[Title] [Deciding Court] Supreme Court [Date of Decision] 8 June 2001 [Case No.] Case No.

929 (O ) of 2000 Case No.780 (Jyu ) of 2000 [Case Name] [Source]

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[Party Names] Tsuburaya Productions Co., Ltd. vs Sompote Saengduencha [Summary of Facts] The underlying substantive issue in this case concerns who holds the foreign rights related to the popular Japanese Ultraman movie and TV series. (1) Tsuburaya Productions K.K. (the plaintiff and appellant, hereinafter Tsuburaya) held the copyright to the works in Japan. According to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, these rights extended to the Kingdom of Thailand, which is a signatory to the convention. Tsuburaya granted use of the copyright in Japan and various Southeast Asian countries to Bandai K.K., a Japanese corporation. Bandai, in turn, extended use of the works in Thailand, Singapore, and Hong Kong to a subsidiary. Sompote Saengduencha (the defendant and appellee, hereinafter Sompote)

is a Thai national domiciled in Thailand and president of Chaiyo Film Co. Ltd. (hereinafter Chaiyo), an unregistered Thai company. unlimited term. Chaiyo asserted that in Sompote and 1976 it contracted with Tsuburaya for all rights to the works outside of Japan for an Tsuburaya disputed the veracity of this contract. Chaiyo had no presence and did no business in Japan. In April 1997, Chaiyos Hong Kong lawyers sent a warning letter to Bandai and Sega Enterprises K.K., a Japanese company that was negotiating a merger with Bandai at the time. The letter stated that because Chaiyo held the copyright for Ultraman and received from Tsuburaya the right to use the works exclusively, use of the works in Thailand, Singapore, and Hong Kong by Bandais subsidiary violated Chaiyos exclusive rights. This warning letter was delivered to Bandais and Segas offices in Japan. In July 1997, Tsuburaya filed this case against Sompote and his related entities in the Tokyo District Court seeking, inter alia, compensation and a declaration that Sompote has no right to use the works in Thailand or elsewhere. After filing the case, in December 1997 Tsuburaya brought a second lawsuit before the Thai courts, also seeking compensation and an injunction against Sompotes use of the works. The lawsuits differed, at least in part, because copyright infringement is a criminal act in Thailand, and thus the Thai case included criminal charges against Sompote. At the first hearing, the Tokyo District Court dismissed the case for lack of international jurisdiction over the matter. Tsuburaya appealed, and the Tokyo High Court dismissed the appeal. [Summary of Decision] The first appeal is vacated and the original judgment reversed. This case is remanded to the Tokyo District Court. Upon the grounds stated below: Part 4. Nonetheless, we cannot confirm the lower courts findings outlined above for the following reasons: (1) In the case of a claim for tort damages caused by a defendant not domiciled in Japan, acceptance of international jurisdiction by Japanese courts depends upon satisfaction of the Code of Civil Procedures rule for court venue at the place of the tort (Code of Civil

Procedure, article. 5(9) or in this case the Old Code of Civil Procedure, article 15). Thus, in principle, it is appropriate to understand that this is satisfied where one evidences an objective factual relationship giving rise to damages for the plaintiff s legal benefit caused by the defendants acts in Japan. may countersue. Perhaps it can be said that if this factual relationship exists, in most cases there is a rational reason upon which the defendant Further, we should consider the division of court functions in an Nevertheless, because there is a sufficient legal relationship, it international society.

is just to exercise our jurisdiction. It is clear that regarding the first claim [for tortious damages] there is an objective factual relationship based on the disturbance of the Appellants business caused by the Appellee having the warning letter delivered to the companies addresses in domestic Japan. Correspondingly, Japanese courts must accept international jurisdiction over the first claim. (2) Because the object of the second claim [for a declaration regarding ownership of the Japanese copyright] is property that exists in Japan, it is clear that Japan satisfies the Code of Civil Procedures rule that provides for court venue at the place of the property (Code of Civil Procedure, article 5(4), Old Code of Civil Procedure, article 8). (3) The third through sixth claims [for, inter alia, an injunction against Chaiyo declaring that it has an exclusive right to use the works outside of Japan, and declarations regarding the validity of Chaiyos license agreement and the Thai copyright] may all be joined with the first and second claims. In the case where there are other claims between the parties to a petition for which a Japanese court has already accepted international jurisdiction pursuant to a specific jurisdictional cause, acceptance of international jurisdiction over the additional claims by a Japanese court depends upon satisfaction of the Code of Civil Procedures rule of court venue for joined claims (Code of Civil Procedure, article 7 or Old Code of Civil Procedure, article 21). Thus it is appropriate to understand that this requires a court to find a close relationship among the claims. Perhaps a fear exists that where a Japanese court has accepted international jurisdiction based on a specific claim between the parties, it will also join a claim that does not have a close relationship with the other claims. In such a case, the joining would be inappropriate when considered from the viewpoint of the rational division of court functions in an international society, and furthermore it would delay and complicate the trial. If we apply this rule to the facts here, the third through sixth claims all concern a

dispute about whether or not the copyright includes the works and whether there is an exclusive right of use. This is substantively the same dispute as in the first and second claims, thus it can be said that there is a close relationship. courts. (4) The substance of the claims in this suit and in the Thai suit are not identical, and Nonetheless, one of the points in As a result, we must find that international jurisdiction over the third through sixth claims exists in Japanese

the subject matter of the lawsuits is different.

contention in the Thai litigation and in this litigation is whether or not there is an exclusive right to use of the works. Even with this point of commonality, we cannot say that to subject the Appellee to Japanese jurisdiction is contrary to the notions of expected fairness between the parties, and propriety and expediency of the court. Moreover, regarding this case we cannot recognize any special circumstances that require us to deny the Japanese courts international jurisdiction. 'Part 5. Conclusion As explained above, we find that the Japanese courts have international jurisdiction over each of the claims in this case. ... Therefore, without making a determination on the other portions of the lower courts decisions, we vacate the appeal and reverse the original judgment. The case is remanded to the trial court. So held unanimously. [Keywords] The Ultraman Case Article 5 (iv) of the Code of Civil Procedure Article 5 (ix) of the Code of Civil Procedure Article 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure