism, mysticism; irrationalism, intuitionism, organicism, sensualism, essentialism, mechanism, anthropologism, pantheismsuch is a far from complete list of the philosophical trends, not altogether free of elements of a conventionality that can only be surmounted in the course of a further substantiation of the typology of philosophical doctrines. Inquiry into the relation between the main trends in philosophy, i.e. materialism and idealism, is a most important task of the history of philosophy. It must be theoretically substantiated by evidence that there really are main trends in philosophy and that these trends are precisely materialism and idealism. Both are directly linked with two mutually exclusive answers to the basic philosophical question. One cannot say that, of course, about rationalism, empiricism, naturalism, anthropologism, and several other trends, which may have both a materialist and an idealist character. Does that not indicate that these trends are linked, though in a mediated way, with one or other answer to the basic philosophical question? T h e same can seemingly be said as well about the opposition between the metaphysical mode of thinking and the dialectical. It does not call for great penetration to discover within empiricism, sensualism, anthropologism, naturalism, rationalism, and other philosophical trends an opposition of materialism, and idealism, i.e. materialist empiricism and idealist empiricism, anthropological materialism and anthropological idealism, and so on. This witnesses that all the trends named are specific forms of materialism or idealism. Materialism and idealism
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are consequently really the main philosophical trends, but contemporary bourgeois philosophers interpret these facts differently. T h e y usually treat empiricism, rationalism, anthropologism, and other trends as a surmounting of the basic philosophical dilemma, the discovery of new fields of inquiry across the traditional, 'one-sided' opposition of materialism and idealism. T h e specific form that materialist (or idealist) philosophy takes, thanks to empiricism or anthropologism, does not, of course, follow with logical necessity from one or other of the answers to the basic philosophical question. T h e peculiarity of these main philosophical trends is due to the diversity of the content of philosophy, and its interaction with other forms of social consciousness, social development, the achievements of science and engineering, etc. One must remember, however, that far from all the trends listed are polarised into an opposition of materialism and idealism. T h e r e is no materialist irrationalism, intuitivist materialism, or materialist phenomenalism. Irrationalism, intuitionism, and phenomenalism are varieties of idealist, and only idealist philosophy. Mechanism, atheism, and hylozoism, on the contrary, mainly characterise certain historical forms of materialism. Analysis of some of the concrete, historical modifications of materialism and idealism is a task of the present inquiry. T h e survey of philosophical trends is usually reduced in popular works to a description of materialism and idealism. T h e reader is sometimes given the impression that there are no other trends at all. But in that case one cannot, of course, understand why materialism and idealism form the main trends in philosophy. It is consequently necessary to analyse the different trends from the angle of their relation to materialism or idealism. An inquiry of that kind not only has to reflect the real confrontation that constitutes the content of the history of philosophy, but also has to concretise our understanding of materialism and idealism. T h e history of philosophy is a picture of a supreme diversity of ideas and dramatic tension. No doctrine (let alone current or trend) can be concretely defined simply by relating it to one of the main trends, just as no phenomenon can be characterised by an indication alone of its belonging to a certain kind or type. Aristotle, and Leibniz, and Schopenhauer were idealists, but that very important circumstance does not indicate the differences between their doctrines, which are very substantial. It is necessary to inquire into the different types of idealism; and
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that presupposes elucidation of the attitude of the thinkers being studied to other doctrines and trends within which there was a development of both materialist and idealist philosophy. T h e idealist Leibniz was a rationalist, the founder of a metaphysical system, monadology, a pluralist, a dialectician, etc. T h a t does not m e a n that the concept of idealism does not adequately define his doctrine; all its characteristics are specific definitions of his idealism, i.e. his rationalism, like his metaphysics, pluralism, etc., has an idealist character. T h e r e are consequently no grounds for opposing the separate characteristics of Leibniz's philosophy to one another. They indicate that idealism, like any doctrine, possesses both general, particular, and individual features. T h a t is seemingly not taken into account by those inquirers who a r e inclined to regard rationalism, empiricism, anthropologism, and all the other features of one doctrine or another, as something existing in them over and above materialism or idealism. With such an approach to philosophical theory its basic content is schematicised and distorted. T h e problem of trends is a main one in study of the specific nature of philosophical knowledge. T r e n d s exist, it is true, in all sciences, but in them they are usually trends of research conditioned by the choice of objects or methods of investigation. T r e n d s of that kind often develop in parallel, encouraging one another; and when contradictions arise between them they are resolved over a comparatively short historical period, since the dispute is about partial matters that are resolved by observation, experiments, and practical tests. It is another matter with philosophical trends, which cannot help being opposed to one another. These trends actually took shape as philosophical ones, since there were other philosophical (and not only philosophical) systems of views with which they came into conflict. T h e whole historical past of philosophy witnesses to philosophical views (and that means trends, too) as a rule having a mutually exclusive character. Contemporary bourgeois philosophers usually make an absolute of this fact, i.e. consider it an intransient fundamental characteristic of any philosophical dispute, thus reviving the main thesis of ancient scepticism, viz., that philosophy differs radically from any other knowledge in that unanimity is impossible in principle in it. Hegel wittily criticised the sceptical interpretation of the history of philosophy as the point of view of ordinary consciousness, which imagines itself philosophically profound when in fact it is only fixing differences and disagree7

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ments that appear on the surface, without noting the incomparably m o r e essential, though not obvious unity. Hegel treated disagreements between philosophical doctrines as contradictions in the process of development of the many-sided truth contained in these, at first glance quite divergent philosophies. He incidentally distinguished the subjective notions of philosophers about the sense and substance of their doctrines from their true content (and real relation to other doctrines), which is revealed both by the history of the development of philosophical knowledge and by inquiry into this process. Hegel's dialectical approach to the history of philosophy, thanks to which the differences between doctrines, theories, currents and trends were treated as necessarily connected with identity, played an immense role in moulding the science of the history of philosophy (which was impossible without overcoming scepticism in the history of philosophy). But he harmonised the process of the history of philosophy too much, depicting it as the forming of absolute self-consciousness. T h e plurality of systems is not so much a fact in the Hegelian history of philosophy as a semblance of fact that is removed by the triumphal progress of the Absolute Spirit. This root fault of Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy can only be eliminated by a thorough analysis of the struggle between materialism and idealism as the essential content of the world process of the history of philosophy. T h e contemporary epoch in philosophy is that of the confirmation of dialectical and historical materialism, on the one hand, and of the crisis of idealist philosophising on the other. Indirect recognition of this fact is the militant denial, characteristic of contemporary bourgeois philosophy, of the possibility and necessity of the unity of philosophical knowledge. T h e Greek sceptics, in denying the unity of philosophical knowledge, rejected philosophy as incapable of yielding indisputable truths. T h e followers of the bourgeois 'philosophy of the history of philosophy', on the contrary, consider the greatest merit of philosophy to be that it is allegedly not interested in ' i m p e r s o n a l ' objective truths; philosophy allegedly creates its own world in which the place of the facts recorded as truths is taken by statements that have sense irrespective of their possible truth. From the angle of this modernism in the history of philosophy, a philosophical statement ceases to be such when it becomes an 'acquired truth'. T h e real content of philosophy, according to this view, is formed by the mode of self-assertion of the philosophising individual and his inimitable creative individuality.
8

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An e x t r e m e e x p r e s s i o n of this c o n c e p t i o n is t h e s t a t e m e n t that p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r e n d s a n d c u r r e n t s a r e only o u t w a r d divisions established by c o m m e n t a t o r s , since e v e r y p h i l o s o p h i c a l d o c t r i n e is a u t h e n t i c only in so far as it is u n i q u e . G e n e r a l , c o m m o n f e a t u r e s , if t h e y a r e p r e s e n t in v a r i o u s p h i l o s o p h i c a l d o c t r i n e s , p o i n t t o t h a t which p r e s e n t s n o interest i n t h e latter. R e c o g n i t i o n of t h e essential significance of philosophical t r e n d s m e a n s , in the c o n t e x t of t h e ' p h i l o s o p h y of t h e history of philosophy', denial of t h e specific n a t u r e of philosophical k n o w l e d g e and of its radical difference from s c i e n c e . T h e t h e o r y of t h e c o u r s e of t h e history of p h i l o s o p h y m a k e s an a b s o l u t e of t h e e l e m e n t of the singularity i n h e r e n t in e v e r y o u t s t a n d i n g philosophical d o c t r i n e . But t h e u n i q u e n e s s is relative, a n d t h e r e a l m e a n i n g of a t h e o r y is d e t e r m i n e d n o t simply by its u n i q u e n e s s but by its a c t u a l i n v o l v e m e n t in t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of k n o w l e d g e , its a n s w e r s to q u e s t i o n s a l r e a d y posed b e f o r e it, w h i c h m e a n s its inclusion in t h e existing p r o b l e m a t i c . In spite of t h e fact t h a t individual s p o k e s m e n of the ' p h i l o s o p h y of t h e history of p h i l o s o p h y ' m a k e a substantial c o n t r i bution to t h e s c i e n c e of t h e history of p h i l o s o p h y in their c o n c r e t e inquiries devoted to the great p h i l o s o p h e r s of the past, t h e i r theoretical c o n c e p t i o n is clearly u n s o u n d . It intensifies t h e historically obsolete metaphysical c o u n t e r p o s i n g of philos o p h y to n o n - p h i l o s o p h i c r e s e a r c h , a n d in the end r e d u c e s p h i l o s o p h y to a variety of artistic c r e a t i o n . T h i s must not, of c o u r s e , be t r e a t e d as a belittling of the significance of philosophy, but it is still a fact that philosophical systems a r e not artistic w o r k s even w h e n they a r e written in verse. T h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of aesthetic c r i t e r i a into p h i l o s o p h y is t h e r e f o r e in fact an indirect denial of philosophy as a specific form of knowledge. I h a v e a l r e a d y r e m a r k e d that a d i s c a r d i n g of t h e basic philosophical question, a n d likewise a t t e m p t s to 'rise a b o v e ' the opposition of materialism and idealism, a r e a c h a r a c t e r istic f e a t u r e of c o n t e m p o r a r y b o u r g e o i s philosophy. T h e subjectivist denial of t h e i m p o r t a n c e of philosophical t r e n d s is a modification of t h e r e a c t i o n a r y t e n d e n c y often met u n d e r the flag of d e - i d e o l o g i s a t i o n of philosophy. S i n c e t h e subjectm a t t e r of my b o o k is a t h e o r e t i c a l analysis of t h e c o u r s e of t h e h i s t o r y of p h i l o s o p h y , it is at t h e s a m e t i m e a critical analysis of t h e most influential idealist philosophical c o n c e p t i o n s of o u r day.
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NOTES In c o n t r a s t to t o d a y ' s p h i l o s o p h e r - m e t h o d o l o g i s t s of a s c e p t i c a l t u r n , t h e classical scientists of the twentieth c e n t u r y h a v e been profoundly convinced t h a t t h e s c i e n c e s o f n a t u r e r e a l l y c o g n i s e it, w h i c h e x p l a i n s scientists' a g r e e m e n t o n most f u n d a m e n t a l m a t t e r s . A s M a x P l a n c k w r o t e : ' O u r p r e s e n t p i c t u r e o f t h e w o r l d a l r e a d y ... i n c l u d e s c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s t h a t c a n n o l o n g e r b e effaced b y a r e v o l u t i o n e i t h e r i n n a t u r e o r i n t h e h u m a n s p i r i t ' ( 2 0 7 : 6 3 1 ) . H e r e a n d s u b s e q u e n t l y , t h e first n u m b e r i n b r a c k e t s i n d i c a t e s t h e n u m b e r of t h e s o u r c e in t h e b i b l i o g r a p h y at t h e e n d of t h e b o o k ; t h e n u m b e r in italics i n d i c a t e s t h e v o l u m e , w h e n t h e r e i s m o r e t h a n o n e i n a w o r k , a n d t h e last n u m b e r t h e p a g e .
1 2

Problemy

istoriko-filosofskoi

nauki, 2 n d ed.

(Mysl, Moscow, 1982).

In this c o n n e c t i o n it is not o u t of p l a c e to cite L . A . A r t s i m o v i c h ' s f o l l o w i n g interesting r e m a r k : ' T h e a u t h o r of a textbook, compelled by the necessity to p r e s e n t a s c i e n c e as a s t a b l e c o m p l e x of i n f o r m a t i o n , s e l e c t s a p p r o p r i a t e m a t e r i a l , r e j e c t i n g w h a t s e e m s t o h i m n o t t o b e a d e q u a t e l y verified, p r o b l e m a tical, a n d u n s t a b l e . A s a r e s u l t h e u n w i t t i n g l y m a n a g e s t o g i v e t h e r e a d e r w h o is s t a r t i n g to s t u d y a n e w field t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t it is c o m p l e t e d . E v e r y t h i n g s e e m s in t h e m a i n to h a v e b e e n d o n e , a n d it n o w r e m a i n s , chiefly, to fill in t h e d e t a i l s . T h e t e x t b o o k m a y t h e r e f o r e s o m e t i m e s w e a k e n t h e r e a d e r ' s will for independent thinking by d e m o n s t r a t i n g the science to him as a collection of well p r e s e r v e d m e m o r i a l s of t h e p a s t a n d n o t as a r o a d to a f u t u r e s h r o u d e d in f o g . T h e r e is a l s o a p u r e l y p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e a s o n for t h e c o n s e r v a t i s m of t e x t b o o k s . T h e y a r e u s u a l l y w r i t t e n b y p e o p l e o f t h e o l d e r g e n e r a t i o n for y o u n g b e g i n n e r s , a t a t i m e w h e n t h e m i d d l e g e n e r a t i o n i s a l t e r i n g t h e face of t h e s c i e n c e by its e f f o r t s , b r o a d e n i n g or s m a s h i n g p r e v i o u s l y e s t a b l i s h e d n o t i o n s ' ( 9 : 1 4 2 ) . I t must b e said that A r t s i m o v i c h h a d i n m i n d p r i m a r i l y t e x t b o o k s of p h y s i c s , but it w o u l d be at least p r e s u m p t u o u s not to see that this c o n s i d e r a t i o n a p p l i e s mutatis mutandis to t e x t b o o k s of p h i l o s o p h y , despite the very substantial differences in the content and rates of developm e n t of t h e t w o s c i e n c e s .
4

O n e must n o t e , i n c i d e n t a l l y , that C a m u s is d e v e l o p i n g a p r o p o s i t i o n h e r e e x p r e s s e d b y N i e t z s c h e w h o s u g g e s t e d that G r e e k t r a g e d y ' g u e s s e d w h e r e t h e g r e a t q u e s t i o n m a r k w a s put, a b o u t t h e v a l u e o f e x i s t e n c e ' ( 1 9 4 : 2 ) . A s a p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y t h i n k i n g w r i t e r , C a m u s b e l i e v e d that this t r a g i c q u e s t i o n should occupy the main place in philosophy. B u h r a n d I r r l i t z ( G D R ) point out in a b o o k on G e r m a n classical p h i l o s o p h y , that t h e basic p r o b l e m o f classical b o u r g e o i s p h i l o s o p h y f r o m B a c o n a n d D e s c a r t e s t o H e g e l a n d F e u e r b a c h w a s that o f m a s t e r i n g laws o f n a t u r e a n d r a t i o n a l r e s t r u c t u r i n g o f p u b l i c life. ' B a c o n a n d D e s c a r t e s n o longer r e g a r d e d o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y , like f e u d a l - c l e r i c a l t h o u g h t , a s G o d - g i v e n a n d d e p e n d e n t on Him, but as g o v e r n e d by man himselfand s h a p e a b l e by him' ( 2 4 : 1 9 ) . Hegel and F e u e r b a c h 'over and over again c a m e back to the q u e s t i o n w h i c h B a c o n a n d D e s c a r t e s first f o r m u l a t e d implicitly, viz., h o w c a n M a n r a t i o n a l l y m a s t e r n a t u r e a n d s o c i e t y ? ( i b i d . ) . T h i s 'basic p r o b l e m ' of classical b o u r g e o i s p h i l o s o p h y d o e s n o t in t h e least lessen t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e basic p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n . T h e following statement of the Western philosopher Gehlen is indicative in this r e s p e c t : 'If p h i l o s o p h y c o m e s a l o n e to m a n " f r o m o u t s i d e " it risks
2-01603

17

b e c o m i n g m a t e r i a l i s t . If it s t a r t s f r o m f a c t s of c o n s c i o u s n e s s it will be abstract immanent-idealist and speak about an incompatible idealand an i n d e t e r m i n a t e g e n e r a l h u m a n origin' ( 7 3 : 2 7 3 ) . I n t r y i n g t o avoid both m a t e r i a l i s m a n d idealism, G e h l e n c o u n t e r p o s e s a p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n t h r o p o l o g y t h a t e c l e c t i c a l l y c o m b i n e s i d e a l i s t e m p i r i c i s m a n d i r r a t i o n a l i s m with s e p a r a t e materialist propositions.
7

It is w o r t h s t r e s s i n g t h a t t h e f e a t u r e s of L e i b n i z ' s i d e a l i s m listed ( i n c i d e n t a l l y as with the main features of any outstanding philosophical doctrine) far from e x h a u s t its c o n t e n t a n d all its i n h e r e n t p e c u l i a r i t i e s ; I h a v e said n o t h i n g of his d y n a m i s m , a b o u t t h e t h e o r y o f s m a l l p e r c e p t i o n s , t h e p r i n c i p l e o f c o n t i n u i t y , t h e s u b s t a n t i a t i o n o f o p t i m i s m , t h e o d i c y , logical i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , e t c . I n d i c a t i o n of t h e p l a c e of a p h i l o s o p h i c a l d o c t r i n e in t h e f r a m e w o r k of s o m e t r e n d or c u r r e n t a n d e l u c i d a t i o n of its main ( m a t e r i a l i s t or i d e a l i s t ) c o n t e n t , h a v e t o b r i n g t o light t h e specific f o r m s i n w h i c h i t i s e x p r e s s e d a n d d e v e l o p e d a n d n o t r e p l a c e c o n c r e t e i n q u i r y i n t o its f e a t u r e s . My article ' M a r x i s m a n d t h e C o n t e m p o r a r y Bourgeois " P h i l o s o p h y of the History of Philosophy"' in t h e s y m p o s i u m Leninism and Contemporary Problems of Historico-Philosophical Science (edited by M.T. Iovchuk, L . N . S u v o r o v , et al.) ( M o s c o w , 1 9 7 0 ) is d e v o t e d to a c r i t i c a l a n a l y s i s of the m a i n propositions of the 'philosophy of the history of philosophy'. I w o u l d m e n t i o n in p a r t i c u l a r t h e f o l l o w i n g i n q u i r i e s by M a r t i a l G u r o u l t : L'volution et la structure de la doctrine de la science chez Fichte, 2 vols. ( L e s belles l e t t r e s , P a r i s , 1 9 3 0 ) , La. p h i l o s o p h i e t r a n s c e n d e n l a l e de Salomon Maimon ( L e s belles lettres, P a r i s , 1931) ( t h e s e t w o w o r k s r e c e i v e d p r i z e s of t h e F r e n c h A c a d e m y of S c i e n c e s ) ; Dynamiquc el mtaphysique l e i b n i z i e n nes ( L e s belles l e t t r e s , P a r i s , 1 9 3 4 ) ; Descartes selon I'ordre des raisons, 2 vols. (Aubrier, Paris, 1953).

Part

One

THE BASIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION AS A PROBLEM OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

I THE SENSE AND MEANING OF THE BASIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION 1. T h e Basic Philosophical Question and the Problematic of Philosophy T h e question of t h e relation of c o n s c i o u s n e s s to being, of t h e spiritual to t h e m a t e r i a l (is t h e spiritual a p r o p e r t y of m a t t e r , a p r o d u c t of its d e v e l o p m e n t ? or, on t h e c o n t r a r y , is t h e m a t e r i a l a d e r i v a t i v e of t h e spiritual?) h a s not constituted a p r o b l e m for a long time, strictly s p e a k i n g , if, g r a n t e d , o n e calls unresolved matters, subject to investigation, p r o b l e m s . T h e materialists of antiquity h a d a l r e a d y posed this question correctly, t h o u g h only on t h e basis of e v e r y d a y o b s e r v a t i o n s . T h e m a t e r i a l i s m of m o d e r n times, a n t i c i p a t i n g special inquiries a n d their results, s h o w e d t h a t t h e spiritual does not exist w i t h o u t m a t t e r organised in a c e r t a i n way. N a t u r a l science h a s not only confirmed t h e materialist a n s w e r to t h e basic philosophical question, b u t also successfully investigates t h e m e c h a n i s m of t h e f o r m a t i o n , functioning, a n d d e v e l o p m e n t of the psychic. Only a few idealists a r e now so bold as to claim u n r e s e r v e d l y t h a t t h e psychic is i n d e p e n d e n t of its physiological s u b s t r a t u m . W h i l e rejecting the materialist a n s w e r to t h e basic philosophical q u e s t i o n , c o n t e m p o r a r y idealism is also forced to r e - e x a m i n e its o w n traditional idealist a n s w e r . T h i s e x p l a i n s t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c striving to e l i m i n a t e this question as not, allegedly, c o r r e c t l y posed. A resolved philosophical p r o b l e m is not, of c o u r s e , c o n s i g n e d to t h e a r c h i v e s b e c a u s e of its ideological significance. N e w scientific discoveries ( c y b e r n e t i c devices, say, t h a t model t h e t h i n k i n g b r a i n ) u n d o u b t e d l y e n r i c h the materialist a n s w e r . And idealists' a t t e m p t s to discredit t h e basic materialist position e v o k e a necessity a g a i n a n d a g a i n to e x p l a i n its c o n t e n t a n d m e a n i n g , basing oneself on t h e a g g r e g a t e of t h e facts of science a n d p r a c t i c e . But t h a t c a n n o t , o f c o u r s e , b e g r o u n d s for revising t h e materialist a n s w e r to t h e basic philosophical
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question. To convert it again into a problem means to drag philosophy back, which incidentally is what contemporary idealists are engaged in. In philosophy, as in any science, the researcher is dealing with problems. As for resolved matters, they find their rightful place in textbooks. All these considerations anent the proposition that can be called an axiom of all materialism enable one to conclude that there are no grounds for the notion common in Marxist literature about the coincidence of the subject-matter of philosophy (including the subject-matter of the philosophy of Marxism) and the basic philosophical question. T h e subject-matter of philosophy, and of any science, must be defined, indicating the class of objects that it studies. This subject-matter can, of course, be described as the aggregate of the historically established, logically interconnected problems whose origin is due to socioeconomic processes, the development of knowledge, and the discovery of new objects of philosophical inquiry or new interpretations of already known facts. But it is quite obvious that this set of problems cannot be reduced to one question, however important. T h e character of the posing of the problems that philosophy is concerned with is theoretically determined, of course, by one answer or the other to the basic philosophical question. That enables one to understand in what sense this question is really basic. T h e identification of the subject-matter of philosophy with the basic philosophical question is apparently linked with the extremely general interpretation of the content of the latter. T h a t interpretation is not legitimate, because it deprives the basic philosophical question of the place it occupies by right by distinctly formulating a definite dilemma. T h e epistemology of dialectical materialism also cannot be reduced to its necessary, initial premiss, viz., the materialist answer to the second aspect of the basic philosophical question. T h e psychophysical problem differs essentially in its content from the basic philosophical question, since it presupposes investigation of the whole diversity of forms of the psychological in its relation to the diversity of the properties of the physiological. One must therefore not confuse the basic philosophical question with the whole problematic of the objectively existing 'spiritual-material' relation, the various forms of which are studied by several sciences. T h e basic philosophical question is one of the priority of one aspect of this relation. Its classical formulation, given by Engels, speaks only of 'which is primary: spirit or nature' (52:346).
20

L e n i n stressed that the scientific m e a n i n g of Engels' formulation of the basic philosophical question was that it singled out from t h e whole diversity of the c o n t e n t of both materialism and idealism just that which theoretically p r e d e t e r m i n e s their mutually exclusive opposition.
E n g e l s w a s right w h e n he said that t h e essential t h i n g is not w h i c h of t h e n u m e r o u s s c h o o l s of m a t e r i a l i s m or idealism a p a r t i c u l a r p h i l o s o p h e r belongs to, but w h e t h e r h e takes n a t u r e , t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d , m a t t e r in m o t i o n , or spirit, r e a s o n , c o n s c i o u s n e s s , etc., as p r i m a r y ( 1 4 2 : 1 4 9 ) .

In Materialism and Empirio-Criticism he constantly stressed t h e need to delimit the basic philosophical question distinctly in order to f o r m u l a t e the alternative that no philosophical doctrine could avoid. In view of the i m p o r t a n c e in principle of delimiting the basic philosophical question and the whole domain of philosophical inquiry, I would cite a n o t h e r wellknown statement of Lenin's:
W h e t h e r n a t u r e , m a t t e r , the physical, t h e e x t e r n a l world should b e taken a s p r i m a r y , a n d c o n s c i o u s n e s s , mind, sensation ( e x p e r i e n c e a s the widespread t e r m i n o l o g y of o u r time h a s it), the psychical, etc., should be r e g a r d e d as s e c o n d a r y t h a t is t h e root q u e s t i o n w h i c h in fact c o n t i n u e s to divide t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s i n t o two great camps ( 1 4 2 : 3 1 5 ) .

T h e materialist answer to the basic philosophical question is an initial theoretical proposition of materialism, which naturally does not include the whole wealth of that doctrine's ideas. Its identification with the subject-matter of philosophy is as unsound as all attempts to extend Lenin's philosophical definition of matter, the immense heuristic significance of which is, in particular, that it excludes all the attributes of matter from its philosophical definition, except one, which epistemologically constitutes its differentia specifica , so disclosing its opposition to consciousness and the d e p e n d e n c e of the latter on it. Is it worth while d e m o n s t r a t i n g that any attempt to extend the philosophical definition of matter by including its physical, chemical and other attributes in it, only reveals i n c o m p r e h e n sion of the real sense of this definition? If the subject-matter of philosophy and the basic philosophical question w e r e one and the same, then the former has not altered historically, in spite of radical socio-economic c h a n g e s and great scientific discoveries. In that case either philosophy does not pose any new questions or their posing goes beyond its subject-matter. It would turn out that the subject-matter of philosophical inquiry had lost c o n t a c t with the historical conditions that d e t e r m i n e t h e development of philosophy and knowledge in general. T h e idealist illusion would be c r e a t e d
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that philosophy exists independent of the events of its epoch, rises above them, and so on. A philosophy that occupied itself with one and the same question would ve wholly the prisoner of tradition, while its development in fact presupposes revision, and not just inheritance of tradition. Identification of the subject-matter of philosophy with the basic philosophical question indirectly, if not directly, rejects the development of philosophy, which is reduced in that case simply to various modifications of the basic philosophical question and various answers to it. But the development of philosophy presupposes the rise of new problems, research tasks, and fields of inquiry. Identification of the subject-matter of philosophy with the basic philosophical question glossed over the qualitative difference between the philosophy of Marxism and preceding philosophy. T h e subject-matter of the former is the most general laws of the motion, change, and development of nature, society, and knowledge. T h e universal laws of men's changing both of the external world and of their social being also constitute the subject-matter of dialectical and historical materialism. T h e materialist answer to the basic question of philosophy theoretically predetermines the corresponding understanding of the most general laws of development. But to identify the two is to make a gross error." I have dwelt on what the basic philosophical question is not at such length that it may, perhaps, cause perplexity. Why do we call this question basic? And if it is not the subject-matter of philosophy, what is the sense of the adjective 'basic'? Will drawing a line between the subject-matter of philosophy and the basic philosophical question not lead to a belittling of the significance of the latter? These fears all merit close attention, and I shall try to show why it is the basic philosophical question that forms the most important philosophical dilemma, and why the materialist answer to it is one of the outstanding gains of philosophical thought. T h e task consists in getting clear about the specific nature of this question and its epistemological necessity, and finally, too, about the sense in which it nevertheless forms a problem, a problem of the history of philosophy.
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2. Self-Awareness and the External World. The Epistemological Necessity of the Basic Philosophical Question Philosophical analysis of any theoretical proposition calls for elucidation of its epistemological premisses. Kant correctly
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called it dogmatism to reject an epistemological investigation of principles on the grounds that they were obvious. Hegel, who demonstrated that sensory reliability if sublated by theoretical analysis, by virtue of which philosophy should recognise only that as true which is obtained through the logical movement of a concept. T h e fact that both Kant and Hegel employed this epistemological imperative to criticise materialism and substantiate idealism does not discredit the principle itself; for Hegel employed dialectics to the same end. Lenin called categories stages in the development of knowledge. Did he mean that cause and effect, essence and phenomenon, space and time did not exist independent of the process of knowing? Such a conclusion would be a subjective-idealist interpretation of the epistemological significance of categories. T h e philosophy of Marxism rejects the metaphysical notion of unchangeable forms of knowledge, given once and for all, which prompted Kant to convert categories into a priori forms of sense contemplation and rational t h o u g h t . Our concepts of causality, essence, space, etc., develop historically, and are enriched by a new content that not only supplements their old, accustomed content but also subjects it to dialectical negation. One should not, therefore, identify the concept of causality with the objectively existing relation of causality; the concept only reflects objective reality approximately. A change in the content of concepts and categories does not give grounds for denying the objective existence of what they reflect; Lenin criticised that mistake of subjective relativism in detail in his Materialism and Empirio-Criticism. In the first three chapters of that work, devoted to the epistemology of dialectical materialism, Lenin examined not only the process of knowing but also the categories usually called ontological. It was an epistemological analysis of causality, necessity, space, etc., that served as the basis for the conclusion about their objective content: the forms of thinking do not, of course, coincide with the forms of being, but they do reflect them. That conclusion rejects the metaphysical opposing of the epistemological and the ontological, and substantiates their unity. Analysis of the objective 'spiritual-material' relation must be approached from that angle, since it is it that forms the content of the basic philosophical question. What is its epistemological necessity? What is its origin? Why is it really a basic question and not a derivative one? In my view, a most necessary condition of all conscious and purposive h u m a n activity, i.e. distinguishing between the subjec23

tive a n d t h e objective, f o r m s t h e factual basis of t h e question of the relation of the spiritual and the material. Everyone (the i d e a l i s t i n c l u d e d ) d i s t i n g u i s h e s h i m s e l f f r o m all o t h e r s , a n d t h r o u g h that is c o n s c i o u s of himself as I, a h u m a n personality, an individuality. P e r c e p t i o n of the s u r r o u n d i n g world is impossible without consciousness of one's difference from the o b j e c t s b e i n g p e r c e i v e d . M a n ' s c o n s c i o u s n e s s (if o n e a b s t r a c t s f r o m its e l e m e n t a r y m a n i f e s t a t i o n s ) i s a t t h e s a m e t i m e selfa w a r e n e s s , since no o n e w o u l d t a k e it into his h e a d to c o n s i d e r h i m s e l f a t r e e , r i v e r , ass, o r a n y t h i n g e l s e t h a t h e p e r c e i v e s . And it follows f r o m this t h a t s e l f - a w a r e n e s s is impossible simply as consciousness of one's E g o ; it is realised t h r o u g h reflection o f a r e a l i t y i n d e p e n d e n t o f i t . D e s c a r t e s , i n c i d e n t a l l y , did n o t k n o w that when he tried to prove that only the doubting, thinking consciousness, or thought, was absolutely reliable, i.e. w h o l l y e x c l u d e d a n y d o u b t s a b o u t its e x i s t e n c e . H e w a s mistaken, since he could not in principle assume that a condition of the self-obvious e x i s t e n c e of s e l f - a w a r e n e s s w a s a far from o b v i o u s link b e t w e e n d o u b t a n d t h e o b j e c t o f d o u b t , b e t w e e n thinking and being. He a s s u m e d that o n e could s e p a r a t e oneself f r o m e v e r y t h i n g s e n s u a l l y p e r c e i v a b l e , a n d t h r o w d o u b t o n its existence, but that it was impossible to d o u b t the reality of the i n t e l l e c t u a l o p e r a t i o n itself t h a t w a s e f f e c t e d i n t h a t w a y . H e did n o t , h o w e v e r , ask: b u t i s t h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l o p e r a t i o n p o s s i b l e irrespective of the external world? F o r denial of the external world presupposes some content known to thought, some t h i n k a b l e fact t h a t is d e c l a r e d in this case to be an illusion. T h a t is w h y the line of d e m a r c a t i o n b e t w e e n s u b j e c t a n d object (irrespective of how the one and the other a r e understood) c o m e s i n t o a n y e l e m e n t a r y act o f h u m a n k n o w i n g a n d b e h a v i o u r , i n s o f a r as it is p e r f o r m e d c o n s c i o u s l y . U n l i k e D e s c a r t e s , K a n t c a m e t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e selfe v i d e n c e of consciousness of one's existence (albeit indep e n d e n t of perception of t h e external w o r l d ) was essentially a n i l l u s i o n r e f u t e d b y its l a t e n t ( a n d d e n i e d ) p r e m i s s , i.e. t h e fact of perception of the e x t e r n a l world. K a n t added a short section 'Refutation of Idealism' to the s e c o n d e d i t i o n of Critique of Pure Reasona r e p l y to t h o s e o f his c r i t i c s w h o l i k e n e d his s y s t e m , n o t w i t h o u t g r o u n d s , to B e r k e l e i a n i s m a n d H u m i s m . In this section he d e m o n s t r a t e d that self-awareness was impossible without sense perception of t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d : 'The simple but empirically determined consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of external objects in space' ( 1 1 6 : 1 7 0 ) . He a f f i r m e d t h a t i n n e r
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e x p e r i e n c e was only possible t h r o u g h external experience, so refuting the Cartesian thesis of t h e absolute reliability of selfa w a r e n e s s alone. T h e external world is also reliable, according to Kant, because 'the consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things without me' ( 1 1 6 : 1 7 1 ) . T h e idealist philosopher, of course, while demonstrating the need to d e m a r c a t e the subjective from the objective, may then declare the difference between them to exist only for h u m a n consciousness or only in it. In that case, too, recognition of the external world is interpreted idealistically, i.e. is reduced to denial of the i n d e p e n d e n c e of reality from consciousness. T h a t is what happened essentially with Kant, since, a c c o r d i n g to his doctrine, the sense-perceived world of p h e n o m e n a posits an external, a priori form of sensory contemplation, which he defined as space. F r o m that angle the external world (in contrast to t h e supersensory 'things-in-itself) is not formed without the involvement of h u m a n senses and a categorial, synthesis performed by reason. Still, K a n t could not get along without d e m a r c a t i n g the subjective from the objective, and without asking what was t h e relation of consciousness to what was not consciousness. Idealism often reduces the objective to the subjective, makes a gulf between them or, on the c o n t r a r y , identifies them. But it c a n n o t ignore this difference, and likewise deny the existence of consciousness (and self-awareness), even when it interprets it as a simple a p p e a r a n c e not unlike an ineradicable illusion about the i n d e p e n d e n c e of will from motives. W h a t e v e r the idealist's ideas a b o u t the essence of the subjective and the objective, and a b o u t the relation between them, he has to recognise their difference if only as directly given to consciousness or as established by it. Neokantians have tried to r e d u c e all sense-perceived, cognised, thinkable reality to constructs of logical thought, and products of scientific-theoretical or artistic creation. In other words they have made an attempt to eliminate being and objective reality, and to interpret them as special modes of the existence of consciousness. Rickert claimed that the objects of knowing ' a r e then my ideas, perceptions, sensations, and expressions of my will', i.e. t h e content of consciousness, while the subject of knowing 'is that which is a w a r e of what this content is' ( 2 2 1 : 1 3 ) . But in o r d e r to distinguish the content of consciousness from awareness of it, he in fact restored the difference between consciousness and being, declaring that
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consciousness, the c o n t e n t of which generates objects, is a universal, supraindividual consciousness, although it also only exists in h u m a n individuals. T h a t forced him to establish a difference of principle b e t w e e n the empirical subject and its direct, subjective consciousness, and the epistemological subject, whose consciousness is impersonal and in that sense objective. T h e theoretical s o u r c e of this conception was the doctrines of Kant and Fichte. T h e concepts of the subjective and objective, whatever c o n t e n t is ascribed to them, form a dichotomy such as makes it possible to mentally grasp everything t h a t exists, everything possible, and everything conceivable, and also, consequently, what does not exist a n y w h e r e except in fantasy. One can always attribute any one p h e n o m e n o n to t h e objective or the subjective. It is a n o t h e r matter that people can disagree with one a n o t h e r about what to consider objective and what subjective. They may take the objective for t h e subjective and vice versa. This is d o n e by some idealists, in particular, who interpret t h e objective as s o m e sort of relation between p h e n o m e n a of consciousness, i.e. as an i m m a n e n t characteristic of the subjective. But in that case the dividing line between the subjective and the objective is maintained, in spite of the subjectivist interpretation. Neopositivists d e c l a r e the concept 'objective reality' a term without scientific sense. But they, too, call for a strict d e m a r c a tion between the subjective and 'intersubjective' or, as B e r t r a n d Russell expressed it, between the personal and t h e 'social'. While disregarding objective reality the neopositivist n e v e r theless strives to retain the counterposing of the objective to the subjective, since denial of this fundamental difference makes it impossible to d r a w a line between knowledge and ignorance, truth and e r r o r . One must note, incidentally, that there a r e also those a m o n g philosophers who dispute the epistemological significance in principle of the dichotomy of the subjective and objective, who try to set some third thing, differing from subject and object, from consciousness and being, above them both, this something forming the original essence as it were, in which nothing is yet divided or differentiated. T h u s , a c c o r d i n g to Schelling's doctrine, the s u p r e m e first principle is neither subjective nor objective, since it is absolute identity free of all differences, the unconscious state of the world spirit. Nevertheless, with Schelling, too, this absolute indifferentiation was divided into subjective and objective as a c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e self-differentiation caused by an unconscious inclination and blind will. And
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these concepts b e c a m e universal characteristics of everything that existed in n a t u r e a n d society. In t h e latest idealist p h i l o s o p h y a t e n d e n c y p r e d o m i n a t e s to d e m a r c a t e the subject and object; this is particularly c h a r a c t e ristic o f b o t h e x i s t e n t i a l i s m a n d H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y . Husserl t h o u g h t it necessary to 'factor out' the external world, i.e. n a t u r e a n d s o c i e t y , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d o n t h e o t h e r consciousness, at least in t h e form in w h i c h it is registered not only by everyday observation but also by psychology. N e x t he set a b o u t d e s c r i b i n g t h e g e n u i n e reality, t o b e called ideal b e i n g or (what is the s a m e thing) p u r e consciousness. Ideal being was neither subjective nor objective because it was absolute. But in contrast to the Platonic realm of transcendental a r c h e types, H u s s e r l ' s ideal b e i n g w a s not t o b e f o u n d b e y o n d h u m a n l i f e b u t i n h u m a n c o n s c i o u s n e s s itself, t h o u g h i n d e p e n d e n t o f the latter. W h e r e Plato ascribed a timeless, other-world existence to ideas, Husserl's 'eide' or intuitively c o m p r e h e n d e d phenomenlogical essences, have no existence in general, at least not a n e c e s s a r y o n e . E x i s t e n c e , a c c o r d i n g to H u s s e r l ' s doctrine, is an empirical determinacy, which cannot be inherent in the absolute, and in particular in truth, the good, and beauty. Sense, meaning, and value are inherent in the absolute. Husserl's ideal being is thus quite similar to the N e o k a n t i a n world of absolute values, w h i c h do not exist but h a v e m e a n i n g as criteria of any empirical existence. Husserl's doctrine about the intensionality of consciousness was also aimed at o v e r c o m i n g the 'dualism' of subjective a n d objective, which, in his opinion, w a s to be achieved by b r i n g i n g out the i m m a n e n c e of the object in consciousness. Since pure consciousness is meant here, consciousness was independent o f t h e e x t e r n a l o b j e c t ; i t h a d it, i n f a c t , n o t a s e m p i r i c a l r e a l i t y , b u t a s a n i n n e r i n t e n s i o n i n h e r e n t i n itself. T h e o b j e c t w a s therefore not something that was outside consciousness; c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' i n t e n s i o n e d ' t h e o b j e c t , i.e. d i s c o v e r e d i t ( r e c a l l e d it, r e c o g n i s e d it, a s i t w e r e , i f o n e a p p e a l e d t o P l a t o ) w i t h i n itself. C o n s c i o u s n e s s a n d t h e o b j e c t t h e s u b j e c t i v e a n d t h e o b j e c t i v e p r o v e in the end to be o n e and the same, because c o n s c i o u s n e s s is o b j e c t i v e as a c o n s e q u e n c e of i n t e n s i o n a l i t y a n d s o f r e e o f s u b j e c t i v i t y , w h i l e t h e o b j e c t , t h r o u g h its ' i d e a t i v e c h a r a c t e r ' , i.e. its i n t e n s i o n a l g i v e n n e s s , i s f r e e o f o b j e c t i v i t y . It m a y s e e m t h a t H u s s e r l in fact s u c c e e d e d ( t h o u g h t h r o u g h idealist mystification) in e l i m i n a t i n g t h e epistemological n e c e s sity o f s e p a r a t i n g t h e s u b j e c t i v e a n d t h e o b j e c t i v e , s i n c e h e treated p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l ideal being as outside both. But that
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impression is deceptive, since the earlier rejected opposition of the subjective and the objective was imperceptibly restored in Husserl's counterposing of the ideal and the empirical. T h e empirical (both being and consciousness) is defined as purely subjective, illusory, i m a g i n a r y , a n d ideal b e i n g (or pure consciousness) as absolutely objective with no relation whats o e v e r with the b e i n g a n d consciousness with w h i c h h u m a n existence, natural science, and practice are connected. Husserl thus r e p e a t e d t h e mistake of those idealists w h o d e c l a r e the real i m a g i n a r y and the imaginary the only existent, and who, confusing subjective and objective idealism, assume t h a t they h a v e d o n e a w a y with all t h e e x t r e m e s o f subjectivism and objectivism. Existentialism m a d e Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g y the basis of its o n t o l o g y o f h u m a n e x i s t e n c e . S i n c e r a t i o n a l , c o n c e p t u a l thought (from the standpoint of the existentialist) cannot be the authentic (existential) m o d e of h u m a n existence, existentialism c o n d e m n s the c o u n t e r p o s i n g of consciousness to being a n d of the subject to the object as a superficial a n d essentially false o r i e n t a t i o n t h a t e x c l u d e s m a n from b e i n g a n d so distorts both being and h u m a n e x i s t e n c e . Existentialism calls for the inclusion of m a n in being. T h a t does not, in g e n e r a l , m e a n that the existentialist protests against treating the h u m a n individual o u t s i d e his r e l a t i o n t o n a t u r e a n d social b e i n g . N e i t h e r t h e o n e nor the other interests him m u c h in essence; following Husserl he factors out the empirical being about which everyday observations and the sciences speak. To include m a n in being means to treat h u m a n existence as the key to solving the puzzle of being. W h i l e stressing that being, at least for m a n , manifests itself o n l y i n h u m a n e x i s t e n c e , t h e e x i s t e n t i a l i s t a t t h e s a m e t i m e f e n c e s m a n off f r o m b e i n g , d e c l a r i n g t h a t t h e l a t t e r i s n e v e r c o m p r e h e n d e d as b e i n g but a l w a y s o n l y as w h a t exists, as m a t e r i a l . C o n s c i o u s n e s s , b y c o n s t a n t l y g o i n g o u t s i d e itself (transcending, in the existentialist's t e r m i n o l o g y ) , therefore d o e s n o t p e n e t r a t e b e i n g , a n d r e m a i n s a l i e n a t e d f r o m it; i t c a n n e v e r b e c o m e being just as being c a n n o t b e c o m e consciousness. T h i s c o u n t e r p o s i n g of consciousness as 'being for itself to 'being in itself' is p a r t i c u l a r l y clearly e x p r e s s e d in t h e d o c t r i n e of J e a n - P a u l Sartre. T h e counterposing of the two is absolute. 'Being in itself does not know temporality, destruction, s u f f e r i n g ; all t h e s e c a t e g o r i e s c h a r a c t e r i s e o n l y ' h u m a n r e a l i t y ' , w h o s e n a t u r e consists in limitless subjectivity a n d mortality. 'It i s w e w h o will d e s t r o y o u r s e l v e s , a n d t h e e a r t h will r e m a i n i n its l e t h a r g y u n t i l a n o t h e r c o n s c i o u s n e s s a r r i v e s t o a w a k e n
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if (236:90). True, in h i s Critique de la raison dialectique, S a r t r e stresses t h e relativity of the opposition between the subjective and the objective: the subject is constantly being e x t e r n a l i s e d , i.e. p a s s e s f r o m t h e i n s i d e t o t h e o u t s i d e , b u t t h e o b j e c t i s c o n t i n u o u s l y b e i n g i n t e r n a l i s e d , i.e. b e i n g a s s i m i l a t e d by the subject. T h e dialectic of the subject and object does not, however (according to Sartre), eliminate the mutual alienation of ' b e i n g f o r itself' a n d 'being in itself; it is c o n s t a n t l y revived a n d reinforced b e c a u s e t h e objective, since it is objective, is absolutely outside consciousness, which is essentially only 'consciousness of consciousness' and, moreover, 'nothing', s i n c e i t d o e s n o t c o n t a i n a n y t h i n g i n itself t h a t i s i n h e r e n t in ' b e i n g in itself'. E x i s t e n t i a l i s m , w h i c h set itself t h e t a s k o f o v e r c o m i n g t h e 'split' b e t w e e n s u b j e c t a n d o b j e c t , t h u s d e e p e n s t h e o p p o s i t i o n of s u b j e c t i v e a n d o b j e c t i v e in fact, since it i n t e r p r e t s it subjectively and anti-dialectically. But the conclusion already d r a w n a b o v e f o l l o w s f r o m t h a t , viz., t h a t it is i m p o s s i b l e in principle to eliminate the question of the relation of consciousness to being, and of the subjective to the objective. T h e whole disagreement about the nature of the relation between them p r e s u p p o s e s this d e m a r c a t i o n a n d , t o s o m e extent, t h e c o u n t e r posing. C o n s c i o u s n e s s of t h e necessity of this d e m a r c a t i o n (and even c o u n t e r p o s i n g ) does not, of course, coincide with recognition of the existence of the spiritual a n d the material. Vulgar m a t e r i a l i s t s d i d n o t r e c o g n i s e t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e s p i r i t u a l , i.e. wholely r e d u c e d it to the material. Subjective idealists on the c o n t r a r y d e n i e d the existence of matter, calling it simply a b u n d l e of sensations. S o m e idealists claimed that consciousness a n d the s p i r i t u a l did not e x i s t at all, a n d r e d u c e d t h e o b j e c t i v e content of consciousness to physiological reactions. N o n e of these views, h o w e v e r , affected the epistemological basis of the q u e s t i o n t h a t E n g e l s c a l l e d t h e s u p r e m e o n e o f all p h i l o s o p h y ; they r e f e r r e d only to i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of this basis. T h e divergences in the interpretation of the 'spiritualmaterial' relation give rise to different w a y s of posing the b a s i c p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n , a n d a l s o t o d e n i a l o f its r e a l significance. T h e s e differences and the converted forms of the basic philosophical question c o n n e c t e d with them merit special study, without which our view of the course of the history of p h i l o s o p h y will be s c h e m a t i c . B u t it is n e c e s s a r y first of all to recognise that the difference between consciousness and being, and subjective a n d objective, is an objective one, existing
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i n d e p e n d e n t l y of c o n s c i o u s n e s s . C o n s c i o u s n e s s is a f u n c t i o n o f t h e b r a i n , b u t b o t h t h e b r a i n a n d c o n s c i o u s n e s s o n l y exist insofar as they relate to the external world with which m a n interacts. Experimental research has shown that w h e n a person is p u t in a s i t u a t i o n t h a t m a x i m a l l y e x c l u d e s t h e effect of countless stimuli on h i m (most of t h e m not even realised) he suffers emotional and psychic disturbances to t h e point of hallucinations and paranoid symptoms. T h e cause of these disturbances of consciousness is the limitation of the n u m b e r of s e n s o r y stimuli or sensory h u n g e r (see 7 4 ) . T h u s the sensualist p r i n c i p l e : Nihil est in intellect quod fuerit in s e n s u (nothing is in the mind that was not in t h e senses) is supported in both the epistemological a n d anthropological aspects. O n e must not, of c o u r s e , t a k e t h a t old d i c t u m literally; sense data a r e not simply perceived or r e p r o d u c e d by consciousness. Consciousness is founded on sense perceptions of the external w o r l d , a n d o n all p r a c t i c a l s e n s u a l activity; a n d t h e r e i s n o consciousness (and knowledge) without sense reflection of objective reality. It is that (but n o t only t h a t alone, as I shall show later) which makes the question of the relation of consciousness and being, and of the spiritual and the material, the basic philosophical question. T h u s , since m a n possesses consciousness, he is a w a r e of the world a r o u n d him and distinguishes himself f r o m the things he i s c o n s c i o u s of, h e f i n d s h i m s e l f i n a s i t u a t i o n t h a t i s f i x e d a n d formulated by the basic philosophical question. Philosophers h a v e n o t i n v e n t e d t h i s q u e s t i o n ; i t h a s g r o w n f r o m all h u m a n p r a c t i c e , a n d t h e history of k n o w l e d g e , but it d o e s not follow f r o m t h i s t h a t w e a r e a w a r e o f i t p r e c i s e l y a s a q u e s t i o n , let a l o n e as a philosophical o n e and, m o r e o v e r , the basic one. M a r x and Engels wrote: 'Consciousness ( d a s Bewusstsein) c a n n e v e r b e a n y t h i n g e l s e t h a n c o n s c i o u s b e i n g ( d a s bewusste Sein), a n d the b e i n g of m e n is their a c t u a l life-process' ( 1 7 6 : 3 6 ) . This is not only a definite posing of ( a n d a n s w e r to) t h e basic philosophical question but is also a direct indication of t h e main facts f r o m w h i c h this question stems. T h e idealist, o r idealistically t h i n k i n g physiologist a n d p s y c h o logist, do not, of c o u r s e , a g r e e , w i t h s u c h a m a t e r i a l i s t i n t e r pretation of the relation of consciousness a n d being, of the p s y c h i c a n d the m a t e r i a l . T h e y try t o c o u n t e r i t with a n idealist a n s w e r to the basic philosophical question. But in this case, too, they cannot eliminate the direct or indirect demarcation of c o n s c i o u s n e s s a n d w h a t i s c o g n i s e d , i.e. b e i n g , t h e a c t u a l p r o c e s s o f h u m a n life, a b o u t w h i c h t h e f o u n d e r s o f M a r x i s m s p o k e o f
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in t h e q u o t a t i o n a b o v e . A n d it is impossible to r e f r a i n h e r e from a q u e s t i o n t h a t h a s a l r e a d y suggested itself e a r l i e r , viz., why c a n ' t p h i l o s o p h y start i m m e d i a t e l y a n d directly with investigation of the reality that constitutes the basis of h u m a n life, i.e. with m a n himself, w h o is u n d o u b t e d l y the most interesting and i m p o r t a n t object of i n q u i r y for himself? W h y c a n n o t t h e o r e t i c a l analysis of t h e most i m p o r t a n t vital r e l a t i o n s of m a n a n d t h e world of things ( r e l a t i o n s t h a t c a n n o t , of c o u r s e , be r e d u c e d just to a w a r e n e s s of b e i n g ) be t r e a t e d as t h e m a i n , really most i m p o r t a n t philosophical question as p h i l o s o p h e r s suggest w h o hold t h a t t h e relation of t h i n k i n g a n d being, of t h e spiritual a n d m a t e r i a l , is t o o abstract a question to be c o n s i d e r e d t h e main o n e ? F o r t h e spiritual, insofar as it is t h o u g h t of in the most g e n e r a l , undifferentiated f o r m , is an a b s t r a c t i o n , existing only in thought. A n d m a t t e r , too, as a c o n c e p t that integrates an infinite a g g r e g a t e of p h e n o m e n a , is also an a b s t r a c t i o n . Berkeley, i n t e r p r e t i n g it from a subjective-idealist a n d nominalist position, d e c l a r e d it an e m p t y a b s t r a c tion, as t h e n a m e of an object t h a t did not in fact exist. A similar, b u t m u c h m o r e sophisticated a t t e m p t a t discrediting not only m a t t e r but also t h e basic philosophical question has been m a d e in o u r time by B e r t r a n d Russell, w h o w r o t e that m a t t e r a n d consciousness w e r e essentially c o n v e n t i o n a l c o n c e p t s , and that it was as senseless to defend t h e p r i m a c y of m a t t e r or c o n s c i o u s ness in face of t h e latest scientific d a t a as to dispute a b o u t which h a n g s a b o v e and which below, t h e Sun or E a r t h (see 2 3 0 ) . By ' t h e latest scientific d a t a ' , he m e a n t t h e t h e o r y of b e h a v i o u r i s m , which e n d e a v o u r e d to e l i m i n a t e consciousness. We n o w see t h e epistemological s o u r c e of t h e a r g u m e n t s that the basic question of philosophy is not, actually, t h e basic o n e b e c a u s e its c o n t e n t is f o r m e d by a b s t r a c t i o n s and not by actual ( h u m a n a n d n a t u r a l ) reality. A clearly oversimplified u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e c o n c r e t e as t h e s u b j e c t - m a t t e r of philosophic inquiry is c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of all these a r g u m e n t s . In that r e g a r d K o n s t a n t i n o v has c o r r e c t l y noted:
An u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the c o n c r e t e as empirical d a t u m has b e c o m e quite c o m m o n a m o n g us. . . . B u t it s h o u l d not be f o r g o t t e n t h a t in M a r x i s m t h e r e is a n o t h e r , d e e p e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e c o n c r e t e , w h i c h is r e p r o d u c e a b l e in t h e o r y a n d is t h e result of k n o w l e d g e ( 1 2 1 : 1 7 )

But, in o r d e r to u n d e r s t a n d the epistemological essence of t h e basic philosophical question precisely in this 'abstract' form of it, it is n e c e s s a r y to t a k e full a c c o u n t of t h e p a t t e r n of t h e ascent from t h e a b s t r a c t to t h e c o n c r e t e in the c o u r s e of theoretical inquiry.
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O n e c a n n o t begin t o i n v e s t i g a t e a n y c o n c r e t e , c o m p l e x p h e n o m e n o n f r o m its t h e o r e t i c a l r e p r o d u c t i o n i n c o n c e p t s . I f t h a t w e r e p o s s i b l e s c i e n c e w o u l d h a v e b e e n a b l e t o solve its tasks b y t h e s h o r t e s t r o u t e , i.e. f r o m t h e c o n c r e t e i n r e a l i t y t o the c o n c r e t e in thought. But the c o n c r e t e in reality can only b e t h e o b j e c t o f c o n t e m p l a t i o n a n d n o t o f scientific u n d e r standing, and any attempt to express the contemplated directly in concepts generates only empty abstractions. T h e concrete in s c i e n c e is built up f r o m scientific a b s t r a c t i o n s . It is a unity of v a r i o u s definitions, e a c h of w h i c h i n e v i t a b l y h a s an a b s t r a c t , one-sided c h a r a c t e r . Science t h e r e f o r e begins investigation of the c o n c r e t e by b r e a k i n g it d o w n into s e p a r a t e parts, aspects, f o r m s , a n d r e l a t i o n s . S c i e n c e c r e a t e s a b s t r a c t i o n s t h a t reflect t h e s e essential f a c t o r s o f t h e c o n c r e t e , a n d a n a l y s e s t h e r e l a t i o n s between these abstractions, because the real complexity, and many-sidedness of the concrete, and the contradictions, changes, a n d d e v e l o p m e n t p r o p e r t o it, a r e r e f l e c t e d i n t h e m . W h o e v e r begins an inquiry from a survey of the concrete whole, the c o m p o n e n t parts, aspects, and premisses of which a r e still u n k n o w n to h i m , in e s s e n c e b e g i n s with an e m p t y abstraction. T h e c o n c r e t e in theoretical thought, M a r x pointed out,
a p p e a r s ... in r e a s o n i n g as a s u m m i n g - u p , a r e s u l t , a n d n o t as t h e s t a r t i n g point, a l t h o u g h it is the real point of origin, a n d thus also the point of origin of p e r c e p t i o n and i m a g i n a t i o n ( 1 6 6 : 2 0 6 )

W e e m p l o y this c o n c l u s i o n t h e r e s u l t o f a m a t e r i a l i s t r e w o r k ing of the H e g e l i a n idealist c o n c e p t i o n n o t j u s t in political e c o n o m y b u t also in o t h e r s c i e n c e s , t h o u g h not, o b v i o u s l y , in all. T h e A r i s t o t e l i a n n o t i o n o f t h e velocity o f f r e e - f a l l i n g b o d i e s ( a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r s h a p e , weight, e t c . ) is a n a i v e ( h i s t o r i c a l l y n a i v e , i.e. i n e v i t a b l e ) a t t e m p t to c o m p r e h e n d a c o m p l e x p r o c e s s . G a l i l e o took a n o t h e r r o u t e , w h e n f o r m u l a t i n g t h e l a w o f fall of b o d i e s . He w a s a w a r e of the necessity of a b s t r a c t i o n a n d r e j e c t e d the weight a n d s h a p e o f the falling b o d y , f o r w h i c h h e h a d n a t u r a l l y t o a s s u m e ( a l s o a n a b s t r a c t i o n ! ) t h a t b o d i e s fall in a v a c u u m . A r i s t o t l e c o u l d n o t , with his ' c o n c r e t e ' a p p r o a c h to t h e p r o b l e m , f o r m u l a t e a law of fall of bodies. G a l i l e o , t a k i n g the r o u t e of scientific a b s t r a c t i o n , d i s c o v e r e d this law ( a b s t r a c t , it is t r u e ) w h i c h , h o w e v e r , r e f l e c t e d t h e r e a l p r o c e s s of t h e u n i f o r m l y a c c e l e r a t e d m o t i o n of falling b o d i e s fairly c o r r e c t l y , i.e. within c e r t a i n limits. A e r o d y n a m i c s c a n n o t , of c o u r s e , be r e s t r i c t e d to a p p l i c a t i o n of G a l i l e o ' s law; in it a n e e d a r i s e s t o s y n t h e s i s e scientific a b s t r a c t i o n s t h a t b y n o m e a n s reflect t h e p r o c e s s of falling in an airless m e d i u m , a n d that
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allow for the weight and shape of the falling body; the task of this concrete knowledge of the process is resolved within the context of these scientific disciplines. In this connection, however, Galileo's law retains its significance within certain empirically fixed limits, the more so that at great altitudes the rarefaction of the atmosphere corresponds approximately to the abstraction of an airless medium introduced by Galileo, which consequently reveals its objective content. Thus, when examining the basic philosophical question from the angle of the development of scientific, theoretical knowledge, we come to the conclusion that it forms the starting point of philosophical inquiry. I shall try to confirm this conclusion in the following sections of this chapter. 3. On the Origin and Development of the Basic Philosophical Question I said above that the basic philosophical question is answered by the whole development of materialist philosophy; there are no grounds for revising that answer. All the same, this question still remains a problem in one very essential respect; namely, a problem of the history of philosophy. Its rise did not coincide with the origin of philosophy ; its history, which covers thousands of years, characterises the development of philosophical knowledge in a specific way. T h e r e is a multitude of philosophical questions that prove to be modifications of the basic one, which is by no means directly obvious and is only established through inquiry. Let me clarify this idea by a comparison. Marx proved that the price of production is a specific modification of value (in the conditions of developed capitalism), although it functions directly as its negation, this direct relation existing, moreover, not only in ordinary consciousness but also in objective reality. Is there not such a relation between the basic philosophical question and the other numerous problems of philosophy? Engels considered that primitive religious beliefs already contained a certain notion about the relation of the psychic and the physical, the soul and the body. Primitive primordial consciousness inevitably recorded the difference between waking and sleeping, between a living and a dead creature, a man and an animal. This difference was not simply ascertained as a consequence of curiosity (though that undoubtedly was inherent in our remote ancestors; for it is inherent in animals
5

3-01603

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that a r e at a much lower level of development, and is probably a necessary precondition of progress in the animal kingdom). T h e establishing of this fact is an expression of a practical attitude to the external world, because man treated the roused and the sleeping, the living and the dead, differently. Primitive men were obviously not inclined to reflection; they did not ask what distinguished the living from the dead, the roused from the sleeping. Nevertheless certain ideas about this difference arose, and were manifested not as answers to questions that had not yet been formulated, but as spontaneously built-up notions. When questions originated and new notions became answers, that was already evidence that reflection had begun on facts that had previously been accepted without questioning. T h e first explanations of the established facts obviously could not be based on an exact description of them; a cognitive capacity of that kind took shape comparatively late. T h e primitive explanation only indicated that the sleeping or even dead person differed from the roused (and living) one not in his body, but in something else, i.e. in the absence of something incorporeal that living, waking creatures had. This unknown later began to be called spirit or soul. T h e soul did not immediately begin to be represented as immaterial, because bodilessness, as philological and ethnographic research witness, was initially understood as the absence of a certain physical form; air and wind, for example, were considered to be incorporeal. Spirit and soul therefore seemed a rather special, very fine substance. T h a t point of view was subsequently substantiated by the materialists of antiquity to counterbalance the then arising spiritualist view of the spiritual. One must also r e m e m b e r that, although the notion of the difference between a living and dead creature took shape very early under the influence of urgent practical need, it was a very vague notion, so that the boundaries between the living and the non-living (inanimate) were only realised within very n a r r o w limits. Primitive men seemingly judged the things around them by analogy with themselves, i.e. they transferred their own capacities that they were aware of to all or nearly all phenomena of nature. T h e habit of measuring by one's own yardstick was the first heuristic orientation, from which stemmed the humanising (or rather, perhaps, animating) of everything that existed. T h e inanimate could only be imagined as the previously living, and that, of course, presupposed a very expanded understanding of life. In short, the primitive outlook on the world was seemingly organismic.
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T h e question of the relation of consciousness to being, and of the spiritual to the material, could thus only be consciously posed when the development of a capacity for disengagement, self-observation, and analysis had reached a comparatively high level. If the origin of the initial religious ideas presupposed the shaping of an abstracting power of thought (which is revealed in all its obviousness in religious fantasy), how much the more that applies to philosophical ideas, however primitive. Philosophy, as is evidenced by the historical facts, only arose at that stage of social development when private property, a stratification into classes, a social division of labour, and, what is particularly vital, an opposition between intellectual activity and the production of material goods already existed. As the founders of Marxism pointed out:
6

F r o m this m o m e n t o n w a r d s consciousness can really flatter itself that it is s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n consciousness of existing practice, that it really represents s o m e t h i n g without representing s o m e t h i n g real; from now on consciousness is in a position to e m a n c i p a t e itself from the world and to proceed to the formation of ' p u r e ' theory, theology, philosophy, morality, etc. ( 1 7 8 : 4 5 ) .

That kind of forgetfulness of its origin and real content is manifested as consciousness's conviction that it does not reflect sensually perceived reality but a special essence differing radically not only from what it perceives but also from what constitutes its corporeal, material basis. In Greek philosophy a system of idealist views was first created by Plato. It is not difficult to disclose a process in his doctrine of ideas of the shaping of an idealist outlook on the world. In Greek the word 'idea' signified form, appearance, image. Plato interpreted form and image as something independent of a thing and even preceding it. From the very start idealism distorted the sense of already formed concepts. But it did not simply invent and make things up; it interpreted the act of creation, in which the ideal image preceded its embodiment, universally and ontologically. Analogy, having become a principle of the explanation of phenomena, led to idealism, which came out, for example, in Aristotle's doctrine. T h e opposition of materialism and idealism is thus clearly traced out only at the pinnacle of the development of Greek philosophy. But there was still no conscious posing then of the basic philosophical question, which was paradoxical since idealism and materialism were already giving opposing answers to this question. How could answers be possible to a question
7

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that had not yet been posed or formulated? To answer that historical p a r a d o x it is necessary to concretise our understanding of the origin of the counterposing of the main philosophical trends. Investigation of the epistemological necessity of the basic philosophical question brings out the theoretical sources of the polarisation of philosophy into two mutually exclusive trends. But one must not oversimplify the historical process of the forming of this opposition, i.e. consider the peculiar content of the basic philosophical question, a content that implicitly includes the inevitability of two diametrically opposite answers, the cause of the rise of materialism and idealism. Like any other phenomenon of social consciousness the forming of the opposition of materialism and idealism was d u e in the final count to historically determined social relations. As for the theoretical grounds of the radical antithesis of materialism and idealism, they took shape after these trends had arisen. T h e i r formation testified that the split in philosophy had become generally recognised, which called for theoretical explanation. It goes without saying that the socio-economic conditioning of the polarisation of philosophical trends did not in the least lessen the role of the basic philosophical question in the system of internally mutually connected philosophical views. All these considerations enable one to understand Engels' conclusion more profoundly: the basic philosophical question
could achieve its full significance, only after h u m a n i t y in E u r o p e had a w a k e n e d from t h e long h i b e r n a t i o n of t h e Christian Middle Ages (52:346).

It is hardly necessary to demonstrate that in an age when religion was practically the masses' sole spiritual food, the very posing of the question of which existed first, matter or spirit, was perceived as an infringement of the holy of holies, for, according to the scholastic definition, God was the physical and moral cause of everything that existed. T h a t same scholasticism also taught that the highest cannot arise from the lowest. Matter was interpreted as the source of every kind of deformation and monstrosity, as the element from which arose worms, bugs, lice, etc. (not without the help of the devil). Even the mediaeval philosophers who were close to materialism had not, as a rule, broken completely with the doctrine of creationism. T h e idea of the co-eternity of nature and God signified a revolutionary challenge to the prevailing ideology. Whole historical epochs were thus needed for the development of
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philosophical thought before the basic philosophical question took on all its actual significance. T h e bourgeois transformation of social relations, the liquidation of the C h u r c h ' s spiritual dictatorship, and the emancipation of philosophy from the shackles of theology completed the historical process of the forming and confirmation of the question of the relation of consciousness and being, of the spiritual and the material, as the basic philosophical question, giving it a definite content that could only be analysed by appeal to facts. Engels linked this historical process directly with the struggle against the Middle Ages:
T h e question of t h e position of t h i n k i n g in relation to being, a question which, by the way, had played a g r e a t p a r t also in t h e scholasticism of t h e Middle Ages, t h e question: which is p r i m a r y , spirit or n a t u r e t h a t question, in relation to the c h u r c h , was s h a r p e n e d into this: Did God c r e a t e the world or has the world been in existence eternally? ( 5 2 : 3 4 6 ) .

It would be naive, however, to suppose that a correct theoretical understanding of the basic philosophical question took shape (and was generally accepted) in philosophy from that time. T h e r e is no doubt that the development and realisation of the radical opposition of materialism and idealism, and the conscious counterposing of the main philosophical trends to one another, characteristic of classical bourgeois philosophy, fostered the shaping of this understanding and frequently came close to it. But the fact that the opposition of materialism and idealism developed within the context of one and the same bourgeois ideology created certain difficulties for bringing out the whole depth and ideological significance of this antithesis of ideas. Only the creation of the dialectical-materialist conception of the historical course of philosophy made it possible to fully reveal the real sense and significance of the basic question of philosophy. 4. The Basic Philosophical Question: Objective Content and Subjective Form of Expression. The Real Starting Point of Philosophical Inquiry It is necessary, in the history of philosophy, more than in any other discipline that studies the development of knowledge and performs a certain ideological function in the class struggle, to draw a line between the objective content of philosophical doctrines and their subjective, often even arbitrary form of
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expression. This is a most important principle of inquiry in the history of philosophy, which is based directly on the initial proposition of historical materialism about the relation of social consciousness and social being. Because of that, consciousness as awareness of being is by no means an adequate reflection; knowledge, at any rate in its developed and systematic form, presupposes inquiry. In philosophy, insofar as it is, on the one hand, investigation, and on the other awareness of historically determined social being, there is constantly a contradiction between its objective content and subjective form of expression. This contradiction is only overcome by Marxism, which has created a scientific, philosophical world outlook that is at the same time a scientific ideology. T h e drawing of a line between the objective content and subjective form of philosophical doctrines is thus a dialecticalmaterialist principle of scientific inquiry. M a r x and Engels constantly applied and developed this principle they had formulated. Their attitude to Hegel is particularly indicative in this sense, since there is perhaps no other philosopher for whom they had such a high regard and whom they so sharply criticised. This attitude, at first glance inconsistent, was in fact a consistent drawing of a line between the objectively true in Hegel's doctrine, and the subjective in it, often even inimical to his own outstanding philosophical discoveries. In reference to Hegel's dialectic, for instance, M a r x said: ' T h i s dialectic is, to be sure, the ultimate word in philosophy and hence there is all the more need to divest it of the mystical a u r a given it by Hegel' (173:316). F u r t h e r on, in the same letter to Lassalle, Marx said, speaking of his own dissertation on Epicurus, that in it he had himself attempted
8

the p o r t r a y a l of a c o m p l e t e system from fragments, a system which I am convinced, by the by, w a s a s with H e r a c l i t u s o n l y implicitly present in ( E p i c u r u s ' ) work, not consciously as a system. E v e n in the case of philosophers w h o give systematic form to their w o r k , Spinoza for instance, the true inner s t r u c t u r e of the system is q u i t e unlike the form in which it was consciously presented by him ( i b i d . ) .

If one had said to Spinoza that the theoretical starting point of his system was a materialist answer to the question of the relation of the spiritual and material, he would not, judging from the inner structure and exposition of his system, have agreed with that characterisation of his doctrine. Neither matter (extent) nor the spiritual (thought) were in any causal relationship, according to his doctrine; they constituted attributes of a single (and sole) substance. N a t u r e as a whole was
38

called God, contrary to Christian theology, which absolutely counterposed the divine to the earthly. Spinoza's system was essentially an atheistic doctrine, a materialist pantheism, that differed in principle from the idealist pantheism developed by several Neoplatonists, and in modern times by the occasionalists (Malebranche, Geulincx), and to a certain extent also by Hegel. In delimiting the objective content and subjective mode of expression in Spinoza's doctrine, M a r x stressed the need to differentiate between 'what Spinoza considered the keystone of his system and what in fact constitutes it' (181:506). T h e objective content of Spinoza's doctrine is incomparably richer, more significant, and more original than what he consciously formulated as his basic conviction. I have dwelt in rather more detail than may seem necessary on setting out one of the most important principles of the Marxian analysis of the history of philosophy, since this helps explain why philosophers who have posed the basic philosophical question and given it a quite definite answer, were not conscious, as a rule, that it was in fact a matter of the basic philosophical question. They were not concerned with investigating its origin and its relation to its varied themata and problematic, so important for distinguishing philosophic doctrines from one another. Philosophers have often called quite other problems basic in general in their doctrines and in philosophy. T h a t point has been noted by Lyakhovetsky and Tyukhtin in their entry ' T h e Basic Question of Philosophy' in the Soviet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, where they say in particular:
Helvetius considered the basic question essence of h u m a n happiness, Rousseau and ways of o v e r c o m i n g it, Bacon the power over n a t u r e by inventions, etc. of philosophy to be that of the the question of social inequality question of extension of m a n ' s (154:172).

But it follows from a concrete analysis of those philosophers' doctrines that what they called basic in their teaching did not form its chief, initial theoretical proposition or principle determining the direction of their philosophic inquiry; it was a matter rather of the sense and humanist purpose of the philosophy, and of the philosophic problems that each of them represented as the most important. I do not see negations of the basic philosophical question in these philosophers, or attempts to counterpose some other one to it. But there is no epistemological analysis in them of the initial theoretical premisses of their own doctrines, and that prevents understanding of the sense in which the question I am concerned with is really basic. As soon as this epistemo9

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logical approach is outlined, the philosopher begins to formulate his real starting point m o r e or less consciously. Kant's proposition cited above, about the self-obviousness of the existence of self-awareness posited perception of the external world and so recognition of its existence. Having drawn that important conclusion, however, Kant rejected the materialist answer to the basic philosophical question and took up a dualist position akin to Cartesianism. Philosophy had to begin with the recognition of consciousness, on the one hand, and on the other of a reality (the 'thing in itself) independent of it. T h e question of the existence of a causal connection between them could not be decided, and therefore neither the subject nor the object, taken separately, could become the starting point of philosophy. Fichte's basic statement against that solution of the problem of the fundamental position boiled down to affirming that philosophy had to deduce the necessity of facts from its adopted fundamental position rather than ascertaining them empirically. T h e r e were consequently only two routes: either to take the object as initial and deduce the subject from it or, taking the subject as initial, to deduce the object from it. Fichte said categorically:
One of the two, spirit or n a t u r e , must be eliminated; t h e two a r e by no m e a n s unitable. T h e i r s e e m i n g union is partly hypocrisy a n d lies, partly an inconsistency imposed t h r o u g h i n n e r feeling ( 6 0 : 3 2 ) .

Consciousness of the necessity of the basic philosophical question, and an understanding of the inevitability of the dilemma and of its alternative answer, are to be seen in this categoricalness of Fichte's. Since he answered it in a subjectively idealist way, he called for elimination of one of the opposites, namely, nature. T h e opposite approach (elimination of spirit), be called 'transcendental materialism', suggesting that any materialism transformed reality into something suprasensory, because the whole, sensually perceivable world, in his conviction, presupposed the existence of a subject Schelling criticised Fichte for his subjective-idealist, essentially negative interpretation of nature.
F o r him n a t u r e is an a b s t r a c t c o n c e p t d e n o t i n g a m e r e b a r r i e r o f t h e not-I, the wholly void object in which n o t h i n g w h a t e v e r is perceivable except just that it c o n f r o n t s the subject ( 2 4 0 : 1 1 0 ) .

T h e objective idealist Schelling, armed with the achievements of the natural science of his day, developed a dialectical philosophy of nature, well aware that the objective could not
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be reduced to the subjective. The opposite view, i.e. the materialist, was also unacceptable to him. A return to the Kantian point of view was hopeless because it dismissed the problem. So Schelling modified the basic philosophical problem. It was no longer one of the relation of subject and object, since the difference between them was not primary. The rise of this difference witnessed to the birth of consciousness, but if consciousness had not always existed, did it not follow that materialism was true? Schelling rejected that conclusion, substantiating the fundamental idealist principle, viz., that consciousness was the product of the self-development and self-differentiation of the unconscious world spirit. But why did the unconscious divide into two, generating its opposite, consciousness? Schelling's philosophy of nature could not answer that. Hegel, inheriting the most valuable ideas of his idealist predecessors, rejected both the Fichtean reduction of the object to the subject and Schelling's conception of absolute identity without inner difference. T h e metaphysical abstraction of absolute identity essentially did not work, as Hegel showed; while there was this identity, in which every determinacy disappeared, there was no world, and as soon as the world manifested itself, absolute identity disappeared. In opposition to Schelling, Hegel showed that substantial identity was dialectical, and by virtue of that initially contained the difference between the subjective and the objective. Hegel formulated the initial proposition of philosophy as the relation of thought and being, whose unity was the 'absolute idea'. He came fully to a conscious formulation of the basic philosophical question when he wrote that 'spirit and nature, thought and being, are the two infinite sides of the Idea' (85:III, 161), a unity of which all philosophical doctrines strove to achieve. Continuing his idea, he wrote:
Philosophy hence falls into the two main forms in which the opposition is resolved, into a realistic and an idealistic system of philosophy, i.e. into one which makes the objectivity and the content of thought to arise from the perceptions, and one which proceeds to truth from the independence of thought (85:III, 162).

Hegel consequently saw the necessary character of the opposition between materialism (realism, in his terminology) and idealism, and found its sources in reality itself, the main determinations of which, in his doctrine, were thought and being. Feuerbach was more aware than other pre-Marxian materialists of the many-sided content of the struggle between
10

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materialism and idealism. Anthropological materialism arose during the disintegration of G e r m a n classical idealism and, for all its opposition to the doctrines of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, was their natural completion. F e u e r b a c h fought against the most developed, significant, profound idealist doctrines that had ever existed in history. We find in him a thorough critical analysis of the speculative-idealist answer to the basic philosophical question. He traced how Hegel, converting thought into the subject and being into the predicate, stood the real relation on its head. T h e Hegelian deduction of nature from the 'absolute idea', as Feuerbach explained, by no means proved that nature was implicitly contained in this idea; if there were no n a t u r e it would be impossible to 'deduce' it from the supernatural. It was necessary, consequently, to return from speculative constructs to the facts, whose existence was obvious to everyone; n a t u r e existed, man existed, human thought existed. And he who also discarded the notion of a supernatural spirit together with theological prejudices thus planted the question of the relation of the spiritual and material in real, human soil. Insofar as philosophy answered the question of the relation of thought and being, it must be anthropology, i.e. a doctrine of man, whose existence formed the actual resolution of this problem. 'The unity of thought and being,' he wrote, 'has sense and truth only when man composes the basis, the subject of this unity ' (57:339). Feuerbach thus reduced the basic philosophical question to that of man, and the relation of the psychic and physical. This was a narrowing of the problem, but at the same time a concretisation of it, since it was in his time that natural science had provided adequate proof that thought was a function of the brain, i.e. of matter organised in a special way. T h e idealist who is compelled by physiology to recognise this fact does not, of course, reject his convictions thereby; he endeavours to find a spiritual first principle outside h u m a n existence, pleading that the dependence of the spiritual on the physical in the structure of h u m a n existence must itself have arisen from (and be explained by) something else, not only supernatural but also s u p e r h u m a n . Feuerbach, being conscious of the inevitability of such objections to materialism, argued that study of n a t u r e did not reveal the necessity for the existence of a supernatural and was not evidence, even indirectly, of its presence. Any supernaturalist explanation of the origin of the psychic was therefore quite without grounds.
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H o w c a n m a n a r i s e f r o m n a t u r e , i.e. t h e s p i r i t f r o m m a t t e r ? F i r s t o f a l l , a n s w e r m e this q u e s t i o n : how can

[he w r o t e ] .

matter arise from spirit?

If you do n o t find any, in t h e least r e a s o n a b l e a n s w e r to t h a t question, y o u will a p p r e h e n d t h a t o n l y t h e c o n t r a r y q u e s t i o n will lead y o u t o t h e goal (56:179).

F e u e r b a c h w a s thus c o n s c i o u s o f t h e difficulties s t a n d i n g in the w a y of a systematic proof of t h e materialist position on t h e e s s e n c e a n d origin of t h e spiritual. But t h e s e difficulties w e r e those of scientific study, while t h e c o n t r a r y idealist thesis was not only u n p r o v a b l e but also incompatible in principle with a scientific posing of the p r o b l e m . T h e idealist interpretation of the relation between the spiritual and material was, as F e u e r b a c h showed, essentially theological:
T h e question whether a God created the world, the question of the relation a c t u a l l y of G o d to t h e world, is o n e of t h e relation of the spirit to sensuality, of the general or abstract to the real, of the species to the individual; this question belongs to the most i m p o r t a n t a n d at t h e s a m e t i m e m o s t difficult o n e s o f h u m a n k n o w l e d g e a n d p h i l o s o p h y , a n d , a s has already b e c o m e clear, the whole history of philosophy virtually turns on it ( 5 7 : 1 3 6 ) .

Lenin, citing this passage, c o m p a r e d it with Engels's formulation of the basic philosophical question (144:70). We see that F e u e r b a c h , to an even greater extent than Hegel, expressed a p r o f o u n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g of this question. C o n s e q u e n t l y , at this point, too, G e r m a n classical philosophy w a s a direct f o r e r u n n e r of dialectical and historical materialism. T h u s , o v e r m a n y c e n t u r i e s , p h i l o s o p h y p r o c e e d e d , i n its theoretical self-determination, from one answer or other to the basic philosophical question, without being a w a r e of t h e fact, s o m e t i m e s e v e n c o m i n g close to a c o r r e c t a p p r e c i a t i o n o f it. T h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h i s c o n t r a d i c t i o n i s t o b e f o u n d , o n the one hand, in n a t u r e , in the genesis of the basic philosophical question, and on the other hand in the general patterns of development of theoretical knowledge. S c i e n c e a l w a y s a t t a i n s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f its t h e o r e t i c a l f o u n d a t i o n s , and of the principles by w h i c h it is in fact guided, by very complicated paths. C o n t r a r y to the ordinary view scientific principles a r e not so m u c h the starting point of t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of a s c i e n c e as a result of t h a t d e v e l o p m e n t . In other words, before the principles become methodological directives they must be brought out through comprehension of the results of scientific d e v e l o p m e n t . As M a m a r d a s h v i l i has correctly noted:
There is no unilinearity of development and continuity in the history of science a n d philosophy, identical to the logical course of t h o u g h t in 43

a theoretical system. T h e d e v e l o p m e n t of k n o w l e d g e proceeds in the form of a mass of lines t h a t e m b r a c e t h e subject a n d go deep into it from v a r i o u s aspects. Philosophy ( a n d science) develops on different 'planes', and singles out aspects of t h e subject of different complexity and depth simultaneously, and reflection of these aspects develops as a whole ( 1 6 0 : 1 8 0 - 1 8 1 ) .

T h e development of each science is built up from two main, qualitatively different, though ultimately interconnected processes, i.e. increase in knowledge about t h e objects that it studies, and investigation of its own theoretical foundations. Inquiries of the latter type are usually late, i.e. are only begun at that stage of a science's development when contradictions in its fundamental theoretical principles come to light that had hitherto seemed incontrovertible. A person who is not engaged in scientific work usually imagines the development of science as harmoniously occurring process. He thinks that scientific problems arise and are resolved in a strict order of priority and corresponding sequence (to begin with, the simplest tasks are tackled, then m o r e complicated ones, and a new matter is not taken up until the old one has been finished with). He pictures the proliferation of scientific knowledge as something like the erection of a multistoreyed building; first a solid foundation is laid, in the constructing of which it is already known in advance how many storeys are to be erected. Then the floors a r e added one after another (again in strict sequence), after which, the interior finishing of the building is completed. Since science is probably the most planned, purposeful, theoretically comprehended form of human activity, the existence of spontaneity in its development seems, if not unnatural, at least irregular, improper, and undesirable, although many scientific discoveries have been made more or less by chance, while the results of research (in contrast to those of other labour processes) cannot be anticipated in advance; we cannot know today what we shall know tomorrow. Each researcher is aware of his own activity, and of the research techniques he employs, but there is an immense gulf between these notions (often, moreover, subjective and superficial) and understanding of the principles and theoretical foundations of the science. Only through the accumulation and development of knowledge, and the rise of incompatible conceptions, contradictions, and paradoxes within the context of a definite science is its real theoretical foundation brought out, and illusions dispersed about convictions uncritically adopted as axioms or even as facts that it was enough
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simply to state, since they were obvious. As Karl M a r x said:

T h e historical progress of all sciences leads only t h r o u g h a multitude of c o n t r a d i c t o r y moves to t h e real point of d e p a r t u r e . Science, unlike other architects, builds not only castles in the air, but m a y construct s e p a r a t e h a b i t a b l e storeys of t h e building before laying the foundation stone ( 1 6 6 : 5 7 ) .

It is therefore not surprising that the basic philosophical questionwhich is really the theoretical point of departure of all more or less systematically developed philosophical doctrinescould be scientifically comprehended, formulated, and, if you please, even discovered only at that historical stage when the main trends in philosophy had been fully singled out, and when it had become more or less obvious that they were materialism and idealism. Scientific understanding of the nature of philosophic knowledge presupposes investigation of the genesis of the basic philosophical question and of its place in the development of philosophy. T h e contradiction between the objective content of philosophical systems and the subjective form of their construction and exposition must not only be explained but also resolved by way of a distinct, scientific demarcation of the point of theoretical departure (answer to the basic philosophical question) and the theoretical principle and initial thesis of the doctrine from which the most important propositions of the system are deduced. Until this important line is drawn, the real significance of the basic philosophical question remains in the dark, since the theoretical principle of philosophical systems always figures in the foreground. T h a t is why philosophers attach paramount importance to it, and see in it, above all, the essence of their discoveries. And this theoretical principle, of course, has far from always coincided with the answer to the basic philosophical question. T h e first thesis of Descartes' philosophy'I think, therefore I am'did not bring out, at least with sufficient definiteness, the dualist c h a r a c t e r of his system. T h e principle of Kant's philosophy the demarcation of empirical and a priori knowledge, and the problem formulated in connection with it, namely how a priori synthetic judgments are possibleundoubtedly included several idealist notions, though the demarcation of types of knowledge (which, moreover, did not lack a rational kernel) did not follow directly from an idealist answer to the basic philosophical question. T h e basic question thus blends with the problems posed by a philosophical system, and with the initial theoretical premisses
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that distinguish o n e philosophy from a n o t h e r . A philosopher usually starts the exposition of his system of views with a statement that leads in some cases to a definite answer to the basic philosophical question, and in others already includes this answer in essence, which only comes out, however, during the logical development of the initial statement, r a t h e r than starting from the question of which is p r i m a r y , the spiritual or the material. Both t h e idealist and the materialist may adopt t h e concept of being as the theoretical principle of their system; while it b e a r s a general form t h e r e is nothing in it, e x c e p t the stating of existence, that is i n h e r e n t in any objects of possible knowledge. A philosopher b e c o m e s a materialist or an idealist only w h e n he passes from this ' n e u t r a l ' , but essentially empty, unpremissed, theoretical principle to the differences i n h e r e n t in it. Aristotle's idealism, for instance, began when he stated (dividing being into m a t t e r and form) that form was a n o n - m a t e r i a l principle d e t e r m i n i n g matter. Analysis of c o n t e m p o r a r y idealist philosophy, in particular, confirms the need for a principled theoretical d e m a r c a t i o n of the initial theoretical proposition (principle) and the real answer to the basic philosophical question, even in those cases when t h e two coincide in form. T h e latest Christian spiritualism, for instance, can easily mislead the unsophisticated reader, in putting forward, as its initial thesis, that being is primary, and consciousness s e c o n d a r y . Only a critical analysis of the c o n c r e t e content that Christian spiritualists invest the concept of being with shows that this thesis formulates an idealist answer to t h e basic philosophical question. Sciacca, a spokesman of Italian Christian spiritualism, substantiates an idealist-theological system of views as follows, starting from the thesis of the primacy of being:
11

Being is primary; only b e i n g is the p r i m a r y . is not even exact to say that it is 'first', in so far as b e i n g is t h e beginning; It is presence, it is, it states itself from itself; t h e r e is n o t h i n g ' b e f o r e ' a n d "after' being. We c a n imagine n o t h i n g n e s s before a n d after, that is to say the absence of being, but s u c h a s u p p o s i t i o n is only possible insofar as t h e r e is being. N o t h i n g n e s s does not a n n i h i l a t e being, for it is i m a g i n a b l e t h a n k s to being... T h i s a b s e n c e , w h i c h is b e c a u s e of p r e s e n c e , we call n o n - b e i n g ; it is a m i s t a k e to call it n o t h i n g n e s s . All t h a t exists is 'dialectic'; it is a p r e s e n c e a n d an a b s e n c e of being, but t h e a b s e n c e is c o n d i t i o n e d by the presence (243:15-16).

L a t e r he counterposes being on the one h a n d to the subject and on the other to the object. He takes up a r m s against the idealism (subjective) that reduces the object to the subject, and against materialism, which allegedly reduces t h e subject
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to the object. Being prevails over all qualitative differences and ultimately over reality; 'the real is not being and being is not the real' (243:19). T h e real is declared to be a derivative form of being, which is interpreted as a supra-empirical, trans-subjective and trans-objective reality, and ultimately as God. A line between the basic philosophical question and the theoretical principle of a philosophic system is essential not only for the critique of idealism but also for a correct understanding of materialist philosophy. Hobbes took as the initial concept (principle) of his materialist system, the concept of body, which he counterposed to the abstract, and sometimes ambiguous (as the history of scholasticism has s h o w n ) , concept of being. For Hobbes philosophy was a doctrine of bodies, because nothing else existed at all.
T h e subject of philosophy, or the m a t t e r it treats of, is every Body of which we c a n conceive any g e n e r a t i o n , and which we may by any consideration thereof c o m p a r e with o t h e r Bodies; or which is c a p a b l e of composition and resolution; that is to say, every Body, of whose G e n e r a t i o n or P r o p e r t i e s we can h a v e any knowledge ( 1 0 1 : 7 ) .

T h e initial concept of Hobbes' system, namely that of body, contains a materialist answer to the basic philosophical question, but the two must not be identified since he included a nominalist interpretation of the objects of knowledge in his answer, a denial of the objectivity of the general, identification of matter and substance, and a denial of immaterial phenomena. T h a t understanding of the object of knowing is unacceptable to the philosophy of Marxism, despite the fact that it agrees with the materialist point of departure of Hobbes' doctrine. T h u s there are constantly different initial theoretical concepts or fundamental statements within the materialist or idealist answer to the basic philosophical question. These concepts and statements differ from one another in both form and content. Anaximander's apeiron, Empedocles' elements, the concept of a single nature of the eighteenth-century French materialists, and the conception of objective reality in the doctrine of dialectical materialism are initial materialist propositions that are as essentially different as the varieties of materialist philosophy connected with them. T h e importance of these differences comes out as soon as we analyse the premisses and conclusions associated with them more deeply. Idealism, probably to an even greater degree than materialism, is distinguished by a diversity of modes of formulating initial philosophical concepts and fundamental statements,
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which is largely due to the fact that the development of natural science constantly discredits its initial propositions, forcing its adherents to transform them within the context of an idealist interpretation of reality. Some idealists take a concept of world reason as the theoretical principle of their system, others one of a world will, and still others one of the unconscious. These are all, of course, only variants of the concept of a spiritual first principle, but they have essential significance within the limits of the idealist system of views. If the absolute principle of everything that exists is reason, the world is depicted as an ordered, rationally organised hierarchical system. If the substantial essence of the world is considered to be an irrational world will, the world is likened to chaos, in which there is no direction whatsoever, no system, or consistency, or basis for purposive h u m a n activity. T h e different variants of the idealist answer to the basic philosophical question thus also, to some extent, determine the peculiarity of the content of philosophic systems. T h e difference between the initial concept (or statement) and the answer to the basic philosophical question must therefore also be treated positively, i.e. as a mode of developing philosophy, since the initial theoretical proposition does not play a formal role but is a profound statement that often marks a new historical stage in the development of philosophical knowledge. If that were not so, then the philosophers who attribute so much significance to the theoretical principle of a system could be reproached with superficiality. But as is readily to be seen from the example of the Cartesian cogito, the initial theoretical proposition is often the formulation of the most important idea of a philosophic system. T h e statement 'I think, therefore I am' had epoch-making socio-historical and heuristic significance. It proclaimed the right of every h u m a n being to answer the question of the truth of any statement and gave Descartes' doctrine (for all its inconsistencies and tendencies to compromise with theology) the character of a revolutionary challenge to mediaevalism. From that angle its theoretical principle was not only and not so much a mode of substantiating a certain system of views as a philosophical thesis whose profound sense was brought out by its theoretical development and methodological application. Spinoza's system was constructed on the analogy of Euclid's Principles which, in the conviction not only of the seventeenth century rationalists but also of naturalists (recall that Newton expounded his Principia mathematica philosophiae naturalis
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according to Euclid's method), was the standard of the connected, consistent, demonstrative exposition of a theory. Such a standard seemed particularly necessary in philosophy, in which unsubstantiated or insufficiently substantiated hypotheses competed with one another. T h e progressing divergence of doctrines, and the barren struggle (as it seemed at the time) between incompatible theories equally claiming to incontrovertible truth, and the crisis of scholasticism with all its carefully developed apparatus of discrimination and 'proofs', all inspired a conviction that only mathematics could rescue philosophy from permanent confusion. Spinoza began with a definition of the basic concepts of his system (substance, attributes, necessity, freedom, etc.); then followed axioms, and then theorems, corollaries, and scholia. There is no need to explain that this mode of exposition (and, as Spinoza imagined, proof) seemed to the author of the Ethica Ordine Geometric Demonstrata (and, of course, not just to him) to be probably his main achievement; the truths of philosophy were proved mathematically for the first time, which it was expected would wholly eliminate the grounds for disagreement. And it would be highly unhistorical to undervalue the method of exposition and proof worked out by Spinoza just because he did not allow for the specific nature of philosophical knowledge (i.e. simply borrowed the method of geometry), and because he did not pose the question of the reality of what constituted the content of his definitions when formulating those that preceded the axioms (and were therefore the real initial concepts of his system). The method of more geometrico employed in philosophy was a really philosophical achievement, and that is perhaps more obvious in our time than it was a hundred years ago. Spinoza said that the beginning was always most difficult and important. He obviously had in mind his own system, too. Stressing the importance in principle of the basic philosophical question does not diminish the significance of the initial theoretical propositions of doctrines; it is simply a matter of demarcating the one from the other, and then of investigating their relationship. And the main thing in this relationship is determined by the choice of alternative, i.e. by a definite answer to the dilemma formulated by the basic philosophical question. I must warn the reader against a formal interpretation of this choice. T h e opponents of materialism often argue as if it started from one postulate and idealism from another, opposite one. But the materialist answer to the basic philosophical
4-01603

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q u e s t i o n is n o t a p o s t u l a t e or a h y p o t h e s i s . As t h e G D R scientist Klaus has remarked:

T h e correct answer to the basis of philosophy is a very broad abstraction from the whole development of h u m a n practice and human thought. Scientific hypotheses that propose a false answer to the basic question to us are therefore rejected because they contradict this practice of mankind (120:69).

P h i l o s o p h y w a s a l r e a d y e n d e a v o u r i n g , a t t h e d a w n o f its e x i s t e n c e , to find a firm t h e o r e t i c a l basis t h a t c o u l d p r o v i d e a r e l i a b l e p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e for t h e w h o l e f u r t h e r d e v e l o p m e n t o f p h i l o s o p h i c t h o u g h t . M a n k i n d ' s scientific a n d historical experience demonstrates that the materialist answer to the basic p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n is this s o u g h t - a f t e r f o u n d a t i o n . Engels characterised materialism as 'a general world outlook r e s t i n g u p o n a definite c o n c e p t i o n of t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n matter and mind' (52:349). What does the word 'general' mean in that context? It seemingly points to the difference between philosophy and those special forms of outlook on the world that h a v e either only n a t u r a l , or only social, reality, as their subject-matter. T h e natural-science, irreligious world outlook t h a t t o o k s h a p e i n d i r e c t c o n n e c t i o n with C o p e r n i c u s ' g r e a t d i s c o v e r y did not c o m e t o b e c a l l e d h e l i o c e n t r i c b y c h a n c e . Engels characterised b o u r g e o i s ideology as a juridical one. I n s o f a r as t h e s u b j e c t - m a t t e r of p h i l o s o p h y is b o t h n a t u r a l a n d social r e a l i t y , it is t h e m o s t g e n e r a l of all possible t y p e s of world outlook. Engels' statement cited above, in formulating the principled basis o f the m a t e r i a l i s t w o r l d o u t l o o k , t h u s s t r e s s e d t h e i d e o logical i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e m a t e r i a l i s t a n s w e r t o t h e basic p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n . T h e idealist c r i t i q u e o f m a t e r i a l i s m i s e v i d e n c e that t h e l a t t e r ' s o p p o n e n t s a r e distinctly c o n s c i o u s o f its ideological s i g n i f i c a n c e a n d g r o w i n g i n f l u e n c e . C o n t e m p o r a r y idealists often criticise t h e i r p r e d e c e s s o r s f o r h a v i n g d e r i v e d b e i n g f r o m t h o u g h t a n d c o n s c i o u s n e s s ; that kind o f idealist p h i l o s o p h i s i n g is n o w c o n d e m n e d as b a r r e n , u n realistic intellectualism, rationalism, panlogism, and so on. T h e one answer to the basic philosophical question or the o t h e r t h u s c o n s t i t u t e s t h e b a s i s of e a c h of t h e s y s t e m s of p h i l o s o p h i c a l views, s o t h e o r e t i c a l l y d e t e r m i n i n g t h e m a i n t r e n d o r direction of inquiry. I stress t h e m a i n trend, a n d not m o r e , b e c a u s e i t w o u l d b e a n o b v i o u s fallacy t o s u g g e s t t h a t t h e a n s w e r p r e d e t e r m i n e s all t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s a n d c o n c l u s i o n s of a g i v e n p h i l o s o p h y . W i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t of a s y s t e m , like a n y t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s t r u c t i n g e n e r a l , logical n e c e s s i t y i s n o t t h e sole
50

form of determination. One must also allow for the fact that the answer to the basic question gets theoretical expression in the results of inquiry only in so far as the philosopher is consistent. But a desire to follow consistently the principle adopted is not enough to attain that end. Berkeley's principle esse ist peripi (to be is to be perceived) cannot be followed consistently in a system whose direct goal is to substantiate a theistic world outlook. T h e p r e - M a r x i a n materialists undoubtedly endeavoured to pursue the materialist principle in philosophic analysis both of nature and of social reality. But, without being aware of it, they remained idealists in their understanding of history. And even in natural philosophy they sometimes retreated from materialism, e.g. the mechanistic assumption of a first impulse, the subjectivist interpretation of so-called secondary qualities, and so on. T h e inconsistency of a materialist or an idealist not only has theoretical and epistemological roots, of course, but also socioeconomic ones. T h e metaphysical character of the materialism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was not, of course, due to the materialist answer to the basic philosophical question, as has been claimed more than once by opponents of the materialist understanding of the world. T h e idealists of that time, too, were as a rule metaphysicists. Any philosophical system takes shape in the socio-economic conditions of a definite historical epoch, and it would be unscientific to deduce its concrete propositions directly from its principle, which at best can only be a guiding thread in the course of inquiry. This general consideration is necessary so as to avoid oversimplifying the idea of the place and role of the basic philosophical question, and at the same time to stress its principled ideological significance.

NOTES
An e x a m p l e of h o w far this revision sometimes goes is t h e following claim of M a x S c h e l e r , the f o u n d e r of philosophical a n t h r o p o l o g y : ' T h e physiological and psychic life processes are ontologically strongly identical ( 2 3 8 : 7 4 ) . 1 shall show, f u r t h e r on, that this proposition, a n d others like it, coincides fully with the idealist interpretation of objective reality and k n o w l e d g e of it.
1 2

It must be stressed t h a t L e n i n , when tackling t h e most i m p o r t a n t problems of the theory of M a r x i s m , often employed definitions whose c o n t e n t was

51

d e m a r c a t e d b y a s i n g l e a t t r i b u t e ; this m a x i m u m l i m i t a t i o n c o n v i n c i n g l y disclosed the main, decisive thing in the M a r x i a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the p r o b l e m . ' O n l y h e i s a M a r x i s t , ' h e w r o t e , f o r e x a m p l e , ' w h o extends t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e c l a s s s t r u g g l e to t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of the dictatorship of the proletariat. T h i s is w h a t c o n s t i t u t e s t h e m o s t p r o f o u n d d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e M a r x i s t a n d t h e o r d i n a r y p e t t y ( a s well a s b i g ) b o u r g e o i s . T h i s i s t h e t o u c h s t o n e o n w h i c h t h e real u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d r e c o g n i t i o n o f M a r x i s m s h o u l d b e t e s t e d ' ( 1 4 5 : 3 5 ) . I t s e e m s t o m e t h a t this e x a m p l e m a k e s t h e s e n s e of o p t i m a l d e m a r c a t i o n of t h e c o n t e n t of a d e f i n i t i o n p a r t i c u l a r l y obvious. By e m p l o y i n g this a n a l o g y one can readily u n d e r s t a n d that a c o r r e c t a p p r o a c h t o t h e b a s i c q u e s t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h y c o n s i s t s i n fixing t h e really principal thing that distinguishes the main parties in philosophy, a n d n o t i n e x t e n d i n g its c o n t e n t .
3

I h a v e e x a m i n e d this p o i n t s y s t e m a t i c a l l y i n m y a r t i c l e ' O n t h e C h a n g e i n t h e S u b j e c t - M a t t e r of P h i l o s o p h y ' p u b l i s h e d in M . T . I o v c h u k , et al. ( E d s . ) . Problemy istorii filosofskoi i sotsiologicheskoi mysli XIX veka (Nauka, Moscow, 1960). I am n o t r e f e r r i n g h e r e ( s i n c e it is a m a t t e r o n l y of t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l aspect of the question interesting me) to the fact obvious from the angle of historical materialism, that self-awareness presupposes not only perception of the e x t e r n a l world but also m a n ' s attitude to m a n , t h e interaction between people, the result of which is society. M a n , M a r x said, is not born either w i t h a m i r r o r in his h a n d s , or with a F i c h t e a n s e l f - a w a r e n e s s ' I am I '. ' P e t e r o n l y e s t a b l i s h e s his o w n i d e n t i t y as a m a n by first c o m p a r i n g himself with P a u l a s b e i n g o f like k i n d ' ( 1 6 7 : I , 5 9 ) . O n e m u s t a g r e e w i t h P l e k h a n o v : ' T h e r e w a s a t i m e w h e n p h i l o s o p h e r s did not d i s c u s s s u c h q u e s t i o n s . T h i s w a s i n t h e initial p e r i o d o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of ancient Greek philosophy. For instance, Thales taught that water was the p r i m a r y s u b s t a n c e f r o m w h i c h all t h i n g s c o m e a n d t o w h i c h all t h i n g s r e t u r n . B u t h e did n o t ask himself: w h a t r e l a t i o n h a s c o n s c i o u s n e s s t o t h a t p r i m a r y s u b s t a n c e ? N o r did A n a x i m e n e s ask himself t h e s a m e q u e s t i o n w h e n h e a v e r r e d that the p r i m a r y s u b s t a n c e was not w a t e r b u t air' ( 2 1 0 : 5 7 7 ) . I t h e r e f o r e c a n n o t a g r e e w i t h A n i s i m o v ' s v e r y c a t e g o r i c a l s t a t e m e n t that p r i m i t i v e m a n ' w a s a l w a y s a b o v e all a r a t i o n a l i s t , a n d n a t u r a l m a t e r i a l i s t ' ( 5 : 1 2 4 ) . I t b y n o m e a n s follows f r o m t h e o b v i o u s fact that p r i m i t i v e m e n , insofar as they a d a p t e d themselves s o m e h o w to their e n v i r o n m e n t and possessed c e r t a i n c o r r e c t i d e a s a b o u t it, t h a t t h e s e i d e a s w e r e p h i l o s o p h i c a l or theoretical. S o m e w o r k e r s , in trying to disclose the historical roots of m a t e r i a l i s t a n d r a t i o n a l i s t v i e w s , s e e m i n g l y g o t o o f a r not o n l y i n t o h i s t o r y but also into the prehistory of m a n k i n d . C o n v e r s i o n o f a n a l o g y i n t o a p r i n c i p l e for e x p l a i n i n g r e a l i t y i s a l s o c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f t h e m o s t d e v e l o p e d v a r i e t i e s o f i d e a l i s m . S h i n k a r u k n o t e s this f e a t u r e in Hegel's philosophy: ' T h e idealistically i n t e r p r e t e d purposive a c t i v i t y o f m a n s e r v e s a s a n e m p i r i c a l m o d e l o f t h e w o r l d . T h e initial p r e m i s s e s o f this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a r e a s follows: t h i n k i n g p r e c e d e s m a t e r i a l activity; t h e material, objective world is t h e p r o d u c t of purposeful activity a n d consequently of thought; the subject of purposive activity ( m a n ) is e i t h e r r e d u c e d t o c o n s c i o u s n e s s o r his c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s s e p a r a t e d f r o m this real subject a n d interpreted in the spirit of theology as t h e self-existant d e m i u r g e of the world (245:127). 52

I h a v e s u r v e y e d t h i s q u e s t i o n in g r e a t e r d e t a i l in my m o n o g r a p h Problemy isloriko-filosofskoi nauki ( P r o b l e m s of t h e H i s t o r y of P h i l o s o p h y ) , 2 n d e d . (Mysl, Moscow, 1 9 8 2 ) . See C h a p . 2, 5; C h a p . 7, 3.

8

This comes out with even g r e a t e r obviousness in the doctrines of the Russian materialists, the r e v o l u t i o n a r y d e m o c r a t s . Pisarev, for instance, claimed t h a t t h e final g o a l o f p h i l o s o p h y a n d k n o w l e d g e i n g e n e r a l ' c o n s i s t e d i n answering the always inevitable question of h u n g r y and naked people; outside this q u e s t i o n t h e r e i s a b s o l u t e l y n o t h i n g t h a t i t i s w o r t h c a r i n g a b o u t , t h i n k i n g about, and bustling about' ( 2 0 6 : 1 2 5 ) . Quite obviously, he had in mind h e r e n o t an initial t h e o r e t i c a l f u n d a m e n t a l p r o p o s i t i o n , n o t a mode of s o l v i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m s , b u t a s u p r e m e task o f p h i l o s o p h y f r o m t h e a n g l e o f the interests of the oppressed and exploited masses.
9

I t h e r e f o r e c a n n o t a g r e e with L y a k h o v e t s k y a n d T y u k h t i n w h e n t h e y say, i n t h e i r e n t r y cited a b o v e : ' N e i t h e r H e g e l n o r F e u e r b a c h , h o w e v e r , distinguished t h e question of the relation of thought to being as t h e basic o n e o f all p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n s ' ( 1 5 4 : 1 7 2 ) . T h a t i s said t o o c a t e g o r i c a l l y . I t i s a n o t h e r m a t t e r t h a t H e g e l often s m o o t h e d o v e r t h e a l t e r n a t i v e b e i n g or t h o u g h t w h e n proving that thought was being, and that the latter was a n a t t r i b u t e o f t h o u g h t . T h a t fault did n o t e x i s t i n F e u e r b a c h , a s w e s h a l l see later.
10

T h a t is why Engels stressed t h a t 'as soon as we d e p a r t even a millimetre from t h e s i m p l e b a s i c f a c t t h a t b e i n g i s c o m m o n t o all t h e s e t h i n g s , t h e differences between these things begin to e m e r g e a n d w h e t h e r these differences consist i n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e t h a t s o m e a r e w h i t e a n d o t h e r s a r e b l a c k , t h a t s o m e a r e a n i m a t e a n d o t h e r s i n a n i m a t e , t h a t s o m e m a y b e o f this w o r l d a n d o t h e r s o f t h e w o r l d b e y o n d , c a n n o t b e d e c i d e d b y u s f r o m t h e fact t h a t m e r e existence is in e q u a l m a n n e r ascribed to t h e m all' ( 5 0 : 5 4 - 5 5 ) .
11

II THE TWO SIDES OF THE BASIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION 1. T h e Ontological Aspect: the Materialist A n s w e r to the Basic Question T h e question of the relation of the spiritual and the material is a b o v e all o n e o f t h e e s s e n c e , o f t h e n a t u r e o f w h a t e x i s t s . W h e n o n e asks ' W h a t is t h e world?', ' W h a t is it that exists?', the answers a r e necessarily concretised as follows: ' W h a t is m a t t e r ? ' , ' W h a t is spirit?'. T h e relation 'spiritual-material' is an objective one, e x i s t i n g i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f o u r c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f it. T h a t i s t h e ontological aspect of the basic philosophical question. W h e n t h e p s y c h i c r e a c h e s t h e level o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n its d e v e l o p m e n t , and knowledge of the reality a r o u n d it begins, an epistemological, subject-object relation arises. T h e notion t h a t s o m e t h i n g i s p r i m a r y a n d s o m e t h i n g else s e c o n d a r y is based on t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t both exist. T h e s e c o n d a r y posits t h e p r i m a r y , w h i c h , h o w e v e r , i s p r i m a r y i n t h e c o n text of t h e ' s p i r i t u a l - m a t e r i a l ' relation. B u t this relation does not h a v e a correlative c h a r a c t e r , since only o n e aspect of it depends on the other, which, on the contrary, is independent, primordial, substantial. T h e G r e e k materialists started from the concept of a p r i m a r y m a t t e r ( m a t e r i a prima), a p r i m a r y s u b s t a n c e , t r e a t i n g e v e r y t h i n g d i f f e r e n t f r o m i t a s t r a n s f o r m e d f o r m s o f it. D e s p i t e t h e n a i v e t e o f t h a t p o s i n g o f t h e q u e s t i o n , w h i c h did n o t r u l e o u t t h e p r i m a r y i n t i m e ( a n d s o t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e w o r l d ) , its p r i n c i p l e d i d e o l o g i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e is o b v i o u s ; it is a m a t t e r of t h e m a terial unity of the world. Is that not w h y the idea of p r i m a r y m a t t e r retains a significance of principle also for c o n t e m p o r a r y physics? This idea contradicts the metaphysical notion that e v e r y t h i n g c o g n i s e d will a l w a y s b e a n i n f i n i t e l y s m a l l p a r t o f t h e u n k n o w n . M a r k o v has remarked, apropos of that:
T h e drive to understand 'something' as constituted of 'something' 'simpler' and fundamental has always been progressive a n d led, as history witnesses, to quite substantial positive results. T h e idea of primary matter 54

as t h e basis a n d driving m o t i v e of a definite a p p r o a c h to analysis of the material world has always been and remains productive (165:66-67).

T h e 'spiritual-material' relation is not a substantial or absolute ontological one in the sense in which the motion, change, and d e v e l o p m e n t of matter a r e absolute. It arises of objective necessity, b u t only in c e r t a i n conditions. It also d i s a p p e a r s , c o n s e q u e n t l y , of objective necessity, b e c a u s e of a c o r r e s p o n d i n g c h a n g e in the conditions. O n e must not, therefore, as Svidersky remarks,
confuse t h e basic question of philosophy with the basic relationship of reality itself. T h e relationship of m a t t e r and consciousness is not always universal and in that sense the basic relation of reality itself (252:45).

T h e r e is evidently an endless n u m b e r of heavenly bodies l a c k i n g t h e m o s t e l e m e n t a r y p h e n o m e n a o f life. Idealism has often, since S c h o p e n h a u e r ' s time, depicted h u m a n reason as an anomaly, doomed to disappear without t r a c e . T h a t view suits not only irrationalists but also theologians, w h o suggest that the advent of rational beings was an indubitable miracle. F r o m the angle of materialism reason is not something foreign to matter. T h e spiritual is a n a t u r a l c o n s e q u e n c e of matter's c o n tinually o c c u r r i n g transformations. T h e first materialists, the hylozoists, w h o identified life w i t h t h e m o t i o n o f m a t t e r , m a d e a p r o f o u n d , t h o u g h n a i v e g u e s s a b o u t t h e e s s e n c e o f t h e living. T h e h y p o t h e s i s t h a t t h e r e w a s a t i m e w h e n t h e r e w a s n o life i n t h e infinite U n i v e r s e c a n n o t b e s c i e n t i f i c a l l y s u b s t a n t i a t e d , just like t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t life exists o n l y o n o u r p l a n e t . E n g e l s seemingly h a d that in mind w h e n he said:
We have the certainty that ... none of (matter's) attributes can ever be lost, and therefore, also, that with the same iron necessity that it will ext e r m i n a t e on the earth its highest creation, the thinking mind, it must s o m e w h e r e else and at a n o t h e r time again p r o d u c e it ( 5 1 : 3 9 ) .

P r e - M a r x i a n materialists sometimes expressed an idea of the co-eternity of spiritual and material, while at the s a m e time stressing the f o r m e r ' s d e p e n d e n c e on t h e latter. S p i n o z a called thought an attribute of substance-nature. Diderot considered sensitivity, t h e e l e m e n t a r y f o r m of t h e psychic, to be i n h e r e n t in m o l e c u l e s . I n t h e l a n g u a g e o f c o n t e m p o r a r y logic t h i s ' r o o t i n g ' of t h e spiritual in the m a t e r i a l c a n be expressed as follows, in N a r s k y ' s v i e w : ' I n t h e d i s p o s i t i o n a l s e n s e c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s always i n h e r e n t in m a t t e r as an i n a l i e n a b l e p r o p e r t y of it' ( 1 9 0 : 6 8 ) . T h a t posing of the question rules out the assumption of a c h a n c e o r i g i n of c o n s c i o u s n e s s . B u t a c l a r i f i c a t i o n is s e e m i n g l y
55

necessary here. It should not be supposed that everything that i s n o t c h a n c e i s n e c e s s a r y o r i n e v i t a b l e . D e f i n i t e possibilities ( i n c l u d i n g t h a t o f t h e o r i g i n o f life i n c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s ) , f o r instance, a r e not s o m e t h i n g h a p h a z a r d or c h a n c e . But the conc e p t of necessity is i n a p p l i c a b l e to possibilities of t h a t k i n d p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e a n y p o s s i b i l i t y i s n e c e s s a r i l y c o n t r a d i c t e d b y its n e g a t i o n . A n y possibility posits t h e e x i s t e n c e of a n o t h e r o n e as a c o n d i t i o n of its e x i s t e n c e as a p o s s i b i l i t y . In t h a t c o n n e c t i o n Shklovsky r e m a r k e d with reason:
One c a n n o t , of course, e x c l u d e the possibility in principle that in the c o n t e m p o r a r y age E a r t h is t h e sole focus of intelligent life in the Galaxy a n d , who knows, p e r h a p s also in considerably g r e a t e r spacetime regions of t h e Universe. It is w o r t h philosophers' while to p o n d e r seriously about t h a t possibility. P r o b l e m s of a quite non-trivial c h a r a c t e r arise here, it would seem, especially w h e n one allows for t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e that the length of t h e 'psychozoic' e r a on E a r t h may be limited ( 2 4 6 : 6 2 ) .

T h e question of the primary thus has nothing in common, in its m a t e r i a l i s t ( a n d e v e n m o r e d i a l e c t i c a l - m a t e r i a l i s t ) p o s i n g , w i t h t h e m y t h o l o g i c a l n o t i o n o f a p r i m a e v a l c h a o s t h a t i s often a s c r i b e d t o m a t e r i a l i s m b y its c r i t i c s . T h e c o u n t e r p o s i n g o f t h e m a t e r i a l to the spiritual m e a n s only that the existence of matter d o e s not p r e s u p p o s e a necessity for c o n s c i o u s n e s s to exist. T h e spiritual on t h e c o n t r a r y , h o w e v e r , does not exist without matter. T h e counterposing of spiritual and material consequently
has absolute significance only within t h e b o u n d s of a very limited field in this case exclusively within t h e bounds of the f u n d a m e n t a l epistemological problem of what is to be regarded as p r i m a r y and what as second a r y . Beyond these b o u n d s the relative c h a r a c t e r of this antithesis is indubitable ( 1 4 2 : 1 3 1 ) .

T h i s proposition of Lenin's indicates that an absolute c o u n t e r p o s i n g of spiritual a n d m a t e r i a l is i n c o m p a t i b l e with m a t e r i a l ism; it constitutes t h e essence of philosophical dualism, which substantialises the antithesis of spiritual a n d material. Idealism, too, often starts f r o m a thesis of t h e a b s o l u t e antithesis of the p s y c h i c a n d t h e p h y s i c a l , a s s u m i n g a t t h e s a m e t i m e that this r e lation of absolute incompatibility is r e m o v e d by t h e s u p e r n a t u r a l spirit. F r o m the standpoint of dialectical materialism the spiritual i s a n i m m a t e r i a l p r o p e r t y o f t h e m a t e r i a l , its i m m a t e r i a l i t y , moreover, not consisting in anything transphysical; the nature of this immateriality is expressed by t h e epistemological concept of r e f l e c t i o n . T h e difference of principle of the philosophy of Marxism f r o m t h e p r e c e d i n g m a t e r i a l i s m finds d i r e c t e x p r e s s i o n n o t o n l y
56

in a materialist answer, but also in a dialectical one, to the basic philosophical question. This answer comes, in the first place, from a scientifically realised, epistemologically investigated, distinctly formulated basic philosophical question, while preMarxian materialists had no clear idea of its structure, place, and significance. Secondly, dialectical materialism excludes in principle any identifying or confusing of the spiritual and material. Lenin noted Dietzgen's mistake in calling everything that exists matter. That seemingly consistent materialist view proved in fact to be a concession to idealism. And Lenin warned: 'to say that thought is material is to make a false step, a step towards confusing materialism and idealism' (142:225). For it is objective idealism that interprets the spiritual as a reality existing outside and independent of human consciousness. T h e dialectical-materialist understanding of the immateriality of consciousness is organically connected with the epistemological definition of matter developed by Lenin, according to which the concept of matter 'epistemologically implies nothing but objective reality existing independently of the h u m a n mind and reflected by it' (142:242). T h e epistemological understanding of the spiritual as immaterial corresponds to this philosophical definition of the concept of the material. A third feature of the dialectical-materialist answer to the basic philosophical question consists in historism. T h e pre-Marxian materialists often said that the spiritual, like matter, did not originate. T h a t point of view limited the materialist understanding of the 'spiritual-material' relation to recognition solely of a dependence of the former on the latter. T h e theory of evolution, confirmed in biology in the second half of the nineteenth century, rejected this limited view. Natural science brought out the error of another metaphysical materialist notion as well, namely that certain combinations of elementary particles caused the a p p e a r a n c e of consciousness. T h e unsoundness of that notion was revealed by dialectical materialism, which counterposed a concept of development to it that is characterised by continuity, succession, direction, irreversibility, preservation of achieved results, etc. Unfortunately this difference has not yet been adequately studied philosophically, which provides grounds for certain critics of materialism to deny the materialist understanding of the origin of consciousness, since (as they claim) no combination of elementary particles can lead to the formation of a thinking brain. One of the most important characteristics of the dialecticalmaterialist answer to the basic philosophical question is its socio57

logical aspect. T h e p r e - M a r x i a n materialists defined matter as s u b s t a n c e or body, a n d this characteristic of objective reality, drawn from mechanistic natural science, provided no notion of the peculiarities of material social relations and of t h e spiritual processes caused by t h e m . It b e c a m e possible to o v e r c o m e that historical limitation of p r e - M a r x i a n materialism t h r o u g h the d i s c o v e r y a n d investigation of t h e specific m a t e r i a l basis of social life. T h e history of philosophy thus brings out various types of materialist answer to the basic philosophical question, c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the main stages in the d e v e l o p m e n t a n d to the most important forms of materialist philosophy. T h e dialectical-materialist a n s w e r s u m s up t h e c e n t u r i e s - l o n g history of this question, which deserves special investigation. Such an inquiry, of course, is b e y o n d t h e s c o p e of my b o o k , yet a brief e x c u r s u s into history is necessary for a p r o p e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e c o n t e n t and significance of the materialist a n s w e r to t h e basic philosophical question. T h e m a t e r i a l i s t n a t u r a l p h i l o s o p h y o f t h e a n c i e n t s t h e first historical form of philosophical t h o u g h t d i d not yet single out the c o n c e p t of the psychic as s o m e t h i n g different from the m a t e r i a l , a l t h o u g h t h e t e r m 'spirit' w a s e m p l o y e d , w i t h w h i c h , i t seems, c o n c e p t s w e r e associated that w e r e derived both from e v e r y d a y e x p e r i e n c e and from mythology. T h a l e s supposed that a m a g n e t h a d a s o u l , i.e. t r i e d t o e x p l a i n t h e p h e n o m e n o n o f m a g n e t i s m in that w a y ; the c o n c e p t of soul served h i m to explain a far from spiritual p h e n o m e n o n . T h e fact that T h a l e s , incidentally, d r e w on t h e n o t i o n of a spirit to explain such a m y s t e r i o u s p h e n o m e n o n for his t i m e as m a g n e t i s m i n d i c a t e s t h a t s p e c i a l p r o p e r t i e s w e r e still a s c r i b e d t o t h e s o u l . A c c o r d i n g t o H e r a k l e i t o s i t w a s n o t s i m p l y a f l a m e , but t h e m o s t p e r f e c t s t a t e o f fire, f r e e o f m o i s t u r e . D e m o c r i t o s c o n s i d ered it composed of very smooth, r o u n d atoms. T h e spiritual was t h e n still n o t c o u n t e r p o s e d t o m a t t e r a s s o m e t h i n g q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t , t h o u g h d e r i v e d f r o m it. T h i s u n d e v e l o p e d c h a r a c t e r of t h e notion of the spiritual was a main reason why t h e materialist p h i l o s o p h y o f a n t i q u i t y , a s E n g e l s s t r e s s e d , ' w a s i n c a p a b l e of clearing up the relation between mind and matter' (50:159). T h i s p h i l o s o p h y t r e a t e d qualitative differences as significant only from the standpoint of everyday consciousness ('opinion'). P h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s , h a v i n g fixed t h e i d e n t i t y o f t h e a g g r e g a t e s t a t e s o f w a t e r , j u d g e d all o t h e r o b s e r v e d s t a t e s b y a n a l o g y w i t h it. T h e o r i g i n a l n a t u r a l m a t e r i a l i s m , E n g e l s pointed out,
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r e g a r d s t h e unity of the infinite diversity of n a t u r a l p h e n o m e n a as a matter of course, and seeks it in something definitely c o r p o r e a l , a p a r t i c u l a r thing, as T h a l e s does in w a t e r ( 5 1 : 1 8 6 ) .

It was that conception of the material unity of n a t u r e that constituted the central point of G r e e k n a t u r a l philosophy, since it h a d n o t y e t s i n g l e d o u t t h e p s y c h o p h y s i c a l p r o b l e m , let a l o n e t h e basic philosophical question. T h e idea of the substantial identity of the psychic and the physical w a s n o t specially s u b s t a n t i a t e d o r p r o v e d , p a r t l y b e c a u s e t h e r e w a s a s yet n o n o t i o n o f t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e d i f f e r e n c e between them, and partly as a c o n s e q u e n c e of the p r e d o m i n a n c e of naturally formed hylozoist views. T h e theoretical roots of that c o n c e p t i o n of the unity of t h e world lay in the m o d e of r e g a r d i n g t h e w o r l d i n h e r e n t i n t h e first m a t e r i a l i s t d o c t r i n e s . A s Engels stressed,
A m o n g the Greeksjust because they were not yet advanced enough to dissect, analyse n a t u r e n a t u r e is still viewed as a whole, in general. T h e universal connection of natural p h e n o m e n a is not proved in regard to particulars; to the Greeks it is the result of direct contemplation. Herein lies the i n a d e q u a c y of Greek philosophy, on a c c o u n t of which it had to yield later to other modes of outlook on the world. But herein also lies its superiority over all its subsequent metaphysical opponents (51:45,46).

T h e metaphysically thinking philosophers of m o d e r n times, by rejecting the naive dialectical views of the world, blocked their own progress 'from an understanding of the part to an u n d e r standing of t h e whole, to an insight into the g e n e r a l i n t e r c o n nection of things' (51:45). Engels thus considered that philosophy (and incidentally k n o w l e d g e i n g e n e r a l ) a s c e n d e d i n its d e v e l o p m e n t f r o m understanding of the particular to understanding of the whole. T h e problem of the world as a whole is a m o n g the root problems of philosophy. D e m a r c a t i o n of philosophy from the special s c i e n c e s d o e s not i n t h e least e l i m i n a t e t h i s p r o b l e m f r o m p h i l o s o p h y . T h e f a c t t h a t c e r t a i n scientific d i s c i p l i n e s a r e c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h i s p r o b l e m d o e s n o t i n t h e least d i m i n i s h its s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r p h i l o s o p h y , b u t o n t h e c o n t r a r y i n c r e a s e s it. T h e w o r l d a s a w h o l e (it is, o f c o u r s e , n o t s i m p l y t h e a g g r e gate of e v e r y t h i n g that exists) is boundless and inexhaustible. It is a m a t t e r , a b o v e all, of t h e u n i v e r s a l a n d , in a c e r t a i n s e n s e , absolute interconnection and interdependence of phenomena, of the unity of t h e world. It seemed s o m e t h i n g quite obvious to the G r e e k materialists, constantly confirmed by everyday experience. But when there b e c a m e an awareness in philosophy of t h e real antithesis b e t w e e n t h e spiritual and material, this
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unity b e c a m e p r o b l e m a t i c . Subsequently it was m o r e and m o r e often called in question, with the c o n s e q u e n c e that the qualitatively h e t e r o g e n e o u s p h e n o m e n a of n a t u r e w e r e systematically and specially investigated by isolating t h e m from one another. T h e primitive naive notion of the universal i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e and interconversion of n a t u r a l p h e n o m e n a , which was based on a proposition of their substantial identity, gave way to a metaphysical view that interpreted the qualitative differences between things as evidence of their essential i n d e p e n d e n c e of one a n o t h er. Yet the idea of the unity of the world did not get consigned to oblivion. It was constantly revived by natural science and philosophy in the course of their development. Both materialism and idealism, and both metaphysically thinking philosophers and dialecticians, defended a n d substantiated t h e idea of the unity of t h e world, each, of course, in his own key. T h e moulding of the materialism of m o d e r n times was closely linked with the revival of G r e e k cosmological doctrines that p r e c e d e d this historical process in the natural-philosophy systems of the Renaissance. T h e n a t u r a l philosophers of t h e beginning of the seventeenth c e n t u r y developed t h e view of the atomistic materialism of antiquity about the infinite universum, which received a n a t u r a l - s c i e n c e substantiation for the first time t h r o u g h C o p e r n i c u s ' system and the c o r r e c t i o n s introduced into it by G i o r d a n o Bruno. T h e idea of the space-time infinity of the universe smashed the scholastic notion of the radical antithesis of heavenly 'matter' to base earthly substance. T h e dualism of m a t t e r and form was also shattered along with that of the earthly and the h e a v e n ly, i.e. the Aristotelian-scholastic hyiomorphism that interpreted m a t t e r only as material for the creative activity of a s u p e r n a t u r a l spirit. T h e infinity of the universum was c o m p r e h e n d e d as an unlimited diversity of the potentials contained in matter, and as evidence that matter was not confined to any limits; it was universal reality, a unique and single world. T h e hylozoism of the ancients was reborn in the organicist conceptions of n a t u r a l philosophers who ascribed vegetable and animal functions to metals and minerals. T h o s e views u n d e r mined t h e theological, scholastic dogmas a b o u t the s u p e r n a t u r a l c h a r a c t e r of the spiritual, a n d denied t h e theological division of t h e world into this one and the other. T h e pantheistic identification, typical of m e d i a e v a l ideology, also provided substantiation of the principle of material unity, since it led to denial of God. T h e materialists of m o d e r n times, unlike their predecessors,
1

60

had already singled out the question of the relation of spiritual and material, attaching ever greater importance to it. T h e antifeudal struggle against religious-scholastic mystification of the spiritual as something transcendental and out of this world which was the primary essence and other-world principle of human life in this world, brought this question to the foreground. Materialism demystified the spiritual, seeing in it a natural phenomenon governed by the laws of nature. Toland, who ascribed life to everything that existed, linked its highest manifestations with a special, material basis, the brain. In that connection he criticised Spinoza's conception of thought as an attribute of matter, but of matter in general. 'Whatever be the Principle of Thinking in Animals,' he wrote, 'yet it cannot be performed but by the means of the Brain' (256:139). Citing Hippokrates and Demokritos, Toland claimed that all emotional and psychic disorders had their cause in a disturbance of the normal state of the brain. T h a t was the point of view, too, of Lamettrie, Holbach, Diderot, and others. If the existence of reason presupposed the existence of a specific, material substratum, Holbach argued,
likewise to say that n a t u r e is g o v e r n e d by an intelligence, is to claim that it is g o v e r n e d by a being provided with organs, seeing that it could not, w i t h o u t organs, h a v e either perceptions, ideas, intentions, thoughts, desires, plan, or actions ( 1 0 3 : 7 2 ) .

Thus, in modern times, too, just as in antiquity, denial of the supernatural and recognition of the material unity of the world were inseparable. But whereas the natural philosophers of antiquity and the Renaissance substantiated the principle of the material unity of the world by reducing the supernatural to the natural, sensually perceived, the materialists of modern times enriched this principle of the explanation of the world, while developing it from itself, by a developed materialist answer to the basic philosophical question. This was a new stage in the development of materialist philosophy; substantiation of the material unity of the world coincided with materialist monism. Both monism and recognition of the unity of the world, as Plekhanov stressed, were of course compatible with idealism. But only materialist monism ruled out the spiritualist, absolute counterposing of the psychic to the physical, of the mentally comprehended to sensually perceived reality. Only materialist monism, consequently, consistently followed the principle of the unity of the world. According to this tenet nature in 'its broadest sense' as Holbach said, was the sole reality, or 'the great whole that results from the assemblage of different substances, from their different combinations, and from the different mo61

tions that we see in the universe' (103:11). In opposition to materialism the idealist conception of the unity of the world inevitably includes a latent dualism of spiritual and material. I must stress, incidentally, that recognition of the unity of the world and the concept 'the world as a whole' do not fully cover one another. Idealist philosophers, who counterpose a dualist or pluralist interpretation to the principle of the unity of the world, in no way eliminate the concept of the world as a whole even when they deny it. T h e y only interpret the whole world dualistically or pluralistically. Even irrationalists, for whom the world and the universe are something like chaos, ruling out order of any kind, interpret the world as a whole in their own way. But only materialism indissolubly links the concepts of the world as a whole and of the unity of the world as the essential content of its materiality. Any attempts to picture matters as if the questions of the world as a whole and of the unity of the world were essentially different ones are therefore in principle unsound. For the materialist the concept of the unity of the world is a concretisation of the more general one of 'the world as a whole', since to recognise the unity of the world and at the same time to deny the legitimacy of the philosophical concept of the world as a whole (as some Marxists unfortunately do) means to admit quite incompatible statements. T h e principle of the material unity of the world does not simply precede the comprehensive materialist posing of the basic philosophical question historically. In that case it could seem to be the natural-philosophy past of modern materialism. But this principle is one of the most important aspects of the materialist answer to the basic philosophical question, from which it follows that the concept of the world as a whole, too, continues to be developed and enriched by new content disclosing the unity of an endless diversity of phenomena. P r e - M a r x i a n materialists spoke of the great whole of nature. In our day the expression often provokes an indulgent smile, since the world as a whole cannot directly be the object of knowing. Neopositivists especially make fun of this kind of 'archaic', 'natural philosophy' t u r n of phrase. ' T o be real in the scientific sense', C a r n a p , for example, declares, 'means to be an element of the system; hence this concept cannot be meaningfully applied to the system itself (30:207). In other words, one system or another can only be the object of inquiry when it itself is a subsystem, i.e. an element of another system. T h e world as a whole cannot be singled out as a subsystem, and so is unreal in the sci62

entific sense. Carnap's idea seems at first glance to be indisputable; one cannot shift the E a r t h if there is no fulcrum outside it. But if the unity of the world, to use Engels' words, cannot be shown by a pair of juggler's phrases, then denial of this unity cannot be substantiated by the same means. It is worth looking into this matter in more detail, if only because Carnap's point of view justifies epistemological subjectivism and agnosticism. T h e subjectivist denies the reality of the world as a whole, since this whole is not a directly given, sensually perceived object of existing or possible experience. He represents the term 'whole' in application to the whole aggregate of p h e n o m e n a as devoid of any sense. T h e agnostic argues differently. By claiming that sciences (and philosophy) do not recognise the world as a whole either directly or indirectly, or in any degree whatever (corresponding to their level of development), the agnostic thus somehow recognises the Kantian unknowable 'thing in itself, i.e. a reality beyond the limit of quite knowable phenomena. T h e metaphysical gulf between phenomena and 'things in themselves' is revived as an absolute incompatibility of knowledge of the world of phenomena and of the world as a whole. C a r n a p , too, is consistent in his own way when he declares that objective reality (or the world of things) is not an object of scientific knowledge:
those who raise the question of the reality of the thing world itself h a v e p e r h a p s in mind not a theoretical question as their formulation seems to suggest, but r a t h e r a practical question, a m a t t e r of a practical decision c o n c e r n i n g the s t r u c t u r e of o u r l a n g u a g e ( 3 0 : 2 0 7 ) .

It turns out that we only have the right to speak of the reality of those things or events that we include in a certain system by means of our language. But to recognise the existence of the world as a whole, and likewise the unity of the world, means to employ ordinary 'thing language' (which has an unscientific character) unconsciously. Such is the position of the neopositivist; it differs from that of objective idealism in denying the real existence of the world as a whole. T h a t is a pseudoconcept, C a r n a p explains, and from his position objective reality is just such a pseudoconcept. Both recognition and denial of objective reality should therefore be rejected as pseudopropositions, which means that one should adhere to philosophical scepticism on the question of objective reality, i.e. reserve judgment on it. It is not enough, in order to refute a false point of view, of course, just to point out the untenable conclusions that follow from it. T h e erroneous proposition must be refuted in essence.
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It is necessary, consequently, to r e t u r n to the thesis that the world as a whole c a n n o t be the object of knowing. T h i s is c o r r e c t in the sense that investigation posits singling out of t h e object of inquiry, but a procedure of that kind is impracticable as regards the world as whole. T h e r e is no tower from which o n e could observe t h e whole world; that must not only be u n d e r s t o o d literally but also taken in the figurative sense. But it does not follow from this, as the c o n t e m p o r a r y West G e r m a n idealist philosopher Lei-segang claims, that
2

the world as a whole, the universe, and nature are something outside experience. We see and experience always only this or that in the world, this or that which nature has produced, but never the world, or nature, as such and as a whole (137:72).

It is very notable that Leisegang equates the world as a whole, the universe, and n a t u r e with one a n o t h e r . In fact, for one who denies the possibility of cognising t h e world as a whole, all objective reality proves to be u n k n o w a b l e . In stressing t h e unlimited qualitative diversity of the universe, we do not simply establish a methodological postulate t h a t possibly comes into contradiction with the principle of the unity of the world, but we formulate a conclusion that sums up the whole history of knowledge. And that conclusion, like many other propositions of natural science (about which I shall speak b e l o w ) , refers to the world as a whole. W h e n we say that t h e r e a r e no objective limits to knowing t h e world, we a r e o n c e again arguing about the world as a whole. But how a r e j u d g m e n t s of that kind possible? T h e y a r e possible primarily because t h e r e a r e no absolute antitheses in t h e ontological sense. W h a t e v e r 'marvellous' p h e n o m e n a cosmology has discovered, we a r e quite justified in claiming that they will not be wholly incompatible with those already known to science. T h e r e a r e no g r o u n d s for assuming that cosmology or any other science will discover s o m e w h e r e that which the theologists and scholastics of t h e Middle Ages tried to discover at distances incomparably closer to our planet. N a t u r a l science confirms the scientific, atheistic conviction that t h e r e is nothing absolutely opposite to what exists and what is already known. Difference posits identity and is inseparable from it. Diversity and unity do not exclude o n e a n o t h e r . H e t e r o geneity, like homogeneity, is not absolute. An 'antiworld' in the precise full sense of t h e t e r m is impossible; it fixes antitheses, whose relativity is attested by their constantly being revealed unity. In the 'antiworld' t h e material does not b e c o m e a product of t h e spiritual; any f e a t u r e of the 'antiworld' exists in a certain n a t u r a l relation with its antipode. T h e s e general propositions
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a c q u i r e a non-trivial c h a r a c t e r as soon as they are applied in a c o n c r e t e i n q u i r y a n d i n e v a l u a t i n g its r e s u l t s . A s G o t t j u s t l y remarks:

T h e concept of impossibility not only reflects that certain possibilities do not exist, but also reflects what processes do not permit the existence of these possibilities, i.e. h a v e a positive as well as a negative aspect (78:220).

T h e concept of the ontological is applied to the problem of the w o r l d as a w h o l e , of c o u r s e , in a d i a l e c t i c a l - m a t e r i a l i s t s e n s e , which presupposes an epistemological interpretation of any form of universality inherent in n a t u r e , society, and knowle d g e . A n y d e s c r i p t i o n o f o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y a n d its s c i e n t i f i c r e f l e c t i o n is b a s e d on a d e f i n i t e level of d e v e l o p m e n t of k n o w l e d g e . This description consequently changes, and is enriched by new c o n t e n t a s k n o w l e d g e d e v e l o p s . I n t h a t s e n s e o n t o l o g i c a l definitions a r e also epistemological ones. And this unity of the epistemological a n d ontological in scientific a n d philosophical k n o w l edge is of decisive i m p o r t a n c e in t h e dialectical-materialist posing of the p r o b l e m of t h e world as a w h o l e . T h e history of science enables one to say that the existence of a b s o l u t e antitheses is epistemologically e x c l u d e d , at least within the c o n t e x t o f scientific k n o w l e d g e ; n e w scientific t r u t h s d o not refute 'old' ones. T h e y m a k e t h e m m o r e precise, concretise and s u p p l e m e n t them, taking t h e m into a system of m o r e p r o f o u n d scientific n o t i o n s . As K u z n e t s o v c o r r e c t l y notes:
T h e o r i e s whose correctness has been established experimentally for any field of physical p h e n o m e n a a r e not eliminated as something false when new, m o r e general theories appear, but retain their significance for the f o r m e r domain of p h e n o m e n a , as a limiting form and partial case of the new theories ( 1 3 0 : 1 5 6 ) .

It f o l l o w s f r o m this t h a t a s c i e n t i f i c , t h e o r e t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n of t h e diversity and unity of the world is i n s e p a r a b l e from t h e processes of i n q u i r y . B e i n g , b e y o n d t h e limits o f o u r k n o w l e d g e , i s a n o p e n q u e s tion, precisely an o p e n a n d not a closed o n e . T h a t also applies to w h a t is called 'the world as a w h o l e ' , since it r e c o g n i s e s that such a w h o l e exists ( n o m a t t e r h o w a b s t r a c t this t r u t h is relative to t h e world as a w h o l e , it is by no m e a n s a t a u t o l o g y ) . T h e history of science has s h o w n that the investigation of unobservable p h e n o m e n a is a r e g u l a r p r o c e s s of d e v e l o p m e n t of scientific knowledge. Many p h e n o m e n a have become observable because they were first discovered theoretically. Observability w a s an a b s o l u t e p r e m i s s of knowability only for the empiricists of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. T o d a y
3

5-01603

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empiricism takes up a m o r e flexible epistemological position, since science successfully anticipates unobservable p h e n o m e n a , e s t a b l i s h e s t h e i r e x i s t e n c e , a n d i n t h e final a n a l y s i s m a k e s t h e m observable indirectly, if not directly. T r u e , the unobservable object called 'the world as a whole' c a n n o t be r e c o r d e d even n e g a t i v e l y like, f o r e x a m p l e , a f i l t r a b l e v i r u s . W h i l e s p a c e p r o b e s h a v e p h o t o g r a p h e d t h e far side of the m o o n , u n o b s e r v a b l e from t h e earth (recognition of the existence of which was deemed scientifically s e n s e l e s s b y n e o p o s i t i v i s t s b e c a u s e o f t h e u n v e r i f i a b i l i t y o f t h e r e l e v a n t s t a t e m e n t s ) , o n e will n e v e r fly a r o u n d t h e w o r l d as a whole, of c o u r s e , in a s p a c e p r o b e . But o n e m u s t not u n d e r stand singling out of the object of inquiry in an oversimplified way. Science singles out not only the individual a n d the particular, b u t a l s o t h e g e n e r a l , a n d e v e n t h e u n i v e r s a l , i.e. a d e f i n i t e n e s s o f p h e n o m e n a t h a t i t r e l a t e s t o all p h e n o m e n a without exception, o r i n o t h e r w o r d s t o t h e w o r l d a s a w h o l e . T h e universalisation of scientific p r o p o s i t i o n s of t h a t k i n d is far f r o m a l w a y s justified, o f c o u r s e , b u t e v e n t h e n s c i e n c e g e t s t h e c h a n c e t o e s t a b l i s h its f r o n t i e r s , i.e. t o c o n c r e t i s e u n i v e r s a l i t y . T h e discovery of laws of n a t u r e is the singling out of t h e most g e n e r a l , n e c e s s a r y , a n d r e c u r r i n g r e l a t i o n s t h a t a p p l y a t l e a s t partially to t h e world as a w h o l e , e v e n if only b e c a u s e t h e p a r t of a w h o l e is not s o m e t h i n g foreign to it but includes the n a t u r e of the w h o l e to s o m e e x t e n t or o t h e r ( a n d this h a s , of c o u r s e , to be investigated). Necessity and universality are inseparable. But not every statement about universality applies to the world as a whole. A n d it is i m p o s s i b l e to e s t a b l i s h a p r i o r i t h a t it d o e s n o t a p p l y to e v e r y t h i n g that exists; that, too, has to be prove d . Limitation o f t h e u n i v e r s a l i t y o f l a w s a n d scientific p r o p o s i t i o n s i s j u s t a s difficult a r e s e a r c h t a s k in g e n e r a l as s u b s t a n t i a t i o n of t h e i r universality. T h e law o f universal g r a v i t a t i o n w a s d i s c o v e r e d b y N e w t o n p r e c i s e l y a s a law o f t h e universum. A n d t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s t h e n u b of the discovery, because terrestrial attraction was known before N e w t o n ; it h a d been r e c o r d e d in t h e law of falling bodies discovered by Galileo. N e w t o n ' s genius in this case was that he e x t e n d e d the idea of attraction to t h e w h o l e universe, which was i n c o m p a t i b l e with c o m m o n sense since it called for the ass u m p t i o n of actio in distans a n d w a s f r a u g h t w i t h p a r a d o x e s t h a t N e w t o n tried to avoid by m e a n s of t h e o l o g i c a l a s s u m p t i o n s . Yet the law he d i s c o v e r e d w a s confirmed by s u b s e q u e n t r e s e a r c h a n d e x p e r i m e n t s , a n d i s still b e i n g c o n f i r m e d t o d a y . T h a t d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t its u n i v e r s a l i t y will n e v e r b e l i m i t e d . M o r e e s s e n t i 66

ally, l i m i t a t i o n of t h e u n i v e r s a l i t y of t h i s l a w will be a f u r t h e r d e e p e n i n g of u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e , s i n c e it c a n n o t be a m a t t e r of its r e p u d i a t i o n as n o n - e x i s t e n t , in fact i n o p e r a t i v e , e t c . B u t i s t h e law o f u n i v e r s a l g r a v i t a t i o n r e a l l y a n e x c e p t i o n ? A r e n ' t t h e c o n s e r v a t i o n l a w s also r e a l l y l a w s o f t h e universum?. N e o p o s i t i v i s t s , i t t u r n s out, c l e a r l y u n d e r e s t i m a t e t h e possibilities o f s c i e n c e . D e s p i t e C a r n a p ' s p r o t e s t a t i o n s , n a t u r a l s c i e n c e d o e s n o t r e n o u n c e s t u d y o f t h e w o r l d a s a w h o l e a t all. T h i s s e e m s a b a n a l t r u t h w h e n it is g r a s p e d . B u t still, let me cite t h e naturalists themselves. H e r e , for e x a m p l e , is w h a t L a n d a u and Lifschitz wrote:
the world as a whole in the general theory of relativity (my italics ..) must not be regarded as a closed system, but as one that is in a variable gravitational field; in that connection application of the law of increasing entropy does not lead to a conclusion about the necessity of a statistical equilibrium (132:46).

But w h a t applies to the g e n e r a l t h e o r y of relativity is seemingly also a p p l i c a b l e t o o t h e r f u n d a m e n t a l scientific t h e o r i e s . Z e l m a n o v notes t h a t t h e c o n c e p t of t h e world as a whole a n d of t h e u n i v e r s e as a w h o l e is t r e a t e d in c o s m o l o g y in at least t h r e e a s p e c t s . ( 1 ) T h e u n i v e r s e i s r e g a r d e d a s a single o b j e c t i r r e s p e c tive of its p a r t s . ( 2 ) T h e u n i v e r s e as a w h o l e is r e g a r d e d in its r e l a t i o n s to its p a r t s , a n d t h e l a t t e r in r e l a t i o n to t h e w o r l d as a whole. (3) T h e c o n c e p t of t h e universe as a whole is applied to all its r e g i o n s i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e i r r e l a t i o n to e a c h o t h e r a n d to the whole universe. He concludes accordingly: 'cosmology is a p h y s i c a l d o c t r i n e of t h e U n i v e r s e as a w h o l e , i n c l u d i n g t h e theory of the whole world covered by astronomical observations as a p a r t of t h e U n i v e r s e ' ( 2 6 8 : 2 7 7 ) . As f o r t h e views of t h o s e c o s m o l o g i s t s w h o d o n o t t h i n k i t possible t o s p e a k o f t h e k n o w ability in p r i n c i p l e of t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e , Z e l m a n o v justly r e m a r k s (in my v i e w ) in a n o t h e r of his w o r k s :
Paradoxically, denial of the legitimacy of the doctrine of the Universe as a whole, based on any considerations of the Universe whatsoever, is logically contradictory, since these considerations themselves can be treated as elements of such a doctrine, while denial of its legitimacy also means denial of the legitimacy of the considerations adduced (267:321).

So t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e is n o t a s p e c u l a t i v e a b s t r a c t i o n of n a t u r a l p h i l o s o p h e r s b u t a s p e c i a l , I w o u l d s a y mediated, object of scientific i n q u i r y . T h e w o r l d as a w h o l e is n o t s o m e t h i n g t r a n scendent, b e y o n d all limitations in r e g a r d to a n y attained k n o w l e d g e . D e n i a l o f its k n o w a b i l i t y i n p r i n c i p l e ( a n d a l w a y s h i s t o r ically l i m i t e d ) a t first g l a n c e a p r o f o u n d p o i n t of v i e w
67

proves on closer examination to be a superficial, empiricist one, for empiricists have always asserted that we know the finite, and that the infinite is unfathomable. T h e real problem is something else; how to study the world as a whole? How is this cognitive process performed? H o w far can scientific propositions regarded as referring to the whole universum be rigorously substantiated? Are they not destined to remain hypotheses for ever? Dialectical-materialist analysis of the process of cognition gives an answer to that in general form; in knowing the finite, individual, passing, and partial, we at the same time (within certain limits, of course) know the infinite, general, intransient, and whole. As Engels put it:
In fact all real, exhaustive knowledge consists solely in raising the individual thing in thought from individuality into particularity and from this into universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the finite, the eternal in the transitory. The form of universality, however, is the form of self-completeness, hence of infinity; it is the comprehension of the many finites in the infinite.... All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the eternal, the infinite, and hence essentially absolute (51:234).

Comprehension of the world as a whole is thus the mediated result of scientific cognition in respect of a certain 'section' of the universum, and not simply of the whole conceivable aggregate of existing and possible phenomena. If everything consists of atoms, for example, and of the elementary particles that form them, then atomic physics studies the world as a whole, though it does not study psychic processes, social life, etc. If, say, the proposition of quantum mechanics that the dualism of waveparticles is absolutely general, applying to the whole physical world, is correct, then here, too, it is a matter of study of the world as a whole. Recognition of that has nothing in common with justification of the unscientific, metaphysical assumption of the possibility of absolute knowledge, which is incompatible with materialist dialectics. In saying that physics and certain other fundamental sciences study the world as a whole, we also start from the assumption that the unity of the world (the world as whole) is revealed in its parts, and so in special fields of scientific inquiry. The whole of the universum, then, must not be understood as an external aggregate of parts, but rather as something inner, i.e. as the nat u r e of the whole, which incidentally is expressed by dialectical laws and categorial relations. It is also important to stress that recognition of the reality of definite (of course, limited) knowledge of the world as a whole not only has ideological and meth68

odological significance, but also constitutes a necessary element of concrete, historical research at a quite high level of theoretical generalisation. As Sergei Vavilov wrote:
It seems to me that there is an undoubted grain of truth in the tendencies of the theory of relativity to explain the properties of elementary particles from the properties of the world as a whole. If the properties of particles really explain very much in the behaviour of the world as a whole, then, on the other hand, we can rightly expect, according to the general laws of dialectics, that the properties of elementary particles themselves are determined by those of the world as a whole ( 2 5 8 : 7 1 ) .
4

Lenin constantly stressed, when characterising materialist philosophy, that it posits a definite understanding of the world as a whole. 'There is nothing in the world but matter in motion, and matter in motion cannot move otherwise than in space and time' (142:158). Marxian authors who insist that the concept of the world as a whole is illegitimate should ponder whether their position is compatible with the basic propositions of materialism, for it is quite obvious that denial of this concept cannot be agreed with such a truth, formulated by Lenin, as 'the world is matter in motion' (142:262). Natural scientists also undoubtedly agree with that statement about the world as a whole and in that sense it is not only a philosophical concept, but also a scientific one. Lenin remarked that the sciences elucidate the unity of the world in a specific way, by virtue of which a special epistemological investigation of these forms of scientific knowledge is needed. 'The unity of nature is revealed in the "astonishing analogy" between the differential equations of the various realms of phenomena' (142:269). Contemporary natural science has given new, at times quite unexpected confirmations of Lenin's idea. I have in mind the broad spread of mathematical methods of inquiry in sciences that developed for ages independent of mathematics, the peculiar 'welding together' of several fundamental sciences such as physics and chemistry, the rise of a multitude of 'butt' disciplines, which witnesses to the unity of qualitatively different processes of nature, the progress of cybernetics and electronics in modelling several higher psychic functions. Epistemological comprehension of the historical process of the differentiation and integration of sciences also confirms the dialectical-materialist conception of the world as a whole. T h e unity of the world is recorded in the classification of the sciences, which brings out the link between them as having an objective ontological basis. As Fedoseev has written:
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T h e i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n of t h e sciences reflects t h e interconnection of p h e n o m e n a in reality itself. T h e problem of the i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n of the sciences is one of the unity of t h e world and a qualitative f e a t u r e of its different fields ( 5 4 : 1 3 8 ) .

T h e e x p r e s s i o n 'to c o g n i s e t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e ' is often u n d e r s t o o d quite w r o n g l y , as if it w e r e a m a t t e r of p o s i n g t h e task of c o g n i s i n g all a n d e v e r y t h i n g , s u m m i n g u p all k n o w l e d g e , a n d so on, i g n o r i n g the historically f o r m e d division of l a b o u r in t h e s c i e n t i f i c field. A u t h o r s w h o a r g u e i n t h a t m a n n e r u s u a l l y affirm t h a t o n l y all t h e s c i e n c e s t a k e n t o g e t h e r s t u d y t h e w o r l d a s a whole, while each s e p a r a t e science deals with s o m e p a r t or facet of t h e world. Views of t h a t kind do not, in my view, touch the n u b of the question posed here. Study of the world as a whole has nothing in c o m m o n , of course, with claims to c o m p r e h e n d all a n d e v e r y t h i n g ( e v e r y t h i n g t h a t e x i s t e d i n t h e p a s t , e x i s t s n o w , a n d w h a t will b e ) o r t o s u b s t i t u t e s o m e s o r t o f s p e c i a l s c i e n c e for t h e w h o l e a g g r e g a t e of existing scientific disciplines. F r o m m y p o i n t o f v i e w , t h e w h o l e a g g r e g a t e o f p r e s e n t l y e x i s t i n g scie n c e s does not dispose of k n o w l e d g e of t h e w h o l e , since n e w b r a n c h e s of s c i e n c e will arise, a n d n o w u n k n o w n fields of r e s e a r c h will b e d i s c o v e r e d t h a t will e s s e n t i a l l y a l t e r o u r n o t i o n s o f t h e universum. E n g e l s r e m a r k e d that G r e e k philosophy h a d a l r e a d y anticipated the correct notion that
the whole of n a t u r e , from the smallest element to the greatest, from grains of sand to suns, from Protista to man, has its existence in eternal coming int being and passing a w a y , in ceaseless flux, in u n r e s t i n g motion and change (51:30-31).

T h a t understanding of the world as a whole, at which the G r e e k philosophers had only brilliantly guessed, has b e c o m e one of the most vital t h e o r e t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s n o t o n l y o f t h e d i a l e c t i c a l materialist o u t l o o k on t h e w o r l d b u t also of c o n c r e t e , scientific research. T h e unity of the w o r l d i t is constantly necessary to stress is not d e m o n s t r a t e d by speculative, logical a r g u m e n t s , but by the whole edifying history of science and material p r o d u c t i o n . T h e scientific p h i l o s o p h i c a l s u m m i n g - u p a n d c o m p r e h e n s i o n o f this world-historical p r o c e s s n o t only rejects t h e idealist notions of t h e i m m a t e r i a l essence of t h e m a t e r i a l or t h e s u p e r n a t u r a l essence of t h e spiritual, but also helps bring out a n d describe the diverse forms of t h e m a t e r i a l unity of t h e world. Philosophy, it goes without saying, studies t h e world as a w h o l e a n d the unity of t h e world only in a c e r t a i n aspect, s i n c e it wholly e x c l u d e s t h e specific p r o b l e m a t i c of t h e special sciences. It d o e s n o t r e q u i r e
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great a c u m e n to u n d e r s t a n d that investigation of the most general patterns of the motion, change, and development of n a t u r e , society, a n d k n o w l e d g e is a limitation of t h e investigative task that corresponds to t h e subject-matter and c o m p e t e n c e of the philosophy of Marxism. T h e explanations adduced seemingly m a k e it comprehensible in what sense one not only can but must recognise both the possibility a n d necessity of studying t h e w o r l d as a whole. As M e l y u k h i n justly r e m a r k s , t h e p r o b l e m should be formulated as follows:
C a n a scientific philosophy a n s w e r t h e questions w h e t h e r 'the world as a whole' was c r e a t e d by a God or w h e t h e r it has existed eternally, infinite in space and time, w h e t h e r t h e whole world is material, whether matter has certain universal properties and laws of being, type of motion, interaction, space, and time, conservation laws, law of causality, and so on? T h e a n s w e r can and must be quite unambiguous, because any deviation from it and any v a c u u m in t h e c o m p r e h e n d e d philosophical information provide an excuse to spokesmen of religious-idealist doctrines to fill that v a c u u m in a c c o r d a n c e with the spirit of these doctrines. T h e fact that no science can provide complete u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e world as a whole by no m e a n s signifies that t h e r e c a n n o t be reliable information in o u r notions about t h e properties of t h e whole material world, a n d that a meaningful outlook on t h e world is impossible ( 1 8 3 : 1 4 4 ) .

T h a t is w h y one c a n n o t a g r e e with those Marxist researchers w h o suggest t h a t t h e task of s t u d y i n g the w o r l d as a w h o l e has s u n k into oblivion along with n a t u r a l p h i l o s o p h y . ' It is h a r d l y necessary to e x p l a i n in detail that t h e u n s o u n d n e s s o f n a t u r a l p h i l o s o p h y w a s n o t a t all t h a t i t s t u d i e d t h e w o r l d a s a w h o l e ; it d r e w m a i n l y on s u r m i s e s for lack of c o n c r e t e scientific d a t a . N a t u r a l p h i l o s o p h y , E n g e l s p o i n t e d o u t , o u t l i v e d its t i m e b e c a u s e it w a s n o w possible to ' p r e s e n t in an a p p r o x i m a t e l y systematic form a c o m p r e h e n s i v e view of the i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n in nat u r e by m e a n s of t h e facts provided by empirical n a t u r a l science itself ( 5 2 : 3 6 4 ) . He c o n s e q u e n t l y considered it possible, by rej e c t i n g t h e n a t u r a l - p h i l o s o p h i c a l s y s t e m s , to give a general picture of nature as a connected whole on t h e b a s i s of p r o p e r l y t e s t e d s c i e n t i f i c f a c t s . H i s Dialectics of Nature w a s an a t t e m p t of that kind to c o m p r e h e n d t h e material unity of the world philosophically. T h i s n e w posing of t h e p r o b l e m differed radically from the natural-philosophical one; the principle of natural p h i l o s o p h y w a s a c o m p l e t e ' s y s t e m of n a t u r e ' , a s y s t e m of final t r u t h s i n t h e last i n s t a n c e . O p p o s i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e w i t h o u t w h i c h natural philosophy was inconceivable, Engels wrote:
T h e world clearly constitutes a single system, i.e., a c o h e r e n t whole, but t h e knowledge of this system presupposes a knowledge of all n a t u r e and history, which m a n will never attain. H e n c e he who makes systems 71

must nil in the countless gaps with figments of his own imagination (50:386).

W a r n i n g against t h e systematics of n a t u r a l philosophy, which squeezes t h e infinite w h o l e into the P r o c r u s t e a n bed of always historically limited knowledge, Engels (we see) did not consider k n o w l e d g e of t h e world as a whole an idle business. He simply pointed out the dialectical contradictoriness of this cognitive process:
cognition of the infinite is therefore beset with double difficulty and from its very nature can only take place in an infinite asymptotic progress. And that fully suffices us in order to be able to say: the infinite is just as much knowable as unknowable, and that is all that we need (51:234-235).

Engels thus fought against t w o metaphysical extremes; on the one h a n d , against denial of t h e knowability in principle of the world as a whole and, on t h e other, against the dogmatic u n d e r standing that m a d e an absolute of t h e k n o w l e d g e of t h e world as a whole that science already to some extent disposed of. T h e philosophy of M a r x i s m bases itself in its statements about the universum on the results obtained by all the sciences of nat u r e and society. But that is why its conclusions naturally do not coincide with those arrived at by each of these sciences. Both philosophical statements about the world as a whole and about p a r t i c u l a r sciences a r e absolutely ineradicable, necessary, and heuristically fruitful w h e n they h a v e (1) a materialist, and (2) a dialectical c h a r a c t e r . Let philosophers w h o think t h e m selves spokesmen of a scientific outlook on the world, try to manage without 'metaphysical', 'ontological', and 'natural-philosophical' statements of such a kind. Materialism, of course, is a system of logically interconnected theoretical propositions. I shall list a few, apologising in a d v a n c e to the r e a d e r to whom I am c o m m u nicating nothing new in this case. T h e unity of the world consists in its materiality. M a t t e r is u n c r e a t a b l e and indestructible. C o n sciousness is a product of the development of matter. Motion is the form of existence of matter. Matter exists in space and time. T h e world is k n o w a b l e in principle. Do all these statements relate to the world as a whole or only to that p a r t of it t h a t has already been mastered by science and practice? Positivists and other spokesmen of t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y subjective-agnostic philosophy of science reject these propositions, declaring them to lack scientific sense, and c o m e quite logically to an absolute relativism. S o m e of them, incidentally, h a v e already begun to revise their former denial of the comprehensibility of the concept of the
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world as a whole. P o p p e r , for instance, wrote in t h e foreword to his Logic of Scientific Inquiry ( 1 9 5 9 ) :
I, h o w e v e r , believe t h a t t h e r e is at least one philosophical p r o b l e m in w h i c h all t h i n k i n g m e n a r e i n t e r e s t e d . It is the problem of cosmology: the problem of understanding the worldincluding ourselves, and our knowledge, as part of the world ( 2 1 1 : 1 5 ) .

His p a p e r at t h e 14th International Congress of Philosophy was evidence that he was trying to treat t h e problem of the world as a whole from a stance of neorealist pluralism, some p r o p o sitions of which a r e similar to the idealist postulates of Platonism (see: 2 1 3 : 2 4 - 2 5 ) . Dialectical materialism rejects positivist scepticism as a subjective, anti-dialectical view, by investigating the real facts of scientific knowledge. Marxist materialism not only affirms the truths of p r e - M a r x i a n materialism but also goes incomparably further in philosophical generalisation. Development is universal and absolute. Contradictions, and the i n t e r c o n v e r sion and struggle of opposites, constitute the inner c o n t e n t of the process of development. Development takes place t h r o u g h the conversion of quantitative changes into qualitative ones, through negation and negation of the negation. No special insight is needed in o r d e r to understand t h a t these statements refer to the world as a whole, otherwise they simply lack scientific sense. W h e n developing, elucidating, and enriching them we once again h a v e the world as a whole in mind and not some part of it. T h a t is why denial of the world as a whole (in w h a t e v e r sense, epistemological or ontological) is a denial of t h e unity of the world, and of t h e universality of motion, space, time, etc. N a t u r a l science does not provide any g r o u n d s for conclusions of that kind; on the c o n t r a r y it confirms t h e materialist proposition of the unity of the world on this point, as on other matters. F u r t h e r m o r e , as I showed above, n a t u r a l science has passed of necessity, at the present time, to t h e notion of a diversity of links and i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e s between t h e world as a whole and its c o m p o n e n t parts, right down to e l e m e n t a r y particles. O n e can a g r e e with Kedrov:
The problem of the unity of the world loses nothing from the fact that it is treated simultaneously as a philosophical and a scientific one, but on the contrary only gains through the creative union of advanced philosophy and natural science (118:36).

But I do not s h a r e his conviction that the concept of t h e world as a whole and that of t h e unity of the world a r e essentially different from one a n o t h e r . I h a v e pointed out that the history of materialism begins
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with t h e t h e o r e t i c a l s u b s t a n t i a t i o n o f s p o n t a n e o u s l y established convictions about the eternity of n a t u r e and matter. T h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h o s e ideas signified a d e m y s t i f i c a t i o n of n a ture, and demolition of the religious-mythological interpret a t i o n of t h e w o r l d , f o r w h i c h n a t u r e w a s a p r o d u c t of the supernatural. Materialism has formulated and substantiated the principle of the material unity of the world from t h e very s t a r t ; d e v e l o p m e n t of t h a t p r i n c i p l e led to a f a c t u a l s i n g l i n g o u t o f a n d m a t e r i a l i s t a n s w e r t o t h e basic p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n . B u t t h a t did not e l i m i n a t e t h e p r o b l e m o f t h e w o r l d a s a w h o l e , w h i c h w a s t a k e n f u r t h e r p r e c i s e l y on t h e basis of this a n s w e r , s i n c e t h e a n t i t h e s i s o f m i n d a n d m a t t e r , c o n sciousness and being, the subjective and t h e objective gave it the content and significance that natural philosophers had always had a very h a z y notion about. T h a t also witnesses to t h e m a n y - s i d e d c o n t e n t o f t h e m a t e r i a l i s t a n s w e r t o t h e basic philosophical question. 2 . T h e O n t o l o g i c a l Aspect: a Contribution to t h e D e l i n e a t i o n of the Idealist A n s w e r to the Basic P h i l o s o p h i c a l Question E x p l a n a t i o n of t h e w o r l d f r o m i t s e l f s u c h is t h e p r i n c i p l e of materialist philosophy that even the first, 'naive' materialist d o c t r i n e s s t a r t e d f r o m . A n d it w o u l d be a c l e a r misu n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e h i s t o r i c a l s h a p i n g of p h i l o s o p h y if we b e g a n t o e v a l u a t e this ' d i r e c t ' r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h i n k i n g m a n a n d t h e w o r l d that o p p r e s s e s h i m b y its u n l i m i t e d p o w e r a s s o m e t h i n g that t o o k s h a p e o f itself. T h e i n t e l l e c t u a l n e e d t o e x p l a i n t h e w o r l d f r o m itself i s i n d u b i t a b l e e v i d e n c e t h a t m a n k i n d is b e g i n n i n g to o v e r c o m e its s p o n t a n e o u s l y f o r m e d d e l u s i o n s a n d fallacies a n d t o r e c o g n i s e t h e m a s fallacies that a r e by no means those of s e p a r a t e individuals. In o r d e r to a s c e n d e v e n t o t h e ' n a i v e ' , ' d i r e c t ' view o f p r i m i t i v e s p o n t a n e o u s m a t e r i a l i s m , it w a s n e c e s s a r y to g e t rid of t h e m o n s t r o u s s p e c t r e s t h a t m y t h o l o g y a n d r e l i g i o n h a d e n v e l o p e d h u m a n life in, t h e r e f l e c t i o n i n f a n t a s y o f m a n ' s d e j e c t i o n b y t h e d o m i n a tion o f e l e m e n t a l f o r c e s o f n a t u r e a n d s o c i a l d e v e l o p m e n t . A s p o n t a n e o u s l y f o r m e d s u p r a n a t u r a l v i e w o f t h e w o r l d historically preceded philosophy. Primitive materialism was the first intelligent intellectual protest against s u p r a n a t u r a l i s m ; it w a s b o t h a c r i t i q u e a n d a d e n i a l of it. T h e s t r e n g t h a n d weakness of primitive materialism comes out particularly ob74

viously in its naturalistic theogony by which the gods (whose existence was not yet d o u b t e d ) arose now from water, n o w from fire, now from some other 'substantial' matter. T h e s u p e r n a t ural was thus interpreted as n a t u r a l , i.e. 'explained' from n a t u r e and so converted into a n a t u r a l p h e n o m e n o n . As for idealism, which took shape later, it e n d e a v o u r e d to defend the s u p r a n a t u r a l i s t world outlook by r e - i n t e r p r e t i n g it. While not discarding explanation of n a t u r e by assuming beings above n a t u r e (i.e. s u p e r n a t u r a l ones) idealism developed theoretical conceptions that gradually wiped out the antithesis between the s u p e r n a t u r a l and the n a t u r a l . While materialism is a denial of religion, idealism is an attempt to t r a n s f o r m it into an intellectual outlook on the world. Idealism consequently is an ally of religion even when it reforms its traditional n o tions. It is in that case, moreover, that it really p e r f o r m s its social function, in spite of the desperate protests of conservative zealots of religion, w h o often see in idealism refined heresy. T h e young M a r x probably had that in mind when he wrote:
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all the philosophies of the past without exception have been accused by the theologians of abandoning the Christian religion, even those of the pious Malebranche and the divinely inspired Jakob Bhme (171:190).

T h e idealist doctrines of G r e e c e and R o m e differed essentially from the religious outlook then prevalent. It is sufficient to c o m p a r e the Platonic transcendental ideas with the Olympian gods of the H o m e r i c epic. This evolution of idealist philosophy, incidentally, also expresses the evolution of religion to some extent. Mediaeval Christian philosophy, which took shape in an age when religion m o r e or less directly dominated the everyday consciousness of people, put the concept of an absolutely immaterial, s u p e r n a t u r a l essence in the place of the idealist notion of antiquity of the immateriality and impersonal basis of the universum. This r e t u r n to mythology was m a d e , however, on a new basis, since the scholastic assimilation of Plato's doctrine, and then of Aristotle's, e n c o u r a g e d the forming of a speculative-idealist interpretation of God as world reason. Essentially this was the f o r e r u n n e r of the idealist philosophy of m o d e r n times, in spite of the fact that t h e rising bourgeois philosophy was a repudiation in o t h e r respects of scholasticism. It the age of the assertion of capitalism the idealist answer to the basic philosophical question was gradually m o r e and m o r e secularised, so acquiring a mode of expression formally
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independent of theology. And while scholasticism had carried divine reason beyond the limits of finite, allegedly created nature, which it interpreted as contingent being, the idealist philosophy of modern times, while rejecting the theological disparagement of the earthly, finite, and transient, has striven to overcome the 'split' between the world and God. This philosophy developed on the background of the outstanding progress of natural science; it was often linked with the latter's advances, assimilating and interpreting them in its own way; what scholasticism had deemed supernatural, also gradually began to be interpreted as immanent to nature. T h e supernatural was eliminated to some extent, since divine law, according to the rationalist idealists, was essentially natural law. While materialism had previously condemned idealist philosophy for an unsubstantiated assumption of the supernatural, idealists were now already accusing materialists of believing in miracles, for example, in the rise of consciousness from matter. Leibniz wrote: 'It is enough that we cannot maintain that matter thinks unless we attribute to it an imperishable soul, or rather a miracle' (136:166). T h a t was not simply a polemical trick, but a natural turn in the history of idealism, since science was developing criteria of scientific c h a r a c ter and idealism could not help allowing for them. Leibniz proclaimed it one of the urgent tasks of philosophy to draw a distinct line between the natural and the supernatural, i.e. what contradicted the laws of nature, and so reason. But, remaining an idealist, he claimed that 'it is not natural to matter to have sensation and to think' (136:165), and if they were inherent in it, then it was necessary to admit the existence of an immaterial substance within matter. It would be supernatural, he argued further, if people were mortal as spiritual beings, i.e. shared the fate of their mortal transitory body. So 'souls are naturally immortal' and '... it would be a miracle if they were not' (136:166). In Leibniz's doctrine the material was active only through its immaterial essence, a monad, which was undoubtedly created.
Thus, in the order of nature (miracles apart) God does not arbitrarily give to substances such and such qualities indifferently, and He never gives them any but those which are natural to them, that is to say, qualities which can be derived from their nature as explicable modifications (136:164).

So, although the supernatural still formally occupied its appointed place, all the properties observed in natural phenomena were treated as necessarily inherent in them. T h e y must
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therefore be derived from nature and not from a supernatural being, which meant that the materialist principle of explaining the world from itself was no longer discarded right away but was interpreted idealistically as a mode of ascending from experiential to the superexperiential. It was necessary, Leibniz said, 'to lead men little by little by the senses to what is outside the senses' (135:70). From that angle the supersensory had to be revealed through investigation of the senseperceived world, and the super-experiential found in experience. Speculative idealism, which pursued the goal of going beyond any possible experience, sought points of contact with the empirical investigation of nature. In that connection it was not only interested in the results, but also in the cognitive process itself, investigation of which threw light on the nature of the objects studied. Condillac, a thinker who wavered between materialism and idealist empiricism, formulated a principle by which the philosopher differed indeed from other people in giving everything a natural explanation:
It is not enough for a philosopher to say that a thing has been done by extraordinary ways; it is his duty to explain how it would have been done by natural means (cited after 19:209).

Idealism also needed to accept that naturalistic principle, though not by any means without reservations, and very inconsistently. Such is the regular trend of the evolution of the idealist answer to the basic philosophical question conditioned by the development of bourgeois society. This trend comes out quite markedly even in such an unswerving theist as Bishop Berkeley. Berkeley was an empiricist, but an idealist one. T h e very development of that variety of idealism was evidence of a developing need for a naturalist interpretation of this philosophy, including its theological conclusions that were in reality its hidden basic principles. The reduction of sense-perceived reality to a variety of combinations of sensations was the central point of Berkeley's doctrine. To be was to be perceived. But then where did God come from, to whom Berkeley in the final analysis led his readers? For the idea of God, as Berkeley's predecessors had shown, could not be drawn from experience; His existence was comprehended through our innate ideas and by a priori principles, and by means of intellectual intuition or inferences. Berkeley categorically disagreed with these rationalist notions, which he qualified, not without grounds, as unconvinc77

ing. A c c o r d i n g t o his d o c t r i n e w e c o m p r e h e n d e d t h e e x i s t e n c e of G o d e m p i r i c a l l y ; o u r sensations w e r e not p e r c e p t i o n s of m y t h o l o g i c a l t h i n g s but p e r c e p t i o n s , t h o u g h n o t direct, of God himself. T h e c o u r s e of t h e Irish b i s h o p ' s t h o u g h t is interesting. He did not e v a d e t h e question of t h e external source of t h e diversity of t h e sense d a t a at t h e disposal of t h e h u m a n individual. He s t r o v e simply to s h o w t h a t t h e c a u s e s of sensations could not be things, b e c a u s e w h a t we called things, a n d c o n s i d e r e d w i t h o u t g r o u n d s t o b e s o m e t h i n g different from o u r sensations, w e r e built u p wholly from sensations. T h e r e must c o n s e q u e n t l y be s o m e o t h e r e x t e r n a l s o u r c e of t h e i n e x h a u s t i b l e diversity of sensations ( s u c h is t h e logic of t h e subjective i d e a l i s t ) , since m a n himself (in w h o m t h e s e sensations a r e r e v e a l e d , discovered, a n d realised in a q u i t e i n v o l u n t a r y w a y ) c o u l d not be it. T h e s o u r c e of o u r s e n s a t i o n s , B e r k e l e y c o n c l u d e d , could only b e God; H e g a v e t h e m t o m a n , w h o h a d t o see in t h e m signs a n d symbols t h a t c a r r i e d G o d ' s w o r d . B e r k e l e y ' s mystic idealism (as K a n t aptly c h r i s t e n e d it) claimed that n o t h i n g s e p a r a t e d m a n a n d G o d ( e x c e p t materialist m i s c o n c e p t i o n s , of c o u r s e ) , since n a t u r e or m a t t e r did not exist as a reality i n d e p e n d e n t of c o n s c i o u s n e s s . T h e revelation of G o d was directly accessible to m a n , a c c o r d i n g to this d o c t r i n e ; it was the s e n s e - p e r c e i v e d world, t h e world of m a n ' s sensations, which c a m e t o h i m f r o m o n h i g h for h i m t o decipher and so grasp the divine purpose. T h e God of B e r k e l e i a n p h i l o s o p h y differed n o t a b l y from t h e All-Highest of t r a d i t i o n a l C h r i s t i a n d o g m a ; He p e r m a n e n t l y r e v e a l e d himself to m a n a n d , so to say, existed in e v e r y t h i n g , or r a t h e r in every c o m b i n a t i o n of sensations. M a n saw, h e a r d , a n d p e r c e i v e d or felt the divine p r e s e n c e , as it w e r e , a n d it only r e m a i n e d for him to be a w a r e of that fact, c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y c o m p r e h e n d i n g his s e n s a t i o n s . It is specially o b v i o u s from t h e e x a m p l e of Berkeley that the difference b e t w e e n subjective a n d objective idealism s h o u l d not be e x a g g e r a t e d . S u b j e c t i v e idealism does not, as a r u l e , go b e y o n d an epistemological i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the facts of k n o w l e d g e or e x p e r i e n c e s . If it leaves t h e question of t h e ontological p r e m i s s e s of c o g n i t i o n a n d e m o t i o n a l life o p e n , t h a t is agnosticism of a H u m e a n h u e . If, on t h e c o n t r a ry, h o w e v e r , it goes b e y o n d a p u r e l y epistemological analysis, it is inevitably c o m b i n e d with objective idealism, as h a p p e n e d not only with B e r k e l e y b u t also with F i c h t e . K o s i n g c o r r e c t l y notes:
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T h e boundaries between subjective and objective idealism are fluid, because subjective idealists generally, in order to avoid the conclusions of solipsism, aim mainly at broadening individual consciousness into a general one (for instance, Rickert's consciousness in general or epistemological subject) (124:72).

R e s e a r c h w o r k e r s o f a positivist t u r n u s u a l l y t r y t o s h o w t h a t s u b j e c t i v e idealism is f r e e of t h e s u p e r n a t u r a l i s t a s s u m p t i o n s p r o p e r t o o b j e c t i v e idealism. I n fact b o t h v e r s i o n s o f t h e idealist a n s w e r t o t h e basic p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n m a k e c o n t a c t i n t h e i r main trends. B e r k e l e y ' s t r a n s i t i o n to a s t a n c e of a kind of P l a t o n i s m with a c l e a r l y e x p r e s s e d p a n t h e i s t i c c o l o u r i n g was n o t a c c i d e n tal; his s u b j e c t i v e idealism w a s m e a n t f r o m t h e s t a r t t o s u b stantiate the religious outlook. Nevertheless Western workers a p p r a i s e B e r k e l e i a n i s m as a system of ' n a t u r a l r e a l i s m ' , a philosophy of c o m m o n sense, and so on. Idealist p h i l o s o p h y t h u s a c q u i r e d its o w n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e s p i r i t u a l first p r i n c i p l e d u r i n g t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of b o u r g e o i s s o c i e t y ; w i t h o u t , i n e s s e n c e , b r e a k i n g with r e l i g i o u s belief in a s u p e r n a t u r a l b e i n g , it e l i m i n a t e d t h e p e r s o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a t t r i b u t e d t o this b e i n g b y t h e o l o g y , a n d t e n d ed m o r e a n d m o r e to a p a n t h e i s t i c d e n i a l of t h e t h e o l o g i c a l antithesis of God and n a t u r e , G o d and h u m a n i t y . While m a t e r i a l ist p h i l o s o p h y g r a d u a l l y o v e r c a m e p a n t h e i s m , o b j e c t i v e i d e a l ism f o u n d in it t h e s o u g h t - f o r b o u r g e o i s s e c u l a r i s a t i o n of the religious outlook. P a n t h e i s t i c t e n d e n c i e s w e r e m o s t fully r e p r e s e n t e d i n classical G e r m a n idealism i n t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f H e g e l ; h e t r a n s f o r m e d S p i n o z a ' s m a t e r i a l i s t p a n t h e i s m i n t o a n idealist p a n logism. His ' a b s o l u t e i d e a ' , w h i c h h e f r e q u e n t l y d i r e c t l y c a l l e d G o d , w a s a n i m p e r s o n a l logical p r o c e s s , s u p e r h u m a n b u t n o t s u p e r n a t u r a l , b e c a u s e ' M i n d h a s f o r its presupposition N a t u r e ' ( 8 7 : 1 6 3 ) , a l t h o u g h , of c o u r s e , 'it is S p i r i t itself w h i c h gives itself a presupposition in Nature, ( m y i t a l i c s . . ) (86:295). N a t u r e was the o t h e r - b e i n g of absolute reason, which, h o w e v e r , did n o t exist o u t s i d e its o w n s e l f - a l i e n a t i o n a n d , consequently, outside natural and h u m a n being. T h e latter w e r e not simply involved in the absolute (as Neoplatonism asserts) b u t c o n s t i t u t e d an a t t r i b u t i v e f o r m of its e x i s t e n c e a n d selfconsciousness. F e u e r b a c h defined p a n t h e i s m as a d o c t r i n e t h a t did n o t distinguish t h e e s s e n c e o f G o d f r o m t h e e s s e n c e o f n a t u r e a n d m a n , i.e. a d o c t r i n e t h a t s e c u l a r i s e d t h e o l o g i c a l n o t i o n s b u t did n o t fully b r e a k with t h e m . In his s t u d i e s in t h e h i s t o r y
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of philosophy he showed that idealist philosophy came to pantheism by virtue of the inner logic of its development. Its primary premisses had a theistic character, but theism, too, in so far as it acquired a speculative form, became pantheism. What then was the attitude of pantheism to the radical antithesis between materialism and idealism? Feuerbach said: ' P a n theism therefore unites atheism with theism, i.e. the negation of God with God... It is theological atheism, theological materialism, the negation of theology, but all this from the standpoint of theology (57:297). Elsewhere, however, he asserted with no less grounds that 'idealism is the truth of pantheism' (57:302). These different appraisals of pantheism express a real contradiction inherent in the pantheistic outlook, within which the radical antithesis between materialism and idealism is not only smoothed over, but even continues to be deepened. T h e idealist answer to the basic philosophical question retains its content of principle in spite of the change of form, and seemingly precisely because of this change, since it otherwise could not resist the facts refuting it that the sciences of nature, society, and man are discovering and materialistically interpreting. T h e idealistic notion of the spirit arose from prescientific introspection, the impelling motives of which, at least for a long time, were not so much connected with intellectual curiosity as linked with fear and man's actual helplessness in face of the elemental forces of nature that dominated him. Idealism mystified these forces, which it interpreted as supernatural beings. Mystification of the human psyche gave rise to the idealist notion of a superhuman spirit. But these speculations also retained a certain link with reality, i.e. with nature and the human psyche, which played the role of a springboard from which idealism broke into the absolute intellectual vacuum in which, as Goethe said:
Naught, in the everlasting void afar, Wilt see, nor hear thy footfall's sound, Nor fore thy tread find solid ground! (76:II, 218)

T h e history of idealism indicates that it, while despairing of the possibility of a positive, profound description of the supernatural and superhuman, and rejecting fruitless attempts to demonstrate the existence of the transcendental absolute logically, did not renounce the goal that inspired it. It began to concern itself with a scrupulous analysis of empirically established, scientifically proven facts which it no longer,
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at least directly, rejected but interpreted c o n t r a r y to their actual, materialist sense. In other words, while idealism flourished in the past in those domains that scientific r e search did not touch, now, partly conscious of the groundlessness of its former speculative constructs and partly finding itself ' s u r r o u n d e d ' as a c o n s e q u e n c e of the increasing e x p a n sion of science, it is trying to root itself in science's own soil, so as to live parasitically on its often intransient achievements r a t h e r than on its e p h e m e r a l flaws. This t e n d e n cy, born in t h e seventeenth century, b e c a m e particularly influential in the latter half of t h e nineteenth century, and has won a dominating position in our d a y . S c h o p e n h a u e r was p e r h a p s the first idealist philosopher to treat reason and consciousness as physiologically conditioned. He identified himself with natural science on this question, while nevertheless taking an idealist s t a n c e . T h e idealist answer to the basic philosophical question does not necessarily consist in the p r i m a r y being directly interpreted as consciousness, thought, or reason. T h a t understanding of the p r i m a r y is characteristic of rationalist idealism. Its antithesis within the idealist t r e n d is irrationalism. T h e latter rejects the thesis of the p r i m a c y of reason, thought, and consciousness, arguing that these intellectual forms of the spirit a r e secondary; only will, the unconscious, the irrational 'vital impulse', etc., are p r i m a r y . It would therefore be an oversimplification or a dogmatic ignoring of the real tendencies of development of idealism to r e d u c e its i n t e r p r e tation of the 'spiritual-material' relation to a monolinear stereotype: consciousness ( t h o u g h t ) is primary, matter (being) secondary. T h e irrationalist interpretation of the p r i m a r y principle is often counterposed both to the materialist and to the idealist (rationalist) answer to the basic philosophical question. T h a t was characteristic of the 'philosophy of life' that interpreted life (its initial concept) as something nonspiritual but at the same time immaterial. A peculiar f e a t u r e of this idealist interpretation of life was that life itself was declared to be p r i m a r y and substantial. In that connection, however, life was regarded as unconscious, psychic activity manifesting itself in instincts, inclinations, etc. So we see that analysis of the diversity of idealist answers to the basic philosophical question is a vital task of the history of philosophy, because only a special inquiry into this diversity can bring out the i n h e r e n t internal unity of the answers. W h e r e t h e r e is no understanding of this
9 10

6-01603

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unity, the various versions of idealism a r e often taken as phil o s o p h i c a l t r e n d s i n d e p e n d e n t of it. A p a r a d o x i c a l f o r m of t h e idealist a n s w e r is d e n i a l of the existence of consciousness and the spiritual in general. This position is usually associated with vulgar materialism, but t h e r e is also an idealist denial of t h e reality of c o n s c i o u s n e s s , w h i c h s h o u l d be c a l l e d vulgar idealism. I f H e g e l c l a i m e d t h a t 'all c o n t e n t , e v e r y t h i n g o b j e c t i v e , is only in relation to consciousness' (85:I, 3 7 4 ) , Nietzsche, r e j e c t i n g r a t i o n a l i s t i d e a l i s m , p r o c l a i m e d a t h e s i s a t first g l a n c e quite alien to idealism: ' t h e r e is no intelligible world' (196:326). T h i s denial of spirituousness was associated w i t h a s p i r i t u a l i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f life a n d h u m a n c o r p o r e a l i t y , i.e. h a d n o t h i n g i n c o m m o n w i t h t h e m a t e r i a l i s t u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e spiritual as a specific p r o p e r t y of t h e m a t e r i a l . N i e t z s c h e did n o t , i n e s s e n c e , d e n y t h e s p i r i t u a l ; h e w a s o p p o s e d o n l y t o its r a t i o n a l i s t - i d e a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a tion, the central point of which was recognition of the substantiality of r e a s o n and of rational reality. In contrast to Nietzsche, William J a m e s attempted to show, f r o m a s t a n c e of idealist empiricism (not alien, incidentally, to irrationalism), that the existence of consciousness was no m o r e than an illusion s t e m m i n g from t h e fact that things not only existed but a r e also differentiated and cognised by m a n . T h e r e w e r e t h u s things a n d witnesses of t h e fact; w h a t was called consciousness, say, of a c o l o u r did not include a n y t h i n g e x c e p t this c o l o u r . C o n s c i o u s n e s s w a s c o n s e q u e n t l y s o m e t h i n g illusory.
T h a t entity [consciousness] is fictitious, while thoughts in the concrete a r e fully real. But thoughts in the c o n c r e t e a r e made of the same stuff as things a r e ( 1 1 0 : 1 8 3 ) .

W h a t w a s t h i s 'stuff' f r o m w h i c h t h i n g s a n d t h o u g h t s w e r e f o r m e d ? It was not, of c o u r s e , m a t t e r , t h o u g h J a m e s called it ' m a t e r i a l ' a n d e v e n ' p r i m a l stuff'. B u t listen t o J a m e s himself:
if we start with t h e supposition that there is only one primal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of which e v e r y t h i n g is composed, and if we call t h a t stuff ' p u r e e x p e r i e n c e ' , then k n o w i n g can easily be explained as a p a r t i c u l a r sort of relation t o w a r d s o n e a n o t h e r into which portions of p u r e e x p e r i e n c e m a y enter. T h e relation itself is a part of p u r e e x p e r i e n c e ; o n e of its 'terms' becomes the subject or b e a r e r of the knowledge, the k n o w e r ( 1 1 0 : 1 7 0 ) . "

I t will r e a d i l y b e u n d e r s t o o d t h a t t h i s d e n i a l o f t h e r e a l i t y o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s ( a n d t h e s p i r i t u a l i n g e n e r a l ) h a s a n illusory c h a r a c t e r : ' p u r e experience', in spite of J a m e s ' convic82

tions, is something spiritual that includes consciousness. But it was that which J a m e s denied just as the empiriocritics denied the subjectivity of sensations (treating them as neutral, i.e. neither material nor spiritual, elements of both the physical and the psychic). James argued more simply, perhaps: he declared the spiritual ('pure experience') to be the material. So the idealist answer to the basic philosophical question acquired a materialist a p p e a r a n c e that deceived certain behaviourists as well, who based themselves on James' doctrine. Roback, for instance, argued that 'behaviorism ... is merely a philosophical attitude as applied to the subjectmatter of psychology. This attitude will be recognised as that of materialism' (222:32-22). James' point of view has been taken in our day by certain influential idealist scholars who are orientated on behaviourist psychology and interpret the cybernetic modelling of mental actions subjectively. Adherents of the philosophy of linguistic analysis, for instance, suggest rejecting such concepts as 'consciousness', 'thought', 'sensation', and 'subjective', replacing all these (as they suggest) unscientific, ordinary notions or 'pseudoconcepts' by a description of the corresponding actions and processes performed in the nervous system. T h a t point of view has been systematically set out in Ryle's Concept of Mind ( 1 9 4 9 ) . Flew, a follower of Ryle's, claims that this book, and Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (1953) must be acknowledged "as major contributions to materialist philosophy' (63:110). How can denial of the reality of consciousness (and the spiritual in general) be combined with idealism? T h e kernel of this idealism, which undoubtedly differs from the traditional doctrine of the dependence of the material on the spiritual, consists in reducing all our knowledge about objective reality to reactions of various kind to external stimulation, i.e. in denial of an objective content of our notions. T h e purposiveness of h u m a n behaviour, which presupposes adequate response reactions to effects from outside, is characterised as activity that does not include any sort of knowledge about the external world. T h e images of objects of the external world that exist in man's consciousness are treated as physiological states, and not a reflection of reality. Linguistic or ordinary language philosophy, basing itself on behaviourist psychology, which identifies mind and behaviour (i.e. the aggregate of actions), in the end concludes that the concept of objective reality has sense only when there is consciousness. Denial of consciousness thus proves to be a means of denying objective reality.
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Analytical philosophers reduce thought to an aggregate of operations that can also be performed by a machine. T h e process of cognition is interpreted in roughly the same way; knowing is treated as a proper combining (corresponding to the purpose of the machine) of signs and elements of ordinary language, or an artificial one. In the last analysis man's emotional life, too, is reduced to movements of various kind, and combinations of same, which form what are called, in common speech, joy, grief, anger, compassion, love, etc. An automatic machine is put in the place of man who perceives the reality around him (including other people) and cognises, understands, feels, experiences, and acts accordingly, though far from always rationally. T h e automaton, of course, does not feel, does not experience, does not think but it performs all the actions inherent in the 'feeling', 'experiencing', 'thinking' being. So it is said to be proved that no feelings or emotions, no experiences, no thoughts exist; all are a special kind of illusion that will sooner or later be reduced to machine acts. Such are some of the extremely subjectivist and agnostic conclusions of the 'philosophy of linguistic analysis'. In several respects they border on vulgar materialism, which is not surprising, for the vulgar materialists of the nineteenth century often came to extravagant subjectivist and agnostic conclusions. Idealism's denial of the reality of the spiritual is not the sole metamorphosed form of the idealist answer to the basic philosophical question. An even commoner version consists in interpreting the material as essentially immaterial, this creates an appearance as if idealism, like its antipode, accepts something material as primary, for example a law, energy, time, nature, etc. But the idealist deprives this material of its real properties, citing modern physics in that connection, which is claimed to have proven that the material is essentially immaterial. T h e idealist philosopher Ostwald employed the concept of energy as substantial essence as a fundamental principle, which he declared to be neutral in relation to the material and the spiritual, forming the essence of both. In counterposing energy to matter he argued that it was immaterial. T h e antithesis of energy and the spiritual served to substantiate the thesis that energy was not a spiritual essence. On closer examination, however, it turned out that Ostwald was trying, by distinguishing energy from substance (which he identified with matter) and from human consciousness (the subjective), to create an objective-idealist natural-philosophical system related to Schelling's philosophy of identity.
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84

Bergson's undisguised idealist philosophy started from the concept of duration ( dure ), which was essentially time, i.e. something material. He considered duration to be something different from physical time. He counterposed duration (time) to matter and reason as some supernatural creative force (eternal becoming, lan vital) the products of whose decay were, on the one hand, matter, and on the other, intellect associated with it. T h e material, so idealistically interpreted, became the point of d e p a r t u r e of an irrationalist system. It was probably this kind of idealism that Lenin had in mind when he said: 'time outside temporal t h i n g s = G o d ' (144:70). We see that the essence of the idealist answer to the basic philosophical question is not directly revealed in what is called primary. One has to clarify what content the concept of the primary is invested with. Only then does it become obvious what is the character of an answer to the basic question that is considered non-idealist. T h e modernisation of the idealist answer, the idealist interpretation of the materialist answer, the 'acknowledgement' of the material fobbed off as immaterialall these latest methods of substantiating idealism and reconciling it with science (materialist at bottom) show that it remains idealism even when it formally rejects the traditional idealist answer to the basic question of philosophy. T h e nub of this idealist revision of idealism, which must be treated as a transformation of its form, was profoundly revealed by Lenin in his critique of the Russian Social-Democratic epigones of Machism. In his Materialism and Empirio-Criticism he showed that even the subjective idealist is sometimes ready to declare nature primary, but only on condition that it is understood as an aggregate of the data of experience, as something that posits a subject perceiving it. T h a t is how the subjective idealist Bogdanov interpreted nature, when affirming that his initial propositions 'fully accord with the sacramental formula of the primacy of nature over mind' (cited from 142:207). Criticising this sophisticated mystification of the materialist answer to the basic philosophical question, Lenin wrote:
The physical world is called the experience of men and it is declared that physical experience is ' higher ' in the chain of development than psychical... It is simply farcical for Bogdanov to class this 'system' as materialism. With me, too, he says, nature is primary and mind is secondary. ... Not a single idealist will deny the primacy of nature taken in this sense, for it is not a genuine primacy, since in fact nature is not taken as the immediately given, as the starting point of epistemology (142:208). 85

T h e whole significance of a r e m a r k L e n i n m a d e later, viz., ' n a t u r e outside, independent of m a t t e r = G o d ' (144:69), becomes u n d e r s t a n d a b l e in the light of his critique of one of the varieties of idealist empiricism. T h a t r e m a r k disclosed the objective tendency of the naturalistic metamorphosis of idealism; the formal renunciation of both fideism and spiritual substance, and similarly the formal a g r e e m e n t with the materialist r e q u i r e ment to take n a t u r e as the starting point, proved to be one of the latest versions of idealism, resignedly gravitating to the same sophisticated fideism. It is not e n o u g h , however, to state this a p p e a r a n c e of a negation of idealism; it is necessary to disclose the objective logic of the historical metamorphosis of idealist philosophy. It then becomes evident that it really is a denial, but a denial of discredited modes of idealist philosophising, while preserving its basic content. It is a denial such as turns our in fact to be a reconstruction of idealism t h r o u g h a renewal of its tradition and an idealist assimilation of t h e materialist answer to the basic philosophical question. It is thus clear that the crisis of idealist philosophy is so impressive a fact that even idealists themselves have noted it. In t h e second part of my book I shall give a description of this crisis in detail in connection with analysis of the struggle of the main philosophical trends. Just now I shall limit myself to pointing out that an undisputed symptom of this crisis is the critique of the idealist hypostasising of mind and reason, and irrationalist scepticism about philosophical intellectualism. Nietzsche saw in the Miletians, Heraklitos, and other natural philosophers of antiquity a higher degree of philosophical u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the world than in Sokrates and his followers. It was not the materialism or dialectics of these dtrines that enraptured him; it was the osmi frame f mind that attracted him, which he counterposed to the h u m a n , 'too h u m a n ' contemplation of the world, locked in its own subjectivity. But this a d m i r e r of majestic cosmological objectivism was a clear, though inconsistent subjectivist. T h e same has to be said of Heidegger who, following Nietzsche, extolled the P r e s o c r a t i a n s above the later philosophers, although his own philosophy was a quite quaint mixture of e x t r e m e subjectivism and an objective-idealist postulating of an unfathomable absolute being. C o n t e m p o r a r y idealist philosophy fully combines a leaning toward cosmic objectivism with subjectivism, which, however, has been subjected to limited criticism as a provincial view of the universe from an earthly gateway. One of the main papers at the 14th International Congress
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of Philosophy (Vienna, 1968) 'Postulates of t h e History of P h i losophy' was read by the F r e n c h philosopher Martial G u e r o u l t ( 8 0 ) . In it he criticised the subjective-idealist world outlook as naive a n t h r o p o c e n t r i s m , incapable of taking in the infinity of cosmos and the contingent c h a r a c t e r of h u m a n life and h u m a n reason (whose a b o d e is an insignificant planet in an insignificant solar system, dwarfed to insignificance in o n e of the countless g a l a x i e s ) . G u e r o u l t exclaimed fervently:
For shouldn't a philosophy worthy of the name try to elevate itself above any finite point of view to the infinitely infinite infinity of the universe and consequently wouldn't it want to rid itself of what aspires to enclose it in the circle of man? ... Won't a philosophy that counts itself authentically philosophy want to be authentically cosmic? So, in the infinitely infinite immensity of astronomical spaces and times, it will restore the human race living cramped on a star of the lowest magnitude over a stretch of time infinitely short compared with the billions of centuries during which billions of stars have flared up and been extinguished, and it will hold it derisory to shut the sense of all philosophy, a fortiori the sense of everything, up in the few centuries of human history, even if one does not go so far as to see in it realisation of the Absolute and the profound basis of the universal system of Nature (80:10).

G u e r o u l t did not define what he called cosmic philosophy m o r e concretely: he simply m a d e the claim. But in this claim for a new understanding of the s u p e r h u m a n and the Absolute (with a capital) t h e r e a r e distinct attempts to f o r m u l a t e a new idealist credo, the point of d e p a r t u r e of which would be a counterposing of the s u p e r n a t u r a l , s u p e r h u m a n , s u p e r rational to the natural, h u m a n , a n d rational, a c r e d o that (starting from cosmological ideas) would save idealism from the inferiority c o m p l e x organically i n h e r e n t in it. Idealism seeks an empirical basis for its notions formed by emasculating the real content of the theoretical reflection of objective reality. T h a t largely explains its m e t a m o r phoses and the diverse versions of the idealist answer to the basic philosophical question.
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3. The Epistemological Aspect. The Principle of Reflection and the Idealist Interpretation of the Knowability of the World T h e antithesis of principle between materialism and idealism is d e t e r m i n e d above all by the different answers to t h e first, ontological aspect of the basic philosophical question. But
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this answer does not define the epistemological position of a philosophy directly; acknowledgement of the knowability or, on the contrary, unknowability of the world in itself (i.e. irrespective of understanding of the process of cognition) does not provide grounds for classing a philosophy in the materialist or idealist trends. Most materialists are consistent adherents of the principle of the knowability of the world. This principle is integrally linked in their doctrines with an explanation of the world from itself (and consequently with denial of a transcendental reality), with a high evaluation of sense experience and science, and with denial of religious humbling of the individual. But idealists, too, quite often acknowledge the knowability of the world. Most philosophers, as Engels remarked, answer this epistemological question in general in the affirmative (see 52:346). In Hegel, for instance, the principle of the knowability of the world follows directly from the fundamental proposition of his idealist system, i.e. from the identification of being and thought. Since being is the content of thought, consciousness of its own content in thought makes being knowable in principle. Nothing consequently divides mind and being except the empirical singleness of the human individual, which is overcome by his historically developing generic essence, humanity. Engels called Hegel's arguments against the agnosticism of H u m e and Kant decisive, in the context of the idealist system of views, of course. To counter agnosticism Hegel proclaimed that
the closed essence of the Universum has no power in itself that could resist the daring of perception; it must be open to it and lay its riches and depths before its eyes and lead it to delight (84:1XXV).
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How then is the absence of a direct link between one answer or the other to the ontological aspect of the basic philosophical question and the answer to the second, epistemological aspect to be explained? Apparently by the point that the polarisation of philosophy into materialist and idealist trends is theoretically predetermined by two alternative answers to the question of the relation of the spiritual and the material. As for the antithesis between philosophers who substantiate the principle of the knowability of the world and the sceptics (or agnostics), it is associated with two mutually exclusive interpretations of specifically h u m a n activity, which of course presupposes the existence of an external world but is not determined by the existence of the latter, because knowing is a social p r o cess which, like all social processes, is not determined by
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natural conditions or objects. Does this mean that the epistemological and ontological aspects of the basic philosophical question exist unrelated to each other? Does it not follow from everything said above that inquiry into the epistemological aspect of this question does not even indirectly bring out the fundamental antithesis of materialism and idealism? Of course not. T h e r e is a mediated unity between the answer to the two aspects of the basic philosophical question, but a unity that is not an obviousness establishable without inquiry. One therefore cannot agree with those workers who claim that the epistemological antithesis between the main philosophical trends consists in the one's substantiating the principle of the knowability of the world and the other's substantiating epistemological scepticism. An example of this view, which clearly contradicts the facts of the history of philosophy, is to be found in Gaidukov's article in the symposium On Dialectical Materialism, in which it is said:
W h e r e a s the spokesmen of materialism start (my italics ..) from recognition of the knowability of t h e material world by m a n , the spokesmen of idealism deny t h e possibility of such knowledge and d e c l a r e the s u r r o u n d i n g world mysterious, inaccessible to h u m a n knowledge and science ( 7 0 : 3 5 7 ) .

But materialists start, of course, from recognition of the primacy of matter and the secondariness of mind. Materialists have one initial fundamental principle, by virtue of the monistic character of their philosophy, while two are ascribed to them in Gaidukov's article; the principle of the primacy of matter and the principle of the knowability of the world. This augmenting of the initial fundamental principles comes from identifying the second aspect of the basic philosophical question with the first. Since the sole organising principle of idealism consists in recognition of the primacy of the spiritual, philosophical scepticism (which declares the psychophysical problem unsolvable in principle) does not, of course, stem of necessity from the idealist answer to the basic philosophical question. T h e sceptic is, actually a sceptic because he treats both the materialist and the idealist answer to this question slightingly as dogmatism. Lenin persistently stressed that 'the agnostic does not go on either to the materialist recognition of the reality of the outer world, or to the idealist recognition of the world as our sensation (142:96). In most cases, incidentally, this compromise position tends to an idealist answer to the ontological problems as well as to the episte89

m o l o g i c a l o n e s . B u t o n e m u s t d i f f e r e n t i a t e t h e final, q u i t e often idealist conclusions a n d points of d e p a r t u r e of s c e p t i c i s m ( a n d a g n o s t i c i s m ) , a n d l i k e w i s e its c o n s t a n t w a v e r i n g b e t w e e n m a t e r i a l i s m a n d i d e a l i s m , b e c a u s e all this c o n s t i t u t e s the essential c o n t e n t of this doctrine. T h e mistaken preposition cited a b o v e w a s published in 1953, but was not criticised in subsequent years, and, m o r e o v e r , it was repeated almost word for word in 1960 in a n o t h e r popular publication, A Reader in Marxist Philosophy (edited by M . M . R o s e n t h a l ) in which it was said:
D e n i a l of t h e k n o w a b i l i t y of t h e w o r l d is c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of idealist p h i l o s o p h y . T r u e , t h e r e a r e also idealists w h o d o n o t d e n y m a n ' s c a p a b i l i t y o f c o g n i s i n g t h e real p r o p e r t i e s o f t h i n g s , b u t t h e y , t o o , c l a i m t h a t h e d o e s not k n o w n a t u r e a n d m a t t e r , b u t s o m e m y s t e r i o u s , invisible spirit t h a t c r e a t e d n a t u r e a n d c o n s t i t u t e s t h e basis o f all t h i n g s ( 2 2 7 : 2 0 2 ) .

It is quite i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e w h y even those idealists w h o , in the words cited, 'do not d e n y man's capability of cognising t h e r e a l p r o p e r t i e s o f t h i n g s ' all t h e s a m e c l a i m t h a t h e d o e s not k n o w either n a t u r e or m a t t e r . But the idealist proposition about the secondariness of nature and matter, which represent only the external envelope of the soul, is evidence that idealism c o n s i d e r s the essence of the m a t e r i a l a n d n a t u ral to be w h o l l y k n o w a b l e . Recognition of the knowability or the unknowability in principle of the world t h u s d o e s n o t i n itself c o n s t i t u t e g r o u n d s f o r s i n g l i n g o u t t h e main t r e n d s i n p h i l o s o p h y . B u t i t s h o u l d not b e c o n c l u d e d , h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e r e i s n o e p i s t e mological antithesis between materialism and idealism. Such a c o n c l u s i o n s e e m s to me to be superficial. T h e r e is a radical antithesis b e t w e e n t h e materialist a n d idealist u n d e r s t a n d i n g s of the knowability of the world. An e r r o r of epistemological idealism (from M a c h i s m and n e o r e a l i s m to o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e p h i l o s o p h y ) is a d o g m a t i c c o n v i c t i o n that t h e r e is a p u r e l y e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l solution of p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m s t h a t e x c l u d e s a n y ' m e t a p h y s i c s ' , i.e. a n y ontological premisses. In fact, a n y epistemological posing of a philosophical p r o b l e m implicitly includes ontological prem i s s e s , a n d a b o v e all a d e f i n i t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e ' s p i r i t u al-material' relation. T h e expression 'epistemological ideali s m ' is t h e r e f o r e l a r g e l y a r b i t r a r y ; it is a m a t t e r of a v e r s i o n of idealist p h i l o s o p h y that poses a n d tries to a n s w e r only t h e o r e t i cal, c o g n i t i v e p r o b l e m s , f r o m w h i c h it does, n o t follow, h o w ever, that it succeeds in eliminating 'metaphysics'. Thus I hold, in spite of
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epistemological

idealism,

that

both the materialist and idealist answers to the first aspect of the basic philosophical question form the initial fundamental principle of the corresponding (materialist or idealist) epistemological doctrine. Materialism, in setting out from acknowledgement of the primacy of the material and secondariness of the spiritual, treats the material as a reality different from and independent of mind that determines consciousness and so, too, its content. T h a t is why the materialist answer to the second aspect of the basic philosophical question does not boil down to recognition of the knowability in principle of the world. Its essence is understanding of cognition as reflection of objective reality that exists irrespective of the process of knowing. It is the concept of reflection, the scientific interpretation of which posits recognition of the reflected, which exists independent of the reflection, that constitutes the point of departure of materialism in epistemology. As Lektorsky and Shvyrev write:
The fundamental importance of the category of reflection for the whole system of dialectical materialism is precisely that its development makes it possible to throw a bridge from matter that feels to matter that does not, and to indicate the potential possibility of the development of matter {hat feels, and in the final count possesses consciousness, from matter thai does not possess sensation, a psyche, and consciousness (138:27).

Metaphysical materialism interpreted reflection one-sidedly as an adequate reproduction of the object of knowing, as a consequence of which false notions were considered not to reflect anything. Metaphysical materialists did not consistently follow the principle of reflection, since they denied the existence of reflection in human errors and did not see what these errors reflected. They interpreted religious consciousness as lacking any objective content. To consider religion a reflection of objective reality meant, for them, to justify a theistic world outlook. P r e - M a r x i a n materialism had no idea of social consciousness reflecting social being. T h e metaphysically interpreted epistemological phenomenon of reflection played a limited role in general in its system of concepts. Only the philosophy of Marxism, thanks to the dialectical understanding of the process of reflection, and application of the concept of reflection to sociological investigation of cognition and mind, demonstrated that misconceptions (as distinct from logical mistakes) reflect objective reality. Mind (consciousness), whatever its
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form, is a reflection of reality i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e latter. This consistently materialist understanding of the n a t u r e of mind is a very i m p o r t a n t epistemological principle of m a t e r i a lism, systematically substantiated by Marxist-Leninist philosophy. T h e epistemological concept of reflection indicates that the c o n t e n t of consciousness (and of knowledge) is not generated by mind itself b u t is d r a w n from what is realised and cognised and forms the object of inquiry. Even w h e n the object of cognition is knowledge itself, the concept of reflection retains its sense, since knowledge as the object of inquiry exists independently of the investigation. T h e fact that the object is a reflection of the external world alters nothing in principle, because the reflection of the e x t e r n a l world in mind is a process g o v e r n e d by objective laws. One must stress, f u r t h e r m o r e , that u n d e r s t a n d i n g of mind (consciousness) as a reflection of objective reality c h a r a c terises its form as well as its content. W e r e t h e r e no sun t h e r e would also be no vision, this specific form of reflection of objective reality. Logical forms, as Lenin stressed, reflect the most general relations of things, established every day in e x p e r i e n c e . T h i s feature of logical forms is also revealed by c o n t e m p o r a r y mathematical logic, since it treats them as relations between the signs by which objects a r e thought about. Cognition, knowing, is a specific form of reflection, because not all of a living c r e a t u r e ' s (including m a n ' s ) reflection of the external world is knowledge. M a n reflected q u a n t u m mechanical processes even when he did not have the slightest notion of t h e m . Animals obviously also reflect the diversity of the laws of n a t u r e in their activity insofar as they adapt spontaneously to them. But t h e r e can be nothing h e r e , of course, to do with cognition. Knowing does not e m b r a c e all the reflective activity peculiar to the a n i m a t e . M o r e than 70 years ago Lenin expressed t h e following hypothesis in his Materialism and Empirio-Criticism: 'it is logical to assert that all matter possesses a p r o p e r t y which is essentially akin to sensation, the p r o p e r t y of reflection' ( 1 4 2 : 7 8 ) . T h e latest research in the field of cybernetics, and in particular the concept of information as an objective process, indicates the legitimacy of the ontological i n t e r p r e tation of reflection as an attribute of certain forms of the interaction of material p h e n o m e n a . F r o m that angle reflection as a cognitive process is the highest level of development of
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the property of reflection inherent in matter. With that understanding of the 'spiritual-material' relation, the organic unity between the materialist answer to both the first and second aspects of the basic philosophical question is brought out. A Social-Democratic review of Materialism and EmpirioCriticism called the materialist principle of reflection 'Platonism inside out'. T h a t clearly erroneous statement, however, indirectly pointed out the radical epistemological antithesis of the main philosophical trends that Helvetius called the lines of Plato and of Demokritos. T h e latter formulated the first, naive version of the theory of reflection in his doctrine of eidola, according to which the reflections of things in men's minds were the consequence of 'contact' of the sense organs with the images of objects that were moving in the air, separated from them. Demokritos considered errors a consequence of deformation of the eidola in the medium in which they moved, collided, and combined with one another. In opposition to him Plato affirmed that ideas ( eide ) did not reflect things but that things, on the contrary, reflected transcendental ideas. That, too, was also a denial of the epistemological theory of reflection that knowing is a reflection of reality independent of it. Platonism, however, as the Italian existentialist Castelli has remarked, is 'precisely the categorical affirmation of the impossibility of knowing exactly beyond remembrance, the possibility of reducing the unknown to the known' (32:8). From that point of view one knows irrespective of the existence of an external world. Thus, despite the Social-Democratic critic's assertion, it is not the materialist theory of knowledge, but the idealist one that is a turning upside-down of the real relation existing between h u m a n consciousness and the material world. Therefore reflection was a static relation for Plato that jelled the structure of the world, while for Demokritos, in spite of his oversimplified understanding of reflection, the cognitive p r o cess appeared as continuous movement, in which the notions of things created by reason entered into a contradiction with their sensual images, and 'opinions', i.e. ordinary notions, were refuted by real knowledge of what actually existed. Plato's epistemology was a theory of recollection, according to which one knew because the human soul turned away from the sense-perceived world and forgot its perishable earthly life so as, having concentrated, to immerse itself in itself and discover precisely in itself the knowledge that it was impossible to acquire in the world of things. He therefore called for a
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stopping of the ears and a closing of the eyes; only by tearing loose from nature, did the soul get back to itself from the world of alienated existence. And then it was faced not with things, but with ideas of things, the transcendent primary essences that it had contemplated before its fall, i.e. its incarnation in the human body. Plato attributed a mystical sense to the ordinary notion (everyone knows what it means to r e m e m b e r ) ; during remembrance the soul mentally returned to its transcendent primary source. T h e antithesis between Plato and Demokritos brings out the main epistemological alternative particularly sharply. What forms the source of our knowledge? N a t u r e or the supernatural? Matter or spirit? Lenin, when criticising 'physical' idealism, which argued that the change in the scientific understanding of physical reality overthrew the materialist outlook on the world, made it clear that the development of scientific notions about matter had 'no relation to the epistemological distinction between materialism and idealism' (142:240), since this distinction was not linked with any understanding of the structure and forms of existence of matter, elementary particles, etc. T h e epistemological antithesis of the main philosophical trends is determined by differences in understanding the source of knowledge.
Materialism and idealism [he wrote] differ in their answers to the question of the source of our knowledge and of the relation of knowledge (and of the 'mental' in general) to the physical world ( ibid ).

Materialism regards cognition as a specific reflection of the material world. T h e idealist denial of the material world is a denial of the real epistemological function of reflection, which means that the idealist can employ the concept of reflection only by mystifying its real content as a cognitive process, which was already to be found in Plato. In the idealist philosophy of modern times the concept of reflection has been employed by Leibniz, Hume, Hegel, and other philosophers. In Hegel it (reflexion) serves to describe such relations as 'essence-being', and 'appearance-phenomenon'. He endeavoured to demonstrate that the antitheses inherent within objective reality were reflectively related and reflected each other. Essence, for example, is sublated being, which is retained in it as appearance or 'reflected being' (see 86:162, and 89:15-22). Consequently
reflection, or light thrown into itself, constitutes the distinction between Essence and immediate Being, and is the peculiar characteristic of Essence itself (86:162). 94

Hegel thus understood reflection as an ontological relation. On the one hand he mystified the real process of cognition, and on the other, revealed the basic elements of the actual essential relation. T h e correlativeness of the elements of essence (identity and difference, the positive and the negative, the ground and the consequence, etc.) were defined as Reflexion, i.e. a relation of mutual reflection. In that connection the term 'reflection' also meant contemplation, in accordance with traditional usage, but there was no thinking subject and object of thought independent of it in this contemplation, since it was a matter of an impersonal logical process which, according to Hegel, formed the essence of everything that existed. He analysed the dialectical nature of essence, i.e. the inner relationship, and interdependence of phenomena, but the concept of reflection as a human cognitive process, positing both mind and the realisable objective reality, remained alien to his philosophy. Cognition, according to Hegel, was the de-objectifying of nature, and overcoming of its objectivity by exposure of the 'semblance' of everything natural. While nature was external, 'outside' in relation to spirit (including the h u m a n mind), an alienated discovery of the Absolute I d e a ) , cognition had to tear the material 'envelope' off nature, which it had already done (in Hegel's view) at the stage of its development when science discovered laws of nature (which he interpreted as laws of objective thought, or the rational in the universum). Natural science, according to Hegel's doctrine, confirmed the truth of idealism, since it proved that natural processes were governed by definite laws which, according to him, were rational, immaterial relations. T h e fault of science, however, in his view, was that it treated laws as relations between things, i.e. did not bring out the teleological relation in them. Philosophical inquiry, in contrast to scientific research, stripped all the material covers from nature, penetrated to the interior of things, finding these the incorporeal, ideal, and supernatural. T r u t h , Hegel taught, was immaterial; it had no need of covers or cloaks; it was impossible to see, or hear, or smell, or feel; it was discoverable only by speculative thought, which knew itself in nature and outside nature. Cognition of nature was, according to him, a surmounting of the natural, an ascent from the antithesis of thought and being to their dialectical identity or, in other words, demonstration of the truth of idealism. Recognition of the knowability of the world in principle, and agreement with the epistemological principle of reflection
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are not quite the s a m e thing. O n e cannot agree with Horn, a Marxist from the G D R , who treated the term 'knowledge' and 'reflection' as essentially s y n o n y m o u s . S u c h a point of view is acceptable for a materialist, but should not be ascribed to idealists. But H o r n wrote:
In the w h o l e t h e o r y of k n o w l e d g e t h e c o n c e p t of reflection h a s a c e n t r a l p l a c e . I t a l w a y s used t o b e falsely a t t r i b u t e d o n l y t o m a t e r i a l i s m ; i n r e a l i t y i t a l s o u n d e r l i e s i d e a l i s m , t h o u g h often u n d e r a n o t h e r n a m e (104:61).

H o r n tried to s h o w that the p r o b l e m of reflection was of s u c h a f u n d a m e n t a l c h a r a c t e r t h a t no idealist d o c t r i n e c o u l d a v o i d it. T h a t i s c o r r e c t , o f c o u r s e , b u t i t d o e s n o t f o l l o w f r o m i t a t all t h a t i d e a l i s t s a g r e e w i t h t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l principle of reflection. Idealism interprets the process of k n o w i n g as an a u t o n o m o u s activity i n d e p e n d e n t of material r e ality. S o m e idealists d e s c r i b e c o g n i t i o n as a logical p r o c e s s of the self-movement of p u r e thought, independent of sense perceptions. O t h e r s c o n s i d e r it s u p e r s e n s o r y vision, a mystical d a w n i n g o n o n e , a n d a n i n t u i t i v e m e r g i n g w i t h t h e w o r l d . Still others, being inclined toward idealist empiricism, see in cognitive activity an o r d e r i n g of sense data, the establishing of connections between them, and the constructing of things from the material of sensations. T h e different interpretations often o v e r l a p , a d e n i a l of k n o w i n g as reflection of a w o r l d i n d e p e n d e n t o f it, m o r e o v e r r e m a i n i n g i n e v i t a b l e f o r t h e m . T h a t , as Lenin stressed, determines t h e epistemological antithesis between materialism and idealism:
T h e fundamental distinction between the materialist a n d the a d h e r e n t of idealist p h i l o s o p h y c o n s i s t s i n t h e fact t h a t t h e m a t e r i a l i s t r e g a r d s s e n s a t i o n , p e r c e p t i o n , idea, a n d t h e m i n d o f m a n g e n e r a l l y , a s a n i m a g e of o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y ( 1 4 2 : 2 4 8 ) .

T h e materialist considers the sensually perceived world to be r e a l i r r e s p e c t i v e o f its b e i n g k n o w n b y t h e e x i s t i n g w o r l d . T h a t is o n e of the most i m p o r t a n t features of the principle of reflection, which presupposes reliance on the evidence of the sense organs. T h e objective necessity, justification, and l e g i t i m a c y of this c o n f i d e n c e is f o u n d e d on p r a c t i c e , s i n c e it is by sense perceptions that m a n orientates himself in the material w o r l d a r o u n d h i m , a d a p t s h i m s e l f t o it, a n d a l t e r s it. Idealism scorns this allegedly uncritical confidence in t h e e v i d e n c e of the sense organs, in spite of the fact that materialist epistemology h a s always b e e n c o n c e r n e d with a critical analysis of the c o n t e n t of sensory reflection, and the philosophy of M a r x i s m disclosed the dialectical contradiction
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between rational and sense reflection of the e x t e r n a l world. But c o n t e m p o r a r y science, which has developed very precise methods of investigating the reflective activity peculiar to the n e r v o u s system, has fully confirmed materialist confidence in sense data. As A n o k h i n has pointed out, investigation of information relations in the world of living c r e a t u r e s witnesses that 'the n e r v o u s system achieves striking precision of information of the brain about t h e original effects of e x t e r n a l objects' ( 6 : 1 1 6 ) . And further:
the theory of information indicates that any object reflected in the nervous system through a number of recodings of the original signal, in the final stage quite exactly reflects the chief, biologically most important parameters of the reflected object (6:118).

This scientific evaluation of the epistemological principle of reflection is at the same time confirmation of the materialist answer to the first aspect of the basic philosophical question, since it indicates that the sense-perceived world a r o u n d us is an actual and not illusory reality. In opposition to materialism, idealism interprets senseperceived reality now as a specifically ' h u m a n ' reality, now as an external, i n a d e q u a t e expression of the suprasensitive, substantial essence of the world. T h e materialist does not, of course, deny that t h e r e a r e sensuously unperceivable p h e n o m e n a that form causes, hidden components, and the essence of observed p h e n o m e n a . But he rejects an antithesis in principle of the observable and imperceptible, because the latter is a sort of 'thing in itself that will b e c o m e a 'thing for us' in certain conditions and t h r o u g h the development of knowledge. T h e difference between a 'thing in itself and 'thing for us' has an epistemological r a t h e r than an ontological c h a r a c t e r . In other words, t h e r e a r e no absolute, unconditional, insurm o u n t a b l e limits of possible e x p e r i e n c e ; and consequently t h e r e is also no suprasensitive or t r a n s c e n d e n t reality. Lenin's Materialism and Empirid-Criticism not only d e m o n strated the incompatibility in principle of idealism and the theory of reflection; in it he gave a profound analysis of the main idealist a r g u m e n t s against t h e epistemology of materialism. I h a v e in mind first and foremost his critique of the views of Bishop Berkeley against the materialist conception of sense perceptions.
But say you [Berkeley wrote], t h the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind, yet there may be things like them whereof are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance. I answer an idea can be like nothing but an idea,
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a colour, or figure, can be like nothing but another colour or figure. If we look but never so little into our thoughts, we shall find it impossible for us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas. Again I ask whether those suppos'd originals or external things, of which our ideas are the picture or representations, be themselves perceivable or no? If they are, then they are ideas and we have gained our point; but if you say they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense, to assert a colour is like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like something which is intangible and so of the rest (15:31).

Berkeley claimed that the concept of reflection lacked sense. C o n t e m p o r a r y idealist empiricism has not added anything essentially new to this a r g u m e n t . Berkeley counterposed idealism directly to materialism (he called the f o r m e r i m m a t e r i a l i s m ) , while the latest positivism, in rejecting the epistemological principle of reflection, quite often is not a w a r e of the idealist c h a r a c t e r of this stance. C o n t e m p o r a r y positivists in fact resort in essence to the Berkeleian a r g u m e n t s : acknowledgement of external objects independent of sensuality (and r e flected by it) is unprovable in principle. Berkeley was m o r e consistent, declaring the assumption of t h e existence of sensual objects 'in themselves' to be absurd, since sense data consisted of sensations only. Berkeley's main a r g u m e n t deserves special attention, viz., that ideas (as he called both sensations and sense perceptions) cannot be like things precisely because they a r e ideas and not things. T h a t consideration served him not in o r d e r to c o u n t e r pose sensations and things, but in o r d e r to c o n c l u d e that sensations were the sole reality directly accessible to us. Sensations, according to him, a r e not evidence of the existence of things; they were things. T h e r e f o r e any attempt to d r a w some kind of distinction between sensations and things and divide them from one a n o t h e r was fruitless, scholastic philosophising. We had no right to assert that there was something distinct in things from what was in sensations, since this distinction did not exist in sensations. But if everything that was in things was also in sensations, what basis was there for thinking that something existed distinct from sensations? Such is the logic of subjective-idealist epistemology. T h e r e h a v e n e v e r been materialists, of course, who would have claimed that sensations as such, i.e. as psychic p h e n o m ena, were like things. T h e principle of reflection registers the difference between the subjective image and the object, pointing at the s a m e time to the content of the image, d r a w n from outside, from the object that is somehow r e p r o d u c e d in this image. Materialism does not ascribe a n y physical, c h e m i 98

c a l , o r o t h e r p r o p e r t i e s t o t h e s e n s u a l i m a g e o f t h e object ( o r t h e c o n c e p t t h a t s u m s u p t h e a t t r i b u t e s o f a w h o l e class of objects). T h e images of objects do not h a v e t h e mass or c o l o u r i n h e r e n t i n t h e latter, a l t h o u g h t h e y d o c o n t a i n a n o t i o n o r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ( k n o w l e d g e ) a b o u t all t h e s e p r o p e r ties. T o d o r P a v l o v c o r r e c t l y r e m a r k s :
colours, tones, smells, lines, geometrical figures, magnitudes, and various relations, when they 'enter' consciousness (or rather, the world of our ideas), do not cease to be colours, tones, smells, lines, etc., but have already lost their material being. No mind, of course, has ever smelled of rose, but every mind is, incidentally, consciousness of the fragrance of a rose or the smell of garlic, which really are properties of the things themselves (roses and garlic) but ideally enter the content of our idea-images as components, i.e., so enter our world of ideas (203:172).

T h e reflection a n d t h e reflected a r e dialectical opposites w h o s e unity h a s a s its basis a n o b j e c t e x i s t i n g i n d e p e n d e n t l y of t h e process of reflection. T h i s antithesis of t h e ideal and t h e m a t e r i a l is t r a n s f o r m e d t h r o u g h r e f l e c t i o n i n t o an a n t i thesis b e t w e e n t h e s u b j e c t i v e f o r m a n d t h e o b j e c t i v e c o n t e n t of t h e i m a g e . T h e objectivity of t h e c o n t e n t of i m a g e s is an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l objectivity, s i n c e this c o n t e n t is n o t i d e n t i cal with t h e c o n t e n t of t h e objects; it o n l y r e p r o d u c e s it, a n d o f c o u r s e , m o r e o v e r , n o t fully, b u t a p p r o x i m a t e l y , a n d u s u a l l y o n e - s i d e d l y , etc. T h e o b j e c t i v e c o n t e n t o f i m a g e s i s t h e idealised c o n t e n t of t h e r e f l e c t e d objects, by v i r t u e of w h i c h t h e r e is a l w a y s an e l e m e n t of t h e s u b j e c t i v e in it. T h e l a t t e r n e e d s t o b e u n d e r s t o o d n o t o n l y a s a n illusion o r i n c o m p l e t e k n o w l e d g e b u t also as t h e m o d e of m e n t a l a s s i m i l a t i o n of o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y , w h i c h gets specific e x p r e s s i o n i n t h e r e f l e c t e d c o n t e n t . As Mitin writes:
the ideal and the material are characterised by a relation of dialectical antithesis. T h e image of an object is not extended, does not contain any grain of the substance of the object reflected by it, and cannot perform the functions that the object itself does. But the structure of the ideal image is determined by the material interaction of the knowing subject with the object, has an objective content, and adequately, approximately truly, ideally, and exactly expresses the essence of the structure of the object itself (184:76).

T h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e o f r e f l e c t i o n i n its c o n t e m p o r a r y f o r m , i.e. as it is b e i n g d e v e l o p e d by t h e p h i l o s o p h y of M a r x ism, t h u s p r e s u p p o s e s n o t o n l y a d e m a r c a t i o n of t h e s u b j e c t i v e a n d o b j e c t i v e , b u t also o n e w i t h i n t h e s u b j e c t i v e a n d w i t h i n the objective. T h e subjective in reflection is not only that which is not related to the object, which must t h e r e f o r e be
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a b s t r a c t e d so as to u n d e r s t a n d t h e object precisely as it exists i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e subject, b u t also t h a t w h i c h is r e v e a l e d in t h e inclination itself of cognition, in t h e m e t h o d s of i n q u i r y e m p loyed by t h e cognising subject, in t h e m o d e of 'coding' t h e reflected c o n t e n t , t h e varied f o r m s of w h i c h a r e historically d e v e l o p e d a n d consciously p e r f e c t e d d u r i n g t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of k n o w l e d g e . T h e objective is not only w h a t exists outside of a n d i n d e p e n d e n t of c o n s c i o u s n e s s ; that, of c o u r s e , is its m a i n definition, but o n e must not forget a b o u t t h e e p i s t e m o logically objective a n d t h e logically objective. T r u t h is objective a l t h o u g h it is a p h e n o m e n o n of t h e process of c o g n i tion. T h e laws ( r u l e s ) of logical t h o u g h t a r e also objective, b u t they do not exist outside t h o u g h t . Berkeley identified objects with sensations, a n d t h a t was t h e i n e r a d i c a b l e fault of his essentially solipsistic t h e o r y . S u b s e q u e n t idealism, u n l i k e Berkeleianism, b e g a n to t r e a t objects and sense p e r c e p t i o n s as similar but not m u t u a l l y identical p h e n o m e n a of t h e mind. H u m e h a d a l r e a d y put impressions ( p e r c e p t i o n s ) in t h e p l a c e of objects, a n d treated ideas (notions, c o n c e p t s ) as images of impressions. T h i s t h e o r y , h o w e v e r , was an illusory c o n c e p t i o n of reflection, since ideas, a c c o r d i n g to him, differed from impressions like r e m e m b r a n c e s from direct e x p e r i e n c e s , i.e. w e r e less lively, direct, a n d vivid.
Those perceptions [Hume wrote], which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions; and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking reasoning (106:I, 11).

T h i s subjective-psychological d e m a r c a t i o n of impressions and their ' i m a g e s ' has n o t h i n g in c o m m o n with t h e epistemological p r i n c i p l e of reflection, which starts from recognition of a m a t e r i a l reality i n d e p e n d e n t of cognition. H u m e ' s a m e n d i n g of Berkeley's epistemological subjectivism t h u s boils d o w n to c l a i m i n g that things w e r e identified with sensations only b e c a u s e t h e y f u n c t i o n e d as things for us. T h e q u e s t i o n of w h a t t h i n g s w e r e in themselves lacked sense b e c a u s e w e only k n e w w h a t sensations witnessed t o a b o u t t h e m . T h i s t e n d e n c y , b a r e l y e m e r g i n g in H u m e ' s p h i l o s o p h y , got systematic d e v e l o p m e n t in K a n t ' s d o c t r i n e of t h e 'thing-in-itself. N e o k a n tianism, which h a s d i s c a r d e d this i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t of K a n t ' s d o c t r i n e , h o w e v e r , r e t a i n e d t h e agnostic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of sense d a t a as a specific m o d e of d e n y i n g t h e epistemological p r i n c i p l e of reflection. T h i s line was most consistently followed by C a s s i r e r in his Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff, in
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which we find, in particular, such a categorical statement as the following:

Our sensations and ideas are signs or symbols, not images of objects. For one requires some kind of equality of the picture with the reflected object, which we can never assure ourselves of here (31:404).

T h e concept of a sign, of course, has a varied content. Since sensations are regarded as images of objective reality, the images (reflections) can also function as signs. But the concept of a sign lacks any objective content for the Neokantian, being counterposed precisely in this sense to the concept of an image. T h e r e are relations in the reality around us whose separate elements appear as objectively existing signs, since they are attributes or signs of definite phenomena. As the old saw says, there is no smoke without fire. Smoke is both an attribute and a sign of fire; it is the latter, of course, only in man's mind, i.e. in reflected form. Man interprets the attributes or traits of objects as signs or symbols, or even creates arbitrary, conventional signs, symbols, names, etc. As for the reflection of the world in sensations, ideas, etc., that is essentially an objective process, the patterns of which are discovered and investigated by contemporary science. T h e N e o kantian interpretation of sensations as symbols quite emasculates the objective content of sense reflection of material reality, which wholly corresponds to the Neokantian conception of the world as a logical construction. ' T h e idealist denial of reflection as the essence of the cognitive process is often expressed in the form of a critique of the limited understanding of reflection peculiar to pre-Marxian materialism. T h e idealist stresses that knowing is not a passive process of perceiving something external that man has come up against, and concludes on that basis that knowing is not reflection. But the contemporary dialecticalmaterialist understanding of reflection as a cognitive process is organically linked with recognition of the cognising subject's activity and with analysis of the interconversion of theoretical activity into practical activity and vice versa. Having overcome the deficiencies of the metaphysical-materialist conception of reflection, the philosophy of Marxism has enriched the concept by investigation of the dialectics of cognitive activity. But idealism ignores this very important circumstance, interpreting the materialist understanding of reflection as a simplified interpretation of the process of knowing. T h u s Pratt, the American 'critical realist', rejecting
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t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e of r e f l e c t i o n , simplified its r e a l c o n t e n t t o t h e e x t r e m e a n d s o d i s t o r t e d it. ' T h e m i n d i s n o t a m i r r o r n o r a p i c t u r e gallery.... T h e c o n t e n t o f t h e m i n d d o e s n o t n e e d t o r e s e m b l e t h e o b j e c t s for w h i c h i t s t a n d s ' ( 2 1 5 : 1 9 3 ) . But e v e n p r e - M a r x i a n m a t e r i a l i s m did n o t t r e a t r e f l e c t i o n a t all as P r a t t p i c t u r e d it. T h e c o m p a r i s o n with a m i r r o r , if it w a s e v e r m a d e , was no m o r e than an analogy, of course, and such an a n a l o g y h a s p e r h a p s n o t lost s e n s e e v e n i n o u r t i m e . O r d i n a r y u s a g e c o n n e c t e d t h e w o r d ' r e f l e c t i o n ' with t h e n o t i o n of passive p e r c e p t i o n of e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s . W h e n s c i e n c e b o r r o w s s o m e of its t e r m s f r o m o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e , it gives them a new content, sense, and meaning. T h e critique of scientific t e r m i n o l o g y t h a t s t a r t s f r o m t h e m e a n i n g of t e r m s in their ordinary usage is mistaken. Idealism makes precisely that k i n d of m i s t a k e in its c r i t i q u e of t h e m a t e r i a l i s t c o n c e p t of r e f l e c t i o n . T h e r o o t o f t h e e r r o r i s t h e idealist u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e p r o c e s s of k n o w i n g by w h i c h t h e w o r l d is c o g n i s e d o n l y i n s o f a r as it h a s a m e n t a l c h a r a c t e r , i.e. c o i n c i d e s , if not d i r e c t l y t h e n u l t i m a t e l y , with h u m a n m e n t a t i o n . I f t h e w o r l d w e r e m a t e r i a l it w o u l d be u n k n o w a b l e s u c h is t h e logic of t h e idealist. T h e mystic d o c t r i n e o f t h e m e r g i n g o f m a n a n d G o d is an e x t r e m e e x p r e s s i o n of this idealist idea. O n e m u s t n o t e i n p a s s i n g that c o n t e m p o r a r y idealist d o c t r i n e s u s u a l l y avoid a d i r e c t identification of t h e k n o w a b i l i t y o f t h e w o r l d with m e n t a t i o n . T h e d o m i n a n t idealist c o n c e p tion in c o n t e m p o r a r y b o u r g e o i s p h i l o s o p h y of an initially alienated relations between the knowing subject and the surr o u n d i n g reality is f r e q u e n t l y e x p r e s s e d in a s s e r t i o n s a b o u t t h e ' m i n d l e s s n e s s ' or 'spiritlessness' of t h e w o r l d , f r o m w h i c h it d o e s not follow, h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e w o r l d i s m a t e r i a l . T h i s c o n c e p t i o n of a s u b s t a n t i a l a l i e n a t i o n links up d i r e c t l y , in s o m e c a s e s with a g n o s t i c i s m , in o t h e r s is c o m p e l l e d to s e e k n e w m o d e s of idealist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e k n o w a b i l i t y of t h e w o r l d . I n H e i d e g g e r ' s ' f u n d a m e n t a l o n t o l o g y ' , for i n s t a n c e , t h e possibility of k n o w i n g t h e w o r l d is s u b s t a n t i a t e d by t h e ' o p e n n e s s ' of h u m a n e x i s t e n c e , i.e. its p r i m o r d i a l u n i t y with t h e b e i n g of w h a t exists. T h e r a t i o n a l i s t d o c t r i n e of lumen naturale ( n a t u r a l light of r e a s o n ) , a c c o r d i n g to H e i d e g g e r , is an oversimplified e v o c a t i v e n o t i o n of this p r e r e f l e x i v e existence of the individual which precisely makes knowledge possible, t h o u g h o n l y t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t i t r e t a i n s this o r i g i n a l ' t u n a b i l i t y ' of e x i s t e n c e . It is n o t difficult to disc o v e r i n t h e s e a r g u m e n t s o f this v e n e r a b l e e x i s t e n t i a l i s t t h e Platonic conception of knowledge being preformed in the
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h u m a n soul. A c c o r d i n g to this view ( w h i c h H e i d e g g e r freed of t h e m y t h o l o g i c a l m o d e of e x p r e s s i o n ) , k n o w l e d g e is not a c q u i red a n d is not multiplied d u r i n g c o g n i t i o n a n d d u r i n g all h u m a n life; it is a l r e a d y given ( m e a s u r e d off) in a d v a n c e , i.e. b e f o r e t h e b i r t h of t h e h u m a n individual. His cognitive activity is r e d u c e d to d i s c o v e r i n g and, so to say, c o n s u m i n g this k n o w l e d g e . T h e materialist p r i n c i p l e of reflection took s h a p e long b e f o r e t h e rise of idealist philosophy; in its original f o r m it was e x p r e s s e d by so-called n a i v e realism, i.e. o r d i n a r y c o n sciousness b a s e d o n e v e r y d a y 'materialist' p r a c t i c e . T h e epist e m o l o g y of idealism took s h a p e historically as a denial of t h e epistemological p r i n c i p l e of reflection first in its n a i v e and then in its t h e o r e t i c a l l y s u b s t a n t i a t e d form. In opposition to m a t e r i a l i s m idealism puts t h e real m a t e rial world within t h e mind or s o m e o t h e r mental essence, whose o u t c o m e is c o n s i d e r e d to be consciousness. Idealism does not stop at t h e o r d i n a r y religious n o t i o n of t h e spiritual as t h e e x t e r n a l c a u s e of t h e m a t e r i a l w o r l d . T h e logic of idealist philosophising inevitably leads to t h e reality of t h e real world cognised by the sciences being a c k n o w l e d g e d only in so far as t h e a s s u m p t i o n of its d e p e n d e n c e on t h e spiritual is a c c e p t e d , i.e. on its reflection, which in t h a t case is no longer t r e a t e d , of c o u r s e , as reflection. T h i s principle of t h e idealist ' t r a n s f o r m a t i o n ' of t h e world, k n o w l e d g e of which t h e idealist obtains from t h e s a m e s o u r c e s as the materialist, was expressed most u n e q u i v o c a l l y by S c h u p p e , t h e leader of ' i m m a n e n t philosophy', w h o wrote: ' T h e sun, m o o n , and stars, a n d this e a r t h with all its rocks a n d animals, volcanic m o u n tains, etc., a r e all t h e c o n t e n t of consciousness' ( 2 4 1 : 7 0 ) . T h e idealist says: 'I do not d e n y a n y t h i n g that exists or that you d e e m to exist, but I do not a g r e e that it exists as y o u i m a g i n e it t o ' . S c h u p p e c o n v e r t e d consciousness into a s u p r a - i n d i v i d u a l a l l - e m b r a c i n g reality in which, so to say, all existing things w e r e p o n d e r e d . S u c h consciousness, of c o u r s e , h o w does it differ from G o d ? c a n n o t be reflection. T h e idealist opposes the p r i n c i p l e of t h e subjectivity, activity, and c r e a t i v e f r e e d o m of cognition to t h e materialist u n d e r s t a n d i n g of it as reflection of objective reality. But this a n t i thesis is only justified insofar as t h e r e is denial of an objective reality existing outside and i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e mind. Otherwise, i.e. if o n e a c c e p t s t h e dialectical-materialist a n s w e r to t h e basic philosophical question, this antithesis (like t h e idealist c r i t i q u e of t h e t h e o r y of reflection) lacks a n y sense. As K o p n i n has rightly remarked,
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the two statements about knowledge (subjective creative activity and reflection) not only agree with one another, but even necessarily posit each other. Knowledge can only be active, practically directed reflection of objective reality. Subjective activity without reflection leads to an arbitrariness practically without results, rather than to creativity and the creation of things needed by man (122:23).

T h e antithesis between the materialist and idealist answers to the epistemological aspect of the basic philosophical question thus comes out with full obviousness in these incompatible interpretations of the principle of the knowability of the world. 4. The Epistemological Aspect. The Principle of the Knowability of the World and Philosophical Scepticism Philosophy had in fact already proclaimed the principle of the knowability of the world at the dawn of its existence, since philosophers began with reflections about cosmos foreign to scepticism, leaving it to 'opinion', i.e. the ordinary mind, to decide what was directly accessible to sense perception. This position of the fathers of the materialist understanding of the world was soon, however, rejected by those philosophers, the predecessors of idealism, who first denounced the cosmological claims of Ionian natural philosophy to cognise the universum, and later began to argue about the illusoriness of any human knowledge, whatever objects it was related to. T h e Eleatics claimed that the picture of the world based on sense contemplation completely deceived us; real existence could only be mentally comprehendable reality free of the qualities our senses endowed it with. Zen of Elea logically tried to prove the validity of denying the sensuous picture of the world. His aporias were, as a matter of fact, the first school of philosophical scepticism. It was not without reason that sceptics were later called aporetics. T h e Sophist Gorgias, who developed the dialectical mode of thought in the negative form that Zeno had given it, gave a proof of the following theses: (1) nothing exists; (2) if anything existed, it would be unknowable; (3) if anything were knowable it would be impossible to express knowledge of it. 'This is no idle talk, as was formerly supposed,' Hegel commented, 'for Gorgias' dialectic is of a quite objective kind, and is most interesting in content' (85:380). So, already in the early stages of philosophy's existence, an antithesis arose between theories that substantiated the
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knowability of the world in principle and doctrines that inclined to an opposite opinion. And although this antithesis did not form the main trends in philosophy, despite the claims of the Sceptics, it would be shallow to underestimate the antithesis between them, which has developed over the thousands of years of the existence of philosophy. T h e fundamental theoretical and ideological significance of the posing of the question of the knowability (or unknowability) of the world does not boil down to an appraisal of already available knowledge, although this appraisal, too, acquires more and more significance as science develops. T h e nub of the matter is the global posing of the question, which therefore, properly speaking, has a philosophical character, forming one of the epistemological aspects of the basic philosophical question. A concrete, historical study of this epistemological antithesis is therefore necessary. A scientific critique of philosophical scepticism presupposes a concrete delimitation of its historical forms and an appraisal of each of them from the angle of the socio-economic and cultural conditions giving rise to it. In that connection, of course, one has in mind, as well, the historical connection between the various types of scepticism, i.e. its development, during which new tendencies, and new epistemological and ideological functions, come to light. T h e Marxist-Leninist critique of scepticism thus does not come down to an analysis and refutation of its arguments; it is a theoretical summing up of its history, and exploration both of its real development and of its naturally changing places in mankind's intellectual life. Here, too, the main role belongs to the history of philosophy. Greek Scepticism, unlike its forerunners (mentioned at the beginning of this section), reflected the decline of the slaveowning mode of production. It was a philosophy of social indifferentism and submissiveness to historical fate. It was generated by the disillusionment of the masses of the free population with the ideals and norms of the existing social set-up. This disillusionment did not contain either a denial of the existing order, or an attempt to develop a new social p r o g r a m m e . Scepticism sought the road to individual's salvation in the conditions of the decaying social structure: only you yourself could save yourself. This salvation was ataraxia, or the real happiness attainable by turning away from public affairs and abstaining from judgments in matters not directly related to one's personal experiences. Abstention from actions, except those most necessary, also corresponded to abstention from ideological judgments.
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Greek Scepticism was thus not just a philosophy, but also a psychology and a theory of education that reflected the p r o gressing alienation of the individual in a society in which there was no class that could take on the initiative of radical social transformations. T h a t was its social sense. But from the angle of the history of philosophy it is an incomparably more interesting phenomenon, since it was scepticism that systematically summed up the preceding development of philosophy, though in a negative form, disclosed its inherent contradictions, and put forward problems whose significance went far beyond the bounds of the historical epoch that gave rise to it. Disputes about first principles and elements, about the universal flux of things, or about immobile existence, the counterposing of what truly existed to what existed in opinions, the dividing of the world into a this-side realm of things and a transcendent realm of ideas, the dualism of matter and formall that, according to the Sceptics' doctrine, proved that any philosophical statement could be countered by one that excluded it. No one, consequently, knew what things consisted of, whether of water or of fire, of homoeomeries or atoms or something else. T h e only correct stance in a philosophical dispute was therefore to abstain from judgments. T h a t did not mean that no meaning should be attached to the evidence of the sense organs. On the contrary, only that evidence deserved attention; honey was sweet, and it was impossible not to acknowledge that perception as a fact. One should only not affirm that the sweetness was inherent in the honey in itself. Greek Scepticism was primarily a denial of the possibility of reliable philosophical knowledge. One must not forget, of course, that any theoretical knowledge was in essence called philosophy in those days, and the Sceptics waged polemics against mathematics, too, trying to prove that truth was also unattainable in that field. Roman Scepticism, while directly associated with the Greek, took this whole tendency to the logical extreme. T h e teaching of Ainesidemos of Knossus and his successor Agrippa about tropes or modes boiled down to this that it primarily stressed the subjectivity of sense perceptions and in that regard anticipated the agnosticism of modern times. Roman Scepticism also campaigned against logical thinking, pointing out that inferences did not yield truths, because the premisses from which they were drawn could never be proved. So logic was employed to refute logic. T h e Sceptic analysis of causality presents special interest. Ainesidemos, citing everyday experience, concluded that it was
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impossible not to acknowledge that m a n y of the p h e n o m e n a we observed a p p e a r e d to be the consequences of other p h e n o m e n a also r e c o r d e d by observations. This evidence of everyday experience, however, could not be justified by logic; analysis of the concept of cause indicated that it could not be in what preceded the action, in what existed simultaneously, or in what followed after it. T h e r e is no need to dwell on his a r g u m e n t a t i o n to see that it was a matter of quite real problems that a r e also being discussed in our day. In his doctoral dissertation and his work on it young M a r x gave a very interesting appraisal of G r e e k Scepticism, c o m p a r i n g it with other tendencies in Hellenistic philosophy that also expressed the historical decline of the c u l t u r e of antiquity in a specifically philosophical way. He characterised Scepticism (together with Stoicism and E p i c u r e a n i s m ) as a basic type of G r e e k spiritual culture. 'Is not their essence, he asked, 'so full of c h a r a c t e r , so intense and eternal that the m o d e r n world itself has to admit them to full spiritual citizenship?' ( 1 6 9 : 3 5 ) . He expressed that proposition at a time when he was not yet a materialist; yet it was not foreign to a scientific understanding of the course of the history of philosophy, in which Scepticism, and Epicureanism, and Stoicism w e r e periodically reborn and enriched with new ideas over a stretch of two thousand years. In 1839-41 M a r x criticised Scepticism from a Y o u n g Hegelian position, claiming that the creative force and cognitive power of self-awareness were unlimited and in essence coincided. T h e Sceptics, on the c o n t r a r y , 'consider the powerlessness of the spirit to c o m p r e h e n d things as its essential aspect, its real activity' ( 1 7 4 : 4 2 8 ) . T h e Sceptic t h e r e f o r e did not get beyond semblance, which he sought, found, and defended as his own sole birthright. This point of view was 'professional opposition to all thought, the negation of determination itself (174:4294 3 0 ) . But thought was impossible without judgments, and the latter without determinations. And the Sceptic
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accepts all determinations, but in the determinateness of semblance; his activity is therefore just as arbitrary and displays everywhere the same inadequacy. He swims, to be sure, in the whole wealth of the world, but remains in the same poverty and is himself an embodiment of the powerlessness which he sees in things (174:430)

M a r x revealed the hopeless contradictions of Scepticism, which, in its fight against so-called dogmatism, defended the dogmatism of semblance. But he also noted Sceptics' positive role in the development of philosophy. T h e y w e r e
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the scientists among the philosophers, their work is to compare, and consequently to assemble together the various assertions already available. They cast an equalising, levelling learned glance back on the systems and thereby brought out the contradictions and oppositions (174:504).

T h e main content of G r e e k Scepticism consisted, consequently, in a critique of the varied, mutually exclusive philosophical conceptions, to which, however, it counterposed ordinary notions, without insisting on their truth, but suggesting that they w e r e m o r e capable all t h e same of achieving a t a r a x i a than all previous philosophy. G r e e k Scepticism was a self-criticism of philosophy at that stage of its development when it was almost wholly based on everyday e x p e r i e n c e alone and differed from o r d i n a r y consciousness in its theoretical interpretation, which was not, however, confirmed by e x p e r i e n c e . T h e scepticism of the age of the forming of t h e capitalist system, while reviving t h e ideas of its G r e e k f o r e r u n n e r s , already appeared in a new quality; it fought against clericalism, theology, and scholasticism, and also against those bourgeois rationalist doctrines that, for all their historical progressiveness, reconciled reason and faith. Christian phraseology, behind which (as Engels pointed out) 'the present-day philosophy has had to hide for s o m e time' ( 5 3 : 4 2 2 ) , often served this scepticism only as an ideological cover. While making use of this shield, scepticism defended toleration, and sometimes even c a m e to a justification of religious indifferentism and atheism. P i e r r e Bayle c a m e forward in his Historical and Critical Dictionary, as a pious erudite w h o collated t h e views of philosophers and theologians, and set out the historical facts. His conclusions were far from categorical and were still quite una m b i g u o u s for a n y o n e who could read between the lines. He believed that a logical substantiation of religious dogmas was impossible in principle and only discredited the lofty aim it pursued. T h e rationalist critique of religion, too, was unsound, because the latter did not b e c o m e divine revelation in o r d e r to justify itself before limited h u m a n reason, which constantly c a m e into conflict with itself when it tried, for example, to p r o v e the reality of the sense-perceived world or to formulate criteria to d e m a r c a t e t r u t h from e r r o r . Philosophy did not frighten religion, because t h e latter was based on faith, which could not be demolished by logical a r g u m e n t s of any kind.
Neither the dogmatics nor the sceptics will ever be capable of entering the kingdom of God, unless they become little children, unless they change maxims, unless they renounce their wisdom, and unless they make 108

a holocaust of t h e i r vain systems at the foot of t h e cross, for t h e alleged nonsense of our (i.e. C h r i s t i a n . . ) p r e a c h i n g ( 1 3 : 3 1 4 ) .

It goes w i t h o u t saying t h a t this a s s u m e d o r t h o d o x y , w h i c h c o n t a i n e d n o little t o u c h o f i r o n y , d e c e i v e d n o o n e a n d w a s a n unreliable defence. Bayle was not only refuted but also persecuted, b u t he c o n t i n u e d his s t r u g g l e for f r e e d o m of c o n s c i e n c e , camouflaged as dogmatic o r t h o d o x y (though seemingly not alien to real religious feeling), demonstrating that reason and faith w e r e i n c o m p a t i b l e , b e c a u s e faith, t h e H o l y S c r i p t u r e s taught, was of s u p e r n a t u r a l origin. Morality, he claimed, was independent of religion, since real virtue was not maintained a t all b y f e a r o f r e t r i b u t i o n f r o m o n h i g h . T h e a t h e i s t , t o o , c o u l d t h e r e f o r e be a moral person, especially w h e n one took into a c c o u n t that disavowal of religion ( h o w e v e r mistaken it was) called for i n c o m p a r a b l y g r e a t e r c o u r a g e t h a n mindless following o f its d o g m a s . T h e s e b o l d t r u t h s w e r e p r e s e n t e d a s i f t h e u n f a t h o m a b l e wisdom of God was revealed in t h e m in t h e most miraculous way.
T h a t the greatest scoundrels w e r e not atheists, and that most of the atheists whose n a m e s have c o m e d o w n to us were honest folk in the world's opinion, is a f e a t u r e of t h e infinite wisdom of God, and a cause for a d m i r i n g his P r o v i d e n c e ( 1 3 : 2 7 7 ) .

M a r x and Engels regarded Bayle as an eminent f o r e r u n n e r of the F r e n c h E n l i g h t e n m e n t . His place in the d e v e l o p m e n t of philosophical k n o w l e d g e was d e t e r m i n e d by his c r i t i q u e of the metaphysical systems of the seventeenth century. Descartes and M a l e b r a n c h e had proved the existence of an external world independent of the h u m a n mind by a r g u m e n t s akin to scholastic i s m : G o d c o u l d n o t b e a d e c e i v e r , i.e. i n s p i r e m a n w i t h false c o n v i c t i o n s a b o u t w h a t did n o t i n f a c t e x i s t . B a y l e r i d i c u l e d this a r g u m e n t a t i o n , noting that one must not put the responsibility for h u m a n opinions and delusions onto God. F r o m his point of view, philosophical propositions w e r e u n d e m o n s t r a b l e : even self-evidence did not g u a r a n t e e t r u t h ; scepticism w a s an a s p i r a t i o n for t r u t h t h a t tirelessly t r i e d to find objections to everything accepted as truth and constantly subverted the custom of agreeing with what seemed obvious. T h a t theoretical position was groping for the element of truth contained in scepticism, but at the s a m e time m a d e an absolute of it.
Dialecticsas Hegel in his time explained [Lenin w r o t e ] c o n t a i n s an element of relativism, of negation, of scepticism, but is not reducible to relativism. T h e materialist dialectics of M a r x and Engels certainly does contain relativism, but is not reducible to relativism, t h a t is, it 109

r e c o g n i s e s t h e r e l a t i v i t y o f all o u r k n o w l e d g e , n o t i n t h e s e n s e o f d e n y i n g o b j e c t i v e t r u t h , b u t i n t h e s e n s e t h a t t h e limits o f a p p r o x i m a t i o n o f o u r k n o w l e d g e t o this t r u t h a r e h i s t o r i c a l l y c o n d i t i o n a l ( 1 4 2 : 1 2 1 ) .

T h e metaphysical systems of the seventeenth century interpreted their results dogmatically, and m a d e absolutes of the truths that they had discovered in battle with scholasticism. Bayle's scepticism was thus not only directed against scholasticism and theologythe general opponent of the progressive philosophy of the seventeenth c e n t u r y b u t also against those features of the metaphysical systems that had b e c o m e fetters on their f u r t h e r p r o g r e s s in c o n d i t i o n s of rapidly d e v e l o p i n g scientific knowledge. M a r x and Engels wrote of Bayle:
Pierre Bayle n o t o n l y p r e p a r e d t h e r e c e p t i o n of m a t e r i a l i s m a n d of the philosophy of c o m m o n sense in F r a n c e by s h a t t e r i n g metaphysics w i t h his s c e p t i c i s m . He h e r a l d e d t h e atheistic society w h i c h w a s s o o n to c o m e i n t o e x i s t e n c e by proving t h a t a s o c i e t y c o n s i s t i n g only of a t h e i s t s is possible, t h a t an a t h e i s t can be a m a n w o r t h y of r e s p e c t , a n d t h a t it is n o t by a t h e i s m b u t by s u p e r s t i t i o n a n d i d o l a t r y t h a t m a n d e b a s e s himself ( 1 7 9 : 1 2 7 ) .

A n e w historical form of scepticism, reflecting the conversion of t h e b o u r g e o i s i e into a c o n s e r v a t i v e class, w a s t h e d o c t r i n e of David H u m e . T h e Scottish philosopher considered himself a n o p p o n e n t o f 'excessive s c e p t i c i s m ' ; h e t r i e d t o c o u n t e r p o s e ' m i t i g a t e d s c e p t i c i s m ' ( 1 0 5 : 1 1 1 ) t o it, w h i c h i n h i s o p i n i o n was a philosophy of c o m m o n sense obliging m a n to observe r e a s o n a b l e c a u t i o n in his assertions. B u t his belief in t h e m o d e r a t e n e s s of his s c e p t i c i s m was u n f o u n d e d ; he led t h e r e a d e r i n t o e r r o r b e c a u s e h e w a s h i m s e l f m i s t a k e n . S c e p t i c i s m h a d its objective logic t h a t c o m p e l l e d it to pass f r o m o n e n e g a t i o n to another, and which it was impossible to avoid. In proclaiming t h e g o a l o f s c e p t i c i s m t o b e ' t o d e s t r o y reason' ( 1 0 5 : 1 0 7 ) , s i n c e i n q u i r y h a d t o r e f u t e all outward a u t h o r i t y , H u m e s u b j e c t i v e l y belittled the significance of theoretical t h o u g h t . Both the metaphysicians of the seventeenth century, and Bayle, and H u m e ' s contemporaries, the French Enlighteners, categorically o p p o s e d r e a s o n t o f a i t h . H u m e r e v i s e d t h i s p r i n c i p l e o f all t h e progressive philosophy of the time and considered knowledge a s p e c i a l k i n d of belief, w h i c h he d e f i n e d as ' m e r e l y a p e c u l i a r feeling or sentiment (106:II,313). The objective logic of s c e p t i c i s m i s s t r o n g e r t h a n t h e d e s i r e t o a v o i d its h a r m f u l conclusions and hopeless contradictions. On the one hand H u m e a s s e r t e d t h a t r e a s o n , o p e r a t i n g a c c o r d i n g t o its g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s , i.e. b y t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f l o g i c , ' l e a v e s n o t t h e l o w e s t d e g r e e of evidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or c o m m o n
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life' (106:I, 2 5 2 - 2 5 3 ) , and on the other hand declared: 'for to me it seems evident, that the essence of the mind being unknown to us with that of external bodies' (106:I,6). He consequently both denied and recognised the significance of obviousness, depending on what it was a matter of. H u m e unconditionally rejected the possibility of finding an indisputable truth that could serve as the point of departure for further reasoning: 'But neither is there any such original principle, which has a prerogative above others, that are selfevident and convincing' (105:103). T h a t thesis was quite unavoidable for any sceptic. Nevertheless Hume not only suggested that principles of that kind (the doctrine of the correspondence of ideas and perceptions) were indisputable but also recommended in a more general form that it was necessary 'to begin with clear and self-evident principles' ( ibid .). Above I cited Hume's assertion about the impossibility of knowing 'the essence of external bodies'. T h a t statement may seem a phrase accidentally dropped, since he persistently stressed that 'nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception' (105:104). But it was by no means a slip of the pen, since he was really trying to combine incompatible propositions: 'We never really advance a step beyond ourselves' (106:I, 7 2 ) ; nevertheless 'external objects become known to us only by those perceptions they occasion' (106:I, 7 1 ) . While denying the objective reality of primary as well as of secondary qualities (following Berkeley, whose doctrine he characterised as scepticism), he did, however, consider that there was 'a certainunknown, inexplicable something, as the cause of our perceptions' (105:107). T h e principle of causality was the main object, of course, of Hume's critique. He denied the existence of objective causal connections, arguing that any link was introduced by reason into the stream of sense perceptions. Yet he regarded the abovementioned 'something' precisely as the objective cause of perceptions, anticipating Kant's 'thing-in-itself. But if one really held Hume's point of view, then the concept of existence had no objective content: 'The idea of existence, then, is the very same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent' (106:I, 71). Hume himself was to some extent conscious that his philosophy of common sense was not in tune with real common sense. But the latter was essentially quite impossible from his point of view. Common sense was only feasible in practice and in behaviour, the motives of which had neither a philosophical nor
1ll

a theoretical c h a r a c t e r . It was impossible to be consistent, rational, a n d logical in t h e s p h e r e of theory. T h e theorist was t h e r e f o r e left s i m p l y t o c h o o s e b e t w e e n c o n c l u s i o n s t h a t w e r e useful a n d a g r e e a b l e a n d others t h a t did n o t lead to e x p e r i e n c e s of such a kind. And, anticipating pragmatism, H u m e declared: t h a t ' I f I m u s t b e a f o o l , a s all t h o s e w h o r e a s o n o r b e l i e v e a n y t h i n g certainly a r e , m y f o l l i e s s h a l l a t l e a s t b e n a t u r a l a n d a g r e e a b l e ' ( 1 0 6 : I , 2 5 4 - 2 5 5 ) . B u t did n a t u r a l o r a g r e e a b l e folly exist, a t least for t h e t h i n k e r ? H u m e s p o k e bitterly a b o u t t h e 'forelorn solitude, in which I am plac'd in my philosophy' (106:I, 2 4 9 ) . We see, consequently, that the 'mitigated scepticism' was a t h e o r y that revealed a n d at the s a m e time veiled t h e c o n t r a d i c tions of scepticism. H u m e was the philosopher w h o e x p o u n d e d the doctrine of scepticism with the greatest fullness, t h o r o u g h n e s s , and system; t h a t i s w h y its u n s o u n d n e s s i s r e v e a l e d w i t h s p e c i a l c l a r i t y i n his w o r k s , w h i c h , w h i l e insisting o n r e f r a i n i n g f r o m p h i l o s o p h ical j u d g m e n t s , a d o p t e d t h e p o s e o f s u p r e m e a r b i t e r i n p h i l o sophy and, while rejecting dogmatism, at the s a m e time converte d his o w n theses i n t o d o g m a s . H u m e , as we know, had a great influence on Kant, rousing h i m ( t o u s e K a n t ' s e x p r e s s i o n ) f r o m d o g m a t i c s o m n o l e n c e , i.e. from the 'pre-critical' views that he subsequently rejected. K a n t regarded both dogmatism and scepticism as inevitable stages in the history of h u m a n reason. T h e sceptic was right in relation to the dogmatist, w h o was not a w a r e of the necessity of a critical s t u d y of his f u n d a m e n t a l p r o p o s i t i o n s , a n d of t h e cognitive peculiarities of m a n in general. But scepticism claimed too m u c h , while it w a s in fact
a r e s t i n g - p l a c e for r e a s o n , in w h i c h it m a y reflect on its d o g m a t i c a l w a n d e r i n g s , and gain s o m e k n o w l e d g e of the region in which it h a p p e n s to b e , that it m a y p u r s u e its w a y with g r e a t e r c e r t a i n t y ; b u t it c a n n o t be its p e r m a n e n t d w e l l i n g - p l a c e . It must t a k e up its a b o d e o n l y in the r e g i o n o f c o m p l e t e c e r t i t u d e , w h e t h e r this r e l a t e s t o t h e c o g n i t i o n o f o b j e c t s t h e m s e l v e s , o r t o t h e limits w h i c h b o u n d all o u r c o g n i t i o n (116:434).

In spite of his d o c t r i n e of 'things-in-themselves' u n k n o w a b l e in principle, and the d e p e n d e n c e of the world of p h e n o m e n a on the s t r u c t u r e of h u m a n cognitive abilities, K a n t not only did n o t c o n s i d e r h i m s e l f a s c e p t i c , b u t s u g g e s t e d t h a t only his d o c t r i n e finally o v e r c a m e scepticism. T h a t w a s n o s i m p l e illusion. K a n t really disagreed with H u m e and his predecessors on a n u m b e r of questions, although in the final count he c o n t i n u e d the s a m e line in philosophy.
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F r o m point of view of Kant, who inordinately limited the concept of scepticism, and so the task of overcoming it, the essence of this doctrine consisted in a denial of the possibility of judgments that had strict universality and necessity. He reproached H u m e for not recognising, along with empirical synthesis of perceptions, the a priori synthetic judgments that alone make theoretical knowledge possible. 'This sceptical philosopher did not distinguish these two kinds of judgments' (116:436). F r o m his point of view empiricism was doomed to sceptical conclusions when it did not resort to the aid of apriorism. But the sceptics, of course, criticised the apriorism of seventeenth-century metaphysics, convincingly demonstrating its unsoundness. Kant agreed with that critique as regards the a priori not being some content of knowledge and not being a means of supra-experiential knowledge, which was impossible in principle. But sceptics, according to him, did not see the possibility of a rational understanding of the a priori and came to the mistaken conclusion that it did not in general exist. But a priori principles (i.e. pre-experiential, and possessing universal and necessary significance) did exist but they possessed only a form of knowledge applicable only to experience, which was impossible as something ordered, properly speaking, without them. We see what a dear price Kant paid for this partial, and in many ways illusory overcoming of the sceptic denial of the possibility of categorial synthesis and theoretical knowledge in general, for a priori forms of contemplation (space and time) and a priori forms of thinking (categories) were subjective, i.e. inapplicable to a reality existing prior to cognition and irrespective of it. They were applicable only to the world of phenomena, which was treated as being correlative to the knowing subject. T h e objectivity of the world of phenomena, which Kant doggedly stressed, consists not in its being independent of cognition but rather in the mechanism of their formation during cognition not being dependent on the subject's will. When Kant spoke of the universality of space, time, causality, and other categories, this universality was limited to the world of phenomena. 'Things-in-themselves' were therefore unknowable. A condition of the knowability of the object forms its dependence on knowing; reality independent of cognition is unknowable in principle. Kant also differed from the sceptics in recognising the attainability of truth, the possibility of differentiating truth from error and, furthermore, the possibility of scientific, theoretical know19

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ledge. Cognition of p h e n o m e n a was not limited by any bounds, but progressing knowledge of the world of p h e n o m e n a did not bring us a whit closer to the 'things-in-themselves', i.e. to objective reality, which was treated as above experience and transcendental. Kant thus did not defeat scepticism. Like the sceptics he interpreted cognition subjectively and recognised something unknowable, this something, moreover, being not some infinitely remote residue left (as Herakleitos put it) at the bottom of a bottomless well, but everything that gave rise to sensations, i.e. objective reality. Kant's scepticism consisted in his mode of interpreting the fact of knowledge rather than in denying it. In order to understand this form of scepticism properly, which differs essentially from Hume's (not to mention earlier forms), it is important to stress that the unknowable 'thing-in-itself was not the starting point of Kant's doctrine, but its end result. He created it not in order to prove the existence of an unknowable reality, but with the aim of substantiating the knowability of the world of phenomena in principle and the possibility of science as theoretical knowledge embracing universal and necessary judgments. But his anti-dialectical understanding of the universality and necessity of theoretical judgments as absolute universality and absolute necessity led to his opposing a priori principles to empirical data, to a dualism of phenomena and 'things-in-themselves', of the world of experience and the transcendental, and ultimately to a subjectivist, agnostic interpretation both of cognition and of knowable reality. Considering the difference between Kant's doctrine and Humism and other varieties of scepticism, it is expedient to call it agnosticism rather than scepticism, although this term did not yet exist in his day. Scepticism and agnosticism are doctrines of the same type, of course, but the differences between them are substantial and the student of philosophy should not ignore them. T h e agnostic, like the sceptic, denies the knowability of objective reality or even throws doubt on its very existence, but he does not deny either the possibility of theoretical knowledge or the attainability of truth, and accordingly does not stick to the principle of refraining from theoretical judgments. Agnosticism can be regarded as a form of scepticism that developed in the period when science had achieved social recognition, and its outstanding advances were making the old sceptical denial of the possibility of science simply impossible; despite the commonly held view, facts also play a significant role in philosophy.
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T h e term 'agnosticism' was introduced into scientific currency by the famous English Darwinist . . Huxley, who counter posed the concept of agnosticism not only to the forgotten Christian gnosticism but also to theology in general, and to the dogmatic (in his opinion) scientific theories that followed from the allegedly unscientific assumption that everything could be known. Huxley claimed that agnosticism was not in fact a profes sion of faith but a method, the essence of which consisted in strict application of a principle (see 49:21). He defined this principle positively as recognition only of that as true which had been quite firmly established and which therefore did not evoke doubts of any kind. T h e gist of this fundamental proposition was defined negatively as refusal to recognise as truth that which has not been fully proved or adequately confirmed. T h e agnosticism of Huxley and the philosophers and scien tists who agreed with him did not consist simply in demands for scientific rigorousness that ruled out credulity and neglect of the criteria of scientific character (demands acceptable to the most consistent adherents of the principle of the knowa bility of the world) but also in convictions that scientific methods of inquiry were in principle inapplicable to objects of religious belief and also to matter and force, since by these was meant not separate material phenomena and the forces operating in them but what was thought of as the general es sence of these things and processes. Huxley thus not only counterposed science to religion but also tried to discover in science itself a radical antithesis of reason and faith, and so to register their principle unknowable but not transcendental. T h e physiologist du BoisReymond, who was close to Huxley's agnosticism, claimed that the most exact knowledge of the processes taking place in man's brain and nervous system did not provide any possibility of comprehending their essence. In his work ber die Grenzen des Naturerkennens (Leipzig, 1873, p. 34) he argued that there were seven problems unre solvable in principle: viz., (1) the nature of matter and force; (2) the origin of motion; (3) the origin of life; (4) the orderly arrangement of nature; (5) the origin of simple sensation and consciousness; (6) the nature of thought and speech; and (7) the question of freedom of will (see 82:1213). Haeckel convincingly showed, in his Riddle of the U niverse, which caused a storm in university circles, that science was nearing solution of all these problems, and had partially answered them. Nevertheless he also tried to establish the boundaries of possible
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k n o w l e d g e , i.e. t o i n d i c a t e s o m e t h i n g i n p r i n c i p l e u n k n o w a b l e . ' T h e m o n i s t i c p h i l o s o p h y , ' h e d e c l a r e d , 'is u l t i m a t e l y c o n f r o n t e d with b u t o n e simple and c o m p r e h e n s i v e e n i g m a t h e " p r o b l e m of s u b s t a n c e " ' ( 8 2 : 1 2 ) . Engels called H u x l e y ' s agnosticism a n d that of related s c i e n t i s t - t h i n k e r s shamefaced materialism ( 5 2 : 3 4 7 ) . T h a t was a v e r y apt definition t h a t m a d e it p o s s i b l e to d i s t i n g u i s h t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y i n c o n s i s t e n t m a t e r i a l i s m o f scientists f r o m K a n t i a n a g n o s t i c i s m , w h i c h c o m b i n e d d u a l i s m with i d e a l i s m a n d u l t i m a t e l y passed t o t h e s t a n c e o f t h e l a t t e r . T h e 'shamefaced' materialist agnostic in essence a c k n o w l e d g e d all t h e r e a l c o n c r e t e p r o b l e m s o f s c i e n c e a n d p h i l o s o p h y to be solvable; what he called unsolvable enigmas were incorrectly formulated problems t h e anti-dialectical posing of which blocked the way to their solution. T h e agnostic of the type of H u x l e y or Haeckel was an inconsistent materialist (usually of the metaphysical, mechanistic t y p e ) , a n d o p p o n e n t o f t h e religious, idealist o u t l o o k o n t h e w o r l d . B u t h e d i s s o c i a t e d himself f r o m m a t e r i a l i s m , w h i c h h a d a b a d r e p u t a t i o n in b o u r g e o i s s o c i e t y . H a e c k e l , for e x a m ple, called his o u t l o o k not m a t e r i a l i s t b u t m o n i s t i c , a n d even p r e a c h e d a s o r t of ' m o n i s t i c r e l i g i o n ' t h a t on c l o s e r e x a m i nation proved to be polite atheism.
P u r e monism [he wrote] is identical neither with the theoretical materialism that denies the existence of spirit, and dissolves the world into a heap of dead atoms, nor with the theoretical spiritualism (lately entitled 'energetic' spiritualism by Ostwald) which rejects the notion of matter and considers the world to be a specially-arranged group of 'energies', or immaterial natural forces (82:16-17).

T h e r e i s n o n e e d t o p r o v e t h a t t h e position o f H u x l e y a n d his a s s o c i a t e s i n t h e l a t t e r half o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y w a s h i s t o r ically p r o g r e s s i v e a n d as a m a t t e r of f a c t a n t i - r e l i g i o u s . So it is u n d e r s t a n d a b l e why the English writer G.K.Chesterton, an a d h e r e n t of T h o m i s m , ruefully wrote: ' N o w so m a n y bishops a r e agnostics' (35:432). E n g e l s stressed t h a t s c i e n t i s t s ' ' s h a m e f a c e d m a t e r i a l i s m ' , t h o u g h t h e y c a l l e d i t a g n o s t i c i s m , differed e s s e n t i a l l y f r o m t h e Kantian doctrine of 'things-in-themselves'. T h e latter, according to Kant, w e r e outside time and space and could not be an o b j e c t of c o g n i t i o n . But, as E n g e l s p o i n t e d out 'scientists t a k e c a r e not to apply the p h r a s e about the thing-in-itself no natural s c i e n c e , t h e y p e r m i t t h e m s e l v e s this only i n p a s s i n g i n t o p h i l o s o p h y ' ( 5 1 : 2 4 1 ) . If a s c i e n t i s t a p p l i e d t h e c o n c e p t ' t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f t o p h e n o m e n a c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e o b j e c t o f his r e s e a r c h , h e w o u l d
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find himself in an embarrassing position, i.e. he would have to go much further than Kant (according to whose doctrine phenomena were knowable) and say that a dog, it seems, has four legs, and so on. No scientist, of course, would go so far; his argument about the unknowable relates only to what he is not engaged in knowing and which seems to him to belong essentially to the competence of philosophy. T h a t indicates that 'shamefaced materialism' in essence shares the prejudices of those empiricist scientists who fence themselves off in every way from philosophy and imagine themselves quite free of its 'prejudices', but in fact are under the influence of the most outmoded and eclectic philosophical conceptions. Agnosticism thus, even in the weakened form in which it is expressed by certain empiricist-scientists, is by no means the outcome proper of natural sciences, even when it is based on real contradictions in their development. It is the reflection in science of subjective and agnostic notions prevailing in bourgeois society. One must therefore not counterpose this agnosticism absolutely to Kantianism and Humism; they have many ideas in common. As Ilichev has rightly remarked:
the spectre of the unknowable 'thing-in-itself inevitably arises everywhere where the contradictions of the cognitive process are not rationally resolved, which is inevitable, of course, with a metaphysical understanding of this process and its specific difficulties, contradictions, and historical limitedness (107:20).

My brief digression into the history of scepticism lacks a last necessary link, namely a description of contemporary agnosticism which, unlike its forerunners, is concerned almost exclusively with a critique of scientific knowledge. In its irrational form this critique is a further 'deepening' of the Nietzschean principle of the 'revaluing of values'. As for positivist agnosticism, it comes forward as (sic!) a denial of agnosticism and a strict scientific interpretation of scientific knowledge. Nietzsche considered that when striving for truth became a passion (the ideal of Spinozism) it was evidence of a degradation of the substantial will to power ( a u t h o r i t y ) . He valued knowledge only ecologically as a means of adaptation to the environment. This limited view suggested the following conclusion: a 'will to power' needed useful fallacies more than truth. In fact, he declared, 'suppose we want the truth: why not rather untruth? and uncertainty? even ignorance?' (195:9). What role, come to that, do truth and adequate knowledge play? Nietzsche had no unambiguous answer to that: unlike Kant he did not consider consistency an achievement of philosophy. Sometimes he asserted
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that knowledge and t r u t h were no m o r e t h a n illusions since this seeming world was essentially unique. In other cases he saw a fatal destiny, threat, and challenge in knowledge and truth:
it might be a basic characteristic of existence that those who would know it completely would perish, in which case the strength of a spirit should be measured according to how much of the 'truth' one could still barely endureor to put it more clearly, to what degree one would require it to be thinned down, shrouded, sweetened, blunted, falsified (195:49).

T h e Nietzschean conception of truth and knowledge registered a contradiction i n h e r e n t in bourgeois ideological consciousness, but it was not this contradiction that animated Nietzsche's irrationalist epistemology. T h e basis of his epistemological pessimism lay in an aristocratic fear of the spread of knowledge a m o n g the masses, w h o would b e c o m e enlightened in the struggle against the 'elite' by c o m p r e h e n d i n g t h e basic truths about which they had always been kept in ignorance. T h e scepticism of antiquity and of m o d e r n times stemmed from a high evaluation of knowledge, but considered it, alas, an unattainable ideal. Nietzsche developed an anti-intelleclualist view that, although opposed to Christian doctrine, was quite close to the belief in the futility and even harmfulness of knowledge characteristic of the latter. T h e latest irrationalism is a further development of the Nietzschean epistemological nihilism, though it does not h a v e such an e x t r a v a g a n t c h a r a c t e r . Its distinguishing feature is denial of the n e e d for h a r m o n y between knowledge and man's practical achievements, for e x a m p l e , in the s p h e r e of material production. Mastering of the elemental forces of n a t u r e , according to the doctrine of irrationalism, is therefore by no means evidence of the progress of knowledge and ever d e e p e r penetration into the essence of natural p h e n o m e n a . ' W e have no better vision of n a t u r e and life than some of our predecessors', G e o r g e S a n t a y a n a wrote, 'but we have g r e a t e r material resources' ( 2 3 4 : 2 7 ) . What is this proliferation of material resources due to? Irrationalism supposes it is connected with cognition of the external, but insists that knowing of this kind blocks the way to u n d e r s t a n d i n g the profound essence of being. Existentialism, we know, proclaimed a c a m p a i g n against the 'spirit of abstraction' p r o p e r to science, which naturally ascends from the directly observed and k n o w n to t h e u n k n o w n , observable only by indirect means, which is possible only by forming abstractions of a h i g h e r and h i g h e r level, since c o n c r e t e understanding of the patterns d e t e r m i n i n g directly observable
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processes can only be built up from them. Existentialism interprets this process subjectively as a permanent distancing of science from reality. T h e scientist does not comprehend this tragedy of scientific cognition, while the irrationalist philosopher, free of intellectualist illusions, understands that knowledge is only realised ignorance. T h e pseudodialectical (relativist) elimination of the antithesis between knowledge and ignorance guided the Spanish existentialist Ortega Gasset to a quite free-will interpretation of physics, which he characterised as a special kind of poetry that created its own peculiar 'abstractionist' world, i.e. the universes of Newton and of Einstein. T h e world of physics, he suggested, 'can be only a reality of the fourth of fifth degree' (200:96), which means that the probability of its existence is correspondingly less than the probability of the existence of 'human reality', i.e. existence and its objectivisation.
But it is of courseI repeata reality. By reality I mean everything with which I have to reckon. And today I have to reckon with the world of Einstein and De Broglie ( ibid .).

T h e goblins and hobgoblins that the superstitious person fancies lurk in every dark corner are real for him. One can, of course, say that goblins exist, certainly in the imagination. By obliterating the antithesis between subjective and objective reality, Ortega suggested that it was only a difference of degree. Hence it followed that physical reality was actually more doubtful than imaginary reality, distinguished by undoubted existence.
What the physical world is, we do not know, nor even what is an objective world, hence a world that is not only the world of each but the world common to all (200:74).

T h e existentialist denial of criteria of objective reality (practice) is a reduction of reality to 'human reality', to images of the mind interpreted not as reflections of objective reality, but as reality itself, a situation experienced by the human individual. This latest version of the old agnostic conception that we know only the content of the mind, which cannot jump out of itself and break through sensation to whatever is other. But the mind (consciousness) does not exist in itself, autonomously, independent of the world and of practical activity, which links it firmly with things. Practice is the way out from the confines of consciousness and, moreover, is a conscious way out. T h e existentialist loves to argue that to exist means to be in
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a c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n : I exists o n l y in u n b r e a k a b l e c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e n o t - I . A n d h e s t u b b o r n l y f e n c e s c o n s c i o u s n e s s off f r o m b e i n g , a r g u i n g t h a t it is n o t c o n s c i o u s n e s s of b e i n g , b u t o n l y c o n s c i o u s n e s s of w h a t is, w h i c h differs r a d i c a l l y f r o m b e i n g . T h e d u a l i s m o f m i n d a n d b e i n g , i.e. t h e m y t h o f t h e p r i m o r d i a l a l i e n a t i o n o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , c o n s t i t u t e s t h e basis of e x i s t e n t i a l i s t a g n o s t i c i s m . ' T o k n o w b e i n g as it is,' S a r t r e w r o t e , 'it i s n e c e s s a r y t o b e i t ' ( 2 3 5 : 2 7 0 ) . T h e K a n t i a n 'thing-in-itself is transformed into 'being-in-itself, and the world of cognised p h e n o m e n a has b e c o m e simply consciousness, or ' c o n s c i o u s n e s s of m i n d ' . Existentialist agnosticism transforms into a new, frequently irreligious mode the Christian conception of the unreality of h u m a n e x i s t e n c e , w h i c h is r e v e a l e d , in p a r t i c u l a r , in s t a t e m e n t s a b o u t t h e u n r e a l i t y o f k n o w i n g a n d t h e illusorin e s s of its object. H e n c e , t o o , t h e d e n i a l of t h e p l e a s u r e of knowing, related to Nietzscheanism, which is mainly connected with n e g a t i v e e m o t i o n s , a n d p r i m a r i l y with f e a r t h a t P a n d o r a ' s b o x w o u l d b e o p e n e d . T h e r e s e r v a t i o n s o f all s o r t s t h a t w h a t is m e a n t h e r e is not o r d i n a r y , vulgar fear alter nothing.
About whom and what can I, [Camus wrote] in effect, say: 'I know that!' This heart inside me I can put to the test, and I deem it to exist. This world I can touch, and again I deem it to exist. T h e r e all my knowledge stops, the rest is construction. For if I try to seize this me of which I am sure, if I try to define it and to sum it up, it is no more than water that runs through my fingers (28:34).

W h y t h e n d o e s t h e closest a n d u n d o u b t e d p r o v e i n e s s e n c e t o b e incomprehensible? T h e a n s w e r is the existentialist doctrine about the 'schism' between subject and object that C a m u s supp l e m e n t e d with a thesis a b o u t t h e s e l f - a l i e n a t i o n of e x i s t e n c e itself.
T h e rift between the certainty I have of my existence and the content that I try to give that certainty will never be filled. I shall always be a stranger to myself. T h e r e are truths in psychology as in logic, but no truth (28:34).

I t m u s t n o t b e t h o u g h t t h a t this h o p e l e s s ( a s h e p u t it) s i t u a t i o n i n t h e s p h e r e o f c o g n i t i o n r e a l l y h o r r i f i e d C a m u s : for e v e r y thing that science knows m e a n s nothing for an individual who exists, i.e. w h o is c o n s c i o u s of his m o r t a l i t y . 'It is u t t e r l y i m m a terial w h e t h e r the earth or the sun rotates a r o u n d the other. In s h o r t it is a trifling q u e s t i o n ' ( 2 8 : 1 6 ) . B u t w h a t is n o t a trifle? T h e f a c t t h a t m a n i s m o r t a l , t h a t life l a c k s s e n s e , t h a t t h e a b s u r d is the most fundamental p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l reality.
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T h u s t h e knowable is trivial or terrible; t h e existentialist likes to lay on the colours. He therefore ascribes the greatest heuristic significance to fear, and considers science the source of existential fallacies. Real knowledge terrifies the existentialist, ignorance inspires hope. Long before the rise of contemporary existentialism Timiryazev ridiculed this pretentiously unoriginal, though eloquent 'mystic ecstasy of the ignoramus, beating his breast, and wailing ecstatically: "I do not understand! I have not caught on! I never shall!"' (255:439). With a few slight corrections that also applies to the irrationalist agnosticism of our day. During the half-century of logical positivism's existence it has changed its stance many times. Substantial disagreements between its spokesmen a r e also characteristic of it. Nevertheless scepticism in the H u m e a n sense, however, remains the common ideological platform of all neopositivism. As the Canadian historian of philosophy Wisdom justly remarks, neopositivism is 'a meta-ontological negativism, is a negative ontology, based on a sceptical epistemology' (263:205). Logical positivist scepticism does not call itself either scepticism or agnosticism; it preaches a purging of science from 'metaphysics'. T h e neopositivist usually stresses that not only are pseudopropositions 'metaphysical' but so are their negations, which should also be considered pseudopropositions. Thus, from the standpoint of logical positivism, the following pairs of mutually exclusive propositions are identically unsound:
The world is knowable in principle There is a realily independent of cognition The world is unknowable in principle There is no reality independent of cognition

Even statements of the type of 'I do not know whether or not there is an external world' a r e considered scientifically meaningless since t h e notion of an external world is defined as a pseudoconcept. This stance differs little from that of scepticism, the whole wisdom of which boils down to a demand to refrain from philosophical judgments. Logical positivism, it is true, has concretised this imperative: refrain from 'metaphysical' judgments. But logical positivists interpret 'metaphysics' very broadly. N o n e of them can, in essence, draw a clear line of demarcation between 'metaphysical' and scientific judgments. Even in science such a line proves beyond them. T h e task has simply been incorrectly formulated. With them the concept 'metaphysics' proved essentially to be a pseudoconcept. Their claim to rise above the antithesis of 'dogmatism' and scepti121

cism proved in fact to be an eclectic reconciliation of the former with the latter. T h e logical positivist 'third way' is thus an idealist empiricism that does not, however, extend to logical and mathematical propositions. T h e latter a r e characterised as non-empirical and consequently analytical or tautological. By means of that limitation of the competence of empiricism neopositivists have tried to cope with the arguments of Kant, who demonstrated the possibility, despite empiricism (and scepticism), of judgments with a strict universality and necessity. Logical positivists object that judgments of that kind a r e only possible as logical and mathematical ones that are not based on facts but on agreement among scientists about terms and their definitions and applications. Neither logic nor mathematics cognise anything. T h a t is the thesis of agnosticism, of the most sophisticated kind, it is true. T h e a priori does not exist, logical positivists declare with reason. All judgments relating to facts therefore have no real universality and necessity. So, if any factual proposition relates to an unlimited class of objects, it has a 'metaphysical' c h a r a c ter; it is not verifiable (in the positivist sense, of course, the inadequacy of which is now recognised even by positivists themselves) and is not demonstrable in a purely logical way. This line of argument is distinguished by a greater rigorousness than that of the Greek Sceptics or even Hume. It undoubtedly poses essential epistemological problems, but no more; we do not find a single new idea in it. T h e Greek Sceptics said that all philosophical judgments were refutable. T h e y also, it is true, included mathematics in philosophy and also tried to refute it. Contemporary positivism seems more modest; it rejects only 'metaphysical' sentences. But it turns out in fact that any proposition of science, insofar as it relates to an unlimited class of objects, must be considered 'metaphysical' from the standpoint of logical positivism. This not only applies to formulations of the laws of n a t u r e but also to sentences like 'all bodies have extension', 'everything living is mortal', and so on. Logical positivists h a v e long felt that they present such 'rigorous' demands to science that their fulfilment would possibly make it purer, but of course less productive. Science rejected this unjustified epistemological rigorousness based on a separation of theory from practice, and logical positivists have been compelled in fact to reject the verifiability principle, and to replace it by that of confirmation. But that con122

cession to science (and so to 'metaphysics') also proved insufficient, and empirical sentences themselves (like logico-mathematical ones) ultimately began to be interpreted as essentially conventional or arbitrary, i.e. based on 'rules of the game' specified by an ordinary or artificial language. T h e collapse of t h e principle of verifiability brought into being a principle of falsifiability, formulated by Popper, at first glance absolutely contrary to it. Whereas empirical statements had previously been counted as scientifically meaningful only insofar as they were 'verified' or 'confirmed' (I put these words in inverted commas so as to emphasise the limited character of the logical positivist interpretation of these p r o c e d u r e s ) , now these same statements have acquired the status of scientific character to the extent that they can be comprehended as refutable. 'A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is non-scientific. Irrefutability is not a virtue of a theory (as people often think) but a vice' (213:159). I am not referring here to the grain of truth that is contained in Popper's seemingly quite extravagant statement, viz., that a statement about an unlimited number of facts cannot be confirmed by any finite n u m b e r of facts (no matter how l a r g e ) , while a single fact not agreeing with it is enough to refute it. Bacon formulated that in his doctrine of the role of negative instances in the process of induction. T h e 'originality' of Popper's conception consequently is that he formulated a subjective principle of absolute relativism by which any description of facts ultimately proves to be a fallacy. This is the most sophisticated version of the latest agnosticism, whose roots (it is not difficult to show) are discoverable in the epistemological constructs of irrationalism. Popper started from the point that science is constantly formulating an endless number of factual propositions whose universality cannot be confirmed precisely because of their factual character. These propositions cannot be repudiated because science is impossible without them. To acknowledge their truth, since they are constantly being confirmed, is also impossible, according to Popper (because the dialectics of relative and absolute truth is quite incomprehensible to h i m ) . Sooner or later, he declares, these propositions will be refuted, which is why they must be considered scientific. T h e poor Greek Sceptics!it never even entered their heads that an attribute of scientism was refutability. If they had known that in time philosophy would have been saved!
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So, from Popper's point of view, scientific assertions possessing unlimited universality are necessary scientific fallacies (he seemingly would not accept this term and would say refutable t r u t h s ) . We already find this bent for witticisms, however, in Nietzsche who, without claiming to develop a scientific methodology, wrote: 'we are fundamentally inclined to claim that the falsest judgments (which include the synthetic judgments a priori) a r e the most indispensable for us' (195:12). Nietzsche saidfor us; Popper specifiesfor science. Nietzsche not only showed the necessity of mistaken, generally affirmative judgments but directly declared, without any pedantry: 'It is certainly not the least c h a r m of a theory that it is refutable; it is precisely thereby that it attracts subtler minds (195:24). Popper also defined m o r e exactly here: refutability gives a scientific character to a theory and not charm. I am quite disinclined to accuse the worthy professor of plagiarism. Coincidences do happen. And so, too, does congenialitycongeniality between the 'critical rationalist' and the irrationalist, the theorist of rigorous scientism and the thinker who treated science as decadence. They agree on one point, viz., a subjectivist agnostic interpretation of knowledge and the process of cognition. T h e latest form of positivist scepticism is thus absolute relativism. It starts from the point, long established in philosophy, but which has become specially obvious owing to the advances of science in this century, that our knowledge (the most reliable, exact, and scientific included) has a relative character. Its relativity consists in its inevitable incompleteness, appoximateness, and dependence on the specific laws of the process of cognition. Exhaustive knowledge is possible only in the form of a statement of the fact which is (so to say) already 'exhausted', i.e. cannot be repeated, and if, besides, this statement satisfies the requirements of logic that delimit it. T h e relativity of knowledge has not always been realised of course, and even now is not always acknowledged. T h e r e was a time when mathematicians were not a w a r e that Euclid's geometry did not fully describe the properties of space. A fallacy of a subjectivist character followed from that, viz., the universalisation of Euclidean space. Such fallacies also occur today, since awareness of the relativity of any knowledge presupposes not only an appropriate methodological orientation, but also investigation of this relativity. Relative truth is
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objective truth, and it is an error to go beyond its limits (in particular, to universalise it). T h e subjectivist ignores the objective content of a relative truth, interpreting relativity as subjectivity or, what is the same thing, as refutability. This conclusion is a corollary of the metaphysical absolutising of the relativity of knowledge, of the divorce of scientific ideas from the objects they reflect, and a denial of either the objective reality of these objects or the possibility of reliable knowledge of their existence. We know from the history of science that scientific notions of matter, atoms, molecules, space, time, etc., have altered substantially, and that this was brought about by the development of knowledge and not by changes in the p h e n o m e n a themselves. This fact, i.e. the absence of a direct link between change in the object and the change in scientific ideas about it, merits special epistemological investigation. It indicates the specific patterns of development of cognition, its passage from one level to another, higher one. Logical positivists interpret this fact as if the changing scientific ideas were essentially subjective ones. Hypotheses about the n a t u r e of ether were developed over 2,000 years and certain, allegedly inherent properties were ascribed to it, until it was shown that no ether whatsoever existed. Such is roughly the inner logic of the relativist's arguments. If one agrees with him, one has to recognise that the existence of the scientific concepts of matter, space, time, etc., is not evidence of the real existence of matter, space, and time; science does not prove the existence of objective reality, and the history of science offers a choice of a host of different scientific pictures of the world. Is it worth bothering to fix on any one of them? For it will inevitably be replaced by a new one. One discovers the unity of the epistemological sources of contemporary positivist agnosticism and subjective idealism in that. Both claim that there is no evidence in the content of knowledge of its dependence on the object of knowing since the content of knowledge is constantly being transformed by the process of cognition. This whole argument is built on a one-sided statement of fact, from which agnostic conclusions a r e then drawn. But the development of cognition consists as well in changes in existing scientific notions (I stress 'as well' because new scientific ideas also appear that supplement those already available). It is not enough, however, simply to ascertain the c h a n g e in scientific ideas, because this process occurs in
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a definite d i r e c t i o n , o n e o f c o m i n g e v e r c l o s e r t o t h e o b j e c t . T h e agnostic, h o w e v e r , begins to protest at this point that we h a v e no right to s p e a k of t h e a p p r o x i m a t i o n of scientific ideas to objects b e c a u s e we only h a v e notions (representations) at o u r d i s p o s a l . W e c a n , o f c o u r s e , call s o m e n o t i o n s objects a n d o t h e r s descriptions of t h e m . It is t h e old B e r k e l e i a n a n d Hum e a n a r g u m e n t : w e c a n n o t e x c e e d t h e limits o f o u r consciousness. E v e n w h e n a t h e o r y is confirmed, that does not p r o v e that t h e objects it describes exist i n d e p e n d e n t l y , irrespective of t h e process of cognition; they a r e p e r h a p s results of cognition, t h e s a m e a s t h e t h e o r y itself. T h e British M a r x i s t J o h n L e w i s pointed out that even t h e Papal Inquisition took a pragmatic stance w h e n evaluating Copernicus' hypothesis:
C a r d i n a l Bellarmine tried to p e r s u a d e Galileo to d e s c r i b e t h e p l a n e t a r y theory as no m o r e t h a n an instrument of calculation, and not a description o f t h e a c t u a l u n i v e r s e ( 1 5 0 : 4 9 ) .

T h e point of view of c o n t e m p o r a r y neopositivism is the same; when comparing various theories about one and the same matter it suggests c h o o s i n g the o n e that is m o r e c o n v e n i e n t and effect i v e , w i t h o u t p o s i n g t h e ' m e t a p h y s i c a l ' q u e s t i o n o f its c o r respondence to objective reality. T h e fact of t h e existence of v a r i o u s solutions of o n e a n d the s a m e p r o b l e m or different interpretations of o n e and t h e s a m e fact a r e evidence (according to t h e d o c t r i n e of logical positivism) of t h e scientific a b s u r d ity o f s u c h c o n c e p t s a s ' o b j e c t i v e t r u t h ' , ' o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y ' , etc. F r o m that a n g l e it is not simply an u n r e s o l v a b l e task to establish t h e o b j e c t i v e c o n t e n t of a t h e o r y but a pointless exercise of the 'metaphysicians'. It is w o r t h stressing that t h e 'critical rationalism' w h i c h has s u c c e e d e d logical positivism i n t h e m a i n d e v e l o p s this s a m e subjectivist-agnostic p h i l o s o phy of science. N a t u r a l science, in w h o s e n a m e logical positivists a n d p o s t p o s i t i v i s t s s p e a k , i s c a t e g o r i c a l l y h o s t i l e t o s u c h an interpretation of science. As M a r x Born wrote:
N a t u r a l s c i e n c e is s i t u a t e d at t h e e n d of this s e r i e s , at t h e p o i n t w h e r e t h e ego, t h e s u b j e c t , p l a y s o n l y a n i n s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t ; e v e r y a d v a n c e i n t h e mouldings of the concepts of physics, a s t r o n o m y and chemistry denotes a f u r t h e r step t o w a r d s the goal of e x c l u d i n g t h e ego. T h i s does not, of course, deal with t h e act of k n o w i n g , which is b o u n d to the subject, but with t h e finished p i c t u r e of N a t u r e , t h e basis of w h i c h is the idea t h a t t h e o r d i n a r y w o r l d exists i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f a n d u n i n f l u e n c e d by the process of k n o w i n g (21:2).

Lenin cism, t h e

brought link of

o u t , i n h i s Materialism positivist agnosticism

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and E m p i r i o - C r i t i ( a n d in p a r t i c u l a r

absolute relativism) with the methodological crisis in physics. Discovery of the electron structure of matter, and rejection of the mechanistic-materialist notion of it, had been interpreted as the 'annihilation' of matter, i.e. a refutation of what t h e preceding, insufficiently developed science had considered to exist. Lenin showed the indissoluble link of positivist agnosticism with idealism, and likewise the theoretical roots of absolute relativism. Against the 'physical' idealists (among whom there were some eminent physicists), Lenin affirmed, starting from the dialectical-materialist understanding of cognition and of the objective world, that the interpretation of matter provided by the latest physics did not discard the old physics, that the change in scientific concepts of matter was evidence of a m o r e profound knowledge of it, and not that there was nothing objectively real corresponding to them. It is important to note that physicists themselves subsequently c a m e to this sole correct epistemological conclusion. Planck, for instance, pointed out in his ' T h e Sense and Limits of Exact Science' that the scientific picture of the world was a reflection of objective reality which was already known to some extent in everyday practice, that it was not complete and final, and that the change in it was evidence of the development of knowledge of the objective world.
The former picture of the world is consequently retained, but it now appears as a special part of a yet bigger, fuller, and at the same time more homogeneous picture. And it is so in all cases, so far as our experience goes (208:17).

It will be readily understood that the theoretical basis of logical positivist agnosticism is idealist empiricism, corresponding in the main to Mach's 'psychology of knowledge'. Mach, however, 'imprudently' claimed that things were complexes of sensations. Neopositivists avoid such formulations and limit themselves to claiming that science and thought deal in general only with 'sense data', and that any arguments about what things are in themselves should be rejected as metaphysical pretensions lacking sense. From that angle theory is the analysis and interpretation of sense data. T h e checking or testing of a theory consists in comparing its propositions with these data; and there is no necessity to recognise a reality independent of them. T h e logical positivist counterposes recognition of the sensually given as the sole reality known to science to materialism, on the one hand, and to solipsism, on the other. T h e materialist regards sensations and perceptions as a reflection of a reality independent of them; the solipsist
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claims that t h e r e is no other reality t h a n t h e sensually given. T h e neopositivist c o n d e m n s b o t h ' e x t r e m e s ' , d e c l a r i n g : 'as a m a n o f s c i e n c e I h a v e n o r i g h t t o affirm t h e o n e o r t h e o t h e r . Sense data a r e evidence only of their own existence, and I h a v e n o r i g h t t o c o n s i d e r t h e m a p h e n o m e n o n o f s o m e t h i n g else. B u t I also c a n n o t d e n y t h a t s o m e t h i n g q u i t e u n k n o w n t o m e exists'. Such are the two main forms of the c o n t e m p o r a r y agnostic a n s w e r to t h e second aspect of t h e basic philosophical question. B o t h h a v e a n i d e a l i s t c h a r a c t e r a n d , i n s p i t e o f vital d i f f e r ences, h a v e m u c h in c o m m o n . I h a v e pointed out t h e closeness of absolute relativism to irrationalism. I must note that the latter widely employs a relativist line of a r g u m e n t . T h e irrationalist d e v a l u a t i o n of s c i e n c e is b a s e d to a c o n s i d e r a b l e e x t e n t on a c o n v e n t i o n a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f it. J a s p e r s c l a i m s t h a t
science leads, in order to know, to how and on w h a t g r o u n d s and within w h a t limits, and in w h a t sense one knows. It teaches k n o w i n g by consciousness of t h e method of t h e a p p r o p r i a t e knowledge. It gives certainty, t h e relativity of whichi.e. d e p e n d e n c e on suppositions and research methodsis its decisive f e a t u r e ( 1 1 5 : 2 1 2 ) .

T h e r e is no need to e x a m i n e that proposition; I have already s h o w n a b o v e that the subjectivist interpretation of t h e fact of k n o w l e d g e is a very c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f e a t u r e of c o n t e m p o r a r y agnosticism, which can no longer d e n y the existence of knowledge, n o r its d e v e l o p m e n t , n o r s c i e n t i f i c p r o g r e s s . H o w e v e r fragmentary my excursion into the history of philos o p h i c a l s c e p t i c i s m is, i t m a k e s i t p o s s i b l e t o d r a w s e v e r a l theoretical conclusions. T h e philosophy of scepticism took shape in the age of t h e forming of theoretical k n o w l e d g e as t h e negat i o n o f t h e l a t t e r . I r r e s p e c t i v e o f its i d e o l o g i c a l f u n c t i o n scepticism then posed important epistemological problems, and furthered investigation of the foundations of theoretical knowledge. To s o m e extent that also applies to the historical forms of scepticism that a r o s e in t h e age of the bourgeois revolutions in struggle against scholasticism, theology, and rationalist m e t a p h y s i c a l systems. But t h e p r o g r e s s of scientific k n o w l e d g e and development of the dialectical world outlook deprived s c e p t i c i s m of its e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n . In t h e l i g h t of c o n t e m p o r a r y scientific a c h i e v e m e n t s a n d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e dialectical-materialist outlook, philosophical scepticism ( a g n o s t i c i s m ) is a historically o u t d a t e d intellectual p h e n o m e n o n . Scepticism p o i n t e d out t h e physiological limitedness of t h e s e n s e o r g a n s , w h i c h allegedly put limits to t h e cognitive process. It h a s b e e n s h o w n t h a t this limitedness, b e i n g a n e c e s s a r y condition of cognitive activity, m a k e s it possible to e x 128

tend the sphere of sense reflection endlessly, and to observe phenomena, in an indirect way, that man does not have the sense organs to perceive. Scepticism registered the historically occurring succession of scientific theories, discovery of the scientific unsoundness of many of them, and the struggle of opposing conceptions in science and philosophy. It thus brought out its real historical premisses. But scepticism wrongly interpreted the history of science (and philosophy) as the history of permanent fallacies. This anti-dialectical generalisation has long been refuted by the development of knowledge and the activity based on it, which is the main refutation of agnosticismthe main one, since theory and practice merge together in it. Scepticism proved incapable of critically comprehending the concept 'thing-in-itself, to which it attributed a meaning of supersensory reality. But from the standpoint of epistemological historism the concept of an unknowable 'thing-in-itself means only, as Engels stressed, that 'we can only know under the conditions of our epoch and as far as these allow' (51:241). But since the conditions alter (including and thanks to knowledge), the 'thing-in-itself is converted into a 'thingfor-us', i.e. the opposition between it and phenomena is not absolute but relative. Dialectical materialism thus recognises not only the existence of 'things-in-themselves' but also that they appear, are discovered, cognised, and in practice converted into 'thingsfor-us'. This conversion of the unknown into the known is at the same time a transformation of the objective 'necessity-in-itself into freedom, or 'necessity-for-us'. In that sense freedom becomes a refutation of agnosticism. Marx wrote of the Kantians that 'their daily business is to tell their beads over their own powerlessness and the power of things' (174:429). It is not surprising therefore that practical mastery of the 'power of things' forms the basis of a world outlook incompatible in principle with scepticism. T h e latter was justified in regard to dogmatism and the metaphysical mode of thinking as their abstract negation. But an abstract antithesis of dogmatic-metaphysical thinking of that kind is itself dogmatic and metaphysical to the core. T h e philosophy of Marxism, by critically summing up the history of knowledge and revealing the inner contradictions and incompleteness inherent in it, also overcomes the dogmaticmetaphysical interpretation of the cognitive process, together with scepticism, an interpretation that is usually formulated
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as if everything not yet k n o w n will be s u b s e q u e n t l y k n o w n . But s u c h a f o r m u l a t i o n is u n s o u n d , s i n c e it a s s u m e s t h e feasibility of k n o w i n g e v e r y t h i n g t h a t exists, i.e. as c a l c u l a t e d infinity. But t h e e x h a u s t i n g of a n y possible k n o w l e d g e is n e i t h e r a real n o r even an a b s t r a c t possibility, i.e. is simply impossible. And it must not be t h o u g h t , in addition, t h a t m a n is interested in k n o w i n g all a n d e v e r y t h i n g simply so t h a t n o t h i n g would r e m a i n u n k n o w n . E v e n in t h e s p h e r e of e v e r y d a y e x i s t e n c e p e o p l e still do not e x p e r i e n c e a need for k n o w l e d g e of all t h e t h i n g s k n o w n to t h e m . But t h a t 'still' applies in p a r t i c u l a r to w h a t lies b e y o n d e v e r y d a y e x p e r i e n c e . T h e i n c o m p l e t e n e s s of h u m a n k n o w l e d g e is always being o v e r c o m e , w h i c h m e a n s that k n o w l e d g e is always i n c o m p l e t e . C o n s c i o u s n e s s of t h a t truth distinguishes t h e g e n u i n e scientist from both t h e d o g m a t i s t and t h e agnostic, w h o bewails t h e p o w e r l e s s n e s s of h u m a n reason that he himself has i n v e n t e d . K n o w l e d g e is both a b s o l u t e a n d relative, w h i c h m e a n s that a n y i g n o r a n c e is s u r m o u n t a b l e (from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of m a n kind's historical d e v e l o p m e n t ) a n d that a n y k n o w l e d g e is i n c o m p l e t e , even w h e n it yields a b s o l u t e t r u t h . S p i n o z a h a d a l r e a d y essentially f o r m u l a t e d t h a t p r i n c i p l e : 1. t h e r e is an infinite n u m b e r of k n o w a b l e things; 2. t h e finite mind c a n n o t c o m p r e h e n d the infinite ( 2 4 9 : 4 ) . T h e r e a r e n o things w h o s e n a t u r e would m a k e t h e m in p r i n c i p l e u n k n o w a b l e . But d o e s that m e a n that t h e t e r m ' u n k n o w a b l e ' simply lacks scientific sense in all cases? We obviously will n e v e r k n o w t h e c o n t e n t of m a n y Egyptian p a p y r i that h a v e vanished for e v e r ; a n d it will r e m a i n u n k n o w n b e c a u s e of c e r t a i n empirical c i r c u m s t a n c e s . It is c i r c u m s t a n c e s like that which m a k e it impossible, for e x a m p l e , to establish w h a t was in a given, a r b i t r a r i l y selected spot ten t h o u s a n d y e a r s ago. We usually p r e f e r to speak in these cases, of c o u r s e , of t h e u n k n o w n and not. t h e u n k n o w a b l e . But s o m e thing u n k n o w n can b e c o n v e r t e d into t h e u n k n o w a b l e t h r o u g h d i s a p p e a r a n c e of t h e factual d a t a n e e d e d for k n o w i n g it. And in t h e history of k n o w l e d g e t h e r e a r e seemingly irreversible processes, gaps, and omissions that c a n n o t be m a d e good. And t h e t e r m ' u n k n o w a b l e ' h a s a c e r t a i n sense w h e n it is not a m a t t e r of u n k n o w a b i l i t y in p r i n c i p l e or of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l . T h e m e t a p h y s i c i a n i m a g i n e s t h e a g g r e g a t e of t h e objects of cognition as a definite sum or set, p a r t of w h i c h is a l r e a d y k n o w n , so that f u r t h e r d e v e l o p m e n t of k n o w l e d g e r e d u c e s all that r e m a i n s u n k n o w n . T h e i n a d e q u a t e n e s s of that view is that it r e p l a c e s t h e infinite by t h e finite. It usually c o n s i d e r s t h e a g g r e g a t e of possible objects of k n o w l e d g e to be i n e x h a u s t i b l e
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only as regards quantity, overlooking the qualitative inexhaustibility of phenomena. Not only is the whole set of phenomena of the universe infinite, but also the subsets of this set. Lenin's remark about the inexhaustibility of the electron must be understood above all in the epistemological sense. In the nineteenth century naturalists were already expressing the idea that knowledge of physical, chemical, and other phenomena was nearing completion. Contemporary science exploded that view as epistemologically primitive. Heisenberg hardly deserved the reproaches levelled at him when he said, not only wittily but essentially correctly, that the number of things unknown was being increased thanks to the process of cognition. That, did not, of course, mean that the number of known things is being reduced during the historical course of the development of knowledge. T h e matter is that most of the phenomena modern science is concerned with were unknown in the past. For the atomists of antiquity and of modern times there was no unknown structure of the atom since they did not know of its existence and did not think that the atom was a complex formation. T h e unknown is the objective reality existing outside and independent of consciousness, but its description as unknown is, of course, an epistemological one, which means that in order to know some fragment of objective reality it is necessary to separate it from what is already known, and to single out and recognise the unknown in it. T h e history of Marxist philosophy witnesses that in one historical period problems of the struggle against epistemological dogmatism, and in another the critique of epistemological scepticism, were brought to the fore. In spite of the difference in the conditions and tasks, however, the founders of Marxism waged a constant battle against both metaphysical conceptions. Engels, for instance, pointed out that 'human thought, is just as much sovereign as not sovereign, and its capacity for knowledge just as much unlimited as limited' (50:103), and at the same time stressed that knowledge of the unique, finite, and transient was also knowledge of the universal, infinite, and eternal. T h e same consistently dialectical approach is characteristic of Lenin's works. In Materialism and Empirio-Criticism he criticised first and foremost absolute relativism, demonstrating that the difference between relative and absolute truth was by no means absolute, by virtue of which 'human thought then by its nature is capable of giving, and does give, absolute truth, which is compounded of a sum-total of relative truths' (142:119). In other works of that and later periods, he explained
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t h a t M a r x i s m s t o o d firmly, as a g e n u i n e s c i e n c e of society, on a f o u n d a t i o n of historical facts, and precisely for that reason rejected in principle t h e possibility of theoretical solutions w h e r e the necessary historical e x p e r i e n c e for it h a d not been gathered. As for M a r x i s m ' s views on the c o m m u n i s t future of mankind, he remarked: ' T h e r e is no trace of an attempt on M a r x ' s part to m a k e up a utopia, to indulge in idle guesswork about what cannot be k n o w n ' (145:81). T h e epistemological m e a n i n g of t h a t is that it rejects, t o g e t h e r with scepticism, u n s o u n d a t t e m p t s to c o n v e r t scientific k n o w l e d g e in an absolute. ' D i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m insists o n t h e a p p r o x i m a t e , r e l a t i v e c h a r a c t e r of every scientific t h e o r y of t h e s t r u c t u r e of m a t t e r a n d its p r o p e r t i e s ' ( 1 4 2 : 2 4 2 ) . It would be dogmatism to suppose that a dialectical understanding of the knowability of the world introduces an element of u n c e r t a i n t y into people's conscious activity. On t h e c o n t r a ry, it m a k e s this activity m o r e c o n s c i o u s , self-critical, c r e a tive, r e s o u r c e f u l , a n d mindful of t h e c h a n g e in conditions. Philosophical scepticism (agnosticism) is thus refuted by the w h o l e history of m a n k i n d ' s knowledge and practice. But it retains considerable influence in bourgeois society. T h a t is not simply inertia; historically outlived tendencies a r e preserved in society not b e c a u s e o n e p r e v e n t s their existence, but because there are reactionary forces that maintain them. T h e crisis of c o n t e m p o r a r y idealist philosophy, i n c a p a b l e of assimil a t i n g m a t e r i a l i s t d i a l e c t i c s b e c a u s e o f its s o c i a l o r i e n t a t i o n , is o n e of the m a i n reasons for t h e existence of philosophical doctrines that h a v e long b e e n historical a n a c h r o n i s m s .

NOTES
T h e hylozoistie-organicist u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e unity of t h e spiritual and m a l e r i a l w a s a l s o r e t a i n e d by e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y m a t e r i a l i s t s , in s p i t e of the already established mechanistic interpretation of n a t u r e . Even J o h n T o l a n d , w h o substantiated the principle of the self-motion of matter argued t h a t t h e r e w a s n o t h i n g not o r g a n i c i n t h e e a r t h a n d c o u l d b e n o t h i n g t h a t was self-generated; and that everything arose from an a p p r o p r i a t e embryo. Nihil interra, ut verbo dicam, organicum est; aequivoca datur illius rei, se absque p r o p r i o femine, g e n e r a t i o ( 2 5 7 : 2 1 ) . In a n o t h e r p l a c e he w r o t e t h a t t h i s m u s t be t h o u g h t a b o u t t h i n g s in the Universe, not just of a n i m a l s a n d p l a n t s , b u t also a b o u t s t o n e s , m i n e r a l s , a n d metals, w h i c h w e r e n o less c a p a b l e o f g r o w t h , a n d o r g a n i c , possessed t h e i r o w n s e e d s , w e r e formed in an a p p r o p r i a t e e n v i r o n m e n t , a n d grew from a special nutrient, l i k e m e n , q u a d r u p e d s , r e p t i l e s , birds, a q u a t i c a n i m a l s , a n d p l a n t s . Idem esto de reliquis Universi speciebus judicium, de animalibus tantum and stirpibus; sed etiam de lapidibus, m i n e r a l i b u s , and metallis: quae
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minus vegetabilia sunt and organica, suis gaudentia seminibus, proprijs in matricibus formata, et peculiari crescentia nutrimento; quam homines, quadrupedes, reptiles, alites, natatiles, aut plantae (257:17). There were s i m i l a r v i e w s a s well a m o n g t h e F r e n c h m a t e r i a l i s t s o f t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y , e s p e c i a l l y with R o b i n e t , w h o still l a r g e l y s h a r e d t h e v i e w s o f Renaissance philosophers.
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A m b a r t s u m y a n a n d Kazyutinsky h a v e formulated their understanding of t h e scientific a s p e c t s of t h e p r o b l e m of t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e in t h e foll o w i n g w a y : ' A t a n y g i v e n m o m e n t n a t u r a l s c i e n c e i s d e a l i n g o n l y with s e p a r a t e a s p e c t s of t h a t p a r t of o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y t h a t is s i n g l e d out by t h e e m p i r i c a l a n d t h e o r e t i c a l m e a n s a v a i l a b l e a t t h a t t i m e . C o s m o l o g y d o e s not h a v e a special place a m o n g the other natural sciences in that respect"all m a t t e r " ( t h e m a t e r i a l w o r l d as a w h o l e ) is n o t n o w , a n d n e v e r will b e , its object. T h e v e r y p o s i n g o f this p r o b l e m i s not l e g i t i m a t e ' ( 4 : 2 3 5 ) . L a t e r I shall s h o w t h a t f a r f r o m all n a t u r a l i s t s (in p a r t i c u l a r , a s t r o n o m e r s ) s h a r e t h a t point of v i e w . Its v a l u e , in my v i e w , lies in its c r i t i c a l a t t i t u d e to t h e u n l i m i t e d , often u n s u b s t a n t i a t e d e x t r a p o l a t i o n of e x i s t i n g scientific n o t i o n s to the whole universe, which undoubtedly contains m u c h that does not a g r e e with t h e m . A n d i t i s n o t b e c a u s e t h e s e n o t i o n s a r e m i s t a k e n , b u t b e c a u s e they a r e relative. 'Being', Engels r e m a r k e d , 'indeed, is always an open question b e y o n d t h e point w h e r e o u r s p h e r e o f o b s e r v a t i o n s e n d s ' ( 5 0 : 5 5 ) . C o n t e m p o r a r y i d e a l i s m , h o w e v e r , p e r s i s t e n t l y s t r i v e s t o c l o s e this q u e s t i o n , i.e. to w i t h d r a w it f r o m t h e c o m p e t e n c e of s c i e n c e a n d p h i l o s o p h y . T h i s s t r i v i n g to e l i m i n a t e t h e p r o b l e m of t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e is p a r t i c u l a r l y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of n e o p o s i t i v i s m . ' T h e w o r l d as a w h o l e ' , s a y s V i c t o r K r a f t , 'remains beyond science. T h e r e is t h e r e f o r e an i n s u r m o u n t a b l e dualism of mechanism and determinism in n a t u r e on the one hand, and of creative d e v e l o p m e n t a n d f r e e d o m i n life a n d c o n s c i o u s n e s s o n t h e o t h e r ' ( 1 2 6 : 6 2 ) . K r a f t , we s e e , d o e s not limit himself to an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l c r i t i q u e of t h e m a t e r i a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n of t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e ; he c o u n t e r p o s e s a dualist m e t a p h y s i c s to it. So t h e latent o n t o l o g i c a l p r e m i s s e s of e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l idealism c o m e out, in w h i c h a d e m o n s t r a t i v e d e n i a l of e v e r y t h i n g o n t o logical is t y p i c a l .
4

It is c o n v e n i e n t to n o t e h e r e that a s i m i l a r view h a s b e e n e x p r e s s e d by a n a t u r a l i s t , a s r e m o t e from d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m a s H e r m a n n Bondi: ' T h e p r o b l e m is, of c o u r s e , t h a t t h e u n i v e r s e c a n n o t be s h u t off from o u r o r d i n a r y p h y s i c s . It c o m e s i n t o it at e v e r y t u r n . . . . T h e u n i v e r s e c o m e s into e v e r y e x p e r i m e n t b e c a u s e it p r o v i d e s t h e i n e r t i a of t h e bodies t a k i n g p a r t in it' ( 2 0 : 8 3 ) . T h e c o n c e p t o f t h e w o r l d a s a w h o l e c o n s e q u e n t l y c a n n o t b e e x c l u d e d e i t h e r from t h e g e n e r a l p i c t u r e o f t h e w o r l d o r from s t u d y o f s e p a r a t e fragments of objective reality. 'In t h e p a s t ' , A b d i l d i n (for e x a m p l e ) w r i t e s , ' p h i l o s o p h e r s c r e a t e d d o c t r i n e s a b o u t t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e , a n d c o n s t a n t l y a n d tirelessly l o o k e d for an a b s o l u t e p r i n c i p l e o n w h i c h t o build t h e i r c u m b e r s o m e s y s t e m s o f t h e w o r l d . All that w a s t o l e r a b l e s o l o n g a s c o n c r e t e k n o w l e d g e ( p h y s i c s , c o s m o l o g y , a s t r o n o m y , b i o l o g y , p o l i t i c a l e c o n o m y , e t c . ) h a d n o t yet b e e n d e v e l o p e d ' ( 1 : 1 6 8 - 1 6 9 ) . A little l a t e r A b d i l d i n s p e a k s of t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e that ' t h e fundamental Leninist proposition about the inexhaustibility of matter' h a s f o r s c i e n c e ( i b i d . ) , s e e m i n g l y not c o n s c i o u s t h a t t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n r e f e r s not t o s o m e s e p a r a t e f r a g m e n t o r o t h e r o f r e a l i t y , b u t t o t h e w h o l e universum. 133

O n e c a n n o t , t h e r e f o r e , a g r e e w i t h S u k h o v , w h o i n fact identifies idealism a n d r e l i g i o n . ' R e l i g i o n , ' he w r i t e s , 'is a f o r m of o b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m ; its most c r u d e a n d p r i m i t i v e f o r m ' ( 2 5 1 : 1 1 6 ) . But r e l i g i o n , a s a f o r m o f social c o n s c i o u s n e s s , differs e s s e n t i a l l y f r o m p h i l o s o p h y ( e v e n idealist p h i l o s o p h y ) , a n d arose, furthermore, m a n y thousand years earlier than philosophy. T h e history of p h i l o s o p h y as a s c i e n c e t h e r e f o r e d o e s not i n c l u d e t h e h i s t o r y of r e l i g i o n , w h i c h m u s t n o t , in g e n e r a l , be r e g a r d e d as t h e h i s t o r y of k n o w l e d g e , if o n ly b e c a u s e religious consciousness is opposed to the conscious, realistically orientated practical activity within which the cognitive process takes place d i r e c t l y , e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e e a r l y s t a g e s o f social e v o l u t i o n . O n l y s u b s e q u e n t l y did religious images begin to be interpreted as expressing cognitive strivings. T h e f u n d a m e n t a l t h e o r e t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s o f i d e a l i s m s h o u l d n o t b e identified w i t h r e l i g i o u s n o t i o n s a b o u t t h e s u p e r n a t u r a l , a l t h o u g h t h e y a r e l i n k e d with o n e a n o t h e r h i s t o r i c a l l y . S u k h o v d o e s n o t a l l o w f o r t h e real h i s t o r i c a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n p h i l o s o p h y a n d religion w h e n , for e x a m p l e , h e says: T h e idealist a n s w e r t o t h e b a s i c p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n i s t h e e p i s t e m o l o g ical e s s e n c e o f a n y r e l i g i o n ' ( 2 5 1 : 1 1 7 ) . T h i s t e n d e n c y i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f idealist i d e o l o g y w a s n o t e d b y v o n E i c k e n . But h e , b e i n g himself an idealist, i n t e r p r e t e d it as t h e t r e n d of d e v e l o p m e n t of all p h i l o s o p h y from ' c r u d e ' n a t u r a l i s t i c v i e w s to ' s u b l i m e ' religiousidealist ones. He t h e r e f o r e claimed that 'the leading thought of philosophy was obviously t h e t e n d e n c y to attribute the multiplicity of p h e n o m e n a t o a s i n g l e first c a u s e , t a b s t r a c t t h e l a t t e r m o r e a n d m o r e f r o m m a t e r i a l i t y , a n d to c o n c e i v e of it as an i m m a t e r i a l b e i n g ' ( 4 8 : 3 8 ) . T h e opposite tendency, which adequately expresses the development of natural science and the historical process of the mastering of nature's elemental f o r c e s , is i g n o r e d by idealists. ' R e a s o n , ' w r o t e H e g e l , 'is t h e soul of t h e w o r l d it i n h a b i t s , its i m m a n e n t p r i n c i p l e , its most p r o p e r a n d i n w a r d n a t u r e , its u n i v e r s a l ' ( 8 6 : 3 7 ) . F e u e r b a c h justly e v a l u a t e d t h e H e g e l i a n p h i l o s o p h y a s ' p a n t h e i s t i c i d e a l i s m ' . H e g e l , himself, besides, had r e c o g n i s e d this fact, t h o u g h n o t w i t h o u t r e s e r v a t i o n s . P a n t h e i s m , h e w r o t e , 'by n o m e a n s s h a d e s i n t o a b r e a k i n g d o w n a n d s y s t e m a t i s i n g . N e v e r t h e l e s s t h i s view f o r m s a n a t u r a l s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r every healthy soul' ( 9 0 : 4 9 ) .
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T o d a y , a s i n t h e p a s t , n o few idealists, o f c o u r s e , reject t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l n o r m a t i v e s of scientific r e s e a r c h , or o n l y a d o p t t h e m as a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n of r e s p e c t a b i l i t y in p h i l o s o p h y . T h e N e o t h o m i s t c o n c e p t i o n of t h e h a r m o n y of r e a s o n a n d faith is s u c h a p s e u d o s c i e n t i f i c d o g m a , that o n l y o u t w a r d l y c o n t r a d i c t s t h e P r o t e s t a n t belief a b o u t t h e a b s o l u t e a n t i t h e s i s o f r e l i g i o n a n d s c i e n c e . I n o u r d a y idealists a l s o often s t r u g g l e w i t h t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of d e s p a i r to affirm a p u r e l y r e l i g i o u s c o n t e n t in p h i l o s o p h y . At t h e 13th International Congress of Philosophy the Spanish philosopher M u o z A l o n s o was deservedly likened to a prophet preaching the truths of revelation. H e r e a r e s o m e e x t r a c t s f r o m his p a p e r Homeless Man. ' T h e s u p e r n a t u r a l is n o t of this w o r l d . But t h a t is n o t to s a y t h a t it c a n n o t b e c o n c e r n e d with this w o r l d ' ( 1 8 7 : 7 4 ) . C l a i m i n g t h a t c o n t e m p o r a r y philosophy was too 'stuck' in t h e earthly, historically transient, he argued t h a t this p a t h w a s l e a d i n g i t a w a y f r o m t h e u r g e n t p r o b l e m s o f h u m a n life. ' C o n t e m p o r a r y philosophy is m a k i n g it quite evident that it has no a n s w e r to t h e vitally i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n , o f Biblical p r o v e n a n c e , t h a t p h i l o s o p h y c a n n o t shirk: My God, My God, why hast thou foresaken me? (187:78). M u o z A l o n s o i s q u i t e t y p i c a l . Did H e g e l n o t h a v e t o d e f e n d himself
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deferentially against t h e mystic a n d political r e a c t i o n a r y von B a a d e r , w h o accused him of making concessions to materialist philosophy? (See 84:xxxviii-xii). T h e Swiss M a r x i s t S c h w a r z notes a p r o p o s of this that S c h o p e n h a u e r ' s 'physiological-biological point of view is m u c h m o r e materialist t h a n that of B c h n e r and Moleschott' (242:18). O n e c a n n o t a g r e e with that, h o w e v e r , s i n c e t h e u n c o n s c i o u s spirit, t h e b l i n d u n i v e r s a l will t h a t c r e a t e s e v e r y t h i n g and destroys everything, was p r i m a r y for S c h o p e n h a u e r . C o n sciousness actually proved to be derivative, but matter, too, with which it was directly linked, was treated as derivative of t h e blind, unconscious, cosmic will. T h e r e is n o t a g r a i n of m a t e r i a l i s m in this c o n c e p t i o n d e s p i t e t h e q u i t e d e l i b e r a t e u s e of a c e r t a i n m a t e r i a l i s t p r o p o s i t i o n .
10

T h i s idealist d e n i a l of t h e r e a l i t y of c o n s c i o u s n e s s is n o t o n l y an e n d e a v o u r to eliminate the d i l e m m a formulated by t h e basic philosophical question, b u t a l s o a n a t t e m p t a t p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l r e d u c t i o n o f p s y c h i c life t o t h e d i r e c t l y o b s e r v e d b e h a v i o u r in w h i c h it is m a n i f e s t e d a n d objectified. William J a m e s anticipated behaviourism, which, starting from zoopsycholo g y ( w h i c h s t u d i e s t h e b e h a v i o u r of a n i m a l s w h i c h , it is a s s u m e d , do n o t possess c o n s c i o u s n e s s ) c o n c l u d e d t h a t h u m a n b e h a v i o u r w a s w h o l l y e x p l i cable without admitting such 'survivals' of t h e metaphysical conception of s o u l o r spirit s u c h a s t h e c o n c e p t s o f p s y c h e , c o n s c i o u s n e s s , a n d t h o u g h t . Watson, the founder of behaviourism, wrote: ' T h e time seems to have c o m e w h e n p s y c h o l o g y m u s t d i s c a r d all r e f e r e n c e t o c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' ( 2 6 0 : 7 ) . Behaviourists e q u a t e d t h o u g h t and speech, which they treated in t u r n as a c e r t a i n reaction of t h e l a r y n x . Sensations, e m o t i o n s , self-awareness, etc., w e r e i n t e r p r e t e d i n r o u g h l y t h e s a m e w a y . W e t h u s s e e t h a t t h e idealist d e n i a l of c o n s c i o u s n e s s w a s a false, i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of facts t h a t e x p e r i m e n t a l p s y c h o l o g i s t s w e r e e n g a g e d i n i n v e s t i g a t i n g . T h e m i s c o n c e p t i o n o f idealism s o o n b e c a m e t h e f a l l a c y of a s c h o o l of p s y c h o l o g y .
11

Weiss, an a d h e r e n t of behaviourism, w r o t e for instance, that 'the question, " I s t i m e a n d s p a c e i n d e p e n d e n t o f h u m a n b e i n g s ? " m e r e l y r e d u c e s itself to t h e absurdity, " C a n special forms of h u m a n behavior occur without h u m a n b e i n g s " ' ( 2 6 2 : 2 3 ) . I n s p i t e o f its d e n i a l o f t h e r e a l i t y o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , b e h a v i o u r i s m t h u s a r r i v e d a t a s u b j e c t i v e idealist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the objective conditions of men's existence. T h e conclusion was by n o m e a n s a c h a n c e o n e ; i t f o l l o w e d logically f r o m t h e s u b j e c t i v i s t u n d e r s t a n d i n g of k n o w l e d g e (and science) as a m o d e of b e h a v i o u r a n d a d a p t a tions to the 'stimulus-response' principle (262:25).
12

It w o u l d be i n c o r r e c t to i g n o r e t h e theoretical r o o t s of O s t w a l d ' s e n e r g i s m , w h i c h h a v e been justly pointed out by Kuznetsov: 'Discovery of t h e law of t h e c o n s e r v a t i o n a n d t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of e n e r g y a n d t h e s u c c e s s e s of t h e r m o d y n a m i c s w h e n a p p l i e d t o m a n y classes o f n a t u r a l p h e n o m e n a w e r e the excuse for making attempts to convert " p u r e " energy into an absolute that allegedly eliminated m a t t e r from n a t u r e and b e c a m e t h e ultimate c o n t e n t of everything in g e n e r a l that exists' ( 1 3 0 : 6 4 ) . Ostwald, seemingly, by no m e a n s m e a n t t o s a v e idealism b y m e a n s o f e n e r g i s m . I f h e h a d u n d e r s t o o d matter as objective reality existing outside a n d independent of the mind, he would not h a v e b e g u n to c o u n t e r p o s e m a t t e r to energy.
13

It is s y m p t o m a t i c t h a t G u e r o u l t c a l l e d his idealist c o n c e p t i o n ' t h e p o i n t of v i e w o f a p o s i t i v e a n d m a t e r i a l i s t r e a l i s m t h a t w a n t s t o b e s t r i c t l y scientific' ( 8 0 : 1 0 ) . B u t ' r e a l i s t ' m a t e r i a l i s t s differ, i n his view, f r o m t h o s e t h a t P l a t o

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had already criticised as 'friends of the e a r t h ' , i n c a p a b l e of rising a b o v e the h o r i z o n o f t h e e a r t h l y . G u e r o u l t ' s ' m a t e r i a l i s t ' p h i l o s o p h y , a s h e himself a c k n o w l e d g e d , is a g n o s t i c p h i l o s o p h y of e t e r n i t y t h a t c o n s i d e r s t i m e an illusion o r e v e n a d e c e p t i o n . M y p a p e r ' P o s t u l a t e s o f t h e I r r a t i o n a l i s t P h i l o s o p h y of H i s t o r y ' in t h e s y m p o s i u m on t h e r e s u l t s of t h e 14th I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n g r e s s of P h i l o s o p h y [ P . N . F e d o s e e v ( E d . ) Filosofiya i sov r e m e n n o s t ' , N a u k a , M o s c o w , 1 9 7 1 ] w a s d e v o t e d t o a c r i t i c a l a n a l y s i s o f this c o n c e p t i o n of G u e r o u l t ' s .
15

T h e Hegelian epistemological optimism of c o u r s e had a negative aspect. H i s Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences s u b s t a n t i a t e d the attainability o f a b s o l u t e k n o w l e d g e , a n d t h e possibility o f c o m p l e t i n g t h e h i s t o r i c a l p r o c e s s of its d e v e l o p m e n t , at least in its t h e o r e t i c a l f o r m , w h i c h he r e d u c e d basically to philosophy. T h i s c o n s e r v a t i v e epistemological tendency is essentially p e c u l i a r t o all m e t a p h y s i c a l s y s t e m s . O n e d o e s n o t h a v e t o s h o w t h a t t h e c l a i m to a b s o l u t e k n o w l e d g e , in p a r t i c u l a r w h e n it is l i n k e d w i t h idealist s u b s t a n t i a t i o n of t h e r e l i g i o u s o u t l o o k , a n d w i t h a c o u n t e r p o s i n g of p h i l o s o p h y (as ' a b s o l u t e s c i e n c e ' ) r e l a t i v e t o scientific k n o w l e d g e , i s a s alien t o t h e scientific o u t l o o k o n t h e w o r l d a s s c e p t i c a l n e g a t i o n o f m a n ' s c o g n i t i v e power. I t will r e a d i l y b e u n d e r s t o o d t h a t H e g e l r e j e c t e d t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e o f r e f l e c t i o n for t h e s a m e r e a s o n s t h a t P l a t o h a d d o n e s o i n a n t i q u i t y ; this p r i n c i p l e posits r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y of n a t u r e , r e c o g n i t i o n of s e n s e - p e r c e i v e d r e a l i t y a s r e a l i t y , a n d n o t s i m p l y a p p e a r a n c e o r e v e n illusion. O n e must r e m e m b e r , however, that in d e n y i n g t h e epistemological principle of r e f l e c t i o n H e g e l s u b s t a n t i a t e d t h e i d e n t i t y in p r i n c i p l e of d i a l e c t i c s , logic, a n d e p i s t e m o l o g y . I n t h a t w a y h e b r o u g h t out p r o f o u n d l y ( a n d a t t h e s a m e t i m e mystified) t h e u n i t y o f t h o u g h t a n d b e i n g , t h e c o g n i t i v e activity of the subject, the objectivity of the forms of thinking, the i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n o f c a t e g o r i e s , a n d m u c h else t h a t m e t a p h y s i c a l m a t e r i a l i s t s did not understand, and which promoted the development of the dialectical-materialist p r i n c i p l e of t h e r e f l e c t i o n of o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y , i r r e s p e c t i v e of H e g e l ' s i n t e n t i o n s . L e n i n w r o t e : ' H e g e l a c t u a l l y proved t h a t logical f o r m s a n d laws a r e n o t a n e m p t y s h e l l , b u t t h e reflection o f t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d . M o r e o r r e c t l y , he did not p r o v e , b u t made a brilliant guess (144:180-181). In s p i t e of his b r i l l i a n t g u e s s , h o w e v e r , H e g e l , b e i n g an o p p o n e n t of m a t e rialism, rejected the t h e o r y of reflection, c o n s i d e r i n g it an empirical c o n c e p tion t h a t c o u l d not rise to u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e n a t u r e of t h e o r e t i c a l , in particular philosophical knowledge.
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17

In this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of s e n s a t i o n s is to be felt t h e r e j e c t i o n c h a r a c t e ristic of N e o k a n t i a n i s m not o n l y of t h e ' t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f ' b u t also of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a e s t h e t i c in w h i c h K a n t , in s p i t e of his a p r i o r i s m , still set o u t f r o m t h e c o n v i c t i o n t h a t t h e b a s i s o f k n o w l e d g e w a s p r o v i d e d b y s e n s e e x p e r i e n c e . C a s s i r e r t o o k a q u i t e d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n , a f f i r m i n g t h a t 'all c o n s c i o u s n e s s r e f e r s first of all o n l y to t h e s u b j e c t i v e s t a t e s of t h e i n d i v i d ual Ego, which is precisely that these states constitute t h e content of the i m m e d i a t e l y given' ( 3 1 : 3 9 1 ) . T h a t , too, is an a b a n d o n i n g of t h e e p i s t e m o l o g ical p r i n c i p l e of r e f l e c t i o n , w h i c h is r e p l a c e d by a s u b j e c t i v i s t c o n s t r u i n g of the sense-perceived p i c t u r e of t h e w o r l d . E v e n N e o t h o m i s t s , f o r w h o m ( a s B y k h o v s k y r e m a r k s ) ' t h e possibility o f rational k n o w l e d g e is based on the substantial identity of t h e rational mind and the spiritual f u n d a m e n t a l principle of being' ( 2 7 : 1 2 7 ) , admit the know136

18

a b i l i t y in p r i n c i p l e of t h e m a t e r i a l w o r l d , t h e e x i s t e n c e of w h i c h d e n i e d a n d is r e g a r d e d as t h e r e s u l t of d i v i n e c r e a t i o n .
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is n o t

T h e s c e p t i c a d m i t s o n l y j u d g m e n t s o f p e r c e p t i o n ( t o use K a n t ' s e x p r e s s i o n ) , i.e. a s i m p l e s t a t e m e n t o f t h e o b s e r v e d . H e m a y s a y , ' w h e n t h e s u n i s w a r m , a s t o n e g e t s h o t ' , b u t h e d a r e n o t affirm t h a t ' t h e s u n h e a t s t h e s t o n e ' , s i n c e s u c h a j u d g m e n t posits r e c o g n i t i o n a n d a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e p r i n c i p l e of causality. In opposition to t h e sceptics, Kant claimed that a categorial synthesis of sense contemplations was possible and had objective significance. In s p i t e of t h e i n e v i t a b l e i n c o m p l e t e n e s s of e m p i r i c a l i n d u c t i o n , j u d g m e n t s o f strict u n i v e r s a l i t y a n d n e c e s s i t y e x i s t e d , a n d w e r e e v i d e n c e d b y p u r e m a t h e m a t i c s a n d ' p u r e s c i e n c e ' ( t h e o r e t i c a l m e c h a n i c s ) . T h e t a s k consisted o n l y i n e x p l o r i n g h o w t h i s fact o f k n o w l e d g e ( i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h s c e p t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i s i n g ) w a s possible. O n e m u s t not a s s u m e t h a t this a p p r a i s a l o f a g n o s t i c i s m w a s d e t e r m i n e d b y C h e s t e r t o n ' s T h o m i s m . T h e t e r m ' a g n o s t i c i s m ' w a s e m p l o y e d i n this c a s e i n a v e r y c o m m o n s e n s e . A n a t o l e F r a n c e , r i d i c u l i n g religion a n d t h e o l o g y , said of a c h a r a c t e r in his Revolt of the Angels: ' H e w a s a g n o s t i c , as o n e says, in society, so as not to employ t h e odious t e r m of freethinker. And h e c a l l e d himself a g n o s t i c , c o n t r a r y t o t h e c u s t o m o f h i d i n g t h a t . I n o u r c e n t u r y t h e r e a r e so many ways of believing and not believing that future h i s t o r i a n s will h a r d l y b e a b l e t o find t h e i r b e a r i n g s ' ( 6 5 : 5 ) .
20

It w o u l d be a m i s t a k e to c o u n t e r p o s e t h e p r i n c i p l e of falsifiability to t h a t of verifiabilily a s s o m e t h i n g t h a t e x c l u d e s it. N a r s k y , w h o c h a r a c t e r i s e s P o p p e r ' s p r i n c i p l e as a v e r s i o n of a w e a k e n e d p r i n c i p l e of v e r i f i c a t i o n , is r i g h t . P o p p e r p r o p o s e d n e g a t i v e v e r i f i c a t i o n (falsification) in p l a c e of positive, i.e. o n e 'by w h i c h n e g a t i v e s e n t e n c e s r a t h e r t h a n a f f i r m a t i v e o n e s a r e s u b j e c t t o v e r i f i c a t i o n ' ( 1 9 1 : 2 6 4 ) . T h a t did n o t , o f c o u r s e , e l i m i n a t e t h e difficulties t h a t t h e positivist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f s c i e n c e c a m e u p a g a i n s t .
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Even such a m o d e r a t e neopositivist as R e i c h e n b a c h , w h o does not accept the neopositivist rejection of objective reality, treats physics purely relatively. ' T h e axioms of Euclidean geometry, the principles of causality and s u b s t a n c e a r e no longer recognized by the physics of our days' ( 2 2 0 : 4 8 ) . This essentially nihilistic c o n c l u s i o n follows from t h e e m p i r i c i s t n e g a t i o n p e c u l i a r to n e o p o s i t i v i s m of t h e right of s c i e n c e to g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s t h a t h a v e a universal and necessary significance.
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In this s e n s e t h e finding of u n k n o w n p h e n o m e n a ( ' b l a n k s p o t s ' ) is an act of k n o w i n g . T h a t is o b v i o u s l y w h a t H e i s e n b e r g h a d in m i n d . A n d it is q u i t e c l e a r that i t i s w h a t d e B r o g l i e h a d i n m i n d w h e n h e w r o t e : ' W e m u s t n e v e r f o r g e t , t h e h i s t o r y o f t h e s c i e n c e s p r o v e s it, t h a t e v e r y a d v a n c e i n o u r k n o w l e d g e raises m o r e p r o b l e m s t h a n i t s o l v e s a n d t h a t i n t h i s d o m a i n e a c h n e w l a n d d i s c o v e r e d g i v e s us a g l i m p s e of v a s t c o n t i n e n t s yet u n k n o w n ' ( 2 3 : 3 8 1 ) . A n a d h e r e n t o f a g n o s t i c i s m w o u l d p r o b a b l y n o t fail t o i n t e r p r e t t h e s e w o r d s , t o o , in his o w n w a y . T h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l possibility of s u c h a w r o n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a c o r r e c t scientific p r o p o s i t i o n lies in t h e r e l a t i v i t y of t h e opposition between knowledge and ignorance, truth and error. T h e i g n o r i n g of this a n t i t h e s i s , a n d a b s o l u t i s i n g of it, a r e m e t a p h y s i c a l e x t r e m e s characteristic of sceptics on the one h a n d and dogmatists on the other.
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Two

PHILOSOPHICAL T R E N D S AS AN OBJECT OF RESEARCH IN THE HISTORY

III THE DIVERGENCE OF PHILOSOPHICAL DOCTRINES A N D ITS INTERPRETATION. METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS A N D T H E DEVELOPMENT OF T H E ANTITHESIS BETWEEN MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM 1. Dispute about Trends or Dispute of Trends? T h e problem of philosophical trends is one of the most c o m plicated ones in the history of philosophy. T h e variety of trends that c h a r a c t e r i s e s p h i l o s o p h y in a specific w a y h a s always c a u s e d d i s t r u s t o f its c a p a c i t y t o a n s w e r t h e m a t t e r s d i s c u s s e d i n a positive way. R o u s s e a u w r o t e with indignation of t h e rival philosophical trends:
I shall only a s k : W h a t is p h i l o s o p h y ? W h a t do t h e w r i t i n g s of t h e best k n o w n p h i l o s o p h e r s c o n t a i n ? W h a t a r e t h e lessons o f t h e s e f r i e n d s o f w i s d o m ? L i s t e n i n g t o t h e m w o u l d o n e n o t t a k e t h e m for a p a c k o f c h a r l a t a n s , e a c h s h o u t i n g his w a r e s i n p u b l i c : ' C o m e t o m e ; I'm t h e only o n e w h o d o e s n ' t d e c e i v e ' ? O n e c l a i m s t h a t t h e r e i s n o b o d y a n d that everything is representation; a n o t h e r that t h e r e is no substance other than matter and no God other than the world. This one suggests that there a r e no virtues or vices, and that good and bad morals a r e c h i m e r a s ; a n d that o n e that men a r e wolves a n d can d e v o u r each o t h e r with a safe conscience (229:17-18).

OF

PHILOSOPHY

Rousseau condemned the progressing divergence of philosophical doctrines, being u n a w a r e that it had deep and far from c h a n c e causes. Trends in philosophy a r e a b o v e all disputing parties that d o not r e a c h a g r e e m e n t since they d o not c e a s e t o dispute. I n t h a t r e s p e c t t h e y a r e n o t l i k e t h o s e old p r o f e s s o r s w h o a r g u e d b e c a u s e they essentially agreed with o n e a n o t h e r . A constant c o n f r o n t a t i o n f o r m s t h e i n n e r r h y t h m o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f all philosophical trends. And the great philosopher comes forward, as a rule, as a t h i n k e r w h o disagrees, m o r e t h a n a n y o n e else, with w h a t t h e philosophers b e f o r e h i m affirmed. S u c h , in any c a s e , i s his c o n v i c t i o n , w h i c h m o r e o r less r e f l e c t s t h e real s t a t e of affairs. T h e following s t a t e m e n t of Fichte's, addressed to t h e o p p o n e n t s of his p h i l o s o p h y , is t h e r e f o r e typical: ' B e t w e e n y o u a n d m e t h e r e i s n o p o i n t i n c o m m o n a t all o n w h i c h w e c a n
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a g r e e a n d f r o m w h i c h w e c a n a g r e e o n a n y t h i n g else' ( 5 9 : 2 0 8 2 0 9 ) . H e o b v i o u s l y e x a g g e r a t e d his d i s a g r e e m e n t s w i t h o t h e r idealists, b u t t h e y w e r e v e r y s u b s t a n t i a l o n e s . H i s system c a m e i n t o p r o f o u n d conflict e v e n w i t h K a n t ' s , of w h i c h it w a s a d i r e c t c o n t i n u a t i o n . T h a t well i l l u s t r a t e s t h e d e p t h o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i v e r g e n c e s e v e n w i t h i n o n e a n d t h e s a m e , i n this c a s e i d e a l ist, t r e n d . P h i l o s o p h e r s w h o reflect o n t h e d i v e r g e n c e o f p h i l o s o p h i cal d o c t r i n e s d i s a g r e e in t h e i r e v a l u a t i o n of this p h e n o m e n o n , a n d of its e s s e n c e , s i g n i f i c a n c e , a n d p r o s p e c t s . In o t h e r w o r d s , t h e r e a r e various trends even in t h e understanding of philos o p h i c a l t r e n d s : t h e i r e x i s t e n c e reflects t h e v e r y f u n d a m e n t a l fact t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s t h e s u b j e c t o f m y i n q u i r y . S o m e p h i l o s o p h e r s view t h e d i v e r s i t y o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r e n d s as e v i d e n c e of p h i l o s o p h y ' s i n a b i l i t y to be a s c i e n c e , w h i l e o t h e r s s e e it as s t r i k i n g e v i d e n c e t h a t it s h o u l d n o t be o n e : o n e d o e s n o t d e m a n d t h a t a r t b e scientific, s o w h y d e m a n d i t o f p h i l o s o p h y , w h i c h differs both f r o m s c i e n c e a n d f r o m a r t ? T h e r e a r e a l s o w o r k e r s w h o d e n y t h e fact o f t h e e x i s t e n c e of philosophical trends, but not, of course, because they h a v e n o t n o t i c e d a n essential d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n p h i l o s o p h i c a l d o c t r i n e s . O n t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e y d o not n o t i c e t h e essential s i m i l a r ity b e t w e e n t h e m , i.e. t h e g r o u n d s t h a t e n a b l e s o m e t o b e classed i n o n e t r e n d a n d o t h e r s i n a n o t h e r . F r o m t h e i r a n g l e p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r e n d s a r e a n illusion b o r n o f classificatory thinking. T h e r e a r e also v e r y different views, s o m e t i m e s m u t u a l l y exclusive, about t h e reasons for t h e existence of philosophical t r e n d s . S o m e s u p p o s e t h a t p h i l o s o p h e r s h a v e r u s h e d i n different d i r e c t i o n s s i m p l y b e c a u s e t h e y w e r e i n c a p a b l e o f a p p l y i n g in t h e i r field t h e scientific m e t h o d s d e v e l o p e d by mathematics and natural science. Others, on the contrary, see t h e reasons for t h e progressing divergence of philosophical d o c t r i n e s i n t h e v e r y n a t u r e o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l k n o w l e d g e , i.e. r e g a r d t h e c e n t r i f u g a l t e n d e n c i e s a s a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i tion of p h i l o s o p h y ' s e x i s t e n c e . T h i s p r o b l e m o f t r e n d s m a y b e defined i n f i g u r a t i v e t e r m s as o n e of interspecific a n d i n t r a s p e c i f i c d i f f e r e n c e s . In t h a t s e n s e t h e task of t h e h i s t o r y of p h i l o s o p h y is s i m i l a r to t h a t w h i c h D a r w i n c o p e d with in his d a y , i.e. to e x p l o r e t h e origin of t h e s e d i f f e r e n c e s . H e c o n s i d e r e d t h a t t h e e x i s t i n g set o f a n i m a l a n d plant species had c o m e about t h r o u g h development or evolution, t h e m a i n elements of which w e r e t h e d i v e r g e n c e of intraspecific characteristics, inheritance and a c h a n g e in heredity, adaptation
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to conditions, and struggle for existence. Philosophical doctrines, tendencies, and trends, and consequently, too, the differences between t h e m are also the product of historical development, in which the original differences between a few scholars b e c a m e ever d e e p e r and m o r e essential. This d i v e r g e n c e of philosophical d o c t r i n e s led t o t h e r i s e o f n e w p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c e p t i o n s , t h e o r i e s , a n d s y s t e m s . T h e s u c c e e d i n g d o c t r i n e s did not s i m p l y inherit the content of the preceding ones but also opposed them, selecting ideas in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e new conditions that brought these doctrines into existence.
1

T h i s c o m p a r i s o n of the historical process of philosophy with t h e p i c t u r e of t h e e v o l u t i o n of living c r e a t u r e s is no m o r e , of course, than an analogy. But analogies o c c u r in o b j e c t i v e reality as well as in t h o u g h t . In this c a s e they often p r o v e to be essential relations of similarity. T h e c o n c e p t 'philosophical t r e n d ' , like most philosophical c o n c e p t s , h a s n o r i g o r o u s l y fixed c o n t e n t . N o t o n l y i s t h e r a n g e of m a i n ideas c o m m o n to a n u m b e r of d o c t r i n e s often called a t r e n d , but a l s o c e r t a i n fields of i n q u i r y , for e x a m p l e , n a t u r a l philosophy, epistemology, and ontology. Those doctrines, schools, and tendencies that a r e r e b o r n in new historical conditions, h a v i n g survived their d a y , a r e also often c o n s i d e r e d trends. In c o n t e m p o r a r y bourgeois literature on the history of p h i l o s o p h y , t h e c o n c e p t of t r e n d is q u i t e often c o n v e n t i o n a l . Heinemann, one of the authors (and publisher) of the huge monograph Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, declared:
In E u r o p e a n cultural circles four main trends are life-philosophy; (2) p h e n o m e n o l o g y ; (3) ontology; In Anglo-Saxon cultural circles the following stand tism; ( 2 ) i n s t r u m e n t a l i s m ; ( 3 ) logical p o s i t i v i s m ; schools (96:268). distinguished: (1) (4) existentialism. out: (1) p r a g m a (4) the analytical

I w o u l d n o t e , first o f a l l , t h a t H e i n e m a n n a t t r i b u t e d f u n d a m e n t a l i m p o r t a n c e t o t h e d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n t h e idealist c a m p . He said nothing about the materialist trend, which incidentally is n a t u r a l ; in c o n t e m p o r a r y b o u r g e o i s p h i l o s o p h y materialism is n o t a m a i n t r e n d , d e s p i t e its b e c o m i n g t h e c o n s c i o u s c o n v i c t i o n of most w o r k e r s in the natural sciences. F r o m that angle one could understand the historian of c o n t e m p o r a r y bourgeois phil o s o p h y , w h o s i n g l e s o u t t h e m a i n t r e n d s o f idealist p h i l o s o p h y p r e v a i l i n g in m o d e r n b o u r g e o i s society. But H e i n e m a n n did not follow that line; t h e s e p a r a t e t e n d e n c i e s a n d c u r r e n t s within irrationalism, and also within positivism and p r a g m a t i s m , w e r e m a i n t r e n d s for him. H e c o n s e q u e n t l y refrains f r o m t r a c ing t h e differences both b e t w e e n t r e n d s a n d c u r r e n t s a n d
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between t h e latter and s e p a r a t e doctrines, e.g. pragmatism. O n e might not attribute essential significance to this terminological discrepancy at first glance. But one must stress that refusal to d e m a r c a t e such concepts as 'trend' and 'main t r e n d ' is a b o v e all a denial of t h e polarisation of philosophy into t h e antithesis of materialism and idealism. Underestimation of t h e fundamental i m p o r t a n c e of trends in philosophy is often manifested in a reduction of t h e problem to a methods matter of classification, i.e. the rational g r o u p ing of doctrines in a c c o r d a n c e with a propaedeutic task. In Bocheski's Contemporary European Philosophy, for e x a m ple, t h e following six main (in his opinion) trends or positions a r e named: 'empiricism, idealism, life-philosophy, p h e n o m e n ology, existentialism, and metaphysics' ( 1 6 : 3 1 ) . In this list idealism is one of the six trends in c o n t e m p o r a r y philosophy. T h e others a r e not considered idealist, which witnesses, to put it mildly, to a very peculiar understanding of the essence of idealism. It is also worth drawing attention to t h e point that m a t e rialism did not figure in Bocheski's list. T h a t was not d u e to the c i r c u m s t a n c e already noted a b o v e that materialism has an insignificant place in c o n t e m p o r a r y bourgeois philosophy. F r o m Bocheski's angle materialism was only a variety of empiricism. Its other versions w e r e neorealism and neopositivism. Empiricism was characterised as t h e 'philosophy of matter'; the antithesis between materialist and idealist empiricism was ignored. It could not be otherwise, incidentally, if one followed Bocheski's scheme, according to which idealism was distinguished in principle from empiricism. Bocheski's e r r o r was not simply that he overlooked the opposition of materialism and idealism within empiricism. As is evident from his classification, he interpreted the latest idealist doctrines ( p h e n o m e n o l o g y , metaphysical systems, including N e o t h o m i s m ) as non-idealist. T h e c o n t e m p o r a r y , modernised forms of idealism represented, for him, an overcoming of idealist philosophy, so that he did not see idealismin idealism. W h o are idealists for Bocheski? Croce, Brunschvicg, and t h e Neokantians. Arguing that their basic positions 'unquestionably rise above the primitive level of materialism, positivism, and psychologism as well as theoretical and axiological subjectivism' ( 1 6 : 9 8 ) , he nevertheless considered idealism a trend that had already left t h e historical a r e n a ; in most E u r o p e a n countries, he wrote, 'idealism still exercised the greatest influence' in the first q u a r t e r of t h e century, 'but
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ceased to do so ... by about 1925' (16:26). I leave that to this idealist author's conscience. T h e reverse side of the classificatory approach to philosophy is a subjectivist (mainly irrationalist) denial of the significance (and even existence) of philosophical trends, which are declared in this case to be simply labels invented by teachers of philosophical propaedeutics. T h e adherents of this conception a r e most clearly represented by the French school of the 'philosophy of the history of philosophy' already mentioned. Like the nominalists, they claim that only the individual, unique, exists in philosophy. Adherents of the 'philosophy of the history of philosophy', criticising any attempt to classify doctrines as a populariser's interpretation of the history of philosophy, substantiate a metaphysical understanding of philosophy as an aggregate of sovereign systems even more categorically than the 'classifiers'. While Bocheski established six main trends in contemporary philosophy, every system, from the standpoint of Gueroult and his disciples forms a trend of its own, because philosophy is the 'institution of true realities, or philosophical realities, by philosophising thought' (81:10). From that standpoint there are as many trends in philosophy as there are systems; and all of them, if you please, are main ones. In that connection, however, the concept of a main trend has no sense. From the standpoint of dialectical and historical materialism trends in philosophy are regular forms of its internal differentiation, divergence, and polarisation. T h e singling out of materialism, idealism, and other trends therefore has nothing in common with a purely methods grouping of doctrines by quite obvious attributes. T h e inquirer discovers, and cognises objectively governed, historically moulded differences and antitheses in philosophy, and does not establish them. T h e antithesis between materialism and idealism, rationalism and empiricism, intellectualism and anti-intellectualism, and dialectical and metaphysical modes of thinking is a fundamental fact of a kind that can least of all be considered a conclusion from some system of classification. A philosophical school is a r e markable phenomenon in the intellectual history of the human race. T h e historian of philosophy studies doctrines, currents, schools, and trends, elucidating their problematic, content, direction, and relation to other doctrines, schools, and trends. As for investigation of the antithesis between materialism and idealism, it is analysis of the main contradiction inherent in the development of philosophy, which directly characterises the
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s t r u c t u r e o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l k n o w l e d g e a n d t h e specific f o r m o f its d e v e l o p m e n t . Study of t h e historical c o u r s e of philosophy indicates that the question of trends had already, in antiquity, b e c o m e t h e problem of t h e contradictions in t h e development of philosophy, of its e s s e n c e , a n d of its r i g h t to exist as a s c i e n c e . D i o g e n e s L a e r t i u s h a d a l r e a d y a s s e r t e d t h a t all p h i l o s o p h e r s w e r e d i v i d e d into dogmatists and sceptics.
All those who make assertions about things assuming that they can be known are dogmatists; while all who suspend their judgement on the ground that things are unknowable are sceptics (42:1,17).

K a n t said a l m o s t t h e s a m e t h i n g 2 , 0 0 0 y e a r s a f t e r t h e G r e e k d o x o g r a p h e r , though, unlike Diogenes Laertius, he distinguished an a n t i t h e s i s of m a t e r i a l i s m a n d idealism w i t h i n ' d o g m a t i s m ' . In s u b s t a n t i a t i n g a d u a l i s t ( a n d u l t i m a t e l y idealist) p o s i t i o n , K a n t r e p r o a c h e d b o t h m a t e r i a l i s t s a n d idealists w i t h t a k i n g o n faith w h a t w a s s u b j e c t t o c r i t i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n a n d did n o t , in his o p i n i o n , s t a n d up to it. T h e 'critical p h i l o s o p h y ' c r e a t e d b y K a n t w a s i n t e n d e d , on t h e one h a n d , to o v e r c o m e t h e antithesis between 'dogmatism' a n d s c e p t i c i s m , a n d , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t o f o u n d a n e w , third trend in philosophy that would reconcile materialism and idealism, r a t i o n a l i s m a n d e m p i r i c i s m , s p e c u l a t i v e m e t a p h y s i c s and science. Kant treated 'dogmatism' (or rather dogmatic metaphysics) and scepticism as main philosophical trends, and m a t e r i a l i s m a n d idealism a s v a r i e t i e s o f ' u n c r i t i c a l ' m e t a physics. As I h a v e a l r e a d y p o i n t e d o u t , H e g e l in e s s e n c e b r o u g h t out t h e p a t t e r n of t h e r a d i c a l p o l a r i s a t i o n of p h i l o s o p h y i n t o m a t e r i a l i s t a n d idealist t r e n d s . But h e u n d e r e s t i m a t e d t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of m a t e r i a l i s m as a m a i n t r e n d . A n d he did n o t p a y s u b s t a n t i a l a t t e n t i o n to e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e a n t i t h e s i s of m a t e r i a l i s m a n d idealism in t h e c o n t e x t of t h e basic p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n . A c t u a l b e i n g s u c h w a s his i d e a c o u l d b e physical r e a l i t y , b u t b e i n g - f o r - i t s e l f w a s a l w a y s ideal. T h e ideal, h e c l a i m e d , w a s t h e t r u t h o f e v e r y t h i n g m a t e r i a l , o b j e c t i v e , u n i q u e , o r ( p u t t i n g i t his w a y ) f i n i t e . ' T h i s ideality o f t h e finite is t h e m a i n m a x i m of p h i l o s o p h y ; a n d f o r t h a t r e a s o n every g e n u i n e philosophy is idealism' (86:140). T h e classical w r i t e r s o f p r e - M a r x i a n p h i l o s o p h y u s u a l l y counterposed the main philosophical trends categorically to o n e a n o t h e r . T h a t c a n n o t b e said o f t h e b o u r g e o i s p h i l o s o p h y of t h e last c e n t u r y , in w h i c h a s o p h i s t i c a t i o n of t h e o r e t i c a l a r g u m e n t is c o m b i n e d with a c l e a r u n d e r e s t i m a t i o n ( o r d e n i a l )
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of this fundamental antithesis and illusory notions about the existence of trends beyond materialism and idealism. According to Dilthey, for example, philosophy existed either as a metaphysical outloook with pretensions to sovereignty or in the form of a theory orientated on a synthesis of scientific data. T h e antithesis between materialism and idealism developed, according to him, only within metaphysical system-making:
A bifurcation of the system, with an antithesis of realist and idealist standpoints, or something similar, corresponds to the main counterposing of ideas in thinking which is grounded, at best, in the nature of this metaphysical concept-forming (41:97).

He represented the antithesis between the 'living' metaphysicalirrationalist ideological trend in philosophy and the requirement of scientific character, also taking shape within philosophy, as a characteristic of philosophical knowledge constantly being revived in each new historical age, and consequently attributive. Reduction of the main philosophical antithesis to an opposition between speculative metaphysics claiming to be knowledge above experience, and a specialised, mainly epistemological philosophical theory became a favourite idea of positivism. Having proclaimed struggle against metaphysics the cardinal task of philosophy, the positivists considered both objective idealism of a rationalist turn and materialist philosophy to be metaphysics. Some positivists recognised spiritualism and positivism as the main philosophical trends, others empiricism and rationalism, and still others epistemology and natural philosophy. Ultimately these notions about the main trends agreed with one another on the chief, decisive point, i.e. in denying the fundamental antithesis between materialism and idealism, and in evaluating 'positive philosophy' as the 'philosophy of science', which rejected in principle the task of philosophical comprehension of natural and social reality as scientifically senseless. T h e latest irrationalist idealism, despite its characteristic denial of positivist scientism, in general accepts the positivist notion about the main philosophical trends, although evaluating each of them differently. Some irrationalists speak of the opposition of metaphysics and empiricism, coming forward as reformers of traditional metaphysics or claiming to surmount the antithesis they proclaim; others interpret irrationalist metaphysics as a true empiricism retaining intimate contact with life. T h e Bergsonian, Gilbert Maire, counterposing the irration144

alist m e t a p h y s i c s o f b e c o m i n g t o t h e r a t i o n a l i s t m e t a p h y s i c s of being, defined their inter-relation as an antithesis between idealism and empiricism. 'Philosophy is compelled to choose b e t w e e n t h e s e t w o a t t i t u d e s , ' h e w r o t e , ' a n d a c c o r d i n g t o its choice, it b e c o m e s idealist or empiricist' ( 1 5 7 : 1 9 - 2 0 ) . In a n o t h e r place he stressed that idealism and empiricism w e r e 'the two cardinal points around which philosophical doctrines are grouped' (157:29). Maire, of course, considered himself an o p p o n e n t of idealism (like his t e a c h e r H e n r i B e r g s o n ) , t h e n u b of w h i c h (in his view) was that it trusted the 'evidence of the senses and the data of consciousness only after their refraction in ideas or concepts' (ibid.), w h i l e t h e e m p i r i c i s m t h a t B e r g s o n i s m p r o c l a i m e d itself t h e p i n n a c l e o f ' a c c e p t s , a t l e a s t a s its s t a r t i n g point, inward or external experience as the senses and cons c i o u s n e s s c o n f i d e i t t o it' (ibid.). E m p i r i c i s m w a s t h u s c h a r a c terised as a s p o n t a n e o u s attitude to t h e sensually given, alien to speculative premisses, imbued with confidence and enthus i a s m , a n d a s a w a r e n e s s o f its i n e x h a u s t i b l e r i c h n e s s a n d v i t a l truth. W h a t p h i l o s o p h i c a l d o c t r i n e s did M a i r e class a s e m p i r i cism? His answer was rather interesting:
m a t e r i a l i s m , positivism, a c e r t a i n e v o l u t i o n i s m , p r a g m a t i s m , ism, c o m p r i s e t h e c a t e g o r y of e m p i r i c i s t p h i l o s o p h i e s , in their dissimilarity and disagreement ( 1 5 7 : 2 9 ) . Bergsons p i t e of

T h a t proposition includes an indirect recognition of the polarisation of empiricism into an opposition of materialism and idealism. But M a i r e was far f r o m c o n s c i o u s of that, since he c o u n t e r p o s e d e m p i r i c i s m to idealism. F r o m his point of view Bergsonism was closer to materialism than to idealism. Is m o r e eloquent evidence needed of the unsoundness in principle of this idea of t h e m a i n t r e n d s in p h i l o s o p h y ? I h a v e e x a m i n e d the opinion that philosophy is polarised into two main, mutually exclusive trends that do not correspond to materialism and idealism. Along with t h e 'bifurcation' of philosophy, there h a v e been, h o w e v e r , no few attempts to d e m o n s t r a t e the existence of a m u c h larger n u m b e r of main t r e n d s . T h e Russian idealist G i l y a r o v , for e x a m p l e , a r g u e d that t h e r e w e r e f o u r of t h e m . His line of r e a s o n i n g was as f o l l o w s : p h i l o s o p h y , h o w e v e r f a r i t g o e s i n its s p e c u l a t i o n s , always starts f r o m t h e directly obvious. F o r m a n this w a s only m a n himself, a n d not, m o r e o v e r , m a n i n g e n e r a l but h u m a n existence proper, perceivable by the philosophising individual. B u t m a n a n d t h i s w a s a l s o d i r e c t l y o b v i o u s w a s a corporeal,
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spiritual living creature. These attributes of h u m a n existence, according to Gilyarov, determined the inevitability of four main philosophical trends:
We can try to comprehend reality from the corporeal basis, or from the spiritual, or from the one or the other in their isolation, or from both taken in their unity. T h e first point of view is called materialism, the second spiritualism, the third dualism, and the fourth monism. T h e r e are no other philosophical trends, and cannot be (75:3)

According to him none of these trends could cope with its task. Materialism discovered the impossibility of reducing everything that existed to matter; idealism the impossibility of reducing what exists to spirit; dualism could not explain the interaction of the spiritual and t h e material; and monism could not demonstrate the unity of the spiritual and the material that it postulated. N o n e of the trends, consequently, surpassed the others; they were all only attempts, doomed to failure since there were no roads leading from the directly authentic to being as such, from human existence to the absolute. To some extent Gilyarov's ideas anticipated the existentialist 'philosophy of philosophy' that interprets philosophising as the return of mind to itself from the depersonalised sphere of alienation. And although this return does not, in the existentialists' view, bring us any closer to objective truth, it clarifies our understanding of its fatal unattainability and gives it profound sense. Dilthey saw the difference in principle between philosophical trends and scientific ones in philosophy's being authentic intellectual experience of life, while science was concerned with things that were not experienced but simply studied for the sake of some, usually practical end, necessary but not expressing the sense of life. No one won in the fight between philosophical trends, since each of them expressed a living feeling inevitable for a definite historical age, that was not subject to appraisal as either true or false; it simply existed, like life itself. It was because of its closeness to life that philosophy could not exist as gradually developing knowledge, possessing an inner unity and conforming in its parts. ' E v e r y w h e r e (he contended) we see an infinite variety of philosophical systems in chaotic disorder' (41:75). Each system claimed general significance, which was justified, since philosophy was a life-sensitive expression of its epoch. But along with the rise of a new attitude to the world there also arose a new philosophy cor146

responding to it, whose claims to general significance w e r e as justified as those of all t h e other systems. T h e sense of philosophising, a c c o r d i n g to this conception, wholly mastered by existentialism, consisted in awareness of this contradiction, which was evidence that philosophy's tasks could be c o m p r e h e n d e d but not resolved. Philosophising should t h e r e f o r e be r e g a r d e d as self-comprehension r a t h e r than mastery of t r u t h or k n o w l e d g e of s o m e material content, and so as discovery of the sense of t h e life situation from which each trend (or mode) of philosophising grew. T h e historical process of philosophy, from Dilthey's standpoint, was a very profound expression of t h e substantiality and spontaneity of life; it was an ' a n a r c h y of philosophical systems' ( 4 1 : 7 5 ) . Dilthey rejected t h e Hegelian conception of t h e progressive development of philosophy. Philosophical doctrines w e r e of equal value in principle as specific vital formations. T h a t conclusion did not, however, a g r e e with the p r e f e r e n c e he g a v e to irrationalist idealism. ' T h e r e is no room,' he declared, 'for looking on t h e world from t h e angle of values and aims' in the materialist conception ( 4 1 : 1 0 5 ) . T h e n u b of this statement is that the sense and aim of life can only be brought out through analysis of t h e religious, mythological, poetic, and metaphysical mind. All these forms of consciousness, it is true, only expressed symbolically the ' n a t u r e of world unity' which was incomprehensible. But objective idealism, according to Dilthey, expressed this mystery of life most m e a n ingfully (see 4 1 : 1 1 7 ) . While t h e classical writers of p r e - M a r x i a n philosophy saw evidence of the weakness of philosophy, which had to be overc o m e by developing scientific methods of exploring philosophical problems, in the existence, rivalry, and succession of n u m e r o u s philosophical systems, c o n t e m p o r a r y thinkers of an irrationalist turn of mind (following Dilthey) consider the a n a r c h y of systems a n o r m a l situation specifically characteristic of philosophy. T h e irrationalist philosopher believes that conviction of the t r u t h of one's philosophical views is a prejudice; he c o n s e q u e n t ly suggests, as a postulate, a conviction that all existing and possible doctrines a r e u n t r u e but h a v e the attractive force inh e r e n t in truth because each has its sense, at least: for those w h o discover it. Irrationalism is only one of the main trends of c o n t e m p o r a r y idealist philosophy, of course, and its conception of t h e a n a r c h y of systems clashes with the opposite conceptions that d e n o u n c e or deny this a n a r c h y . Neopositivists and Neothomists,
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while interpreting the subject-matter and tasks of philosophy d i f f e r e n t l y , n e v e r t h e l e s s find a c o m m o n l a n g u a g e w h e n e v a l u a t ing the pluralism of doctrines existing in philosophy. T h e y d e n o u n c e the irrationalist apologia for the a n a r c h y of systems, t a k i n g it as a very h a r m f u l fallacy of philosophy on h u m a n i t y ' s r o a d s t o truth a n d justice, not being a w a r e t h a t this a n a r c h y is essentially an irrationalist myth. F r o m the angle of neopositivism the 'anarchy of philosophical s y s t e m s ' is a fatal c o n s e q u e n c e of ' m e t a p h y s i c a l ' p h i l o sophising, which, by not allowing for the principle of verif i c a t i o n a n d t h e s t r i c t r e q u i r e m e n t s o f l o g i c , a b a n d o n s itself on t h e whole to a speculative imagining c a p a b l e of creating an unlimited n u m b e r of identically u n s o u n d systems. Only a f e w n e o p o s i t i v i s t s a t t e m p t t o ask t h e r e a s o n s f o r t h e p r o g r e s s i v e d i v e r g e n c e of doctrines, justly r e g a r d i n g it as a d a n g e r to the v e r y e x i s t e n c e of p h i l o s o p h y as a s c i e n c e . I am far from u n d e r v a l u i n g t h e i m p o r t a n c e of t h e differences between existentialists, neopositivists, Neothomists, and the adherents of philosophical anthropology, the 'new ontology', p e r s o n a l i s m , and o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e or linguistic philosophy, etc. I a m s i m p l y c o n v i n c e d t h a t all t h e s e d o c t r i n e s ( b u t c o n t e m p o r a r y b o u r g e o i s philosophers dispute just this) a r e factions of idealist philosophy, w h o s e differences by no m e a n s outweigh their f u n d a m e n t a l unity. T h e analysis in C h a p t e r 1 of the n u m e r o u s versions of t h e posing a n d a n s w e r i n g of t h e basic philosophical question provides the key to understanding the c o n t e m p o r a r y varieties of idealist p h i l o s o p h y , w h i c h differ substantially in several respects from the idealism of past centuries. T h i s difference is q u i t e often t a k e n by c o n t e m p o r a r y b o u r g e o i s philosophers as a rejection of t h e main propositions o f i d e a l i s t p h i l o s o p h y r a t h e r t h a n a d e n i a l o f its t r a d i t i o n a l forms. But the history of philosophy of m o d e r n times has a l w a y s b e e n a p i c t u r e of an i m p r e s s i v e d i v e r s i t y of idealist doctrines. It is enough to c o m p a r e Descartes' metaphysics, L e i b n i z ' s m o n a d o l o g y , B e r k e l e y ' s idealist e m p i r i c i s m , M a i n e d e Biran's irrationalism, Fichte's subjective idealism, Schelling's philosophy of identity, to see t h e u n s o u n d n e s s of t h e view that t h e e x i s t e n c e of d i s a g r e e m e n t s b e t w e e n idealists calls in question t h e i r u n i t y i n p r i n c i p l e o n t h e m a i n , d e t e r m i n i n g p o i n t , i.e. t h e i r a n s w e r to the basic philosophical question. It is h a r d l y necessary to demonstrate that the divergences between contemporary idealist d o c t r i n e s a r e n o m o r e substantial t h a n t h o s e b e t w e e n the classic w r i t e r s of idealist philosophy. The unity in principle of idealist
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doctrines

does

not

in

the least rule out the existence of opposing systems of views within this trend. Existentialists and neopositivists hold incompatible views on a number of problems. Hegel and Schopenhauer also took opposite idealist stances. A polarisation, and even more a divergence of doctrines, is possible within one trend, especially in the idealist one. That essential fact makes it necessary to demarcate the main trends of idealist philosophy in both the past and the present. T h e r e are thus no grounds for speaking of an anarchy of systems in contemporary bourgeois philosophy, since almost all these systems (the exception being only a few materialist doctrines or ones related to materialism) have an idealist character. Lenin wrote, characterising the bourgeois philosophy of the beginning of this century:
scarcely a single contemporary professor of philosophy (or of theology) can be found w h o is not directly or indirectly engaged in refuting materialism (142:10).

In that respect contemporary bourgeois philosophy does not differ essentially from its immediate predecessor. The uncritical statement about a host of philosophical doctrines usually leads metaphysically thinking philosophers to a denial of the fundamental antithesis between materialism and idealism, which are declared to be at best nothing but two trends among a host of others. But, as I have stressed above (and I am deliberately returning to this thesis so that it can be thoroughly grasped), materialism and idealism are trends of a kind such that the antithesis between them is constantly being revealed within other trends. T h e r e is no rationalism in general, for example; each rationalist is an idealist or a materialist, because it is impossible to be only a rationalist. And those bourgeois philosophers who counterpose rationalism to both materialism and idealism as a rule display an extremely narrow, over-simplified understanding of them. A philosopher does not have to be a rationalist or an empiricist, a sensualist, irrationalist, or phenomenalist, a nominalist or a 'realist', etc. He can reject all of them or defend only one of them. But he cannot reject both materialism and idealism; he has to choose between them, i.e. to take a stand for one and against the other. That pattern of the moulding of all, in any way developed doctrines is not made less important by the existence of eclectic and dualist theories. Eclecticism is first and foremost an attempt to unite materialism and idealism. As Plekhanov noted:
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those people w h o a r e incapable of consistent thought stop half-way a n d a r e c o n t e n t with a m i s h - m a s h o f idealism a n d m a t e r i a l i s m . S u c h i n c o n s i s t e n t t h i n k e r s a r e c a l l e d eclectics ( 2 1 0 : 5 7 8 ) .

O n e ' c o m p o n e n t ' usually p r e d o m i n a t e s in any eclecticism. In most cases philosophical eclecticism tends to idealism, since o n e o f its m a i n s o u r c e s i s a b s e n c e o f a d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o p u r s u e a materialist line in philosophy. It c a n n o t , of c o u r s e , be r e d u c e d simply to inconsistency; it would be m o r e correct to say that t h i s i n c o n s i s t e n c y itself is a c o n s e q u e n c e of an o r i e n t a t i o n t h a t considers it necessary to conjoin essentially incompatible principles. An eclectic o r i e n t a t i o n is s o m e t i m e s d i s t i n g u i s h e d as a s u r m o u n t i n g o f ' o n e - s i d e d n e s s ' . L e n i n p o i n t e d o u t its l i n k w i t h s o p h i s m , w h i c h , b y b r i n g i n g e x a m i n a t i o n o f all a s p e c t s o f a n o b j e c t t o t h e f o r e , a n d a l l o w a n c e f o r all a n d e v e r y t h i n g , v e i l e d t h e n e e d t o s i n g l e o u t t h e m a i n o n e a n d its s y s t e m a t i c , consistent, logical d e v e l o p m e n t . Consistency, w h i c h m u s t not be confused with persuasiveness, constitutes a m a i n p r o p e r t y of philosophical t h i n k i n g , w h i c h explains t h e often p a r a d o x i c a l and even extravagant conclusions. Eclecticism is therefore e s s e n t i a l l y i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h s o u n d p h i l o s o p h y , w i t h its i n t r e p i d r e a d i n e s s t o g o t o t h e l o g i c a l e n d , a n d t o a c c e p t all c o n c l u s i o n s that follow from t h e initial, f u n d a m e n t a l statement. O n e must not c o n f u s e eclecticism, h o w e v e r , with inconsistency in p u r s u i n g a principle linked with i n a d e q u a t e development of s a m e , a l t h o u g h that often gives rise to c o n t r a d i c t i o n s o f a k i n d t h a t m a y s e e m a t first g l a n c e t o b e a c o n s e q u e n c e of e c l e c t i c i s m . It is not e c l e c t i c i s m w h e n a p h i l o s o p h e r p r o v e s i n c a p a b l e o f d r a w i n g all t h e c o n c l u s i o n s s t e m m i n g f r o m h i s principle since these conclusions m a y simply not be deducible but p r e s u p p o s e d i s c o v e r y of c e r t a i n facts. T h e e s s e n c e of e c l e c t i c i s m is r e p u d i a t i o n of a p r i n c i p l e d p o s i t i o n in a d i s p u t e b e t w e e n fully e x p o u n d e d , m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e t h e o r i e s , a n d a readiness to replace o n e line of principle by another, opposite o n e 'for a time'. L e n i n ' s c r i t i q u e of Machism is a brilliant e x a m p l e of u n m a s k i n g of the anti-philosophical essence of eclecticism. He c i t e d Mach's The Analysis of Sensations, in w h i c h it is said in p a r t i c u l a r :
If I i m a g i n e that w h i l e I am e x p e r i e n c i n g s e n s a t i o n s , I or s o m e o n e else c o u l d o b s e r v e m y b r a i n with all p o s s i b l e p h y s i c a l a n d c h e m i c a l m e a n s , it would be possible to ascertain with what processes of t h e o r g a n i s m p a r t i c u l a r s e n s a t i o n s a r e c o n n e c t e d (cited from 1 4 2 : 3 1 ) .

Citing

this

essentially

materialist
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position,

Lenin

concluded

that M a c h ' s view was an e x a m p l e of eclectic half-heartedness and muddle:

A delightful philosophy! First sensations are declared to be 'the real elements of t h e world', on this an 'original' Berkeleianism is e r e c t e d a n d t h e n t h e v e r y o p p o s i t e view i s s m u g g l e d in, viz., t h a t s e n s a t i o n s a r e c o n n e c t e d with definite p r o c e s s e s i n t h e o r g a n i s m . A r e n o t t h e s e 'processes' c o n n e c t e d with metabolic e x c h a n g e b e t w e e n t h e ' o r g a n i s m ' and the external world? Could this metabolism take p l a c e if the sensations of t h e p a r t i c u l a r o r g a n i s m did n o t g i v e it an o b j e c t i v e l y c o r r e c t idea of this e x t e r n a l w o r l d ? ( 1 4 2 : 3 1 ) .

Lenin counterposed brilliantly consistent idealists to Mach and his a d h e r e n t s , pointing out that t h e y in fact refused to t a k e m o r a l responsibility for the fundamental principles they accepted; they ignored t h e m w h e n n a t u r a l science forced t h e m t o a g r e e with facts clearly i n c o m p a t i b l e with idealism. My appreciation of philosophical eclecticism m a y seem e x t r e m e l y s e v e r e a n d unjustified; for Aristotle w a s s o m e t i m e s called an eclectic for his w a v e r i n g b e t w e e n idealism a n d materialism. I t h e r e f o r e think it necessary to concretise t h e c o n c e p t o f e c l e c t i c i s m b y a h i s t o r i c a l a p p r o a c h t o its d e f i n i tion. F r o m my angle t h e rise of philosophical eclecticism belongs to the time when the tendency toward a radical polarisation of philosophy into materialism a n d idealism was c o n v e r t e d i n t o a p a t t e r n , i.e. w h e n t h e m a i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r e n d s h a d already taken shape and were opposed to each other. Eclecticism b e c a m e a n u n p r i n c i p l e d ( a n d i n t h a t s e n s e a n t i - p h i l o s o p h i cal) conception, because the centuries-long evolution of philosophy not only b r o u g h t out but consolidated the m u t u a l ly exclusive systems. But that w a s not yet in Aristotle's times. L e n i n d e s c r i b e d A r i s t o t l e ' s Metaphysics a n d t h a t w h o l e p e riod of the m o u l d i n g of t h e main philosophical t r e n d s in t h e following way: 'What the Greeks had was precisely modes of frami n g q u e s t i o n s , a s i t w e r e tentative s y s t e m s , a n a i v e d i s c o r d a n c e of views, excellently reflected in Aristotle' ( 1 4 4 : 3 6 7 ) . Aristotle's w a v e r i n g , his q u e s t s a n d f r a m i n g of q u e s t i o n s , a n d also his c r i tique of Plato's theory of ideas (which disclosed t h e main w e a k ness of idealism, with which Aristotle, h o w e v e r , did not b r e a k ) have to be appraised from that angle. T h e p r e s e n c e of materialist propositions in Aristotle's idealist d o c t r i n e s e e m i n g l y i n d i c a t e s its i n c o m p l e t e n e s s , w h i c h w a s l i n k e d in t u r n with t h e historically d e t e r m i n e d lack of d e v e l o p m e n t of the antithesis between materialism a n d idealism. T h e r e f o r e one can only apply the concept of eclecticism to separate proposi151

tions of his and by no m e a n s to his doctrine as a whole. I must stress that a limited notion of the antithesis of materialism and idealism was not just characteristic of antiquity. We meet it even a m o n g materialists of m o d e r n times w h o c o m b i n e a materialist u n d e r s t a n d i n g of n a t u r e with an idealist (true, naturalistic) conception of social life. It would be w r o n g to interpret that a m b i v a l e n c e of p r e - M a r x i a n materialism as eclecticism; h e r e we h a v e an inadequate, clearly limited understanding of t h e main philosophical principle of materialism, and not a rejection of it. T h e question of the e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y materialists w h o held deist views is r a t h e r special. It needs a special inquiry, t h e results of which I c a n n o t of c o u r s e anticipate. Such an inquiry, it goes without saying, should fully allow for t h e fact that in t h e eighteenth c e n t u r y deism was a m o d e of a tacit, but quite definite rejection of religious ideology. We must also r e m e m b e r , too, the inner contradictions of the materialist philosophy of that century, caused by the mechanistic form of its development. It is important to distinguish dualism from eclecticism, for it consciously counterposes recognition of two substances, two initial propositions to monistic philosophical doctrines, considering that no one of them can be deduced from the other. W h e r e the materialist considers the spiritual a p r o p e r t y of matter organised in a certain way, and the idealist tries to d e d u c e matter from a spiritual p r i m a r y substance, t h e dualist rejects both paths, suggesting that one cannot start just from t h e material or just from t h e spiritual. He consequently motivates, and tries consistently to follow, a quite definite principle according to which two realities originally existed, independent of each other. T h e dualist principle played a historically progressive role in the systems of Descartes and Kant; Cartesianism counterposed it to scholastic idealism, Kantianism to the metaphysics of supersensory knowledge. T h e e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y materialists criticised t h e Cartesian dualism from the left, relying on Descartes' physics, in t h e main materialist. T h e idealists, on the c o n t r a r y , criticised it from the right, rejecting Cartesian physics (natural phil o s o p h y ) , which explained natural p h e n o m e n a by materialist principles. T h e s a m e was repeated in respect of Kant. If one agrees with t h e d e m a r c a t i o n of t h e concepts of dualism and eclecticism, o n e c a n n o t accept P l e k h a n o v ' s proposition that ' dualism is always eclectic' ( 2 1 0 : 5 7 8 ) . Eclecticism has not enriched philosophy by a single significant idea, while dualism was an e p o c h - m a k i n g event in philosophy. T h e eclectic can be comp a r e d with t h e scientists w h o , while accepting Einstein's postu152

late that no velocity can be greater than that of light, nevertheless try to apply the rule of the addition of velocities formulated by classical mechanics to light. T h e unsoundness of dualism is not its inconsistency but its incapacity to explain the unity of the psychic and physiological rationally. Despite its being counterposed to both materialism and idealism, dualism cannot exist as an independent doctrine, independent in fact from those it is endeavoured to be opposed to. Furthermore, its claim to be a third line in philosophy is unsound. Its historical role was that it was a transitional stage in some cases from idealism to materialism, and in others from materialism to idealism. T h e development of a dualist system of views inevitably begot its negation, since it revealed the impossibility of consistently following opposing principles within one and the same doctrine. T h e basic philosophical question is a dilemma calling for a substantiated choice and an alternative answer, which cannot be avoided either by means of eclecticism or by way of dualism, the historical fates of which confirm the law-governed nature of the radical polarisation of philosophy into two main trends, viz., materialist and idealist. T h e progressing divergence of philosophical doctrines regularly leads to their polarisation in opposing trends, and to the development of diverse forms of the mutually exclusive antithesis between materialism and idealism. T h e irrationalist interpretation of this as an anarchy of philosophical systems is unsound in principle since it ignores the existence of main trends and the development of an antithesis between them, and also overestimates the role of divergences within the idealist trend, displaying a clear incomprehension of the unity in principle of the latter's qualitatively different forms. T h e distinguishing of main trends in philosophy, it goes without saying, has nothing in common with underestimation of the significance of others. T h e point is simply that the sense and meaning of all other trends can only be understood by their attitude to materialist philosophy on the one hand and idealist on the other. T h e diversity of the forms of development of materialism and idealism is also manifested precisely in the existence of a host of philosophical trends. T h e history of philosophy has to study these transmuted forms of the main trends, bringing out their peculiarity, which does not stem directly from materialist or idealist basic principles. T h e opposition between scholasticism and mysticism, for instancethe two main trends in mediaeval European philosophydid not coincide with the antithesis of materialism and idealism, which can be brought out,
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however, by analysis of each of these mediaeval trends. Engels wrote of T h o m a s Mnzer:

His philosophico-theological doctrine attacked all the main points not only of Catholicism, but of Christianity generally. Under the cloak of Christian forms he preached a kind of pantheism, which curiously resembles modern speculative contemplation and at times approaches atheism (53:70-71).

From Mnzer's point of view, revelation was nothing other than human reason, faith was awakened reason, paradise was not the other world but what believers were called on to build on earth. Summing up this characterisation of Mnzer's mystic yet revolutionary doctrine, Engels stressed that 'Mnzer's religious philosophy approached atheism' (53:71). Thus, when distinguishing the main philosophical trends and elucidating their attitude to others, the outstanding significance of which it would be ridiculous to underestimate, we thereby prove the unsoundness of any counterposing of any doctrine, current, or trend whatsoever to materialism and idealism. A philosopher cannot: avoid choice; he chooses insofar as he philosophises. Materialism or idealismsuch is the inevitable alternative in philosophy. Realisation of this alternative puts an end to superficial understanding of philosophy as a labyrinth in which all paths lead to a dead end. T h e choice the philosopher makes (and to some extent the student of philosophy) is ultimately one between two really alternative answers and not among many. It is a choice, if one can so express it, of his philosophical future, after which he has to choose between one or other concrete, specific version of materialism or idealism. It would be very frivolous to underestimate the significance of this secondary choice; for materialism and idealism do not exist in some pure form, isolated from other not only numerous but also meaningful trends. Materialism can be dialectical or, on the contrary, metaphysical, mechanistic, and finally even vulgar. These are not only different historical stages in the development of one and the same doctrine but also versions of materialism existing at the present time. And acquaintance with contemporary bourgeois philosophy indicates that the few of its spokesmen who are materialists, having surmounted the ideological prejudices prevailing under capitalism, far from always make this decisive choice in the best way. T h e r e are very many forms of idealism, and the differences between them are often significant in principle; suffice it to recall the struggle between rationalist idealism and irrationalism, which was already developing in the nineteenth century and
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has acquired even greater ideological significance in our day. T h e revival of rationalist traditions, and the struggle of certain contemporary idealist philosophers against the irrationalist bacchanalia in philosophy, are undoubtedly evidence of the existence of differences among the forms of idealism. It is unscientific and unwise to ignore these differences, their epistemological sense, and their ideological implication. T h e dispute about philosophical trends, and about whether t h e r e are main trends in philosophy and what kinds they are, is a reflection within the context of the history of philosophy of the struggle between the various doctrines, schools, currents, and trends in philosophy. 2. Metaphysical Systems. Spiritualism and the Naturalist Tendencies T h e establishment of the fact of a radical polarisation of the numerous philosophical trends into an antithesis of materialism and idealism is the grounds for singling out these as the main trends in philosophy and opens up a perspective of a new, m o r e profound interpretation of the antitheses of rationalism and empiricism, rationalism and irrationalism, naturalism and supranaturalism, metaphysical systems and phenomenalism, the metaphysical and dialectical modes of thinking, etc. T h e content and significance of these undoubtedly opposite trends are fully disclosed only by an inquiry that fixes the radical antithesis of materialism and idealism as the starting point. In the light of this methodological premiss, which reflects the actual state of affairs, the struggle of the many philosophical doctrines figures as a development of the main antithesis between materialism and idealism rather than as a process taking place outside it. Exploration of the specific (and diverse) relations between the main trends on the one hand and all other trends in philosophy on the other thus has to concretise the general, often schematic presentation of the struggle between materialism and idealism, and to deepen our understanding of the unity of the historical course of philosophy. It is impossible within the scope of one monograph to explore the history of empiricism, rationalism, dialectics, and other trends of philosophical thought from the angle of the struggle between materialism and idealism. I shall therefore limit myself to an analysis of metaphysical systems, since they have been less studied in Marxian literature on the plane of the radical antithesis mentioned above.
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T h e terms 'metaphysics', 'metaphysical system', and 'speculative m e t a p h y s i c s ' h a v e b e e n a n d a r e e m p l o y e d i n s o m a n y different, at times quite i n c o m p a t i b l e m e a n i n g s that it w o u l d be unw i s e t o t r y a n d s i n g l e o u t a s e n s e c o m m o n t o all t h e s e u s a g e s . S u c h a s e n s e simply d o e s n o t exist. T h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l d o c t r i n e s called metaphysical systems often p r o v e to be a n e g a t i o n of m e t aphysics. And philosophies that claim to finally refute metaphysi c s a r e o f t e n , o n t h e c o n t r a r y , o n l y m o d e r n i s a t i o n s o f it. T h e r e f o r e , instead of a q u e s t f o r a u n i v e r s a l definition of t h e c o n c e p t o f m e t a p h y s i c s I s h a l l e n d e a v o u r t o g r a s p t h e m a i n t r e n d s i n its actual d e v e l o p m e n t theoretically. In that respect it is necessary t o d e l i m i t s u c h c o n c e p t s a s m e t a p h y s i c a l system, a n d m e t a p h y s i c a l method, o r m o d e , o f t h i n k i n g f r o m t h e s t a r t . A t f i r s t g l a n c e this d e m a r c a t i o n d o e s not give rise to difficulties, s i n c e m e t a p h y s ics a s a m e t h o d i s t h e d i r e c t o p p o s i t e o f d i a l e c t i c a l t h i n k i n g . B u t the question then arises w h e t h e r the metaphysical m o d e of thinking is inevitable for a m e t a p h y s i c a l system a n d t h e dialectical m e t h o d for an antimetaphysical one. An u n a m b i g u o u s a n s w e r to that is impossible if only b e c a u s e Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y was a m e t a physical system a n d his m e t h o d dialectical. A n d t h a t c a n n o t b e explained simply by reference to the contradiction between the m e t h o d a n d s y s t e m i n his d o c t r i n e . L o c k e ' s system m i g h t b e c h a r a c t e r i s e d a s a n t i m e t a p h y s i c a l , a n d his m e t h o d a s m e t a p h y s i c a l , in s p i t e of t h e fact that t h e r e is no c o n t r a d i c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e m . In that c o n n e c t i o n his m e t a p h y s i c a l m e t h o d w a s a c l e a r o p p o s i t e of that inherent in the rationalist systems of s e v e n t e e n t h - c e n t u r y metaphysics. T h e simplest e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e difficulties a n d a m b i g u i t i e s associated with the t e r m ' m e t a p h y s i c s ' is to point out that it is e m p l o y e d in at least t w o s e n s e s that m u s t n o t be c o n f u s e d . T h a t is c o r r e c t , but only w i t h i n c e r t a i n limits, s i n c e it is n o t just a m a t ter of h o m o n y m s but of p h e n o m e n a that a r e s o m e t i m e s associated with o n e a n o t h e r in a very close way. T h e s e preliminary r e m a r k s indicate that the investigation of metaphysical systems in their relation to the main philosophical t r e n d s is a very c o m p l i c a t e d business, in p a r t i c u l a r b e c a u s e t h e antithesis between them and antimetaphysical doctrines by no m e a n s always coincides with the antithesis between idealism and materialism. It is also w r o n g to s u p p o s e that metaphysical systems inevitably h a v e a rationalist, a n d even m o r e an a priori c h a r acter, that they always interpret reality as rational, a n d so on. M e t a p h y s i c a l systems a r e p r e d o m i n a n t l y idealist d o c t r i n e s , but n o t o n l y s u c h . I t d o e s n o t follow, h o w e v e r , a s will b e s h o w n b e low, that the c o n c e p t of a metaphysical system equally e m b r a c e s
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both materialism and idealism. T h e relation of metaphysical systems to this basic antithesis is an indirect one, which makes the job of the inquirer even more complicated. T h e authors of textbooks usually point out that the term 'metaphysics' owes its origin to a historical accident; Aristotle's commentator Andronikos of Rhodes, when classifying the works of the great Stagyrite, signified by the words meta ta physika those works that he placed 'after physics'. T h e title of Aristotle's famous work Metaphysics thus actually arose in that sense quite accidentally; it was not yet in the list of Aristotle's works given by Diogenes Laertius. What was called Metaphysics was seemingly not one of Aristotle's works, but several joined together by his disciples and commentators. I do not intend to dispute the traditional idea of the origin of the term 'metaphysics', but wish to stress that it was applied by Andronikos of Rhodes to those works of Aristotle's that their author classed as 'first philosophy' and not as physics and other parts of the philosophy of his day. I would also note that the prefix 'meta', as Aristotelian scholars have already remarked, had a double sense in Greek, since it meant not only 'after' but also 'over', 'above', or 'higher' (see 79:16). From that angle the title 'metaphysics' is not so chance a one; it was given to those works of Aristotle's in which the question of the first principle of physical (natural) processes was discussed. It will readily be understood that there were grounds for a meaningful application of the term 'metaphysics' not only in Aristotle's philosophy but above all in Plato's doctrine, which first introduced the concept of transcendent, all-defining reality into philosophy, and considered n a t u r e only a hazy image of the transcendent world. T h e definition of being as immobile, invariant, radically opposed to sense-perceived nature, belongs to Plato's forerunners, the Eleatics. But only Plato can be considered the first creator of a metaphysical system. T h e antithesis between the intelligible and the sensual world in his system is one between the spiritual and the material (the incorporeal and the c o r p o r e a l ) , the original and the derivative, the motionless and the changing, the intransient and the transient, perfection and imperfection, unity and aggregate, the general and the particular. Plato thus expressed a significant part of the principles of subsequent metaphysical systems. His epistemology, as the most categorical denial of the significance of sense experience for knowing transcendent reality was an extreme expression of the rationalist antithesis of reason and sensuality. N o n e of the succeeding rationalist
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metaphysicians p e r h a p s went so far, and that is very essential for u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e development of metaphysical systems, w h o s e creators, especially in m o d e r n times, could no longer i g n o r e empirical k n o w l e d g e and its scientific-theoretical comprehension. Plato's d o c t r i n e about i n n a t e ideas anticipated t h e epistemological problematic of succeeding metaphysics, including t h e d o c t r i n e of a priori knowledge. It is also important to note h e r e that n o n e of Plato's successors (having in mind, of course, outstanding philosophers) adopted his epistemological conception as a whole, a c c o r d i n g to which man knows nothing essential in his real life, i.e. life in this world, in the world he sees, hears, feels and, finally, alters. This deviation from Platonism is a regular tendency in the d e v e l o p m e n t of metaphysical systems in t h e new socio-historical cultural environment. Aristotle's Metaphysics was less metaphysical than Plato's system. In that sense one can say that the origin of t h e term 'metaphysics' is really associated with his works by c h a n c e , since his f o r e r u n n e r had already had a much m o r e clearly expressed concept of metaphysical reality. Aristotle was an idealist but he did not accept the Platonic denial of the i m p o r t a n c e of t h e sensual picture of the world. Single material objects w e r e transient but m a t t e r as t h e essence of all of them did not arise and was not destroyed. T r u e , material things could not ( a c c o r d i n g to him) arise just from matter (and be correspondingly e x p l a i n e d ) ; matter was only the material cause of individual things. But form was also inherent in things (not just external a p p e a r a n c e but also any other substantial d e t e r m i n a c y ) , and was something distinct from m a t t e r ( s u b s t a n c e ) , because a ball, for example, could be m a d e of copper, marble, wood, etc. Consequently, he suggested, it was reasonable to recognise t h e existence of a cause that determined the s h a p e of things, i.e. a formal cause. T h e form of any single thing was inseparable from it, but t h e r e was also, seemingly, a form of everything that existed, which lay outside single things, and consequently outside matter. It was t h e prim a r y form, or the form of forms. T h e motion of single things was something different from their materiality and form. It could only be t h e c o n s e q u e n c e of the effect of a special kind of c a u s e on a body, which Aristotle called efficient, which causes motion. A moving body posited what moved it. Any motion had a beginning but the chain of causes provoking it could not be infinite. T h e r e was consequently a first or p r i m a r y cause, a first mover. Finally, t h e r e was also a final (specific or purposeful) cause,
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s i n c e all t h e o t h e r c a u s e s d i d n o t e x p l a i n f o r w h a t p u r p o s e c e r tain bodies existed and t h o s e of their relations with o n e a n o t h e r that could be defined as relations of m e a n s and end. T h a t referred not only to actual purposefulness in t h e world of t h e living b u t a l s o t o a n y effect o f t h e l a w s o f n a t u r e , w h i c h s e e m e d t o A r i s t o t l e t o b e p u r p o s i v e . A t h r o w n s t o n e fell, f o r e x a m p l e , b e c a u s e its ' n a t u r a l p l a c e w a s o n t h e g r o u n d ' . M e t a p h y s i c s a s a s y s t e m , first c r e a t e d b y P l a t o , i s t h u s a n i d e a l ist d o c t r i n e a b o u t a s p e c i a l , ' m e t a p h y s i c a l ' r e a l i t y t h a t d e t e r mines material, sense-perceived reality. Aristotle, like Plato, c r e a t e d a m e t a p h y s i c a l s y s t e m , b u t h e c o u n t e r p o s e d his d o c t r i n e to Plato's metaphysics. W h a t was the n u b of the divergence between Aristotle and Plato? In a dispute b e t w e e n t w o varieties of m e t a p h y s i c s ? I n a c o n t r a d i c t i o n w i t h i n t h e idealist c a m p ? T h a t i s f a r f r o m all, a n d i s p e r h a p s n o t t h e m a i n p o i n t . L e n i n n o t e d materialist features in Aristotle's critique of the Platonic d o c t r i n e of i d e a s :
Aristotle's criticism of Plato's 'ideas' is a criticism of idealism as idealism in g e n e r a l : for w h e n c e concepts, abstractions, a r e derived, t h e n c e c o m e also 'law' and 'necessity', etc. ( 1 4 4 : 2 8 1 ) .

Aristotle posed the question of t h e genesis of general concepts a n d u n i v e r s a l s , a q u e s t i o n t h a t did n o t e x i s t f o r P l a t o ; t h e g e n e r a l was p r i m a r y and substantial. T h a t is an essential d i v e r g e n c e , which anticipated the struggle of nominalism and 'realism' in mediaeval philosophy, a struggle in which t h e antithesis between materialism a n d idealism was developed in an indirect way. A r i s t o t l e c o n s t a n t l y r e t u r n e d i n t h e Metaphysics t o t h e q u e s tion o f t h e r e l a t i o n o f t h e g e n e r a l , p a r t i c u l a r , a n d i n d i v i d u a l , trying to explain their unity and mutual penetration.
But man and horse and t e r m s which a r e thus applied to individuals, but universally, a r e not s u b s t a n c e but something composed of this p a r t i c u l a r formula and this particular matter treated as universal ( 8 : 5 5 9 ) .

In a n o t h e r place he again stressed that 'clearly no universal e x i s t s a p a r t f r o m its i n d i v i d u a l ' ( 8 : 5 6 4 ) . T h e s e p r o p o s i t i o n s w e r e n o t y e t , o f c o u r s e , a n s w e r s t o t h e difficult q u e s t i o n o f t h e n a t u r e of t h e universal, but they w e r e a w e l l - f o u n d e d denial of Plato's posing of t h e p r o b l e m of metaphysics. A r i s t o t l e ' s i d e a l i s m , u n l i k e P l a t o ' s , h a d a s its m a i n t h e o r e t i c a l s o u r c e not a substantiation of t h e g e n e r a l but a limited empirical notion of t h e causes of t h e motion of bodies e v e r y w h e r e and c o n stantly observed in nature. Aristotle considered the sole possible e x p l a n a t i o n of this fact to be r e c o g n i t i o n of a first m o v e r w h i c h could not be anything material, in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e c o u r s e of his a r g u m e n t , b e c a u s e e v e r y t h i n g m a t e r i a l , i n h i s belief, w a s set
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in motion from outside. 'Of course,' Lenin pointed out,

it is idealism, but more objective and further removed, more general than the idealism of Plato, hence in the philosophy of nature more frequently=materialism (144:280).

In o r d e r to emphasise t h e principled significance of this imp o r t a n t conclusion, let me point out that m a n y p r e - M a r x i a n m a terialists w e r e not atheists. J o h n T o l a n d , w h o first put forward and substantiated t h e very important materialist proposition about the self-motion of matter, was nevertheless a deist. T h e outlook of Joseph Priestley was even m o r e contradictory. Meerovsky rightly stresses:
A materialist philosopher and splendid naturalist, he was at the same time a religious man. A doctrine of matter, a criticism of the idea of two substances, an affirmation that thought was a property of matter with a definite system of organisation, denial of the immortality of the soul, and a proclaiming of the universality of the principles of determinism were combined in Priestley's world outlook with belief in revelation, resurrection of the dead, and the divine authority of Jesus Christ. He not only did not see the inner contradictoriness of his views but, on the contrary, was convinced that materialism was fully compatible with religion (182:43).

I am far from thinking that the idealist Aristotle and t h e materialist T o l a n d held the s a m e views; but it is important to stress that a materialist tendency, expressed in recognition of the eternity of matter, existed in the womb of Aristotle's metaphysical system. In t h e Middle Ages this tendency got clear expression in Averrism; it facilitated t h e moulding of t h e materialist philosophy of m o d e r n times. Its essential significance was above all that the basic contradiction organically inherent in metaphysical systems was manifested in it; t h e latter laid claim to knowledge above experience but based this claim on observations drawn from everyday e x p e r i e n c e and science. T h a t was inevitable, of course, for t h e r e was no other m e a n s at all of idealist philosophising, since there was no transcendent reality and knowledge above experience. A n y o n e w h o tried to prove the existence of the one or the other could not help appealing to this world. An appeal to the natural and empirical for ' p r o o f of the existence of the s u p e r n a t u ral and s u p e r e x p e r i e n t a l m o r e and m o r e b e c a m e a pressing necessity, the m o r e advances w e r e m a d e by n a t u r a l - s c i e n c e knowledge of n a t u r e . Such, in my view, a r e the deep-lying sources of t h e crises that periodically wrack carefully constructed metaphysical systems. T h e idealist metaphysician c a n n o t avoid confrontations either with the 'naive realism' of everyday experience, which is d r a w n t o w a r d a materialist understanding of the world, or with science,
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which sustains materialism. It is therefore no accident that the most outstanding, comprehensively developed metaphysical system, Hegel's philosophy, was materialism stood on its head. Explaining that quite, at first glance, incomprehensible phenomenon, Engels pointed out that philosophers (including idealists)
w e r e by no m e a n s impelled, as they t h o u g h t they w e r e , solely by t h e force of p u r e r e a s o n . On t h e c o n t r a r y , w h a t really pushed t h e m f o r w a r d most was t h e powerful and ever m o r e rapidly o n r u s h i n g progress of n a t u ral science and industry. A m o n g t h e materialists this was plain on t h e surface, but t h e idealist systems also filled themselves m o r e and m o r e with a materialist content and attempted pantheistic ally to reconcile t h e antithesis between mind and matter. T h u s , ultimately, t h e Hegelian system represents merely a materialism idealistically t u r n e d upside down in m e t h o d and content ( 5 2 : 3 4 8 ) .

T h a t brings out the progressive tendencies in the development of metaphysical systems, tendencies that w e r e always, however, resisted by reactionary conceptions, viz., denial of t h e ideological significance of scientific discoveries, a striving to subordinate philosophical inquiry to substantiation of a religious world outlook, etc. T h e mediaeval metaphysical systems disclosed both these tendencies in forms appropriate to an age when religion in essence constituted t h e sole developed, systematised ideology. T h e antithesis between mediaeval 'realism' and nominalism, as I have already mentioned, anticipated the struggle of materialism and idealism in the philosophy of modern times. 'Realism', which bordered on Plato's doctrine, was more and m o r e drawn, in the course of its development, to a pantheistic outlook that excluded recognition of a supernatural or supranatural reality. This tendency already existed in J o h n Scot Erigena's metaphysical system. It is not surprising, therefore, that theology condemned not only the nominalism that attached p a r a m o u n t importance to the existence of individual sense-perceived material things, but also extreme 'realism'. In the latter the Christian God was a universal being who merged with this world by virtue of his universality and integrity. It is understandable why T h o m a s Aquinas defended moderate 'realism', basing his arguments not on Plato but on Aristotle. Thomas Aquinas and his successors removed the anti-metaphysical features from Aristotle's metaphysics. Matter, which he had considered uncreatable and indestructible, embracing diverse possibilities for modification, was interpreted by t h e Scholastics as a pure possibility that was not being and that b e c a m e such only due to the actualising activity of form. T h a t interpretation
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o f m a t t e r w a s fully c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e C a t h o l i c d o g m a o f t h e creation of the world from nothing. In Aristotle's d o c t r i n e G o d only w o u n d up t h e world clock; in t h e metaphysics of T h o m i s m he is t r a n s f o r m e d into a c o n c e p t o f a b s o l u t e , s u p r a n a t u r a l b e i n g . T h e r e l a t i o n ' G o d - n a t u r e ' (in which n a t u r e was interpreted as contingent being, wholly dependent on the supernatural) was explained as the highest subjectm a t t e r of philosophical consideration. I say 'consideration' and not investigation, b e c a u s e T h o m i s m starts in fact from t h e point t h a t t h e a n s w e r s t o all t h e q u e s t i o n s i n t e r e s t i n g p h i l o s o p h y will be found in Holy Scripture, and that philosophers' job is simply t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e s e a n s w e r s (i.e. t h e C h r i s t i a n d o g m a s ) , a n d t o lead h u m a n reason t o t h e m , w h i c h must r e c o g n i s e t h e s u p e r natural as truth above reason (but not against r e a s o n ) , incomp r e h e n s i b l e w i t h o u t t h e h e l p o f r e l i g i o u s belief. I t m a y s e e m t h a t T h o m i s m , w h i c h b a s e d its d o c t r i n e o n t h e ' s u p r a r a t i o n a l ' d o g m a s o f C h r i s t i a n i t y , finally p u t a n e n d t o t h e f a t a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n c o r r o d i n g metaphysical systems from within. But that c o n t r a diction is also p r e s e r v e d in T h o m i s m , which 'proves' m e t a p h y s ical-theological propositions by a r g u m e n t s of c o m m o n sense and everyday experience and, moreover, quotes the discoveries of natural science as authority. T h e p h i l o s o p h y o f m o d e r n t i m e s f o r m u l a t e d its p r o g r a m m e in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e interests of t h e rising bourgeoisie on t h e one hand, and the main tendencies of the development of the sciences of nature on the other. T h e development of the bourgeois e c o n o m i c s t r u c t u r e a n d t h e pressing needs of social p r o duction orientated science on investigation of everything that was involved in o n e w a y or a n o t h e r in t h e s p h e r e of social p r o duction. Description of the different minerals and metals, classification of plants a n d a n i m a l s a l l g r a d u a l l y a c q u i r e d not only scientific but also practical significance. By g a t h e r i n g factual d a t a , a n d delimiting p h e n o m e n a t h a t h a d been identified with o n e a n o t h e r in the preceding period (substances diverse in their proper!ies w e r e r e d u c e d , for e x a m p l e , t o f o u r ' e l e m e n t s ' e a r t h , w a t e r , air, a n d fire), n a t u r a l s c i e n c e inevitably h a d to isolate t h e studied p h e n o m e n a , a b s t r a c t i n g their i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n s a n d interactions, w h o s e significance could not yet be p r o p e r l y evaluated. T h e l i m i t e d n e s s o f t h e f a c t u a l d a t a still m a d e i t i m p o s s i b l e to understand the universality of c h a n g e and development, w h i c h could not, of c o u r s e , be registered by d i r e c t o b s e r v a t i o n . T h e naive dialectical a p p r o a c h to natural p h e n o m e n a peculiar to G r e e k philosophers gave natural science nothing at that stage o f its d e v e l o p m e n t . T h e s c h o l a s t i c m e t h o d o f r e f i n e d d e f i n i t i o n s
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and distinctions lacking real empirical content was quite unsuitable for describing and investigating natural phenomena. T h e problem of method, as Bykhovsky has rightly stressed, acquired key importance in both philosophy and natural science. T w o of the founders of the philosophy of modern times, Descartes and Bacon, one a rationalist and the other an empiricist, w e r e equally convinced that the prime task of philosophy was to create a scientific method of inquiry. Bacon considered this method to be induction; the need for a systematic development of it was evidenced by 'natural philosophy', i.e. natural science. T h e method he developed had, of course, a metaphysical character in Engels' (and particularly in Hegel's) sense of the word, since he ignored the inner mutual conditioning of phenomena, and their change and contradictory development. But his metaphysical method was irreconcilably hostile to the method that was the tool for constructing speculative metaphysical systems. T h e inductive method called for careful generalisations and their constant confirmation by new observations and experiments. I am thus convinced that the concept of a metaphysical method must also be employed in at least two senses. T h e r e is nothing easier than to represent the metaphysical method that took shape in the natural science and philosophy of modern times as a kind of methodological interpretation of certain basic ontological notions of the preceding idealist metaphysics. Its representatives distinguished invariant, supersensory being in general from empirical, definite being. Variability, emergence, and destruction were considered attributes of everything 'finite' and transient, and evidence of its contingency and imperfection. In contrast to that speculative-idealist metaphysical method, the metaphysical method of seventeenth-and eighteenth-century naturalists and empiricist philosophers generally ignored 'metaphysical', intelligible reality and denied the importance and universality of change precisely in sense-perceived material reality. It denied it, of course, not because it ascribed perfection to empirical reality but because it did not see all those qualities in it. That is why Engels, when describing the metaphysical mode of thinking predominant in the eighteenth century, stressed its link with empirical natural science, remote from speculation: 'the old metaphysics, which accepted things as finished objects, arose from a natural science which investigated dead and living things as finished objects' (52:363). In contrast to Bacon Descartes developed a method of theoretical investigation (both philosophical and natural-science)
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starting from m a t h e m a t i c s and mechanics. It m a y seem that his method, which also had a metaphysical c h a r a c t e r , fully c o r r e sponded to t h e tasks of constructing an idealist metaphysical system, t h e m o r e so that he was striving to c r e a t e such. But closer examination of t h e 'main rules of t h e m e t h o d ' he formulated shows that they theoretically s u m m e d up t h e e x p e r i e n c e of scientific inquiry in the exact sciences and w e r e not very suitable for metaphysical system-creation. Descartes was t h e f o u n d e r of t h e rationalist metaphysics of t h e seventeenth c e n t u r y and his method was t h e scientific method of his time; the essence of t h e 'Cartesian revolution' in philosophy consisted in t h e attempt to c r e a t e a scientific metaphysical system by means of mathematics and mechanics. T h e contradiction between t h e idealist metaphysics and m a t e rialist science of m o d e r n times b e c a m e t h e i m m a n e n t c o n t r a diction of Descartes' metaphysical system, t h e contradiction between metaphysics and physics, idealism and materialism.
Descartes in his physics [Marx and Engels wote] endowed matter with self-creative power and conceived mechanical motion as the manifestation of its life. He completely separated his physics from his metaphysics. Within his physics, matter is the sole substance, the sole basis of being and of knowledge (179:125).

This negation of metaphysics by physics was m a d e in t h e context of a metaphysical system and started from its main premiss, to wit, the absolute antithesis of t h e spiritual and material. But w h e r e a s that kind of absolute antithesis stemmed in preceding metaphysical systems from an assumption of a t r a n s c e n d e n t reality radically different from t h e sense-perceived world, with Descartes and his followers it followed logically from reduction of t h e spiritual to thinking alone, and the material to extension alone.
T h e spirit and the body; the substance that thinks, and that which is extended [Malebranche wrote] are two kinds of being quite different and entirely opposed: what suits the one cannot suit the other (159:III, 439).

Such a framing of t h e question had a dualistic, metaphysical (anti-dialectical) c h a r a c t e r , but was not necessarily connected with an assumption of t r a n s c e n d e n t reality. A necessary corollary of that postulate was the separation of physics from metaphysics. T h e concept of metaphysical reality was freed of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n c y ascribed to it; it was mainly interpreted epistemologically, as t h e essential definiteness of t h e world, which was inaccessible to sense perceptions. 'It is a prejudice that is not based on any reason to believe that one sees bodies as they a r e in themselves,' M a l e b r a n c h e categorically declared (159:III, 50) .
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T h a t t u r n i n g away from a fundamentally unscientific interpretation of metaphysical reality as s u p e r n a t u r a l to an epistemological distinction between t h e metaphysical and p h e n o m e n a l (in spite of the latter's not being free of certain ontological premisses) was a retreat of metaphysics in face of t h e forces of m a terialism and n a t u r a l science hostile to it and united in their ideological orientation. Metaphysics was evolving and was compelled, to s o m e extent, to assimilate ideas of n a t u r a l science alien to it, even if only so as to 'prove' its propositions about a non-existent s u p e r n a t u r a l world by t h e ' n a t u r a l ' way and a r g u m e n t s of ordinary c o m m o n sense. T h a t crisis of metaphysical speculation was p r o m p t e d by t h e anti-speculative doctrines of materialist philosophers and naturalists. 3. Materialismthe Sole Consistent Opponent of Speculative Metaphysical Systems T h e a t t e m p t at a radical restructuring of speculative metaphysics was Descartes'; and that attempt, as shown above, led to philosophical dualism. T h e d o c t r i n e of his direct successor Spinoza was a negation of idealist metaphysics, but in t h e context of the new metaphysical system he created. T h e pantheistic identification of God and n a t u r e , and the ascribing of certain divine attributes to t h e latter in Spinoza's system proved to be essentially a materialist denial of a n y t r a n scendency. Spinoza did not, true, reject supersensory reality; he interpreted it as a substantialness of n a t u r e inaccessible to experience, a strict orderliness, 'reasonableness', and universal pattern of a single, omnipresent, and omnipotent universum. Denial of c h a n c e and freedom of will w e r e t h e r e v e r s e side of this conception, a c c o r d i n g to which an eternal, invariant, motionless metaphysical reality constantly r e p r o d u c e d a world of transient, finite phenomena, i.e. the whole diversity of the states of substance. But both the metaphysical natura naturans (creative n a t u r e ) and t h e sense-perceptible natura naturata (created n a t u r e ) constituted o n e and t h e s a m e this world. Spinoza was a resolute opponent of t h e teleological interpretation of n a t u r e characteristic of all p r e c e d i n g metaphysical systems, which led to theological conclusions. He differentiated between t h o u g h t as an attribute of substance and h u m a n intellect; the latter he defined as a mode, infinite, it is t r u e . This distinction was m e a n t to p r o v e not only t h e existence of a substantial basis to people's thinking but also t h e identity of the empirical and logical foundations, t h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e of the
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order of ideas and order of things, the existence of an u n c h a n g ing universal p a t t e r n of e v e r y t h i n g t h a t exists, w h i c h w a s interpreted as natural predetermination. Spinoza's philosophy was a most convincing expression of t h e reality of t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i n h e r e n t in metaphysical systems I have already mentioned above. He endeavoured to resolve t h e s e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s b y c r e a t i n g a materialist m e t a p h y s i c a l s y s t e m . But a m a t e r i a l i s m t h a t r e t a i n e d t h e f o r m of a m e t a p h y s i c a l s y s t e m w a s i n c o n s i s t e n t , if o n l y b e c a u s e it a s s u m e d a s u p e r s e n s o r y r e a l i t y . T h a t s h o w e d itself i n S p i n o z a ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e ' s p i r i t u a l - m a t e r i a l ' r e l a t i o n , i n his a n a l y s i s o f t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n s u b s t a n c e a n d m o d e s , in his t h e o r y of k n o w l e d g e ( w h i c h g r e a t l y limits t h e i m p o r t a n c e of t h e p r i n c i p l e of r e f l e c t i o n ) , a n d finally i n t h e v e r y i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f G o d a n d n a t u r e . T h e a m b i v a l e n c e i n h e r e n t i n his p h i l o s o p h y s t e m m e d f r o m t h i s u n i t i n g o f materialism and a metaphysical system and not simply f r o m p a n t h e i s m , a s t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y British N e o t h o m i s t h i s t o rian Copleston suggests (see 3 8 : 1 0 3 ) . In C h a p t e r 1 I noted the c o n t r a d i c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e objective content and subjective form of Spinoza's doctrine. That he was s e e m i n g l y n o t w h o l l y a w a r e s u b j e c t i v e l y o f his p h i l o s o p h y a s a n a t h e i s t i c a n d m a t e r i a l i s t o n e , i s t h e e s s e n t i a l i n c o n s i s t e n c y o f his d o c t r i n e . It was not an i n a d e q u a c y of exposition but a c o n t r a diction h a r m f u l t o t h e system. O n e should t h e r e f o r e not b e s u r p r i s e d that m a n y i d e a l i s t s h a v e f o u n d i d e a s c o r d i a l t o t h e m i n Spinoza's doctrine. And the materialists w h o in fact developed his c o n c e p t i o n o f s u b s t a n c e i n t h e i r d o c t r i n e s o f t h e s e l f - m o t i o n of m a t t e r as self-cause (like T o l a n d , for e x a m p l e , and t h e eighteenth-century F r e n c h materialists) usually polemicised against him. Spinoza's system was the result of t h e c e n t u r i e s - l o n g develo p m e n t of metaphysical philosophising a n d a result, m o r e o v e r , that not only b r o u g h t out t h e antithesis of t h e spiritualist and naturalist tendencies a d v a n c i n g within metaphysics, but also d r o v e it to direct, t h o u g h not quite realised conflict. M e t a p h y s i c a l systems did n o t exist and d e v e l o p on t h e p e r i p h e r y of scientific k n o w l e d g e ; D e s c a r t e s a n d L e i b n i z , t h e g r e a t est m e t a p h y s i c i a n s o f t h e s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y , w e r e a m o n g t h e most outstanding m a t h e m a t i c i a n s and n a t u r a l scientists of their t i m e . S p i n o z a , w h o did n o t p l a y a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e s c i e n c e s of n a t u r e , w a s au fait with all t h e i r a d v a n c e s ; his c o r r e s p o n d e n c e p r o v i d e s e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e materialist metaphysical system he created was to s o m e extent a philosophical s u m m i n g up of them. T h a t comes out not only in t h e c o n 166

ception of the applicability in principle of mathematical methods outside mathematics, but also in his treatment of one of the most important scientific (and philosophical) problems of the age, that of determinism. Spinoza's system was a revolution in t h e history of metaphysical systems, which had been idealist doctrines in the main in the preceding ages. Does that not explain why many of his contemporaries, and even thinkers of subsequent times, persistently did not understand him as a materialist philosopher? And in fact a metaphysical system and a materialist world outlook were mutually exclusive phenomena. But they presumed each other in Spinoza's doctrine, the speculative-metaphysical system of which was metaphysical materialism. T h e term 'metaphysical' functions in this case, of course, in t w o quite different meanings, neither of which can be discarded. Metaphysics (speculative metaphysics) took shape historically as a system during the development of philosophical supranaturalism, the primary source of which was the religious outlook on the world. T h e history of speculative metaphysics is a history in t h e main of objective idealism, whose development could not help reflecting the social processes that were compelling religion to adapt itself to new conditions and w e r e making science the authentic form of theoretical knowledge. T h e head-on offensive of natural science, materialist in its basis, the philosophical vanguard of which was metaphysical materialism, resolutely hostile to speculative idealist metaphysics, of necessity led to what might be called the Spinoza case or, if you like, a scandal in metaphysics. Speculative metaphysics, however, was a Procrustean bed for materialist philosophy. T h e Middle Ages knew doctrines, materialist in their prevailing tendency, that developed within a mystic integument that clearly did not correspond to them. T h e philosophy of modern times, developing in close association with bourgeois enlightenment, would not stand this flagrant contradiction and strove to bring the form of philosophising into line with its content. A metaphysical system could not be an adequate form of development or exposition of materialism primarily because it was senseless without assuming a special transphenomenal reality. T h e latter retained a ghost of the t r a n scendent even when it denied it, or interpreted it in t h e spirit of rationalist materialism. Spinoza maintained that substance possessed an infinite number of attributes, but knowledge only of thought and extension was accessible to man. T h a t was a clear and, of course, not
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sole concession to theology; the concession was not a c h a n c e one, b e c a u s e Spinoza's w h o l e system was a c o m p r o m i s e of speculative metaphysics with materialism. Hobbes, Gassendi, and other mat e r i a l i s t s c a m e o u t a g a i n s t it. T h e i r d o c t r i n e s w e r e b a s e d o n a m e c h a n i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n , p r o g r e s s i v e f o r its t i m e , t h a t w a s b e i n g affirmed in n a t u r a l science, and that was in essence a s y n o n y m for materialism a n d t h e sole real alternative to a theological outlook. H o b b e s and Gassendi successfully argued that t h e r e w e r e no scientific g r o u n d s for assuming s o m e m e t a p h y s i c a l reality radically different from that observed. Gassendi counterposed the atomistic materialism of Epicurus, whose natural philosophy and ethics w e r e frankly hostile to a metaphysical f r a m e of mind, to speculative metaphysics. Atoms w e r e not, of course, accessible to sense perception, but they also did not form a s u p e r s e n s o r y reality, since their properties w e r e similar to those of sense-perceived things and w e r e governed by laws that operated everywhere. Gassendi, true, endeavoured to reconcile Epicureanism with C h r i s t i a n d o g m a s , b u t t h a t w a s an e x o t e r i c p a r t of his p h i losophy, since the d o g m a s w e r e not substantiated theoretically but s i m p l y t a k e n as w h a t p h i l o s o p h y s h o u l d a c c o r d with, at least outwardly. Hobbes took an even m o r e irreconcilable stand in regard to speculative metaphysics. His references to Christian dogmas, in particular to the works of Christian writers (both, according to his interpretation, confirmed t h e truth of m a t e r i a l i s m ) w e r e seemingly not simply an exoteric veiling of materialist freethinking but also a sophisticated m e a n s of exposing the flagrant contradictions of the theology of Christianity. And since everything that existed was, a c c o r d i n g to him, nothing except body, the question of a metaphysical reality was u n r e s e r v e d l y removed.
1 0

T h e W o r l d , ... is C o r p o r e a l l , that is to say, B o d y ; a n d h a t h t h e d i m e n sions of M a g n i t u d e , namely L e n g t h , Bredth, and D e p t h : also every part of Body, is l i k e w i s e B o d y , a n d h a t h t h e like d i m e n s i o n s ; a n d c o n s e q u e n t ly e v e r y p a r t of t h e U n i v e r s e , is b o d y ; a n d t h a t w h i c h is not B o d y , is n o p a r t o f t h e U n i v e r s e : A n d b e c a u s e t h e U n i v e r s e i s All, that w h i c h is no p a r t of it, is Nothing; a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y no where ( 1 0 2 : 3 6 7 - 3 6 8 ) .

T h a t a r g u m e n t indicates that Hobbes employed the 'geometrical' m e t h o d o f r e a s o n i n g a l m o s t w i t h t h e s a m e skill a s S p i n o z a . He considered metaphysics a pseudoscience, stipulating, true, that he had in mind university philosophy, which 'hath no otherwise place, than as a h a n d m a i d to the R o m a n e Religion' ( 1 0 2 : 3 6 7 ) . T h i s p h i l o s o p h y , h e n o t e d , w a s c o n s i d e r e d t h e basis
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of all other sciences but was not in fact such since its content was determined by authority, while t r u e philosophy 'dependeth not on Authors' ( ibid .), i.e. was demonstrated and not imposed from outside. Hobbes scorned metaphysical systems as foreign to t h e spirit of science, counterposing them to geometry, which he called genuine philosophy. He attributed universal significance to the geometrical method, which m a d e conclusions possible that w e r e independent of t h e thinker's subjectivity. Metaphysics' incapacity for rigorous logical thought was due, according to Hobbes, to its inherent verbalism, i.e. to a striving to replace study of real bodies by the defining of words and terms, like body, time, place, matter, form, essence, subject, substance, accidence, force, act, finite, infinite, quantity, quality, motion, passion, etc. But metaphysics did not understand the n a t u r e of language, i.e. the sense of the signs or names given to things, the separate properties of things, and also to combinations of signs. Some signs, he claimed, did not signify anything that really existed. It is interesting to note that he considered the verb 'to be' to be one of those signs that did not, as he said, signify any thing but was only a logical copula.
And if it were so, that there were a Language without any Verb answerable to Est, or Is, or Bee; yet the men that used it would bee not a jot the lesse capable of Inferring, Concluding, and of all kind of Reasoning, than were the Greeks, and Latines. But what then would become of these Terms, of Entity, Essence, Essentiall, Essentiality, that are derived from it, and of many more that depend on these, applyed as most commonly they are? They are therefore no Names of Things; but Signes, by which wee make known, that wee conceive the Consequence of one name or Attribute to another (102:368).

Pardon me for such a long quotation from Leviathan, but it was necessary as indisputable evidence that the neopositivist critique of metaphysics (at least to the extent that it is on target) was essentially anticipated by the materialists of the seventeenth century. T h e neopositivists, who borrowed their semantic arguments from the materialist Hobbes, have turned them primarily against materialism by interpreting the meaningful categories of the materialist understanding of n a t u r e as terms without scientific sense. Let us return, however, to the real opponents of seventeenth-century metaphysics, viz., its materialist contemporaries. M a r x and Engels called J o h n L o c k e the creator of 'a positive, anti-metaphysical system' (179:127). T h a t sounds paradoxical; for Locke, as Engels noted elsewhere, was t h e founder of a metaphysical method (see 5 0 : 2 9 ) . But as I have already pointed out, the metaphysical method that took shape in natural science
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and philosophy in t h e seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as a mode of empirical inquiry differed radically from the speculative method of metaphysical systems, though the latter usually also had an antidialectical character. I lack the space to m a k e a special examination of Locke's positive anti-metaphysical system. Let me simply say that the main principle of its construction was a sensualistic, in the main materialistic analysis of the concepts employed in philosophy in order to bring out their actual content and fitness for knowledge. For Locke the sensualist method was not so much a mode of deducing new concepts from available sense data, as a means of reducing existing abstract concepts to their empirical source, if t h e r e was one. But it often happens that concepts that comprise the theoretical arsenal of metaphysical systems do not stand the test; they do not designate anything existing in sense perceptions, which means they lack real sense and need to be rejected. Other terms to which metaphysics ascribes fundamental significance in fact possess a very scanty empirical content. It is necessary, consequently, to re-examine and define their sense and meaning more accurately. From Locke's point of view, metaphysics was a consequence of the abuse of words, the possibility of which was latent in the imperfection of language. In Locke's classification of the sciences he singled out a 'doctrine of signs', calling it semeiotics or logic. T h e business of logic, he wrote,
is to consider the nature of signs the mind makes use of for the understanding of things, or conveying its knowledge to others.... T h e consideration, then, of ideas and words as the great instruments of knowledge, makes no despicable part of their contemplation who would take a view of human knowledge in the whole extent of it (152:608).

As we shall see, Locke, like Hobbes, foresaw certain very important ideas of contemporary positivism, in particular the principle of verification, logical syntax, and reductionism. But he was not a positivist, of course, and employed these ideas mainly to substantiate a materialist outlook. According to him the sensualist criterion excluded both the metaphysical conception of innate ideas and the notion of a supernatural reality. T h e criterion of reality was inseparable from sense perceptions of the external world. T h e sense of touch, for instance, always evoked an idea of solidity in us. ' T h e r e is no idea which we receive m o r e constantly from sensation than solidity' (152:76). T h e concept of impenetrability that physicists employed only expressed the same sense content
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in a n e g a t i v e w a y ; it c o u l d t h e r e f o r e be r e g a r d e d as a c o r o l l a r y of solidity. M o r e t h a n a n y o t h e r idea, t h a t o f solidity w a s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h our representations of bodies. F u r t h e r m o r e , it f o r m e d t h e most essential c o n t e n t o f t h e s e n o t i o n s . I t w a s t h e r e f o r e

n o w h e r e else to be found or imagined but only in matter; and though our senses take no notice of it but in masses of matter, of a bulk sufficient to cause a sensation in us; yet the mind, having once got this idea from such grosser sensible bodies traces it farther and considers it, as well as figure, in the minutest particle of matter that can exist, and finds it inseparably inherent in body, wherever or however modified ( ibid .).

Protesting against t h e isolation of m a t t e r from sense-perceived bodies, and against t h e tendency to counterpose t h e m and to a c c e p t n a m e s for t h i n g s (i.e. c o n v e r t g e n e r a l c o m m o n n a m e s or even t h e n a m e s of names into supersensory and so t r a n s c e n d e n t essences t h a t did n o t i n f a c t e x i s t ) , L o c k e a r g u e d t h a t t h e c o n c e p t of m a t t e r w a s a c o m p o n e n t p a r t of a m o r e g e n e r a l , i n his o p i n i o n , c o n c e p t o f b o d y . T h e w o r d ' m a t t e r ' , he claimed, designated something dense and uniform, while t h e t e r m ' b o d y ' i n d i c a t e d e x t e n s i o n a n d f i g u r e a s well, i n a d d i t i o n t o t h o s e q u a l i t i e s . I t will r e a d i l y b e n o t e d t h a t t h e s e d e l i m i t a tions connected with Locke's nominalism (or r a t h e r c o n c e p t u a l ism) in no w a y affected t h e basis of m a t e r i a l i s m . T h e y w e r e d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t s c h o l a s t i c m e t a p h y s i c s , f o r w h i c h , a s h e said, 'those o b s c u r e and unintelligible discourses and disputes... concerning materia prima' were characteristic (152:404). L o c k e opposed the metaphysical conception of the objective reality of universals, defending t h e materialist (but antidialectical, conceptualist) u n d e r s t a n d i n g of matter as t h e reality o f c o r p o r e a l s u b s t a n c e s . H e c o n s e q u e n t l y a r g u e d , t h o u g h not w h o l l y c o n s i s t e n t l y , for t h e m a t e r i a l i t y o f t h e w o r l d . O n e must evaluate Locke's critique of t h e concept 'substance', w h i c h h e t e n d e d t o assign t o u n i v e r s a l s ( w h i c h o b s c u r e d t h e problem of reality) from that standpoint. He claimed that the word 'substance' was applied by philosophers to t h r e e quite d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s : ' t o t h e infinite i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e G o d , t o finite spirits, a n d t o b o d y ' ( 1 5 2 : 1 1 6 ) . Did t h a t m e a n t h a t G o d , t h e h u m a n spirit, a n d b o d y w e r e o n l y m o d i f i c a t i o n s o f o n e a n d t h e s a m e substance? No one, evidently, would a g r e e with that. In that case, seemingly, it must be supposed that philosophers ' a p p l y i t t o G o d , finite spirits, a n d m a t t e r , i n t h r e e d i f f e r e n t s i g n i f i c a t i o n s ' ( i b i d . ) . But t h a t , t o o , l a c k e d s e n s e , s i n c e i t w a s e x p e d i e n t , i n o r d e r t o avoid m u d d l e , t o e m p l o y d i f f e r e n t w o r d s .
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What, in that case, r e m a i n e d of t h e concept of substance? L o c k e sometimes expressed himself in t h e sense that philosophy could m a n a g e without this term; t h e c o n c e p t of body fully covered t h e positive content contained in t h e idea of substance. T h e historical originality of t h e materialism of Hobbes, L o c k e , and their successors is largely d e t e r m i n e d by t h e negation of speculative metaphysics, and the struggle against that specific variety of objective idealism. I cannot, within t h e scope of this study, p u r s u e t h e qualitatively different stages of this struggle, and must limit myself to pointing out that t h e successors of Hobbes and L o c k e in their struggle against speculative metaphysics w e r e t h e English materialists ( T o l a n d , Priestley, and Collins) and t h e e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y F r e n c h materialists, beginning with Lamettrie. I must stress that the F r e n c h materialists' irreconcilability t o w a r d speculative metaphysics did not p r e v e n t them from positively evaluating t h e real advances of philosophical thought associated with it. T h e contradiction between t h e naturalist and spiritualist tendencies in t h e doctrines of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz w e r e first systematically b r o u g h t out precisely by F r e n c h materialism. Descartes' physics b e c a m e one of its theoretical sources. I h a v e already spoken a b o v e of the significance of Spinoza's d o c t r i n e of substance for t h e development of the materialist conception of t h e self-motion of matter. In contrast to the materialists of t h e seventeenth and eighteenth centuries t h e spokesmen of idealist empiricism saw nothing in metaphysical systems except fallacies and clear sophistry. T h a t applies in p a r t i c u l a r to H u m e , w h o opposed metaphysical system-creation after it had already been subjected to very fundamental materialist criticism. T h e crisis of speculalive metaphysics was o n e of t h e main reasons for t h e a p p e a r a n c e of idealist empiricism. H u m e claimed, from a s t a n c e of p h e n o m enalism and scepticism, that t h e r e was no essence, no substance, no thing-in-itself, no objective necessity, no regularity they w e r e all speculative constructs of metaphysics. T h e r e was no other connection between p h e n o m e n a t h a n what was revealed psychologically, subjectively, t h r o u g h association by similarity, contiguity, etc. He interpreted t h e c o n c e p t of m a t t e r as an illusion of something supersensory t h a t really did not exist, and rejected it as a variety of scholastic philosophising about a mythical substance. He also considered causality an illusory notion about t h e succession of our impressions in time and a habitual belief that what followed was t h e c o n s e q u e n c e of what preceded. But t h e p r e c e d i n g could not be t h e c a u s e just
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because it was earlier, he correctly noted. T h e relation of causality presumed dependence of the subsequent on the preceding. But if any link were introduced by the mind, then objective causality did not exist and this category only made sense within the context of the psychology of cognition. P h e nomenalism was thus subjective idealism, the solipsistic tendency of which was mitigated and so veiled by agnosticism. T h e struggle of phenomenalism against metaphysics was a polemic of subjective idealism against objective idealism on the one hand, and against materialist philosophy on the other. In the course of the development of bourgeois philosophy this other hand acquired p a r a m o u n t importance, since the divergence between the two varieties of idealism mentioned became less substantial. It must be acknowledged, incidentally, that phenomenalism demonstrates the real weakness of essentialism, of the philosophical trend which, instead of explaining the world of p h e n o m e n a from itself, treats all phenomena as the realisation of some essences independent of them. T h a t sort of opposing of essence to p h e n o m e n a is an inseparable feature of metaphysical systems that the materialists of the seventeenth century had already noted. But materialism, while criticising the mystification of the categories of essence and substance, did not reject them, and began to develop them from the standpoint of the doctrine of the unity of the world, the interaction of phenomena, causality, necessity, and regularity. In other words, materialism took on the job of theoretical interpretation of these categories, based on a critical analysis of experimental data, while the phenomenalist understanding of the senseperceived world proved a kind of continuation of the speculative metaphysical line to its epistemological discredit. Thus, idealist metaphysics was opposed in the eighteenth century by materialism, on the one hand, which developed a positive anti-metaphysical system of views, and by phenomenalism, on the other hand, which criticised idealist metaphysics from subjective and agnostic positions. Only materialism was a consistent opponent of speculative metaphysics. 4. Kant's Transcendental Dualist Metaphysics A new stage in the history of metaphysical systems began with Kant's 'critical philosophy', which was both a negation of metaphysics as a theory of supersensory knowledge, and a substantiation of t h e possibility of a new, transcendental
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metaphysics. Its basis, in Kant's scheme, was not formed by experience and, of course, not by supra-experience, but by that which, in Kant's view, m a d e experiential knowledge possible, viz., a priori forms of sensual contemplation and thinking. Kant had already expressed a belief in the impossibility of supra-experiential knowledge in his 'precritical' period. T h e transition from inconsistent materialism to 'critical philosophy' did not lead him to reject his belief in the illusory character of such knowledge. His critique of the conception of the a priori developed by seventeenth-century metaphysics was associated with this basic belief. According to him t h e r e was no a priori content of knowledge; only t h e forms of theoretical knowledge w e r e a priori, and they could not be deduced from experience by virtue of the universality and necessity inherent in them, and so preceded it. A priori forms therefore did not take us outside experience. T h e main fallacy of the old metaphysics was that it tried to overstep the bounds of any possible experience by means of categories and a whole arsenal of logical methods. T h e critique of metaphysics coincided in that respect with the critique of rationalism. Kant thus defined metaphysics as a theory of metaphysical knowledge impossible in principle from his point of view. His agnosticism was above all a denial of the possibility of metaphysical knowledge but, since he considered recognition of an objective reality, existing irrespective of h u m a n knowledge, also to be a metaphysical assumption, his whole epistemology acquired a subjective-agnostic character. T h e Kantian definition of metaphysics was primarily epistemological. He called any judgments and inferences metaphysical that were not based on sense data. In the language of contemporary positivism the same idea is expressed by the following formula: metaphysical propositions are unverifiable in principle, i.e. can neither be confirmed nor refuted by experience. Kant, furthermore, defined metaphysical inferences as logically unsound, pointing out that all metaphysical doctrines about mind, the world as a whole, and God inevitably lapsed into paralogisms or even antinomies. Logical positivism repeats Kant here, too, asserting that metaphysical judgments are logically unprovable. Kant, however, did not limit himself to an epistemological characterisation of metaphysics. He also defined its ontological content, viz., recognition of a supersensory reality and an evaluation of it as primary, determining the world of senseperceived phenomena. While denying the possibility of c o m p r e 174

hending the supersensory, he still postulated its existence as 'things-in-themselves' and noumena. But metaphysical systems were not so much doctrines about 'things-in-themselves' that, according to Kant, 'affected' our sensuality, without being an object of sense perception, as ones 'about t h e absolute world as a whole, which no sense could grasp, and also about God, freedom, and immortality' (117:18). Do these transcendent essences, or n o u m e n a exist? We do not and can never know, Kant said, whether they exist or not. T h e questions had no basis in experience, and were therefore theoretically unanswerable. But were they not rooted in what preceded experience? Kant claimed that t h e basic metaphysical ideas were a priori ideas of p u r e reason. Reason, in contrast to understanding, which synthesised sense data, synthesised concepts created by the latter. These, he suggested, could be either empirical or pure; the latter had their origin exclusively in understanding, i.e. were a priori. T h e ideas comprising p u r e concepts of that kind were ideas of p u r e reason, metaphysical ideas, or noumena. They did not, consequently, contain any knowledge of objective reality; they were the consequence of reason's aim of 'carrying out the synthetical unity which is cogitated in the category, even to the unconditioned' (116:225). Because of that reason directs the activity of understanding, pointing out to it the final, in principle unattainable, goal of cognition which, however, retained the significance of an ideal. Whereas empirical concepts were objective, t h e concepts of reason (or ideas) did not, by virtue of their a priori character, indicate the existence of what was cogitated, personal immortality, say, or the independence of will from motives. By rejecting the rationalist identification of the empirical basis with the logical, Kant thereby condemned the efforts of all previous metaphysics to deduce the existence of what is being thought from concepts. Kant, following Wolf, supposed that only t h r e e main metaphysical ideas existed, viz., those of a substantial soul, of the world as a whole, and of God. Accordingly there were t h r e e metaphysical disciplines, viz., rational, i.e. speculative, psychology, rational cosmology, and rational theology. He scrupulously examined the main arguments of these disciplines, demonstrating the impossibility in principle of a theoretical proof of the substantiality of the soul, personal immortality, and the existence of God. T h a t did not mean, however, according to him, that a theoretical proof of t h e contrary theses was possible. Rational cosmology differed from the other metaphysical
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d i s c i p l i n e s i n t h a t its m a i n t h e s e s , a n d t h e a n t i t h e s e s o p p o s i n g them, were equally provable. O n e could show that the world had no beginning in time and was not limited in space. But the opposite thesis c o u l d also be proved. T h e a n t i n o m i e s inevitable in a n y metaphysical inquiry into cosmological problems w e r e evidence, according to Kant, of their unresolvability in principle by theory. K a n t t h u s c o n v i n c i n g l y s h o w e d t h a t all m e t a p h y s i c a l s y s t e m s that had ever existed w e r e unsound, not b e c a u s e of t h e errors of their inventors, but by virtue of their basic content and c h a r a c t e r , i.e. b e c a u s e t h e y c l a i m e d t o c o m p r e h e n d s u p e r experiential ( t r a n s c e n d e n t ) reality. Metaphysics d r a g g e d out a m i s e r a b l e e x i s t e n c e ; p e o p l e d i d n o t e v e n d i s d a i n it, b u t w e r e s i m p l y i n d i f f e r e n t t o it. I t w a s still w o r t h p o n d e r i n g , h e w r o t e , w h e t h e r this indifferentism was a superficial, dilletante attitude to a vitally i m p o r t a n t p r o b l e m . M e t a p h y s i c s , of c o u r s e , did not exist as a science, and it w a s not clear w h e t h e r it could b e c o m e s u c h , b u t its h i s t o r y c o n v i n c e d o n e a t l e a s t o f o n e t h i n g , v i z . , that interest in t h e metaphysical problematic was a p r o p e r interest of reason, not forced on it from outside, but rooted in the very essence of the rational. T h e ineradicable bent of h u m a n reason for metaphysics was s h o w n by the constant manifestations of this inclination. And t h e first q u e s t i o n t h a t f a c e d t h e e x p l o r e r o f t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l odyssey of h u m a n reason was h o w was metaphysics possible as a natural inclination? T h e new philosophical discipline (from w h i c h K a n t t o o k t h e t i t l e o f h i s f a m o u s w o r k Critique o f Pure Reason) w a s c a l l e d u p o n t o p r o v i d e t h e a n s w e r . Rationalism, Kant claimed, had an uncritical character. Rationalists, for example, w e r e convinced that p u r e reason, i.e. r e a s o n f r e e o f s e n s u a l i t y ( o f s e n s e d a t a a n d a f f e c t s ) w a s n e v e r m i s t a k e n , a n d t h a t all t h e e r r o r s o f r e a s o n w e r e t h e c o n s e q u e n c e of i n t e r f e r e n c e by affects and unsystematic sense perceptions. T h e adherents of rationalism w e r e mistaken in supposing that reason was c a p a b l e of grasping what existed beyond any possible e x p e r i e n c e in a purelv logical way, witho u t b a s i n g itself o n e m p i r i c a l d a t a . T h e s e e r r o r s w e r e n o t c h a n c e ones, but inevitable; p u r e reason erred not as a conseq u e n c e of outside interference but precisely because it was p u r e reason. Kant's transcendental dialectic was a theoretical generalisation of t h e history of metaphysical systems, or an analysis of t h e logic of m e t a p h y s i c a l philosophising. But if p u r e reason inevitably lapsed into paralogisms and antinomies, perhaps the answer to metaphysical problems was
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realisable t h r o u g h theoretical comprehension of experience? Kant ruled that alternative out; comprehension of sense data did not take one beyond t h e limits of the world of phenomena, which was proved by the transcendental analytic. So was metaphysics impossible as a science? Yes, it was impossible as a positive doctrine about noumena. But since it was possible and necessary and, in fact, already feasible to m a k e a systematic, conclusive investigation of the metaphysical inclination of human reason, and of those even though imaginary objects to which it was directed, t h e question of how metaphysics was possible as a science was quite legitimate. Such was the p r o b lematic of Critique of Pure Reason, which Kant expected not only to overthrow all previous dogmatic metaphysics theoretically but also to substantiate the principles of a new, transcendental metaphysics. Transcendental metaphysics thus did not claim to be a positive investigation of metaphysical essences, and even refrained (true, without d u e consistency) from any statements about their factual existence. Its immediate task was to inquire into the n a t u r e of theoretical knowledge and its relation to sense-perceived objects and experience in general. T h a t task did not boil down to an epistemological exploration of the fact of knowledge, because that meant, according to Kant, estabblishing the presence of an unknowable transcendent reality, which was already an ontological conclusion. Nature, unlike the supersensory world of 'things-in-themselves' was a knowable reality, which did not exist, however, outside and independent of the process of cognition. Ontology was converted into epistemology, i.e. into an investigation of rational knowledge that synthesised sense data through a priori principles and so created a picture of surrounding reality that the 'uncritical' minds took for an objective world independent of knowledge. Therefore,
the proud name of an Ontology, which professes to present synthetical cognitions a priori of things in general in a systematic doctrine, must give place to the modest title of analytic of the pure understanding (116:185).

T h e next, and most important task of the transcendental metaphysics (in Kant's view) was to investigate reason as h u m a n spiritual essence immanently generating metaphysical ideas. T h e latter were regarded as fundamental p h e n o m e n a of the mind since the question of whether transcendent essences corresponded to the ideas of reason was theoretically unanswerable. At that stage of the inquiry metaphysics had only to
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explain the origin in reason of the idea of a substantial soul, the idea of the world as a whole, and the idea of God. T h a t framing of the question brought Kant close to awareness of the need to investigate the epistemological roots of religion and idealism, an awareness absent among the French materialists, who considered religion a product of ignorance and deceit, and did not ponder on what it reflected and why it was so deeply rooted in men's minds. Kant, of course, was far from understanding religion as a reflection of historically determined social being, but he was also far from a superficial conviction that belief in transcendent essences was an ordinary prejudice overthrowable by enlightenment. Kant's attempt to explain the main metaphysical ideas epistemologically from the logical n a t u r e of the t h r e e principal types of inference was, of course, unsuccessful. It does not follow at all from the fact that there are categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive deductions and inferences, that the thinking individual comes of necessity to questions of the essence of the soul, the nature of the world as a whole, and about whether God exists. Kant himself, incidentally, did not attach great significance to this formal deduction of metaphysical ideas, perhaps being aware that they, and the frames of mind associated with them, were not reducible in general to logical structures. For, according to his doctrine, the deepest foundation of metaphysical ideas lay in moral consciousness rather than in epistemology. T h e metaphysics of morals had primacy over the metaphysics of nature in his system. That is why the most important principle of his metaphysical system was formed not by theoretical reason but by p u r e practical reason, i.e. by moral consciousness, since it did not depend on sensuality and any other motives, and therefore followed one a priori moral law alone, the categorical imperative. T h e idea of the autonomy of moral consciousness led Kant to affirm what before him had mainly been done by materialists, viz., that morality is independent of religion, since this dependence would have made its existence impossible. Establishing of the existence of morality was therefore, from Kant's angle, proof of the autonomy of moral consciousness. But unlike the French materialists he did not strive to overthrow religion, but rather to accord it with 'pure reason', both theoretical and practical. Theoretical reason led of necessity to agnosticism, so leaving room for faith, as Kant himself stressed. As for practical reason, its very existence as unconditional morality excluding any compromises was only possible because its
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postulates w e r e recognition of t h e existence of God, retribution beyond t h e grave, and t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e of will of motives. T h e contradictions in t h e t r e a t m e n t of t h e relation between moral and religious consciousness w e r e organically linked with t h e duality characteristic of Kant in his understanding of 'things-in-themselves' and n o u m e n a . In t h e first edition of Critique of Pure Reason ( w e k n o w ) , he defined a 'thing-initself simply as a limitation concept, so questioning its r e a l existence, i.e. its i n d e p e n d e n c e of t h e process of cognition. In t h e second edition he attempted to eliminate that subjectivist accent. In t h e addition entitled 'Refutation of Idealism' (already m e n t i o n e d a b o v e ) , he categorically declared that his d o c t r i n e ruled out a n y doubts of t h e existence of 'things-in-themselves'. But no declaration could eliminate t h e contradiction contained in t h e very c o n c e p t of an absolutely u n k n o w a b l e essence, in relation to which it was considered established that it existed, affected our sensuality, etc. This contradiction of t h e agnostic interpretation of t h e traditional metaphysical problematic is particularly obvious in t h e c h a p t e r of Critique of Pure Reason entitled 'On t h e G r o u n d of t h e Division of All Objects into P h e n o m e n a and N o u m e n a ' ( 1 1 6 : 1 8 0 ) . In it K a n t explained that the dividing line between p h e n o m e n a and n o u m e n a h a d only a negative c h a r a c t e r b e c a u s e t h e r e could not be positive statements about t h e existence of what was not an object of experience. In stating t h a t t h e sensually perceived a r e only p h e n o m e n a , one thus (in his idea) counterposed it to what was not an object of experience, which m e a n t that t h e fixing of b o u n d a r i e s of e x p e r i e n c e was at t h e s a m e time a mental assumption of what existed outside experience. But w h y did these b o u n d a r i e s indicate t h e existence of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t ? T h e explanation was that t h e b o u n d a r i e s of sense c o n t e m p l a tion (and of any possible e x p e r i e n c e in g e n e r a l ) comprised space and time, and everything that existed outside space and t i m e must be considered transcendent. But what did t h e c o n c l u sion about t h e existence of extraspatial and e x t r a t e m p o r a l essences follow from? F r o m t h e fact, K a n t suggested, that time and s p a c e w e r e only forms of sense contemplation. Ultimately he admitted that t h e reality of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t was unprovable:
But, after all, the possibility of such noumena is quite incomprehensible.... The conception of a noumenon is therefore merely a limitation conception, and therefore only of negative use (116:188).

U n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e absurdity of solipsism, K a n t argued that consciousness of t h e subjectivity of t h e sensual was precisely an establishing of its b o u n d a r i e s , beyond which lay objective
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reality i n d e p e n d e n t of sensibility. T h i s speculative a r g u m e n t was essentially t h e sole o n e possible from t h e angle of t h e Kantian pure, theoretical reason. T h e Critique o f Practical Reason i n t e r p r e t e d n o u m e n a a s n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e possibility of m o r a l consciousness. If it w a s possible only b e c a u s e o f t h e t r a n s p h e n o m e n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e o f will f r o m s e n s u a l m o t i v e s , d i d i t n o t f o l l o w f r o m this t h a t p u r e g o o d will was also a n o u m e n o n ? And if the motives of m o r a l actions w e r e t r a n s c e n d e n t essences (substantial soul, G o d , etc.) did it not follow that they w e r e not simply conceivable but actually existing realities? Otherwise, it t u r n e d out that the h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l w a s m o r a l o n l y b e c a u s e o f e r r o r , i.e. b e c a u s e h e o r s h e believed that God and t r a n s c e n d e n t justice existed, t h o u g h i n fact n e i t h e r t h e o n e n o r t h e o t h e r did. B u t t h a t a s s u m p t i o n , t o o , left t h e m a i n p o i n t u n c l e a r : h o w w a s f r e e w i l l , b a s e d o n l y on a conviction that f r e e d o m really existed, possible? Kant a r g u e d that the h u m a n individual as a sensuous being (or phenomenon) was absolutely determined and consequently d i d n o t b e l o n g t o itself, d i d n o t p o s s e s s m o r a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s , w a s not, in essence, even an individual. It b e c a m e an individual a n d b e a r e r of m o r a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s only insofar as it w a s also a supersensuous being. T h e Critique of Pure Reason i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e e x i s t e n c e of n o u m e n a w a s e s s e n t i a l l y p r o b l e m a t i c . T h e Critique o f Practical Reason u l t i m a t e l y c o n v e r t e d t h e s e p o s t u l a t e s i n t o a c t u a l c o n d i tions of morality. T h e existence of p u r e morality, treated as fact ( b e c a u s e Kant considered ' i m p u r e ' morality as t h e most obvious negation of the fact of m o r a l i t y ) , was interpreted as practical p r o o f o f t h e s u b s t a n t i a l i t y o f t h e s o u l , f r e e w i l l , e t c . T h e e x a c t e s t a b l i s h i n g a n d d e s c r i p t i o n o f a fact s h o w e d , a c c o r d i n g t o h i s d o c t r i n e , t h e f a c t u a l c o n d i t i o n s o f its p o s s i b i l i t y , i.e. o t h e r f a c t s n o t a m e n a b l e t o o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t , h o w e v e r , had t o e x i s t b e c a u s e o t h e r w i s e w h a t w a s , i.e. t h e e s t a b l i s h e d d e s c r i b e d fact, w a s impossible. T h e f r a m i n g of the question that epistemological analysis of s o m e facts argued the existence of others, to s o m e extent foresaw t h e real significance of practice, in p a r t i c u l a r of t h e o r e t i c a l a n a l y s i s o f its c o n t e n t , f o r p r o v i n g t h o s e j u d g m e n t s of science that could not be obtained by logical deduction. But K a n t h a d no u n d e r s t a n d i n g of practice as universal h u m a n activity; for him practical reason w a s only moral consciousness a n d b e h a v i o u r c o r r e s p o n d i n g to t h e strict r e q u i r e m e n t s of the categorical imperative. It w a s a matter, f u r t h e r m o r e , of t h e absolutely p u r e moral consciousness ascribed to the sensuous
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h u m a n individual, although it was independent, according to the definition, of sensibility. Such consciousness did not, of course, exist (as Kant himself was to some extent a w a r e ) , but the logic of his argument was as follows: to the extent to which t h e r e was p u r e moral consciousness, t h e r e w e r e t h e transcendent, theological premisses of h u m a n morality. But the whole point was that all these premisses (or cogitated facts) could not partly exist precisely because they were cogitated not only as ideas but also as noumena. Kant's philosophy was thus a negation of traditional metaphysical systems whose ideological downfall had been brought about by materialism's struggle against idealist speculation, by the outstanding advances of natural science, and by the development of bourgeois society. T h e reform of metaphysics undertaken by him started from awareness of these facts. T h e main problem he posed was how was science possible. Correspondingly, metaphysics, too, according to his doctrine, should become a science, since any other alternative was ruled out in principle. Kant developed metaphysics (1) as a doctrine of the forms of knowledge that transformed sense data into a system of science, and (2) as an epistemological study of the origin of the fundamental philosophical ideas that were not related to p h e n o m e n a of the sense-perceived world. (3) He mapped out a new path of development of metaphysical ideology on the basis of a philosophical doctrine of practical reason, substantiating the primacy of the latter over theoretical reason. He developed that principle only in relation to ethics; even the question of the existence of 'things-in-themselves' as the source of sense data was not posed from the angle of practical reason, since moral necessity was not inherent in reality of that kind. Nevertheless Kant considered it absurd to deny the existence of 'things-in-themselves', i.e. recognised them, in contrast to noumena, as undoubtedly existent. Kant understood metaphysics as a rationalist philosophical system, a system of pure reason. T h a t was a one-sided view, not only because anti-metaphysical views had also developed on the soil of rationalism, and because certain opponents of rationalism had created idealist-empirical metaphysical systems. T h e limitedness of identifying metaphysics with rationalism consisted also in an incorrect radical antithesis of rationalism and empiricism, which in fact often supplemented each other, as it had been with Descartes and his opponent Hobbes, and just as it was with Kant himself. This identification, moreover, left out the irrationalist tendency of metaphysical philosophis181

ing, first brought out in t h e systems of Neoplatonism, and which have again become common, but now in the twentieth century, which Kant, of course, could not foresee. Along with this one-sided understanding of speculative metaphysics in Kant t h e r e was also a very broadened interpretation of it, since only philosophical scepticism was declared its opposite. Kant's 'critical philosophy' claimed to overcome the extremes of metaphysical dogmatism and scepticism. Such a conception condemned all doctrines foreign to scepticism and criticism as dogmatic metaphysics. It ignored the idealist character of criticism and rejected materialism as 'uncritical' metaphysical philosophising. These contradictions in Kant's understanding of metaphysics were rooted in the contradictions of his own metaphysical system, in which he tried to join together scientific knowledge and superscientific assumptions, the principle of the knowability of the sense-perceived world and agnosticism, materialism and idealism, reason and faith. T h e failure of this attempt again brought to the fore the alternativemetaphysics or materialism? I shall not go into the metaphysical systems of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, since it is sufficient, to answer the question of metaphysics' attitude to the antithesis between materialism and idealism, to stress that these thinkers developed new varieties of speculative metaphysics. To the metaphysics of immutable essences they counterposed a metaphysics of becoming, change, and development. This turn, which Kant clearly did not foresee, was largely the work of Hegel, who created a dialectical metaphysical system. What had been absolute opposites for Kant, i.e. subjective and objective, phenomenon and essence, knowledge and the 'thing-in-itself, freedom and necessity, this world and the transcendent one, in short everything that he and his predecessors had antidialectically opposed to one another, were treated by Hegel as a dialectical relation, a relation of opposites being converted into one another. T h e r e is no need specially to trace this dominant tendency of the Hegelian metaphysical system. Suffice it to point out that, according to Hegel, 'in cognition ... the contrast is virtually superseded, as regards both the onesidedness of subjectivity and the one-sidedness of objectivity' (86:283). Reason, on the one hand, and the external world on the other, which had remained essences alien to each other in pre-Hegelian metaphysics, proved (according to him) to be t w o interpenetrating aspects of one whole that could be defined as subject-object, or thought-being. In that way the
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world b e c a m e rational and reason objective and secular. G e r m a n classical idealism was a very important epoch in the history of metaphysical systems. As M a r x and Engels wrote:
S e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y metaphysics, driven from t h e field by t h e F r e n c h E n l i g h t e n m e n t , notably by French materialism of t h e eighteenth c e n t u r y , experienced a victorious and substantial restoration in German philosophy, p a r t i c u l a r l y in t h e speculative German philosophy of t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . After Hegel linked it in a masterly fashion with all subsequent metaphysics and with G e r m a n idealism and f o u n d e d a metaphysical universal kingdom, the attack on theology again corresponded, as in t h e eighteenth c e n t u r y , to an attack on speculative metaphysics and metaphysics in general. It will be defeated for ever by materialism, which h a s now been perfected by t h e w o r k of speculation itself and coincides with humanism ( 1 7 9 : 1 2 5 ) .

They noted in this connection the historical significance of Feuerbach's materialism, which 'counterposed sober philosophy to wild speculation' ( ibid .). On the other hand they pointed out the development of communist theories that opened up a historical prospect of solution of radical social problems. These problems w e r e unresolvable in principle in bourgeois society (which was presented by speculative philosophers as the sole possible form of civilisation). In that way Marxism disclosed t h e deep social roots not only of t h e theological but also of the philosophical conception of the transcendent, which thus functioned not simply as a misconception in the way of knowing but also as a specific form (of course illusory but fully fulfilling its ideological purpose) of resolving the antagonist contradictions of social development. In the light of the antithesis of communism (which M a r x and Engels also called practical materialism) and idealism the whole preceding materialist critique of the metaphysical conception of transcendent reality, which seemed to rise above the empirical reality that oppressed human individual, proved one-sided, not affecting the social sense of freedom. Was that only a theoretical flaw or rather a consequence of the fact that the antithesis between materialism and idealist metaphysics developed in the context of one and t h e same bourgeois ideology? ' T h e standpoint of the old materialism,' Marx wrote, 'is civil society; the standpoint of the new is human society, or social humanity' (177:5). It is therefore not surprising that eighteenth-century materialism, irreconcilably hostile to theological and idealist speculations about a transcendent reality, proved quite incapable of disclosing the social roots of that speculation in the alienated social relations of an antagonistic society.
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5. T o w a r d a Critique of Irrationalist S p e c u l a t i v e M e t a p h y s i c s H e g e l ' s p h i l o s o p h y w a s t h e last g r e a t s y s t e m o f s p e c u l a t i v e metaphysics. Dialectically rethinking t h e traditional metaphysical p r o b l e m a t i c , he g r o p e d for a w a y out of t h e dead end o f m e t a p h y s i c a l s y s t e m - m a k i n g . B u t t h a t w a y o u t w a s o p e n only for those w h o rejected idealism together with t h e metaphysical m o d e o f t h i n k i n g . H e g e l c o u l d n o t t a k e t h a t r o a d . H e limited h i m s e l f t o s u b s t a n t i a t i n g t h e thesis t h a t t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t w a s i m m a n e n t to empirical reality, t h a n k s to which it was rational. H i s d o c t r i n e , h o w e v e r , a s L e n i n s h o w e d , implicitly i n c l u d e d a conclusion that 'the struggle against existing w r o n g and p r e v a l e n t evil, is a l s o r o o t e d in t h e u n i v e r s a l l a w of e t e r n a l d e v e l o p m e n t ' ( 1 4 1 : 2 1 ) . T h a t c o n c l u s i o n , h o w e v e r , c o u l d only be d r a w n by a revolutionary thinker. And only consistent revol u t i o n a r i e s , b a s i n g t h e m s e l v e s o n this c o n c l u s i o n , h a v e b e e n able to develop t h e dialectical-materialist system of views not only o n n a t u r e but a l s o o n society. T h e b o u r g e o i s p h i l o s o p h y o f t h e l a t t e r half o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y n a t u r a l l y c h o s e another road. I n G e r m a n y , after t h e 1848 R e v o l u t i o n , E n g e l s w r o t e ,
the old fearless zeal for theory has now disappeared completely, along with classical philosophy. Inane eclecticism and an anxious concern for career and income, descending to the most vulgar job-hunting, occupy its place (52:375).

T h i n g s w e r e r o u g h l y t h e s a m e i n t h e o t h e r d e v e l o p e d capitalist c o u n t r i e s o f t h e t i m e , a s well. T h e positivist a n d N e o k a n t i a n s c h o l a r s w h o filled u n i v e r s i t y c h a i r s u n a n i m o u s l y r e j e c t e d m e t a p h y s i c a l s p e c u l a t i o n , but w h a t did t h e y o p p o s e to it? I n d e t e r m i n a t e agnosticism which b e c a m e the refuge of inconsistent subjective idealism. T h e latter c a m e forward in the r o l e of a scientific p h i l o s o p h y t h a t boiled d o w n to e p i s t e m o l o g y . P h i l o s o p h y w a s e x p o u n d e d as a special scientific d i s c i p l i n e , b u t in its N e o k a n t i a n a n d positivist v e r s i o n s it w a s not s u c h , of c o u r s e , i.e. it r e m a i n e d a specific w o r l d o u t l o o k or i d e o l o g y , r a t h e r e m a s c u l a t e d , it is t r u e , t h a t it w a s d i s c a r d e d by all w h o really sought to answer ideological questions. I t s e e m e d t h a t p h i l o s o p h y , a s t h e N e o k a n t i a n P a u l s e n said o f t h a t t i m e , n o l o n g e r h a d a f u t u r e . A n d o n l y t h e fact t h a t t h e u n i v e r s i t i e s still r e t a i n e d p h i l o s o p h y c h a i r s i n s p i r e d w e a k h o p e s . B u t t h e s i t u a t i o n a l t e r e d decisively a t t h e e n d o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . T h e e s s e n c e o f t h e t u r n , i n P a u l s e n ' s belief, w a s t h a t t h e positive sciences, which had very nearly ousted philosophy,
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h a v e not fulfilled all t h e expectations t h a t w e r e put in t h e m a generation ago; they h a v e led neither to a stabilised total view of things in themselves n o r to a s e c u r e conception of life and s t a n d a r d of living (202:390).

Paulsen noted the revolution in physics which had begun at t h e e n d o f t h e c e n t u r y , a n d t h e r e s u l t i n g m e t h o d o l o g i c a l crisis:

almost all t h e basic concepts t h a t w e r e so confidently operated with a g e n e r a t i o n a g o as eternal t r u t h s , h a v e recently been s h a k e n ... even t h e law of conservation of e n e r g y is no longer safe from sceptical ideas and doubting inquiries ( ibid .).
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T h e new discoveries in physics and other sciences had, in Paulsen's opinion, caused disappointment with science. T h a t u n e x p e c t e d conclusion reflected t h e real facts, t h o u g h in d i s t o r t e d f o r m . T h e old a n t i - d i a l e c t i c a l c o n c e p t i o n s o f t r u t h a n d k n o w l e d g e i n g e n e r a l h a d c o l l a p s e d . T h e o v e r s i m p l i f i e d positivist c o n c e p t i o n t h a t s c i e n c e did not deal with ' m e t a p h y s i c a l ' p r o b l e m s h a d s u f f e r e d fiasco. O b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m , w h i c h s e e m e d t o b e u t t e r l y d e f e a t e d , s t i r r e d t o life. S c i e n c e , P a u l s e n w r o t e , r e f l e c t i n g t h i s q u i c k e n i n g i n t e r e s t f o r o b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m a n d a n idealist interpretation of ideological problems, h a d n o w h e r e got to the root of m a t t e r s , n e i t h e r in t h e smallest n o r in t h e biggest.
O n e begins with t h e question: c a n n o t and should not philosophy, so long despised and m u c h abused, then in t h e end p r o v i d e that without which, after all, t h e h u m a n spirit c a n n o t m a n a g e for long, viz., an answer to the ultimate questions of reality and life, if not in t h e form of necessary propositions or eternal truths, as t h e old metaphysics believed, then at least in t h e s h a p e of possible and believable opinions, in t h e s h a p e of ' r e a s o n a b l e thoughts'? ( 2 0 2 : 3 9 1 ) .

Paulsen explained the resurrection of speculative metaphysics idealistically. T h e n u b of t h e m a t t e r was not t h e 'ideological anguish' about which W i n d e l b a n d spoke, so realising the i n a d e q u a c y of N e o k a n t i a n 'scientific idealism'. Bourgeois s o c i e t y , a f t e r t h e c o m p a r a t i v e l y q u i e t , ' p e a c e f u l ' p e r i o d t h a t set in after t h e 1848 revolutions, had again e n t e r e d an a g e of r e v o l u tionary upheavals. Philosophical indifferentism in r e g a r d to s o c i a l p r o b l e m s , w h i c h h a d p e r f o r m e d its i d e o l o g i c a l f u n c t i o n s u c c e s s f u l l y i n t h e lull, c l e a r l y d i d n o t c o r r e s p o n d t o t h e p r e imperialist a n d imperialist epochs. A ' r e v a l u a t i o n of values', an apologia for tragic contradictions, and an irrationalist substantiation of imperialist policy had b e c o m e necessary, since it could n o t b e justified b y r a t i o n a l i s t p h i l o s o p h e r s a n d pacifists w h o c l u n g t o old l i b e r a l i d e a l s . T h e i r r a t i o n a l i s t ' p h i l o s o p h y o f life', e s p e c i a l l y i n its N i e t z s c h e a n v e r s i o n , p r o v e d t h e h i g h r o a d o f d e v e l o p m e n t of imperialist ideology and t h e philosophy corr e s p o n d i n g t o it.
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N i e t z s c h e ridiculed the religious and idealist c o n c e p t i o n s of a s u p e r n a t u r a l reality (sometimes even in t h e spirit of F e u e r b a c h ) . H e r i d i c u l e d t h e m a s h o s t i l e t o life, b e c a u s e life a s a w h o l e i s t h i s - w o r l d a n d d o e s n o t c a r e f o r lifeless t r a n s c e n d e n c y . He c a m e close to an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the social sense of t h e conception of t r a n s c e n d e n c y , pointing out that it w e a k e n e d t h e will t o life.
T h e concept of 'God' invented as a c o u n t e r c o n c e p t of lifeeverything harmful, poisonous, slanderous, the whole hostility u n t o death against life synthesized in this concept in a g r u e s o m e unity! T h e concept of t h e 'beyond', the ' t r u e world' invented in order to d e v a l u a t e t h e only world t h e r e isin order to retain no goal, no reason, no task for our earthly reality! ( 1 9 6 : 3 3 4 ) .

Nietzsche, of course, r e m a i n e d a stranger to t h e materialist u n d e r s t a n d i n g of r e l i g i o n as a f a n t a s t i c r e f l e c t i o n of t h e d o m i n a n c e of elemental forces of social d e v e l o p m e n t over p e o p l e . E v e n less w a s h e a b l e t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e s o c i a l f u n c t i o n of r e l i g i o n as a w e a p o n of s p i r i t u a l e n s l a v e m e n t of t h e e x p l o i t e d . Exploitation, oppression, the domination of s o m e over others w e r e t h e e s s e n c e o f life f o r h i m . H e t h e r e f o r e c r i t i c i s e d r e l i g i o n (in c o n t r a s t t o F e u e r b a c h ) f o r its o v e r p o w e r i n g o f t h e n a t u r a l l y l i m i t l e s s will t o life, w h o s e i n c a r n a t i o n , a c c o r d i n g t o his doctrine, was whoever knew how to rule. T h e c o n d e m n a t i o n o f t h e r e l i g i o u s ' c u r b i n g ' o f life g r e w w i t h N i e t z s c h e into a c r i t i q u e of t h e objective-idealist c o n c e p t i o n of m e t a p h y s i c a l reality; he s a w in that c o n c e p t i o n an illusion of the weak about the rational order prevailing in the world. Rationalist ideas of p r o g r e s s w e r e rejected as an u n f o r g i v a b l e n e g l e c t of t h e s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of life, t h e e s s e n c e of w h i c h w a s f o r m e d n o t b y r e a s o n b u t b y will, n o t b y t h o u g h t b u t b y i n s t i n c t , f e e l i n g , a n d i n c l i n a t i o n . N i e t z s c h e set u p o n t h e r a t i o n a l i s t m e t a physics of p u r e reason: ' T h e " p u r e spirit" is a p u r e stupidity; substract the n e r v o u s system and the senses, the 'mortal s h e l l , and we are left withnothing at all!' (194:179). Nietzsche's expression m a y seem essentially materialist to the reader unversed in philosophy. Surely he was opposing sensuality and corporeality to the 'pure reason' of the rationalists? But t h e w h o l e point is t h a t N i e t z s c h e spiritualised t h e b o d y , c o n s i d e r i n g i t t h e i n c a r n a t i o n o f t h e i m m a t e r i a l will t o p o w e r , i.e. o f a p r i m o r d i a l f o r c e t h a t a c q u i r e d its c o n s c i o u s e x p r e s s i o n i n t h e h u m a n b o d y . H e f o l l o w e d t h e p a t h laid b y S c h o p e n h a u e r ' s d o c t r i n e of t h e blind, anti-reason, indomitable w i l l , w h i c h h e t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a d o c t r i n e o f life's p r i m o r d i a l n a t u r e . L i f e did n o t r e c k o n w i t h a n y l a w s o r c o n f i n e s ; i t s t r o v e
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to destroy everything that impeded its elemental expansion. F r o m Nietzsche's point of view the will to power was not a scientifically established fact; he had a majestic disdain for facts of that kind. Life did not need recognition or justification. And the will to power was life itself, experience of life that adequately expressed its fullness and pressure. Even if the will to power was only a myth, life expressed itself in it. All t h e rest w e r e ghosts, because the very existence of the world was 'only like an aesthetic phenomenon' (197:43). T h e world of a p p e a r ance was the sole world, and life needed no other imaginary world whatsoever, for the comfort of the weak. Nietzsche, who is often called the thinker who put an end to speculative metaphysics, in fact gave it a qualitatively new, irrationalist form, so breathing strength into it. Contemporary philosophical irrationalism, relying on Nietzsche, comes forward as a critic of the historically outlived rationalism of t h e seventeenth century, with its naive notion of the omnipotence of reason and its rigid hierarchy, absolutely excluding chance, of immutable laws that guaranteed h a r m o n y in every thing that exists. This critique of rationalist illusions is a form of manifestation of contemporary irrationalist metaphysics, since irrationalist philosophers objectively wage war not on the past but on contemporary science and materialist philosophy, which have long already overcome the errors of rationalism, retaining the kernel of truth it contained. That is obvious, in particular, from the example of existentialism, which expresses most vividly the transformation of metaphysics into an anti-scientific, irrationalist doctrine, in spite of its coming forward, in Heidegger's doctrine for example, as the negation of metaphysics. Heidegger counterposed his 'fundamental ontology' to metaphysics, which he treated not only as a false way of thinking but also as a false mode of human existence created by the growing alienation of the h u m a n personality throughout civilisation, which was m o r e and more losing its authenticity and its primaeval intuition of being initially inherent in it. But, didn't calling his philosophy ontology lead Heidegger into a contradiction with his intention to put an end to metaphysics (for ontology has always been the basis of metaphysics)? And in our time ontology (for example in Neothomist metaphysics) is a doctrine of being, above all of higher, mentally comprehensible being. But Heidegger broke with the traditional understanding of ontology, claiming that being could not be an object of cognition, and that an illusory notion of the knowability of being was engendered by the metaphysical exclusion
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of m a n from being and by the rationalist counterposing of consciousness to being, as a c o n s e q u e n c e of which mind was interpreted as s o m e t h i n g distinct from being. Heidegger took up a r m s against t h e materialist (and not j u s t t h e m a t e r i a l i s t ) r e c o g n i t i o n o f a n external w o r l d , i n t e r preting this epistemological premiss as an i m p o v e r i s h m e n t o f h u m a n self, a c o n v e r s i o n o f b e i n g i n t o s o m e t h i n g e x t e r n a l , r e d u c t i o n o f t h e h u m a n p e r s o n a l i t y t o a ' t h i n k i n g t h i n g ' , i.e. t o a n o b j e c t t h a t s u p p o s e d l y l e n d s itself t o c o g n i t i o n l i k e o t h e r things. Ontology in Heidegger's sense was called upon to c o n c e r n itself w i t h i n v e s t i g a t i n g t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e sense of being. It thus appealed to m a n , to t h e real man w h o inquires about the sense of being. In other words ontology w a s p o s s i b l e o n l y a s p h e n o m e n o l o g y i n H u s s e r l ' s s e n s e , i.e. exploration of the special p h e n o m e n a of h u m a n consciousness that have the sense of being. F r o m that angle ontology was an anti-metaphysical doctrine, whose subject-matter was not being in general but h u m a n existence. Existentialist ontology appraises the d e m a r c a t i o n of consciousness and being, subject and object, as neglect of being. S u c h d e m a r c a t i o n ( t h e b a s i s of w h i c h is f o r m e d by a life situation of alienation and not by mental acts) results in being functioning as t h e opposite of consciousness. But real being, lost b y h u m a n i t y a n d p h i l o s o p h y , d o e s n o t b r e a k d o w n i n t o these opposites, since it is no m o r e outside consciousness than consciousness is outside being. T h e dualism of being and consciousness is caused not simply by metaphysics but by the d e v e l o p m e n t of c u l t u r e , by scientific a n d t e c h n i c a l p r o g r e s s , b y t h e loss o f m a n ' s initial i n t i m a t e link w i t h b e i n g . T h e p l a c e of real being is t h e r e f o r e taken by the material world, the e x i s t e n t , w h i c h i s t a k e n , h o w e v e r , f o r b e i n g . B e c a u s e o f its alienation consciousness everywhere encounters only the existent, n o w h e r e discovering being, although t h e latter does not hide from m a n but on t h e c o n t r a r y is open to open h u m a n existence, b e c a u s e it differs f r o m a n y existent, w h i c h h a s to be discovered. Metaphysics, Heidegger wrote, 'thinks of the existent as t h e existent. E v e r y w h e r e w h e r e it is asked what t h e e x i s t e n t is, t h e e x i s t e n t a s s u c h i s i n s i g h t ' ( 9 4 : 7 ) . B u t t h e observation of t h e existent is t a k e n as t h e observation of being. W h a t e v e r is r e p r e s e n t e d as e x i s t e n t w h e t h e r t h e soul in the sense of spiritualism or m a t t e r or strength in t h e sense of m a t e r i a l i s m , b e c o m i n g a n d life a s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o r will, s u b s t a n c e , s u b j e c t , e n e r g y , e t e r n a l r e t u r n , etc., all t h a t i s o n l y t h e existent. But it seems being, t h e l u m i n e s c e n c e of being,
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b e c a u s e , as a c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e d u a l i s m of c o n s c i o u s n e s s and being, t h e alienated consciousness is engrossed in t h e existent, c o n t e m p l a t e s and cognises t h e existent.

Because metaphysics questions the existent as the existent, it remains with the existent and does not turn to being as being.... Insofar as metaphysics always imagines only the existent as existent, it does not think of being itself (94:8).

T h e e x i s t e n t i s e v e r y t h i n g definite, m a t e r i a l t h a t i s p e r c e i v e d , c o g n i s e d , a n d utilised. B u t m e t a p h y s i c s d o e s n o t u n d e r s t a n d t h a t all t h a t is n o t b e i n g . At t h e s a m e time, in spite of Heidegger, t h e c r e a t o r s of t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l s y s t e m s of t h e past did not identify t h e existent with b e i n g . T r u e , b e g i n n i n g w i t h A r i s t o t l e , t h e y c o n s i d e r e d t h e e x i s t e n t as s u c h t h e s u b j e c t - m a t t e r of t h e i r i n q u i r i e s , i.e. i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e d i v e r s i t y of its v e r s i o n s or of i n d i v i d u a l sense-perceived things. Speculative metaphysics also e n d e a v oured to c o m p r e h e n d the 'being of t h e existent' that Heidegger constantly talked about as what was beyond the sense-perceived w o r l d . H e i d e g g e r , o f c o u r s e , w a s well a w a r e t h a t t h e r e w a s also t h e d e m a r c a t i o n h e a t t a c h e d f u n d a m e n t a l i m p o r t a n c e t o ( t h e e x i s t e n t a n d its b e i n g ) i n m e t a p h y s i c s . H e t h e r e f o r e declared: everything that metaphysicians considered supers e n s o r y , e x t r a s e n s o r y , t r a n s c e n d e n t , w a s n o t b e i n g , b u t only e v e r y t h i n g t h a t is. M e t a p h y s i c i a n s w e r e m i s t a k e n h e r e t o o i n that they again took the existent for being w h a t e v e r they h a d in m i n d , w h e t h e r t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e , s i n g l e s u b s t a n c e , materia prima, etc. T h i s c o n f u s i n g of t h e e x i s t e n t with b e i n g , as H e i d e g g e r s t r e s s e d , 'is c e r t a i n l y t o b e t h o u g h t a c o n s e q u e n c e ( E r e i g nis), not a m i s t a k e ' ( 9 4 : 1 1 ) . W h a t is it a c o n s e q u e n c e of? Of t h e fact t h a t m a n d o e s not s i m p l y live i n t h e w o r l d o f t h e e x i s t e n t (it is i n e v i t a b l e ) b u t , so to s a y , is at h o m e in it, is a b s o r b e d by it, d r e a d s his o w n a u t h e n t i c i t y a n d t u r n s a w a y i n d r e a d f r o m it, i.e. f r o m t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e e x i s t e n t ( ' w h a t t h e r e i s ' ) . But w h a t is this e x i s t e n c e of ' w h a t t h e r e is' t h a t h a s b e e n lost by h u m a n i t y like t h e m y t h i c a l g o l d e n a g e o r t h e Biblical p a r a d i s e ? H o w i s t h e b u l k o f ' w h a t t h e r e is' t o b e p e n e t r a t e d i n o r d e r t o r e a c h b e i n g ? T h e a n s w e r s boil d o w n t o t h e d e m a n d , a d d r e s s e d t o t h e h u m a n p e r s o n a l i t y t h a t h a s lost its E g o : t u r n y o u r g a z e from the materiality that has depersonalised you, return to yourself, r e a c h f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e t h a t i s ' a m o d e o f b e i n g , a n d a c t u a l l y t h e b e i n g o f t h a t " w h a t t h e r e is" ( e x i s t e n t ) , w h i c h often s t a n d s f o r t h e o p e n n e s s o f b e i n g ' ( 9 4 : 1 5 ) . B e i n g i n e x i s t e n c e is a p e r m a n e n t p r o c e s s of r e t u r n i n g to o n e ' s self from t h e w o r l d , w h i c h c a n n o t b e left w h i l e y o u r e x i s t e n c e i s m a i n 189

t a i n e d . It is also a p e r m a n e n t r e t u r n i n g to t h e w o r l d f r o m e x i s t e n c e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h a t is n o t a v i c i o u s c i r c l e f r o m w h i c h t h e r e i s n o w a y out, s i n c e t h e t a s k consists p r i m a r i l y i n e n t e r i n g it. ' E x i s t i n g ' i s p u r e s u b j e c t i v i t y a n d a t t h e s a m e t i m e ' t r a n s c e n d i n g ' , o r c o n t i n u o u s e m e r g e n c e b e y o n d t h e limits o f o n e ' s E g o . But t h e m a i n p o i n t i n this r e a l e x i s t e n c e i s its t e m p o r a r y character, that nothing any longer prevents constant awareness of. E x i s t e n c e i s t h e r e f o r e ' b e i n g t o d e a t h ' , p e r m a n e n t d r e a d of t h e last possibility, t h e possibility of not b e i n g . It is not v u l g a r d r e a d , h o w e v e r , w h i c h is a l w a y s i m p o s e d f r o m o u t s i d e , f r o m a c h a n c e e n c o u n t e r a n d h a p h a z a r d e x p e r i e n c e ; i t is, s o t o say, o r i g i n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s of t h e p r i c e l e s s n e s s of o n e ' s p e r s o n a l i t y . This d r e a d is a priori emancipation from t h e external and i m p e r s o n a l p r e v a i l i n g in t h e w o r l d of w h a t is, a n d is t h e a n s w e r to the q u e s t i o n a b o u t the sense of the question of the sense of b e i n g . As for b e i n g as s u c h , it is i n d e f i n a b l e , i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e . A n y definition posits t h e m a t e r i a l i t y o f t h e defined. O n e c a n s a y of b e i n g only t h a t it is. Being is b e i n g . T h e w o r d 'is' h e r e e x p l a i n s n o t h i n g . It c a n n o t be an e l e m e n t of a definition of t h e concept of being since t h e concept was formed as a c o n s e q u e n c e of m a k i n g a s u b s t a n t i v e of t h e v e r b 'to b e ' . T h e d e m a r c a t i o n of being and existence stressed h u m a n s u b j e c t i v i t y , but said n o t h i n g a b o u t b e i n g , a p a r t f r o m its not being existence.
T h e existent, which is the mode of existence, is man. Man alone exists. T h e rock is, but it does not exist. T h e tree is, but it does not exist. T h e horse is but it does not exist. T h e angel is but it does not exist. God is, but He does not exist ( ibid .).

T h a t proposition of Heidegger's, explaining the difference b e t w e e n e x i s t i n g a n d b e i n g , d o e s n o t clarify t h e q u e s t i o n o f being. And philosophy, according to him, should go no further. It c a n n o t s a y w h a t b e i n g is, but c a n e x p l a i n w h a t it is n o t . L i k e a n e g a t i v e t h e o l o g y it d i s c a r d s all t h e a t t r i b u t e s a s c r i b e d to G o d , l i m i t i n g itself to t h e s t a t e m e n t t h a t He is not w h a t is a s c r i b e d to H i m , a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y H e exists. A n d t h a t s t a t e m e n t , after e a c h r e j e c t i o n of w h a t is t a k e n as f o u n d a n d k n o w n , is filled with e v e r d e e p e r s e n s e , t h o u g h n o t h i n g h a s b e e n a d d e d t o its content. M e t a p h y s i c s h a s a t all t i m e s m o r e o r less d e n i e d o r d e p r e c i a t ed real k n o w l e d g e , e m p i r i c a l in its origin, w h i c h it h a s d e p i c t e d n o w a s illusory, n o w a s finite, s u p e r f i c i a l , etc. B u t w h i l e r a t i o n a l ist m e t a p h y s i c s c o u n t e r p o s e d a b s t r a c t i o n s of an o r d e r l y r e a l i t y , a w o r l d o f u n i v e r s a l laws, w o r l d h a r m o n y , etc. t o t h e m o s a i c
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of sense perceptions, Heidegger's irrationalist metaphysics treated being as the negation of any pattern, insofar as the sciences recognise and cognise patterns of the existent. But everything that the sciences cognise, Heidegger averred, is only 'what there is', and to consider it being meant to repeat the mistake of metaphysics again and again. Being could be understood only as negation of the existent, which is present for man only as what can be cognised, measured, subordinated to himself, and used to attain practical ends. But being as the negation of any comprehensible definiteness is irrational. Heidegger's d e p a r t u r e from classical metaphysics consisted not in his denying the existence of metaphysical reality; he denied only the metaphysical reality that rationalist metaphysicians recognised. T h e supersensory reality that he recognised could not be defined positively but its negative definition obviously meant for him mythological chaos, a flux lacking direction, an eternal menace, and the last judgment. T h e irrationalist conception of metaphysical reality is a way of interpreting reality (both natural and social) that cannot be interpreted scientifically in terms of rationalism or irrationalism, in spite of the notions of speculative metaphysics in general. It is man w h o changes, transforms the world around him and makes it, in accordance with his knowledge and ability and within the framework of t h e objective conditions, independent of him, if not rational, at least more comfortable for living, or perhaps more interesting and inviting. But all that is only what is, the irrationalist metaphysician objects, resembling a religious preacher explaining to his flock that this world is unreal, not authentic, in brief, is not what it is. T h e r e is little wonder that the main expression of the alienation and selfalienation of the human personality, for Heidegger, was not man's enslavement by elemental forces of social development, but man's domination over nature, which (from his point of view) had nothing in common with the transformation of elemental natural forces into consciously and purposefully operating social ones. Heidegger condemned scientific and technical progress not just because he saw its negative aspects. He was horrified precisely by progress rather than by its secondary effects. Mastery of the elemental forces of n a t u r e represented for him a danger (and, moreover, not even to life but to its sense of being) of a kind by comparison with which the atom bomb was a m e r e trifle. ' T h e atom bomb, much discussed as the special death-machine, is not t h e fatal one,' he wrote. T h e most terrible thing was man's belief that he
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c a n m a k e h u m a n existence t o l e r a b l e and o n t h e w h o l e h a p p y for e v e r y o n e t h r o u g h p e a c e f u l r e l e a s e , t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , s t o r i n g up, a n d control of t h e energies of n a t u r e ( 9 1 : 2 7 1 ) .

H e i d e g g e r ' s c o n c e p t i o n of irrational b e i n g is a p h i l o s o p h y of social pessimism in t h e spirit of S c h o p e n h a u e r , w h o together with Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, was the f o r e r u n n e r of existentialist metaphysics. It w a s f r o m a s t a n c e of social pessimism that Heidegger opposed rationalist metaphysics, one of whose main trends he considered to be materialism; and that not at all b e c a u s e m a t e r i a l i s m r e c o g n i s e s s o m e ' f i r s t p r i n c i p l e ' o r , a s s o m e o f its o p p o n e n t s c l a i m , i d o l i s e s m a t t e r . T h e m e t a p h y s i c a l s i n o f m a t e r i a l i s m , f r o m h i s p o i n t o f v i e w , i s p r i m a r i l y its r e g a r d i n g n a t u r e a s b e i n g , e x p l a i n i n g n a t u r e f r o m itself, i.e. c o n s i d e r i n g ' w h a t t h e r e is' a s t h e c a u s e o f itself, i g n o r i n g t h e u n k n o w a b l e b u t o m n i p r e s e n t e x i s t e n c e o f ' w h a t is'. And H e i d e g g e r , as not so often h a p p e n s in c o n t e m p o r a r y bourgeois p h i l o s o p h y , d i r e c t l y o p p o s e d i d e a l i s m t o m a t e r i a l i s m , i.e. t h e d o c t r i n e that rejects explanation of the existent by the existent:
I f t h e title ' i d e a l i s m ' m e a n s a s m u c h a s a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g that b e i n g i s never explicable t h r o u g h the existent, but is a l r e a d y ' t r a n s c e n d e n t a l ' for a n y e x i s t e n t , t h e n idealism is t h e s o l e , c o r r e c t possibility of t h e philosophical problematic (93:208).

H e i g n o r e d t h e point that idealism, which e x p l a i n s the existent f r o m b e i n g , u n d e r s t a n d s t h e l a t t e r a s s o m e t h i n g s p i r i t u a l . But the spiritual, according to existentialism, must be related to the existent as being present in e x p e r i e n c e . Heidegger saw the nomination of man to purposively transf o r m b e i n g as t h e s e c o n d m e t a p h y s i c a l sin of m a t e r i a l i s m .
It is c e r t a i n l y a l s o n e c e s s a r y , m o r e o v e r , t h a t we rid o u r s e l v e s of n a i v e notions about materialism and the c h e a p refutations of it we meet. T h e e s s e n c e of m a t e r i a l i s m d o e s not consist in t h e a s s e r t i o n that all is m a t t e r , but r a t h e r in a m e t a p h y s i c a l n o t i o n a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h e v e r y t h i n g existent a p p e a r s as the material of labour. T h e m o d e r n metaphysical e s s e n c e of l a b o u r w a s in H e g e l ' s a f o r e m e n t i o n e d Phenomenology of Spirit as the s e l f - o r g a n i s e d p r o c e s s of u n c o n d i t i o n a l p r o d u c t i o n , w h i c h is a c o n c r e t i s i n g of the real t h r o u g h m a n u n d e r s t o o d as s u b j e c t i v i t y . T h e e s s e n c e of m a t e r i a l i s m is g i v e n in t h e e s s e n c e of t e c h n i q u e , a b o u t w h i c h m u c h h a s b e e n w r i t t e n , t o b e s u r e , but little t h o u g h t ( 9 2 : 8 7 - 8 8 ) .

H e i d e g g e r u n d o u b t e d l y displayed a d e e p e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the essence of materialism than m a n y contemporary bourgeois philosophers. He was a w a r e that it does not deny the existence o f t h e s p i r i t u a l , a n d c o r r e c t l y p o i n t e d o u t its c l o s e c o n n e c t i o n with social, primarily production, practice. T h e materiality o f n a t u r e , t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a n e x t e r n a l w o r l d , a n d its r e f l e c t i o n in people's consciousness w e r e d e m o n s t r a t e d in practice. But
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he did not w a n t to accept these basic propositions of m a t e r i a l ism, a n d c o u l d not. His w h o l e ' a n t i - m e t a p h y s i c a l ' ontology was directed against materialism, especially against Marxist m a t e r i a l i s m , w h o s e s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r all o t h e r p h i l o s o p h i c a l d o c t r i n e s he recognised. And his polemic against rationalist metaphysics, depicted as a struggle against any metaphysics w h a t s o e v e r , w a s only an a t t e m p t to c r e a t e an idealist ideology t h a t w o u l d m a k e p o s s i b l e , a s h e p u t it, a ' f r u i t f u l c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h M a r x i s m ' , i . e . s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t it. So H e i d e g g e r ' s ' f u n d a m e n t a l ontology' was a revival of metaphysics, but in a new form corresponding to c o n t e m p o r a r y c o n d i t i o n s . I n his last w o r k s h e b r o u g h t t h e c o n c e p t o f b e i n g , indeterminate in principle, closer and closer to the traditional metaphysical representation of God. His attitude to speculative metaphysics also altered:
A t h i n k i n g t h a t t h i n k s a b o u t t h e t r u t h o f b e i n g i s n o l o n g e r satisfied, to be sure, with metaphysics; but it also does not think c o n t r a r y to metaphysics. M e t a p h y s i c s r e m a i n s t h e first i n p h i l o s o p h y . I t d o e s n o t a t t a i n p r i m a c y in t h o u g h t . M e t a p h y s i c s is o v e r c o m e in t h i n k i n g on t h e t r u t h of being... Nevertheless this ' o v e r c o m i n g of metaphysics' does not abolish m e t a p h y s i c s . F o r as l o n g as m a n r e m a i n s a r a t i o n a l a n i m a l ( a n i m a l rationale) he is a m e t a p h y s i c a l o n e ( a n i m a l metaphysicum). As l o n g as m a n u n d e r s t a n d s himself a s t h e r e a s o n i n g c r e a t u r e , m e t a p h y s i c s a p p e r t a i n s (in K a n t ' s w o r d s ) t o his n a t u r e ( 9 4 : 9 ) .

T h a t half-recognition of metaphysics as the first in philosophy did not, of c o u r s e , p r e v e n t H e i d e g g e r f r o m d e p i c t i n g his ontology as a fundamental o v e r c o m i n g of metaphysics, t h e m o r e so that the definition of m a n as a rational c r e a t u r e was interpreted as the c o n s e q u e n c e of alienation of h u m a n essence. In fact, he put m e t a - m e t a - p h y s i c s in p l a c e of meta-physics. In our day of the very wide spread of metatheories of every k i n d , this effort s e e m s v e r y p r o m i s i n g t o m a n y b o u r g e o i s philosophers. But it is to be expected that, having m a s t e r e d t h e logic o f H e i d e g g e r ' s a r g u m e n t s , t h e r e w o u l d a p p e a r s o m e a m o n g his p r e s e n t s u p p o r t e r s , w h o w o u l d t r y t o c r e a t e a m e t a fundamental ontology. W h e r e a s metaphysics is revealed in Heidegger only as the hidden essence of 'fundamental ontology', differing from the subjective f r a m e of mind, other spokesmen of existentialism c o m p r e h e n d their critique of rationalism as an attempt to transform speculative metaphysics. J a s p e r s , w h o usually stressed his ideological k i n s h i p with Kant, considered the striving to convert metaphysics into a science the fatal e r r o r of t h e latter and other philosophers.
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Kant had claimed that only by creating a philosophical science could the real need for philosophy (in contrast to the philosophising that anyone who felt like it engaged in) be substantiated. Jaspers took a different stance; only philosophising, i.e. meditation, guided by subjective needs and not t h e requirements of science, was possible and, moreover, necessary. T h e endeavour to put an end to philosophising through the development of a coherent, consistent, demonstrative system of views of intersubjective significance meant a return (from Jaspers' point, of view) to dogmatism, and denial of the true sense of philosophy. Jaspers was right in saying that a scientific metaphysics was impossible. He was also right in recognising that metaphysics constantly suffered fiasco in its efforts to overstep the bounds of possible experience. But his conclusion from that was unsound. He proposed not to reject metaphysics and its superscientific claims, but to agree that it was not knowledge but belief and only differed from religion in being the faith of reason, while religion could be defined as metaphysics for the people . It could not be put more clearly. T h e third volume of Jaspers' Philosophy is called 'Metaphysics'. It opens with the following declaration: 'What is being, is the eternal question in philosophising' (114:III,1). That correct statement was interpreted, however, in the sense that only definite being was cognisable, as if there were a being that lacked definiteness. T h e cognition of definite being, incidentally, was also reduced to discovery of the unknowable in it. But what was that? Once again being, but being as transcendency. T h e r e were thus existence and transcendency, and between them an ephemeral world of knowable phenomena that were nothing other than ode to be deciphered, of course, by other than scientific means. ' T h e modes of this hunt for being from possible existence are ways to transcendency. To be illumined with it, is philosophical metaphysics' (114:III,3). Metaphysics, in Jaspers' understanding of it (in contrast to how the classics of rationalism understood it), was opposed to science as a real approximation to genuine metaphysical reality. In that understanding of it existentialist philosophy in essence made common cause with frankly religious Neothomist philosophising, which proclaimed through the mouth of Maritain: ' T h e inner being of things, situated outside of science's own sphere, remains for science a great and fertile unknown' (164:7). In his popular works Jaspers said directly: transcendency
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is God. In his main work he said that the divine was t r a n scendent, so assuming that it included something else as well, possibly even non-divinity. Marcel expressed his attitude to religion m o r e directly. Characterising his philosophy as metaphysics free of dogmatic systematism, he argued that the central metaphysical problem, that of the existence of t h e h u m a n Ego, was at the same time the problem of God. Not only did man exist thanks to God, but God, too, existed through and in man. This new, theological-existentialist version of 'principal co-ordination' was formulated as follows: 'It must then be possible, without attributing to the absolute Thou (my italics .. ) an objectivity that would destroy its very essence, to save its existence' (161:304). This conception of t h e immanence of transcendent h u m a n existence created a bond between existentialism and Christian spiritualism. So the metaphysical philosopher is illumined by the t r a n scendent. Jaspers clearly fought dogmatism in a mediaeval way, by means of mysticism, which cannot be a revolutionary opposition in our day as regards the religious ideology dominant in bourgeois society. 'Existentialist philosophy,' Jaspers declared, 'is essentially metaphysics. It believes what it springs from' (114:I,27). For all his agnosticism, he seemingly believed that he knew for certain what source existentialist metaphysics stemmed from; it believed in the transcendence that illumined it. Faith in the transcendent existed, of course, as a fact of consciousness. But this faith, like existentialist metaphysics as a whole, was rooted in the historical situation of this world and not in a mythical transcendence. T h e metaphysics of existentialism is a striking expression of the hopeless crisis of metaphysical philosophising. 6. The Dispute between Materialism and Idealism and Differences in Understanding Speculative Metaphysics If we exclude Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, and certain other philosophers and natural philosophers from the history of speculative metaphysics, in particular those who c a m e close to materialism or even shared materialist views, then t h e r e are no special difficulties in defining metaphysics. But such a limiting of the concept would so distort its real development and all its inherent contradictions, crises, transitions, negations,
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a n d i n t e r m e d i a t e a n d c o n t e m p o r a r y results, t h a t i n q u i r y into this very m e a n i n g f u l p h e n o m e n o n of t h e alienated form of c o g n i t i o n is largely to lose its sense. S p e c u l a t i v e m e t a p h y s i c s , as I h a v e tried to s h o w , is a system of objective idealist views that, while s u b s t a n t i a t i n g t h e e x i s t e n c e of s u p e r s e n s o r y reality, at t h e s a m e t i m e g e n e r a t e s its n e g a t i o n . T h a t is b e c a u s e speculative m e t a p h y s i c s , h o w e v e r r e m o t e it is from science, is c o n c e r n e d with k n o w l e d g e a n d not simply with mystification of reality. I h a v e a l r e a d y r e f e r r e d to Engels' a p p r a i s a l of T h o m a s M n z e r ' s religious outlook as a p p r o a c h i n g a t h e i s m . It would seem t h e r e could b e n o t h i n g m o r e impossible t h a n t o c o m b i n e religion a n d its n e g a t i o n , yet it is a fact and not, m o r e o v e r , the sole case. T h e M i d d l e Ages a n d t h e R e n a i s s a n c e k n e w quite a few of these religious t h i n k e r s w h o lapsed into atheistic 'mistakes', and mystics w h o w e r e not c o n s c i o u s t h a t they w e r e inclining t o w a r d materialism. Views of t h a t kind must not be r e g a r d e d as eclecticism (a v e r y gross m e t h o d o l o g i c a l mistake!) but as a p e c u l i a r expression of t h e crisis of t h e religious mind. H e n c e t h e g l a r i n g c o n t r a d i c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e t h i n k e r ' s subjective religiosity and t h e objective, s o m e t i m e s even anti-religious c o n t e n t of his d o c t r i n e . S o m e t h i n g similar h a p p e n e d , too, in s p e c u l a t i v e metaphysics. It took s h a p e as a s e c u l a r i s a t i o n of t h e religious outlook that o p e n e d t h e r o a d to scientific investigation, which also d e v e l o p e d to s o m e e x t e n t within speculative m e t a p h y s i c s , altering its c o n t e n t . Metaphysics could not avoid n a t u r a l i s t i c t e n d e n c i e s , since it b r o k e with religion (if only in f o r m ) and assimilated the results of scientific d e v e l o p m e n t . But t h e s e t e n d e n c i e s w e r e n e g a t i o n s of its basic spiritualist trend. And d u a l i s m , and s o m e times even m a t e r i a l i s m , p r o v e d an inevitable c o n s e q u e n c e of this, sinful link (for m e t a p h y s i c s ) with empirical reality. But this metaphysical l e a n i n g t o w a r d the real and e a r t h l y c o n t r a dicted t h e spiritualist f e r v o u r of metaphysics, which usually ' o v e r c a m e ' t h e split in its own c a m p by dissociating itself from t h e dualist and materialist heresy, and again reviving as a d o c t r i n e of a special reality allegedly q u i t e t h e opposite of the reality we c o g i t a t e but n e v e r t h e l e s s f o r m i n g its substantial basis. T h u s , a l t h o u g h m e t a p h y s i c s is t h e n e g a t i o n , in both t h e epistemological and ontological respects, of t h e substantiality of t h e reality that h u m a n i t y k n o w s a n d t r a n s f o r m s , this n e g a tion is n a t u r a l l y not based on i n q u i r y i n t o t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t ( w h i c h c a n n o t be an object of cognition simply b e c a u s e it does not e x i s t ) . M e t a p h y s i c s c o n s e q u e n t l y studies t h e world that it denies. Is it s u r p r i s i n g t h a t n e g a t i o n of t h e ' b e y o n d ' reality,
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and not of this one, often proves a consequence of this contradiction? Just as periodical crises of overproduction are a mode of restoring the 'normal' proportion between demand and supply in bourgeois society, crises in the history of speculative metaphysics a r e specific forms of its development through which idealist conceptions of metaphysical reality become more 'realistic', assimilating the arguments of its opponents, scientific advances, and everyday experience (to the extent, of course, that this is possible for idealism). So neorealistic conceptions of ontology arise that admit the existence of qualitatively different fundamental realities, viz., material, spiritual, subjective, and logical, denying the necessity of the basic philosophical question and the alternative it contains on the grounds that t h e r e is no problem of genesis for the fundamental reality. So dualism and materialism are far from chance phenomena in the history of speculative metaphysics, i.e. in the essence of idealist philosophy. These phenomena, which can be called paradoxes of metaphysics, express in an essential way the inevitability of the decomposition of each of its historical forms. Dualism, for example, generally does not exist outside metaphysics; it is the expression of the contradictions tearing metaphysics apart. One cannot, of course, say that of materialism, whose essence is adequately expressed in its opposition to speculative metaphysics, but one must note that the materialism, that grew on the soil provided by the decay of a certain historical form of metaphysics, was a specific form of materialist philosophy. It bore many birthmarks of metaphysics, which was evident not just in Spinoza; the materialist doctrines of Giordano Bruno and Jean-Baptiste Robinet were no less indicative. While dualism and certain varieties of materialism were the inevitable consequence of contradictions internally inherent in speculative metaphysics, the overcoming of the crisis provoked by them, and the rebirth of speculative metaphysics, were the result of an idealist re-appraisal of values and of the development of new varieties of idealism. Thus, the irrationalist metaphysics of Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Bergson, and their modern disciples, c a m e in place of the rationalist metaphysics of classical German idealism. But irrationalism is quite incapable of substantiating the need for the coexistence and 'reconciliation' of speculative metaphysics and science. Neothomism claims that, and so do the 'realist' versions of
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metaphysical philosophising. So the modernisation of speculative metaphysics in our time is a permanent factor in its development. Bocheski, whose Neothomist orientation was a guarantee against his critical appraisal of speculative metaphysics, claimed that contemporary metaphysical systems were overcoming the one-sidedness of materialism and idealism and were therefore the most promising trends in philosophy:
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C o n s e q u e n t l y metaphysics today cannot simply be identified or contrasted with other philosophical m o v e m e n t s i t lowers over them just as philosophy towers over the special sciences ( 1 6 : 2 4 9 ) .

In ounlerposing metaphysics as a 'realist' philosophy of being to extremely narrowly interpreted idealism, he considered the main features of contemporary metaphysical doctrines to be empiricism ('experience alone provides a basis for philosophy' ( 1 6 : 2 0 6 ) ) , intellectualism (the assumption in addition to sense experience of an 'intellectual experience' radically different from it, capable of comprehending 'intelligible contents in reality' ( 1 6 : 2 0 6 - 2 0 7 ) ) , rational method (according to which 'all reality is rational' ( 1 6 : 2 0 7 ) ) , the ontological tendency (investigation of all 'concrete being in its totality' and of 'all the modes of being ( Seinswiesen )' in contrast to p h e n o m e n o l ogy which limits itself to analysis of just one 'pure' or ideal being), universality (investigation of all levels of being, including 'the world's ultimate principles' and of what constitutes the subject-matter of 'natural theology' ( i b i d . ) ) , and humanism ('their systems pay considerable attention to the philosophy of man' ( 1 6 : 2 0 8 ) ) . T h e main feature of this apologia for speculative metaphysics is a persistent drive to show that the metaphysical systems of the twentieth century are free of the weaknesses of preceding metaphysics; rationalism has been supplemented by empiricism, ontology by philosophical anthropology, claims to superexperiential knowledge have been coordinated with the latest scientific discoveries, the one-sided interpretation of being has been overcome by exploration of all its levels, not excluding, of course, the being of God. Hence, too, the conclusion 'there a r e no other systems so balanced, sober, and rational as those of the metaphysicians' (16:249). These systems were
examples of all that is best in the achievements of contemporary philosophical study.... But the fact that Europe now possesses a prominent group of genuine metaphysicians holds out hopes of a better future for the coming generations (16:250-251).

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To believe Bocheski, metaphysics had got its second wind, and the 'Thomist renaissance' presaged the advance of postcapitalist Christian civilisation! Matters are quite different, in fact, above all because the metaphysical synthesis about which Bocheski spoke, is no m o r e than appearance, generated by metaphysics' adaptation to contemporary historical conditions. T h e centuries-long evolution of speculative metaphysics confirms t h e description of it as essentially idealist that we find in The Holy Family of M a r x and Engels. T h e truth of that was not always recognised by p r e - M a r x i a n philosophers, materialists as well as idealists. Helvetius, for example, considered materialism one of the main trends of metaphysics. Hegel, who stated the opposition between metaphysics and physics, suggested that any philosophy worthy of the n a m e was in essence metaphysics, since thinking was by its n a t u r e metaphysical, i.e. went beyond experience. T h e only p u r e physicists,' he wrote, 'are the animals: they alone do not think: while a man is a thinking being and a born metaphysician' (86:144). T h a t view is directly linked with his doctrine of the substantiality of thought, but it also has a m o r e general sense: philosophy is engaged in investigating categories and in it thought comprehends what has already become its content; here, consequently, it is not something external but thought itself that constitutes its subject-matter. Hegel called such thinking speculative, metaphysical, philosophical. But alongside that he employed the epithet 'metaphysical' to characterise anti-dialectical thinking. He thus not only gave the term 'metaphysics' a new, negative sense, but also retained the traditional meaning of the concept. Dialectics, which, from his point of view, was not only method and epistemology, but also ontology, i.e. a metaphysical system, was counterposed to the metaphysical mode of thinking. Dialectics was therefore characterised as an autonomous logical process, the self-development of a concept, the basis of which consisted in the logical structure of reality itself. A speculative metaphysical system was precisely a system of purely logical conclusions which, being independent of experience, went beyond it and comprehended the transcendent as immanent to thought, which constituted the essence of everything, including h u m a n essence. Dialectics, according to Hegel, was the genuine metaphysical method, which enabled one to rise above the inevitable limitedness of experiential knowledge at any level of its development. Whereas the seventeenth century rationalists, arguing that thinking independent of experience discovered facts inaccessible
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t o e x p e r i e n c e , c i t e d m a t h e m a t i c s , w h i c h did n o t , i n a n y c a s e directly, appeal to experience, Hegel already understood that philosophy could not b o r r o w the method of mathematics. Nevertheless, he essentially s h a r e d t h e illusions of the seventeenth century rationalists, though he supposed he had overcome them, since he regarded the self-development of the concept as an objective, ontological process that took place in r e a l i t y itself a n d n o t s i m p l y i n t h e i n q u i r e r ' s h e a d . B u t i t w a s t h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f b e i n g a n d t h o u g h t t h a t w a s n o t h i n g else t h a n a c o n s i s t e n t d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e r a t i o n a l i s t c o n f u s i o n of t h e empirical f o u n d a t i o n s with logical ones. T h e adherent of irrationalist metaphysics accuses the rationalist m e t a p h y s i c i a n o f i d e n t i f y i n g t h e e m p i r i c a l a n d t h e logical, being and t h o u g h t . But b o t h t h e rationalist and t h e irrationalist, in different w a y s , it is t r u e , i n d u l g e in philosophical s p e c u l a t i o n , i.e. e n d e a v o u r t o g r a s p t h e s u p e r s e n s o r y , s u p e r e x p e r i e n t i a l , t r a n s c e n d e n t p u r e l y s p e c u l a t i v e l y . I d e a l i s m is, o f c o u r s e , a definite a n s w e r to the basic philosophical question, and since that a n s w e r is not based on t h e s u m total of t h e facts of s c i e n c e a n d p r a c t i c e , it h a s a s p e c u l a t i v e c h a r a c t e r . Is s p e c u l a t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , not a n a t t r i b u t e o f i d e a l i s m ? An u n a m b i g u o u s a n s w e r cannot be given, it seems, to that q u e s t i o n . If that is so, t h e antithesis of idealism a n d materialism is not reducible to an opposition between speculative and anti-speculative w a y s of thinking. T a k e , for e x a m p l e , t h e K a n t i a n definition of t h e speculative:
T h e o r e t i c a l cognition is speculative when it relates to an object or certain conceptions of an object which is not given and c a n n o t be discovered by means of experience. It is opposed to the cognition of nature, which c o n c e r n s only those objects or predicates which can be presented in a possible e x p e r i e n c e (116:369).

T h a t is an idealist u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e s p e c u l a t i v e , b u t it is not, of c o u r s e , t h e only o n e possible. T h e materialist n a t u r a l philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a l t h o u g h it was based on t h e d a t a of the natural s c i e n c e of the time, was speculative in a certain sense, like a n y n a t u r a l philosophy in g e n e r a l , since, in Engels' words,
it could do this only by putting in place of t h e real but as yet unknown interconnections ideal, fancied ones, filling in t h e missing facts by figments of the mind and bridging t h e actual gaps merely in imagination (52:364).

T h i s t h e o r i s i n g against t h e facts, t h a t effaces t h e b o u n d a r y between empirical data and the probable, conceivable, and s u p p o s e d , is a basic f e a t u r e of t h e s p e c u l a t i v e m o d e of t h i n k i n g .
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T h e p h i l o s o p h y o f M a r x i s m , w h i l e disclosing t h e vast c o g n i tive significance of bold scientific a b s t r a c t i o n a n d s w e e p i n g assumptions and hypotheses, rejects speculative arbitrariness, s c o r n i n g of t h e empirical data, a n d u n d e r v a l u i n g of facts established scientifically. Abstract t h i n k i n g and s p e c u l a t i v e abstracting a r e far f r o m identical things in spite of their often merging with one another in certain historical conditions. A l i g h t a g a i n s t s p e c u l a t i v e t h e o r i s i n g w a s a b a s i c f e a t u r e of t h e historical moulding and development of Marxism. M a r x and Engels highly valued F e u e r b a c h ' s brilliant critique of t h e philosophical speculations of idealism. At t h e s a m e time t h e y s t r e s s e d t h a t his p h i l o s o p h y w a s n o t f r e e o f s p e c u l a t i o n . T h e fathers of Marxism argued, in continuing Feuerbach's fight against speculative theorising, that t h e traditional opposing of p h i l o s o p h y and scientific r e s e a r c h h a d a s p e c u l a t i v e c h a r a c t e r . T h e M a r x i s t n e g a t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h y i n t h e old s e n s e o f t h e w o r d was also n e g a t i o n of s p e c u l a t i o n . But it w a s a n e g a t i o n t h a t did n o t , i n c o n t r a s t t o idealist e m p i r i c i s m ( a n d p o s i t i v i s m ) , b e l i t t l e t h e p o w e r of a b s t r a c t i o n , a n d did not d i s p a r a g e t h e o r e t i c a l thinking. Idealists f r e q u e n t l y m a k e an absolute out of t h e relative independence of thought from sense data. Such an overestimation is i n h e r e n t , in p a r t i c u l a r , in s p e c u l a t i v e m e t a p h y s i c s . We find it already in the Eleatics, and in m o d e r n times a m o n g the rationalists of the seventeenth c e n t u r y and in G e r m a n classical p h i l o s o p h y . U n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e of t h o s e o u t s t a n d i n g doctrines, any philosophical generalisation c a m e to be regarded as essentially metaphysical, since it inevitably went beyond the bounds of the experience available at t h e time. W u n d t , w h o was far from rationalism as a philosopher, nevertheless wrote:
metaphysics is t h e s a m e attempt u n d e r t a k e n on t h e basis of t h e whole scientific consciousness of an age, or of a specially outstanding content, to obtain a world outlook t h a t unifies t h e c o m p o n e n t s of special k n o w l edge ( 2 6 5 : 1 0 6 ) .

A world outlook, he suggested, was n a t u r a l l y a metaphysical s y s t e m o f v i e w s . W u n d t d i s m i s s e d t h e specific f e a t u r e s o f speculative metaphysics, since he was endeavouring to substant i a t e it by e m p i r i c a l , in p a r t i c u l a r scientific d a t a . He c o n c l u d e d , from t h e fact that metaphysical p r o b l e m s h a d a philosophical c h a r a c t e r , t h a t all p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m s h a d a m e t a p h y s i c a l n a t u r e . Speculative metaphysics was t h e r e f o r e t h e sole possible p a t h o f d e v e l o p m e n t o f p h i l o s o p h y . ' O n e will n o t g e t f r e e o f metaphysics since metaphysical problems and hypotheses are
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not at all the specific domain of a special science but recur everywhere in all fields' (265:132). T h e erroneousness of that conclusion is connected with a very blurred and extended understanding of the problems of speculative metaphysics. Nevertheless, even if we digress from the antithesis of materialism and idealism, it is not difficult to show that phenomenalism and the other idealist doctrines related to it are anti-metaphysical systems of views. That point, to which Wundt did not draw due attention, since he did not regard metaphysics as a certain mode of speculative inquiry, got an original interpretation in the research of Ehrlich, the West German spokesman of 'the philosophy of the history of philosophy'. Being a w a r e of the obvious opposition between the metaphysical conception of a supersensory reality and philosophical empiricism, he claimed that there was a positive metaphysics, on the one hand, and a negative one on the other. He reduced the antithesis between objective idealism and subjective idealism, and likewise that between materialism and the same subjective idealism, to a differentiating of 'beingmetaphysics' on the one hand and 'categorial-metaphysics' on the other (47:95). T h e age-old struggle of materialism against speculative metaphysics was presented in a distorted light by this verbal demarcation: materialism, it turned out, opposed its own essence, clearly not suspecting it and not being a w a r e of the ineradicable metaphysical n a t u r e of any philosophy. T h e antithesis between materialism and idealism was treated as a contradiction between the metaphysics of everyday experience and a logically balanced, 'critical' metaphysics, consistent in its conclusions, transcendental, and even 'scientific'. And while the materialist critique of idealism was attributed to block-headedness, idealism's struggle against materialism was presented as the necessary negation of a primitive, barren variety of speculative metaphysics. T h e confusing, and even complete identification, of such concepts as 'philosophy', 'speculation', and 'metaphysics', is not only an idealist fallacy with deep epistemological roots, but is also a specific form of idealism's fight against materialism. Some idealists are adherents of speculative metaphysics, and others its opponents. But both endeavour to refute materialist philosophy: the former as a false metaphysics and the latter as a metaphysical ideology alien to science. Let us consider their arguments. T h e adherent of speculative metaphysics argues that materialism is metaphysical since it starts from recognition of the
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primacy of matter, deduces t h e spiritual from the material, and ascribes eternity and infinity to the universe. F r o m that angle materialism does not differ essentially from t h e doctrine that considers t h e spiritual primary, deduces the material from it, etc. These are contradictory views, of course, but they have this in c o m m o n that they go beyond the limits of any possible experience and consequently have no right to refer to it to confirm their speculative postulates and conclusions. T h e adherent of speculative metaphysics thus asserts that his postulates are as justified as those of the materialist. T h e essence of this idealist critique of materialism is the assertion that the latter has as little connection with science as idealism, and that science cannot confirm (or refute) either t h e one point of view or the other. Ehrlich claimed that the materialist conception of history was a metaphysical system since it started from such 'essences' as social production, economic basis, superstructure, etc. T h e principle of partisanship, substantiated by Marxism, he c h a r a c terised as a metaphysical principle, and declared the scientific socialist ideology to be a system of superexperiential knowledge (see 47:106-110). T h a t interpretation of Marxian materialism glossed over its irreconcilable opposition to religious ideology which, as Ehrlich rightly stressed, is the initial source of metaphysics. Ehrlich did not consider metaphysicism a shortcoming of materialism. He was even inclined to reproach materialism for a lack of it. He therefore counterposed speculative idealism to materialist philosophy, thus delimiting in principle 'good' metaphysics from 'bad', i.e. from materialism (which in fact is the negation of speculative metaphysics). He did not actually dispute this fact, but tried to show that t h e materialist negation of metaphysics failed to achieve its aim because metaphysics was ineradicable from philosophy. If we allow for the fact that Ehrlich, like other idealists, considered the essence of metaphysics to be recognition of a supernatural, supersensory reality, it becomes clear that his definition of materialism as 'metaphysics' (though, negative) veiled the incompatibility in principle of materialist philosophy and this idealist trend. Positivism, as a continuation of the idealist-empiricist (phenomenalist) and agnostic line in philosophy, proclaimed its most important job to be the critique of metaphysics. Comte considered metaphysics a historically inevitable stage in the development of knowledge which, in his view, passed through three stages: theological, metaphysical, and scientific. While
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defining metaphysics as a striving to go beyond t h e bounds of experience, he did not ask about t h e relative n a t u r e of t h e boundaries of any experience and consequently about whether not only philosophy but also any special science (even when it remained within the limits of empirical research) did not continually go beyond its limits of experience (i.e. beyond any available e x p e r i e n c e ) . He simply declared that knowledge of what lay outside experience was impossible, so that metaphysics could not be a science. While proposing to reject metaphysical philosophising, Comte and his followers did not, however, reject the existence of a supersensory reality, i.e. held to the ground of an anti-dialectical counterposing of the experiential and the superexperiential, t h e sensory and the supersensory, supposing that they interpreted this antithesis rationally and not in the spirit of a religious differentiating of this world and the beyond. It was that metaphysical counterposing (in all senses of the word) that constituted the ontological premiss of positivist agnosticism, at least in the form in which it was presented by its founders. T h e basically subjective epistemology of Comte, Herbert Spencer, and other founders of positivism, rested on that antithesis. And although they constructed their philosophy as a doctrine of the most general patterns of t h e reality known to science, they interpreted it (and correspondingly its laws) as an aggregate of phenomena given in experience, whose existence outside experience always remained problematical. Spencer, for example, claimed that we cannot know the ultimate n a t u r e of that which is manifested to us' (248:107), by virtue of which 'the philosophy which professes to formulate being as distinguished from a p p e a r a n c e ' ( ibid .) must be considered impossible. That formulation did not just point out a banal truth (our knowledge of being reflects not only being but also the level of development of knowledge of it), but formulated a principle according to which knowledge was discovery of the unknowable. T h e differentiation of subject and object was thus not the stating or grasping of a definite fact but was the 'profoundest of distinctions among the manifestations of the unknowable' (248:130). T h e concepts of matter, motion, space, and time were interpreted in that same spirit; they existed only for t h e knowing subject. T h e proposition of natural science about t h e indestructibility of matter was treated as constantly existing in t h e content of sense experience, from which it was concluded that experience fixed something associated everywhere with a reality independent of it. But experience was subjective, and therefore a phenomenon should not be confused with t h e unknowable.
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An u n k n o w n c a u s e of t h e k n o w n effects which we call p h e n o m e n a , likenesses and differences a m o n g these k n o w n effects and a segregation of the effects into subject and objectthese a r e t h e postulates without which we c a n n o t think ( 2 4 8 : 1 4 5 ) .

T h a t positivist c o n c e p t i o n d i f f e r s f r o m K a n t i a n a g n o s t i c i s m i n its b a s i c e m p i r i c i s t c h a r a c t e r , w h i c h m a k e s i t p o s s i b l e t o c o m b i n e epistemological subjectivism with e l e m e n t s of a materialist understanding of n a t u r e . Positivism opposed objective idealism, which it criticised as a f a n t a s t i c r e f l e c t i o n of r e a l i t y , t h e f r u i t of s p e c u l a t i v e a r b i t r a r i ness. T o objective idealism w a s c o u n t e r p o s e d empiricism, w h i c h w a s i n t e r p r e t e d in a subjectivist a n d agnostic spirit. This c i r c u m s t a n c e gradually altered the direction of the critical statements of neopositivists; materialism was m a d e the m a i n object of criticism, and was likened to objective idealism and c o n d e m n e d as a very sophisticated speculative metaphysics seemingly based on experience that somehow recognised the obviously speculative essence of Matter (writing t h e word, of c o u r s e , with a capital M ) . Analysis of t h e attitude of S p e n c e r and other early spokesmen of positivism to objective idealism indicates that their objections to it related mainly to t h e p r o b l e m s of a positive description of a reality i n d e p e n d e n t of c o n s c i o u s n e s s . T h e positivist a g r e e d w i t h t h e o b j e c t i v e idealist t h a t t h i s r e a l i t y d i f f e r e d r a d i c a l l y from sense-perceived p h e n o m e n a ; he also considered these p h e n o m e n a d e r i v a t i v e . But w h i l e t h e o b j e c t i v e idealist e n d e a v o u r e d to establish t h e m a i n features of this p r i m o r d i a l reality, t h e positivist insisted t h a t i t c o u l d o n l y b e d e f i n e d n e g a t i v e l y , i.e. s i m p l y a s u n k n o w a b l e . T h e d i v e r g e n c e between positivism and materialism was, of course, incomparably m o r e substantial, the m o r e so that it was constantly being deepened during the history of the former. W h e r e a s its e a r l y s p o k e s m e n f r e q u e n t l y i n c l i n e d t o a c o m p r o mise with materialism, especially with t h e materialism of t h e n a t u r a l sciences, their successors m o r e and m o r e b r o k e with materialist tendencies, including 'shamefaced materialism' of a n a g n o s t i c h u e . I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e i n this c o n n e c t i o n t h a t M a c h , w h o rejected r e p r o a c h e s of solipsism and e n d e a v o u r e d to p r o v e t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n p r i n c i p l e o f his d o c t r i n e f r o m B e r k e l e i anism (and at t h e s a m e t i m e from K a n t i a n i s m ) , stressed that
Berkeley r e g a r d e d the 'elements' as conditioned on something lying outside them, an u n k n o w a b l e ( G o d ) , for which Kant, in order to a p p e a r a sober realist, invented t h e 'thing-in-itself, while t h e notion defended h e r e is expected, with a d e p e n d e n c e of t h e 'elements' on one another, to find t h e practical and theoretical answer ( 1 5 5 : 2 9 5 ) . 205

This explanation of M a c h ' s exactly indicates the difference of subjective idealism, which recognises only the interconnection of t h e 'elements' (sensations), from objective idealism, which assumes t h e existence of an immaterial reality preceding sensations. A n d it w a s f r o m a s t a n c e of subjective idealism that Mach explained everyone's inherent awareness of the difference existing between sensations and t h e thing: it boiled d o w n , i n his view, t o d i s t i n g u i s h i n g b e t w e e n s e p a r a t e s e n s a tions and the w h o l e c o m p l e x of ideas ( e m b r a c i n g past and future experience) linked with them. T h e f a c t t h a t p o s i t i v i s m d i s t a n c e d itself m o r e a n d m o r e f r o m o b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m d u r i n g its e v o l u t i o n c r e a t e s a n i m p r e s s i o n that it consistently fought both t h e materialist recognition of a reality i n d e p e n d e n t of k n o w i n g , and t h e idealist r e c o g n i t i o n o f it. B u t p o s i t i v i s m d o e s n o t d e n y i d e a l i s m i n g e n e r a l , b u t o n l y objective idealism of t h e classic t y p e that s u b s t a n t i a t e d t h e thesis of t h e existence of a s u p e r s e n s o r y , i m m a t e r i a l reality. In that c o n n e c t i o n p o s i t i v i s m , w h i l e d i s s o c i a t i n g itself f r o m s o l i p s i s m , frequently interpreted subjective p h e n o m e n a of consciousness as i n d e p e n d e n t of a w a r e n e s s of reality. P o s i t i v i s m ' s f i g h t a g a i n s t ' m e t a p h y s i c s ' w a s t h u s a b o v e all a fight a g a i n s t m a t e r i a l i s m . B u t in o u r d a y it is i m p o s s i b l e to 'refute' materialism without distancing oneself from the most d i s c r e d i t e d idealist d o c t r i n e s a n d s o m e t i m e s even f r o m idealism itself. I h a v e a l r e a d y e x p l a i n e d a b o v e w h a t t h e i d e a l i s t ' d i s a v o w al' of idealism r e p r e s e n t s in fact. T h e p o l e m i c within the idealist c a m p c a n t h e r e f o r e only b e p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d a n d a p p r a i s e d i n c o n n e c t i o n with i d e a l i s m ' s c o m m o n fight a g a i n s t materialist philosophy. T h e c l a s h e s w i t h i n t h e idealist c a m p a r e e v i d e n c e , a t f i r s t g l a n c e , that idealists a r e not so m u c h e n g a g e d in refuting materialist philosophy as in settling theoretical a c c o u n t s with o n e a n o t h e r . B u t t h a t first i m p r e s s i o n i s d e c e p t i v e , b e c a u s e t h e w e a k n e s s e s in idealists' d o c t r i n e s disclosed by t h e materialist critique a r e realised in the polemic between them, while the i d e a l i s t a r g u m e n t a t i o n i s i m p r o v e d i n it, a n d a c o m m o n l i n e of anti-materialist views is developed. Ultimately t h e divergence between the different factions of idealism p r o v e to be closely c o n n e c t e d with t h e fight b e t w e e n materialism and idealism. T h a t f u n d a m e n t a l fact, w h i c h also helps us u n d e r s t a n d t h e rivalry a m o n g idealist d o c t r i n e s , is b r o u g h t out p a r t i c u l a r l y clearly b y t h e h i s t o r y o f p o s i t i v i s m a n d its f i g h t a g a i n s t ' m e t a p h y s i c s ' . T h e b a n k r u p t c y of t h e positivist interpretation of m a t e r a l i s m as a variety of s p e c u l a t i v e m e t a p h y s i c s has been d e m o n s t r a t e d
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historically. Nevertheless philosophical revisionism, which has never been distinguished by independence or profound thought, has completely assimilated these 'antimetaphysical' (in essence idealist) arguments against materialism. P r o u c h a , who p r o claimed it his task to 'enrich' t h e philosophy of Marxism by existentialist ideas, claimed that dialectical materialism needed to be freed of survivals of speculative metaphysics, in particular of propositions about the eternity and indestructibility of matter. T h e s e last, in his opinion, w e r e a 'substantialist model', 'metaphysical essentialism', i.e. integral elements of the classical speculative metaphysical doctrine of immutable essences that had been 'uncritically' taken up by Engels (218:614).
Just like the classical metaphysician, Engels sought the existent, which is the final basis of any reality, and after which no questions can be asked since there is nothing beyond it. At the same time, he also hold this existentmatterto be that which is in general (218:613).

Speculative metaphysics, of course, considered t h e existent as such, and that which is in general, as supersensory reality, radically different from the sense-perceived world. P r o u c h a missed the main point, viz., idealist speculation about a metaphysical super-reality. He also did not c a r e to see that a counterposing of matter to individual things as their universal and immutable first essence was absolutely alien to dialectical materialism. T h e Marxist understanding of the material essence of p h e n o m e n a does not contain any recognition of a special, absolute being, independent of individual and transient material things. But it was such a really metaphysical conception that he ascribed to dialectical materialism, interpreting the materialist conception of n a t u r e as essentially incompatible with dialectics. P r o u c h a wrote:
How often he (Engels .. ) speaks about the indestructibility and eternity of matter! From that basic aspect change and motion were only external for him as regards matter (218:614).

So, if one agrees with him, it turns out that dialectics should reject the principle of the indestructibility of matter, which has become a truism of all natural science in our day. P r o u c h a represented as unimportant the fact, that matter is conserved precisely during the transition from one form of its existence to another, i.e. during change and development, or, as he put it, this 'does not threaten the materialism of the metaphysical starting point' ( ibid .). Bourgeois critics of the philosophy of Marxism wipe out the radical, qualitative difference of dialectical materialism from
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metaphysical materialism, the radical antithesis between materialism (in particular, Marxist materialism) and speculative, idealist metaphysics. T h e revisionist P r o u c h a did the same, with the sole difference that he, of course, declared all this a development of Marxist philosophy (which, in fact, he disavowed). Early positivism often identified any philosophy with speculative metaphysics and replaced the speculative counterposing of philosophy to the special sciences by a 'positive' counterposing of the special sciences to philosophy. T h a t framing of the question inevitably led to a nihilistic denial of the whole historically established problematic of philosophy. G.H. Lewis, for example, wrote: 'Philosophy and Positive Science are irreconcilable' (149:xviii). But, while preaching the abolition of philosophy as a metaphysics alien to science, positivism at the same time proclaimed the creation of a positive, scientific philosophy, i.e. tried to combine philosophical nihilism with positive philosophical inquiry. What was the source of this contradictory position, which condemned positivist philosophising to eclecticism? In the latter half of the nineteenth century, speculative metaphysics had lost its old hold among the scientific intelligentsia in England, France, Germany, and other European countries. 'Shamefaced materialism' acquired a dominant position in the form in which it was developed by .. Huxley and other scientists, and propagandists of natural science. Positivist nihilism, denial of 'metaphysics', and a striving to put 'psychic knowledge' ( M a c h ) , epistemology, etc., in the place of philosophy, signified recognition of a crisis of idealism, but at the same time rejection of the way out of the crisis proposed by materialist philosophy, and attempts to revive and modernise idealism, limiting it to an epistemological problematic. Limitation of the problematic did not, of course, prevent positivism from defending an ideological doctrine that gave a subjective (agnostic) reply, if not directly then indirectly, to all the main philosophical problems. Neopositivism took shape as realisation of a tendency toward maximum limitation of the subject-matter of philosophy, which was justified on the one hand by the need to exclude 'metaphysics' and on the other by positive investigation of n a t u r e and society having become the subject-matter of special sciences. This limitation of the problematic of philosophy (like the exclusion of 'metaphysics' from it) boiled down to a rejection of ideological (essentially materialist) conclusions
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from the sciences of n a t u r e . Such conclusions w e r e declared t o b e i n t r o d u c e d i n t o n a t u r a l s c i e n c e f r o m o u t s i d e , i.e. f r o m 'metaphysics'. T h e materialism of naturalists, insofar as it constantly c a m e to light in their special r e s e a r c h e s , was t r e a t e d as h a v i n g n o r e l a t i o n t o t h e c o n t e n t o f scientific k n o w l e d g e a n d p o s s i b l y a s s o c i a t e d o n l y w i t h its f o r m , i.e. w i t h t h e l a n g u a g e of science, aggravated by 'metaphysical' prejudices that arose f r o m its i m p e r f e c t i o n a n d f r o m n o n o b s e r v a n c e o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of logical syntax, etc. C a r n a p , for e x a m p l e , wrote:
I will call metaphysical all those propositions which claim to r e p r e sent knowledge about something which is over or beyond all experience, e.g. about the real Essence of things, about T h i n g s in themselves, the Absolute, and such like. I do not include in melaphysics those theoriessometimes called m e t a p h y s i c a l w h o s e object is to a r r a n g e the most general propositions of t h e various regions of scientific k n o w l e d g e in a well-ordered system; such theories belong actually to the held of empirical science, not of philosophy, however daring they may be ( 2 9 : 2 1 2 - 2 1 3 ) .

T h e e x a m p l e s o f m e t a p h y s i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s cited b y h i m w e r e mainly d r a w n from t h e past; h e r e f e r r e d t o basic propositions of T h a l e s , P y t h a g o r a s , P l a t o , S p i n o z a , etc., c o n c l u d i n g that monism, dualism, materialism, and spiritualism w e r e equally m e t a p h y s i c a l , s i n c e t h e i r p r o p o s i t i o n s c o u l d n o t b e verified n o r p r o v e n in a p u r e l y logical way. T h e subsequent development of neopositivism has shown, of c o u r s e , t h a t t h e limited u n d e r s t a n d i n g of verification and proof it proposed was inapplicable to the main principles and laws of n a t u r a l science. F r o m t h e angle of neopositivism these principles, laws, and premisses were 'metaphysical , i.e. subject to exclusion f r o m s c i e n c e . T h a t fact, w h i c h m a d e it necessary to reconsider t h e neopositivist ' O c k h a m ' s razor', showed that neopositivism was not so much aimed against speculative metaphysics as against theoretical generalisations in s c i e n c e , s i n c e t h e y did n o t a g r e e w i t h n a r r o w ( a n d , m o r e o v e r , i d e a l i s t ) e m p i r i c i s m a n d led t o m a t e r i a l i s t c o n c l u s i o n s . N e o positivism, while claiming only to study t h e l a n g u a g e of science c r i t i c a l l y , i n fact t u r n e d o u t t o b e a n idealist c r i t i q u e o f its materialists content. T h e denial of the speculative counterposing o f p h i l o s o p h y t o n a t u r a l s c i e n c e w a s i n e v i t a b l y c o n v e r t e d into a c o u n t e r p o s i n g of positivism to t h e materialist m e t h o d o l o g y of n a t u r a l science. It b e c a m e t h e main task of neopositivism to ' p r o v e ' t h a t s c i e n c e was i n c o m p a t i b l e with materialism and agreed only with subjective-agnostic absolute relativism. Neopositivists h a v e ultimately been forced to admit that they h a v e not succeeded in putting an end to metaphysics,
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and that the methods of clarifying the sense of sentences proposed by them do not eliminate 'metaphysics', which seemingly c a n n o t be banished even from natural science, not speaking about philosophy in general. This forced recognition witnessed to t h e collapse of the principles of neopositivist epistemology, a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h a n y s t a t e m e n t s w e r e ' m e t a p h y s i c a l ' that did n o t r e s p o n d to verification ( o r falsification) or else w e r e not deductive conclusions. Since t h e r e a r e statements of that kind in all s c i e n c e s a n d , w o r s e s t i l l , i n n e o p o s i t i v i s t p h i l o s o p h y , t h e criterion of 'metaphysicalness' (or unscientific c h a r a c t e r ) suggested by neopositivism proved bankrupt. It has been discovered at the s a m e time (and neopositivists had to a c k n o w l e d g e this) that m a n y of t h e 'metaphysical' propositions of philosophy and natural science h a v e been logically p r o v e d and e m p i r i c a l l y verified in t h e c o u r s e of their h i s t o r ical d e v e l o p m e n t . A s e n i o r n e o p o s i t i v i s t , V i c t o r K r a f t , w r o t e :
A t o m i s m h a s b e c o m e a t h e o r y of n a t u r a l s c i e n c e f r o m a m e t a p h y s i c a l i d e a . I t n o l o n g e r h a n g s i n t h e a i r a s a d o g m a t i c c o n s t r u c t i o n , but h a s its solid basis in e x p e r i e n c e ( 1 2 6 : 7 1 ) .

Neopositivists n o w often talk a b o u t the inevitability of ' m e t a physical', intelligible, a n d even irrational postulates in science. Reichenbach considers 'metaphysical' recognition of objective r e a l i t y a sine qua . T h e o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e p h i l o s o p h y s e p a r a t e d off f r o m n e o p o s i t i v i s m as a d o c t r i n e t h a t p r o v e d an illus o r y o p p o n e n t o f ' m e t a p h y s i c s ' . But t h e l a n g u a g e p h i l o s o p h e r s , t o o , p r o v e ' m e t a p h y s i c i a n s ' w h e n i t c o m e s t o t h e test, primarily because they interpret language as the space of h u m a n life a n d , m o r e o v e r , t h e limits o f t h e w o r l d . ' T h e r e i s b e i n g , ' Yvon Gauthier wrote, 'only in and through language... T h e real is l a n g u a g e , the s p a c e open to the reciprocal play of o n s c i o u s n e s s a n d its w o r l d ' ( 7 2 : 3 3 1 ) .
1 8

T h e h i s t o r y o f p o s i t i v i s m t h e h i s t o r y o f its l o u d l y p r o c l a i m e d s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t ' m e t a p h y s i c s ' c u l m i n a t e s i n its c a p i t u l a t i o n to s p e c u l a t i v e , idealist p h i l o s o p h i s i n g . A n d that is n o r m a l , f o r i d e a l i s m , w h a t e v e r its f o r m , i s c o n s t a n t l y d r a w n t o the speculative metaphysics of objective or subjective idealism. T h e neopositivists' illusion is their conviction that empiricism (idealist, of c o u r s e ) is i n c o m p a t i b l e with 'metaphysics' b e c a u s e o f its a n t i t h e s i s t o o b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m . H i s t o r y h a s d i s p e l l e d that illusion. I have examined the main differences in the understanding of s p e c u l a t i v e m e t a p h y s i c s a n d t h e related differences as regards metaphysical (and 'metaphysical') problems in general. These disagreements, like the struggle against speculative
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m e t a p h y s i c s , a r e a t a n g l e d skein of c o n t r a d i c t i o n s . It is o n e of the most r e w a r d i n g tasks of t h e history of philosophy to unravel it. T h e l i t t l e I h a v e b e e n a b l e t o d o i n t h i s c h a p t e r l e a d s t o the conviction that both the defence and denial of speculative metaphysics, and the constant c h a n g e in the sense of the term 'metaphysics', reflect t h e age-old dispute b e t w e e n materialism and idealism, t h o u g h in an indirect way.

NOTES
1

I t r e a t e d t h e p r o b l e m of t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of p h i l o s o p h i c a l k n o w l e d g e ( j o i n t l y w i t h A . S . B o g o m o l o v ) s p e c i a l l y in o u r Principles of the Theory of the Historical Process in Philosophy ( s e e C h a p t e r 5. Basic F e a t u r e s of t h e Process of t h e History of Philosophy, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1986). T h i s point of view was subsequently developed by Paulsen, w h o tried to s u b s t a n t i a t e it f r o m a r e l i g i o u s - p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n v i c t i o n t h a t t h e w o r l d is t h e e m b o d i m e n t o f a r a t i o n a l d i v i n e will. ' O b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m , ' h e w r o t e , 'is t h e m a i n f o r m o f t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l o u t l o o k o n t h e w o r l d ' ( 2 0 2 : 3 9 4 ) . He t h u s linked t h e proposition expressed by Hegel with t h e theological p r e m i s s implicit in it; it is t h i s r e d u c t i o n of H e g e l ' s p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t b r i n g s o u t its r e a l s e n s e . T h o m a s M n z e r was not, of course, an exception. As t h e G D R philoso p h e r L e y p o i n t s o u t in his d e t a i l e d m o n o g r a p h Studies in the History of Materialism in the Middle Ages, m e d i a e v a l m y s t i c d o c t r i n e s h a d a s u p r a naturalist c h a r a c t e r in part, and partly a p p r o x i m a t e d to a pantheistic variety of m a t e r i a l i s m , as w a s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , for e x a m p l e , of M e i s t e r E c k h a r t . ' T h e path from Ibn-Sina to Siger and Meister Eckhart,' Ley notes, ' c o v e r s a s i g n i f i c a n t p e r i o d in t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of p h i l o s o p h i c a l m a t e r i a l ism' ( 1 5 1 : 5 0 6 ) . It is a l s o c l e a r t h a t t h e d e m a r c a t i o n of m e t h o d a n d system in p h i l o s o p h y has a very relative c h a r a c t e r . Herakleitos' dialectics arose not so m u c h as a m e t h o d a s a n o u t l o o k o n t h e w o r l d . A n d i n its m o d e r n f o r m d i a l e c t i c s i s a t h e o r y of d e v e l o p m e n t , a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y a d e f i n i t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of r e a l i t y t h a t , by v i r t u e of its u n i v e r s a l i t y a n d r i c h n e s s of c o n t e n t , is a m e t h o d o f i n v e s t i g a t i o n a n d i n q u i r y . T h e s a m e c a n b e said o f t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l m e t h o d ; denial of t h e i m p o r t a n c e and universality of the process of developm e n t i s a b o v e all a n i d e o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e t h a t h a s s o m e t h i n g i n c o m m o n i n s e v e r a l b a s i c e l e m e n t s , o r e v e n c o i n c i d e s , w i t h w h a t m o s t often c h a r a c t e r ises m e t a p h y s i c a l s y s t e m s , s i n c e t h e y i n t e r p r e t b e i n g a s a n a b s o l u t e , a n d invariant, ruling out any becoming, arising, and destruction. T h e S o v i e t A r i s t o t e l i a n s c h o l a r , K u b i t s k y , p o i n t s out t h a t t h e title o f t h e Metaphysics c a m e i n t o g e n e r a l use a f t e r t h e edition of A n d r o n i k o s of Rhodes, w h o followed the e x a m p l e of t h e A l e x a n d r i a n cataloguers in h i s classification o f A r i s t o t l e ' s w o r k s ( s e e 1 2 8 : 2 6 4 ) . But w h a t signified, for t h e cataloguers, no m o r e t h a n an indication of t h e order of Aristotle's w o r k s ( p o l i t i c a l , e t h i c a l , p h y s i c a l , a n d t h o s e c a l l e d t h e 'first p h i l o s o p h y ' ) a c q u i r e d a n i n f o r m a l s i g n i f i c a n c e a f t e r A n d r o n i k o s , i.e. b e g a n t o b e e m p l o y e d as a c o n c e p t i n d i c a t i n g a s p e c i a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m a t i c . 211

C o n t e m p o r a r y T h o m i s m retains in t h e main this mediaeval u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the subject-matter and job of philosophy. T h e leading American n e o T h o m i s t , Burke, writes that t h e m a i n task of T h o m i s t philosophy is to p r o v e t h e e x i s t e n c e of a s u p r e m e b e i n g a n d t h a t it c o l l a p s e s if G o d is r e m o v e d f r o m it as t h e f o u n d a t i o n of a n y r e a l i t y a n d activity.
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'Descartes and Bacon,' Bykhovsky notes, 'agreed in u n d e r s t a n d i n g the d e c i s i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f m e t h o d for c r e a t i n g t h e n e w s c i e n c e , a n d d e v e l o p m e n t o f this m e t h o d ( t h e a n t i p o d e o f s c h o l a s t i c i s m ) w a s t h e f o c u s o f t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . D e s c a r t e s fully s h a r e d B a c o n ' s v i e w s o n t h e a d v a n t a g e s o f methodical e x p e r i e n c e , of experiment compared with expertentia vaga, a n d on t h e n e c e s s i t y of a r a t i o n a l w o r k i n g up of s e n s e d a t a ' ( 2 6 : 6 0 ) .
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T h i s e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l division o f r e a l i t y d o e s n o t , o f c o u r s e , r u l e out t h e possibility of an o n t o l o g i c a l c o u n t e r p o s i n g of m e t a p h y s i c a l r e a l i t y to t h e world of p h e n o m e n a . In t h e s t a t e m e n t cited a b o v e M a l e b r a n c h e to s o m e extent anticipated Kant, w h o arrived at an ontological counterposing of an u n k n o w a b l e w o r l d of ' t h i n g s - i n - t h e m s e l v e s ' to a k n o w a b l e w o r l d of p h e n o m e n a precisely by w a y of a similar epistemological division. T h a t M a l e b r a n c h e h a d a l r e a d y t a k e n t h e r o a d t h a t u l t i m a t e l y led t o K a n t follows not o n l y from t h e d u a l i s m o f m i n d a n d m a t t e r b u t a l s o f r o m o t h e r , m o r e p a r t i a l p r o p o s i t i o n s s u c h as, for i n s t a n c e , t h e thesis t h a t ' t h e e r r o r s o f p u r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g c a n only b e d i s c o v e r e d b y c o n s i d e r i n g t h e n a t u r e o f t h e spirit itself, a n d of t h e i d e a s that it n e e d s in o r d e r to k n o w o b j e c t s ' (159:III,340).
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O n e must r e m e m b e r i n this c o n n e c t i o n , o f c o u r s e , t h a t t h e a s c r i p t i o n t o s u b s t a n c e a s a n a t t r i b u t e p r e c i s e l y o f t h o u g h t , a n d not o f s o m e o t h e r m o r e p r i m i t i v e f o r m of t h e p s y c h i c is a s s o c i a t e d with t h e r e d u c t i o n of e v e r y t h i n g p s y c h i c to t h o u g h t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of r a t i o n a l i s m , i.e. to a f o r m of t h o u g h t w h i c h it is i m p o s s i b l e in p r i n c i p l e to d e d u c e d i r e c t l y from m a t t e r .

9

Engels wrote, characterising the relation between natural science and r e l i g i o n in t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y , i.e. a h u n d r e d y e a r s a f t e r G a s s e n d i : ' S c i e n c e w a s still d e e p l y e n m e s h e d in t h e o l o g y . E v e r y w h e r e it s o u g h t a n d f o u n d t h e u l t i m a t e c a u s e i n a n i m p u l s e from o u t s i d e t h a t w a s n o t t o b e e x p l a i n e d from n a t u r e itself ( 5 1 : 2 5 ) . T h e i d e o l o g i c a l w e a k n e s s o f e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y n a t u r a l s c i e n c e did n o t , h o w e v e r , e x c l u d e its h o s t i l i t y t o s p e c u l a t i v e metaphysics. Newton counterposed 'natural philosophy' to metaphysics, a f f i r m i n g that m e t a p h y s i c a l p h i l o s o p h i s i n g w a s a g r e a t d a n g e r for p h y s i c s . His f a m o u s p h r a s e ' H i p o t h e s e s n o n fingo' o f c o u r s e m e a n t only m e t a p h y s i c a l h y p o t h e s e s t h a t e x c l u d e d t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f scientific c r i t e r i a .
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T h e h i s t o r y o f m e t a p h y s i c s , t h e F r e n c h neopositivist R o u g i e r , for e x a m p l e , claimed, is largely a play of w o r d s a r o u n d the verb 'to be' t r a n s f o r m e d into a n o u n by m e a n s of t h e d e f i n i t e a r t i c l e in G r e e k . A r i s t o t l e ' s m e t a p h y s i c s w a s b a s e d o n t h a t logical j u g g l i n g , w h i c h w o u l d h a v e b e e n i m p o s s i b l e , for e x a m p l e , i n A r a b i c . R o u g i e r , b y t h e w a y , did n o t c o n s i d e r i t n e c e s s a r y to explain why t h e most e m i n e n t followers of Aristotle in the Middle Ages w e r e precisely Arabic philosophers. He simply stated that t h e concept ' t o b e ' , o n w h i c h all o n t o l o g y i s b a s e d , w a s o n e t h a t l a c k e d c o n t e n t a n d t h a t did n o t c o r r e s p o n d t o a n y l i v i n g e x p e r i e n c e w h a t s o e v e r ( s e e 2 2 8 : 2 3 1 ) . By b o r r o w i n g t h e a r g u m e n t from H o b b e s (or from those w h o b o r r o w e d it from h i m ) , R o u g i e r , unlike Hobbes, employed it to criticise materialism. T h e s a m e is d o n e by the c o n t e m p o r a r y Spanish philosopher of an existen11

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tialist t u r n , M a r i a s , w h o c l a i m s t h a t t h e c o n c e p t o f b e i n g , d e r i v e d f r o m t h e v e r b ' t o b e ' d o e s n o t signify a n y t h i n g t h a t r e a l l y exists ( s e e 1 6 2 : 8 5 ) . W h e n t h e contradiction between Hegel's dialectical method a n d metaphysical s y s t e m is s p o k e n a b o u t , t h e d u a l s e n s e of t h e t e r m ' m e t a p h y s i c s ' is sometimes overlooked. Hegel's system was metaphysics in t h e original m e a n ing o f t h e t e r m ( w h i c h h a s n o t lost its s e n s e e v e n i n o u r d a y ) , d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t m a n y o f its p r o p o s i t i o n s , i n p a r t i c u l a r t h e final c o n c l u s i o n s , w e r e m e t a p h y s i c a l in t h e second basic m e a n i n g of t h e word. An idealistically interpreted dialectical principle of t h e c o i n c i d e n c e of epistemology, logic, a n d o n t o l o g y , o f c o u r s e , c o n s t i t u t e d t h e basis o f H e g e l ' s m e t a p h y s i c a l s y s t e m .
1 2

Several decades later O r t e g a Gasset appraised t h e situation in philosophy in the latter half of t h e nineteenth c e n t u r y in roughly the s a m e way, writing t h a t ' t h e p h i l o s o p h e r i s a s h a m e d t o b e s u c h ; t h a t i s t o say, h e i s a s h a m e d n o t to be a physicist. As t h e g e n u i n e l y philosophical p r o b l e m s do not lend themselves to solution after t h e fashion of physical k n o w l e d g e , he refuses t o t a c k l e t h e m , a n d r e j e c t s his p h i l o s o p h y , r e d u c i n g i t t o a m i n i m u m a n d putting it h u m b l y at t h e service of physics' ( 2 0 0 : 4 8 ) . Philosophy was slighted a s a n o n - s c i e n c e , a n d t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s did n o t d a r e a n s w e r t h a t i t w a s s o m e t h i n g m o r e t h a n s c i e n c e . B u t t h e crisis i n p h y s i c s r a d i c a l l y a l t e r e d t h e situation. It b e c a m e evident that physics could not r e p l a c e metaphysics. ' H a v i n g o v e r c o m e t h e idolatry of experiment and shut physical k n o w l e d g e u p i n its m o d e s t o r b i t , t h e m i n d r e m a i n s f r e e f o r o t h e r m o d e s o f k n o w i n g a n d r e t a i n s lively s e n s i b i l i t y f o r t r u l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m s ' ( 2 0 0 : 5 7 ) . T h a t w a s written forty years ago. T h e Spanish philosopher had a rather v a g u e notion o f t h e p r o g r e s s o f p h y s i c s . S i n c e t h e scientific a n d i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n based on the outstanding achievements of science, the capacity of the natural sciences to enrich the philosophical outlook by discovery of new, unexpected, even paradoxical aspects of objective reality a n d k n o w l e d g e of it, h a s b e e n c o n v i n c i n g l y d e m o n s t r a t e d .
13

In t h e postscript t o t h e t h i r d e d i t i o n o f his m a g n u m o p u s Philosophy, J a s p e r s d e c l a r e d , a n s w e r i n g t h o s e w h o r e p r o a c h e d him for l a c k o f c l a r i t y and definiteness, that this ' i n a d e q u a c y ' a p p e r t a i n e d to the essence of philos o p h y . ' T h e s t r e n g t h o f p h i l o s o p h y d o e s n o t lie i n firmly b a s e d t h o u g h t s , n o r i n t h e p i c t u r e , s h a p e , a n d t h o u g h t i m a g e , n o r i n e m b o d i m e n t o f p e r c e p t i o n (all t h a t is s i m p l y m e a n s ) , b u t in t h e possibility of it ( p h i l o s o p h y ) b e i n g r e a l i s e d t h r o u g h e x i s t e n c e in its h i s t o r i c i t y . So t h i s p h i l o s o p h y [he w a s r e f e r r i n g to existentialism..] is philosophy of freedom a n d at t h e s a m e time of t h e limitless will t o c o m m u n i c a t i o n ' ( 1 1 4 : I , x x x i i ) . T h a t did n o t , o f c o u r s e , a n s w e r t h e fully d e s e r v e d r e p r o a c h . N o o n e d e m a n d s o f p h i l o s o p h y a p i c t u r e s q u e e x p o s i t i o n of t h o u g h t s , b u t its c o n s i s t e n c y a n d s y s t e m do n o t e x c l u d e a ' b o u n d l e s s will t o c o m m u n i c a t i o n ' . T h e h e a r t o f t h e m a t t e r i s different; m e t a p h y s i c a l p h i l o s o p h i s i n g lost t h e c o n f i d e n c e t h a t used t o b e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t h e r a t i o n a l i s t m e t a p h y s i c i a n s . T h e d e n i a l of system t h a t J a s p e r s p a s s e d off a s s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t d o g m a t i s m (in a n o t h e r p l a c e h e d e c l a r e d t h a t h e did n o t w a n t p h i l o s o p h y t o b e a d o g m a , l e a d e r , o r d i c t a t o r , i m p o s i n g o b e d i e n c e a g a i n s t t h e will) w a s t h e r e v e r s e o f t h e i r r a t i o n a l i s t c r i t i q u e o f t h e idea of a scientific p h i l o s o p h y , w h i c h h a d n o t in t h e least lost its signific a n c e after t h e collapse of rationalist metaphysics.
14

S k v o r t s o v h a s c o r r e c t l y s t r e s s e d this p o i n t i n t h e s o l e s t u d y i n S o v i e t l i t e r a t u r e o n t h e h i s t o r y o f s p e c u l a t i v e m e t a p h y s i c s : ' T h e old i d e a o f m e t a p h y s i c s as a d o c t r i n e of h i d d e n , e t e r n a l e s s e n c e s o u t s i d e t h e visible

15

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empirical world and at t h e s a m e time comprising t h e basis of being, is being modernised by contemporary bourgeois philosophy' (247:5).
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'I c o m p a r e these t w o kinds of metaphysics,' w r o t e Helvetius, analysing the opposition of materialism and idealism, 'to the t w o different philosophies of Democritus and Plato. T h e former gradually rose from earth to heaven, while t h e latter gradually sank from heaven to e a r t h ' (99:156). O n e must n o t e , i n c i d e n t a l l y , t h a t H e l v e t i u s , l i k e H o l b a c h , i n s p i t e o f this c o n f u s i o n of c o n c e p t s , w a s an i r r e c o n c i l a b l e o p p o n e n t of s p e c u l a t i v e m e t a p h y s i c s .
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H a n s Leisegang, a philosopher of an irrationalist turn, wrote, w h e n asserting t h a t t h e s u b j e c t - m a t t e r o f m e t a p h y s i c s c o m p r i s e d 'all t r a n s - s u b j e c t i v e objects in the sense of t h e w o r d " t r a n s - s u b j e c t i v e " ' ( 1 3 7 : 7 2 ) : ' w h e r e t h e o b j e c t s o f m e t a p h y s i c s ( f o r c e , life, t h e s o u l , t h e s p i r i t , infinity, e t e r n i t y , t h e w o r l d s o u l , t h e w o r l d spirit, a n d m a n y o t h e r s ) a p p e a r , t h e y will b e e m p l o y e d a s a m e a n s t o g i v e s e n s e t o t h e real a n d k n o w a b l e ' ( 1 3 7 : 7 7 ) . M a t e r i a l i s m , h e c o n t i n u e d , a l s o s t e m m e d f r o m this i n t r o d u c t i o n o f s e n s e i n t o s t u d i e d o b j e c t s , c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of m e t a p h y s i c s . ' M a t t e r is l i k e w i s e a m e t a p h y s i c a l o b j e c t ' ( i b i d . ) . T h a t c o n c l u s i o n f o l l o w e d , i n his o p i n i o n , f r o m t h e f a c t that m a t t e r was treated as s u b s t a n c e . T h e c o n t e m p o r a r y apologia for speculative metaphysics is thus based on effacing t h e difference between t h e real o b j e c t s of p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n q u i r y a n d illusory o n e s t h a t do n o t in fact exist. T h e s e p r o p o s i t i o n s d e v e l o p i d e a s e x p r e s s e d by W i t t g e n s t e i n in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, w h i c h of c o u r s e p l a y e d a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e in t h e m o u l d i n g of n e o p o s i t i v i s m . ' T h e limits of my language,' Wittgenstein w r o t e , ' m e a n t h e limits o f m y w o r l d ' ( 2 6 4 : 1 4 9 ) . T h e o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e philosophy, which supposes that it has solved t h e t a s k p r o c l a i m e d b y n e o p o s i t i v i s m , i n t h e final a n a l y s i s r e t r a c e s t h e p a t h of e r r o r s followed by t h e l a t t e r .
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IV T H E GREAT CONFRONTATION: MATERIALISM VS IDEALISM. T H E ARGUMENTS A N D COUNTERARGUMENTS 1. T h e Struggle of Materialism and Idealism as an Epochal Cultural and Historical P h e n o m e n o n Study of t h e basic philosophical question and of t h e natural polarisation of philosophical t r e n d s indicates that it is m a t e r i a l ism a n d i d e a l i s m t h a t a r e t h e m a i n t r e n d s i n p h i l o s o p h y . I n the preceding chapters I have already examined the materialist c r i t i q u e o f i d e a l i s m , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d t h e i d e a l i s t a r g u ments of idealism against materialism on the other, in c o n n e c tion with a positive analysis of p r o b l e m s of t h e history of p h i l o s o phy. T h e aim of the present chapter is to continue and sum up this e x a m i n a t i o n , b u t on a b r o a d e r p l a n e , viz., f r o m t h e a n g l e of t h e social d e v e l o p m e n t of m a n k i n d , w h i c h takes p l a c e not w i t h o u t the involvement of philosophy. A p r e j u d i c e of c o n t e m p o r a r y b o u r g e o i s history of p h i l o s o p h y is the idea that the struggle between materialism and idealism is an internal m a t t e r of p h i l o s o p h y of no significance for o t h e r r e a l m s o f s o c i e t y ' s s p i r i t u a l life. N e o p o s i t i v i s t s , c l a i m i n g to o v e r c o m e this ' o n e - s i d e d ' antithesis, p r o c l a i m e d that s c i e n c e did not c o n f i r m e i t h e r m a t e r i a l i s m or idealism, so b o t h s h o u l d be r e g a r d e d as l a c k i n g scientific sense. ' E v e r y o n e k n o w s , ' B e r t r a n d Russell said ironically, 'that " m i n d " is w h a t an idealist t h i n k s t h e r e is n o t h i n g else but, a n d " m a t t e r " is what a materialist thinks the s a m e about' ( 2 3 1 : 6 3 3 ) . He was convinced, of course, that he was as remote from materialism as he was from idealism. Neopositivists picture the struggle between materialism and idealism as s o m e t h i n g like t h e q u a r r e l b e t w e e n t h e Lilliputian T r a m e c k s a n s a n d S l a m e c k s a n s described by Swift (see 2 5 3 ) . T h e f o r m e r argued that only high heels c o r r e s p o n d e d to the traditions and state system of Lilliput, d e m a n d i n g that only those w h o preferred high heels to low should be appointed to high state posts. T h e S l a m e c k s a n s , on t h e c o n t r a r y , claimed that
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only low heels w e r e e v i d e n c e of t h e t r u e virtues and merits t h a t d e s e r v e t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s high confidence. T h e neopositivist idea of t h e u n s o u n d n e s s of t h e antithesis of materialism and idealism h a s a m a r k e d influence at first on t h o s e scientists w h o had not s u c c e e d e d in finding their way from historically outlived m e c h a n i s t i c materialism to a m o d e r n d i a l e c t i c a l - m a t e r i a l i s t outlook. S u b s e q u e n t l y m a n y of t h e m b e c a m e a w a r e of t h e incompatibility of positivist subjectivism and t h e ideological premisses of t h e s c i e n c e of n a t u r e , but only a few b e c a m e conscious a d h e r e n t s of dialectical materialism in t h e c o n d i t i o n s of capitalist society. M a x P l a n c k w r o t e , t o c o u n t e r b a l a n c e t h e neopositivist denial of t h e ' n a i v e ' belief in t h e e x i s t e n c e of a reality i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e k n o w i n g subject:
This firm belief, unshakable in any way, in the absolute reality in nature is the given, self-evident premiss of this work for him and strengthens him again and again in the hope that he can succeed in groping a little loser still to the essence of objective nature, and through that to advance on the track of its secrets farther and farther. (208:19).

T h e t e r m i n o l o g y employed by P l a n c k is not, of c o u r s e , wholly satisfactory, s i n c e r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e objective reality of n a t u r e is not belief but k n o w l e d g e , which is present in every act of m a n ' s conscious, practical activity, and in a n y fragment of scientific u n d e r s t a n d i n g w h a t s o e v e r . It is t h a t which he was stressing, but in this case t h e i n e x a c t i t u d e of t h e t e r m i n o l o g y only e m p h a sises his basic materialist conviction m o r e s t r o n g l y . F a r from all investigators of n a t u r e , w o r k i n g in an a t m o s p h e r e of vulgarisation and distortion of materialism h a v e been able, of c o u r s e , to s e p a r a t e themselves from idealist views of the world. M a n y , o n the c o n t r a r y , a d h e r e t o idealism. T h e bourgeoisie, L e n i n said, r e q u i r e r e a c t i o n a r y views of their professors. T h e c o n c l u s i o n suggested by e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e philosophical views of c o n t e m p o r a r y n a t u r a l scientists brings me back to a thought expressed at t h e b e g i n n i n g of this c h a p t e r , viz., that the struggle between materialism and idealism is not the p r i v a t e business of p h i l o s o p h e r s . T h i s s t r u g g l e of ideas fills and a n i m a t e s all s p h e r e s of social life. T h e history of f r e e t h i n k ing, e n l i g h t e n m e n t , and atheism, t h e struggle against t h e spiritual d i c t a t o r s h i p of t h e C h u r c h and against clericalism in g e n e r a l , t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of legal consciousness, t h e abolition of s e r f d o m , b o u r g e o i s d e m o c r a t i c t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s , t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of moral and aesthetic criteria, and t h e t h e o r y and p r a c t i c e of socialism all t h e s e processes, w h o s e significance is obvious, a r e organically
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associated with the struggle b e t w e e n the t w o basic ideologies, i.e. m a t e r i a l i s m a n d i d e a l i s m . Let us turn to the historical evidence. Feudal reactionaries w e r e often distinguished by an a c u t e lucidity of class c o n sciousness. In 1770 Sguier, advocate-general of the parliament o f P a r i s , c a l l i n g f o r t h e official c o n d e m n a t i o n a n d b u r n i n g o f Holbach's System of Nature, declared:
T h e philosophers h a v e elevated themselves as preceptors of the h u m a n race. F r e e d o m of t h o u g h t is their cry, and this cry is m a d e audible from o n e end of t h e world to t h e other. On t h e one h a n d they h a v e tried to s h a k e t h e t h r o n e ; on the other they h a v e w a n t e d to overturn the altars (225:278).

T h e r e i s n o t o n l y f e a r i n t h o s e w o r d s , w i t h its a t t e n d a n t e x a g geration of the real d a n g e r threatening feudalism from p r o gressive (in this c a s e m a t e r i a l i s t ) p h i l o s o p h y , b u t also a s o b e r a w a r e n e s s of the fact that t h e philosophical revolution in F r a n c e was paving the w a y to a political upheaval. Unlike advocate-general Sguier, de Maistre evaluated the revolutionary significance of the philosophy of the F r e n c h E n lightenment after t h e revolution has o c c u r r e d .
T h e present generation is witnessing one of t h e greatest spectacles that h a s e v e r m e t t h e h u m a n e y e , t h e fight t o t h e d e a t h o f C h r i s t i a n i t y and philosophism (158:61).

Philosophy (that of the F r e n c h Enlightenment, it goes without saying) was 'an essentially disorganising p o w e r ' for t h e ideologist o f t h e R e s t o r a t i o n ( 1 5 8 : 5 6 ) , s i n c e i t f o u g h t r e l i g i o n i n s t e a d o f b a s i n g itself o n it. I t s s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t f e u d a l i s m w a s i n t e r p r e t ed as a nihilistic n e g a t i o n of civilisation in g e n e r a l . 'I shall n e v e r believe in t h e fruitfulness of nothingness' ( 1 5 8 : 5 7 ) . Although Sguier's p r o n o u n c e m e n t was aimed directly at Holbach's 'bible of materialism', he had in mind (like de Maistre later) the whole philosophy of the French Enlightenment, w h o s e brilliant spokesmen included both materialists and idealists. Voltaire, w h o fused t o g e t h e r N e w t o n ' s physics, deism, L o c k e ' s sensualism, a critique of speculative metaphysics, and philosophical scepticism, was probably the most passionate opponent of feudalism. His motto 'Ecrasez l'infme!' inspired struggle against the spiritual dictatorship of the C h u r c h . Volt a i r i a n i s m , i n s p i t e o f t h e m o d e r a t i o n o f its s o c i a l p r o g r a m m e , was considered very nearly a s y n o n y m for open rebellion against the existing system then. Gogol put the following words into the mouth of the town governor: "That's the way God Himself has arranged things, despite what the V o l t a i r i a n s s a y ' ' ( 7 7 : 3 1 9 ) . R u s s i a n a n d P r u s s i a n , a n d all
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other feudal reactionaries went in t e r r o r of Voltairianism. J e a n - J a c q u e s Rousseau was t h e spiritual father of the J a c o b ins. W h y did that idealist put forward a m o r e radical social p r o g r a m m e than t h e materialists Holbach, Helvetius, and Diderot? Rousseau was an ideologist of the lower middle classes, above all of the peasant masses, w h o w e r e not, of course, irreligious. At the time of the G r e a t F r e n c h Revolution atheism was an esoteric philosophy of t h e aristocracy and t h e part of t h e b o u r geoisie closest t them in social position, a m o n g whom we find the f a r m e r - g e n e r a l Helvetius. Holbach was called the personal enemy of the Lord God. He dedicated his Ethocratic to Louis XVI, whom the revolution soon sent to the scaffold. H o l b a c h ' s political ideal was an enlightened constitutional m o n a r c h y , but that was a bourgeois-revolutionary ideal of the time, in spite of the fact that some bourgeois and lower middle class ideologists had already proclaimed the need for a republic. T h e c o m m o n aim of all the enlighteners, both materialist and idealist, was the fight against feudalism. T h e question of t h e future form of government had not yet b e c o m e a pressing one. Did that mean that t h e r e w e r e no disagreements a m o n g the F r e n c h enlighteners, both materialist and idealist? B no means. T h e disagreements related to most essential problems: religion, atheism, and the philosophical interpretation of reality. But in the fight against the c o m m o n enemyclericalism and scholasticism and the varieties of idealism related to the latter all the enlighteners w e r e united. T h e i r a r g u m e n t s against feudal ideology were not, of course, of equal worth, and that considerably affected the subsequent development of philosophy. But, to the ideologists of feudal reaction, the idealist Rousseau was no less terrible than the materialist Holbach; this idealist found effective a r g u m e n t s against feudal ideology that the atheist Holbach did not. Rousseau, for example, claimed that the Catholic religion d o m i n a n t in F r a n c e corrupted the h u m a n mind, an a r g u m e n t acceptable to the man of the T h i r d Estate. Holbach, however, argued that any religion c o r r u p t e d the mind; only a few agreed with that sweeping conclusion. Study of the c o m p a r a t i v e role of materialism and idealism in the history of h u m a n i t y thus suggests an organic inclusion of these main philosophical trends in a real socio-economic context. T h e philosophical ideology of the bourgeoisie w h o w e r e storming feudalism was revolutionary even when it b o r e an idealist or even religious c h a r a c t e r . T h e materialist philosophy
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o f t h e b o u r g e o i s i e w h o c a m e t o p o w e r , o n t h e c o n t r a r y , was conservative; such, for example, was vulgar materialism in G e r m a n y i n t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . I n o t h e r , less d e v e l o p e d capitalist c o u n t r i e s , i n c i d e n t a l l y , this f o r m of m a t e r i a l i s m p l a y e d a progressive role. O n e can a g r e e with Kopnin:
T h e idealist system can be a step forward in the development of philosophical knowledge compared with existing materialism, and play a reactionary role in the ideological life of society, and on the contrary have no significance in the forward movement of philosophical thought and exert a progressive influence on a country's social life (122:111).

H i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m , w h i c h c o n s i d e r s p h i l o s o p h y a specific r e f l e c t i o n of social b e i n g , d e n i e s in p r i n c i p l e an u n a m b i g u o u s definition of t h e social position of b o t h m a t e r i a l i s m a n d i d e a l ism. T h e idea t h a t t h e s t r u g g l e b e t w e e n t h e t w o a l w a y s reflects t h e o p p o s i t i o n of t h e m a i n classes of a n t a g o n i s t i c s o c i e t y is an oversimplification, b o r d e r i n g on Shulyatikov's notorious c o n c e p tion. T h e e x a m p l e of the F r e n c h enlighteners indicates that this a n t i t h e s i s also exists i n t h e c o n t e x t o f o n e a n d t h e s a m e bourgeois ideology. Witness t h e historical antithesis of Hegel a n d F e u e r b a c h ; t h e i r d o c t r i n e s reflected t h e d e g r e e o f d e v e l o p m e n t of b o u r g e o i s i d e o l o g y in G e r m a n y . T h e m a t e r i a l i s t p h i l o s o p h y o f t h e b o u r g e o i s e n l i g h t e n e r s was, of c o u r s e , hostile to t h e idealism of t h e ideologists of f e u d a l ism. D i a l e c t i c a l a n d h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m is a d o c t r i n e r a d i c a l ly o p p o s e d to c o n t e m p o r a r y idealist p h i l o s o p h y . In o t h e r w o r d s , t h e a n t i t h e s i s b e t w e e n m a t e r i a l i s m a n d idealism h e r e reflects t h e s t r u g g l e of a n t a g o n i s t i c classes. An ideology has a revolutionary (or progressive) c h a r a c t e r i n s o f a r as it reflects t h e u r g e n t n e e d s of social d e v e l o p m e n t . In c e r t a i n h i s t o r i c a l c o n d i t i o n s , w h e n a t r a n s i t i o n is u n d e r w a y from o n e h i s t o r i c a l f o r m of e n s l a v e m e n t of t h e w o r k i n g p e o p l e to a n o t h e r c o r r e s p o n d i n g to a h i g h e r level of t h e p r o d u c tive f o r c e s , t h e i d e o l o g i c a l f o r m o f t h e t r a n s i t i o n m a y b e idealism and religion. Early Christianity, before it b e c a m e the state relig i o n , w a s a h i s t o r i c a l l y p r o g r e s s i v e i d e o l o g y of t h e slaves. R e l i g i o u s P r o t e s t a n t i s m was t h e i d e o l o g y o f t h e D u t c h r e v o l u t i o n a n d l a t e r of t h e E n g l i s h . It t o o k centuries of t h e e m a n c i p a t i o n struggle of t h e w o r k i n g people and long, e x p e r i e n c e of t h e class s t r u g g l e o f t h e p r o l e t a r i a t , f o r a t h e i s m t o b e c o m e t h e outlook of the advanced part (but by no means the majority) of t h e o p p r e s s e d a n d e x p l o i t e d masses. D o e s t h a t belittle t h e g r e a t c u l t u r a l a n d h i s t o r i c a l , c o g n i t i v e , p h i l o s o p h i c a l signific a n c e of atheism and materialism? Of c o u r s e not.
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T h e materialism of Holbach, Helvetius, and Diderot was a m u c h h i g h e r level o f t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l s u m m i n g - u p o f n a t u r e t h a n R o u s s e a u ' s idealist d o c t r i n e . T h e latter, it is t r u e , surpassed t h e F r e n c h materialists of t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y in his u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f s o c i a l life, b u t i t s h o u l d n o t b e f o r g o t t e n t h a t p r e M a r x i a n m a t e r i a l i s t s did n o t a d h e r e t o m a t e r i a l i s m i n t h a t domain. T h e r e is consequently no sharply expressed opposition in t h e p h i l o s o p h y of history b e t w e e n t h e idealist R o u s s e a u a n d t h e materialist H o l b a c h , in spite of t h e s u b s t a n t i a l differences associated with the latter's atheism a n d m e c h a n i s m . R o u s seau, as we k n o w , i n t e r p r e t e d the history of m a n k i n d in a n a t u r alistic w a y , w i t h o u t r e s o r t i n g t o t h e o l o g i c a l a r g u m e n t s , a n d attached p a r a m o u n t importance to such factors as increase of population, spread of private property, development of sciences, culture, and the state. H o w e v e r paradoxically it m a y seem, the idealist R o u s s e a u c a m e c l o s e r t o a m a t e r i a l i s t u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f history than the materialist Holbach. T h a t was because of the dialectical a p p r o a c h to c e r t a i n v e r y essential aspects of social development peculiar to Rousseau. E n g e l s pointed out that R o u s s e a u had s h o w n with p r o f o u n d penetration, twenty years before the birth of Hegel, that the rise of social inequality had been progress. R o u s s e a u also u n d e r stood that the antagonistic f o r m of social p r o g r e s s of necessity g a v e rise t o its n e g a t i o n , t h e a b o l i t i o n o f s o c i a l i n e q u a l i t y .
Already in Rousseau, therefore [he w r o t e ] , we find not only a line of thought which c o r r e s p o n d s exactly to the one developed in M a r x ' s Capital, but also, in details, a whole series of the same dialectical turns of speech as M a r x used: processes which in their n a t u r e a r e antagonistic, contain a contradiction; t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of one e x t r e m e into its opposite; and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation (50:160-161).

R o u s s e a u ' s d i a l e c t i c s w a s u n d o u b t e d l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h his social s t a n c e , with a l o w e r middle-class c r i t i q u e of antagonistic society. But it m u s t not be forgotten that the l o w e r m i d d l e class, r o m a n t i c c h a r a c t e r of this c r i t i q u e h a d a r e v e r s e , r e a c t i o n a r y side which, it is true, only a c q u i r e d substantial influence later w h e n history posed the question of transition from capitalism to socialism. A c o m p a r a t i v e analysis of the role of m a t e r i a l i s m a n d idealism i n t h e i d e o l o g i c a l life o f s o c i e t y t h u s c a l l s f o r c o n c r e t e , h i s t o r i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f v a r i o u s c i r c u m s t a n c e s . F i r s t o f all, o n e m u s t m a k e c l e a r w h a t social interests of a given historical age a r e e x p r e s s e d by t h e materialist or idealist d o c t r i n e b e i n g e x a m i n e d , a n d w h a t its s o c i a l s e n s e a n d i d e o l o g i c a l m e s s a g e a r e . O n e m u s t
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f u r t h e r m o r e allow fully for t h e fact that, in t h e c o n t e x t of p r e M a r x i a n philosophy, the antithesis between materialism and idealism is m a i n l y o n e b e t w e e n t h e materialist a n d idealist u n d e r s t a n d i n g of n a t u r e , while their theoretical positions often prove to be quite close to one another in the philosophy of history. Finally, the concrete, historical form of materialism or idealism, a n d t h e i r link with o u t s t a n d i n g scientific discoveries, attitude to religion and to dialectics, rationalism, empiricism, and other philosophical trends, are of particular importance. T h e r e is c o n s e q u e n t l y a s c a l e of indices of t h e p r o g r e s s i v e significance of p h i l o s o p h i c a l d o c t r i n e s in t h e c o n t e x t of a historically definite social reality, that has been developed not only by t h e history of philosophy but also by the w h o l e evolution of h u m a n i t y . T h e struggle between materialism and idealism is a very c o m plex, c o n t r a d i c t o r y p h e n o m e n o n that c a n only be properly u n d e r s t o o d from a scientific analysis of t h e w h o l e socio-historical process that excludes any schematisation. Theoretical generalisations a r e only possible w h e n it is r e m e m b e r e d that d o m i n a n t t e n d e n c i e s clash with opposite ones, w h i c h often limits their i n f l u e n c e . A final c o n c l u s i o n a b o u t t h e c o m p a r a t i v e h i s t o r i c a l role of materialism and idealism in the development of m a n k i n d can only be based on a study of the qualitative difference between historical periods and the m a n y forms of their philosophical self-expression. O t h e r w i s e , it is impossible to u n d e r stand, for e x a m p l e , why certain mediaeval mystical doctrines h a d a r e v o l u t i o n a r y c h a r a c t e r , w h i c h did not r u l e it out, of course, that there w e r e also reactionary mystical doctrines in the s a m e periods. And that applies, of course, to m o r e t h a n mysticism. T h e basic social sense of the battle of ideas b e t w e e n t h e m a i n philosophical trends that developed in m o d e r n times was formulated by Lenin as follows:
T h r o u g h o u t t h e m o d e r n history of E u r o p e , and especially at the end of the e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y in F r a n c e , w h e r e a r e s o l u t e s t r u g g l e w a s c o n d u c t e d a g a i n s t e v e r y k i n d of m e d i e v a l r u b b i s h , a g a i n s t s e r f d o m in i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d i d e a s , m a t e r i a l i s m h a s p r o v e d t o b e t h e only p h i l o s o p h y t h a t i s c o n s i s t e n t , t r u e t o all t h e t e a c h i n g s o f n a t u r a l s c i e n c e a n d hostile to superstition, cant, and so forth. T h e enemies of d e m o c r a c y h a v e , t h e r e f o r e , a l w a y s e x e r t e d all t h e i r efforts t o ' r e f u t e ' , u n d e r m i n e and defame materialism, and have advocated various forms of philosophical idealism, which always, in one w a y or a n o t h e r , a m o u n t s to t h e d e f e n c e or support of religion (147:24).

T h e r e i s n o d o u b t a b o u t t h e i m m e n s e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l signific a n c e of that conclusion for understanding t h e social role of i d e a l i s m as a w h o l e .

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T h e antithesis between idealism and materialism is one between mystification of n a t u r e and social reality and its demystification. Religion was t h e first, spontaneously moulded form of mystification of the world, which seemingly was not realised for centuries as a system of beliefs or convictions, since such a w a r e n e s s presupposed comparison of various religious beliefs, t h e existence of doubts in the correctness of certain dogmas of a religion, and consequently reflections on matters of faith. T h e original religious notions were, to use D u r k h e i m ' s well-known expression, only the collective notions of primitive men which w e r e taken by each m e m b e r of t h e clan as directly given and not subject to doubt. T h e consciousness of primitive men did not, of course, stop at religious notions existing independently of personal experience, insofar as primitive men acquired certain empirical knowledge. But personal e x p e r i e n c e and its associated empirical knowledge did not function in direct connection with impersonal religious ideology. T h e latter was assimilated in r e a d y - m a d e form as a system of answers to questions that w e r e not yet in the minds of primitive men; the questions seemingly arose under t h e influence of t h e answers. W h e n empirical ideas began to be interwoven with religious notions, contradiction arose between them. T h e attempts to c o o r d i n a t e t h e h e t e r o g e n e o u s elements of everyday consciousness, doubts, reflections, and waverings signified the beginning of a b r e a k - d o w n of the first religious form of mystification of reality. And at that point in m a n k i n d ' s cultural development philosophy arose. Insofar as philosophy eliminated the primitive religious consciousness, it t h e r e b y took the first steps along the road to o v e r c o m i n g the original mystification of the world. T h e first Greek materialists, while not denying the existence of gods, asserted that they arose from air, fire, etc. N a t u r e was regarded as a self-sufficing whole that had always and e v e r y w h e r e existed. Since the gods of the mythology of antiquity w e r e described as man-like c r e a t u r e s , the materialist theogony c a m e into contradiction with these naive idyllic ideas. X e n o p h a n e s of Kolophon, w h o continued the traditions of Ionic philosophy in a n u m b e r of respects, wittily criticised religious a n t h r o p o m o r p h i s m : if 'cattle and horses ... had hands ... horses would d r a w the forms of t h e gods like horses, and cattle like cattle...' (translator's notes cited from 85: I, 378; see also 6 8 : 9 6 ) . T h e t e n d e n c y to depersonalise the mythological gods definitely led to pantheism. If t h e early Greek thinkers did not c r e a t e this conception (its formulation belongs to the age of
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H e l l e n i s m , i.e. t o t h e t i m e o f t h e b r e a k - u p o f a n c i e n t s o c i e t y and of the religious ideology peculiar to it), that was seemingly b e c a u s e p a n t h e i s m w a s a kind of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of m o n o t h e i s m , while the Greeks w e r e polytheists. G r e e k materialism also g r a d u a l l y d e b u n k e d t h e mythologicalreligious conception of fate. A c c o r d i n g to A n a x i m a n d e r of M i l e t o s all t r a n s i e n t t h i n g s p e r i s h e d , a c c o r d i n g t o n e c e s s i t y , because 'they give justice and m a k e reparation to one another for their injustice, a c c o r d i n g to t h e a r r a n g e m e n t of T i m e ' ( 6 7 : 1 9 ) . F o r H e r a k l e i t o s all t h i n g s ' c o m e a b o u t b y d e s t i n y ' , which he identified with necessity (42:II, 4 1 5 ; see also 85:1, 2 9 3 ) . N e i t h e r view is yet freed f r o m m y t h o l o g y , p r i m a r i l y b e c a u s e of t h e a b s e n c e of a distinctly e x p r e s s e d c o n c e p t of causalit y , w h i c h s u p p o s e s t h a t each t h i n g h a s its own, s p e c i a l c a u s e . T h e idea of a diversity of causes, c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the diversity of p h e n o m e n a , both significant a n d insignificant, f o r m e d a most important stage on the road to the demystification of religious belief in p r e d e s t i n a t i o n . D e m o k r i t o s , for e x a m p l e , discussed both the general causes of everything that existed and the causes that produced sound, fire, and other 'earthly phenomena', and t h o s e that g a v e rise to plants and a n i m a l s . In his w o r k s on medicine he studied the 'causes of seasonable and unseasonable things' (see 6 8 : 2 9 8 ) .
4

Demokritos distinguished necessity from cause-effect relations, employing the concept of necessity to explain everything that was constantly r e p r o d u c e d , a n d so p r e s e r v e d in spite of the genesis and annihilation of individual things. A n y event w a s inevitable, from his s t a n d p o i n t . But this fatalistic c o n c e p tion differed from religious fatalism since every event was c o n s i d e r e d t h e c o n s e q u e n c e of a s p o n t a n e o u s , in effect c h a n c e c o i n c i d e n c e . But h e did n o t r e c o g n i s e t h e e x i s t e n c e o f c h a n c e s . E p i c u r u s tried to e l i m i n a t e this v u l n e r a b l e point in his d o c t r i n e , while retaining the principles of atomistic materialism. Epicureanism was an important new stage in the demystifying of nature. According to E p i c u r u s t h e r e was no omnipresent necessity; s o m e things w e r e inevitable, others depended on chance, and o t h e r s still o n o u r r e a s o n . F o r t h e f i r s t t i m e i n p h i l o s o p h y t h e p r o p o s i t i o n o f t h e objective e x i s t e n c e o f t h e c h a n c e w a s put f o r w a r d . T h a t was a great a c h i e v e m e n t of materialist philosophy, a real discovery w h o s e significance has only been properly appreciated in our day. E p i c u r u s disagreed with those p h i l o s o p h e r s w h o considered any reference to c h a n c e was an excuse, a rejection of explana223

tion. He suggested, on the c o n t r a r y , that c h a n c e should not be considered an 'uncertain cause', if only because m u c h comes to m a n in life in a c h a n c e fashion. His d o c t r i n e of t h e declination of atoms was m e a n t to give a physical explanation for the fact of c h a n c e . T h e declination did not r e q u i r e explanation; it constituted an attributive definition of the atom. Epicurus explained even free will by t h e declination of atoms. However naive that conception, it u n d e r m i n e d the foundations of the fatalist mystification of natural processes.
It would be better (Epicurus wrote) to accept the myth about the gods than to bow beneath the yoke of fate imposed by the Physicists, for the former holds out hope of obtaining mercy by honouring the gods, and the latter, inexorable necessity (174:408; 198:33).

T h e aim of philosophy, according to him, was to teach man to enjoy life rationally. F o r that it was necessary first and f o r e most to o v e r c o m e fear of the gods, of t h e spectre of illusory absolute necessity, and of death. T h e r e was no other way to h a p piness than knowledge of n a t u r e , which dispelled all superstitions, and with them fear.
It is impossible (he said) to banish fear over mailers of the greatest importance if one does not know the essence of the universe but is apprehensive on account of what the myths tell us. Hence without the study of nature one cannot attain pure pleasure (174:409; 198:36).

A materialist interpretation of n a t u r e and a naturalistic c o n c e p tion of man w e r e the basis of Epicurus' ethics. T h e whole s u b sequent light of materialism against religion has been basically a further theoretical development of this ethical, h u m a n i t a r i a n c r e d o of his. Spinoza, the eighteenth-century F r e n c h materialists, and F e u e r b a c h w e r e continuers of Epicurus, and fighters against the spiritual enslavement of the individual.' T h e r e is no need, in the scope of my book, to t r a c e the history of materialism in order to affirm the thesis stated above, namely that materialism demystifies n a t u r e and social relations. T h a t applies both to atheistic materialism and to those materialist doctrines that c o m b i n e their essentially anti-religious views with deistic and even theistic conclusions that contradict t h e basic content of any materialist doctrine. P r e - M a r x i a n materialism paved the way, by its critique of religious and idealist mystification of n a t u r e , for natural science on t h e one hand and for the development of theoretical h u m a n i s m on t h e other. By rejecting religious and idealist postulates p r e - M a r x i a n materialists showed that people themselves created their own history. T h e philosophy of Marxism, which completed t h e building of materialism, not only disclosed t h e socio-economic roots of
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religion but also investigated all other forms of t h e ideological mystification of social reality as specific forms of spiritual oppression e n g e n d e r e d by antagonistic social relations. And while t h e critique of religious prejudices had been confirmed as a special domain of philosophical, sociological, and historical r e search before M a r x , t h e critique of social prejudices had been mainly limited to publicistic attacks on feudal ideology. U t o pian socialism, it is true, also criticised bourgeois prejudices, but it saw them as a delusion or manifestation of self-interest, since it did not understand t h e objective mechanism of t h e operation (and development) of the capitalist m o d e of p r o d u c t i o n . Only historical materialism laid t h e philosophical basis for an all-round critical study not only of religious or idealist but also of any other type of mystification of social life. I c a n n o t e x a m i n e this point in detail, as it is outside, the scope of my t h e m e . Let me cite just one example, viz., M a r x ' s critique of the vulgar economists' t r i u n e formula: capital p r o d u c e s profit, land rent; and labour wages. T h e unsoundness of that notion had already been obvious in t h e main to R i c a r d o , w h o had shown that all forms of income ( r e v e n u e ) w e r e created by labour. But he rejected t h e t r i u n e formula simply as a fallacy. M a r x a p p r o a c h e d t h e matter quite differently; t h e formula was not simply unsound scientifically but, for all its falseness, it was a description of t h e external aspect of a process actually taking place. Just try to deny the obvious fact that t h e l a n d o w n e r received a r e v e n u e ( r e n t ) precisely b e c a u s e he was t h e owner of land that other people worked. And did t h e proprietor of an enterprise not receive a r e v e n u e (profit) in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e size of his capital? And what did t h e w o r k e r receive? Wages, and no m o r e . So does it seem that t h e vulgar economists' false formula correctly reflects economic reality? In that case, however, it should be considered scientific and not at all false, while t h e scientific theory of value (and surplus value) should be viewed as no m o r e than a speculative c o n s t r u c tion refuted by t h e facts known to everyone. M a r x posed t h e matter with all the sharpness peculiar to his brilliant scientific penetration. He b r o u g h t out t h e contradiction by virtue of which t h e t r i u n e formula seemed a reflection of reality. But this reality was only a p p e a r a n c e . Vulgar political economy passed it off as t h e essence, since every capitalist, being guided by a p p e a r a n c e , attained his goal. This a p p e a r a n c e was not dispelled by scientific investigation; so it r e m a i n e d t h e s t u b born fact that had to be r e c k o n e d with. It reflected t h e end result of t h e distribution of surplus v a l u e and its b r e a k d o w n into
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s u c h f o r m s of r e v e n u e as profit, rent, a n d interest. T h e s e r e v e n u e s f u n c t i o n i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f e a c h o t h e r s i n c e e a c h h a s its 'source', n a m e l y capital and land. So t h e mystification is prese n t h e r e n o t o n l y i n t h e o r y b u t a l s o i n r e a l i t y itself. L a b o u r p o w er, a p p l i e d by capitalists, c r e a t e s a v a l u e c o n s i d e r a b l y g r e a t e r than the value of the labour power, whose m o n e y expression is wages. This 'excess' of v a l u e is surplus value. Surplus value is produced in various quantities in different capitalist enterprises as a c o n s e q u e n c e of differences in t h e organic c o m position of capital d u e to the technology of production. But c o m p e t i t i o n a n d t h e s u b s e q u e n t flow o f c a p i t a l i n t o t h e m o s t profitable fields bring a b o u t a redistribution of surplus v a l u e d u r i n g the sale of c o m m o d i t i e s . In that w a y an a v e r a g e rate of profit is f o r m e d not d i r e c t l y d e p e n d e n t on t h e n u m b e r of w o r k e r s exploited by t h e capitalist but c o m m e n s u r a t e with t h e size of his c a p i t a l . S i n c e land is a m e a n s of p r o d u c t i o n u n d e r capitalism, a c o m m o d i t y with a definite p r i c e , it is a f o r m of c a p i t a l . T h e l a n d e d p r o p r i e t o r r e n t s it out only on c o n d i t i o n of r e c e i v i n g t h e r a t e of profit he w o u l d get on a m o n e y c a p i t a l c o r r e s p o n d i n g to t h e price of land. M a r x s h o w e d that the antagonistic essence of capitalist p r o d u c t i o n w a s r e f l e c t e d i n its a p p e a r a n c e . T h e t r i u n e f o r m u l a is a s t a t e m e n t of an objectively existing relation but o n e that veils t h e a c t u a l e s s e n c e o f capitalist p r o d u c t i o n a n d d i s t r i b u t i o n . It reflects facts, but only those that a r e a n e g a t i v e expression of the objective pattern, w h o s e existence is denied or ignored by the apologists of capitalism. T h e theory of c o m m o d i t y fetishism c r e a t e d b y M a r x ' s g e n i u s , d i s c l o s e d t h e i n n e r m e c h a n i s m of this mystification of capitalist relations of p r o d u c t i o n , taking p l a c e s p o n t a n e o u s l y , i n d e p e n d e n t of p e o p l e ' s c o n s c i o u s ness a n d will. Capitalist p r o d u c t i o n materialises social relations. C o m m o d i t y e x c h a n g e , a n d all a c t s o f b u y i n g a n d s e l l i n g , a r e i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations that take the f o r m of relations b e t w e e n things. H u m a n life f i n d s itself d e p e n d e n t o n t h i n g s , a n d p r i m a r i l y o n t h e i r v a l u e . But value is not a p r o p e r t y of things. 'So far,' M a r x c o m m e n t e d ironically, 'no chemist has ever discovered e x c h a n g e - v a l u e e i t h e r in a p e a r l or a d i a m o n d ' ( 1 6 7 : I, 8 7 ) . V a l u e is a p r o p e r t y of a c o m m o d i t y . T h e latter as a r u l e is a t h i n g , b u t that d o e s not m e a n t h a t t h e t h i n g i s b y its n a t u r e a c o m m o d i t y . A c o m m o d i t y is a p r o d u c t of labour, but that does not m e a n that l a b o u r by its n a t u r e , i.e. a l w a y s a n d e v e r y w h e r e , i s a n a c t i v i t y t h a t c r e a t e s commodities. T h e commodity-capitalist form of production
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mystifies t h e p r o d u c t o f l a b o u r . T h e a m o u n t s o f v a l u e a l t e r i r r e s p e c t i v e o f p e o p l e ' s c o n s c i o u s n e s s a n d will, a s a c o n s e q u e n c e of which people seem to be in t h e power of an elemental social process w h o s e f o r m of existence is t h e m o v e m e n t of t h i n g s , i.e. c o m m o d i t i e s . T h e c o m m o d i t y - c a p i t a l i s t f o r m o f p r o duction transforms the ordinary thing created by labour, a table, say, into a sensuous-supersensory thing or commodity, which as a v a l u e is not a t h i n g in g e n e r a l , s i n c e v a l u e does n o t c o n t a i n a g r a i n of s u b s t a n c e a l t h o u g h it e x i s t s o u t s i d e of a n d i n d e p e n d e n t o f m e n ' s c o n s c i o u s n e s s , l i k e all m a t e r i a l t h i n g s . M a r x stressed t h a t t h e mystical c h a r a c t e r of a c o m m o d i t y is b o r n o f its e x c h a n g e v a l u e , b u t b y n o m e a n s o f its u s e - v a l u e , i.e. its c a p a c i t y t o satisfy c e r t a i n w a n t s o r n e e d s . O n t h e s u r f a c e , however, everything seems the contrary since the commodity f o r m itself f u n c t i o n s d i r e c t l y a s d e p e n d e n t o n u s e - v a l u e ; i f c o m m o d i t i e s did n o t d i f f e r f r o m o n e a n o t h e r p r e c i s e l y a s u s e - v a l u e s , c o m m o d i t y e x c h a n g e would be impossible. Bourgeois economists w e r e t r a p p e d by t h e objectively o c c u r r i n g mystification of social relations. We see thus that M a r x ' s critique of t h e ideological distortion of e c o n o m i c reality is not just of significance for political e c o n omy. T h e t h e o r y of c o m m o d i t y fetishism provides t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l b a s i s f o r a scientific c r i t i q u e of a n y f a n t a s t i c r e f l e c t i o n of o b j e c t i v e reality, in p a r t i c u l a r religious and idealist distortions. It helps disclose t h e m e c h a n i s m of t h e reflection of alienated social reality by alienated ideological consciousness. T h e religious a n d idealist mystification of t h e world is not simply a s u b j e c t i v e f a b r i c a t i o n b u t a reflection of facts. T h e l a t t e r , h o w e v e r , a r e only the external aspect of real processes, and an aspect, m o r e o v e r , t h a t r e f l e c t s t h e i r e s s e n c e i n t h e least a d e q u a t e w a y . W h i l e r e l i g i o n , i n its o r i g i n a l f o r m , w a s a n a i v e m y s t i f i c a t i o n of reality that was dispelled as civilisation developed, and u n d e r t h e i m p a c t o f t h e m a t e r i a l i s t c r i t i q u e , its s u b s e q u e n t f o r m s c a n be r e g a r d e d as a s e c o n d a r y mystification of t h e world, o n e of w h o s e b a s e s i s f o r m e d b y t h e idealist o u t l o o k o n t h e w o r l d . W h i l e m a t e r i a l i s m c a m e f o r w a r d , f r o m its v e r y b e g i n n i n g , a s a spiritual force destroying religion, idealism, on t h e c o n t r a r y , c o m p r e h e n d e d , justified, s u b s t a n t i a t e d , a n d t r a n s f o r m e d r e l i g i ous consciousness. It is very indicative that Plato, in opposition to Demokritos, widely employed myths to expound and explain his t e a c h i n g . F o r h i m m y t h s w e r e n o t j u s t a m o d e o f p o p u l a r exposition, but one of thinking and understanding. He even c r e a t e d n e w myths, t h e r e b y s h o w i n g that idealism w a s not satisfied w i t h t h e t r a d i t i o n a l m y t h o l o g y .
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Christianity, unlike c e r t a i n older religions, is based on a p r e vious idealist t r a d i t i o n in w h i c h , in t h e p e r i o d of t h e b r e a k - u p of antique society, notions about the other world, t h e substant i a l i t y o f t h e s o u l , a n d a d i v i n e first c a u s e , a n d e v e n o f t h e creation of the world, were developed. It was because Christianity ' e n r i c h e d ' t h e s p o n t a n e o u s l y s h a p i n g r e l i g i o u s c o n s c i o u s n e s s with v e r y i m p o r t a n t p r o p o s i t i o n s of t h e p r e c e d i n g idealist p h i l o s o p h y t h a t i t b e c a m e a r e l i g i o n c a p a b l e o f p e r f o r m i n g its function in m o r e developed social formations. T h e same, s e e m ingly, applies to B u d d h i s m , M o h a m m e d a n i s m , and certain other c o n t e m p o r a r y religions. Study of the historically developing relation between idealism a n d religion s e e m s to me a most pressing task for a scientific h i s t o r y of religion as well as for t h e h i s t o r y of p h i l o s o p h y . T h e point is not simply h o w s o m e o n e idealist relates to t h e d o m i n a n t religious views; it is even m o r e essential w h a t r o l e his d o c t r i n e plays in the evolution and modernisation of religion. Kant's w o r k s w e r e put on the Index by the Vatican since they substantiated t h e impossibility of t h e o r e t i c a l l y (i.e. scientifically) p r o v ing t h e e x i s t e n c e of G o d . But it w a s just that side of K a n t ' s d o c trine which had an i m m e n s e influence on Barth, N i e b u h r , Tillich, and other s p o k e s m e n of Protestant n e o - o r t h o d o x y , w h o , while rejecting rationalistic 'proofs' of the existence of God, c a t e g o r i c a l l y insist t h a t f a i t h is i r r a t i o n a l , a n d b e c a u s e of t h a t it grasps the divine presence. T h e idealist-agnostic critique of theology in Kant's w o r k s has thus b e c o m e a main p r o p of the theology of c o n t e m p o r a r y Protestantism. T h e subjective aspect of idealists' attitude to religion must not, of course, e s c a p e t h e investigator's attention, since t h e o v e r w h e l m i n g m a s s o f i d e a l i s t s consciously s u p p o r t , c o n s o l i d a t e , and substantiate the religious outlook. F e u e r b a c h described G e r m a n classical idealism as s p e c u l a t i v e theology, since it tried to 'invest religion with reason' by m e a n s of speculative arg u m e n t s . T h a t idealist p u r p o s e , i n his v i e w , u n d e r m i n e d t h e religious view of t h e world since t h e e m o t i o n a l content of r e l i g i o n w a s s u p p r e s s e d b y t h e r a t i o n a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f it. But putting absolute reason in the place of God, and treating the l a t t e r a s t h e i m m a n e n t e s s e n c e o f t h e w o r l d r a t h e r t h a n its external cause, rationalist idealism passed from t h e positions of t h e d o g m a t i c religious view to panlogism, from which it was o n l y a s t e p t o p a n t h e i s m . T h e latter, F e u e r b a c h s u g g e s t e d , led t o ' t h e o l o g i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m ' , w h i c h s o o n e r o r l a t e r t h r e w off t h e vestments foreign to it and began to consider reason a h u m a n , and only a h u m a n , aptitude.
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T h e p i c t u r e o f t h e e v o l u t i o n o f t h e idealist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f religion painted by F e u e r b a c h has a one-sided c h a r a c t e r , of c o u r s e , b u t i t fixed o n e o f t h e r e a l t r e n d s i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t b o t h of i d e a l i s m a n d of r e l i g i o u s c o n s c i o u s n e s s . R a t i o n a l i s t i d e a l i s m , in striving to c o n v e r t religion into a rational outlook on the w o r l d , t h e r e b y r e v e a l e d its i r r a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r , despite its s p o k e s m e n ' s intentions. T h i s idealism s o m e t i m e s b e c o m e s an irreligious view since it diverts attention from t h e special f o r m e v e r y r e l i g i o u s d e n o m i n a t i o n t a k e s , a n d s e e s its r e a l s i g n i f i c a n c e i n t h o s e f e a t u r e s o f its c o n t e n t t h a t o c c u r i n all r e l i g i o n s . But, as M a r x s a i d in o n e of his e a r l y w o r k s , 'it is t h e g r e a t e s t irr e l i g i o n ... t o d i v o r c e t h e g e n e r a l s p i r i t o f r e l i g i o n f r o m a c t u a l l y existing religion' ( 1 7 1 : 2 0 0 ) . In t h a t w a y idealists' a t t e m p t s to r e c o n c i l e religion with s c i e n c e often h a v e d e s t r u c t i v e c o n s e q u e n c e s for religion that t h r o w d o u b t in general on t h e e x p e diency of philosophical initiatives of that kind. T h i s makes understandable the dispute between Neothomism, which endeavours to substantiate religion 'rationalistically', and religious ( a n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l ) i r r a t i o n a l i s m , w h i c h s t u b b o r n l y insists t h a t religion a n d s c i e n c e , like t h e d i v i n e a n d t h e e a r t h l y , a r e a b s o lutely opposed to o n e a n o t h e r , by v i r t u e of which a n y striving t o a c c o r d t h e o n e with t h e other m e a n s essentially t o d e n y the s u p r e m e truth of t h e revelation of God. T h e duality of t h e idealist a t t i t u d e to religion, or r a t h e r to the traditional, not intellectually refined religious views of n a t u r e a n d m a n m u s t n o t b e e x p l a i n e d j u s t b y t h e theoretical c h a r a c t e r o f idealist p h i l o s o p h i s i n g . I t n e g a t i v e l y r e f l e c t s t h e f a c t t h a t t h e development of production, culture, and education inevitably r e v e a l s t h e i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y of a s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n of n a t u r a l and social p h e n o m e n a and the religious ' u n d e r s t a n d i n g ' of t h e m . I d e a l i s m r u s h e s t o t h e aid o f i n t e r n a l l y split h u m a n c o n s c i o u s n e s s , w h i c h e n t e r s i n t o a d i s p u t e w i t h itself b e c a u s e it c a n n o t r e c o n c i l e reason and prejudice, irreligiosity and relig i o s i t y . But s i n c e i d e a l i s m , just l i k e o r d i n a r y c o n s c i o u s n e s s , r e f l e c t s m a n ' s s o c i a l b e i n g , i t o n l y r e p r o d u c e s t h e s a m e split i n h u m a n consciousness, or the religious self-alienation of man, at t h e level of p h i l o s o p h i c a l a b s t r a c t i o n . T h e idealist a p o l o g i a f o r r e l i g i o n , w i t h all its c o n s e q u e n c e s u n d e s i r a b l e f o r i d e a l i s m , i s a n a l o g o u s t o t h e m o d e r n i s t efforts to r e j u v e n a t e religious dogmatics. T h e modernists start from the contradiction, obvious to everyone, between Holy Scripture on the one h a n d and c o m m o n sense and science on the other, pointing o u t t h e n e e d f o r a ' s c i e n t i f i c ' , i.e. c r i t i c a l , p s y c h o l o g i c a l , a l l e g o r i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e C h r i s t i a n d o g m a s , G o s p e l le229

gends, etc. It is necessary, they suggest, to r e n e w religion, i.e. to reject those of its ideas that a r e incompatible with science, while preserving its most important content, viz., faith in God and t h e divine o r d e r i n g of the world, which, in their view, cannot be shattered by any scientific and socio-political progress. T h e opponents of modernism, the so-called fundamentalists, consider any concessions to the non-religious view of t h e world to be an actual rejection of religion and descrediting of religious faith and belief. In c o n d e m n i n g t h e modernists, despite their sincere efforts to help religion, the fundamentalists point out the disastrous consequences of this renovation for religious consciousness, without noticing, however, that their own diehard conservatism also u n d e r m i n e s t h e foundations of religion. T h e disintegration of religious consciousness in modern times is not, of course, the c o n s e q u e n c e of modernism or of fundamentalism; both only express this process, on t h e one hand, and on the other a r e attempts to o v e r c o m e it, which a r e c o n stantly being u n d e r t a k e n in capitalist society, especially in its c o n t e m p o r a r y stage of development. While idealism of a rationalist h u e is like modernism in its dualist attitude to religion, irrationalist idealism greatly reminds fundamentalism. T h e irrationality of n a t u r e , of h u m a n life, and of k n o w l e d g e is the thesis by which t h e irrationalist idealist in reality substantiates the fundamentalist conception, whose ess e n c e was aphoristicall formulated by Tertullian at t h e dawn of Christianity: Credo quia impossibile (I believe because it is impossible). T h e irrationalist philosopher w h o interprets scientific truth as a conventional logical construction (in which he makes c o m m o n cause with the neopositivist), e n d e a v o u r s to disclose the really t r u e in the impossible and, while agreeing with science, which discovers natural laws and patterns w h e r e , it seems to the religious mind, t h e r e is the presence of the divine, lays it down oracularly that t h e 'very absence (of G o d ) is a kind of presence and (his) silence is a mysterious m o d e of speaking to us' ( 2 2 3 : 3 4 1 ) . O n e must note, incidentally, that this way of substantiating religious convictions by a r g u m e n t s that directly c o n t r a d i c t them was already known to mediaeval mystics. T h e profound truth of t h e u n b r e a k a b l e connection of idealism and religion can thus only be fully grasped when t h e contradictions of religious consciousness mentioned above a r e understood as contradictions r e p r o d u c e d by idealist philosophy in the realm of abstract thought. Subjectively an idealist philosopher may be an irreligious person or even an atheist, but
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objectively his philosophy serves religion though possibly not as a four-square gospel-thing theologian would want. T h e naive, unreasoning religiosity that the compilers of the Bible had in mind when they affirmed that the poor in spirit would enter the kingdom of heaven, has become a historical anachronism. Contemporary idealism endeavours to save religion by cultivating a religious frame of mind, independent of dogmas, or by demonstrating that there is no essential contradiction between science and religion. T h e ' i n d e p e n d e n t ' attitude of the contemporary idealist toward Biblical texts may seem sacrilegious to the guardians of religious dogma, and very nearly atheism, but 'free-thinking', bourgeois idealist philosophers in fact promote a galvanising of disintegrating religious consciousness incomparably m o r e than diehard dogmatic theologians. Lenin constantly stressed the objective link of idealism and religion, which did not depend in principle on the subjective orientations of the spokesmen of the idealist trend. Mach and Avenarius were not religious men and did not set themselves the task of substantiating religion theoretically, but that did not in the least alter the real sense of their doctrine, which was revealed in the frankly fideistic constructs of a considerable number of their pupils and followers. Idealism is the last refuge of the religious understanding of the world. I also apply that to atheist idealists. But how are irreligious, and even more atheistic idealist positions possible? Do they not contradict the essence of idealist philosophising? They do, of course, but the fact remains. T h e facts exist independently of theory. And although investigation of them makes it possible to delimit appearance from essence, it does not lead to denial of the facts themselves. Investigation has to disclose this contradiction and so concretise scientific understanding of the complex relation ' i d e a l ism-religion'. When Jean Paul Sartre, for example, maintained that the point of departure of existentialism was the conviction that there was no God, and consequently that nothing was preordained but that everything stemmed from one's freedom and responsibility, the Marxist researcher has to analyse this and similar expressions as facts of a certain kind. Study indicates that Sartre's atheistic conception is subjective in character; he did not so much deny the existence of God as refused to recognise His power over h u m a n freedom and over the fate of the individual conditioned exclusively by this power. From Sartre's angle the question of the existence or nonexistence of God could
6

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not be answered scientifically because of the limited character of the scientific data. Atheism, in his doctrine, is a rejection of belief in God with all the consequences flowing from that. In that understanding the atheist by no means asserts: ' I know there is no God'; the formula of atheism is an a priori maxim of initial human freedom insofar as it is grasped and affirmed in fact. One can conclude the following from Sartre's atheistic declarations: atheisms are not alike. In denying the possibility of scientific atheism, Sartre's doctrine thereby revealed points of contact with Christian theology, which also considers atheism as a revolt against God, a manifestation of self-will whose source is the free will of the individual. T h e Protestant theologian David Roberts, who preached the need to create 'a new and constructive form of Christian philosophy' (223:337), suggested that Sartre's doctrine helped bring out the deep roots of unbelief and so to overcome it together with atheistic existentialism. In Roberts' view existentialism, irrespective of its religious or anti-religious form, 'should be of compelling interest to the Christian thinker' since it
protests against those intellectual and social forces which are destroying freedom. It calls men away from stifling abstractions and automatic conformity. It drives us back to the most basic, inner problems: what it means to be a self, how we ought to use our freedom, how we can find and keep the courage to face death (223:4).

From the standpoint of the theologian who dreams of infusing new vitality into Christianity, existentialist subjectivism, the irrationalist critique of 'objective philosophy', existentialism's fight 'against all forms of rationalism' (223:6), in short everything that is equally inherent in religious existentialists and existential atheists, is vitally necessary to Christianity, which is threatened most of all by social and scientific and technical progress. I have intentionally dwelt at such length on the relation of idealism and religion since the diversity of idealism's forms, and its evolution under the impact of the natural science and philosophical (materialist) critique, has made this relation very complex, contradictory, and ambiguous. Vulgar materialism usually identifies idealism and the religious outlook, with the result that its critique of idealism is oversimplified and the latter's developing theoretical content is in fact ignored. T h e philosophy of Marxism considers such a critique of idealism to be unsatisfactory also because it loses sight of its concrete historical content.
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Analysis of t h e relation of idealism a n d religion is also essential b e c a u s e i t h e l p s c o m p r e h e n d t h e s t r u g g l e o f m a t e r i a l i s m and idealism on a b r o a d e r plane as one of the most important p h e n o m e n a of the intellectual history of mankind. T h e materialist c r i t i q u e o f i d e a l i s m i s i n t e g r a l l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e c r i t i q u e of religion, and e x p o s u r e of the latter inevitably strikes ideali s m a c r u s h i n g b l o w . I t w a s n o t b y c h a n c e , o f c o u r s e , t h a t all t h e outstanding materialists of t h e past w e r e primarily critics of religion and theology. Demokritos, Epicurus, Lucretius, Hobbes, Spinoza, the eighteenth-century F r e n c h materialists, a n d F e u e r b a c h , all t h e s e b r i l l i a n t s p o k e s m e n o f p r e - M a r x i a n materialism, considered it their main job to expose the primary s o u r c e o f idealism, a n d t o d e m o n s t r a t e that this p h i l o s o p h y , for all its o v e r t d i f f e r e n c e s f r o m r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s , w a s i n e s s e n c e inspired by them. Idealism thus necessarily supplements, substantiates, continues, and modernises t h e religious mystification of reality. But for idealism, religion w o u l d not find t h e spiritual f o r c e in itself t o h e l p i t a d a p t t o e a c h n e w h i s t o r i c a l a g e , a n d t o s u r v i v e i n a n y c l i m a t e , e v e n o n e v e r y u n f a v o u r a b l e f o r it. T h e r e a s o n for this vitality of religion must n o t be r e d u c e d just to t h e m a t e r i a l c o n d i t i o n s t h a t g i v e r i s e t o it. U n l i k e s c i e n c e , w h i c h e l i m i nates subjectivity, religion, as M i t r o k h i n rightly r e m a r k s , is fed by this subjectivity, and t h e r e f o r e functions
7

as a s p e c i a l f o r m of e x p r e s s i o n of illusory s o c i a l e x p e r i e n c e , a t t i t u d e to t h e world, 'feeling', as a m e a n s of p e o p l e s 'inner' a d a p t a t i o n of e m o tions a n d will t o t h e o b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e i r e x i s t e n c e ( 1 8 5 : 4 4 ) .

B u t t h e r e p r o d u c t i o n o f religion i n e a c h n e w h i s t o r i c a l a g e , a n d its d e f e n c e a g a i n s t s c i e n c e , h o s t i l e t o it, a r e l a r g e l y r e a l i s e d consciously, a n d not only, m o r e o v e r , by those for w h o m religious p r e a c h i n g has b e c o m e their professional activity, but also in particular by those w h o a r e not directly c o n n e c t e d with a religious cult a n d a r e s o m e t i m e s even irreligious, yet n e v e r t h e less h e l p r e l i g i o n b y t h e i r idealist s p e c u l a t i o n s .
Marx's philosophical materialism alone has shown the proletariat t h e way o u t o f t h e s p i r i t u a l s l a v e r y i n w h i c h all o p p r e s s e d classes h a v e hitherto languished,

Lenin wrote (147:28). Those remarkable words sum up the h i s t o r y o f m a t e r i a l i s m a n d its m o s t i m p o r t a n t r e s u l t , w h o s e significance goes far beyond the realm of philosophy.

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2. Idealism vs Materialism. Materialism vs Idealism. Results and Prospects Diogenes Laertius wrote:

A r i s t o x e n e s in his Historical Notes affirms t h a t P l a t o w i s h e d to b u r n all t h e w r i t i n g s o f D e m o c r i t u s t h a t h e c o u l d c o l l e c t , b u t t h a t A m y c l a s a n d Clinias the P y p h a g o r e a n s prevented him, saying that t h e r e was no adv a n t a g e i n d o i n g so, for a l r e a d y t h e b o o k s w e r e w i d e l y c i r c u l a t e d . A n d t h e r e i s c l e a r e v i d e n c e for this i n t h e f a c t t h a t P l a t o , w h o m e n t i o n s a l m o s t all t h e e a r l y p h i l o s o p h e r s , n e v e r o n c e a l l u d e s t o D e m o c r i t u s , n o t even w h e r e it would be necessary to c o n t r o v e r t him, obviously b e c a u s e he knew that he would h a v e to m a t c h himself against the p r i n c e of philosophers (42:II, 449:450).

T h a t story is most likely a l e g e n d but, as often h a p p e n s in histor y , t h e l e g e n d p o i n t s e l o q u e n t l y to a fact, viz. t h e s t r u g g l e of idealism against materialism in t h e age of the e m e r g e n c e of these trends. P l a t o really n e v e r did m e n t i o n D e m o k r i t o s , w h o s e w o r k s could not h a v e been u n k n o w n to him. Guessing apart, one must n o t e that P l a t o w a g e d a direct polemic against 'the line of D e m o k r i t o s ' . I n t h e d i a l o g u e Sophist t h e s t r u g g l e b e t w e e n t h e t w o trends in philosophy was mentioned. T h e supporters of one of them asserted
t h a t only t h e t h i n g s w h i c h c a n b e t o u c h e d o r h a n d l e d h a v e b e i n g , b e c a u s e they define being (reality) and body as one, and if a n y o n e else s a y s t h a t w h a t is not a b o d y exists t h e y a l t o g e t h e r d e s p i s e h i m , a n d will h e a r o f n o o t h e r view ( 2 0 9 : 3 9 8 ) .

That trend, was opposed

whose spokesmen Plato called awful people, by those w h o categorically c o n t e n d e d that

t r u e r e a l i t y c o n s i s t s o f c e r t a i n intelligible a n d i n c o r p o r e a l I d e a s ; t h e bodies of the Materialists, which by them a r e m a i n t a i n e d to be the v e r y t r u t h , t h e y b r e a k u p i n t o little bits b y t h e i r a r g u m e n t s , a n d affirm t h e m t o b e , not b e i n g , but g e n e r a t i o n a n d m o t i o n ( i b i d . ) .

P l a t o directly c o u n t e r p o s e d idealism to materialism. Even at that stage of philosophical development the struggle between materialism and idealism e m e r g e d as a theoretical dispute. It was a m a t t e r of basic j u d g m e n t s a n d t h e c o n c l u s i o n s t h a t followed from t h e m , of t h e interpretation of facts, and of t h e sense of concepts; arguments were opposed by counter-arguments. That is t h e historical c o u r s e of t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of philosophical t h o u g h t a n d of t h e p r o b l e m a t i c of philosophy. I stress the theoretical character of the dispute between materialism and i d e a l i s m a s a c o u n t e r w e i g h t t o all t h e v u l g a r n o t i o n s still e x i s t i n g in our day that they express opposing moral stances.
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T h e d i s p u t e b e t w e e n materialists a n d idealists differs essentially, o f c o u r s e , f r o m t h e n o r m a l scientific d i s c u s s i o n b e t w e e n , s a y , a d h e r e n t s of t h e c o r p u s c u l a r t h e o r y of light a n d t h e i r o p p o n e n t s w h o developed the w a v e hypothesis. In that discussion between physicists b o t h s i d e s w e r e t o s o m e e x t e n t r i g h t . B u t t h a t , a f t e r all, is not t h e g e n e r a l r u l e e v e n for scientific discussions. O n e must therefore not oppose philosophical dispute and discussions a m o n g scientists absolutely to o n e a n o t h e r ; in the o n e and t h e other t h e r e is d e f e n c e of definite theoretical views that a r e treated by their supporters as true, or approximately so. Inquiry and argumentation are the main philosophical weapon of t h e disputing parties; and, as the history of philosophy shows, critical r e m a r k s and expressions a r e usually t a k e n into a c c o u n t , if not by t h e c r e a t o r of a g i v e n t h e o r y , t h e n by his successors. But there is no c o n v e r g e n c e of the opposing views; realisation of the sense of the opposite party's views leads to a deepening of the opposition between the main philosophical trends. Counterviews and the development and further substantiation of one's o w n point of view follow, a n d this n a t u r a l l y brings out the incompatibility of materialism and idealism. In short the dispute between these philosophical trends, which differs f r o m o r d i n a r y discussion in constantly l e a d i n g to a d e e p ening and sharpening of the contradictions, has nothing in c o m m o n with t h e kind of discussion in which the parties speak different l a n g u a g e s or simply do not listen to o n e a n o t h e r . In o t h e r w o r d s this is not a fruitless or u n p r o m i s i n g dispute, alt h o u g h the parties do not r e a c h a g r e e m e n t . B e c a u s e of it t h e r e i s a p r o s p e c t o f its u l t i m a t e r e s o l u t i o n . T h e position of principle in the dispute between materialism a n d i d e a l i s m m a k e s a r e l a t i o n o f c o n t i n u i t y p o s s i b l e b e t w e e n t h e s e o p p o s i t e s , h o w e v e r a s t o n i s h i n g t h a t i s a t first g l a n c e . T h e point is not, of c o u r s e , that t h e materialist adopts idealist views or t h e idealist materialist ones. S u c h an eclectic version of 'inheritance' presents no interest for the history of philosophy s i n c e it d o e s not signify a d e v e l o p m e n t b u t r a t h e r a d e g r a d a t i o n of p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h o u g h t . I h a v e s o m e t h i n g else in m i n d , of course. Let me recall that the fathers of M a r x i s m w e r e t r u e heirs of Hegel's dialectical idealism, t h o u g h their doctrine m e a n t a very consistent negation of Hegelian idealism. As C h a l o y a n has rightly said:
It is a l s o i m p o s s i b l e to i m a g i n e t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of p h i l o s o p h y w i t h o u t t h e s u c c e s s i v e link b e t w e e n m a t e r i a l i s m a n d idealism.... L e t w e n o t b e understood wrongly. H e r e I h a v e in mind t h e philosophical views of idealists i n all t h e i r s c o p e a s w h o l e p h i l o s o p h i c a l s y s t e m s , a n d n o t t h e p r i n c i p l e itself of idealism a f f i r m i n g t h e p r i m a c y of t h e ideal ( 3 4 : 3 4 ) . 235

in other words, materialism does not ignore t h e 'rational k e r nel' contained in certain idealist conceptions. As for idealism, it c a n n o t help taking into a c c o u n t those materialist propositions that h a v e b e c o m e general scientific truths. It 'recognises' them by r e w o r k i n g them idealistically. Such is t h e attitude of idealism not only to certain materialist propositions but also to a considerable part of the conclusions of natural science. Recall how H e r b e r t S p e n c e r 'recognised' the truth of a n u m b e r of the basic p r o p o sitions of classical physics (as I mentioned in t h e preceding chapter). In 1 of this c h a p t e r I examined materialism and idealism as opposites within a specific form of social consciousness. Now I shall try to disclose the opposition of their theoretical foundations. My angle differs substantially from the view that materialism and idealism a r e incompatible in the main as regards ideology. I h a v e already shown above, on the c o n t r a r y , that the opposition between them also exists within the context of one and the s a m e bourgeois ideology, a fact that brings out particularly clearly the significance in principle of t h e theoretical dispute between materialism and idealism. T h e c h a r a c t e r of the idealist critique of materialism is determined in certain respects by the contradictions inherent in idealism. Objective idealism, on the one hand, and subjective idealism, on the other, put forward different, but equally idealist views against materialist philosophy. Objective idealism admits the existence of a supersensory reality, while subjective idealism as a rule denies t h e existence of such. Let us e x a m i n e the basic a r g u m e n t s of the two varieties of idealism. From t h e standpoint of objective idealism materialism illegitimately reduces reality to sense-perceived and (directly or indirectly) observed reality, so denying the higher, s u p r a n a t u r a l reality that is discovered either by intellectual intuition, or by irrational vision, or finally by ' p u r e ' thought based on a priori principles. Materialism is depicted as a limited empiricism that clearly underestimates the highest cognitive potentials of the h u m a n mind. Lenz, for example, w h o is close to Neothomism, asserts:
Just as in the child's mental ontogenetic development interest is turned first to external nature, and indeed to the question of what things are made of, so it also is in mankind's phylogenetic development. It turns to the graspable and sense-perceived, asking what their matter (substance) is and what their material cause (148:36).

T h e idealist is ready to admit only a historical justification for materialism. As for t h e materialist philosophy of modern
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t i m e s , i d e a l i s m t r e a t s it as i n t e l l e c t u a l infantilism. T h e e v a l u a t i o n o f m a t e r i a l i s m b y a n o t h e r o b j e c t i v e idealist, Paulsen, seems m o r e interesting to me. Materialism, he wrote,

is after all nothing else than making an absolute of physics by eliminating the spiritual or, consequently, allegedly reducing the spiritual to physiological processes, or simply to chance, 'subjective' epiphenomena of motions (202:394-395).

H e h a d i n m i n d , w h e n s p e a k i n g o f p h y s i c s , all t h e s c i e n c e s o f n a t u r e . He therefore considered t h e reduction of t h e spiritual to t h e physiological, ascribed by him to materialism, as a physical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of r e a l i t y . M a t e r i a l i s m , c o n s e q u e n t l y , l a c k e d a m e t a p h y s i c a l view o f t h e w o r l d . I n o t h e r w o r d s , m a t e r i a l i s m r e j e c t e d t h e v i e w o f o b j e c t i v e idealism. P a u l s e n t h e r e f o r e a l s o c l a i m e d t h a t m a t e r i a l i s m flourished in ' t h e l o w e r levels of s p i r i t ual life' ( 2 0 2 : 3 9 5 ) . L i k e m o s t b o u r g e o i s p h i l o s o p h e r s o f t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e c e n t u r y , he h a d n o t t h e slightest i d e a of dialectical m a t e r i a l i s m . T h e w h o l e of his a r g u m e n t in p r i n c i p l e e x c l u d e d a d m i s s i o n of t h e possibility of a m a t e r i a l i s t p h i l o s o p h y such as would disclose t h e wealth of t h e spiritual, starting from a m a t e r i a l i s t u n d e r s t a n d i n g of social life. F o r h i m , m a t e r i a l i s m w a s simply an a b s o l u t i s i n g of t h e scientific u n d e r s t a n d i n g of nature.
9

It is n o t difficult to d e m o n s t r a t e t h e u n s o u n d n e s s of this appraisal of materialism even in r e g a r d to mechanistic materialism; t h e l a t t e r a p p l i e d t h e m e t h o d s o f m e c h a n i c s t o p h e n o m e n a t h a t m e c h a n i c s h a d n o t h i n g t o d o w i t h . Its s p o k e s m e n , u n l i k e the natural philosophers of antiquity, w e r e interested in h u m a n life, w h i l e t r e a t i n g n a t u r e ( w h i c h t h e y c o m p r e h e n d e d i n t h e spirit of t h e s c i e n c e of t h e i r d a y ) as t h e n a t u r a l basis of m e n ' s life, c r i t i c i s i n g t h e o l o g y a n d s p e c u l a t i v e m e t a p h y s i c s in t h a t c o n n e c t i o n . E v e n a h i s t o r i a n of p h i l o s o p h y as r e m o t e f r o m scientific o b j e c t i v i t y a s L a n g e w a s c o m p e l l e d t o a d m i t t h a t t h e p r o b l e m of m a n w a s t h e c e n t r e of a t t e n t i o n of t h e m a t e r i a l i s t s of m o d e r n t i m e s .
T h r o u g h o u t the history of materialism [he wrote] there runs the definite defect that the cosmic questions little by little lose interest, while the anthropological ones provoke disputes of ever greater fervour (133:391).

O n e cannot, of course, a g r e e that interest in t h e problematic of h u m a n life g r e w at t h e e x p e n s e of a loss of i n t e r e s t in n a t u r e as a w h o l e . B u t it is t r u e t h a t it is t h e m a t e r i a l i s m of m o d e r n times that played the leading role in t h e theoretical substantiat i o n of h u m a n i s m . O n e o b j e c t i v e idealist t h u s sees a prescientific view in m a 237

terialism, a n d a n o t h e r ascribes to it an e x t r a p o l a t i o n of a ' o n e sided' n a t u r a l - s c i e n c e view to e v e r y t h i n g that exists. Both these evaluations, in spite of t h e obvious difference, a r e similar in one r e s p e c t , viz., m a t e r i a l i s m i s s a i d t o p a y t o o m u c h a t t e n t i o n t o experience, is inordinately b o u n d up with the earthly, and ignores the mystic and transcendental not f a t h o m a b l e by scientific m e a n s . T h e o b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s t a g r e e s w i t h m a t e r i a l i s m t h a t n a t u r e , t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d , a n d t h e universum e x i s t i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f human c o n s c i o u s n e s s , t h o u g h t , a n d w i l l . B u t h e i n t e r prets the spiritual as s u p e r h u m a n and supernatural. S u b j e c t i v e idealism, u n l i k e objective, usually figures as idealist empiricism and ascribes an unsubstantiated departure beyond e x p e r i e n c e to materialism, and the assumption of a supersensory reality. F r o m that angle materialism repeals the error of objective idealism, no m a t t e r h o w it interprets this allegedly supersens o r y reality. M a t t e r , t h e s u b j e c t i v e idealist claims, is not an object of s e n s e p e r c e p t i o n ; it is a s p e c u l a t i v e e s s e n c e w h o s e e x i s t e n c e is not confirmed by the e v i d e n c e of e x p e r i e n c e . Idealist e m p i r i c i s m c o u n t e r p o s e s t o t h e materialist u n d e r s t a n d i n g of objective reality a n o m i n a l i s t c r i t i q u e of c a t e g o r i e s , which are interpreted simply as collective names, symbols of a sort, and g r a m m a t i c a l forms. An ontologisation of c o n c e p t s and abstractions (causality, necessity, regularity, etc.) is ascribed to materialism. It c o n s e q u e n t l y is presented as idealism. T h e e x t r e m e e x p r e s s i o n of this allegedly realist position is t h e assertion that t h e c o n c e p t of m a t t e r as reality i n d e p e n d e n t of a n y e x p e r i e n c e in no w a y differs from t h e religious notion of G o d . This sophism, long a g o expressed by Machists, has b e c o m e a g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t e d positivist a r g u m e n t against m a t e r i a l i s m .
1 0

A p a r a d o x i c a l f e a t u r e of t h e latest subjective-idealist. a n d agnostic critique of materialism is the appeal to everyday experience and science. Both these forms of knowledge are treated as i n c o m p a t i b l e with t h e materialist d o c t r i n e of objective r e a l i t y a n d its r e f l e c t i o n i n c o n s c i o u s n e s s . M a t e r i a l i s m i s a c c u s e d of ignoring m a n k i n d ' s e v e r y d a y e x p e r i e n c e and not being in a c c o r d with science, which allegedly confirms t h e p h e n o m e n a l i s t view of reality. Objective idealism opposes this subjective-idealist a r g u m e n t a t i o n and rejects t h e subjectivist critique of materiali s m , e n d e a v o u r i n g t o p r o v e t h a t its b a s i c f a u l t i s a n u n c r i t i c a l attitude to e v e r y d a y e x p e r i e n c e , neglect of t h e specific n a t u r e of the philosophical form of knowledge, and substitution of the scientific d e s c r i p t i o n of reality for p h i l o s o p h y . It b e c o m e s evident, h o w e v e r , that both subjective and objective idealism a r e far from a correct understanding of the relation between every238

day e x p e r i e n c e and science. T h e y do not see what they a g r e e on and in what, on the c o n t r a r y , they contradict each other. Everyday, spontaneously formed e x p e r i e n c e says that t h e r e is a world of p h e n o m e n a outside and independent of t h e mind that is perceived by our sense organs, puts up a certain resista n c e to our actions, discovers properties independent of our mind and will that must be r e c k o n e d with in order to orientate ourselves in t h e e n v i r o n m e n t and m a k e use of things for our own ends, etc. E v e r y d a y e x p e r i e n c e is by no m e a n s evidence that all p h e n o m e n a a r e perceivable by our senses. On t h e c o n t r a r y , it follows from the content of this experience, enriched in t h e c o u r s e of h u m a n life, that a host of p h e n o m e n a previously u n k n o w n to us, later b e c o m e objects of our observation. T h a t these p h e n o m e n a existed even when they had not been perceived by us, t h e r e is not t h e least doubt for everyday experience. It is open to facts u n k n o w n to it, and this essential c h a r a c t e r istic of it is unacceptable in principle to subjective idealism, which claims that the existence of something else independent of e x p e r i e n c e in no way follows from t h e latter. Objective idealism does not often dispute t h e subjectivist interpretation of everyday experience, but asserts that supporters of phenomenalism do not want to note the subjectivity of the content of this experience. A fundamental underestimation of everyday e x p e r i e n c e is thus characteristic of both versions of idealism. This fault of idealism is revealed by t h e materialist critique of it, which recognises that everyday e x p e r i e n c e has a content whose objectivity is constantly being revealed by inquiry and practical activity. Lenin stressed that everyday experience, for all its 'naivety', formed the solid foundation of materialist philosophy: 'materialism deliberately makes the " n a i v e " belief of mankind t h e foundation of its theory of knowledge' (142:56). Science also starts from facts that are constantly confirmed by life and are contained in everyday experience. Does that mean that the materialist philosopher and natural scientist treat everyday e x p e r i e n c e uncritically? Of course not. T h e y analyse its content critically. T h e data of everyday e x p e r i e n c e a r e not the result of inquiry, but a r e formed from sense perceptions that mainly reflect man's direct relation to t h e objects a r o u n d him. Everyday e x p e r i e n c e establishes the existence of objects, some of their properties and features, and so also t h e difference between the objective and the subjective. Science often comes into conflict with everyday experience, but t h e scientific dispute with it as a rule affects matters in which t h e latter has no voice. F r o m t h e standpoint
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of everyday experience, for instance, light is propagated 'instantly'; that was also t h e conviction of physicists until they succeeded in m e a s u r i n g its velocity. Science corrects everyday e x p e r i e n c e but the corrections do not affect t h e basic world-outlook content of t h e latter. Science sometimes throws doubts on the existence of a p h e n o m e n o n about which t h e r e a r e notions in everyday experience. Research may conclusively d e m o n s t r a t e that this p h e n o m e n o n does not exist, but the proof itself establishes the existence of other p h e n o m e n a outside and independent of the mind. Science has discovered a host of p h e n o m e n a i n c o m p r e hensible to everyday e x p e r i e n c e and so has not only confirmed the truth of the concept 'objective reality' but also enormously extended its content. F r o m the standpoint of special scientific inquiry the data of everyday e x p e r i e n c e a r e evidence which, like any evidence, calls for comparison with other evidence, testing, and confirmation. But the s a m e has to be said of the facts established by research, i.e. those facts about which everyday, inevitably limited e x p e r i e n c e knows nothing. Nevertheless science c o m p a r e s these 'superexperiential' facts discovered by research with the ' c r u d e ' data that ordinary e x p e r i e n c e disposes of. T h a t must not be understood in t h e sense that the data of everyday e x p e r i e n c e play t h e role of the criterion of reality. T h e point is r a t h e r that scientific understanding of facts inaccessible to everyday e x p e rience is usually achieved when it succeeds in finding the steps that lead from the special results of research to everyday experience. T h e r e a r e quite a few conditions, Heisenberg pointed out, when 'the possibility of a description in ordinary l a n g u a g e is also a criterion for t h e d e g r e e of understanding reached in the field concerned' (98:140). O r d i n a r y language is t h e language of everyday experience, which constantly confirms the materialist understanding of the world. This everyday experience, consequently, also 'works' in science when it is dealing with objects not c o m p r e h e n d e d by it. And idealism, which has c o n c e r n e d itself for centuries with discrediting everyday experience, has been compelled in the end to r e - e x a m i n e its own position. Idealist propositions h a v e usually been 'substantiated' in our d a y by references to everyday experience. Idealism now often gives itself a testimonial as t h e philosophy of immediate experience. As the American idealist philosopher Newell says: 'philosophy must begin or take its starling-point in t h e c o m m o n sense view of the world' ( 1 9 2 : 1 3 1 ) . This striving to base itself on t h e evidence of o r d i n a r y consciousness, which used to be
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treated as 'vulgar', illusory, and anti-philosophical, is partial recognition by idealism of its own defeat. T h a t is also evidenced by a n o t h e r tendency, viz., the striving to develop 'scientific idealism', and a 'philosophy of science', i.e. to construct an idealist system of views by w a y of a c o r r e s p o n d i n g interpretation of scientific data. A traditional a r g u m e n t of the idealist critique of materialism is to assert that m a t t e r is no m o r e t h a n t h e material formed by immaterial, creative activity. In rejecting t h e rational tendencies of the mechanistic explanation of p h e n o m e n a , idealism in fact took over the vulnerable point of mechanism, a c c o r d i n g to which motion was t h e result of e x t e r n a l action on a body. At the time, while the supporters of mechanistic materialism usually r e n o u n c e d this limited notion when speaking of n a t u r e as a whole, idealism universalised it, separating motion from matter and interpreting the latter as an essence inert by its nature. An outstanding contribution of e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y m e c h a n i s tic materialism was to refute this idealist-mechanistic conception and systematically to develop a scientific-philosophical proposition about t h e unity of motion and matter. Joseph Priestley, w h o aspired to apply the principles of N e w t o n i a n m e c h a n i c s to philosophy, went further t h a n N e w t o n , however, in his u n d e r standing of matter. N e w t o n said that force of attraction was also an attribute of matter, in addition to extension (which t h e Cartesians considered its sole a t t r i b u t e ) . Newton treated r e p u l sion, of course, as an external force acting on matter. Priestley, however, suggested that repulsion was as inherent in matter as attraction. 'I t h e r e f o r e define it [i.e. m a t t e r . . ] to be a substance possessed of the property of extension, and of powers of attraction or repulsion' (216:ii). Matter, he said, must not be identified with density for the simple reason that it was not necessary to multiply the n u m b e r of its attributes needlessly. T h e differences in density or mass characteristics of various substances could be wholly explained by action of the forces of attraction and repulsion. Substances having a larger specific gravity a r e formed as a result of p r e v a l e n c e of attraction over repulsion. T h o s e properties of matter (inertia, impenetrability, mass, etc.) which were indicated to substantiate the thesis of t h e passivity of matter w e r e neither p r i m a r y nor immutable, a c c o r d ing to Priestley. In that c o n n e c t i o n he voiced a n u m b e r of profound philosophical and scientific propositions. He rejected the assumption of indivisible, absolutely dense atoms, since such a proposition multiplied the n u m b e r of premisses accepted
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w i t h o u t p r o o f . All e x t e n s i o n w a s d i v i s i b l e , ' t h i s s o l i d a t o m m u s t b e divisible, a n d t h e r e f o r e h a v e p a r t s ' ( 2 1 6 : 1 2 ) . T h e e x i s t e n c e of r e p u l s i o n t o g e t h e r with a t t r a c t i o n e x c l u d e d t h e possibility o f a b s o l u t e d e n s i t y just a s a w h o l e w i t h o u t p a r t s . N e w t o n , we recall, d e f e n d e d a thesis of t h e e x i s t e n c e of absolutely solid primitive particles
incomparably h a r d e r than any porous bodies c o m p o u n d e d of them; even so very h a r d as never to wear or break in pieces; no o r d i n a r y power being able to divide what God himself made one in the first creation. While the particles c o n t i n u e entire, they may compose bodies of one and the s a m e n a t u r e and t e x t u r e in all ages; but should they wear away, or b r e a k in pieces, the n a t u r e of things depending on them would be c h a n g e d ( 1 9 3 : 5 4 1 ) .

T h a t view has a clearly metaphysical c h a r a c t e r . Priestley c a m e close to the p r e s e n t - d a y notion of the possible density of m a t t e r when he voiced the proposition that
all the solid matter in the solar system might be contained within a nutshell, there is so great a proportion of void space within the substance of the most solid bodies ( 2 1 6 : 2 2 ) .

W h e n we r e m e m b e r that Locke reduced matter (bodies) to density, these ideas u n d o u b t e d l y m a r k a significant a d v a n c e in the d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e scientific and p h i l o s o p h i c a l u n d e r s t a n d ing of the unity of motion a n d m a t t e r . P r i e s t l e y w a s well a w a r e o f t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f his p r o p o s i tions for refuting the theological a n d idealist notions d o m i n a n t in h i s d a y .
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I hope [he wrote] we shall not consider matter with that contempt and disgust with which it has generally been t r e a t e d ; t h e r e being nothing in its real n a t u r e that can justify such sentiments respecting it ( 2 1 6 : 4 4 ) .

T h e subsequent d e v e l o p m e n t of science, and in particular of physics, chemistry, and biology, enriched the materialist understanding of nature by such discoveries and arguments as neither Priestley nor o t h e r scientists of the eighteenth c e n t u r y h a d e v e n t h e foggiest n o t i o n s a b o u t . M u c h i n t h e mechanistic c o n c e p t i o n of the self-motion of matter n o w a p p e a r s n a i v e , b u t its b a s i c m a t e r i a l i s t i d e a h a s b e c o m e e v e r weightier and more convincing in our day. M a t t e r h a s p r o v e d t o b e m u c h m o r e c o m p l e x , a n d its motion incomparably m o r e diverse, than was imagined by eight e e n t h - c e n t u r y materialism. And that does not refute but c o n f i r m s its m o s t i m p o r t a n t i d e a s . T h e i d e a l i s t n o t i o n o f t h e a b s o l u t e o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n l i v i n g a n d ' d e a d ' m a t t e r h a s c o l l a p s e d . Its unsoundness has been demonstrated by modern chemistry and biology. But t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r e m i s s e s of this n o t i o n w e r e
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refuted by the materialist philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. T h e t h e o r y of relativity, which has shown that the energy i n h e r e n t in m a t t e r is equivalent to its mass, has finally overt h r o w n t h e idealist conception of inert matter, a c c o r d i n g to which the essence of m a t t e r consists in the resistance it puts up to an effect. Discovery of intra-atomic energy, whose existence was essentially indicated by Einstein's famous f o r m u la, was evidence in practice of the truth of the materialist view of m a t t e r and its forms of motion and their interconversion. T h e fallacy of t h e absolute opposing of energy to matter, on which Ostwald constructed his idealist n a t u r a l philosophy, b e c a m e obvious. And the efforts, characteristic of objective idealism, to treat life, in p a r t i c u l a r psychic p h e n o m e n a , as processes that w e r e only outwardly linked with physicochemical laws, but in no way determined by them, also proved unsound. T h e advances of chemistry, biochemistry, molecular biology, and genetics, and t h e discoveries of c y b e r n e tics, which h a v e t h r o w n light on the general patterns of the purposive b e h a v i o u r of living systems,all this has convincingly refuted t h e idealist conception of the absolute irreducibility of the spiritual to material processes. But it is that conception which forms one of the principal a r g u m e n t s of idealism in our day too. For, since the theological and speculative metaphysical notions of a s u p e r n a t u r a l , substantial reality h a v e become obsolete, idealism has had to resort m o r e and m o r e to an indirect substantiation of its initial positions. In place of direct assertion of the primacy of the spiritual it has quite often put a negative a r g u m e n t : viz., the spiritual is absolutely irreducible to the material. Idealism has never gone in for a c o n c r e t e epistemological exploration of the theoretical p r o c e d u r e of reduction. It has also not investigated the question of the relation of this cognitive p r o c e d u r e to objective processes. Does it describe the latter to some extent, or is it a purely formal technique? Reduction of the spiritual to t h e material is treated in an oversimplified way, viz., as denial of the specific n a t u r e and even reality of the spiritual. And materialism is correspondingly defined as a d o c t r i n e that admits the reality only of m a t t e r . But the theoretical p r o c e d u r e of reduction n e v e r eliminates the reality of what is being reduced. Obviously nothing can be reduced to something else without a residue. T h e failure of the reductionist attempts m a d e by neopositivists is particularly indicative in that respect. T h e y were ultimately compelled to
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r e c o g n i s e t h a t t h e t h e o r e t i c a l , i n s p i t e o f its e m p i r i c a l o r i g i n , i s n o t r e d u c i b l e , a t least fully, t o s e n s e d a t a . B u t t h a t d o e s n o t belittle the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l significance of the p r o c e d u r e of r e d u c t i o n i n r e s e a r c h , a l t h o u g h i t limits its o b j e c t i v e p o s s i b i l i t i e s , of c o u r s e , to definite c o n t e x t s , i n c l u d i n g t h e specific n a t u r e of t h e p h e n o m e n a s t u d i e d , t h e i r level o f d e v e l o p m e n t , e t c . I t i s o n e t h i n g to r e d u c e a p r o p e r t y like irritability i n h e r e n t in e v e r y t h i n g living to c e r t a i n m a t e r i a l p r o c e s s e s a n d relations, a n d a n o t h e r m a t t e r t o r e d u c e t h e o r e t i c a l t h i n k i n g t o its b a s i s . B u t w h a t c o n s t i t u t e s t h e b a s i s o f t h e o r e t i c a l t h o u g h t ? I t h a s a t least three: the physiological process, social practice, a n d objective r e a l i t y a s t h e o b j e c t o f t h i n k i n g . H e n c e i t i s c l e a r w h a t difficulties a scientific a t t e m p t to r e d u c e the spiritual to t h e m a t e r i a l (within c e r t a i n limits, o f c o u r s e ) c o m e s u p a g a i n s t . T h e s e d i f f i c u l t i e s a r e literally life-savers for idealism. R e d u c t i o n is possible as an o p e r a t i o n effected by t h e o r y only insofar as t h e r e is a unity of w h a t is b e i n g r e d u c e d with w h a t it is r e d u c e d to. U n i t y of t h e p s y c h i c a n d p h y s i o l o g i c a l , of t h e ideal a n d t h e r e a l , t h e s u b j e c t i v e a n d t h e o b j e c t i v e , e n a b l e s t h e o n e to be reduced to the other, but the process of d e v e l o p m e n t as a result of which the psychic; ideal, a n d subjective arise c o n s t i t u t e s t h e limit o f t h i s r e d u c t i o n . T h e d e v e l o p m e n t i s i r reversible, so that the b o u n d a r y of possible reduction is ineradi c a b l e , just a s t h e d i a l e c t i c o f o p p o s i t e s ( i n c l u d i n g t h e i r i n t e r conversion) constantly reproduces the differences between t h e m . S i n c e the spiritual a r o s e from t h e m a t e r i a l as a specific p r o d u c t of the latter's d e v e l o p m e n t , it c a n n o t be wholly r e d u c e d to t h e m a t e r i a l . But, in spite of idealists' beliefs, that in no w a y p r o v e s t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e o f t h e s p i r i t u a l f r o m t h e m a t e r i a l , let a l o n e the primacy of the spiritual. It h a p p e n s that a p r i n c i p a l a r g u m e n t of c o n t e m p o r a r y i d e a l ism is t u r n e d a g a i n s t itself, viz.. t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y of complete reduction of the spiritual to the material ( w h e n , of course, that impossibility is c o n c r e t e l y g r a s p e d a n d c o m p a r e d with e v e r y t h i n g t h a t i s p o s s i b l e a n d r e a l l y t a k e s p l a c e , i.e. t h e u n i t y of the spiritual and material by virtue of which psychic processes are governed by physiological, biochemical, and other laws), is e v i d e n c e in f a v o u r of the materialist u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the spiritual, in particular of the dialectical-materialist u n d e r s t a n d i n g it. Idealism's negative a r g u m e n t s ultimately proved as unsound a s its ' p o s i t i v e ' o n e s , b u t o n e m u s t n o t , i n c i d e n t a l l y , e x a g g e r a t e the difference b e t w e e n t h e m . F o r the thesis of the inertness of m a t t e r was essentially a negative a r g u m e n t based mainly on t h e
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absence of concrete knowledge about the inner energy inherent in m a t t e r . N o t m o r e t h a n a h u n d r e d y e a r s a g o idealism still m a d e it a r e q u i r e m e n t to r e c o g n i s e , realise, a n d fully a p p r e c i a t e t h e initial reality a n d a b s o l u t e s o v e r e i g n t y of t h e s p i r i t u a l , a n d to u n d e r s t a n d it as a r e a l i t y rising a b o v e all t h a t exists in t i m e a n d s p a c e . Idealists r e p r o a c h e d m a t e r i a l i s t s with a n u n f o r g i v a b l e belittling of t h e s p i r i t u a l , r a t i o n a l , a n d ideal. M a t e r i a l i s m , t h e y said, killed r e a s o n , t r e a t i n g it as s o m e t h i n g t h a t w a s b o r n a n d died t o g e t h e r with h u m a n flesh. R e a s o n did not k n o w d e a t h , they a r g u e d , b e c a u s e it had no r e l a t i o n with t h e f e a t u r e s of t h e h u m a n individual that were peculiar to it alone. T h e brain was s u r e l y only t h e seat of r e a s o n , w h i c h w a s essentially i n d e p e n d e n t of a n y of its c o n v o l u t i o n s , t h e p r e s e n c e of p h o s p h o r u s in its tissues, e t c . I d e a l i s m , of c o u r s e oversimplified t h e m a t e r i a l i s t u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the s p i r i t u a l , or r a t h e r c o n s i d e r e d its most a d e q u a t e expression the standpoint of vulgar materialism, which actually did identify t h e p s y c h i c with t h e p h y s i o l o g i c a l . But m a t e r i a l i s t s themselves opposed vulgar materialism, as we know. W h e n F e u e r b a c h w a s criticising idealism, h e dissociated himself f r o m vulgar materialism:
T h e mind or spirit is the highest in man, to be sure: it is the nobleness of mankind, the feature that distinguishes them from animals: but the human first is still not therefore the natural first, the first by nature. On the contrary, the highest, the most perfect, is the last, the latest. To make mind or spirit the beginning, the source or origin, is therefore an inversion of the natural order (58:175).

P r e - M a r x i a n m a t e r i a l i s m must t h u s not be t r e a t e d as a d o c t r i n e t h a t t u r n e d o u t t o b e totally u n a b l e t o g r a s p t h e specific of t h e s p i r i t u a l . It m a d e an essential c o n t r i b u t i o n to u n d e r s t a n d ing of t h e spiritual by its fight against mystification a n d idolising of t h e l a t t e r , by its t h e o r y of effects a n d d o c t r i n e of t h e c o g n i t i v e significance o f s e n s u o u s activity. T h a t m a t e r i a l i s m s h o w e d t h e idealist n o t i o n s of w o r l d r e a s o n , w o r l d spirit, a n d w o r l d will to be based essentially on n o t i o n s of h u m a n r e a s o n , c o n s c i o u s n e s s , a n d will that w e r e d i v o r c e d f r o m m a n , w h i c h m e a n t d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e i r real c o n t e n t , o r i g i n a l i t y , a n d subjectivity. It was no a c c i d e n t t h e r e f o r e that t h e fight of t h e m a t e r i a l i s t s of t h e s e v e n teenth and eighteenth centuries against speculative metaphysics d e v e l o p e d into a r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of h u m a n s e n s u a l i t y a n d m a n in general. F e u e r b a c h t r u l y c a u g h t t h e e s s e n c e of t h e basic idealist a r g u m e n t , viz., that r e a s o n c a n n o t arise f r o m t h e i r r a t i o n a l ,
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and the purposive from a spontaneous, elemental material process, the highest from the lowest, the spiritual from the material. T h a t a r g u m e n t , to which Neothomism adduces fund amental i m p o r t a n c e , is essentially traditional in the history of idealism. It is an ontological interpretation of the feature of the process of cognition that M a r x defined by the following aphorism: ' T h e a n a t o m y of man is a key to the anatomy of the ape' ( 1 7 0 : 4 2 ) . But no one concludes from this truth that the ape originated from man. Idealism, however, in fact, chooses this false path of speculation. Against the facts Hegel claimed that the 'highest organism ... presents us in general with a universal type, and it is only in and from this type that we can ascertain and explain the meaning of the undeveloped organism' (88:357). T h e fact of a purposive relation in a certain field of natural p h e n o m e n a was thus interpreted as discovery of the highest spiritual instance that established it. In our day science has compelled idealism to r e e x a m i n e its traditional conceptions, and sometimes even to reject them. In that connection t h r e e tendencies take p r e f e r e n c e in c o n t e m p o r a r y idealist philosophy. T h e first is a striving to preserve the traditional ontological and natural philosophical domain, sup plementing and transforming it in the spirit of the r e q u i r e m e n t s of modern science. T h i s tendency finds expression in Neothomist philosophy. T h e second tendency is associated with denial of ontology and the possibility of a philosophical d o c t r i n e of the external world in general. T h e third tendency consists in reducing the subjectmatter of philosophy to anthropological problems. Analysis of all these tendencies brings out the general defeat of idealism. Let me cite a few examples. Neothomism, of course, cannot reject the thesis of the sub stantiality of the spirit, or the d o g m a of the creation of each h u m a n soul by God. Yet it reconstructs its doctrine of the psychic, including an admission in it of certain facts established by science. T h e s e confirm only the materialist understanding of the psychic, but Neothomism interprets them as compatible with idealism. According to Z a r a g e t a Bengoechea, for instance,
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the fact is that the processes that take place in it (the body .. ) on the one hand condition those of my consciousness, and on the other hand are conditioned by it (266:106).

From this standpoint consciousness and physiological processes form mutually interacting aspects of h u m a n life. But the N e o thomist retains the traditional formula: ' T h e soul is the s u b stantial form of a living, organised body', supplementing that by
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a forced recognition that the n e r v o u s system 'conditions in t u r n t h e c o u r s e o f m e n t a l activity' ( 2 6 6 : 1 1 3 ) . T h e s e r e s e r v a t i o n s i l l u s t r a t e t h e a t t e m p t s o f N e o t h o m i s t s t o soften t h e spiritualist c o n c e p t i o n , a n d t o ' a c c o r d ' i t with t h e f a c t s e s t a b l i s h e d b y science. T h e c o n c o r d a n c e is purely verbal, of course, because t h e r e c a n n o t be a r e a l l y scientific u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e p s y c h i c if m a t e r i a l i s m is r e j e c t e d b e c a u s e it ' d o e s n o t a d m i t t h e s o u l , in o r d e r not to recognise a consciousness distinct from the organism and mental or psychic p h e n o m e n a that a r e irreducible to corporeal or physiological ones' (266:111). T h e idealist ' a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t ' o f scientific f a c t s s t a r t s f r o m a false p r e m i s s a b o u t t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e o f t h e f u n d a m e n t a l p r o p o s i t i o n s o f i d e a l i s m f r o m scientific k n o w l e d g e . T h e ' a g r e e m e n t ' with s c i e n c e consists o n l y in an idealist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f its p r o p o s i t i o n s . N e o t h o m i s m r e g a r d s t h e a p p e a l t o scientific d a t a as a m e a n s of i l l u s t r a t i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e s e facts. T h a t i s w h y , w h i l e a g r e e i n g with s c i e n c e , w h i c h affirms t h a t m a t t e r g e n e r a t e s s u c h a specific f o r m of its e x i s t e n c e as life in t h e c o u r s e of its e v o l u t i o n , t h e N e o t h o m i s t specifies: if t h a t is p l e a s i n g to G o d . W i t h t h a t a p p r o a c h , t h e o r i g i n o f life, c o n s c i o u s n e s s , a n d t h o u g h t a r e t r e a t e d a s g r e a t e r e v i d e n c e o f t h e o m n i p o t e n c e o f t h e divinity. T h e French Neothomist Lelotte declared:
God gave (matter) the necessary virtualities so that, surrendered to itself in special conditions of constitution, temperature, e t c , ... it could become animated (139:19).

F o r c o n c l u s i o n s of that kind t h e r e is no n e e d , c l e a r l y , to go i n t o t h e c o n t e n t of scientific d i s c o v e r i e s . T h e Neothomist ascribes investigation of the processes of divine creation to natural science. Darwinism, which was c o n d e m n e d in t h e past as c o n t r a d i c t i n g Biblical t r u t h s , is n o w r e c o g n i s e d as a w h o l l y l e g i t i m a t e h y p o t h e s i s w h i c h , in t h e words of J a c q u e s Maritain,
presupposes the transcendent God as the first cause of evolution keeping in existence the things created and the spirit present in them, moving them from above so that the higher forms can emerge from the lower ones (163:25).

Idealist p r o p o s i t i o n s used t o b e cited a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h lower forms were incapable of generating higher ones. Neothomism makes the formula of creationism m o r e precise: the h i g h e r c a n a r i s e f r o m t h e l o w e r b y will o f G o d . W h e n D u n s Scotus asserted that matter acquired the faculty of t h i n k i n g if G o d so willed it, t h a t s t a t e m e n t p a v e d t h e w a y to materialism. But times h a v e changed, a n d in the twentieth
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century Neothomists grab at this argument to save idealism. In contrast to the Neothomists, the supporters of subjectivistagnostic doctrines reduce ontological problems to logical ones, or reject them altogether. Some suggest that they are essentially pseudo-problems, others argue that they all passed out of the competence of philosophy long ago and became the subjectmatter of special sciences.. This last argument is particularly popular with those idealists who seek a way of excluding the dilemma that constitutes the content of the basic philosophical question. Those who take this approach claim that philosophy does not dispose of methods of inquiry available in the special sciences, and therefore cannot occupy itself with the extremely special problem, i.e. the relation of the psychic to the physical. T h a t line of argument clearly confuses two essentially different things, viz., the philosophical, materialist or idealist answer to the basic philosophical question and special study of the diversity, forms, and levels of development of the psychic, which differ qualitatively from each other, and presuppose study of the physiology of higher nervous activity, including its pathological states. Materialism relies on special investigations, comprehending them, drawing conclusions for itself, and at the same time stimulating these inquiries without claiming to anticipate their final results. But the materialist answer to the basic philosophical question took shape historically as a theoretical comprehension of social practice and everyday human experience. That is why this answer became possible well before natural science began to investigate the 'spiritual-material' relation. Lenin differentiated the philosophical and special-science understanding of space and time, matter, causality, etc. That must be borne in mind too, when the psychophysical problem and its separate aspects are tackled. Plekhanov cited the Neokantian Lange, who claimed (in his History of Materialism, p. 653) that 'materialism is constantly faced with the insurmountable obstacle of explaining how conscious sensation can arise from material motion' (cited from 210:593). It will readily be understood that Lange was demanding an answer from materialism to problems facing the special sciences. T h e materialist, when answering that kind of argument, of course does not fail to stress that idealism is not able to explain the origin of consciousness, while its discourse on the origin of matter explains nothing. Without mitigating the significance of this counter-argument, one must, all the same, point out the difference in the standpoint of philosophical materialism
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from the a p p r o a c h of the natural sciences. that:

P l e k h a n o v did just

m a t e r i a l i s t s h a v e n e v e r p r o m i s e d t o a n s w e r this q u e s t i o n . T h e y a s s e r t o n l y ... t h a t a p a r t f r o m s u b s t a n c e p o s s e s s i n g e x t e n s i o n t h e r e i s n o o t h e r t h i n k i n g s u b s t a n c e a n d t h a t , like m o t i o n , c o n s c i o u s n e s s is a f u n c t i o n of matter ( 2 1 0 : 5 9 3 ) .

L e t me refer f u r t h e r to L e n i n ' s posing of this vital question. H e w a r n e d against c o n f u s i n g t h e initial materialist basic p r o p o s i tion with t h e scientific s o l u t i o n o f t h e p s y c h o p h y s i c a l p r o b l e m , s i n c e i t still r e m a i n e d f o r s c i e n c e t o i n v e s t i g a t e a n d r e i n v e s t i g a t e
how matter, a p p a r e n t l y entirely devoid of sensation, is related to matter which, though composed of the s a m e atoms (or electrons) is yet e n d o w e d w i t h a w e l l - d e f i n e d f a c u l t y of s e n s a t i o n . M a t e r i a l i s m c l e a r l y f o r m u l a t e s t h e a s yet u n s o l v e d p r o b l e m a n d t h e r e b y s t i m u l a t e s t h e a t t e m p t t o s o l v e it, t o u n d e r t a k e f u r t h e r e x p e r i m e n t a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n (142:33).

The materialist understanding of the 'spiritual-material' relation thus indicates, in general form of course, the real d i r e c t i o n of fruitful special investigation in this field, while t h e idealist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of this relation yields s c i e n c e n o t h i n g and, moreover, eliminates the p r o b l e m . Positivism and other subjectivist-agnostic doctrines that counterpose natural science to the 'speculative ontology' (and 'natural philosophy') of materialism, clearly do not perceive the philosophical content and significance of the question, which they declare with such ease to be exclusively one of natural science. Existentialism, in c o n t r a s t to o t h e r c o n t e m p o r a r y idealist d o c t r i n e s , h o l d s t h a t all o b j e c t s o f p o s s i b l e k n o w l e d g e c o n s t i t u t e the i n d i s p u t a b l e d o m a i n of scientific i n q u i r y p r o p e r , s i n c e they are studied independently of the existence of the h u m a n individual. P h i l o s o p h y is not, in g e n e r a l , k n o w l e d g e of objects, a n d materialism in essence betrays philosophy if only reality, i n d e p e n d e n t o f h u m a n s u b j e c t i v i t y , i n t e r e s t s it. F r o m t h e a n g l e of existentialism t h e r e is a special reality, by no m e a n s s u p e r s e n sory yet i n a c c e s s i b l e in p r i n c i p l e to s c i e n c e , as well as a s p e c i a l k i n d o f k n o w l e d g e w h i c h c o r r e s p o n d s t o i t a n d t h a t l o s e s its authenticity and truth as soon as it acquires an impersonal, s c i e n t i f i c f o r m . T h i s r e a l i t y i s t h e s p i r i t u a l life o f t h e h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l ; a n d k n o w l e d g e o f it, w h i c h i s i n s e p a r a b l e f r o m e x p e r i e n c e o f life itself, d i f f e r s r a d i c a l l y f r o m a n y s c i e n t i f i c k n o w l e d g e b y v i r t u e o f its d i r e c t n e s s a n d s u b j e c t i v i t y . S c i e n c e s e e k s t h e r e a s o n s f o r o b s e r v e d f a c t s , i.e. t r i e s t o g r a s p w h a t l i e s behind them. Science builds hypotheses, and explains the k n o w n by a s s u m i n g t h e e x i s t e n c e of s o m e t h i n g else, t h e u n k n o w n .
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W h e n applied to h u m a n spiritual life this a p p r o a c h c r e a t e s an impression of e x p l a n a t i o n but in effect yields n o t h i n g for u n d e r s t a n d i n g it. F u r t h e r m o r e , it eliminates h u m a n life's absolute difference from all o t h e r objects of science, i.e. its s u b j e c tivity. Existentialism t h u s asserts that m a n ' s spiritual life is only a d e q u a t e l y g r a s p e d by philosophy, or r a t h e r only by existentialism, which c o m p r e h e n d s the e x p e r i e n c e of life itself without going beyond it a n d without a p p e a l i n g to s o m e t h i n g else. Materialism, existentialists claim, e x a m i n e s spiritual life by t h e m e t h o d of science, a n a l y s i n g its relation to t h e e x t e r n a l world, without p e r c e i v i n g its self-sufficing c h a r a c t e r . But spiritual life, precisely b e c a u s e of its spirituality, individuality, and subjectivity, differs c a r d i n a l l y from e v e r y t h i n g that exists; it c a n n o t b e c o m e an object or the s u b j e c t - m a t t e r of inquiry (i.e. e x a m i n a t i o n from o u t s i d e ) w i t h o u t losing its a u t h e n t i c i t y . Existentialism ascribes an o r g a n i c i n c a p a c i t y to materialism to g r a s p m a n ' s e x i s t e n c e precisely as t h e spiritual life of an inimitable, u n i q u e being existing between life and d e a t h . To investigate the material d e p e n d e n c e of h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e s , decisions, a n d actions is to c o n v e r t subjective acts into s o m e t h i n g i n d e p e n d e n t of m a n , to c o n v e r t m a n himself, a c c o r d i n g to the existentialist's idea, into the c o n s e q u e n c e of s o m e n o n - h u m a n o t h e r . Materialism, existentialists claim, is a denial of the h u m a n p e r s o n a l i t y , i.e. of e x i s t e n c e , freedom, s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n and u n i q u e n e s s . Only r e c o g n i t i o n , in fact, of t h e self-positing subjectivity of the h u m a n Ego, and the i n d e p e n d e n c e of its e x p e r i e n c e s , decisions, and actions from external conditions, m a k e s it possible to p r e s e r v e f r e e d o m and h u m a n i t y . Materialism is d e c l a r e d to be philosophy of a l i e n a t i o n , and even the specific form of alienation of the individual b r o u g h t about by m a t e r i a l p r o d u c t i o n , scientific and e n g i n e e r i n g p r a c t i c e , etc. In that c o n n e c t i o n existentialism clearly fails to think about how h u m a n subjectivity is possible, in g e n e r a l , without the firm foundation c r e a t e d by the d e v e l o p m e n t of social p r o d u c t i o n , which is at the s a m e time d e v e l o p m e n t of the h u m a n personality. And h o w , on the o t h e r h a n d , d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e h u m a n p e r s o n a l i t y and subjectivity o c c u r r e d o v e r the t h o u s a n d s of y e a r s of the existe n c e of civilisation in c o n d i t i o n s of p r o g r e s s i n g e n s l a v e m e n t of the individual by t h e e l e m e n t a l forces of t h e social process? Existentialists a r e least of all c a p a b l e of u n d e r s t a n d i n g the history of h u m a n i t y , and s o m e of t h e m a r e inclined to c o n s i d e r materialist ' m e t a p h y s i c s ' t h e s o u r c e of h u m a n i t y ' s tribulations.
16

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A historical, philosophical analysis of this accusation shows that its main points are a development of the notorious idealist doctrine of free will that took shape in E u r o p e a n mediaeval philosophy under the direct influence of Christian theology. Indeterminists claim that the freedom of the will implies its independence from motives. T h e determinist interpretation of acts of will is treated as incompatible with recognition of the subject of responsibility. T h e opponents of determinism endeavour to prove that it subordinates the human personality on the whole to circumstances independent of it, rules out the possibility of choice, and so on. P r e - M a r x i a n materialism, one of whose outstanding achievements was substantiation of determinism, brilliantly showed the bankruptcy of the idealist conception of free will; only the will's dependence on definite, in particular, moral motives made the h u m a n personality the subject of responsibility. T h e development of science, and in particular of h u m a n physiology and psychology, reinforced the materialist critique of indeterminism. Ultimately, idealists, too, at least the most significant of them, became supporters of determinism, which they interpreted idealistically of course. Dilthey, who rejected causal investigation of spiritual life (and that means of acts of will as well), and who declared subjective idealism to be the 'idealism of freedom', was compelled, however, to recognise that materialism was the philosophy of humanism, in spite of its opponents' claims:
The naturalist ideal, as it was expressed by Ludwig Feuerbach in the outcome of a long cultural development, the free man who discerns the phantom of his wish in God, immortality, and the invisible order of things, has exercised a powerful influence on political ideas, literature, and poetry (41:107).

This admission by an idealist is very symptomatic. Idealism is conscious that opposing of the individual's spiritual life to his bodily, sensuous life serves real humanism as little as the religious counterposing of the immortal soul to the mortal, and of course sinful, body. Existentialism is to some extent free of this dualism of soul and body that is essentially foreign to humanism, but it cannot rid itself of the defects of idealism without rejecting its principal propositions. And the old idealist opposing of the spiritual to the material is revived in the existentialist metaphysical (in all senses of the term) counterposing of subjectivity to 'soulless' objectivity, identified without grounds with the sphere of alienation. Subjectivist intolerance of the objective ultimately proves to be intolerance as well of
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the h u m a n personality, to which absolutely everything is att r i b u t e d as guilt, since t h e sole s o u r c e of h u m a n a c t i o n s is declared to be the self-positing freedom of the individual h u m a n e x i s t e n c e . T h e e x i s t e n t i a l i s t i s well a w a r e , o f c o u r s e , t h a t this f r e e d o m is p o w e r l e s s in t h e face of an objectivity that it d o e s not w a n t to r e c k o n with. T h e realisation of f r e e d o m t h e r e f o r e p r o v e s t o b e d e f e a t , yet t h e r e i s n o o t h e r w a y , t h e e x i s t e n t i a l i s t c l a i m s . I n t h a t s e n s e his f i g h t a g a i n s t f a t a l i s m i s highly inconsistent a n d essentially hopeless. T h e philosophy of Marxism, which brings together a materialist e x p l a n a t i o n o f n a t u r e a n d a m a t e r i a l i s t u n d e r s t a n d i n g of history, indicates a f u n d a m e n t a l l y different w a y of tackling the problem. M a r x wrote, characterising the development of h u m a n f r e e d o m in c o n n e c t i o n with the real historical p r o c e s s a n d its n a t u r a l r e s u l t , i.e. t h e c o m m u n i s t t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f social relations, that f r e e d o m in the d o m a i n of material p r o d u c t i o n , h o w e v e r h i g h a level o f d e v e l o p m e n t i t h a s r e a c h e d ,
can only consist in socialised man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their i n t e r c h a n g e with N a t u r e , bringing it u n d e r their c o m m o n control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of N a t u r e ; and achieving this with the least e x p e n d i t u r e of energy and under conditions most favourable to, and worthy of, their h u m a n n a t u r e . But it nonetheless still remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of h u m a n energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis (167:III, 8 2 0 ) .

T h a t proposition is a most i m p o r t a n t h u m a n i s t conclusion from t h e m a t e r i a l i s t u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f s o c i a l life. T h e d i s p u t e o v e r h u m a n i s m , w h i c h h a s lasted f o r c e n t u r i e s b e t w e e n m a t e r i a l i s m and idealism, and between science and religion, has been finally resolved in favour of materialism and materialistically thinking science. Materialism, atheism, and science constitute the real basis of the h u m a n i s t o u t l o o k ; they free h u m a n i s m f r o m s u p e r f i c i a l , c o n s o l i n g i l l u s i o n s w h o s e s o u r c e i s r e l i g i o u s belief a n d its i r r e l i g i o u s s u r r o g a t e s , a n d o p e n u p t o m a n k i n d a p e r s p e c t i v e of u n l i m i t e d a n d a l l - r o u n d p r o g r e s s . It is a m a t t e r , of c o u r s e , of Marxist dialectical materialism. Let me sum up. Idealism has been compelled to e x a m i n e the a r g u m e n t s it a d v a n c e s against materialism. T h e latter is accused of clinging to e v e r y d a y e x p e r i e n c e , of being uncritical o f s c i e n c e , o f not g r a s p i n g t h e t r u e s e n s e o f r e l i g i o n , a n d o f being foreign to genuine h u m a n i s m . By revising these accusat i o n s i d e a l i s m e n d e a v o u r s t o a s s i m i l a t e i n its o w n i n t e r e s t s t h e point of view t h a t it criticises. But the 'assimilation' p r o v e s in fact to be an idealist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of e v e r y d a y
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e x p e r i e n c e and science, and a new attempt to reconcile reason and faith. T h e i m p o t e n c e of this idealist critique in the main, decisive point does not, of course, rule out the presence of rational elements in it that the history of philosophy has no right to ignore. T h e idealist critique of the mechanistic materialism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries pointed out the latter's actual limitations, despite t h e fact that it lacked u n d e r standing of the historical progressiveness of mechanism. Idealism r e p r o a c h e d metaphysical materialism, not without g r o u n d s , of not seeing the relation of purposefulness in n a t u r e , a l t h o u g h the idealist universalisation of it served as an apology for the religious view of n a t u r e . Lenin wrote that the s u p p o r t e r s of 'physical' idealism of the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century criticised the actual faults of t h e metaphysical, mechanistic materialism that prevailed then in natural science.
17

They combated metaphysical (in Engels', and not the positivist, i.e. Humean, sense of the word) materialism and its one-sided 'mechanism', and in so doing threw out the baby with the bath-water. Denying the immutability of the elements and of the properties of matter known hitherto, they ended by denying matter, i.e. the objective reality of the physical world... Insisting on the approximate and relative character of our knowledge, they ended by denying the object independent of the mind, reflected approximately-correctly and relatively-truthfully by the mind (142:242-243).

He brought out the flimsiness of the philosophical c o n c l u sions d r a w n by idealism from the facts established by it. T h e idealist critique of the s h o r t c o m i n g s of a certain historical form of materialism inevitably lacked a p r o p e r orientation; it c a m e forward as a critique of materialism in general t h o u g h in fact it was directed only against the shortcomings of individual materialist doctrines. T h e illusions of the idealist critique were natural; they expressed the radical opposition of the main philosophical trends. Idealism thus sometimes pointed out shortcomings that w e r e actually inherent in materialism, d r a w b a c k s that it o v e r c a m e in the course of further philosophical development. T h e d o c t r i n e that idealism considered already refuted b e c a m e m o r e and m o r e well founded. T h a t proved a s o u r c e of the crisis of idealist philosophy, the a r g u m e n t s of which against materialism were ultimately turned against itself. Idealism, which accused materialism of denying the transcendent, and of uncritical reliance on sense perceptions, has been compelled partly to reject these s a m e accusations and partly to soften t h e m with
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n u m e r o u s reservations, since the advances of science and the increasing e x p e r i e n c e of mankind h a v e confirmed t h e materialist 'heresy'. H e n c e , too, idealism's p a r a d o x i c a l and at the same time law-governed renunciation of idealism, which I h a v e already noted above, and which proved to be only a c h a n g e of its form. T h a t m a d e it possible to consider c o n t e m p o r a r y idealism a utopian attempt to c r e a t e an anti-materialist system of views free of the defects of idealism. By maximally limiting the field of discredited idealist philosophy, c o n t e m p o r a r y idealists recognise that it has proved b a n k r u p t , and seek new ways of substantiating their outlook. T h e following a r g u m e n t has been advanced in recent decades as the main one: idealism is not the sole alternative to materialism. Spiritualism on the o n e hand, and 'realism' on the other, a r e now declared m o r e serious, promising o p p o n e n t s of m a t e rialism. Both these doctrines a r e considered, of c o u r s e , to be different in principle from idealism. Spiritualism coincides with objective idealism in its initial propositions and can be treated as one of its main versions. In a certain sense objective idealism is a spiritualistic outlook in general. But the pantheistic tendency often opposes this essential definition of it, smoothing over the spiritualist opposing of the spiritual to the material. Attempts to divide spiritualism from idealism boil down in the end to a negation of this pantheistic tendency. As for 'realism', this t e r m often serves (as Lenin noted) to gloss over the radical opposition of the main philosophical trends. Neothomists, and a d h e r e n t s of H a r t m a n n ' s 'new ontology', and followers of neorealism, an epistemological variety of idealist philosophy, call themselves realists. Neothomist 'realism' consists in recognising that sense-perceived reality exists independently of h u m a n consciousness; its first principle, however, is declared to be divine reason. In this connection Egorov noted that ' M a r i t a i n acknowledges the reality of the external world, but then adds that the world a r o u n d us is independent only of man and is completely d e p e n d e n t on God' (46:12). H a r t m a n n ' s 'realism', while lacking theistic tones, boils down primarily to stating that the material and the spiritual a r e not primordial but derivative realities within an a l l - e m b r a c ing being. Not only the spiritual, but also the material, a r e thus regarded as s e c o n d a r y , and being is opposed to both. It will readily be understood that the assumption of a primordial neutral being is a speculative-idealist premiss;
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b e i n g d o e s n o t e x i s t i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f its d e t e r m i n a c y . N e o r e a l i s m s e p a r a t e s itself f r o m s u b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m i n r e c ognising a reality existing outside and i n d e p e n d e n t of c o n sciousness. But the f u r t h e r definition of this reality is based on wiping out the difference between the subjective and the objective, the psychic and the physical, which leads in the end to idealist conclusions. T h e c o n t e m p o r a r y student of n e o r e a l i s m , H i l l , d e c l a r e d , c o m p a r i n g this c u r r e n t , w i t h p r e c e d i n g idealist t h e o r i e s , t h a t p o l e m i c i s e d a g a i n s t t h e s e p a r a t e v e r sions of idealism:
F a r m o r e devastating for idealism was the determined attack from the outside, e a r l y in the twentieth c e n t u r y , by a s t r o n g realist m o v e m e n t that deliberately denied nearly all of the basic tenets of idealism (100:79).

In

another

place,

however,

he affirmed

something contrary:

H a v i n g c o m p l a i n e d t h a t t h e idealists' a s s i m i l a t i o n o f o b j e c t s t o e x p e r i e n c e u n d e r m i n e d t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e o f o b j e c t s , t h e n e w realists p r o c e e d e d t o a s s i m i l a t e e x p e r i e n c e s t o o b j e c t s , with s u r p r i s i n g l y s i m i l a r results.... N o matter h o w m u c h the n e w realist writes of the i n d e p e n d e n c e of the object, he c a n n o t be quite convincing while m a k i n g objects a n d experiences even temporarily identical, or aspects of one a n o t h e r (100:122).

These statements must be treated as evidence of the unsoundness of an idealism t h a t claims to n e g a t e idealism r a t h e r t h a n as e x a m p l e s of a c o n t r a d i c t i o n in t h e e x p o s i t i o n . While the idealist a r g u m e n t s against materialism h a v e been discredited by the progressive development of knowledge, the materialist critique of idealism has m o r e and m o r e revealed its s c i e n t i f i c , t h e o r e t i c a l i m p o r t a n c e . T h e c o u r s e o f d e v e l o p ment of knowledge confirms the correctness of the materialist analysis of idealism's c o m p r o m i s e position in the great dispute between science and religion. Recognition of the point that idealism is always in covert, if n o t o p e n , opposition to s c i e n c e , is winning m o r e and m o r e supporters. Idealism's claim to e x p l o r e a special d o m a i n of w h a t exists, allegedly inaccessible to science, is being discredited by the actual d e v e l o p m e n t o f scientific k n o w l e d g e . T h e c o n c e p t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h y t h a t counterposes science does hot, of course, r e m a i n fixed; it evolves a n d is revised since science not only cognises w h a t was d e c l a r e d to be u n a t t a i n a b l e by scientific m e a n s b u t also discovers 'curious' p h e n o m e n a of a sort whose existence could not h a v e b e e n a n t i c i p a t e d b y t h e m o s t s u b t l e i m a g i n a t i o n . T h e materialist critique of idealism has compelled t h e latter's a d h e r e n t s t o a c k n o w l e d g e c e r t a i n facts a n d scientific
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truths. T h e fight between the different idealist currents has been caused to a considerable extent by the materialist critique of idealism. Idealism has evolved from frank supranaturalism and direct support of the religious outlook to an idealist assimilation of naturalism, and to a 'realism' and philosophising irreligious in form. But this trend in its evolution comes up against opposing tendencies generated by idealist philosophising. Idealism is constantly turning back, i.e. returning from irreligiosity to supranaturalism and mysticism. Besides, m o d e r n ised mysticism was often passed off as related to science and as an outlook possessing deep scientific roots. T h u s Radlov claimed in an article 'Mysticism in Contemporary Philosophy', that the mysticism of the early twentieth century 'differed from earlier forms in not being in the least hostile to science' (219:63). F u r t h e r m o r e , he discovered even 'a reverence of mystical philosophy for science' ( ibid .) T h a t redressing of mysticism is not only evidence of its real bankruptcy but is also an attempt to resurrect it by mystifying scientific data. T h e idealist philosophy of each historical epoch thus presents a picture of a sort of cycle, the different elements of which are reflected in separate idealist doctrines. Depending on the historical conditions, idealism shifts the logical accents, alters the argumentation and approach to problems, formulating its postulates and conclusions in a different fashion. Sometimes it comes forward with a claim to real scientific knowledge, criticising science for an alleged lack of scientific character. At other times it claims superscientific knowledge, condemning the scientific view of the world as a viewpoint of semblance. Idealism often advances tasks of creating a scientific philosophy and even makes a certain positive contribution to the epistemological analysis of the fact of scientific knowledge. In other cases it strives, on the contrary, to show that science has nothing to give either philosophy or art and religion, and that philosophy's acceptance of scientific criteria signifies a repudiation of itself. Whatever all the differences of these notions and approaches, they have something in common, and that is the counterposing of philosophy to the scientific picture of the world, an opposition whose inevitable form is a closed philosophic system. It seems at first glance that the closed character or 'completeness' of a system is associated simply with an anti-dialectical understanding of the systematic character of knowledge and consequently has no relation to the opposition between materialism and idealism. A claim to create a complete system of
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knowledge was peculiar both to natural science and materialist p h i l o s o p h y f o r c e n t u r i e s . I n t h a t c a s e , h o w e v e r , i t w a s n o t just a m a t t e r of a t e n d e n c y t h a t collided with an o p p o s i n g one t h a t p a r t i a l l y n e u t r a l i s e d it, b u t c o n c e r n e d t h e m a i n , d e t e r m i n a n t f e a t u r e of t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a philosophical d o c t r i n e that was inseparable, as c a n readily be s h o w n , from the essence of idealism. Fichte a n d Hegel were dialecticians but they created closed, c o m p l e t e systems of philosophical k n o w l e d g e , c o u n t e r p o s i n g p h i l o s o p h y t o 'finite' s c i e n c e . T h e idealist u n d e r e s t i m a t i o n of scientific k n o w l e d g e , w h a t e v e r form of e x p r e s s i o n it takes, inevitably leads to a c o u n t e r p o s i n g of philosophy'absolute s c i e n c e ' t o special, 'relative' sciences. T h a t is c h a r a c t e r i s t i c not only of rationalist idealism b u t also o f idealist e m p i r i c i s m . R e c a l l M a c h ' s c l a i m t h a t t h e ' e l e m e n t s ' of e v e r y t h i n g that exists c o m p r i s e sensations. E v e n if o n e ignores the subjectivist interpretation of sensations, in this case, too (since it retains the claim that the elements of everything that exists a r e perceived sensuously) t h e r e is an absolutising of empiricism which, by virtue of that, is always c o u n t e r p o s e d to i n c o m p l e t e s c i e n t i f i c k n o w l e d g e . T h e h a r m f u l n e s s o f this c o u n t e r p o s i n g is particularly obvious in M a c h , w h o was not only a physicist b u t also a p h i l o s o p h e r w h o a r g u e d that e v e r y t h i n g t h a t really existed was a c o m p l e x of sensations, T h e discovery of atoms, or r a t h e r the experimental proof o f t h e i r e x i s t e n c e , w h i c h d i r e c t l y r e f u t e d h i s idealist e m p i r i c i s m , c a u s e d t h e f o l l o w i n g v e r y i n d i c a t i v e r e a c t i o n o n his p a r t : if belief in the reality of atoms is so essential for you [physicists], then I disavow the physical mode of thinking, and do not want to be a real physicist (156:11). This frank admission is an interesting illustration of the natural i n e v i t a b i l i t y o f t h e b a n k r u p t c y o f idealist p h i l o s o p h y . Idealism inevitably makes an absolute of the separate features of c o g n i t i o n , w h i c h is a c o n s e q u e n c e of d e n i a l of t h e m a t e r i a l i s t tenet of reflection. T h e metaphysical materialist usually interprets the relative truth attained as absolute truth since a dialectical u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e p r o c e s s o f c o g n i t i o n i s f o r e i g n t o h i m . Yet the metaphysical materialist, w h o sees in p h i l o s o p h y only a r e f l e c t i o n of r e a l i t y , w h i c h is r i c h e r a n d f u l l e r of c o n t e n t t h a n a n y k n o w l e d g e o f it, i s n o t i n c l i n e d t o t r e a t p h i l o s o p h y a s e x h a u s t i v e k n o w l e d g e or u n d e r s t a n d i n g of reality. But denial of t h e p r i n c i p l e o f r e f l e c t i o n , i.e. t h e i d e a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n o f c o g n i tion, entails an illusion of t h e possibility of c o m p l e t i n g a system of k n o w l e d g e . E n g e l s criticised t h e i n c o n s i s t e n t materialist D h r i n g for
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trying to create a completed philosophical system, evaluating these attempts as clear concessions to idealist speculation. Of Dhring he wrote:
W h a t h e i s d e a l i n g w i t h a r e t h e r e f o r e principles, f o r m a l t e n e t s d e r i v e d f r o m thought a n d n o t f r o m t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d , w h i c h a r e t o b e a p p l i e d to nature and the realm of man, and to which therefore nature and man have to conform (50:45).

Engels considered such an understanding of philosophical tenets (1) idealist a n d (2) metaphysical. In contradistinction to idealism, materialism affirmed that
it is n o t n a t u r e and t h e r e a l m of h u m a n i t y w h i c h c o n f o r m to t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s , b u t t h e p r i n c i p l e s a r e o n l y valid i n s o far a s t h e y a r e in c o n f o r m i t y with n a t u r e a n d history. T h a t is the only materialistic conception of the matter, and H e r r Dhring's c o n t r a r y conception is idealistic, m a k e s t h i n g s s t a n d c o m p l e t e l y o n t h e i r h e a d s ( 5 0 : 4 6 ) .

M a t e r i a l i s m , c o n s e q u e n t l y , is a system of views w h o s e e p i s t e m o l ogical basis posits the possibility of an infinite i n c r e a s e of k n o w l e d g e t h r o u g h ever fuller and d e e p e r reflection of reality. F r o m the s t a n d p o i n t of idealism the p r i n c i p l e of the infinite d e v e l o p m e n t of k n o w l e d g e is i n c o m p a t i b l e with the n a t u r e of p h i l o s o p h y ; it is a c c e p t a b l e only in t h e special s c i e n c e s . T h e materialist, while denying the counterposing of philosophy to science, naturally does not accept the theoretical conclusions associated with that. Materialism has therefore developed historically as an open system of philosophical knowledge; its c a p a c i t y t o p e r c e i v e n e w s c i e n t i f i c i n f o r m a t i o n a n d t o g r a s p n e w historical e x p e r i e n c e is constantly g r o w i n g . A r e w a r d i n g task of the history of p h i l o s o p h y is a c o m p a r a t i v e i n q u i r y into the various historical f o r m s of materialism. Engels wrote:
With each e p o c h - m a k i n g discovery even in the s p h e r e of natural s c i e n c e i t h a s t o c h a n g e its f o r m ; a n d a f t e r h i s t o r y a l s o w a s s u b j e c t e d t o materialistic t r e a t m e n t , a new a v e n u e of development has opened here too ( 5 2 : 3 4 9 ) .

C h a n g e in the f o r m of materialism is not r e d u c i b l e to a n e w f o r m u l a t i o n o r r e t h i n k i n g o f its c o n t e n t ; p r e v i o u s l y u n k n o w n facts b e c o m e the subject of discussion, s o m e t h i n g n e w is added to t h e p r o b l e m a t i c , a n d old questions a r e posed in a n e w way. In short, materialism develops; the materialist understanding of reality b e c o m e s m o r e profound, m o r e concrete, better grounded, and new perspectives and new fields of inquiry are o p e n e d u p t o it. T h e d e v e l o p m e n t of materialist philosophy is similar in p r i n c i p l e t o t h a t o f all s c i e n t i f i c k n o w l e d g e . J u s t a s i n t h e
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sciences there a r e propositions in it that sum up the centuriesold history of knowledge. These fundamentals of materialism can be as little refuted by subsequent philosophical development as the natural-science principle of the impossibility of perpetuum mobile. Only a subjective idealist can assume that the progress of science or philosophy can lead to denial of objective reality. As Fedoseev has written:
We would be inveterate dogmatists if we did not see the relativity of many of the concrete propositions of philosophy and did not understand the necessity to develop and refine them. But we would fall into relativism and ultimately into idealism if we assumed that the development of philosophy presupposed denial of its basic, firm principles (55:12).

Development of materialist philosophy in organic connection with the advances of the sciences of nature and society characterises this main trend in a specific way. Idealism, of course, also does not remain an invariant system of views; it cannot help reacting to the advances of the sciences, which compel it to re-examine its propositions, allowing for and idealistically interpreting previously unknown facts. But the changes that idealist philosophy undergoes correspond to its essence; idealism adapts itself to the new intellectual atmosphere and changing historical conditions. Insofar as it mystifies reality it cannot find an adequate philosophical expression of the advances of science and social practice. T h e counterposing of philosophising to scientific inquiry greatly limits its possibilities for assimilating scientific advances. But idealism cannot reject this opposition, which essentially stems from the idealist answer to the basic philosophical question and from recognition of another reality allegedly inaccessible to science. Idealism is compelled to meet the challenge of science and it does so by way of an ever more flexible, cautious, sciencelike formulation of its propositions. Contemporary subjective idealism can declare, for example, that only madmen doubt the existence of an external world. T h a t does not mean, however, it then adds, that an external world really exists. Such a perfecting of the idealist argumentation, it goes without saying, has little in common with the onward development of philosophical knowledge that takes place in the history of materialism. And if Hegel, say, surpassed his idealist predecessors, that was only because his idealism had a dialectical character. Lenin noted the identity in principle of the main fallacies inherent in this doctrine when comparing the most developed idealist doctrines with the original historical forms of idealism:
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P r i m i t i v e idealism; t h e u n i v e r s a l ( c o n c e p t , i d e a ) i s a p a r t i c u l a r being. T h i s a p p e a r s wild, m o n s t r o u s l y ( m o r e a c c u r a t e l y , c h i l d i s h l y ) stupid. But is not m o d e r n idealism, K ant, Hegel, t h e idea of God, o f t h e s a m e n a t u r e (absolutely o f t h e s a m e n a t u r e ) ? T a b l e s , c h a i r s , a n d t h e ideas o f t a b l e a n d c h a i r ; t h e w o r l d a n d t h e i d e a o f t h e w o r l d ( G o d ) ; thing and ' n o u m e n ' , the u n k n o w a b l e 'Thinginitself'; the con n e c t i o n o f t h e e a r t h a n d t h e s u n , n a t u r e i n g e n e r a l a n d law [log o s ] , G o d . T h e d i c h o t o m y o f h u m a n k n o w l e d g e a n d t h e possibility o f idealism ( = r e l i g i o n ) a r e g i v e n a l r e a d y i n the f i r s t , e l e m e n t a r y abstraction ('house' in general and particular houses) (144:370).

T h e diversity of the versions of idealism, which sometimes s e e m s unlimited, is in fact limited w h e n , of c o u r s e , we h a v e in mind the c o n t e n t a n d not t h e m o d e of exposition of this d o c t r i n e . A superficial g l a n c e at the history of idealism mainly c a t c h e s the differences and disagreements, but inquiry shows that even the most d e v e l o p e d idealist d o c t r i n e s essentially r e p e a t the old fallacies, which, h o w e v e r , a r e 'developed', modified, variously substantiated, interpreted, comprehended, and formulated. T h e classical writers of idealist p h i l o s o p h y , while criticising their predecessors (often very thoroughly), were usually c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h e y h a d fully s u c c e e d e d i n o v e r c o m i n g t h e latter's fallacies; in fact, h o w e v e r , t h e y r e f u t e d o n e m o d e or a n o t h e r of substantiating idealism, and certain conclusions, posing of problems, and assumptions by no means obligatory or n e c e s s a r y for idealist p h i l o s o p h y . As for t h e basic idealist conviction, which Lenin pointed out, they gave it a n e w form, i.e. b r o u g h t i t i n t o a c c o r d w i t h n e w s o c i a l n e e d s , h i s t o r i c a l experience, etc. C o n t e m p o r a r y i d e a l i s t p h i l o s o p h y i s u s u a l l y a w a r e t h a t its s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r p r i m i t i v e , ' a r c h a i c ' i d e a l i s m , l i k e its i n d e p e n d e n c e o f it, i s v e r y , v e r y r e l a t i v e . W h e n c o n t e m p o r a r y b o u r g e o i s p h i l o s o p h e r s c o m p a r e t h e latest idealist s y s t e m s w i t h the d o c t r i nes of Plato a n d Aristotle, they often c o n c l u d e that neither the classical writers of idealism n o r their successors h a v e a d v a n c e d f u n d a m e n t a l l y n e w p r o b l e m s or o v e r c o m e the fallacies of these great thinkers. Skvortsov noted the symptomatic character of this c o n c l u s i o n w h e n he p o i n t e d out t h a t it h a d b e c o m e a c o m m o n conviction a m o n g bourgeois philosophers that the history of philosophy was a s u m total of additions to, notes on and annotations of Plato (247:88). W h a t does that conviction reflect? On t h e o n e h a n d s o m e t h i n g t h a t really c h a r a c t e r i s e s t h e a t t i t u d e o f m o s t E u r o p e a n idealist s c h o o l s to Plato, a n d on t h e o t h e r h a n d t h e crisis of idealism, w h i c h h a s failed t o c o p e with t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s a l r e a d y r e v e a l e d i n t h e first i d e a l i s t s y s t e m . I t i s v e r y i n d i c a t i v e t h a t
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t h e reduction of the historical c o u r s e of philosophy to a constant revival of Platonism is directly associated with denial of progress in philosophy.
Philosophical thought [Karl Jaspers wrote] also does not have the character of a progressive process, like science. We know much more, for a certainty, than Hippocrates, the Greek doctor. We can hardly say that we are further than Plato (113:9).

T h e idealists of o u r day ( t h o u g h they do not consider themselves idealists) thus affirm that philosophy is incapable of rising a b o v e its past. T h e irrationalist G e r h a r d K r g e r , went even f u r t h e r t h a n J a s p e r s , interpreting all philosophical doctrines as versions of Platonism. 'Philosophy,' he wrote, 'seen historically, is Platonism' ( 1 2 7 : 2 8 2 ) . He was arguing about philosophy in general, ignoring t h e opposition of idealism and materialism. T h e 'line of Plato', however, in no way characterises the development of materialist philosophy, which had already c o m e forward in antiquity as its denial. S o m e philosophers substantiate the thesis mentioned above by analysing t h e latest philosophic doctrines that b e a r the distinct impress of our times. Heidegger's pupil K u h n e n d e a v o u r e d to p r o v e that Plato was the father of existentialism, writing:
As Plato, the pupil of Socrates showed, man, shaken by the exhaustion of the customs and laws handed down by his ancestors, and astounded by the impossibility to understand the sense-perceived world from itself, asks (when philosophising) about true being as the basis of all that exists... To express it in modern language, the question of being is at the same time one of the sense of being (129:11-12).

K u h n undoubtedly modernised Plato, particularly w h e n he attempted to express the views peculiar to his philosophy in ' m o d e r n ' , or r a t h e r existentialist, language. But doesn't that interpretation of Plato show that modernisation of Platonism is o n e of the sources of m o d e r n idealist philosophy, existentialist philosophy i n c l u d e d ? Idealism c a n n o t , in fact, rise above its past. T h a t points to the incompatibility of idealism and science, to which a kowtowing before the achievements of the past is foreign. But materialism, like science, is integrally linked with the present and at the s a m e time strives to t h e future. A high a p p r e c i a tion of the achievements of previous materialist philosophy does not prevent spokesmen of c o n t e m p o r a r y philosophical materialism from being fully conscious of the root faults of the doctrines of their predecessors.
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Each new age in the history of man thus deepens the opposition between idealism and science further and further, and thereby the opposition between the scientifically philosophical, materialist outlook on the world and idealism. T h e latter is an alienated form of the philosophical assimilation of reality, while materialism is the negation of that philosophical form of alienation. How then to sum up? Materialism, which is depicted by the overwhelming majority of contemporary bourgeois philosophers as a naive, long refuted doctrine incompatible with high philosophical culture, has in fact defeated its sophisticated opponent. I say 'in fact', because idealism predominates on the surface of bourgeois society. But materialism lives and develops in the sciences of nature, forming its inalienable foundation. T h e main direction of the fight against materialism is now formed by the idealist interpretation of scientific data, in which not only are idealist philosophers engaged but also some natural scientists who prove to be prisoners of idealist speculations. Idealist conclusions are therefore not simply introduced into science from outside, but express real contradictions of the development of knowledge in the conditions of contemporary bourgeois society. Nevertheless the materialist doctrine of the materiality of the world has been victorious over the idealist conception of the secondary, contingent c h a r a c t e r of nature. T h e idealist doctrine of the dependence of sense-perceived reality on the mode of its perception has been defeated in the struggle against the materialist theory of reflection (especially the dialectical-materialist o n e ) . Historical materialism has revealed the bankruptcy of the idealist interpretation of history. And what is no less important, materialism has won in science where absolute epistemological relativism, the agnosticism related to the latter, and sometimes even theories of a speculative metaphysical cast were counterposed to it. Such are the results. What about the prospects? They are obvious from the analysis made.
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3. The Dialectical-Materialist Critique of Idealism. The Epistemological Roots of Idealist Fallacies P r e - M a r x i a n materialism disclosed the main features of the idealist mystification of reality and of cognition of it, but could not explain the reasons for idealism's existence, or its
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historical necessity a n d p l a c e in t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of k n o w l e d g e . In fact it i g n o r e d t h e essential point t h a t cognition ideally t r a n s f o r m e d t h e m a t e r i a l w o r l d into systems of a b s t r a c t i o n s . T h e subjective, active aspect of k n o w i n g , which idealism fixes and at t h e s a m e t i m e mystifies, also r e m a i n e d outside t h e field of view of p r e - M a r x i a n materialist philosophy. Idealism s e e m e d to it to be simply n o n s e n s e . At best it c a u g h t idealism's c o n n e c t i o n with t h e religious outlook, but t h a t was n a t u r a l l y not sufficient to c r e a t e a scientific historical p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c e p tion, w h i c h p r e s u m e d analysis of idealism as a p h e n o m e n o n of the history of k n o w l e d g e . T h e p h i l o s o p h y of M a r x i s m not only wages an u n c o m p r o m i s ing struggle against idealism b u t also specially studies its historical and epistemological c o n d i t i o n i n g , and its social, t h e o r e t i c a l , a n d psychological s o u r c e s a n d o r g a n i c link with t h e real c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , difficulties, a n d p r o b l e m s of d e v e l o p i n g k n o w l e d g e ( a n d not just of philosophical k n o w l e d g e , of course). F r o m t h a t point of view idealism is not simply an e p i p h e n o m e n o n of t h e socio-historical process, a g r o u n d l e s s fallacy, or d e l i b e r a t e mystification. Dialectical m a t e r i a l i s m does not t h r o w idealist p r o p o s i t i o n s o v e r b o a r d , but analyses t h e m in essence, a n d revises those t h a t c o n t a i n r a t i o n a l e l e m e n t s , i m p o r t a n t a s s u m p t i o n s a n d guesses, a n d pose i m p o r t a n t questions. L e n i n c o n s i d e r e d a c r i t i q u e of idealism t h a t m e r e l y rejected idealist a r g u m e n t s a v u l g a r materialist one.
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P l e k h a n o v [he w r o t e ] criticises Kantianism (and agnosticism in g e n e r a l ) m o r e from a vulgar-materialistic s t a n d p o i n t than from a dialecticalmaterialistic standpoint, insofar as he merely rejects their views a limine, but does not correct them (as Hegel c o r r e c t e d K a n t ) , d e e p e n i n g , generalising and e x t e n d i n g them, s h o w i n g the connetin and t r a n s i t i n s o f each and every concept ( 1 4 4 : 1 7 9 ) .

A scientific c r i t i q u e of idealism is its demystification, study of t h e c o n t e n t of an idealist d o c t r i n e that is essentially i n d e p e n d e n t of it. R e c o g n i t i o n of t h e richness of idealism's c o n t e n t differs radically f r o m t h e simplified view t h a t it is i n c o m p a t i b l e with inquiry c r o w n e d b y real discoveries. T h e logic of t h a t a r g u m e n t is as follows: fallacy n e v e r leads t o t r u t h . S u c h a n a r g u m e n t i g n o r e s t h e r e a l historical, p s y c h o logical, a n d epistemological p r o b l e m a n d r e p r e s e n t s a n a t t e m p t to get r o u n d t h e c o m p l i c a t e d question of the c o n t r a d i c t o r y d e v e l o p m e n t of k n o w l e d g e by m e a n s of g e n e r a l p h r a s e s . T h e history of s c i e n c e p r o v i d e s t h o u s a n d s of e x a m p l e s of how, in fact, false ideas h a v e h e l p e d in t h e c o u r s e of
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scientific development to discover new phenomena and laws. T h e theory of phlogiston helped chemistry emancipate itself from alchemism. T h e fruitless attempts to create perpetual motion promoted discovery of the law of the conservation of energy. A dialectical understanding of the 'truth-error' relationship is needed even more in research in the history of philosophy than in natural science. Lenin wrote that 'Leibnitz through theology arrived at the principle of the inseparable (and universal, absolute) connection of matter and motion' (144:377). A metaphysically thinking person does not, of course, understand how the philosopher arrived at the truth through theology. Theology leads away from truth. But Leibniz was not a theologian of course in spite of his essentially theological fallacies. T h e object of his inquiry was not religious dogmas but real problems of philosophy and natural science. Creationism put him on the scent of the idea of the unity of the world. T h e profound idea of the link of motion and matter seemed a necessary conclusion to him from the theological conception of a single (created) universe. But he endeavoured to substantiate this idea by an investigation of the facts. It was not by chance, of course, that dialectical logic arose in the womb of German classical idealism. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel were dialecticians not in spite of their idealist convictions; at that time a materialist dialectics as a philosophical science was in general impossible. While, as Engels put it, 'the relation of idealist dialectics to rational dialectics is the same as ... that of the phlogistic theory to the theory of Lavoisier' (51:49), i.e. to a scientific understanding of heat, an unscientific form of dialectics necessarily preceded its scientific one. It is naive to suggest that a scientific system of views can arise immediately, in ready-made form. An idealist theory proves, in certain historical conditions, to be the prehistory of the scientific solution of a problem. A dialectical-materialist analysis of idealist fallacies does not boil down, of course, to bringing out the richness of their content. If one limited oneself to that, one would not get a historical analysis of those errors but a glossing over of idealism's hostility to the scientific outlook on the world. It is therefore important to show that when idealism expresses an essentially correct idea, it inevitably distorts its content, passing it off as confirmation of its basic fallacy. Let me cite Schelling as an example: when criticising mechanistic natural philosophy and counterposing a dialectical understanding of nature to it, he interpreted it in a spirit of mysticism.
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As soon as we trespass in the held of organic nature, all mechanical linking of cause and effect ceases for us [he wrote]. Every organic product exists for itself, and its existence does not depend on any other existence (239:690).

In reality the animate does not exist outside mechanical relations, but includes them; the animate, of course, does not possess absolute autonomy. Schelling was clearly mistaken when he claimed that life, as a specific organisation, ' produces itself and originates from itself' ( ibid .) He criticised mechanism, rejecting this historically progressive view of nature in the name of idealism. But his idealist natural philosophy had a dialectical character. That gave Asmus grounds for the following conclusion:
Schelling's basically idealist view of nature played a positive role; it limited the mechanism predominant in eighteenth-century natural science and led to the concept of a universal connection of the things and phenomena of nature (10:269).

The rational ideas, and posing of problems and surmises, that any idealist theory contains are inevitably deformed by its basic anti-scientific trend. They can be revealed by a materialist reworking of the false that, however, contains some elements of the true, rather than by a direct delimitation of the true and the false. The dialectical-materialist critique of idealism differs qualitatively from any other critique of idealist philosophy in being a theoretical, historical, sociological, psychological, and epistemological inquiry into this specific form of social consciousness. I cannot, naturally, examine all the aspects and special problems of this inquiry here; for the present work the most important direction of the critique of idealism is exploration of its epistemological sources. Every idealist fallacy has epistemological roots, i.e. has a profound character and differs in that from a simple logical mistake whose cause is a breach of the rules of logic. There is no sense, of course, in speaking of the epistemological roots of a true statement, since it includes something more, namely an adequate reflection of reality. It is therefore not legitimate to pose the question of the epistemological roots of materialist philosophy, even though the fallacies inherent in certain historical forms of materialism have their epistemological roots. T h e critique of separate idealist conceptions, for example, the theory of innate ideas or conventionalism, includes analysis of their specific epistemological sources. But the basic sense
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of the d o c t r i n e of the epistemological roots of idealism developed by Lenin consists in investigation of the very possibility of idealism as such. T h i s possibility is i m m a n e n t in the process, s t r u c t u r e , and elementary forms of cognition. T h e point, c o n s e quently, is to e x a m i n e idealism as a system of fallacies that has taken shape and developed in the course of cognition and not s o m e w h e r e on its periphery. T h a t is the first point. Secondly, Lenin posed the question of the epistemological characteristics of idealist speculation. T h e possibility of idealism already existed in the first e l e m e n t a r y abstraction, i.e. the singling out of t h e general. T h e general exists in an isolated way only as an abstraction, a concept, a collective n a m e . In objective reality t h e r e is no general without the p a r t i c u l a r and the individual. T h e individual and s e p a r a t e a r e general precisely in this, their universal definiteness. T h e p a r t i c u l a r is also a form of the universal. To single out the general is to c o u n t e r p o s e it to the particular and the individual, since that separates it from them, a c o u n t e r posing that comes about t h r o u g h the linguistic (sign) form of any knowledge. L a n g u a g e fixes the general, a word expresses the general, but as a sign it does not depend on the things that it signifies. This relative i n d e p e n d e n c e of the concept, word, and language in general is manifested in the possibilities of word formation a c c o r d i n g to the rules of g r a m m a r . Hobbes claimed that the word 'perfection' arose from the word 'imperfection' by discarding the prefix 'im'. W h e t h e r or not he was right, it is clear that the possibility of forming new words can be realised independently of the real objects to which they should be related. T h e r e a r e therefore words that signify what does not in fact exist. T h e word 'idea', as I have already said, signified 'form, kind' in Greek. Plato spoke of the form of things, i.e. of how they looked, and how they differed from other things. But because man things had smething inherent in m m n , in spite of individual differences, the word 'kind' was also used to distinguish whole classes of p h e n o m e n a : tables, horses, etc. Plato said: a kind was preserved as something in c o m m o n ( o r identity) in spite of each representative of a kind being mortal. T h e properties of a kind were interpreted as opposed to those of the c o n s t i t u e n t individuals. T h e individuals w e r e sensuously perceived, c o r p o r e a l , mortal, imperfect p h e n o m e n a ; form or kind was supersensory, incorporeal, eternal, perfect essence. I must stress that a one-sided interpretation of the process of transition from perceptions of individual things to concepts
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also leads to this idealist ontology. If t h e r e is a concept of tree in man's consciousness as some essence common to countless single trees, but at the same time different from these individual things because of its generality, one may ask which comes first, the single trees before their common essence or the latter before the single trees. T h a t was roughly the course of Plato's thought, which supposed that only the existence of the idea of a tree enabled a person who saw one to say 'That is a tree'. Sense perception was characterised as recognising things according to the ideas in a person's mind. But where did the ideas come from? T h e y did not come from anywhere, Plato suggested, rejecting the sensualist understanding of eide and counterposing a mystical pseudoexplanation to it based on mythology. He did not just draw a line between the general and the individual, the single and the many, the concept and the thing, but also counterposed them absolutely. T h e general, severed from single things, was transformed into their essence, which was thought of as being outside them. T h e essence was primary: it generated all single things. T h e object whose properties were generalised in the concept (idea) was treated as the consequence of its own properties transformed into an ideal essence. Thus, an idealist system of views arose on the basis of an ontological interpretation of the concept. Aristotle correctly remarked that Plato's theory of ideas was associated with investigation of the essence of concepts. T h a t remark indicates that he was already posing the question of the epistemological roots of idealism, and that is why his critique of Plato's idealism was one of idealism in general. But in his time the question of the relationship of the general and the individual could only be posed in a very general, abstract form. T h e dispute about universals in mediaeval scholasticism, when we abstract the theological pseudoproblems, was a continuation of the discussion between Aristotle and Plato. Mediaeval nominalism was an attempt to correct the inconsistency of Aristotle's critique of the Platonic doctrine of the primacy of ideas. From the standpoint of nominalism things were primary as regards general concepts regarded as collective nouns. T h a t posing of the question was not yet a denial of idealism in general, but was a denial of one of the versions of idealist philosophising. T h e mediaeval nominalists considered single things the result of divine creation. Only the materialist nominalism of modern
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times, in the person of T h o m a s Hobbes, r e a c h e d t h e conclusion that single things ( o r bodies) w e r e the sole reality. L o c k e developed the s a m e point of view, t h o u g h inconsistently. Both of these materialists interpreted the general only as a p h e n o m e n o n of consciousness, a m o d e of uniting sense perceptions that related to individual objects. In opposition to rationalism, w h i c h substantiated the objectivity of the g e n e r a l , L o c k e said: 'general and universal belong not to the real existence of things; but are the inventions and creatures of the understanding, m a d e b y i t f o r its o w n u s e ' ( 1 5 2 : 3 3 0 ) . T h e empiricist materialists supposed that idealism (they had i n m i n d its r a t i o n a l i s t v e r s i o n ) w a s i n e v i t a b l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h recognition of the objective reality of the general. But Berkeley h a d a l r e a d y c o n s t r u c t e d a n o m i n a l i s t system of idealism in which such concepts as 'matter' and 'substance' were no more than names, because there were no universal essences but only individual sensations and combinations of same, which formed w h a t w e r e called t h i n g s . B u t t h e ' t h i n g ' o r ' b o d y ' a s s u c h did not exist. T h e flimsiness of Berkeley's subjective idealism did n o t r u l e o u t this false d o c t r i n e ' s distorting the real r e l a t i o n between abstractions and the p h e n o m e n a from which they were drawn.
Matter as such [ E n g e l s w r o t e ] is a p u r e c r e a t i o n of thought a n d an abstraction. We leave out of a c c o u n t the qualitative differences of things in lumping them together as corporeally existing things under the c o n c e p t m a t t e r ( 5 1 : 2 5 5 )

It did not follow from that, h o w e v e r , he stressed, that 'fruit as such' existed and that real apples, pears, and cherries were only modification of them. Metal as such, gas as such, chemical c o m p o u n d s a s s u c h did not exist, a c c o r d i n g t o h i m , s i n c e t h e general could only be separated from the particular and individual m e n t a l l y , by w a y of a b s t r a c t i o n ( i b i d . ) . T h e various forms of idealism thus have their epistemological s o u r c e in a l a w - g o v e r n e d splitting of k n o w l e d g e , a c o n t r a d i c tion between the rational a n d sensory, the theoretical and e m pirical. Idealist philosophising is a c o n s e q u e n c e of an u n r e s t r a i n e d abstracting which, not conforming to the nature of objects, oversteps the measure of abstraction, so to speak, and ultimately replaces the objects by abstractions.
Is it s u r p r i s i n g [ K a r l M a r x w r o t e ] t h a t , if y o u let d r o p little by little all t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s t h e i n d i v i d u a l i t y of a h o u s e , l e a v i n g o u t first of all t h e m a t e r i a l s of w h i c h it is c o m p o s e d , t h e n t h e f o r m t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s it, y o u e n d up w i t h n o t h i n g b u t a b o d y ; t h a t , if y o u l e a v e o u t o f a c c o u n t t h e limits o f t h i s b o d y , y o u s o o n h a v e n o t h i n g b u t a s p a c e t h a t if, f i n a l l y , y o u l e a v e o u t o f a c c o u n t t h e d i m e n s i o n s 268

of this space, there is absolutely nothing left but pure quantity, the logical category? If we abstract thus from every subject all the alleged accidents, animate or inanimate, men or things, we are right in saying that in the final abstraction, the only substance left is the logical categories (175:98-99).

T h e reduction, not limited by any bounds whatever and therefore an illegitimate reduction, of all sense-perceived reality to logical determinations, is often comprehended as a continuous penetration into the essence of phenomena. By breaking away from reality a philosopher preserves the illusion of an ever closer approximation to it. T h a t is how the real possibility of idealism a r i s e s . Subjectivism is thus the main epistemological source of both subjective and objective idealism. Subjectivity, as a capacity for abstract thinking, for creating and operating with signs, and for oversimplification of the real picture of things in order to know them better, is a necessary cognitive and creative capacity of man without which no intellectual activity whatsoever is possible. Subjectivism, howeverits negative aspect, the possibility of which can never be excludedconsists in ignoring the need to reflect objective reality and in neglect of the epistemological imperative that any really cogitative thinking must willy-nilly observe. Transformation of necessary and fruitful subjectivity into subjectivism and 'subjective blindness' (in Lenin's expression ( 1 4 4 : 3 6 1 ) ) . Such is the main path of the forming of the idealist outlook on the world. Objective idealism absolutises the relative independence of theoretical thinking from empirical data. T h a t is not only how apriorism arises but also how the notion of the possibility of supersensory knowledge, and a conviction of the existence of transcendent reality comes about. T h a t relative independence of the theoretical from the empirical, however, includes the possibility of subjective idealism, which supposes that knowledge creates the object of knowing, which becomes the object of sense perception as a result of this usually unconscious creative act. Such are the epistemological roots of Neokantian subjective idealism and neopositivist conventionalism. Unlike the other varieties of subjective idealism phenomenalism is epistemologically rooted in a subjectivist interpretation of the content of sense perceptions. This interpretation fixes the fact that subjectivity, the inherent form of sense perceptions, cannot help affecting their content. T h e form and content of sense perceptions are not absolutely opposed to one another, of course, but the dialectic of this opposition does
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not eliminate the real difference between them. Underestimation of this difference constitutes the real possibility of idealism. Idealist empiricism c o u n t e r p o s e s the sensuous to the abstract, by which means the objective forms of universality are cognised. T h i s opposition leads to a subjectivist interpretation not only of the content of the abstract concepts but also of the sensations themselves. Subjective idealism of an empiricist h u e often poses as epistemological naturalism, which denies the reality of the supersensory a n d affirms that only sensations exist a n d that which they form. T h e epistemological s o u r c e of this subjectiveidealist c o n c e p t i o n is a real f e a t u r e of cognition, n a m e l y that sense data a r e really what is given and a r e not p r o d u c e d in the course of cognition, and in that sense must be taken as the starting point.
2 6

Since the sense organs witness to the existence and inherent properties of objects but do not prove their existence, awareness of the difference between the evidence and proof constitutes an i m p o r t a n t stage in the r o a d from naive realism to a scientific, materialist view of t h e w o r l d . But t h e criteria of this delimitation a r e not c o n t a i n e d in c o n s c i o u s n e s s , a n d t h a t fact also f o r m s o n e of the epistemological sources of subjective idealism, which asserts that the d i v i d i n g line b e t w e e n s e n s a t i o n s a n d t h i n g s is nothing other than that between s o m e sensations and others. T h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l roots o f idealism c o m e t o light, c o n s e q u e n t l y , not only in the s t r u c t u r e of cognitive activity but also in the c o u r s e of the d e v e l o p m e n t of k n o w l e d g e , by virtue of w h i c h the possibility of idealist mystification of reality is constantly r e p r o d u c e d . In that case idealism g r o w s from distortions, a n d the absolutising of the truth or a particle of truth that is a result of t h e cognitive process. T h a t also, in p a r t i c u l a r , e x p l a i n s w h y idealism often exists as a parasite on the real a d v a n c e s of s c i e n c e , w h i c h gives it a s e m b l a n c e of scientific character. Lenin criticised P l e k h a n o v for ignoring the link b e t w e e n M a c h i s m and the revolution in physics, stressing that such an a p p r o a c h to idealism contradicted the spirit of the philosophy of M a r x i s m . His c o m m e n t has g e n e r a l methodological significance.
H u m a n knowledge [Lenin wrote] is not (or does not follow) a straight line, but a c u r v e , w h i c h e n d l e s s l y a p p r o x i m a t e s a s e r i e s of c i r c l e s , a s p i ral. A n y f r a g m e n t , s e g m e n t , s e c t i o n o f this c u r v e c a n b e t r a n s f o r m e d ( t r a n s f o r m e d o n e - s i d e d l y ) i n t o a n i n d e p e n d e n t , c o m p l e t e , s t r a i g h t line, w h i c h t h e n (if o n e d o e s n o t s e e t h e w o o d for t h e t r e e s ) l e a d s i n t o t h e q u a g m i r e , into clerical obscurantism ( w h e r e it is anchored by t h e class i n t e r e s t s o f t h e r u l i n g classes) ( 1 4 4 : 3 6 1 ) . 270

Idealism, he stressed, grows from t h e living t r e e of fruitbearing, true, powerful h u m a n knowledge. It is not just a fallacy but fallacious knowledge, a misinterpreting of the facts of objective reality and of consciousness, a distorted understanding of k n o w l edge, and consequently of t h e particles of truth t h a t one idealist or a n o t h e r sometimes discovers. To bring out t h e epistemological roots of t h e idealist conception m e a n s to explicate t h e particle of t r u t h that it contains. Lenin's doctrine of t h e epistemological roots of idealism, A.D. A l e x a n d r o v wrote, pointed out
the general path of consistently scientific struggle against idealism in science. This path consists in distinctly bringing out those features of a theory that idealism illegitimately exaggerates and, thereby, having put these features in their proper place and given them a true explanation, to undercut the very root of idealist interpretations (3:41).

T h a t posing of the problem distinguishes the Marxist critique of idealism in principle from t h e positivist denial of certain idealist doctrines. Neopositivism, in particular the o r d i n a r y language philosophy, criticises objective idealism as empty philosophising and the purest verbalism g e n e r a t e d by t h e structural features of ordinary language, its inevitable imperfections, and other causes that h a v e no direct relation to t h e content of knowledge. Let me dwell, in this connection, on R o u g i e r ' s book Metaphysics and Language. Like other neopositivists, Rougier distinguished the p r i m a r y and the s e c o n d a r y language. T h e first consists of statements, i.e. sentences that do not contain logical terms and can t h e r e fore be called 'atomic'. T h e y express sense data and the words comprising t h e m relate directly to objects. Atomic sentences therefore do not require verification, and t h e ' p r i m a r y language' formed from them is simply a language of facts, i n c o m p a tible with 'idealist' fallacies. T h e 'secondary language' is a n other matter, consisting of 'molecular' sentences built up from sentences of the p r i m a r y language connected by logical constants. Molecular sentences also include concepts of value (true, false), quantifiers (all, s e v e r a l ) , modal concepts (necessary, c h a n c e , possible), etc. N a t u r e does not k n o w negation, or incompatibility, or alternative expressed by the disjunctive or, by a hypothetical j u d g e m e n t that includes if ; t h e r e a r e no classes in it, no quantifiers one, all, several, n o r modalities such as probable, possible, etc. Such terms as 'sense', 'meaning', ' t r u e ' , 'false' relate only to words and not to things. In n a t u r e t h e r e a r e single facts; sentences of the 'secondary language' a r e
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t h e r e f o r e not expressions a b o u t facts. T h e s e n t e n c e 'a b e i n g is m o r t a l or i m m o r t a l ' c o n t a i n s n o t h i n g e x c e p t a t a u t o l o g y ('a being is m o r t a l ' ) , since the question of the existence of an imm o r t a l b e i n g is n o t discussable. T h e s e n t e n c e 'the w o r l d is finite or infinite' is not an expression of even partial k n o w l e d g e of the w o r l d since the very possibility of this or d e p e n d s solely on t h e s y n t a c t i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f t h e l a n g u a g e , i.e. h a s n o r e l a t i o n t o a n y authentic or problematical knowledge. W h i l e natural science formulates empirically verifiable sentences, p h i l o s o p h y (insofar as it d o e s not a d o p t the principles of neopositivism) is c o n c e r n e d with the purest verbalism (according to R o u g i e r ) ; by not delimiting 'primary' and 'second a r y ' l a n g u a g e s , it c o n f u s e s different linguistic systems, levels (for example, formal and physical), properties of n a m e s and properties of objects, a n d so on. As a c o n s e q u e n c e p s e u d o p r o b lems, pseudoconcepts, a n d pseudostatements arise. T h e m e t a p h y s i c i a n , for e x a m p l e , a s c r i b e s the p r o p e r t i e s of objects to classes, w h i c h a r e specific linguistic f o r m a t i o n s a n d no m o r e .
A c l a s s [ R o u g i e r e x p l a i n e d ] , by v i r t u e of t h e t h e o r y of t y p e s , h a s n o n e of t h e a t t r i b u t e s of t h e i n d i v i d u a l s t h a t c o n s t i t u t e it: t h e c l a s s of m o r t a l s is not m o r t a l , t h e c l a s s of s o u n d s is not s o n o r o u s , t h e c l a s s of c o l o u r s is not c o l o u r e d , the class of n u m b e r s is not a w h o l e n u m b e r ( 2 2 8 : 2 0 1 ) .

In that way philosophical categories arise that h a v e no empirical c o n t e n t , since they a r e d r a w n f r o m the l a n g u a g e a n d not from things. All philosophical categories, Rougier suggested, which take their beginning from Parmenides, Plato, and Aristotle, a r e fictions w i t h o u t c o n t e n t . H e classed t h e c o n c e p t s o f m a t t e r , essence, etc., as such fictions. T h e r e is no n e e d to d e m o n s t r a t e that this kind of c r i t i q u e of s p e c u l a t i v e philosophising has a nominalist a n d subjectivist c h a r a c t e r ; its t h e o r e t i c a l p r e m i s s i s t h e n e o p o s i t i v i s t c o n c e p t i o n of p h i l o s o p h y as an activity w h o s e sole goal is to clarify the sense of sentences. Dialectical materialism, in rejecting the n e o positivist r e d u c t i o n of philosophical p r o b l e m s to p s e u d o p r o b lems, also in this c a s e treats t h e fallacy of idealism ( n e o p o s i tivism) as m e a n i n g f u l , with definite historical, psychological, theoretical, and epistemological roots. F r a n c i s B a c o n h a d a l r e a d y in his d o c t r i n e of idols criticised scholastic verbalism, which reproduced certain features of idealist speculation in g e n e r a l in c a r i c a t u r e f o r m . T h i s s p e c u lative v e r b a l i s m also exists in o u r d a y in idealist p h i l o s o p h y . A n d Rougier was basically right w h e n he pointed out that Heidegger's w o r d - s p i n n i n g c r e a t e d an illusion of s o m e o t h e r reality discovered by just this philosopher, a n d that t h e differences
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between das Seiende, das Seiend, das Seiend-sein, die S e i e n d h e i t , Unseiendes, Unsein, das Dasein, das Sosein, a n d das A n d e r s s e i n , did n o t c o r r e s p o n d t o a c t u a l l y e x i s t ing differences (see 2 2 8 : 1 9 2 ) . L a n g u a g e is the form of existe n c e o f t h o u g h t ; its u n i t y w i t h , c o n t e n t h a s a c o n t r a d i c t o r y c h a racter, if only b e c a u s e w o r d s express merely the general. W o r d s and s e n t e n c e s a r e t h e r e f o r e possible that h a v e only an imaginary content. On the other hand, knowledge does not always find adequate expression in language, whose development is stimulated precisely by the need for such adequate expression. T h e epistemological roots of idealism can therefore be b r o u g h t to light not only in sense p e r c e p t i o n s , t h i n k i n g , a n d in t h e p r o cess of cognition, b u t also in t h e l a n g u a g e s p h e r e of h u m a n a c t i v i t y , w h i c h i s c h a r a c t e r i s e d b y r e l a t i v e i n d e p e n d e n c e , specific structure, and patterns of functioning and development. One c a n a g r e e with F r a e n k e l a n d B a r - H i l l e l , w h o m a i n t a i n e d , f r o m a special l o g i c o - m a t h e m a t i c a l study, that a n y l a n g u a g e is
vague and exposed to misunderstanding, even symbolic language (since m a t h e m a t i c a l and logical symbols rest on ordinary language for their i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ) . H e n c e mathematical l a n g u a g e is ambiguous and d e fective; mathematical thought, while strict a n d uniform in itself, is subject to obscurity a n d e r r o r when transferred from one person to a n o ther by m e a n s of speaking or writing ( 6 4 : 2 1 3 ) .

In contrast to R o u g i e r ' s neopositivist a r g u m e n t s , this c o n c r e t e critical c o m m e n t a b o u t the n a t u r e of a n y l a n g u a g e contains no subjectivist-agnostic conclusions. R o u g i e r ' s e r r o r was not that he linked a critique of philosophical fallacies with analysis of language, but r a t h e r that he r e d u c e d philosophical p r o b l e m s to linguistic m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s . As B e r t r a n d Russell correctly pointed out, the s p o k e s m e n of o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e philosophy considered the very e n d e a v o u r to understand the world to be an old-fashioned whimsy. F r o m that angle any philosophical view a b o u t the reality a r o u n d m a n was no m o r e than a g a m e of words. Neopositivism, which has m a d e a valuable critique of speculative verbalism in several respects, has ultimately proved to b e itself i n t h r a l l t o v e r b a l i s m , s i n c e i t e n d e a v o u r e d t o r e d u c e , the content of philosophical doctrines to the words in which t h e y w e r e m e r e l y set o u t . R o u g i e r t r e a t e d t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e linguistic r o o t s of ' m e t a p h y s i c s ' in precisely that spirit; e v e r y thing boiled d o w n to i n c o m p r e h e n s i o n of the n a t u r e of language, uncritical w o r d - u s e , etc. T h e social c o n d i t i o n i n g of philosophical e r r o r s was not taken into account. So, it c a m e about,
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the difference between G e r m a n and French philosophy was d e t e r m i n e d by linguistic differences. T h e philosophy of Marxism has put an end to the ignoring, a l i e n t o s c i e n c e , o f s u c h p h e n o m e n a a s social c o n s c i o u s n e s s , w h i c h i s c o n d i t i o n e d b y social b e i n g , r e f l e c t s t h e l a t t e r , a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y c a n n o t b e e x p l a i n e d f r o m itself. T h a n k s t o t h e materialist conception of history philosophical c o m p r e h e n s i o n of the w o r l d has b e e n u n d e r s t o o d for t h e first t i m e as a s o c i o historical process. T h e e x i s t e n c e of idealist fallacies, which w a s explained o n c e again by misconceptions, has been scientifically explained by investigating the content and development of social c o n s c i o u s n e s s , w h i c h reflects historically d e t e r m i n e d s o cial r e l a t i o n s c o n n e c t e d with p r i v a t e o w n e r s h i p of t h e m e a n s of p r o d u c t i o n , class antitheses, etc. T h e doctrine of the epistemological roots of idealism brings o u t t h e possibility o f t h e r i s e o f t h i s d i s t o r t e d r e f l e c t i o n o f r e a lity. I t d o e s n o t e x p l a i n , a n d i s n o t m e a n t t o e x p l a i n , t h e causes of the e x i s t e n c e of idealism. A sociological investigation of p h i losophical knowledge is necessary to elucidate them; and the basis of such an i n q u i r y c a n only be the materialist c o n c e p t i o n of history. T h e communist transformation of social relations will n o t e l i m i n a t e t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l r o o t s o f i d e a l i s m b u t i t will l i q u i d a t e t h e s o c i o e c o n o m i c s o u r c e s o f t h e i d e a l i s t m y s t i f i c a t i o n o f r e a l i t y . A l i e n a t e d l a b o u r will d i s a p p e a r a n d c o n s e quently the alienation of n a t u r e too. And the m o r e society c o n s c i o u s l y g u i d e s its d e v e l o p m e n t , t h e m o r e , E n g e l s s a i d ,
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will m e n not o n l y feel but also k n o w t h e i r o n e n e s s with n a t u r e , a n d t h e m o r e i m p o s s i b l e will b e c o m e t h e s e n s e l e s s a n d u n n a t u r a l idea o f a c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n m i n d a n d m a t t e r , m a n a n d n a t u r e , soul a n d b o d y , s u c h a s a r o s e a f t e r t h e d e c l i n e o f classical a n t i q u i t y i n E u r o p e a n d o b t a i n e d its highest e l a b o r a t i o n in C h r i s t i a n i t y ( 5 1 : 1 8 1 ) .

Idealism is not e t e r n a l ; this specific type of s y s t e m a t i c e r r o r s will b e c o m e t h e h i s t o r i c a l p a s t , j u s t l i k e t h e r e l i g i o u s ' a s s i m i l a t i o n ' o f t h e w o r l d . T h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f k n o w l e d g e will n o t , o f c o u r s e , e l i m i n a t e e r r o r s a n d m i s c o n c e p t i o n s b u t i t will b e q u i t e c a p a b l e of eliminating a world outlook based on fallacies ( a n d to some extent is already doing so n o w ) . 4. T h e Dialectical-Materialist Critique of Idealism. T h e Principle of the Partisanship of Philosophy Philosophical propositions, both t r u e and false, h a v e a sensible c h a r a c t e r , in spite of the claims of neopositivists. U n d e r
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'sense' we m e a n the content of a statement. T h e r e is no sense without a statement, i.e. without t h e subject's ideas or e x p e r i ences definitely formulated in the ordinary or an artificial language. But t h e r e is no sense as well without content, i.e. without what refers to the object. T h e preceding section was devoted to exploring the epistemological sense of idealist e r r o r s . H e r e I want to go into t h e question of t h e social sense of philosophical propositions. T h a t aspect of idealist philosophising undoubtedly has a p a r a m o u n t place in the dialectical-materialist critique of i d e a l i s m . Before M a r x philosophical propositions w e r e appraised only as t r u e or false. While stressing the fundamental significance of that appraisal, which meets t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of scientific c h a r a c t e r , we still consider it unsatisfactory. T h e point is not just (and not so m u c h ) that many philosophical propositions c a n n o t in general be evaluated by that two-point system, since they formulate definite hypotheses or substantiate certain social needs, but mainly, it would seem, that philosophical ideas and doctrines a r e powerful spiritual factors of social development. T h e founders of M a r x i s m considered it necessary in principle to introduce a differentiation which did not exist before t h e m , between progressive and r e a c t i o n a r y philosophical conceptions, stressing its concrete, historical c h a r a c t e r , since one and the same conception m a y play an essentially different social role as a c o n s e q u e n c e of a c h a n g e in the c h a r a c t e r of social development. M a r x and Engels were the first to begin treating the development of philosophy in connection with the historically determined s t r u c t u r e of society, the struggle of classes, and t h e t r a n sition from one social formation to a n o t h e r . In particular, they established the existence of bourgeois philosophy; they called the philosophical doctrine they developed the philosophy of the proletariat. This fundamentally new a p p r o a c h to the a n a lysis of philosophical doctrines is o n e of the most i m p o r t a n t p r o positions of historical materialism. Marxism d e m o n s t r a t e d t h e scientific flimsiness of the idealist conception of philosophical knowledge standing above history, explored the historical roots of t h e metaphysical opposing of philosophy to social practice, and substantiated the principle of the partisanship of philosophy as a scientific methodological principle of the study of its c h a n g i n g social content. T h a n k s to the Marxist history of philosophy it b e c a m e u n d e r s t a n d a b l e , for the first time, that the traditional conception of a philosophy being above a n y party allegiance was a fallacy that could only be properly u n d e r s t o o d as a reflection of historically transient
28

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features of the d e v e l o p m e n t of philosophy, an unscientific reflection, without d o u b t , since it did not d r a w a line b e t w e e n t h e a p p e a r a n c e or semblance and the essence of philosophic k n o w ledge. If philosophers w e r e c o n v i n c e d for centuries that their d o c t r i n e s w e r e a b o v e p a r t y , o n e m a y well ask w h a t did t h e y h a v e in mind? Doesn't the term 'above party' indicate (indirectly, of c o u r s e ) s o m e essential feature of philosophy that has n o t h i n g in c o m m o n , h o w e v e r , with being a b o v e party? Doesn't it turn o u t , t h u s , t h a t this t e r m ( a n d t h e c o n t e n t a s s o c i a t e d w i t h it) i s an i n a d e q u a t e characterisation of the real status of philosophy? T h e idea of p h i l o s o p h y being a b o v e p a r t y , which w a s d e f e n d e d by t h e g r e a t p h i l o s o p h e r s , c a n n o t s i m p l y be a fiction without content, although the idea undoubtedly concealed hypocrisy, servility, s u b o r d i n a t i o n to political reaction, a n d indifference to the sufferings and struggle of the oppressed and exploited. T h e conception of philosophy being above party, in short, deserves e x p l o r a t i o n as a p h e n o m e n o n of social c o n s c i o u s n e s s ; this false idea is m o r e t h a n s i m p l y p r e j u d i c e or a s e mantic misunderstanding. P h i l o s o p h y a r o s e a s t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e ; its d i s t i n g u i s h i n g f e a t u r e was 'uselessness', the r e a s o n s for w h i c h lay both in t h e u n d e v e l o p e d c h a r a c t e r of theory a n d the limited c h a r a c t e r of social practice. It was often t h e r e f o r e c h a r a c t e r i s e d as k n o w ledge for the s a k e of k n o w l e d g e , a n d n o t for the s a k e of a n y t h i n g u s e f u l . A r i s t o t l e s a i d o f it: ' a l l t h e s c i e n c e s , i n d e e d , a r e m o r e n e c e s s a r y t h a n this, b u t n o n e i s b e t t e r ' ( 8 : 5 0 1 ) . T h e f o r m i n g o f that a t t i t u d e to k n o w l e d g e w a s an i m p o r t a n t l a n d m a r k in m a n k i n d ' s intellectual d e v e l o p m e n t . D e n i a l of a link b e t w e e n p h i l o sophy and non-philosophical needs and interests was clearly a s o u r c e o f t h e i d e a l i s t n o t i o n o f its b e i n g a b o v e p a r t y . We k n o w , h o w e v e r , that G r e e k philosophers often took an active part in the political struggle of their time. T h e y usually remained, however, theoreticians w h e n d e a v u r e d nt so m u c h to c o p e with c e r t a i n c u r r e n t political p r o b l e m s as to d e v e l o p a definite social-political ideal. T h a t stance, not directly linked with topics of the day, s e e m e d a b o v e party since it differed f r o m the particular positions of the separate factions of the ruling class. Aristotle w a s an ideologist of the ruling class of a s l a v e - o w n i n g society. He belonged to the M a c e d o n i a n party, but the special i n t e r e s t s o f t h e p a r t y c o u l d n o t find r e f l e c t i o n i n h i s p h i l o s o p h y . T h e interests of any o n e class, for e x a m p l e the bourgeoisie, find reflection in t h e political activity of several parties, t h e differences
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between which a r e s e c o n d a r y , as a rule, despite the fact that they m a y c a r r y on a fierce struggle for p o w e r with one another to implement their private political ends. And the fact that a philosopher reflecting the radical interests of that class rises above its s e p a r a t e factions seems on the surface to be a rejection of parly position. But if he, on the c o n t r a r y , is a representative of one of these factions, that gives g r o u n d s for asserting that, as a spokesman of it, he is not, strictly speaking, a philosopher, since a philosopher as the c r e a t o r of a philosophical doctrine c a n n o t be an a d h e r e n t or opponent, for e x a m p l e , of the c o r n laws defended by the T o r i e s in the early nineteenth c e n t u r y . If the d o c t r i n e of the Eleatics about being, for example, or the P y t h a g o r e a n theory of n u m b e r s , was independent of the political line that supporters of those doctrines pursued, statement of the fact can suggest the idea that philosophers' sociopolitical views are only outwardly related to their basic t e a c h ing, and that these views o c c u r in general insofar as the philosopher remains a person, yields to the influence of various circumstances, and adopts an 'unphilosophic' stance. According to Hegel philosophy was above party because the 'absolute spirit' philosophised in t h e form of a h u m a n . T h a t may a p p e a r a kind of ontological justification of the idea of the above-party c h a r a c t e r of philosophy, but closer analysis incidentally shows, r a t h e r that it substantiates something else, viz., the need for a scientifically objective investigation excluding subjective arbitrariness. ' T o that end,' Hegel wrote, 'there is required an effort to keep back the incessant impertinence of our own fancies and private opinions' ( 8 6 : 2 9 4 ) . Observance of that requirement, however, does not in the least exclude a social direction of philosophy. Hegel himself also understood that to some extent, in spite of his absolutising of philosophical consciousness. He ridiculed, for e x a m p l e , the d e m a n d that 'the historian should p r o c e e d with impartiality ' ( 8 7 : 2 7 7 ) . In particular, that r e q u i r e m e n t (he wrote) was
29

often and especially made on the history of philosophy: where it is insisted there should be no prepossession in favour of an idea or opinion, just as a judge should have no special sympathy for one of the contending parties. In the case of the judge it is at the same time assumed that he would administer his office ill and foolishly, if he had not an interest, and an exclusive interest in justice, if he had not that for his aim and one sole aim, or if he declined to judge at all. This requirement which we may make upon the judge may be called partiality for justice; and there is no difficulty here in distinguishing it from subjective partiality. But in speaking of the impartiality required from the historian, this self-satisfied insipid chatter lets the distinction disappear, and rejects both kinds of interest (87:277).

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Hegel c o u n t e r p o s e d r e a l partiality, which p r o c e e d s from a n d is guided by t h e objective, to t h e a r b i t r a r y will of t h e subject, 'subjective partiality'. H e t h u s distinguished b e t w e e n p e r s o n a l a n d social interests. A g e n u i n e s c h o l a r is always a b o v e a n y p e r sonal interests; he dismisses t h e m , i g n o r i n g t h e m for the s a k e of t h e interests of t h e m a t t e r . But the s a m e s c h o l a r c a n n o t , a n d in essence d o e s not, wish to be a b o v e social interests; he is c o n sciously guided by t h e m to t h e e x t e n t t h a t he is a w a r e of t h e m a n d recognises t h e i r necessity. Bourgeois s c h o l a r s as a rule t r e a t the idea of t h e partiality or p a r t i s a n s h i p of philosophy (and of t h e social s c i e n c e s in g e n e ral) as s o m e t h i n g foreign to science, imposed on it from outside. T h e fact that this idea h a d a l r e a d y been e x p r e s s e d by Hegel, and to s o m e e x t e n t by o t h e r o u t s t a n d i n g t h i n k e r s , too, is usually passed over in silence. T h e idea of partiality is t h u s passed off as an ' i n v e n t i o n ' of M a r x i s m t h a t b r e a k s c o m p l e t e l y with the traditions of science. T h e Marxist d o c t r i n e of t h e p a r t i s a n s h i p of p h i l o s o p h y is in fact a theoretical g r a s p i n g of t h e c o u r s e of the history of philosophy that could not be m a d e by p r e - M a r xian p h i l o s o p h e r s , p r i m a r i l y b e c a u s e they all c l u n g to an idealist u n d e r s t a n d i n g of history. T h e y m a d e social being d e p e n d e n t upon social consciousness. T h e question of the reflection of t h e socio-historical process in philosophical c o n s c i o u s n e s s was e x c l u d e d in fact from scientific e x a m i n a t i o n . T h e f a t h e r s of M a r x i s m e x p l o r e d t h e historical c o u r s e of t h e m o u l d i n g of b o u r g e o i s philosophy as a reflection of the f o r m ing of the capitalist social system, a n d of the struggle of the b o u r g e o i s i e and the w h o l e third estate against t h e d o m i n a n t feudal relations a n d the religious ideology that c o r r e s p o n d e d to t h e m . T h e materialist c o n c e p t i o n of history not only interpreted the d e v e l o p m e n t of philosophical ideas in a new way but also s h o w e d how t h e b o u r g e o i s c h a r a c t e r of t h e social t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s c o n d i t i o n e d the idealist c o n c e p t i o n of the a b o v e - p a r t y c h a r a c t e r of philosophy. T h e b o u r g e o i s r e v o l u t i o n s signified victory of t h e new social system o v e r feudal provincialism, s e p a r a t i s m , p a r t i c u l a r i s m , c o r p o r a t i o n s , caste privileges, etc. T h e f o r m a t i o n of n a t i o n s in the m o d e r n sense, t h e liquidation of feudal exclusiveness, t h e p r o g r e s s i n g d e v e l o p m e n t of e c o n o m i c relations, t h e f o r m i n g of centralised states, a n d t h e f o u n d i n g of b o u r g e o i s - d e m o c r a t i c institutions all h a d t h e i r ideological e x p r e s s i o n in t h e b o u r g e o i s idea of t h e common good as t h e m o r a l basis of t h e g o a l - o r i e n t ed c o m m u n i t y of p e o p l e . In e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y b o u r g e o i s i d e o logy this idea w a s f o r m u l a t e d as an a x i o m a t i c a l l y o b v i o u s c o n 30

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viction that the common, highest interests of the nation were higher than any particular, vested interests of either separate members of society or of big social groups and classes. T h e general national upsurge, and bourgeois-democratic illusions, undoubtedly encouraged not only bourgeois politicians but also spokesmen of the then proletariat to categorically counterpose the idea of the unity of the nation to the idea of partisanship. During the Great French Revolution the proletariat of Rheims sent the spinner Jean-Baptiste Armonville to the Convention; he preached 'anarchy and agrarian law' at meetings of the people, for which bourgeois contemporaries called him, no less, the 'ringleader of the Rheims rabble'. This proletarian of the eighteenth century accused the bourgeoisie of 'unwise partiality', opposing it by a striving for the 'common good' and 'ardent patriotism' that did not suffer any partisanship that infringed the validity of fraternity and rational freedom, encroaching on reason, fairness, and justice (see 134; cited from the Russian translation of 1925, pp. 24, 2 7 ) . Such was the historical situation that gave the idea of impartiality an anti-feudal sense, so veiling its bourgeois content, incompatible with the interests of the working people. T h e same anti-feudal edge and enlightenment illusions about the real essence of the bourgeois reforms strengthened the appearance of being above party inherent in philosophy. T h e convictions of bourgeois philosophers associated with that appearance were not hypocrisy but fallacy, were the ideological form in which the bourgeoisie understood its historically limited goals as having world-historical importance. T h e founders of bourgeois philosophy proclaimed, as a counter to the mediaeval tradition, that the sole principle that philosophy and science should conform to was that of truth independent of any authority. Any view, belief, or moral, political, religious, and other considerations and interests should reverence the truth because there was nothing higher than it. T h e cult of truth, which was shared equally by rationalists and adherents of empiricism, was directly realised as the principle of being above party, but was essentially the party position of the progressive bourgeoisie. 'Impartiality' meant, then, denial of feudal partiality. But since the party c h a r a c t e r of this denial could not be realised from the stance of the politically still undivided third estate, it took the illusory form of a denial of partiality in general. J o n a t h a n Swift wrote: 'I meddle not the least with any Party, but write without Passion, Prejudice, or Ill-will against any Man or N u m b e r of Men what-soever' (253:277).
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But the bourgeoisie of that time was really fighting for science against religion, for progress against feudal reaction, for truth against what had been proclaimed as truth only because it acc o r d e d with a u t h o r i t y , t r a d i t i o n a n d p o w e r (lay o r c l e r i c a l ) . T h e ideologists of the bourgeoisie c o n d e m n e d partiality from the standpoint of an u n c o n s c i o u s partiality as a manifestation of selfishness, subjectivity, a n d p a r t i c u l a r i s m , which w e r e c o m pletely i n c o m p a t i b l e with the u n c o n d i t i o n a l universality of truth. L e n i n disclosed t h e d e e p social roots of this historically inevitable a n d progressive 'impartiality' in his article ' T h e S o cialist P a r t y a n d N o n - P a r t y R e v o l u t i o n i s m ' , i n w h i c h h e d e monstrated that the bourgeois revolution, insofar as it was overt h r o w i n g the feudal system a n d ' t h e r e b y p u t t i n g into effect t h e d e m a n d s o f all t h e c l a s s e s o f b o u r g e o i s s o c i e t y ' , i n e v i t a b l y r e v e a l e d itself ' i n t h e ' ' p o p u l a r " , a t first g l a n c e n o n - c l a s s , n a t u r e o f t h e s t r u g g l e o f all c l a s s e s o f a b o u r g e o i s s o c i e t y a g a i n s t a u t o c r a c y a n d feudalism' ( 1 4 6 : 7 6 ) . T h e specific f e a t u r e of a b o u r geois revolution, he explained, was that the whole social m o v e ment acquired an appearance of non-partisanship.
3 2

T h e u r g e for a ' h u m a n ' , civilised life, (he u r g e to o r g a n i s e in d e f e n c e of h u m a n dignity, for one's rights as man a n d citizen, takes hold of e v e r y o n e , u n i t e s all classes, v a s t l y o u t g r o w s all p a r t y b o u n d s a n d s h a k e s u p p e o p l e w h o a s yet a r e v e r y far f r o m b e i n g a b l e t o rise t o p a r t y a l l e giance (146:77).

T h i s specific f e a t u r e o f a b o u r g e o i s r e v o l u t i o n e m e r g e s all t h e m o r e in philosophy as an a p p e a r a n c e of impartiality since philosophy is r e m o v e d from the e c o n o m i c basis of society m o r e than any other form of social consciousness. T h e consolidation of the capitalist system gave bourgeois philosophy a conservative, protective character, with the cons e q u e n c e that the ideal of impartiality, which h a d previously been directly aimed against feudal reaction, was now opposed to the class d e m a n d s of the proletariat, which w e r e morally c o n d e m n e d as a c o r p o r a t e position incompatible with the interests of society as a whole. T h e d e v e l o p m e n t of capitalist society's a n tagonistic c o n t r a d i c t i o n s necessarily alters the specific, historical content of the a p p e a r a n c e of impartiality. Let me cite an example. In the mid-nineteenth century Comte, the founder of 'sober', 'scientific', positivist p h i l o s o p h y , c o n v i n c e d the F r e n c h proletariat that
t r u e h a p p i n e s s h a s n o n e c e s s a r y c o n n e c t i o n with w e a l t h ; t h a t i t d e p e n d s far m o r e o n f r e e p l a y b e i n g g i v e n t o t h e i r i n t e l l e c t u a l , m o r a l , a n d social q u a l i t i e s . . . T h e y will c e a s e t o a s p i r e t o t h e e n j o y m e n t s o f w e a l t h a n d power (37:418-419).

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This example shows that bourgeois 'impartiality', a form of struggle against reactionary forces and traditions historically inevitable in the age of the assault on feudalism, has naturally been transformed into the hypocrisy of a semi-official or nonofficial apology for capitalism. It was to that kind of 'impartiality' that Lenin's profound, wrathful words referred when he said:
the non-party principle in bourgeois society is merely a hypocritical, disguised, passive expression of adherence to the party of the well-fed, of the rulers, of the exploiters (146:79).
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T h e principle of the partiality of philosophy, like that of any social knowledge, is thus a necessary conclusion from the materialist understanding of social consciousness. Attempts to isolate philosophy from other forms of social consciousness as a special domain of pure, uninterested contemplation do not stand up to criticism. An appearance of impartiality is essentially inherent in all forms of prevailing bourgeois ideology. T h e bourgeois legal consciousness is an illusory consciousness of the natural justice and fairness of the relations existing between labour and capital, since they are of a 'voluntary' character. Application of one yardstick to unequal people is perceived by the man of capitalist society as the principle of equality of all citizens before the law. Marxism exposed the semblance of law being above party, showing that it was the will of the dominant class raised to a law. T h e character of this law is determined in no small degree by the resistance put up by the exploited to the exploiting class. That, too, helps preserve the illusion that the law prevailing in bourgeois society expresses the interests of all. An appearance of being above party is likewise inherent in bourgeois morality; it proclaims its copybook maxims to be eternal, invariant norms of interpersonal relations. But the actual interpersonal relations in bourgeois society are directly opposed to the generally proclaimed and substantiated maxims. And these actual, unwritten morals have a class, party character by virtue of which man's attitude to man in the conditions of capitalist society is largely determined by what class or social group an individual belongs to. Religion has an appearance, even greater than philosophy, of being impartial under the capitalist system. The struggling classes usually profess the same religion, and they acquire a seeming unity in it, and religion precisely aspires to it in order to reconcile the opposing classes, whose struggle under advanced capitalism usually lacks a religious disguise. But 'above-party' religion inculcates submissiveness and patience in the oppres281

sed and exploited; it also gives their protest against the d o m i n a n t social relations a mitigated, conformist c h a r a c t e r . T h e M a r x i a n critique of bourgeois philosophy, bourgeois religion, bourgeois law, etc., is above all an unmasking of its intrinsic a p p e a r a n c e of being a b o v e class and above party, which is g e n e r a t e d not only by t h e history of capitalist production but also by the inner objective patterns of its functioning. T h e Marxist theory of class struggle scientifically explains why bourgeois ideology preaches t h e idea of impartiality, and why socialist ideology is a n e gation of this false idea, which reflects only a p p e a r a n c e . Lenin wrote:
The most purposeful, most comprehensive and specific expression of the political struggle of classes is the struggle of parties. The non-party principle means indifference to the struggle of parties... Hence, in practice, indifference to the struggle does not at all mean standing aloof from the struggle, abstaining from it, or being neutral. Indifference is tacit support of the strong, of those who rule (146:79).

And he drew a conclusion of immense principled significance, to wit, impartiality is a bourgeois idea, partisanship a socialist one. Bourgeois philosophers often express the opinion that philosophy differs from other forms of knowledge in its disinterestedness in coping with practical tasks, its striving in the realm of p u r e theory, u n c o n n e c t e d with practice and the stormy worldly sea, and in intellectual i n d e p e n d e n c e from e v e r y t h i n g that is acknowledged and sanctified by every kind of authority. In the 1840s the Young Hegelian M a x Stirner formulated this philosophical illusion as follows: 'A philosopher is only such who sees heaven in the world, the heavenly in the earthly, and the divine in the worldly, and proves or d e m o n s t r a t e s it' ( 2 5 0 : 8 7 ) . In The German Ideology M a r x and Engels ridiculed this illusion of alienated philosophical consciousness, which in effect reconciled itself with all that exists, since the latter was claimed to be foreign to philosophy. Stirner was a lower middle-class ideologist, and his notion of the unworldly essence of philosophy reflected in a way the indefinite position of that class g r o u p . In our day attempts of that kind to understand philosophy as thinking remote from everything that affects in o n e way or other non-philosophical consciousness, a r e no less c o m m o n than in the last century. T h e Belgian philosopher Flam, for instance, starting from the thesis that philosophical thought was universal and that it existed only as 'free t h o u g h t ' and was identical in essence with it, concluded that
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philosophy should serve no one, neither theology nor science, and not a social movement. To demand that a philosopher serve a social movement is to make him cease to be a philosopher (61:167).

T h e s e statements clearly illustrate t h e irreconcilable opposition between t h e philosophy of Marxism a n d bourgeois, illusorily impartial p h i l o s o p h y . Bourgeois critics of t h e idea of the partisanship of social knowledge treat t h e p a r t y position in t h e r e a l m of theory as bias, prejudice, a predilection for dogma, an incapacity for i n d e p e n dent tackling of questions and critical analysis of one's own convictions, and absence of a readiness to learn from the differently minded, to listen to the a r g u m e n t s of the opposite side, and to evaluate the state of affairs calmly and without bias. P a r t i s a n ship is depicted as an obsession a m o u n t i n g sometimes to fanaticism, as a conviction whose premiss is disagreement with all possible opponents, but at the same time as a constant readiness to a g r e e with their assertions w h e n they themselves repudiate them. Many bourgeois philosophers, sociologists, or simply specialists in t h e 'critique' of M a r x i s m , claim that all matters a r e decided in a d v a n c e for t h e partisan person, and that all his convictions a r e no m o r e than suggestions from outside, because such a person has no intellectual or moral i n d e p e n d e n c e . T h e bourgeois critic of partisanship, of course, claims that it is inherent only in Marxism. And that evaluation of Marxism as a doctrine that ignores truth for the sake of partisanship is fobbed off as impartial and unbiassed. T h e r e is no need to d e monstrate that such an interpretation of M a r x i s m is highly p a r tial, and precisely in the bourgeois sense, i.e. foreign to objectivity. Marxism and, consequently, the philosophy of Marxism adopt a partisan position since they do not lay claim to the role of arbiter in the historical battle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and c o m e out directly on the side of the working class and all w h o a r e oppressed and exploited. This partisan p o sition is naturally evaluated by the apologists of capitalism as prejudice and subjectivity, since that is how the bourgeoisie appraises the class d e m a n d s of t h e proletariat. In theory the bourgeois ideologist usually finds a c o u n t e r balance to partisanship in objectivism understood as alien to a subjective a p p r o a c h to the investigative task. But objectivism, interpreted as a denial of partisanship, has nothing in c o m m o n with real scientific objectivity. It is a one-sided and therefore subjectivist statement of definite objective tendencies but at the s a m e time an ignoring of the opposite tendencies whose action alters the course of the process t h a t the objectivist claims to be
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giving a rigorously scientific description of. T h e objectivist consequently ignores such a supremely essential c o m p o n e n t of the socio-historical process as the subjective factor. As Chagin correctly notes, the latter is
the forces of consciousness that man, social groups, classes, nations, and parties put into action. These forces of consciousness are transformed in the course of practice into material forces and affect the reality around man through practice, altering and transforming it (33:3).

Engels criticised 'that self-complacent "objectivity" which sees no further than its nose and precisely for that reason a m o u n t s to the most n a r r o w - m i n d e d subjectivity' ( 1 8 0 : 3 2 7 ) . Lenin subjected Struve's objectivism to systematic criticism; the latter flirted with Marxism and depicted it as a doctrine of insuperable tendencies of social development that c a m e about i n d e p e n d e n tly of the activity of people, classes, parties, etc. Objective historical necessity, Lenin explained, rejecting Struve's 'objectivism' existed, changed and was realised by the activity of classes and parties and to the extent of their social activity. T h e realisation of historical necessity is not an u n a m b i g u o u s p r o cess; its c h a r a c t e r is conditioned by what class is 'managing' it. T h u s bourgeois objectivism, by its social content, turns to be sophisticated bourgeois partisanship, and theoretically a version of the fatalistic conception of the course of history that ignores the dialectical interpenetration of subjective and o b jective internally inherent in it. M a r x , c h a r a c t e r i s i n g the views of R i c a r d o , stressed that the outstanding economist was a conscious defender of the interests of the bourgeoisie. But since he defended the real needs of social development his partisan position did not in the least contradict the aspiration for truth natural to any g e n u i n e scholar. And Marx noted that R i c a r d o ' s inquiries were distinguished by 'scientific impartiality and love of truth' (see 167:1, 4 1 2 ) . A contradiction between partisanship and scientific objectivity arises only when the scholar scorns the real needs of social d e velopment; in that case, however, he also betrays scientific objectivity. T h e g e n u i n e scientist and investigator adopts a definite partisan position not in spite of his research activity or irrespective of it, but precisely because he consistently develops the truths established by him. In his r e m e m b r a n c e s of M a r x , Paul L a f a r g u e c h a r a c t e r i s e d the latter's path to proletarian partisanship as follows:
He did not come to the Communist standpoint through sentimental considerations, although he had a profound sympathy for the sufferings of the working class, but through study of history and political 284

economy; he claimed that any impartial spirit who was not influenced by private interests and not blinded by class prejudices must necessarily come to such conclusions (131:11).

Proletarian, C o m m u n i s t partisanship was thus integrally l i n k e d , f o r M a r x , w i t h tireless s e a r c h for t r u t h , a n d with a most resolute rejection of bourgeois dogmas, ordinary notions, and prejudices. T h e r e a l e x p l o r e r o f t h e social p r o c e s s , p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e o f his i n q u i r y , is a w a r e of t h e n e e d f o r a definite s t a n d in t h e fight b e t w e e n p r o g r e s s i v e a n d r e a c t i o n a r y social f o r c e s . I t w a s t h a t , seemingly, that Engels had in mind when he pointed out that M a r x i s m w a s w i n n i n g s u p p o r t e r s 'in e v e r y c o u n t r y w h i c h c o n tains on the o n e h a n d proletarians and on the other u n d a u n t e d scientific t h e o r e t i c i a n s ' ( 5 0 : 1 3 ) . It seems particularly shocking for the upholders of hypocritical b o u r g e o i s ' i m p a r t i a l i t y ' t h a t M a r x i s m r e g a r d s p h i l o s o p h y (this s p e c u l a t i v e s c i e n c e ! ) a s p a r t i s a n a n d criticises c o n t e m p o r a r y idealist d o c t r i n e s a s s u p p o r t i n g t h e c a p i t a l i s t s y s t e m . B o c h e s k i , w h o s n u b b e d d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m literally a s a d i a bolical d e l u s i o n , n e v e r t h e l e s s c l a i m e d t h a t ' t h e p h i l o s o p h e r will feel e v e n less t h e n e e d for v i c t o r y in a c o n t e s t . . . He is a l w a y s p r e p a r e d t o a b a n d o n his o w n v i e w s i f h e finds t h a t t h e o t h e r p e r s o n ' s i d e a s a r e m o r e c o r r e c t ' ( 1 7 : 1 7 8 ) . But b e i n g c o n s c i o u s , s e e m i n g l y , t h a t s u c h a n u n c t i o u s a r g u m e n t was t o o c o n t r a d i c t o r y t o t h e facts, h e t a c k e d o n : 'Of c o u r s e , w e a r e all m e n ' ( i b i d . ) . T h e p h i l o s o p h e r ' s social position was t h u s e x p l a i n e d simply as h u m a n weakness. T h a t i m a g i n a r y indifference to the s t r u g g l e of classes in b o u r g e o i s s o c i e t y signified s u p p o r t of t h e d o m i n a n t e x p l o i t i n g class. A n d t h e m o r e a b o u r g e o i s p h i l o s o p h e r s h a r e s t h e illusion of i n d e s t r u c t i b i l i t y of capitalist r e l a tions, t h e f u r t h e r his p h i l o s o p h y is f r o m s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l reality a n d its v i o l e n t a n d often t r a g i c collisions. H o w e v e r s u r p r i s i n g it is at first g l a n c e , t h e illusory n o t i o n of t h e e t e r n a l c h a r a c t e r of c a p i t a l i s m still s u r v i v e s in t h e c o n s c i o u s n e s s of a c o n s i d e r a b l e mass of p e o p l e in b o u r g e o i s s o c i e t y , i n c l u d i n g its ideologists. But c a p i t a l i s t r e a l i t y c o n s tantly dispels the illusion. In t h e m i d d l e of t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y t h e m o s t f a r - s e e i n g b o u r g e o i s ideologists w e r e a l r e a d y faced with a n e e d t o c o n c e r n t h e m s e l v e s with c o m p r e h e n d ing class a n t a g o n i s m s instead o f s i m p l y i g n o r i n g t h e m . A l o n g s i d e t h e t r a d i t i o n a l n o t i o n s of p h i l o s o p h y b e i n g a b o v e p a r t y a n e w c o n c e p t i o n w a s t a k i n g s h a p e , viz., t h a t t h e r e c o u l d n o t b e i m p a r t i a l j u d g e m e n t s o n m a t t e r s t h a t affected t h e i n t e r e s t s of p e o p l e .
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If the proposition of the square of the hypotenuse [Taine wrote] had shocked out mental habits, we would very quickly have refuted it. If we had a need to believe that crocodiles were gods, a temple would be raised to them tomorrow on the Place du Carrousel (254:290).

T h o s e words were not only recognition of the d e p e n d e n c e of a certain kind of j u d g e m e n t on h u m a n needs but also a relativist-subjectivist denial of the possibility of objective truth in j u d g m e n t s of that kind. T h i n k e r s who claimed that philosophy was above party supposed that any manifestation of partisanship in it meant rejection of a selfless search for t r u t h . T h a t was precisely how T a i n e interpreted partisanship, with the difference only that he excluded the possibility of impartial social knowledge; philosophers in general did not differ much from other people, they had the same passions, beliefs, and subjective p r e dispositions. ' T h e i r opinions a r e sentiments, their beliefs passions, their faith is their life' ( 2 5 4 : 2 0 8 ) . So, while disputing the traditional conception of philosophy being above party, he s h a r e d the notions of its s u p p o r t e r s about the consequences of partisanship, which seemed to him to be disastrous. T h e subsequent development of bourgeois philosophy in conditions of s h a r p e n i n g class struggle e n c o u r a g e d a consolidation of this tendency to recognise the partisanship of philosophy and a striving to link philosophy directly with b o u r geois politics. T a i n e ' s c o n t e m p o r a r y Nietzsche, for whom a presentiment of the future bitterness of class battles was characteristic, derided the traditional notion of speculative philosophising, which had no marked effect on m a n k i n d ' s history.
How I understand the philosopheras a terrible explosive, endangering everythinghow my concept of the philosopher is worlds removed from any concept that would include even a Kant, not t speak of academic 'ruminants' and other professors of philosophythis essay gives inestimable information about that... (196:281).

Bourgeois philosophers of the pre-imperialist age openly a c knowledged through Nietzsche that the struggle of philosophical ideas was not some sort of show that could be watched with dispassionate gaze; willy-nilly, consciously or unconsciously, we w e r e involved in it. E v e r y o n e takes a stance in the struggle of ideologies either for or against, but the philosopher differs indeed from the n o n philosopher in ideologically substantiating, formulating, and defending a definite social position. Man accepts that water consists of hydrogen and oxygen, and not of o t h e r elements, without protest or approval, simply as fact. But he is far from indifferent to what philosophy says about the material and im286

material, about body and soul, about the world a r o u n d us, about the future of the h u m a n r a c e , and even a b o u t its past. 'Objectivity and objectivism must not be confused', the F r e n c h i r r a tionalist B o u t r o u x declared ( 2 2 : 4 2 7 ) . His words were close to Nietzsche's statements, and at the s a m e time went further. He opposed objectivity to objectivism. His critique of objectivism was very far from scientism and was aimed, moreover, against it. Objectivism, he claimed, was the realm of scientific research, which eliminated m a n ' s relation to the object even when the object was m a n himself. Objectivity, in contrast, was alien to science and formed a specific a c h i e v e m e n t of philosophy, which included the h u m a n relation to the object of k n o w ledge in all its judgements. Philosophical objectivity thus c a m e close to ' n a t u r a l ' h u m a n subjectivity, which was opposed to the soulless objectivism of scientific knowledge. So a revision of the traditional conception of the a b o v e - p a r t y c h a r a c t e r of philosophy began. It was not so far from B o u t r o u x to existentialism, which defines scientific truths as impersonal, and philosophy as an interested, personal view of things, above all of h u m a n reality. Heidegger, for instance, t h o u g h he did n o t speak of the a b o v e party n a t u r e of philosophy, a r g u e d a b o u t the 'mood of thinking' which was fully reserved in p u r e speculation, free of sensuous urges or interests.
It often seems [he wrote] from outside as if thought were completely free of any mood by virtue of its rational notions and calculations. But both the coldness of computation and the prosaic sobriety of a project are a characteristic of certainty. Not only that; even the reason that holds itself to be free of all influences of passion is disposed as such to confidence in the logico-mathematical judiciousness of its principles and rules (95:43).

While Heidegger confined himself to recognition of the dep e n d e n c e of thinking on subjective factors independent of it, Jaspers went further. In his Autobiography he claimed that it was politics that helped deepen philosophical understanding: 'only with my emotional development by politics did my philosophy c o m e to full consciousness' ( 1 1 2 : 5 7 ) . And, generalising the conclusion d r a w n from his own intellectual biography, he categorically declared: ' T h e r e is no philosophy without politics and without political conclusions ( 1 1 2 : 5 6 ) . A third major spokesman of existentialism, J e a n - P a u l S a r t r e , tried to grasp the opposition of the main philosophical trends on the social plane.
A feature of idealism that particularly offends revolutionaries [he 287

wrote] is the tendency to represent the changes of the world as governed by ideas, or better still as changes in ideas (237:210).

In contrast to idealism, materialism was an 'active weapon' in Sartre's conviction. T h a t was not, he declared, a whim of intellectuals or a mistake of philosophers; 'today materialism is the philosophy of the proletariat to the exact extent that the proletariat is revolutionary' ( 2 3 7 : 1 7 4 ) . S a r t r e , incidentally, did not link the revolutionary significance of materialism with the objective truth contained in it; it was 'the sole myth (my italics .. ) that meets revolutionary d e m a n d s ' ( 2 3 7 : 1 7 5 ) . We can thus state that the idealist conception of philosophy being above party has been revised to s o m e extent by bourgeois philosophers themselves, w h o a r g u e m o r e and m o r e often in our day about the inevitable 'involvement' of philosophy. Isn't that evidence that they a r e coming close to recognition and understanding of the correctness of the M a r x i a n conception? Of course not. Even those who directly link philosophy with politics by no means consider themselves bourgeois philosophers, i.e. they suppose they a r e outside parties. T h e i r vulgar, subjectivist interpretation of the partisanship of philosophy is d r a w n from the bourgeois idealist sociology of knowledge. T h e sociology of knowledge, which has taken shape under the undoubted influence of historical materialism, but at the same time in struggle against it, rejects the traditional r e q u i r e ment of a radical elimination of a value orientation from the science of society, which was systematically substantiated by W e b e r back at the beginning of this c e n t u r y . This r e q u i r e m e n t is now explained as out-of-date, impracticable, and even d a n gerous; it both disorientates and ideologically disarms sociology. G u n n a r Myrdal, for instance, wrote:
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There is no way of studying social reality other than from the standpoint of human ideals. A 'disinterested social science' has never existed and, for logical reasons, cannot exist. The value connotation of our main concepts represents our interest in a matter, gives direction to our thoughts and significance to our inferences. It poses the questions without which there are no answers (188:1).

Bourgeois sociology is also beginning to recognise such quite banal truths as that objectivity and neutrality a r e not the s a m e thing. But the whole point is that a value orientation or 'feeling of fidelity' is mainly characterised as a p r o p e r t y inherent in the personality of the r e s e a r c h e r . T h e question of the social interests that got expression in sociological or philosophical theories is left out of a c c o u n t as before. Ideology has b e c o m e a subject of special study for c o n t e m 288

porary bourgeois philosophers and sociologists. Its significance is stressed in every way, and the ideological intentions of social research are being disclosed by sociologists, Some see in them an unavoidable evil, the ineradicable presence of a subjective, human element. Others are ready to examine ideological intentions, as well, as something positive, at least in certain conditions. But no contemporary bourgeois researcher considers himself an ideologist. None of them, as will readily be understood, considers himself a bourgeois theoretician. This halfway stance shows that bourgeois thinkers are incapable of ending the myth of the above-party character of philosophy and social knowledge in general. Such is the nature of bourgeois partisanship; it cannot help donning the toga of impartiality. A vague consciousness that bourgeois partisanship is essentially antipeople finds expression in that fact. T h e bourgeois ideologist inevitably counterposes partisanship and scientific character to one another. This theoretical position reflects the real antithesis between bourgeois partisanship and scientism. Marxian partisanship, on the contrary, is distinguished by its constant link with scientism. In substantiating the principle of partisanship Marx wrote as follows:
But when a man seeks to accommodate science to a viewpoint which is derived not from science itself (however erroneous it may be) but from outside, from alien, external interests, then I call him 'base' (176:119).

Bourgeois vulgarisers of the Marxist principle of partisanship of course do not understand that statement of Marx's. They see in itretreat from the principle of partisanship and so demonstrate their incapacity to understand this great scientific principle. Exploration of the phenomenon of the partisanship of philosophy does not, of course, boil down to bringing out its social content and direction; in that respect, as I stressed above, philosophy does not differ from other forms of social consciousness. But philosophy is a specific form of cognition. As for its content, it relates, as we know, not only to social but also to natural reality, and that, in particular, determines its special place in the system of sciences of nature on the one hand and of society on the other. When a philosopher expresses his opinion on social and political matters, his party position does not differ in principle from that of the sociologist, historian, or economist. Philosophical judgements, it is true, have a more general, abstract character than those of the economist or historian, but this
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difference cannot be taken into consideration in this case although it presents a possibility of interpreting philosophers' socio-political statements in different ways. T h e point that interests me here is something else. Since epistemological and ontological conceptions form the most important content of philosophy, the point is the following: how far are the socio-political ideas expressed by philosophers connected with their ontological and epistemological conceptions? Do they include (of course implicitly) a certain social bias? One needs to specify immediately that there cannot be an unambiguous answer to these questions, since the degree of dependence of some opinion on others differs. Plato's social utopia theoretically comprehended a certain historical experience. It would be a d e p a r t u r e from materialism to consider it simply as a theoretical inference from the doctrine of transcendent ideas. But it would be no less mistaken to ignore the real link of the Platonic theory of the state with the doctrine of immutable ideas of justice, truth, and the beautiful, which, according to Plato, determined this-worldly life. T h e ideal state about which Plato wrote was conceived as the happy outcome of mankind's misadventures through the establishment of a perfect social set-up. T h e doctrine of transcendent ideas substantiated and justified this social ideal. T h e attempt to establish a unity between Berkeley's economic views and his philosophy was hardly crowned with success. But his economic and philosophical views obviously had certain common features that stemmed from his empirical nominalism. That was displayed, for example, in his theory of money. Materialists and idealists, rationalists and empiricists developed a theory of natural law. T h e divergences in the views of Hobbes and Rousseau, Spinoza and Locke on the origin and essence of the state (they were all, we know, supporters of the theory of natural l a w ) , a r e irreducible to philosophical disagreements between them. It is evidence simply that philosophers' socio-political conceptions must not be regarded as logical inferences from their doctrines of the world and knowledge. It would be even more mistaken to try and deduce the ontological and epistemological views of philosophers from their socio-political convictions. Something else is required in order to understand the relation between these views: though not directly connected they supplement one another in some way within the context of a single philosophical theory, materialist or idealist, rationalist or empiricist.
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The philosophical doctrine of elements (water, air, fire, and earth) arose in antiquity and existed until the end of the eighteenth century. It would be a concession to vulgar sociologism to regard that conception as a reflection of social being and a historically determined social structure. And that does not apply just to the doctrine of elements; epistemological and ontological ideas in general directly lack social colouring. An inference that philosophy is above party, however, does not follow from that fact, but rather a scientific understanding of the role of interpretation in bringing out the social sense (partisanship) of philosophical ideas. Locke claimed (not without grounds) that the theory of innate ideas served tyranny (see 152:55, 5 6 ) . With Plato it substantiated natural inequality between people, i.e. had an aristocratic character. Locke was not right, however, since he spoke of the social tendency of the theory without allowing for the possibility of another interpretation, a possibility that had already come to light in his day. According to Descartes' doctrine, the original ideas of human reason, from which the whole aggregate of theoretical knowledge could be deduced, were equally inborn in all people and constituted what was usually called common sense ( bon sens), and no one, of course, complained of a deficiency of it. This interpretation had an essentially democratic character. Locke's doctrine of experience, according to which there were no innate ideas (which was the philosophical antithesis of Descartes' doctrine) expressed the same bourgeois-democratic tendency in the social respect. In the doctrine of the French eighteenth-century materialists sensualism philosophically substantiated a bourgeois-humanist outlook. But that same materialist sensualism was the philosophical basis of the Utopian communism of Mably, Dezamy, and their followers. Seventeenth-century rationalism, which proclaimed human reason an all-powerful capacity for knowing, had an essentially anti-theological and (in those historical conditions) an undoubtedly anti-feudal character, in spite of the inconsistency of its outstanding spokesmen, who endeavoured to employ a rationalist epistemology to solve theological problems. The empirical materialists who polemicised against the rationalists, developed the same anti-theological, anti-feudal social programme, but the idealist interpretation of empiricism in Berkeley's philosophy was substantiation of a compromise with feudal ideology. Kant tried to reconcile rationalism with empiricism, a stance
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that made it possible, as his doctrine showed, to develop a bourgeois-democratic outlook. But Fichte's rationalism promoted the same task even better. Feuerbach's materialist anthropologism was a doctrine of the natural equality of all men and a radically democratic denial of feudal ideological prejudices. The Marxian denial of anthropologism, i.e. its understanding of human essence as an aggregate of historically determined social relations, is a philosophical substantiation of the objective need for class struggle in order to achieve real social equality. Carlyle's doctrine of 'heroes' and the 'mob' was an ideology of feudal-romantic reaction. The Young Hegelians, who continued that doctrine, interpreted it in the spirit of bourgeois radicalism. The Russian Populists (members of the People's Freedom Party) turned this doctrine into a revolutionary call to the lower middle-class intelligentsia: viz., to become heroes so as to awaken and lead the people. T h e r e is no need to multiply examples to illusrate that the social sense of epistemological and ontological ideas are inseparable from their interpretation, an interpretation, moreover, that links them with certain socio-political propositions. Only on that condition does any philosophical proposition acquire social content in the context of one system of views or another, and in that sense becomes a party point of view. So far I have talked of partisanship as a social position in theory or a certain interpretation of epistemological and ontological ideas. A third aspect specially characterising philosophy is the consistent following and defence of a principled line, and unswerving adherence to the main principles of a philosophical theory, whether materialist or idealist. From that point of view it presupposes a clear demarcation of mutually exclusive trends, a consistent counterposing of the defended trend to the opposite one, a distinct consciousness of the unprincipled character (and hopelessness) of combining materialism and idealism, and struggle against attempts to reconcile these main philosophical trends. That determines one of the most important aspects of the dialectical-materialist critique of eclecticism and all possible attempts to transcend the allegedly obsolete antithesis of materialism and idealism. Marx had already, in 1843, i.e. when he had just reached the position of dialectical materialism, profoundly realised the fundamental flimsiness of the doctrines that laid claim to the 'highest' synthesis, i.e. the uniting of mutually exclusive propositions. From these positions he criticised the late Schelling:
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To the French romantics and mystics he cries: 'I, the union of philosophy and theology', to the French materialists: 'I, the union of flesh and idea', to the French sceptics: 'I, the destroyer of dogmatism' (172: :350).

Lenin, highly valuing this partisan philosophical position of the young Marx, stressed:
this refusal to recognise the hybrid projects for reconciling materialism and idealism constitutes the great merit of Marx, who moved forward along a sharply-defined philosophical road (142:317).

I have already referred to philosophical eclecticism above; in the light of the Marxist doctrine of the partisanship of philosophy, it makes a claim to a position of impartiality in the struggle of the main trends. Eclecticism, which is not, of course, a view above party, is always ready to see one-sidedness, an incapacity for ideological communication and dogmatism in philosophical partisanship, consistency, and adherence to principle. But the antithesis between materialism and idealism differs radically from the opposition of one-sided views actually occurring in science and philosophy. In the dispute between determinist and indeterminist metaphysicians, for instance, both parties defended one-sided views. The former argued that necessity was universal and freedom impossible; the latter substantiated the existence of undetermined freedom. These one-sided conceptions were overcome by a dialectical posing of the problem, which brought out the unity of freedom and determination. The rationalist and empiricist philosophical doctrines were the same one-sided antithesis. We are now well aware what the rationalists were right in, and what their opponents. The onesided antithesis between epistemological rationalism and empiricist epistemology was not removed, however, by reconciling them, but by a new understanding of the relation of the theoretical and empirical. T h e point of departure for overcoming this one-sided antithesis was a dialectical development of materialist sensualism. The antithesis of materialism and idealism differs in principle from that kind of opposition. To employ Marx's words characterising the relation of mutually exclusive opposites, one can say that materialism and idealism
do not need each other, they do not supplement each other. The one does not have in its own bosom the longing for, the need for, the anticipation of the other (168:88).

This antithesis thus embraces the whole aggregate of philosophical questions. The materialist does not enrich but, on the con293

trary, impoverishes his doctrine when he includes idealist propositions in it. The idealist does not overcome his basic fallacy by adopting separate materialist propositions (as Mach did). The fact that materialism and idealism usually discuss one and the same philosophical problems does not mitigate the contradiction existing between them but on the contrary increases it. This antithesis of the main philosophical trends is further strengthened by there being no third road, at least for consistent philosophers.
T h e genius of M a r x and Engels [Lenin wrote] lies precisely in the fact that during a very long period, nearly half a century, they developed materialism, further advanced one fundamental trend in philosophy ( 1 4 2 : 3 1 5 ) .

This consistency, branded as one-sidedness by eclectics, is the genuine road of scientific research. Those who take fallacy for truth of course reproach their opponents who reject their fallacy with one-sidedness, intolerance and incommunicability. Those who defend the truth also happen to fad into errors, of course, but that is not evidence of compromise. The demarcation of opposing views, a clear delimitation of different points of view, consistent following of principle, and the impermissibility of mixing and confusing views that do not agree with one another, all these are requirements of rigorous scientific character and at the same time Marxist demands of philosophy's partisanship. T h e counterposing of partisanship and scientism so c h a r a c teristic of bourgeois writers expresses the basic features of bourgeois ideology, which by its very nature is unscientific. And when a bourgeois ideologist talks of the unscientific character of any ideology, he is only making a norm of the essence of his own ideology. That is typical subjectivism. The philosophy of Marxism substantiates the principle of the unity of partisanship and scientific character. 'The more ruthlessly and disinterestedly science proceeds,' Engels said, 'the more it finds itself in harmony with the interests and aspirations of the workers' (52 : :376). Philosophy cannot be treated as partly partisan or partisan in the part of it devoted to social matters. The partisanship of philosophy is its social inspiration and the specific historical trend that determines its whole content and manifests itself in the posing and solution of all problems. A desire to pursue the principle of partisanship in philosophy is quite insufficient; a deep understanding of its social and epistemological content, and of the specific method of its scientific application in various
294

fields o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l k n o w l e d g e ( a n d n o t just p h i l o s o p h i c a l ) is also required. As is stated in t h e P r o g r a m m e of the C P S U (1986):

S o c i a l i s m h a s g i v e n S o v i e t s o c i e t y ' s i n t e l l e c t u a l a n d c u l t u r a l life a scientific w o r l d o u t l o o k b a s e d o n M a r x i s m - L e n i n i s m , w h i c h i s a n i n tegral a n d h a r m o n i o u s system of philosophical, economic and sociop o l i t i c a l v i e w s . T h e P a r t y c o n s i d e r s i t its m o s t i m p o r t a n t d u t y t o c o n tinue creatively developing Marxist-Leninist theory of studying a n d generalising new p h e n o m e n a in Soviet society, taking into a c c o u n t t h e e x p e r i e n c e of o t h e r c o u n t r i e s of the socialist c o m m u n i t y a n d the world communist, working-class, national liberation and democratic movements and analysing the progress in the natural, technical and social sciences (217 : 5 6 ) .

S t r e n g t h e n i n g of the unity of various sciences presupposes a profound mastering of the Marxist-Leninist dialectical-materialist m e t h o d o l o g y of scientific t h o u g h t , t h e sole reliable i n s t r u m e n t for cognising society a n d n a t u r e . All that directly witnesses to t h e g r o w i n g role of t h e p h i l o s o p h y of M a r x i s m in t h e system of t h e sciences of n a t u r e a n d society.

CONCLUSION

T h e course of the history of philosophy, often likened to a comedy of errors, wandering in a labyrinth, and an anarchy of systems, forms one of the most important dimensions of man's intellectual progress. The quests for a correct outlook on the world and the tragic delusions and misconceptions, and divergences of philosophical doctrines, and their polarisation into mutually exclusive trends, the battle of the trends, which is sometimes perceived as a permanent philosophical scandal, are not just the searches, torments, and delusions of individual philosophers but are the spiritual drama of all humanity, and he who pictures it as a farce seemingly interprets the tragic solely as idola theatri. The antinomies into which philosophy falls, the crises that rock it, the retreats and withdrawals, the following of a beaten path, including that of errors already committed in the past, the rejection of real philosophical discoveries for the sake of long-refused fallacies persistently taken for truthdo these just characterise philosophy? Philosophy is the spiritual image of mankind, and its achievements and mishaps constitute the most vital content of man's intellectual biography. The specific feature of philosophy is theoretical comprehension of universal human experience and the whole aggregate of knowledge so as to create an integral conception of the world. T h e difficulties on the way of philosophical comprehension of reality are constantly increasing because the treasury of human experience and knowledge is being constantly enriched. The theoretical results of philosophical exploration are quite modest, in particular when compared with those of natural science. The fight between philosophical doctrines that throws doubts on the possibility of getting agreement even on elementary mat296

ters, evokes a sceptical attitude among non-philosopher specialists to a science so unlike the others whose fruitful results are generally recognised. But philosophy, though it does not promise very much and yields even less (as it seems to some), possesses amazing attractive force, as even philosophising dilettantes cannot help recognising who suggest to abolish it as practically useless; as Engels remarked, philosophy teaches how to think theoretically. In fact, in order to think about a separate subject, certain general notions are needed. The greater the aggregate of subjects the more general still the notions needed to understand it. As Lenin pointed out:
anybody who tackles partial problems without having previously settled general problems, will inevitably and at every step 'come up against' those general problems without himself realising it (140:489).

In short, the broader the field of phenomena to which cognising thought turns, the broader the concepts needed for it. But theoretical thinking does not deal simply with phenomena that can be described, counted, etc., but with patterns whose universality is not limited by empirically established boundaries in space and time. Philosophical thought is thus an obligatory premiss of theoretical knowledge. To avoid oversimplification this must not be understood in the sense that only someone who has studied philosophy will become a theoretically thinking subject. People think logically even when they have no notion of logic as a science. Maybe they mastered the elements of logic at school in mathematics lessons, in study of their native tongue, or in some other unconscious way. It is unlikely that anyone would infer from this that study of logic does not foster development of theoretical thinking. The same applies even more to philosophy. The high appraisal of philosophical knowledge in the forming of theoretical thought, in particular of its most developed forms, directly indicates the outstanding significance, perhaps still not adequately appreciated, of the scientific history of philosophy which, as a scientific, theoretical summing-up of all philosophical knowledge, is capable of playing an essentially incomparable role in developing an individual capacity for theoretical thought. One of the basic tasks of this discipline is therefore to create a rational system of the creative mastery of the inexhaustible wealth of philosophical knowledge, and to explore the patterns governing the contradictory unity of this knowledge. The countless number of philosophical conceptions, theories, tendencies, and trends puzzles not only the novice but also spe297

cialist p h i l o s o p h e r s w h o a r e t r y i n g t o c o m p r e h e n d this d i v e r s e k n o w l e d g e i d e o l o g i c a l l y . I n q u i r i e s d e v o t e d t o t h e specific n a t u r e of philosophical knowledge, the n a t u r e of philosophical p r o b lems, the basic philosophical question, a n d t h e main philos o p h i c a l t r e n d s , etc., a r e c a l l e d u p o n t o s e r v e t h a t e n d . T h i s kind of inquiry allows, it seems, to t a k e t h e g r o u n d from u n d e r the irrationalist conception of the a n a r c h y of philosophical syst e m s , w h i c h , s t r a n g e as it s e e m s at first g l a n c e , is r o o t e d in t h e prejudices of e v e r y d a y consciousness. It is b e c o m i n g evident t h a t t h e s t r u g g l e o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r e n d s i s q u i t e fruitful a n d p r o m i s i n g ; i d e a l i s m h a s a l r e a d y s u f f e r e d d e f e a t as a s y s t e m of views. D e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e d i a l e c t i c a l - m a t e r i a l i s t o u t l o o k o n t h e world is at the same time comprehension and critical mastery of t h e h i s t o r y of p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h o u g h t , in w h i c h , it is my d e e p est c o n v i c t i o n , t h e r e a r e n o t r i v i a l p a g e s . T h e task o f a M a r x i s t t h e o r e t i c a l s u m m i n g - u p o f t h e c o u r s e of t h e h i s t o r y of p h i l o s o p h y is n o t e x h a u s t e d by s t u d y of t h e m a i n t r e n d s in p h i l o s o p h y . T h a t is only t h e b e g i n n i n g of a g r e a t work that must be continued by research devoted to the historical c o u r s e o f c h a n g e i n t h e s u b j e c t - m a t t e r o f p h i l o s o p h y , t h e specific f o r m s o f t h e c o n t i n u i t y a n d p r o g r e s s i v e d e v e l o p m e n t o f philosophical knowledge, and the moulding and development of a scientific, p h i l o s o p h i c a l o u t l o o k on t h e w o r l d . I h o p e t h a t t h e s e v e r y i m p o r t a n t t h e o r e t i c a l p r o b l e m s o f t h e scientific h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y will b e t h e s u b j e c t o f s p e c i a l n e w m o n o graphs.

NOTES
1

T h e stance adopted by Heisenberg on this question was more correct; in spite of his idealist fallacies, he was a w a r e of the law-governed nature and fruitfulness of the struggle between materialism and idealism. He affirmed, for example, that 'the struggle for primacy of form, image, and idea on the one side over matter and material being, on the other side, or on the contrary, of matter over the image, and consequently the struggle between idealism and materialism, has always set human thought in motion again and again in the history of philosophy' (97:228). In another place, Planck said that 'exact science can never do without reality in the metaphysical sense' (208:23). T h e term 'metaphysical' sounds ambiguous, since it is a matter of sense-perceived reality. But if we allow for the fact that neopositivists treat materialism as 'metaphysics', it becomes evident against whom his proposition was directed. Robespierre considered atheism an anti-democratic doctrine, and tried to create a rationalist religious cult of the Supreme Being before whom all were equal. 'Atheism is aristocratic,' he said. ' T h e idea of a S u p r e m e Being who 298

keeps watch over oppressed i n n o c e n c e and punishes t r i u m p h a n t c r i m e , is wholly o f t h e p e o p l e ' ( 2 2 4 : 1 2 0 ; 1 1 : 2 1 5 ) . I t i s w o r t h n o t i n g t h a t this d i c t u m d o e s not differ m u c h f r o m V o l t a i r e ' s a p h o r i s m a b o u t t h e p o l i c e f u n c t i o n s o f r e l i g i o n , but has an opposite ideological sense: from Robespierre's standpoint religion was needed not in o r d e r to c u r b the 'lower orders' but in order to ensure e q u a l i t y o f all c i t i z e n s b e f o r e t h e h i g h e s t l a w . D e m o k r i t o s e x p l a i n e d t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e specific g r a v i t y o f s u b s t a n c e s k n o w n f r o m e v e r y d a y e x p e r i e n c e b y t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e ' q u a n t i t y ' o f void i n the spaces between the atoms that formed the substances. Heavy bodies cont a i n e d less void t h a n l i g h t o n e s , w h i c h w e r e d i s t i n g u i s h e d b y a l o w e r d e n s i t y . N e w t o n , w h o a d o p t e d t h e a t o m i s t i c h y p o t h e s i s a n d defined m a s s o r d e n s i t y a s the q u a n t i t y of m a t t e r , in essence s h a r e d D e m o k r i t o s ' view. O n e must n o t e that m o d e r n physical notions of t h e superdense state of a substance a r e not so rem o t e f r o m D e m o k r i t o s ' idea a b o u t c o m b i n a t i o n s o f t h e d e n s e (full) a n d t h e empty (immaterial) that formed the whole diversity of the world's p h e n o mena.
4

J e a n - P a u l S a r t r e , correctly stressing the h u m a n i t a r i a n sense of the atheistic o u t l o o k , a p p r e c i a t e d t h e social c o n t e n t o f m a t e r i a l i s t p h i l o s o p h y i n t h a t c o n nection, as follows: 'I find it linked to the r e v o l u t i o n a r y outlook. E p i c u r u s , t h e f i r s t o n e w h o w a n t e d definitely t o rid m e n o f t h e i r f e a r s a n d c h a i n s , the first o n e w h o w a n t e d to abolish servitude in his estate, was a materialist' (237:173-174).
5

An e l o q u e n t e x a m p l e of t h i s s o p h i s t i c a t e d j u s t i f i c a t i o n of r e l i g i o n is t h e 'critical realism' of S a n t a v a n a , of w h o m Morris C o h e n wrote: ' H e discards theologic dogmas as to God's existence as superstitions but retains those val u e s o f c o n v e n t i o n a l r i t u a l a n d belief w h i c h m a k e o f r e l i g i o n a p o e t r y o f social c o n d u c t , a h e i g h t e n i n g of t h e s p i r i t in w h i c h t h e c o n s c i o u s n e s s of t h e ideals o f o u r c o m m o n life e x p r e s s e s itself. R e l i g i o n , f o r S a n t a y a n a , s e r v e s t o l i b e r a t e man from worldliness' (36:254).
6

P h i l o s o p h y , D i d e r o t s a i d , w a s i n c o m p a t i b l e b y definition w i t h r e l i g i o n . Although that thesis oversimplified the c o n t r a d i c t o r y relation between these p h e n o m e n a , its r e a l s e n s e c o n s i s t e d , o f c o u r s e , i n t h e a f f i r m a t i o n t h a t t r u e philosophy, such as Diderot n a t u r a l l y considered materialism, was a denial of o r d i n a r y r e l i g i o u s c o n s c i o u s n e s s . ' S i r e ' , h e w r o t e 'if y o u w a n t p r i e s t s , y o u d o not w a n t philosophers, a n d if y o u w a n t philosophers y o u do not w a n t priests; for the first being by profession friends of reason a n d p r o m o t e r s of knowledge, a n d the latter, enemies of reason a n d f o m e n t e r s of i g n o r a n c e , if t h e f o r m e r do g o o d , t h e l a t t e r d o evil; a n d y o u d o n o t w a n t g o o d a n d evil a t t h e s a m e t i m e ' (40:33).
7

T h e i d e o l o g i c a l i d e a u n d e r l y i n g t h e s e v u l g a r n o t i o n s w a s o n c e e x p r e s s e d with laudable frankness by the American statesman and militant anti-Communist, J o h n F o s t e r D u l l e s , w h o w r o t e : ' W e shall n o t q u a l i f y f o r s u r v i v a l i f w e b e c o m e a nation of materialists' (43:240). T h e point c o n c e r n e d m a i n t e n a n c e of the c a p i t a l i s t status quo. D u l l e s t h e r e f o r e , at t h e s a m e t i m e , c r i t i c i s e d ' s o m e of t h e idealists w h o w a n t a b e t t e r w o r l d ' ( 4 3 : 1 6 5 ) . T h e A m e r i c a n political scientist B u r n s called for use of police m e a s u r e s against s u p p o r t e r s of materialism, to w h o m he lyingly a t t r i b u t e d 'a cynical c o n t e m p t for h u m a n n a t u r e , a denial t h a t mortals a r e ever p r o m p t e d by noble i m p u l s e s ' ( 2 5 : 7 4 - 7 5 ) , T h a t d e s c r i p t i o n (sic!) o f m a t e r i a l i s m w a s i n t e n d e d t o i n t i m i d a t e all o p p o n e n t s o f t h e r e l i g i o u s - i d e a l i s t w o r l d o u t l o o k d o m i n a n t i n bourgeois society.
8

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K a r l M a r x noted the inadequacy of the materialism of the natural sciences in p a r t i c u l a r w h e n it tried to interpret social p h e n o m e n a : ' T h e w e a k points in t h e abstract materialism of n a t u r a l science, a materialism that excludes h i s t o r y a n d its p r o c e s s , a r e a t o n c e e v i d e n t f r o m t h e a b s t r a c t a n d i d e o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t i o n s o f its s p o k e s m e n , w h e n e v e r t h e y v e n t u r e b e y o n d t h e b o u n d s o f their own speciality' (167:I, 3 5 2 ) . Lenin, too, w r o t e a b o u t these w e a k points of n a t u r a l - s c i e n c e m a t e r i a l i s m in Materialism and Empirio-criticism, when c h a r a c t e r i s i n g the ideological position of Ernst H a e c k e l (see 1 4 2 : 3 2 7 - 3 3 1 ) .
9

Acton declares that 'materialism, by asserting the reality of material subs t a n c e s b e y o n d s e n s e - e x p e r i e n c e , a l l o w s a l s o t h e possibility o f a G o d t h a t transcends sense-experience too. P h e n o m e n a l i s m excludes God but a p p e a r s committed to some sort of idealism. Materialism excludes phenomenalism but o n l y a t t h e e x p e n s e o f m a k i n g G o d a p p e a r a possibility' ( 2 : 2 3 ) . A c c o r d i n g t o h i m , t h e r e i s n o t m o r e c o n s i s t e n t a n t i - t h e o l o g i c a l p h i l o s o p h y , a f t e r all, t h a n idealism of a p h e n o m e n a l i s t h u e . W h e n it c o m e s to solipsism, of c o u r s e , this p o i n t o f v i e w c a n b e d e c l a r e d t h e m o s t c o n s i s t e n t a t h e i s m . B u t s u b j e c t i v e idealists a r g u e t h a t t h e y a r e n o t solipsists. T h e s u b j e c t i v e - i d e a l i s t interpretation of nature, therefore, as the example of Berkeley a n d many o t h e r s u p p o r t e r s o f p h e n o m e n a l i s m p r o v e d , fully d o v e t a i l s w i t h t h e o l o g i c a l conclusions.
10

M a x B o r n w r o t e , as r e g a r d s t h e objects of physics, which a r e also objects perceived in everyday experience: 'The unsophisticated mind is convinced that they a r e not arbitrary products of the mind, but impressions of an external world on the mind. I c a n n o t see any a r g u m e n t for a b a n d o n i n g this convict i o n i n t h e scientific s p h e r e ' ( 2 1 : 5 0 ) .
11

P h i l o s o p h i c a l r e v i s i o n i s m , w h i c h lays c l a i m t o a n e w , d e e p e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f e s t a b l i s h e d f a c t s , i n effect d i c t o r t s t h e m . H a v e m a n n , f o r i n s t a n c e , c h a r a c t e r i s e d M a r x i s t m a t e r i a l i s m as (sic!) a d e n i a l of m a t e r i a l i s m . 'It is o n l y a variety of objective idealism,' he declares, 'and m o r e o v e r an inconsistent, superficial, primitive, a n d vulgarised form of objective idealism' ( 8 3 : 3 0 ) . W h a t i s this v e r y h a r s h c o n c l u s i o n b a s e d o n ? M e c h a n i s t i c m a t e r i a l i s m , h e said, treated t h e laws of n a t u r e as a b s o l u t e a n d sovereign, which not only d e t e r m i n e d b u t p r e d e t e r m i n e d all p h e n o m e n a . H e o b v i o u s l y f o r g o t t h a t e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y n a t u r a l science also treated the laws of n a t u r e in r o u g h l y t h e s a m e w a y . W h y t h e n did h e n o t c o n s i d e r i t a l s o t o b e i d e a l i s t ? H e e n d e a v o u r e d to p r o v e that mechanistic materialism counterposed the laws o f n a t u r e t o n a t u r e , i.e. i n t e r p r e t e d t h e m a s s o m e t h i n g s u p e r n a t u r a l , a conclusion that is a clear s t r e t c h i n g of the point, an insolvent attempt to d e p i c t t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l - m a t e r i a l i s t w o r l d o u t l o o k a s s p e c u l a t i v e idealist metaphysics.
12

'Philosophers w h o recognise only the existence of material things a n d bodies [ C h r i s t i a n v o n W o l f s a i d ] a r e c a l l e d m a t e r i a l i s t s ' ( s e e Das Fischer Lexikon. Philosophie, F r a n k f u r t - o n - M a i n , 1 9 6 7 , p . 1 5 6 ) . T h i s p o i n t o f v i e w i s a c c e p t e d b y m a n y c o n t e m p o r a r y idealists, w h o t h u s a s c r i b e a d e n i a l o f t h e r e a l i t y o f t h e spiritual a n d ideal to m a t e r i a l i s m .
13

T h i s s a m e thesis was repeated by p r a g m a t i s m a h u n d r e d y e a r s after Hegel. William J a m e s opposed the materialists proposition of the origin of the higher f r o m t h e l o w e r , i n s p i t e o f its a l r e a d y h a v i n g a c q u i r e d g e n e r a l scientific s i g nificance. He wrote that materialism was characterised by explaining 'higher p h e n o m e n a by lower ones, a n d leaving the destinies of the w o r l d at t h e m e r c y
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o f its b l i n d e r p a r t s a n d f o r c e s ' ( 1 1 1 : 9 2 - 9 3 ) . F r o m t h e a n g l e o f J a m e s ' ' r a d i c a l e m p i r i c i s m ' t h e ' b l i n d ' , i.e. i n a n i m a t e , p r o c e s s e s o f n a t u r e w e r e b r o u g h t a b o u t b y ' h i g h e r p h e n o m e n a ' l i k e m i n d a n d will. Cassirer interpreted t h e principal ontological thesis of rationalist idealism in a p u r e l y epistemological way: ' T h e proposition t h a t b e i n g is a " p r o d u c t " of thought... contains no pointer of any sort to some physical or metaphysical c a u s a l r e l a t i o n , b u t m e r e l y signifies a p u r e l y f u n c t i o n a l c o n n e c t i o n , a r e l a t i o n of the h i g h e r a n d l o w e r in t h e validity of definite j u d g m e n t s ' ( 3 1 : 3 9 6 ) . In o t h e r w o r d s , h e s u g g e s t e d t r e a t i n g t h e idealist a n s w e r t o t h e b a s i c p h i l o sophical question as a j u d g m e n t defining the category 'being' a n d not being itself, i n r e l a t i o n t o w h i c h t h e r e c o u l d n o t b e k n o w l e d g e a s s o o n a s i t w a s thought of as existing outside thinking. Conceivable being or the category 'being' is created by thinking. That conclusion, w h i c h discards the ontological a s p e c t of t h e b a s i c p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n , is a s u b j e c t i v e - i d e a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of its e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l a s p e c t .
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This point of view was very impressively expressed by the Russian religious existentialist Berdyaev: ' T h e principal attribute of philosophy is that t h e r e is no o b j e c t of k n o w i n g in it. S e n s e is d i s c l o s e d o n l y w h e n I l o o k i n w a r d l y , i.e. into t h e spirit, a n d w h e n t h e r e is no objectivity or materiality for me. All that is an object for me lacks sense' (14:9). He frankly expressed t h e t r u e e s s e n c e o f i d e a l i s m , a n d its hostility t o scientific k n o w l e d g e .
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I.T. F r o l o v c o r r e c t l y r e m a r k s : ' H i s t o r i c a l l y t h e m a t t e r d e v e l o p e d i n s u c h a way t h a t t h e p r o b l e m of purposiveness was discussed on the positive p l a n e m a i n l y i n t h e c o n t e x t o f idealist p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c e p t i o n s , w h i l e m a t e r i a l i s m i n its m e c h a n i s t i c f o r m f o r t h e m o s t p a r t o n l y r e a c t e d n e g a t i v e l y t o t h e existing teleological interpretation of this problem, without occasionally e x a m i n i n g t h e o b j e c t i v e f a c t s b e h i n d it. B u t i t w a s p r e c i s e l y i n t h e c o n t e x t of materialist philosophical conceptions that approaches were formulated that m a d e it possible to elucidate t h e real causes for t h e p h e n o m e n a t r e a t e d as purposive' (69:36-37).
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Let me cite e x a m p l e s s h o w i n g h o w c o n t e m p o r a r y idealism e n d e a v o u r s to benefit f r o m t h e m a t e r i a l i s t c r i t i q u e o f its b a s i c p r o p o s i t i o n s . L o m b a r d i , o n e of the continuers of Italian Neohegelianism, hurled the following sardonic tirade at idealism: ' T h e reality that idealism speaks to us a b o u t is o n e that r a i s e s itself r a t h e r like B a r o n M n c h h a u s e n , w h o g o t h i m s e l f o u t o f a s w a m p by pulling on his hair, but with t h e difference t h a t t h e r e is no s w a m p for idealism, n o r hair, a n d not even a flesh-and-bone cavalier w h o must save himself from t h e s w a m p ' ( 1 5 3 : 1 9 8 ) . T h a t pillorying c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n i d e n tifies i d e a l i s m w i t h s u b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m a n d , f u r t h e r m o r e , w i t h solipsism. S u c h a l i m i t e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e e s s e n c e of i d e a l i s m m a k e s it p o s s i b l e to interpret objective idealism as a non-idealist philosophy. B e h i n d t h e difference between these principal versions of idealism is hidden the identity o f t h e i r s t a r t i n g p o i n t , viz., a n i d e a l i s t a n s w e r t o t h e b a s i c p h i l o s o p h i c a l question.
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O n e o f t h e f i r s t i n v e s t i g a t o r s o f e x i s t e n t i a l i s m , J o h a n n e s Pfeiffer, for w h o m e x i s t e n t i a l i s m t h a t c r i t i c i s e d ' t h e spirit o f a b s t r a c t i o n ' w a s a n e g a t i o n o f i d e a l ism, w r o t e : ' T h e d a n g e r o f i d e a l i s m i s i l l u s i v e n e s s : m a n a s p u r e r a t i o n a l b e i n g , a s t h e r e a l m o f r e a l i s a t i o n o f t h e i d e a , i s f e n c e d off f r o m t h e l a t e n t , original s o u r c e of his existence' ( 2 0 5 : 1 6 - 1 7 ) . T h e f u n d a m e n t a l original s o u r c e of h u m a n existence of which existentialists speak is not, of course,
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a negation of idealism. By stressing the finiteness of m a n a n d t h e subjectivity of individual experiences, existentialism only counterposes an irrational form of idealism that is c o m b i n e d with the assertion that real h u m a n exist e n c e i s o n l y p o s s i b l e i n t h i s w o r l d t o its r a t i o n a l i s t f o r m . I d e a l i s m t h u s n e v e r r i s e s to a c r i t i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g of its o w n e s s e n c e .
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T h e e m i n e n t neurophysiologist a n d Nobel Prize w i n n e r , J o h n Eccles, for i n s t a n c e , said t h a t t h e r e i s a n i n e v i t a b l e a n t i n o m y b e t w e e n t h e ' d e m o c r a t i c c o m m u n i t y ' o f t h e b i l l i o n s o f n e r v e cells t h a t f o r m t h e h u m a n b r a i n , a n d the individual personality that is revealed in the experience and self-consciousness of every person. This antinomy, he suggested, was unresolvable by scientific r e s e a r c h . A n d , a s t h o u g h h e h a d f o r g o t t e n t h a t t h e s c i e n t i s t h a s n o r i g h t t o a p p e a l t o t h e s u p e r n a t u r a l , i.e. t o r e s o r t t o a n u n s c i e n t i f i c a r g u m e n t , h e a r r i v e d a t t h e r e l i g i o u s c o n c e p t o f t h e s o u l a n d r e c o g n i t i o n o f its s p e c i a l c r e a t i o n b y G o d (see 4 4 : 4 3 ; a n d 4 5 cited f r o m 2 5 9 : 9 7 ) . E c c l e s c h a r a c t e r ised his fideist p o s i t i o n as a p h i l o s o p h y of t h e living i n d i v i d u a l . O n e s h o u l d n o t b e s u r p r i s e d t h a t N e o t h o m i s m p r o p a g a n d i s e s his v i e w s a s c o n f i r m i n g T h o m i s t philosophy (see 2 5 9 : 9 4 - 9 7 ) . T h e f l i m s i n e s s o f t h e simplified v i e w o f t h e e s s e n c e o f i d e a l i s m s o m e t i m e s met in Marxist p o p u l a r l i t e r a t u r e is t h e r e f o r e obvious. Boguslavsky, a u t h o r of a p a m p h l e t on t h e b a s i c q u e s t i o n of p h i l o s o p h y , w r o t e : ' T h e i d e a l i s t s ' a r g u m e n t s lead t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e s o l e p e r s o n e x i s t i n g i n t h e w o r l d i s I , a n d t h a t all o t h e r p e o p l e a n d n a t u r e a r e o n l y m y s e n s a t i o n s . C l e a r l y , the person w h o asserts that he a l o n e exists on the e a r t h can h a r d l y be conside r e d n o r m a l . I t i s useless t o listen t o h i m ' ( 1 8 : 1 3 ) . B o g u s l a v s k y ' s m i s t a k e w a s n o t s i m p l y t h a t h e r e d u c e d all idealist d o c t r i n e s t o solipsism w i p i n g o u t the essential differences b e t w e e n the varieties of idealism. F o r him idealism w a s a p s y c h i c a n o m a l y . But i n t h a t c a s e m a t e r i a l i s m ' s s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t idealist p h i l o s o p h y a p p e a r s s t r a n g e a t least. D o s e r i o u s p e o p l e d i s p u t e w i t h madmen? O n e m u s t a l s o b e a r i n m i n d t h a t t h e r i c h n e s s o f t h e c o n t e n t o f idealist e r r o r s a n d fallacies does not simply consist in t h e i r h a v i n g elements of t r u t h , distorted a n d a b s o l u t i s e d by i d e a l i s m . It is d u e as well to t h e fact t h a t i d e a l i s m , as a f o r m o f s o c i a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s , r e f l e c t s h i s t o r i c a l l y definite social b e i n g . I n t h a t sense religious fallacies, too, as F e u e r b a c h s h o w e d , a r e rich in c o n t e n t in s p i t e of t h e i r not i n c l u d i n g e l e m e n t s of a t r u e r e f l e c t i o n of r e a l i t y .
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S o m e twenty or thirty years ago many Marxist historians of philosophy ( a n d n o t j u s t h i s t o r i a n s o f p h i l o s o p h y ) b e l i e v e d t h a t c l a s s i c a l idealist d o c t r i n e s t h a t d i s c l o s e d a n d a t t h e s a m e t i m e mystified t r u t h o f c o u r s e h a d e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l r o o t s . But t h e latest idealist d o c t r i n e s , w h i c h h a v e a n epigonistic c h a r a c t e r as a rule, lack any epistemological roots a n d a r e only a mystified e x p r e s s i o n of t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e b o u r g e o i s i e , in w h i c h t h e r e is n o n e w k n o w l e d g e w h a t s o e v e r a b o u t r e a l i t y . I o v c h u k c o r r e c t l y o p p o s e d this anti-dialectical tendency, stressing that 'valuable posings of questions are to be f o u n d in c o n t e m p o r a r y bourgeois philosophical a n d sociological doctrines, for e x a m p l e the question of the " l a n g u a g e of science" a m o n g i n d i v i d u a l positivists o r t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e f a t e o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l a m o n g c e r t a i n e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s like S a r t r e , a b o u t t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f m a t h e m a t i c a l m e t h o d s i n s o c i o l o g i c a l i n q u i r i e s i n W e s t e r n e m p i r i c a l s o c i o l o g y , e t c . ...But in the m a i n i n general theoretical conclusions, in understanding of the p r o f o u n d laws of c o n t e m p o r a r y social d e v e l o p m e n t and p a t h s of social p r o g r e s s , a n d i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o m p r e h e n s i o n o f t h e latest a d v a n c e s o f 302

s c i e n c e n o t o n e b o u r g e o i s philosophical a n d sociological c u r r e n t c a n give a t r u e , scientific, a n d c o n s i s t e n t a n s w e r t o t h e r o o t p r o b l e m s o f o u r a g e ' (108:172).

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M o t r o s h i l o v a , O g u r t s o v , T u r o v s k y , a n d P o t e m k i n , c i t i n g this t h o u g h t o f A r i s t o t l e ' s , m a d e t h e f o l l o w i n g v a l u a b l e c o m m e n t i n t h e i r e n t r y i n t h e Philosophical Encyclopaedia: ' T h e e s s e n c e of t h i n g s is i d e a l l y d o u b l e d in f a c t in knowledge, floating a w a y ever further from the direct sense image of the object a n d from c o n c r e t e reality. Objectively this m e a n s that the universal law of n a t u r e , i n c o n c e i v a b l e o u t s i d e its d e v e l o p m e n t , is n o t itself a t h i n g a m o n g things. C a u s e , source of motion, law a r e no longer perceived simply as a " f o r m " directly m e r g i n g with a given special motion, but as an ideal principle abstracted from c o r p o r e a l motion. It is only manifested t h r o u g h m a t e r i a l m o t i o n b u t is not identifiable with s o m e special m a t e r i a l s p h e r e ' ( 1 8 6 : 4 0 3 ) . T h u s w e s e e t h a t P l a t o , w h e n i n q u i r i n g into ( a n d a t t h e s a m e time mystifying) the real process of cognition, revealed the dialectical opposition between theoretical a n d emprical knowledge, interpreting the p r e conditions of this opposition idealistically, r e p r e s e n t i n g it as absolute. E n g e l s w r o t e a p r o p o s o f t h i s : ' F i r s t o f all o n e m a k e s s e n s u o u s t h i n g s i n t o abstractions a n d then o n e w a n t s to k n o w them t h r o u g h t h e senses, to see t i m e a n d smell s p a c e . T h e e m p i r i c i s t b e c o m e s s o s t e e p e d i n t h e h a b i t o f e m p i r i c a l e x p e r i e n c e , t h a t h e b e l i e v e s t h a t h e i s still i n t h e f i e l d o f s e n s u o u s e x p e r i ence w h e n he is o p e r a t i n g with abstractions ( 5 1 : 2 3 5 ) . Empiricism, too, can thus p r o v e to be in t h e p o w e r of idealist illusions, s i n c e it is not a w a r e of t h e sense a n d m e a n i n g of abstraction. S e r z h a n t o v c o r r e c t l y s t r e s s e d this e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l f e a t u r e o f idealist e m p i r i cism: 'Idealism arises from a naturalist a p p r o a c h to sensations, w h e n the l a t t e r a r e t r e a t e d e x a c t l y a s t h e y a r e d i r e c t l y g i v e n t o us, a n d t h e y a r e g i v e n t o u s o n l y a s o u r i n n e r e x p e r i e n c e s . I d e a l i s m t a k e s this a s p e c t o f s e n s a t i o n s in isolation from the object a n d from t h e n e r v o u s s u b s t r a t u m , a n d conceives it as some immaterial substance' (244:89-90).

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Rougier wrote: ' G e r m a n expresses t h e mobile aspects of reality, be it the p r o c e s s e s o f n a t u r e o r t h e f l u x o f c o n s c i o u s life b e t t e r t h a n F r e n c h , for e x a m p l e , b y v i r t u e o f t h e f u n d a m e n t a l r o l e i t a s s i g n s t o verbs.... I t h a s a v o c a t i o n for a p h i l o s o p h y o f b e c o m i n g ' ( 2 2 8 : 1 9 1 ) . S u c h a n e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e d i a l e c t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n i n G e r m a n y is, t o p u t i t mildly, v e r b a l i s m ; i t d o e s n o t e x p l a i n w h y , for e x a m p l e , H e g e l ' s d i a l e c t i c a l i d e a l i s m a r o s e i n the early nineteenth century, or what relation it h a d to the epochal events a n d scientific a d v a n c e s o f h i s t i m e a n d t o t h e p r e c e d i n g p h i l o s o p h y ( a n d n o t just G e r m a n philosophy, of c o u r s e ) .
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Bourgeois critics of M a r x i s m depict this feature of the Marxist analysis of i d e a l i s m i n a d i s t o r t e d w a y . M a r x i s t s , says A c t o n , f o r e x a m p l e , ' t h i n k t h a t idealism is a dishonest view' ( 2 : 2 4 ) . But M a r x i s m , as Engels noted, in principle rejects an ethical appraisal of the opposition between the materialist and idealist o u t l o o k s , p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t a n a p p r a i s a l o f t h a t k i n d i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f t h e b o u r g e o i s P h i l i s t i n e . A c t o n f u r t h e r c l a i m e d t h a t ' L e n i n dismisses p h e nomenalism on the g r o u n d that it is dangerous to communism' (2:203). Lenin, of course, rejected p h e n o m e n a l i s m as a false t h e o r y clearly c o n t r a d i c t i n g t h e f a c t s t h a t w a s a b o v e all d a n g e r o u s f o r s c i e n c e . B u t A c t o n c o n v e n i e n t l y kept silent about that.

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It is q u i t e a different m a t t e r , h o w e v e r , w h e n the root opposition of class i n t e r e s t s i s b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d , w h i c h c o m e s t o light i n t h e r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y o f t h e w o r k i n g class a n d b o u r g e o i s p a r t i e s . T h i s o p positionthe conscious expression of the antagonistic contradiction between t h e m a i n classes of b o u r g e o i s societyis ideologically c o m p r e h e n d e d by Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Garaudy's claim that the Communist Party's p h i l o s o p h y ' c a n n o t , i n p r i n c i p l e , b e e i t h e r idealist o r m a t e r i a l i s t , r e l i g i o u s or atheist' (71:284) is t h e r e f o r e a r e n e g a d e apostasy f r o m M a r x i s m , a revisionist transition to b o u r g e o i s positions. P r e - M a r x i a n philosophers, it is t r u e , often spoke a b o u t t h e vast influence of philosophy on relations between people, the state system, etc. S o m e of them even treated philosophy, which they considered the most a d e q u a t e expression o f h u m a n r e a s o n , a s t h e d r i v i n g f o r c e o f s o c i a l p r o g r e s s . B u t a belief i n its a b o v e - p a r t y c h a r a c t e r got a l o n g alright with both recognition a n d denial of its o u t s t a n d i n g r o l e i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f s o c i e t y . T h e m a i n p o i n t t o this conviction was denial of t h e fact that class interests w e r e reflected in philosophical views.

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H e r e is a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c e x a m p l e . Leibniz, t h e ideologist of t h e p r e - r e v o l u t i o n a r y G e r m a n b o u r g e o i s i e , w h o s e d o c t r i n e r e f l e c t e d its s t r i v i n g f o r a c o m p romise with the feudal classes, c o n d e m n e d t h e antithesis b e t w e e n the haves and havenots and, citing the Gospels, substantiated the idea of c o m m u n i t y of p r o p e r t y . 'Leibniz,' Deborin w r o t e in this connection, 'was convinced that community of property was the starting point of the developm e n t of h u m a n i t y , a n d believed that history would lead to a system based on community of property' (39:107). It must not be thought that Leibniz s h a r e d the views of utopian c o m m u n i s t s on this matter. T h i s p r e a c h i n g of the community of property, as Deborin showed, quite obviously expressed t h e s t r e n g t h o f his d e n i a l o f f e u d a l o w n e r s h i p , w h i c h r e v e a l e d t h a t t h e b o u r g e o i s ideologist was very far f r o m u n d e r s t a n d i n g w h a t c o n s e q u e n c e s the bourgeois reorganisation of society would lead to.
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Benjamin F r a n k l i n , t h e ideologist of t h e A m e r i c a n b o u r g e o i s revolution, said i n a p a p e r ' S t a n d i n g Q u e r i e s f o r t h e J u n t o ' t h a t o n l y t h o s e c o u l d b e m e m b e r s of it w h o positively a n s w e r e d the following question: ' D o you love t r u t h f o r t r u t h ' s s a k e , a n d will y o u e n d e a v o u r i m p a r t i a l l y t o find a n d r e c e i v e it yourself and c o m m u n i c a t e it to others?' ( 6 6 : 2 5 9 ) . T h i s conception of 'truth for truth's s a k e ' h a d n o t h i n g in c o m m o n with a c o n t e m p l a t i v e attitude to r e a l i t y ; it w a s a m a t t e r of f i g h t i n g t h e s u p e r s t i t i o n s e n s l a v i n g m a n , of mastering the elemental forces of n a t u r e , of a rational r e - o r d e r i n g of h u m a n life. F o r b o u r g e o i s i d e o l o g i s t a s t r i v i n g f o r t r u t h a n d u n i v e r s a l j u s t i c e c o i n c i d e s w i t h t h e t a s k of a b o u r g e o i s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . I m u s t s t r e s s t h a t i t w a s just i n t h a t a g e , w h e n b o u r g e o i s ' i m p a r t i a l i t y ' was converted into a hypocritical phrase, that the spokesmen of revolutionary d e m o c r a c y began m o r e a n d m o r e resolutely to express the conviction that philosophy could not adopt a n e u t r a l position on radical social problems. T h e A r m e n i a n revolutionary d e m o c r a t N a l b a n d i a n , for instance, wrote: 'Man lacks shelter, m a n has no bread, m a n is unclad a n d barefooted, n a t u r e d e m a n d s its o w n . T o find a s i m p l e , n a t u r a l p a t h , t o s e a r c h f o r g e n u i n e , h u m a n , r a t i o n a l m e a n s for m a n t o get shelter, h a v e b r e a d , c o v e r his n a k e d n e s s , a n d satisfy h i s n a t u r a l n e e d s t h a t i s t h e e s s e n c e o f p h i l o s o p h y ' ( 1 8 9 : 4 6 0 ) . T h a t p a r t i s a n a p p r o a c h to philosophy did not t a k e s h a p e in a v a c u u m of c o u r s e ; it was a d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e h u m a n i s t ideas of t h e bourgeois e n l i g h t e n m e n t of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 304

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Let m e recall i n this connection h o w M a r x and Engels c h a r a c t e r i s e idealist philosophy and its social stance: T h e alteration of consciousness divorced from actual r e l a t i o n s a pursuit followed by philosophers as a profession, i.e., as a businessis itself a p r o d u c t of existing relations a n d inseparable from them. This i m a g i n a r y rising above the world is t h e ideological expression of the impotence of philosophers in face of the world' (178:379). H e i n r i c h R o m b a c h tried to show t h a t this distancing of philosophy from socio-political reality was particularly characteristic of o u r time: philosophy 'no longer speaks outwardly, but only talks to itself; it is by specialists for specialists' ( 2 2 6 : 3 5 0 ) . T h e philosopher, he wrote further, 'is neither a professional politician n o r even a t e a c h e r , a n d not a theologian, j u d g e or doctor' ( ibid .). F r o m t h a t b a n a l statement of t h e professionalisation of philosophical activity, however, he d r e w a sweeping conclusion: ' H e is i m p o r t a n t only for himself and lives in his t h o u g h t s like a h e r m i t in his cell' ( i b i d ) . H o w is this a p p a r e n t l y n e u t r a l position to be explained in the age of struggle of two social systems a n d a d e e p e n i n g of antagonistic contradictions in capitalist countries? C a n it be that R o m b a c h ' s s t a n c e was quite untypical? N o , he expressed one of t h e m a i n tendencies in bourgeois philosophers' evaluation of philosophy's place in m o d e r n social affairs. This interpretation of it as alien to transient socio-political cataclysms was an attempt to p r o v e that the philosophical conception of t h e world was recognition of it as it is, that t h e aspiration to c h a n g e the world (even if it was quite justified) went beyond the c o m p e t e n c e of philosophy, which could neither s u b s t a n t i a t e this striving nor p r o v e its insolvency. O n e must n o t e that this point of view is often expressed by bourgeois philosophers w h o acknowledge that bourgeois values h a v e been discredited but do not see t h e way out of the crisis of bourgeois society. And when Gilbert Ryle, for instance, called philosophers people who a r e 'philosophers' philosophers' ( 2 3 3 : 4 ) , he was t h e r e b y expressing not only a conviction in r e g a r d to the i n d e p e n d e n c e of philosophy from o t h e r forms of knowledge but also disappointment in it.
35

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Weber, stating that 'the various systems of values of the world a r e in unresolvable conflict with one a n o t h e r ' ( 2 6 1 : 5 4 5 ) , believed that it was that fact which m a d e it impossible to combine scientific objectivity of t h e r e s e a r c h e r with any value orientation whatsoever. An orientation of this kind did not, it is true, e x c l u d e t h e possibility of 'discussion of the means to an end firmly stated in a d v a n c e ' ( ibid .), but in t h a t case science was no m o r e t h a n an intellectual t e c h n i q u e . Real inquiry rose above its end results a n d must t h e r e f o r e be ready for any unexpected conclusions. W e b e r ' s a r g u m e n t was a systematic development of t h e traditional conception of t h e inquirer's neutrality. But neutrality and objectivity a r e far from coincident concepts, and disinterestedness is an attitude to reality of a kind that psychologically excludes e x p l o r a t o r y activity.

20-01603

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2 1 9

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247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268

NAME

INDEX

Abdildin, Z h . 1 3 3 Acton, H.B.300, 303 Agrippa 106 A i n e s i d e m o s of K n o s s u s 106 Aleksandrov, A.D.271 Ambartsumian, V.A.133 A n a x i m a n d e r of Miletos223 Andronikos of Rhodes157, 211 Anisimov, A . F . 5 2 Anokhin, P.K.97 A r i s t o t l e 1 3 , 3 2 , 4 6 , 1 5 1 , 157, 1 6 1 , 189, 2 1 1 , 2 1 2 , 2 6 7 , 2 7 2 , 2 7 6 Armonville, J.B.279 Artsimovich, L.A.17 Asmus, V.F.265 Avenarius, R.231

C a m u s , A . 7 , 17, 129 Carlyle, T h . 2 9 2 C a r n a p , R . 6 2 , 63, 67, 209 C a s s i r e r , E . 1 0 0 , 136, 3 0 1 Castelli, E . 9 3 Chagin, B.A.284 Chaloyan, V.K.235 C h e s t e r t o n , G . K . 116 Cohen, M.R.299 Collins, A . 1 7 2 Comte, A.204, 280 Condillac, E.B. d e 7 7 Copernicus, N.60 Copleston, F.C.166 C r o c e , . 141

Baader, F. X. v o n 1 3 5 Bacon, F . 1 2 3 , 163, 212, 272 Bar-Hillel, Y . 2 7 3 Barth, K.228 B a y l e , P . 1 0 9 , 110 Berdyaev, N.A.301 B e r g s o n , H . 8 5 , 145, 197 B e r k e l e y , G . 3 1 , 7 7 , 9 7 - 1 0 0 , 148, 205, 268, 291 B o c h e s k i , J . 1 4 1 , 199 Bogdanov, A.A.85 Bondi, H . 1 3 3 Born, M.126, 300 Broglie, L. d e 1 3 7 B r u n o , G . 6 0 , 197 Boutroux, E.287 Buhr, M.17 Burke, V.212 Burns, E . M c N . 2 9 9 Bykhovsky, B . E . 1 3 6 , 163, 212 317

Darwin, Ch.139 Deborin, A.M.304 Demokritos58, 61, 93, 223, 233-34, 299 D e s c a r t e s , R . 2 4 , 4 5 , 4 8 , 109, 152, 1 6 3 - 6 6 , 172, 1 8 1 , 195, Dzamy, T h . 2 9 1 Diderot, D . 5 5 , 61, 218, 220, Dietzgen, J . 5 7 D i l t h e y , W . 1 4 4 , 146, 147, 2 5 1 Diogenes Laertius-143, 157, D u B o i s - R e y m o n d , E . 115 Dhring, K.E.257 Duns Scotus, J . 2 4 7 Durkheim, E.222

227, 148, 212 299

234

Eccles, G . C . 3 0 2 Eckhart, M.211 Egorov, A.G.254 Ehrlich, W.202, 203

Eicken, H. von134 Engels, F . 2 0 , 2 1 , 29, 30, 33, 36-38, 4 3 , 50, 55, 58, 59, 68, 70, 72, 88, 108, 109, 116, 129, 1 3 1 , 133, 154, 1 6 1 , 1 6 3 , 168, 169, 1 8 3 , 184, 196, 199-201, 207, 212, 257, 258, 264, 268, 274, 275, 282-85, 294, 297, 303, 305 E p i c u r u s 1 6 8 , 223, 224, 233 Erigena (Eriugena), J.S.161

H o b b e s , T h . 4 7 , 1 6 8 - 6 9 , 172, 1 8 1 , 212, 233, 266, 268, 290 Holbach, P .H.D.61, 217-20 Horn, J.H.96 H u m e , D . 9 4 , 100, 1 0 1 , 110-13, 172 H u s s e r l , E . 2 7 , 2 8 , 188 Huxley, . . 1 1 5 , 208

Ilichev, L . F . 1 7 Iovchuk, M.T.302 Irrlitz, G . 1 7

F e d o s e y e v , P . N . 6 9 , 136, 2 5 9 F e u e r b a c h , L . 4 1 , 4 2 , 1 8 3 , 186, 2 0 1 , 219, 224, 228, 229, 233, 245, 2 5 1 , 292 F i c h t e , J . G . 4 0 , 4 2 , 7 8 , 138, 148, 182, 2 5 7 , 2 6 4 , 2 9 2 Flam, L.282 Flew, A . 8 3 Fraenkel, A.273 France, A.137 Franklin, .304 Frolov, I ..301

James, W.82, 83, 300 Jaspers, K . 1 2 8 , 193-95, 213, 261, 287

Galilei, G . 3 2 , 66 G a s s e n d i , P . 168, 2 1 2 Gautier, I.210 G e l l e n , A . 17 G e u l i n c x , A. 39 G i l y a r o v , A . N . 145 Goethe, J.W. von80 Gogol, N . V . 2 1 7 G o r g i a s 104 Gott, V.S.65 G u r o u l l , M . 8 7 , 135, 142

K a n t , I . 2 2 , 2 4 , 4 0 , 7 8 , 1 1 2 - 1 4 , 116, 136, 137, 152, 1 7 3 - 8 2 , 193, 195, 212, 228, 291 K a z y u t i n s k y , V . V . 133 Kedrov, B.M.73 K i e r k e g a a r d , S . A . 1 9 2 , 197 Klaus, G.50 Konstantinov, F.V. 31 K o p n i n , P . V . 103, 2 1 9 K o z i n g , A . 10, 7 8 Kraft, V . 1 3 3 , 210 Krger, G.261 Kubitsky, A . V . 2 1 1 Kuhn, H.261 K u z n e t s o v , I . V . 6 5 , 135

H a e c k e l , E . 115, 3 0 0 Hartmann, N.254 Havemann, R.300 H e g e l , G . W . F . 1 4 , 15, 17, 3 8 , 3 9 , 4 1 - 4 3 , 75, 79-80, 82, 88, 94, 95, 104, 156, 1 6 1 , 1 8 2 - 1 8 4 , 199, 2 0 0 , 2 1 1 , 213, 219, 220, 235, 246, 257, 259, 264, 277, 278 H e i d e g g e r , M . 8 6 , 102, 1 8 7 - 9 3 , 2 6 1 , 272, 287 Heinemann, F.140 Heisenberg, W . 1 3 1 , 240, 298 Helvetius, C . - A . 9 3 , 214, 218, 220 H e r a c l i t u s 5 8 , 86, 2 1 1 , 2 2 3 Hill, T h . E . 2 5 5 Hippocrates61 318

L a Met t r i e , J . O . d e 6 1 , 7 2 Landau, L.D.67 Lange, F.A.237, 248 Lafargue, P .284 L e i b n i z , G . W . v o n 1 3 , 14, 7 6 , 7 7 , 9 4 , 148, 166, 2 6 4 , 3 0 4 Leisegang, H.64, 214 Lektorsky, V.A.91 Lelotte, F . 2 4 7 Lenin, V . I . 2 1 , 23, 43, 57, 69, 85, 8 9 , 9 2 - 9 7 , 109, 126, 1 3 1 , 136, 1495 1 , 160, 184, 2 1 6 , 2 2 1 , 2 3 1 , 2 3 3 , 239, 248, 249, 253, 254, 259, 263, 264, 266, 270, 280-82, 284, 293, 294, 297, 300 Lenz, J.236 Lewes, G . H . 2 0 8 Lewis, J . 1 2 6 Ley, H . 2 1 1

Lifschitz, . 6 7 Locke, J . 1 5 6 , 17072, 242, 290, 291 Lombardi, F.301 Lucretius233 Lyakhovetsky, L.39, 53

268,

Mably, G.B. d e 2 9 1 M a c h , E . 1 2 7 , 150, 1 5 1 , 2 0 6 , 231, 294 Maine de Biran, M.F.P.148 Maire, G.144 Maistre, J. d e 2 0 5 M a l e b r a n c h e , N . d e 3 9 , 109, 212 Mamardashvili, M.K .43 Marcel, G.195 Maritain, J . 1 9 4 , 247 Markov, M.A.54 M a r x , K . 3 0 , 32, 33, 38, 39, 5 2 , 7 5 , 107, 129, 164, 169, 199, 2 0 1 , 2 2 0 , 2 2 5 2 7 , 2 2 9 , 252, 268, 275, 282, 284, 289, 2 9 3 , 300, 305 Meerovsky, B.V.160 Melyukhin, S.T.71 Mitin, M . B . 2 9 Mitrokhin, L.N.233 Motroshilova, N.V.303 MuozAlonso, A.134 M n z e r , T h . 1 5 4 , 196, 211 Myrdal, G.288

208,

P l a n c k , M . 1 7 , 127, 2 1 6 , 2 9 8 P l a t o 2 7 , 3 5 , 9 3 9 4 , 135, 157, 1 6 1 , 209, 227, 234, 260, 266, 267, 272, 290, 291 P l e k h a n o v , G . V . 5 2 , 6 1 , 149, 152, 248, 249 P o p p e r , K . R . 7 3 , 123 Potemkin, A.V.9, 303 Pratt, J.B.101 P r i e s t l e y , J . 160, 172, 2 4 1 , 2 4 2 Proucha, M.207 Pythagoras209

164,

45, 183, 246, 292,

Radlov, E.L.256 Reichenbach, H . 1 3 7 , 210 Ricardo, D.225, 284 Rickert, H . 2 5 Roback, A.83 Roberts, D.E.232 Robespierre, M.298 R o b i n e t , J . B . 133, 197 Rombach, H.305 Rougier, L.212, 27173, 303 R o u s s e a u , J . J . 138, 2 1 8 2 0 , Russell, . 3 1 , 2 1 5 , 2 7 3 Ryle, G . 8 3

290

Nalbandian, M.L.304 N a r s k y , I . S . 5 5 , 137 Newell, J . D . 2 4 0 Newton, I.66, 212, 241, 242 Niebuhr, R.228 N i e t z s c h e , F , 8 2 , 86, 117, 186, 187, 192, 197, 2 8 6

Ogurtsov, A.P.303 Ortega Gasset, J . 1 9 , 2 1 3 O s t w a l d , W . 8 4 , 135, 2 4 3

Parmenides272 Paulsen, F . 1 8 4 , 185, 2 1 1 , 237 Pavlov, . 9 9 Petrovic, G.8 Pfeiffer, J . 3 0 1 Pisarev, D.I.53 319

S a n t a y a n a , G . 1 1 8 , 299 S a r t r e , J . P . 2 8 , 120, 2 3 1 , Scheler, M.51 Schelling, F . W . J . 2 6 , 40, 182, 2 6 4 , 2 6 5 , 2 9 2 Schopenhauer, A.13, 55, 186, 192, 197 Schuppe, W.103 Schwarz, Th.135 Sciacca, M.F.46 Serzhantov, V.F.303 Shinkaruk, V.I.52 Shklovsky, I.S.56 Shvyrev, V.S.91 Skvortsov, L.V.213, 260 Socrates86 S p e n c e r , H . 2 0 4 , 205, 236 S p i n o z a , B . 3 8 , 4 8 , 130, 172, 195, 197, 2 0 9 , 2 2 4 , Stirner, M.282 Struve, P.284 Sukhov, A.D.134 Svidersky, V.I.55 Swift, J . 2 1 5 , 2 7 9 Taine, H.286

287, 299 84, 148,

8 1 , 135,

165167, 233, 290

Tertullian230 T h a l e s 5 8 , 209 Thomas Aquinas161 Tillich, P . 2 2 8 Timiryazev, K.A.121 T o l a n d , J . 6 1 , 132, 160, Turovsky, M.303 Tyukhtin, V.39, 53 Voltaire, F.M.A.299 Watson, J.135 Weber, M.305

166,

172

Weiss, A . F . 1 3 5 Windelband, W.185 Wisdom, J.O.121 Wittgenstein, L.214 Wolf, C h . v o n 1 7 5 , 3 0 0 Wundt, W . 2 0 1 , 202

X e n o p h a n e s of K o l o p h o n 2 2 2

Zarageta Bengoechea, J.246 Zelmanov, A.L.67 Zeno104

SUBJECT

INDEX

Abstract and c o n c r e t e 3 1 , 3 2 A g n o s t i c i s m 1 1 4 , 115, 1 2 1 , 128, 179 and s u b j e c t i v e idealism ( s e e Materialism)63, 124-25 positivist72, 122-23, 126-27 A l i e n a t i o n 7 , 191, 250, 2 5 1 , Anthropologism (philosophical t h r o p o l o g y ) 12, 13, 14, 148, A p p e a r a n c e 9 4 , 279, 280, 281 a n d e s s e n c e 9 4 , 107 A t h e i s m 1 3 , 108, 2 1 9 - 2 2 0 and existentialism231

174, also

274 an292

and the principle of t h e unity of the world62, 73-74 and the psychophysical p r o b l e m 20, 42, 56, 58, 59, 6 1 , 89, 248, 249 and the subject-matter of philosophy9-12, 20-22, 33 Being46 as negation of the e x i s t e n t 1 9 1 phenomenological188 and existence (see Consciousness)190 and reality47 a n d t h e e x i s t e n t 1 8 8 , 189, 192

Basic p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n 1 0 , 1 1 , 19, 2 3 , 2 9 - 3 1 , 3 3 , 3 9 , 4 3 , 4 9 - 5 0 , 9 7 , 128, 1 5 3 as a p r o b l e m of t h e h i s t o r y of philosophy6-7, 20, 33 converted forms83 dialectical-materialist a n s w e r 5 6 , 5 7 , 7 7 - 7 8 , 80, 8 1 , 8 3 - 8 5 , 8 8 epistemological and ontological aspects87-89, 92, 104, 3 0 1 epistemological necessity o f 1 1 , 2 2 , 36, 4 0 genesis o f 3 6 , 45 and religion36-37 . a n d t h e initial t h e o r e t i c a l c o n c e p t 36-37, 4 1 , 42, 45-47, 49 321

C a t e g o r i e s 2 3 , 266 as s t a g e s in t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of knowledge23 c r i t i q u e o f t h e idealist i n t e r p r e tation113-14 Consciousness ( m i n d ) 2 4 , 30, 4 1 , 119 dialectical-materialist understanding of57, 9 1 , 274 intentionalism27 moral178 ordinary58 primitive33-34, 222 a n d b e i n g 3 8 , 188 and self-knowledge (see M a t t e r ) 24

Deism152 Determinism (causality) 172, and indeterminism251 D i a l e c t i c s 3 8 , 109, 2 6 4

223

and metaphysics199 Dogmatism-23 epistemological 129-131 D u a l i s m 1 5 2 , 197 of being and consciousness-188 philosophical (see a l s o E c l e c t i c i s m ) 5 6 , 153 Eclecticism, philosophical150, 292, 293 a n d d u a l i s m 1 5 2 , 153 and historical a p p r o a c h to philosophy151 E m p i r i c i s m 1 2 , 14, 66, 6 8 , 9 7 , 113, 1 4 1 , 144, 2 6 9 , 2 7 0 , 2 9 1 , 2 9 3 Epistemological and ontological23, 97, 291 E p i s l e m o l o g y 2 4 , 88, 9 1 , 9 3 , 9 8 , 291 c r i t i q u e of s c e p t i c i s m (see a l s o Knowledge)129 Existentialism (see also Atheism: B e i n g ) 7 , 12, 2 8 , 1 1 9 - 2 1 , 146, 187-95, 207, 2 3 1 , 2 4 9 - 5 1 , 2 6 1 , 287 Hylozoism13, 55, 59, 60

Intuitionism12,

13

K n o w a b i l i t y o f t h e w o r l d 8 7 , 104 and the principle of reflection95 o p p o s i n g p o s i t i o n s of m a t e r i a l i s m a n d i d e a l i s m 8 8 - 9 0 , 103, 2 5 7 58 Knowledge68 as a specific f o r m of r e f l e c t i o n 9 0 - 9 6 , 101 as a s o c i o - h i s t o r i c a l p r o c e s s 8 8 , 274 the absolute and relative i n 1 3 0 idealist understanding of96, 101, 113-14 unity of the epistemological and ontological 6 5 , 90 and language273 and philosophy16, 71 a n d s c i e n c e 1 0 0 - 1 0 1 , 125, 2 6 3 a n d t h e u n k n o w a b l e 1 1 3 - 1 6 , 130, 204

Linguistic analysis, 8 3 , 84, 9 0 , 148

philosophy

of

I d e a l i s m 1 3 , 14, 3 5 , 4 3 , 4 7 , 86, 140, 148, 149, 2 0 0 , 2 1 9 , 2 6 6 , 2 7 4 dialectical303 e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l 6 6 , 90 objective57, 78 rationalist 8 1 , 228, 248 spiritualistic225, 254 s u b j e c t i v e 2 9 , 78, 85, 269 vulgar82 a n d m e t a p h y s i c s 1 6 0 , 172, 182, 183, 197, 2 0 2 and religion75, 227-28, 232 a n d s c i e n c e 7 6 , 8 1 , 121, 2 4 1 , 242-43, 246, 247, 255, 256, 259, 261, 270 and the theory of reflection (see a l s o Materialism; P a n t h e i s m ) 94-98, 257, 270 Idealist d o c t r i n e s 1 5 4 - 5 5 divergence and polarisation14849, 259-60 I r r a t i o n a l ism (see also Rational i s m ) 1 3 , 8 1 , 118, 123, 128, 144, 147, 153, 185, 197, 2 2 9 , 2 3 0 , 261 322

Material and spiritual (ideal) 1 9 , 54-56, 88 dialectical-materialist understanding o f 5 6 , 57, 82, 98-100, 245 idealist u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f 3 1 , 4 2 , 243-45, 254 M a t e r i a l i s m 7 2 - 7 4 , 154 as e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l antithesis of i d e a l i s m 8 9 , 90, 93, 96, 99, 103, 104, 142 as an o p e n s y s t e m of p h i l o s o p h i c a l knowledge257 anthropological42 d i a l e c t i c a l a n d h i s t o r i c a l 5 , 6, 10, 73, 207, 218-19, 252 historical forms13, 184, 2 3 7 , 241-43 mechanistic167-69, 237, 241, 242 metaphysical59, 98-99, 167, 258 natural scientific236-37 primitive s p o n t a n e o u s 7 4 , 75 v u l g a r 2 9 , 8 2 , 84, 2 3 2 and agnosticism-115-17 and i d e a l i s m 1 5 , 35, 75-77, 87,

1 4 1 , 148, 152, 2 0 0 , 2 0 2 , 2 0 3 , 215, 216, 219, 234-38, 243, 246, 2 5 1 , 253-54, 255, 259, 2 6 1 , 262, 265, 275, 293 and metaphysical sistems159-60, 166, 167, 172, 1 8 3 , 197 and religion74, 75, 224, 227, 228, 232 a n d social p o s i t i o n ( s e e a l s o N e opositivism: Positivism)220 Man, philosophical problem of (see also A n t h r o p o l o g i s m ) 8 - 1 1 Matter207, 238, 241, 242-43 and consciousness (mind) 5 6 , 57, 91 and motion158, 242, 264 and substance58 and thought61 M e c h a n i s m (see also Materialism) 13, 168 M e t a p h y s i c s 1 5 6 - 5 8 , 195-97 as a m e t h o d 1 5 6 , 199 as a s y s t e m 1 5 6 , 159, 167, 198, 199, 2 0 1 , 2 0 2 dualist164, 173-74 idealist181, 186-95, 197, 2 0 0 transcendental173-81 a n d k n o w l e d g e 9 2 , 130 a n d p h y s i c s ( s e e also Dialectics; Idealism; Materialism; N e o p o s i tivism; Ontology; Phenomenalism; Philosophic System; Positivism) 1 6 4 , 167, 185 and r e l i g i o n 9 1 , 178, 194-95 Morality a n d r e l i g i o n 1 7 8 , 180

and t h e basic q u e s t i o n 7 , 8, 52, 67 a n d m a t e r i a l i s m 6 5 , 127, 128, 2 0 5 , 208, 216, 238 a n d s c e p t i c i s m 1 2 1 , 122, 124 N e o r e a l i s m 9 0 , 197, 2 5 4 N e o t h o m i s m 1 2 , 134, 1 4 7 - 4 8 , 187, 194, 197, 229, 246-48, 254, 302 N o m i n a l i s m 1 7 1 , 267

Objectivism and subjectivism (see also Partisanship) 8 6 Ontology290, 291 and m e t a p h y s i c s 1 8 7 - 8 9 , 192, 193

Natural phylosophy60, 243 G r e e k 5 8 , 86 idealist265 materialist58, 7 1 , 72, 200 Naturalism12, 222-24, 270 Necessity256-57, 258-59 and c h a n c e 2 2 3 and freedom 251, 252 historical283 Neokantianism25, 100, 184, 269 N e o p o s i t i v i s m 1 2 , 2 6 , 126, 1 4 7 - 4 8 , 215, 243-44, 269 c r i t i q u e of m e t a p h y s i c s 1 6 9 , 170, 173, 2 0 9 , 2 1 0 critique of objective idealism63, 270-73 323

P a n t h e i s m 8 0 , 154, 165, 2 2 2 a n d i d e a l i s m 7 9 , 80, 2 5 4 materialist and idealist39 Partisanship in philosophy290, 291 ideological f u n c t i o n 2 8 8 - 9 3 and the 'above party' conception as a f a l l a c y 2 7 5 - 7 8 , 2 8 5 - 8 8 and bourgeois ' n o n - p a r t i s a n s h i p ' 279-83, 284 and objectivism283, 286 a n d scientific objectivity284, 294 Phenomenalism13, 27 epistemological roots of269 and essentialism173 and materialism238, 239 and metaphysics173, 202 Phenomenology188 d e m a r c a t i o n of subject and object27 and ontology-187-88 P h i l o s o p h i c a l S y s t e m 1 6 , 4 5 - 4 6 , 146, 256 a n t i m e t a p h y s i c a l 169, 170 form and c o n t e n t 3 7 - 3 9 , 45, 1606 1 , 166 metaphysical 109, 156, 173, 198 a n d m e t h o d 1 5 6 , 162, 163 ' P h i l o s o p h y of t h e H i s t o r y of P h i l o s o p h y ' 1 5 , 16, 1 4 1 , 2 0 2 ' P h i l o s o p h y of L i f e ' 8 1 , 144, 146, 185-87 P o s i t i v i s m 7 3 , 144, 2 4 9 critique of objective i d e a l i s m 2 0 5 , 206

and materialism73, 205, 206 and speculative metaphysics184, 185, 2 0 2 - 2 0 4 , 2 0 6 , 2 0 8 P r a g m a t i s m 2 4 6 , 300

R a t i o n a l i s m 1 2 , 14, 1 8 1 , 2 0 0 , 2 9 1 , 293

a n d i r r a t i o n a l i s m 1 4 4 , 154, 187 Reflection as an epistemological principle 88, 9 1 , 97, 98-101 as a u n i v e r s a l p r o p e r t y of m a t ter-92 and delusion91, 263-66, 270-71, 273, 274

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This collection of articles written by a large team of authors presents the achievements of Soviet philosophers in the comprehensive study of the individual. The authors discuss a wide range of problems: the social and biological aspects of man, as the object of philosophical and scientific study, human health from the philosophical viewpoint, man and philosophy, man and culture, the future of man, etc. The book is addressed to philosophers, sociologists, and all those who are interested in problems of human development.

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The book is a collection of articles on topical philosophical questions related to Soviet society. They discuss social aspects of the acceleration of socialism's development, the improvement of the structure of socialist society, dialectical contradictions in its development, social problems of the scientific and technological revolution, the growing role of the human factor in the process of society's reorganisation, the relationship between economic and social progress, the nature of mechanisms of social development. The book is intended for broad readership.

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