The State of the Union and Foreign Policy President Barack Obama will deliver the State of the

Union address on Tuesday night. The administration has let the media know that the focus of the speech will be on obs and the economy. !iven the strong showing of the "epublicans in the last election# and the fact that they have defined domestic issues as the main battleground# Obama$s decision makes political sense. %e will likely mention foreign issues# and is undoubtedly devoting significant time to them# but the decision not to focus on foreign affairs at in his State of the Union# creates the impression that the global situation is under control. &ndeed# the "epublican$s focus on domestic matters pro ects the same sense. Both sides create the danger that the public will be unprepared for some of the international crises that are already 'uite heated. (e have discussed these issues in detail# but it is useful to step back and look at the state of the world for a moment. The United States remains the most powerful nation in the world [http://www.stratfor.com/forecast/20100120_decade_forecast_20102020] # both in the si)e of its economy and military. *evertheless# it continues to have a singular focus on the region between from &ra' to Pakistan. Obama had argued during the campaign that the !eorge (. Bush had committed the United States to the wrong war in &ra'# neglected the important war in +fghanistan. +fter being elected# he continued to withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq [http://www.stratfor.com/anal sis/2010021!_special_co"era#e_us_withdra wal_iraq] begun under the Bush +dministration# but increased forces in $f#hanistan [http://www.stratfor.com/anal sis/2010021%_af#hanistan_campai#n_special _series_part_1_us_strate# ] . %e has also committed himself to concluding withdrawing U.S. forces from &ra' by the end of this year. This poses a series of series problems for the United States. First# the strategic goal of the United States in +fghanistan is to build an $f#han militar and securit force [http://www.stratfor.com/anal sis/20110111&wee'&war& af#hanistan&(an&!&11&2011] that can take over from the United States in the coming years# allowing the United States to withdraw from the country. &n other words# as in ,ietnam# the United States wants to create a pro-+merican regime with a loyal +rmy to protect +merican interests in +fghanistan# without re'uiring U.S. forces. & mention ,ietnam because# in essence# this is the ,ietnami)ation program that "ichard *i.on tried# applied to +fghanistan. The task is to win the hearts and minds of the people# isolate the guerrillas# and use the pro-+merican public to buttress the /ar)ai +dministration and serve as recruits for the military and security forces. The essential problem with this strategy is that it wants to control the outcome of the war while simultaneously withdrawing from it. For that to happen# it must persuade the $f#han people )which are hardl a sin#le united entit * [http://www.stratfor.com/#raphic_of_the_da /20100+2,_pashtun_af#hanist

an_and_pa'istan] that committing to the United States is a rational choice# when the +merican goal is to leave. The +fghan$s must# first of all# find the +mericans more attractive than the Taliban. Second# they must be prepared to shoulder the risks and burdens the +mericans want to abandon. These risks are substantial. They must be prepared to engage the Taliban# defeat them or endure the conse'uences of defeat. !iven that there is minimal evidence that the United States is winning hearts and minds in meaningful numbers# the rest of the analysis becomes relatively unimportant. But the point is that *+TO has some 012#222 troops fighting in +fghanistan# the President has pledged to begin withdrawals in 3203# and all that -ali.an has to do is not lose in order to win [http://www.stratfor.com/anal sis/2010022/_af#hanistan_campai#n_part_2 _tali.an_strate# ]. This will not result in a crisis in 3200 in the sense of a cataclysmic event. &t is# rather# the fact that there is no definitive event in the offing# nor any that can be clearly defined that is the crisis. The current situation can continue as long as the United States is prepared to continue the fight. &n a sense that is the crisis. &n the meantime# the wrong war# &ra'# shows signs of crisis or# more precisely# crisis in the conte.t of &ran. The United States is committed to withdrawing its forces from &ra'. This has two immediate conse'uences. 0irst1 it increases Iranian influence in Iran [http://www.stratfor.com/anal sis/2011010+&al& sadrs&return&iraq&us&iranian&entan#lement] simply by creating a vacuum the &ra'is themselves cannot fill. Second# it escalates &ranian regional power. The withdrawal of U.S. forces from &ra' without a strong &ra'i government and military will create a crisis of confidence in the +rabian Peninsula. The Saudis# in particular# unable to match &ranian power and doubtful of +merican will to resist &ran# will of necessity have to find an accommodation with &ran. The &ranians do not have to invade anyone to change the regional balance of power decisively. &n the e.treme# but not unimaginable case that &ran turns &ra' into a satellite# &ranian power would be bought to the borders of /uwait# Saudi +rabia# 4ordan and Syria# and increasing &ran$s border with Turkey. 5ertainly the United States could deal with &ran# but having completed its withdrawal from &ra'# it is difficult to imagine the United States rushing forces back in. !iven the U.S. commitment to +fghanistan# it is difficult to see what ground forces would be available. The withdrawal from &ra' creates a ma or crisis in 3200. &f it is completed# &ran$s power is enhanced. &f it is aborted# the U.S. has 12#222 troops# most in training and support mode# few deployed in combat mode# with the decision as to whether combat resumes in the hands of the &ranians and their &ra'i surrogates. Since 012#222 troops were insufficient to pacify &ra' in the first place# sending in more troops makes little sense. &f the United States is prepared to complete the withdrawal of troops from &ra' in

3200# it must deal with &ran prior to that date. The two choices are a massive air campaign to cripple &ran. -he other is a ne#otiated understandin# with Iran [http://www.stratfor.com/wee'l /20110110&tur'ish&role&ne#otiations&iran] . The former might fail# the latter might not be attractive to the &ranians. They are 'uite content seeing the United States leave. The reason why the &ranians are so intransigent is not that they are cra)y. &t is that they think they hold all the cards6and the nuclear issue is hardly what concerns them. The difference between +fghanistan and &ra' is that a wrenching crisis can be averted in +fghanistan simply by continuing to do what the U.S. is already doing. By continuing to do what it is doing in &ra'# the United States inevitably heads into a crisis as the troop level is drawn down. President Obama$s strategy appears to be to continue to carry out operations in +fghanistan# continue the withdrawal in &ra'# and attempt to deal with Iran throu#h sanctions [http://www.stratfor.com/anal sis/200,0,12_iranian_sanctions_special_seri es_introduction]. This is an attractive strategy if it works. But the argument & am making is that the +fghan strategy can avoid collapse but not be successful. & am also e.tremely dubious that sanctions will force a change of course in &ran. First# its effectiveness depends on the actual cooperation of "ussia and 5hina 7as well as 8uropeans9. Sufficient e.ceptions have been given by the Obama administration to +merican companies doing business with &ran# that the others will feel free to act in their self interest. But more than that# sanctions can unify a country. The e.pectations that some had about the 3reen 4e"olution of 200, [http://www.stratfor.com/anal sis/200,022,_iran_election_clamor_su.sides ] have been smashed# or at least should have been. (e doubt that there is massive unhappiness with the regime waiting to e.plode and we see know signs that the regime can$t cope with these threats. The sanctions even provide &ran with cover for economic austerity while labeling resistance unpatriotic. +s & have argued before# sanctions are an alternati"e to a solution [http://www.stratfor.com/wee'l /20100/01_thin'in#_a.out_unthin'a.le_usi ranian_deal]# making it appear that something is being done when in fact nothing is happening. There are numerous other issues Obama could address# ranging from &srael# :e.ico to "ussia. But# in a way# there is no point. Until the United States frees up forces and bandwidth# and reduces the dangers in the war )ones# it lacks the resources# intellectual and material# to deal with these other countries. &t is impossible to be the single global power and focus only on one region# yet it is impossible to focus on the world while fires are burning in a single region. This# more than any other reason# is why Obama must conclude these conflicts# or at least create a situation where these conflicts e.ist in the broader conte.t of +merican interests. There are multiple solutions# all with significant risks.

Standing pat is the riskiest. There is a parallel between Obama$s foreign policy problem and his domestic. ;omestically# Obama is trapped by the financial crisis and the resulting economic problems# particularl unemplo ment [http://www.stratfor.com/anal sis/201012/0&us&emplo ment&sta.ili5es] . %e can$t deal with other issues until he deal with that one. There are a host of foreign policy issues# including the broader 'uestion of the general approach Obama wants to take toward the world. The United States is involved in two wars with a potential third on the table. *othing else can be addressed until these wars are dealt with. The decision to focus on domestic issues makes political sense. &t also makes sense in a broader way. Obama does not yet have a coherent strategy stretching from &ra' to +fghanistan. 5ertainly# he inherited the wars# but they are now his. The +fghan war has no clear endpoint# the &ra' war does have a clear end point# but that endpoint is enormously dangerous. &t is unlikely that he will be able to avoid decisions in the coming year. &t is also unlikely that he has a clear path yet. There are no clear paths and he is going to have to hack his way to solutions. But the current situation does not easily e.tend past this year# particularly in &ra' and &ran# and they both re'uire decisions. Presidents prefer not making decisions# and Obama has been particularly successful at putting them off in Foreign +ffairs. & suspect that time is up and decisions will be made. & have a sense of his options. & don$t have a sense of his choices. That is his advantage6he can surprise the world# but only if beneath the apparent postponement of decisions there is a sense# in his mind# of what that decision will be.