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Islam and ChristianMuslim Relations

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Will the revolution be tweeted? A conceptual framework for understanding the social media and the Arab Spring
Francesca Comunello & Giuseppe Anzera
a a a

Department of Communication and Social Research , Sapienza University of Rome , Italy Published online: 05 Sep 2012.

To cite this article: Francesca Comunello & Giuseppe Anzera (2012) Will the revolution be tweeted? A conceptual framework for understanding the social media and the Arab Spring, Islam and ChristianMuslim Relations, 23:4, 453-470, DOI: 10.1080/09596410.2012.712435 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09596410.2012.712435

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Islam and ChristianMuslim Relations Vol. 23, No. 4, October 2012, 453470

Will the revolution be tweeted? A conceptual framework for understanding the social media and the Arab Spring
Francesca Comunello* and Giuseppe Anzera
Department of Communication and Social Research, Sapienza University of Rome, Italy The goal of this article is to build a conceptual framework for understanding the role of social media in the so-called Arab Spring, considering two different disciplinary perspectives: International Relations and Internet Studies. More specifically, it relies on literature on Middle Eastern political systems and on social network sites. It also refers to literature that examines the relationship between (social) media engagement and civic engagement. Building on this foundation, the article analyses the main attempts to evaluate the impact of social media on the Arab Spring from specific perspectives. Commentators have tended to adopt a dichotomous vision of the topic, either emphasizing the revolutionary role of social media or totally minimizing its role; this article defines them as digital evangelists and techno-realists respectively. In order to prove their point of view, both sides focus on the same issues. The study critically analyses the main issues, discussing how they have been interpreted by both digital evangelists and techno-realists. Through a multidisciplinary framework, it proposes a more nuanced picture of the relationship between the social media and the Arab Spring. Keywords: Arab Spring; social media; internet studies; digital evangelists; techno-realists; international relations

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Analysing the relationship between the Arab Spring and social media from a multidisciplinary perspective The so-called Arab Spring has received wide media coverage in Western countries. Many commentators quickly emphasized the role played by social media, defining the situation as a social media revolution, mainly focusing on its organizational aspects (social media contributions to organizing protestor activities) and information spread (social media are a powerful tool for grassroots journalism and for independent information spread). Others minimized the role of social media, claiming that only a minority of people in the Arab countries have Internet access (and even fewer mobile Internet access), or even suggesting that social media may have represented an important tool for secret services to identify and localize activists. Not only journalists, but also Internet scholars and International Relations scholars have questioned the role of the social media in the Arab Spring, and their opinions, some of which will be reviewed in the following paragraphs, have gained acceptance in the public debate, mainly through the media system. Early in the debate, understandably, there was no empirical research to support their assumptions, and, like journalists and other commentators, they often proposed dichotomous visions of the topic, either emphasizing the revolutionary role of social media, or minimizing it. For a better understanding of the role of social media in the so-called Arab Spring, however, a more nuanced picture is needed. Social media cannot be interpreted as the main cause of such complex processes, nor can they be seen as completely uninfluential. In order to build a more balanced framework for discussion, we consider the

*Corresponding author. Email: francesca.comunello@uniroma1.it

ISSN 0959-6410 print/ISSN 1469-9311 online 2012 University of Birmingham http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09596410.2012.712435 http://www.tandfonline.com

454 F. Comunello and G. Anzera theoretical perspectives and the empirical findings of two different disciplinary approaches: International Relations and Internet Studies. By integrating these different perspectives, we address a major gap in the debate: understandably, Internet scholars tend to have little familiarity with Middle Eastern political systems, while International Relations scholars often show a superficial knowledge of social media and the related social processes. To build an adequate conceptual framework, however, we believe that both perspectives are needed. Fall of sultans: regime change in Middle Eastern Arab countries The revolutionary wave that hit the Arab Middle Eastern countries in 2011 gave a strong impetus to a long process of socio-political transformations; this trend is bound to endure over time and will provoke significant change in the domestic environment of the countries involved, from regime change to the rise of new actors (e.g. new political parties), and to the rearrangement of economic and political elites. As Goldstone (2011) has remarked, we can identify some analogies between the current Arab context and the great wave of revolutions of the past: the rise in prices and widespread unemployment in 2011 played an important role, as happened in Europe in 1848 during the European revolutions against reactionary political forces; similarly, the corruption and stagnation of the political elite in Arab countries played an important role in 2011, acting as a catalyst, as happened during the uprisings in Eastern Europe and in the USSR in 1989. However, while the upheavals in 1848 had the specific target of overthrowing dynastic monarchies and 1989 aimed to bring down Communist governments, the recent social mobilizations are attempting to overturn a different form of government, one that is, however, widespread in the region: the neopatrimonial state led by the so-called New Sultan (ibid.). The neopatrimonial state is based on the systematic expansion of the power of an authoritarian leader; usually, the sultan is able to control the fate of a country for a prolonged period of time, at the expense of formal institutions. Eisenstadt (1973, 1999) was one of the first and most prominent scholars to analyse this kind of government. He described the way that some states developed a form of neopatrimonial power in which an authoritarian leader takes control of the administrative apparatus and achieves significant economic power through which the loyalty of the elite is earned by guaranteeing privileges and rewards. The structuralist analysis of revolutions (a contemporary wave of thought in political science, developed in the late 1970s, focused on violent regime change) pointed out that a neopatrimonial state is highly sensitive to economic imbalances (Russell 1974; Paige 1975; Gugler 1982; Tilly 1978, 1984). Economic biases can magnify fractures inside the neopatrimonial system by triggering breaches within the elites who dominate the economic and military apparatus; the inability of an authoritarian leader to maintain the privileges of the wealthy social groups comprising the ruling elite quickens internal conflicts; with the regime heavily strained by the elites strife, an abrupt uprising at this point could cause the collapse of the entire system and trigger a regime changing dynamic. As scholars have repeatedly pointed out (Linz and Chehabi 1998; Brownlee 2002, 2007, 2009), the neopatrimonial state is not based on a specific ideological system, as its main purpose is the maintenance of personal power; in some cases the sultan may concede to formal elections or the formation of political parties (Ottaway 2003), giving way to an apparently protodemocratic system. However, these tools are generally controlled by the authoritarian leader in a direct or indirect form (e.g. through the insertion of trusted people in key roles), or are cosmetic for external reasons (e.g. to appease international criticism of rough dictatorship). One of the most important mechanisms of the neopatrimonial system is linked to the continuous process of accumulation by the authoritarian leader. The vast riches piled up by

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Islam and ChristianMuslim Relations 455 the sultan are used to strengthen the loyalty of the military and political elite surrounding the supreme leader. From this perspective, the traditional tools for development, such as industrialization or trade ties with foreign countries, become means to amass wealth that is mainly channelled toward the authoritarian leader and his acolytes (Kamrava 2010); as a consequence, only a small part of the countrys resources are available to the population. The security forces and military elite are controlled by the new sultan assigning trusted subjects, often relatives of the sultan himself, to the high command, and controlling the relationships between the various branches of the armed services; the allocation of resources in the hands of the authoritarian leader and the centralization of communications may also be exploited by the sultan to control the security and armed forces. In the neopatrimonial state, the masses are depoliticized and unorganized (Montessoro 2005; Goldstone 2011) and have little ability to control the regularity of electoral procedures and policies. The management of the media by the government, the power of surveillance bodies and the systematic intimidation of protesters generate strong social control of a civilian population that is not inclined to be politically involved. The government, during times of economic crisis, dispenses subsidies for food, electricity or fuel to the population. Finally, in neopatrimonial regimes, a clear displacement of power is rare; usually, an authoritarian leader avoids choosing a successor to rule the country after the sultans death. Generally, this lack of transparency produces deadlock and causes crises when the death of the dictator is approaching (Siaroff 2008). In the North African and Middle Eastern context, Zine Ben Ali in Tunisia, Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Bashar Assad in Syria and Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen represented or still embody this kind of regime, albeit with different styles. Though neopatrimonial regimes may seem sturdy, strong and unshakable, they frequently show serious weaknesses (Lust-Okar 2005, 2011; Ulfelder 2005); often these faults become evident only after the fall of the neopatrimonial/sultanistic power, even if they played a prominent role in causing the collapse of the regime. The structural problems are rooted in the same components on which neopatrimonial regimes are based: the need to maintain high rewards (Gurses and Mason 2010) for the sultans inner circle (comprising persons belonging to the political and economic elite), the persistence of high levels of corruption, which render bureaucracy and the economic structure ineffective, the need to allocate ever-increasing amounts of subsidies to cope with growing unemployment, the inability to generate positive economic growth, and the remarkable dependence on the security apparatus and armed forces (which is a key factor that can determine whether the implementation of a regime change can succeed or fail). In this environment, it is not easy to organize an uprising; in order to mobilize people and occupy squares and streets, the protestors have to challenge regimes that are particularly skilful in suppressing internal dissent. Revolts in neopatrimonial states occur at specific conjunctures, when a number of problems produce a discontent that extends to large segments of the population: the principal causes are the ineptitude of the ruling elite, difficult economic conditions and an intolerable level of corruption (Bellin 2004; Skocpol 1979). These factors allow the rebels to involve broad sections of the population in the mobilization phase, overcoming existing divisions (especially ethnic and religious discord). Two other elements are essential to producing regime change in neopatrimonial states: first, the context involves unwilling leaders of the armed forces, too tired to defend the regime and the sultan; second, it is important that international, regional and global powers do not act to support the sultan and prohibit the use of intolerable levels of violence against the civilian population during the revolt (Kaldor and Kostovicova 2008). As these factors rarely converge, uprisings are a rare development, and even more infrequent are successful revolutions bringing real regime change.

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456 F. Comunello and G. Anzera The revolts in the Middle East and North Africa have the potential to erode the sultanistic dictatorships by virtue of their occurring in an exceptionally favourable situation, triggering a process that, in the medium and long term, will transform the social and political background of the region. It is relevant to point out that, while in the period 1949 to 1979 the revolutionary processes against neopatrimonial regimes (e.g. in Cambodia, China, Cuba, Iran and Vietnam) fostered the rise of Communism-based regimes or Islamist theocracies, these two options are no longer plausible and their appeal for revolutionary movements faded due to their inherent inefficiency in promoting economic development (Linz 2000; Brooker 2000; Katz 2001; Haldenius and Teorell 2007). Goldstone (2011) notes that, over the last 30 years, revolutions against neopatrimonial states and/or dictatorships (such as those of Georgia, Haiti, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Romania and the Philippines) produced weak and corrupt protodemocratic systems that, in some cases, favoured the return of authoritarianism. Finally, it must be pointed out that the recent collapse of neopatrimonial powers followed urban insurrections and did not involve rural areas (a notable difference in comparison with past revolutions) (Anzera 2011). The huge process of urbanization produced megalopolises, such as Cairo, that rearranged populations in the Third World. These mega-cities became such important political and social centres of power that the relevance of rural districts was downgraded. Middle Eastern uprisings in 2011, for example, occurred primarily in large cities or metropolitan environments; events in Tahrir Square or Tunis (where crowds marching from rural areas gathered to form a unified movement), or even the relief of Benghazi (which triggered the Libyan crisis), have had a decisive impact on the destiny of their countries (Anderson 2011). The urban environment can provide some essential advantages to the protesters: the masses are easier to mobilize, and the main targets people and buildings representing the regime are physically present in the area and easy to locate. Furthermore, the size and configuration of the urban environment (e.g. narrow streets and buildings in close proximity to each other), generally favouring the rebels and limiting the effective deployment of security forces, can also play a significant role in urban uprisings, as they reduce the ability of the police to control the rioters. Structuralist studies on revolutions have demonstrated that mobilization in urban areas was not the expression of disorganized and ignorant masses of people; rather, urban uprisings are controlled by educated individuals, often long-time residents of the city, well rooted in the metropolitan social environment (Gugler 1982). The direct causes that more often trigger the urban uprisings are of two types related either to food shortages (shortage of food itself, distribution problems or high food prices) or unemployment or to a combination of these two factors. The first phase of the social uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia can be directly linked to precisely these two factors (Goldstone 2011). Without them, the cities could hardly have become the scene of unrest, since the standard of living and employment opportunities are generally higher than in rural areas. Finally, even in the case of urban uprisings, success depends on the weakness of the sultans dictatorship as well as on the size and loyalty of the security forces. Because transitions in the neopatrimonial states in North Africa will take more time to complete, one of the most important tasks for the international community, and especially for the European Union, due to its proximity and geopolitical position, will be to monitor and support the development of political actors, models of governance and mass participation in social and political protodemocratic electoral appointments, in order to prevent the rise of antidemocratic forces (Snyder 2006). There are three specific areas in which it is considered important to implement careful monitoring to identify the emergence of key actors in supporting the process of democracy building:

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Islam and ChristianMuslim Relations 457 (1) emergence of new political actors and election results: parties, leaders, movements, transfer of subjects from business elites and the military to the political system, adoption of new electoral systems; (2) adoption of new models of governance: implementation of processes of decentralization, devolution and regionalism, new types of federated entities based on ethnic-tribal or religious minorities; (3) growth of a new political consciousness (in previously depoliticized public opinion): use of social media to broadcast programmes, ideas, meetings and events to promote and stimulate the creation of non-governmental organizations, to identify internally and internationally new social and political actors, and influence the transformation of the mainstream media after the collapse of the sultan dictatorship. Insights from Internet Studies Internet Studies is a relatively new field, sometimes described as a meta-field of study (Silver 2004), and is strongly characterized from a multidisciplinary perspective. Markham and Baym (2009, 17), for instance, underline the changing role of disciplinarity in Internet research. Internet Studies deals with the complex relationships between digital technology and contemporary society, relying on conceptual frameworks and empirical methods that originate from the social sciences and humanities (sociology, anthropology, linguistics, etc.), and also integrating insights from more technology-oriented disciplines, such as computer science and network science (for a first Handbook of Internet Studies, see Consalvo and Ess 2011). Wellman (2004, 2011) identifies three ages of Internet Studies. During the first age (1995 98), dystopians were convinced that the Internet could disconnect us from each other (Wellman 2011, 19), while utopians saw the Internet as a bright light shining above everyday concerns. It was a technological marvel, thought to be bringing a new Enlightenment to transform the world (ibid., 18). In this first age, little or no social science knowledge was involved in the debate, or empirical research. Moreover, early commentators did not hypothesize a connection between the online and the offline world. In the following years, the Internet became part of the everyday life of a growing part of the worlds population (Wellman and Haythornthwaite 2002), even though the digital divide still constitutes a major issue in both Western and non-Western countries (Warschauer 2003; Ferro et al. 2010). During the second age of Internet Studies (19982003), a growing body of empirical research led scholars to recognize that neither the utopian hopes nor the dystopian fears have been borne out and that we were starting to live in a world of ordinary people routinely using the Internet (Wellman 2011, 20). During the third age of Internet Studies (2004today), we have witnessed a shift from documentation to deeper analysis, further strengthening empirical research into Internet-related topics. Building on the findings of empirical research, Internet scholars are nowadays convinced that we should focus on the relationships between the online and the offline dimensions, instead of considering them totally separate spheres. Jensen, for example, considers that this divide between online and offline dimensions may have been a necessary step for theory development in early years, but it has become increasingly counter-productive in methodological terms (Jensen 2011, 43). Echoes of the first-age utopian and dystopian attitudes towards digital technology can be found in the widespread dichotomous interpretations of the relationship between social media and the so-called Arab Spring. As in early Internet Studies literature, there is little room for nuanced views and moreover, by focusing on the role of social media in Arab Springs, commentators tend to replicate the idea of the separateness of online and offline worlds and to

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458 F. Comunello and G. Anzera overemphasize the newness of social media. As we shall see in the following pages, in the age of convergence culture (Jenkins 2006) no media environment can be considered isolated from other media environments, while online and offline dimensions are increasingly intertwined. The impact framework may be more conceptually misleading. Commentators have tried to evaluate the impact of social media on the Arab Spring, therefore implicitly adopting a technologically deterministic framework. Technological determinism is a theoretical perspective that assumes that the relationship between technology and society can be described as one-way effects of technology on society: in other words, that technology shapes society. Similarly, first-age Internet commentators (both utopians and dystopians) mainly focused on the consequences of the Internet for society, without considering the complex interactions between technological and social factors, the various contexts in which technologies are used, and the different purposes people pursue by using technology in other words, without considering what people do with mediated communication (Baym 2010, 59).
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Social media and social network sites literature Sociologists have described the shift from communities to networks: in the last few decades, the latter have become the main organizing structure in society (Wellman 1979). More recently, networked individualism has been identified as the main social operating system (Rainie and Wellman 2012) in contemporary societies: following this perspective, the individual has become the primary unit of connectivity a switchboard, between ties and networks (Wellman and Haythornthwaite 2002, 34). Such forms of individualized interaction are enabled rather than determined by digital technology, and are further enhanced by ubiquitous and mobile communication (Castells et al. 2007). Far from leading to isolation, the rise of individualism changes the patterns of sociability in terms of increasingly selective and self directed contacts. The critical matter is not technology, but the development of networks of sociability based on choice and affinity, breaking the organizational and spatial boundaries of relationships (ibid., 1434; emphasis original), thus leading to forms of networked sociability (Hampton 2004). The general framework for such transformations is represented by the network society, a social structure that has been described by Castells (1996), who also focused on its global implications. Following Castells, we can define a network society as a society whose social structure is made of networks powered by microelectronics-based information and communication technologies (Castells 2004b, 3). Such concepts have been recently applied to social interactions taking place on social media and social network sites (SNS). Apart from their growing popularity worldwide, SNS are particularly interesting for sociologists because they represent environments in which to observe publicly articulated (boyd 2004) self-presentation and relational practices; in SNS, such practices appear more visible and trackable than in other contexts (both online and offline). boyd and Ellison define SNS as web-based services that allow individuals to: 1. Construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system; 2. Articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection; 3. View and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the system. The nature and nomenclature of these connections may vary from site to site. (boyd and Ellison 2007) Early research on social network sites has mainly focused on identity performances and selfpresentation practices (e.g. boyd 2008; Livingstone 2008; Walther et al. 2008), as well as on

Islam and ChristianMuslim Relations 459 social relations and friending strategies (e.g. Boase et al. 2006; Ellison, Steinfield and Lampe 2007; Ito et al. 2010); it has also addressed privacy-related issues (Barnes 2006; Gross and Acquisti 2005). More recently, as SNS are becoming increasingly integrated into everyday life and the most popular among them, such as Facebook, can be defined as mainstream sites of relational maintenance (Baym 2010, 134) research has started to include more specialized issues (Comunello 2011), including the role of SNS in enabling new forms of civic engagement and political participation (Johnson et al. 2011; Loader and Mercea 2011). Moreover, scholars are starting to become aware that, as well as analysis of single platforms, cross-platform analyses are needed, and a broader ecological approach, in order to consider the wide variety of platforms through which people pursue their goals. Digital and social media, in fact, represent environments: like the physical environments we live in, each offers specific facilities and constraints to its user (some actions can technically be carried out, others cannot). As in physical environments, moreover, users apply both socially-shared usage norms and more idiosyncratic attitudes to each environment, building on the facilities provided by the environment and further shaping this architecture. Recently, Facebook and Twitter have begun to play a major role worldwide. As of December 2011, Facebook (http://www.facebook.com), with its 845 million monthly active users, qualifies as the most popular SNS worldwide,1 even if local SNS are still the most popular in some countries (such as China and Russia, for instance). Twitter (http://www. twitter.com), on the other hand, despite being far less popular than Facebook, provides specific features that appear effective in information sharing and in supporting activism and mobilization.2 While early research into Twitter has mainly focused on user motivation and usage practices (Huberman, Romero and Wu 2009; Zhao and Rosson 2009), scholars have recently started to consider conversational dynamics and information spread patterns (Wu et al. 2011; Yardi and boyd 2010), the role of Twitter in emergency contexts (Bruns et al. 2012), and the relationship between Twitter and political activism (Small 2011; Ampofo, Anstead and OLoughlin 2011). Convergence culture and civic engagement Following Jenkins, contemporary society is characterized by what can be defined as convergence culture: a culture where old and new media collide, where grassroots and corporate media intersect, where the power of the media producer and the power of the media consumer interact in unpredictable ways (Jenkins 2006, 25960). In such a context, separating what users do with one medium from what they do with other media would be misleading: even so-called old and new media create a continuum, and users are constantly shifting from one platform to another. In order to better understand the social and cultural dynamics surrounding activism and information spread during Arab Springs, isolating social media from other platforms can be justifiable for analytical purposes. (We need to focus on single elements, and analyse them in depth, in order to better understand the whole picture.) Nevertheless, we have to be aware that people continually shift from one platform to another, from grassroots to broadcast media, from online to offline contexts. If we focus on independent information spread, for instance, we should not limit our analysis to independent grassroots media: as Jenkins points out, grassroots media can have the role of creating and sharing information, but often, for larger audiences to reach that information, broadcast media amplification is needed: [t]he power of the grassroots media is that it diversifies; the power of broadcast media is that it amplifies. Thats why we should be concerned with the flow between the two (ibid., 268).

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460 F. Comunello and G. Anzera Some scholars suggest that the participatory practices related to convergence culture provide people (especially young people) with skills that could also be applied to civic and political engagement (Jenkins et al. 2009). Such perspectives are summarized by Bennett:
Some even ascribe civic engagement qualities to many activities that occur in online social networking and entertainment communities. For example, Henry Jenkins, Cathy Davidson, Mimi Ito, and Jochai Benkler argue that many forms of shared activity online (from blogging, to conflict and protest behavior in gaming, fan and entertainment sites) represent forms of civic or media engagement. (Bennett 2008, 2)

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For further discussion of the relationship between media and civic engagement, see also Dahlgren (2009) and Livingstone (2010). Castells has broadly analysed what he denes as the new public sphere (Castells 2008), considering power and counterpower dynamics. He has also focused on activist groups worldwide, studying the relationships between their organizational models and their communication strategies (Castells 2004a, 2009). From his perspective, power is strongly related to communication issues, and the rise of communication networks has contributed to changing power relations. In this scenario, digital media are powerful tools for connecting the local and global dimensions, and for supporting citizen involvement and participation, mainly through forms of mass self-communication (Castells 2009, 63). From its original emphasis on reaching out to a mass audience, the movement has shifted to stimulate mass citizen participation by making the best of the interactive capacity offered by the Internet (ibid., 327). Exploring the role of social media during the Arab Spring The role of social media during protests was explored even before the Arab Spring. In 2009, for instance, protestors against the Iranian national election used Twitter to spread independent information, and gained widespread support from Western social media users (Gaffney 2009). In previous years, scholars focused on early examples of technology-supported activism, studying, for instance, how activists used text messaging to organize a revolt against Estrada, the former Philippine president (Rheingold 2002); or how the Zapatista movement used the Internet as an organizing and mobilizing tool (Castells 2004a). Digital media critics and scholars began their analysis in the early stages of the Arab Spring. Among them, Gladwell, Morozov and Shirky strongly influenced the public debate. We have decided to briefly analyse their opinions, for three main reasons: first, they are regarded as experts in digital and social media; second, their analyses have strongly influenced the public debate; finally, their opinions can be considered as paradigmatic of the opposing points of view on the topic. In this paragraph, we shall not refer to academic literature; we shall instead refer to the opinions expressed through the media by influential digital media critics and/or scholars. Some recent findings by Internet scholars will be discussed in the following paragraph. In 2010, Gladwell analysed the role of social media in the 2009 Iranian protests (Gladwell 2010). Many analyses of the Arab Spring have referred to his article, either agreeing with or refuting his argument. Gladwell compares the kind of activism associated with social media with previous forms of activism (such as the US civil rights movement in the 1960s), arguing that social media is built around weak ties: on that basis, Facebook activism succeeds not by motivating people to make a real sacrifice but by motivating them to do the things that people do when they are not motivated enough to make a real sacrifice (ibid., 467). Moreover, effective forms of activism are often high risk, and need, therefore, precision and discipline; social media, on the contrary, are not about this kind of hierarchical organization. Facebook and the like are tools for building networks, which are the opposite, in structure and character, of hierarchies (ibid., 47). Networks are adaptable and effective in low risk situations, but have

Islam and ChristianMuslim Relations 461 real difficulty reaching consensus and setting goals. They cant think strategically; they are chronically prone to conflict and error (ibid., 48). In Gladwells perspective, social media are powerful tools for activists self-expression, but they make it harder for that expression to have any impact (ibid., 49). In his article, Gladwell refers to both Morozovs and Shirkys work. The latter s Here comes everybody (Shirky 2008) is defined as the bible of the socialmedia movement (Gladwell 2010, 49). In a 2011 article, Shirky analyses the Internets contribution to several political movements, underlining that, even if there have been many examples of the activists failing, social media have become coordinating tools for nearly all of the worlds political movements, just as most of the worlds authoritarian governments are trying to limit access to it (Shirky 2011). Shirky focuses on the role of social media in coordinating and documenting real world action, as well as on their role in strengthening the public sphere, as previous media (such as the printing press) have done in the past. Following his perspective, the best practical reason to think that social media can help bring political change is that both dissidents and governments think they can. Shirky also advocates for a shift from an instrumental to an environmental view of the effects of social media on the public sphere.3 Morozov criticizes the cyber utopian perspective, arguing that digital tools are simply, well, tools, and social change continues to involve many painstaking, longer-term efforts to engage with political institutions and reform movements (Morozov 2011). He focuses on the rich offline activities in which protesters have been involved, proposing that [t]racing the evolution of these activist networks would require more than just studying their Facebook profiles; it would demand painstaking investigative work on the phone and in the archives that cannot happen overnight (ibid.). In Morozovs opinion, commentators that support the Twitter revolution perspective are affected by fetishism for technology, but [t]he current fascination with technology-driven accounts of political change in the Middle East is likely to subside (ibid.), as happened with technologies that were somehow involved in previous forms of activism (such as the telegraph, the radio, etc.). In order to draw a more accurate picture, deeper political and sociological analyses are needed. Internet research and the Arab Spring: some rst research results Although Internet scholars have increasingly devoted attention to the role of digital media in political activism, little empirical research has yet been published on the role of social media in the Arab Spring. This might be related both to timing (the publication process in scientific journals normally takes several months), and to language limitations (only scholars who read Arabic can provide us with a complete picture, while others must limit their analysis to the messages written in English or French).4 We shall give a brief account of a selection of the first empirical research on the topic, in order to show the complexity of both their results and of their methods. Abdul-Mageed et al. (2011) focus on the linguistic features of a corpus of tweets in Arabic, referring to the Arab Spring uprisings, also providing a sentiment analysis of these tweets. Hassanpour (2011) applies a dynamic threshold model for participation in network collective action to demonstrate, maybe counterintuitively, that media disruption can accelerate revolutionary action. Papacharissi and de Fatima Oliveira (2011) analyse the rhythms of news storytelling on Twitter, focusing on the 25 January Egyptian uprising coverage. They apply frequency analysis, combined with computerized content and in-depth discourse analysis. Their results show that news feeds collectively generated by citizens, bloggers, activists, journalists, and media outlets expose the temporal incompatibilities between live tweeting news and reporting (ibid., 23); while many assume that such movements are leaderless,

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462 F. Comunello and G. Anzera Papacharissi and de Fatima Oliveira underline the role of crowdsourcing elites; moreover, the news streams generated during uprisings can be defined as affective, as they blend opinion, fact and emotion (ibid., 24). Nevertheless, in countries where expression is restricted, affective statements become political statements, and affect may signify the political (ibid., 25). As for April 2012, one of the major attempts to systematize both theoretical concerns and empirical research, from a communication and Internet studies perspective, can be found in a special section of the International Journal of Communication.5 Hofheinz (2011), for instance, appeals to researchers for a shift of paradigm, abandoning obsession with the newest technologies and focusing on the long-term social and cultural effects of Internet and mobile phone use. Eltantawy and Wiest (2011) apply resource mobilization theory, and argue that social media played an instrumental role in the Egyptian protests, with regard both to collective action and to the organization of social movements. Aouragh and Alexander (2011) distinguish between the Internet as a tool for organizing dissent, and the Internet as a space where dissent can be expressed and articulated. Authors reject the utopians/dystopians polarization, propose a shift from perspectives that try to separate the Internet from other media (with a major focus on satellite television), and call for a deeper analysis of the relationship between online and offline activism. Iskander (2011) analyses the connections between new and old media, focusing on the Egyptian context. Harlow and Johnson (2011) carry out a content analysis of Egyptian protest coverage from three different sources: The New York Times (NYT), the Twitter feed of a NYT reporter, and the grassroots media site Global Voices, concluding that despite competition from blogs and social media when it came to coverage of the Egyptian protests, the NYT still fell back on routine patterns that potentially marginalize and undermine protesters (ibid., 1370), whereas Global Voices offered a participatory approach that gained credibility among readers. Several datasets have been empirically analysed by various authors. Wilson and Dunn, for instance, analyse three data sets (emerging from interviews to protest participants, transnational public, and tech-savvy coordinators; and from 675,713 #jan25 tweets), offering insights on participant media use, and concluding that social media was not central to protesters communication and organization (Wilson and Dunn 2011, 1263), even if they can be described as an integral and driving component in the media landscape (ibid., 1269). Lotan et al. (2011) analyse news production and dissemination on Twitter with regard to the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings, based on two large datasets: information flow and sub-flows, as well as different actor types (participants, mainstream media, general interest readers), are taken into account; the authors conclude that these actors, working together, can constitute a particular kind of online press, and raise questions about the meaning of objectivity in contemporary journalism (ibid., 1400). Digital evangelists vs. techno-realists: the key points of debate Interest in the role of social media in uprisings during the so-called Arab Spring caused a large number of reflections to be made over the last two years. The intent was to determine the real weight of social media as a tool and how this technology could affect the achievement of regime change. The enthusiasm for social media caused some Western scholars, the so-called digital evangelists, to consider these kinds of devices as an indispensable tool for the rebels (De Boer 2011; Guy 2011; Shirky 2011; Howard et al. 2011). Opposing this is a sceptical view formed by researchers we term techno-realists (Pilkington 2011; Morozov 2011; Gladwell 2010; Zuckerman 2011; Palfrey, Etling and Faris 2009; Etling, Faris and Palfrey 2010), who consider social media tools as irrelevant gadgets, more useful for security forces protecting the

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Islam and ChristianMuslim Relations 463 regimes than for protesters (and especially for the surveillance squads operating in neopatrimonial states). It is interesting to note that both digital evangelists and techno-realists focus on the same eight dimensions of social media usage. However, the two waves of thought reached completely different conclusions on the real importance of these tools in relation to successful regime change efforts. In the following list, we shall inspect the eight dimensions, noting the disputed issues and the main points of debate. (1) Ideology and planning Digital evangelists consider social media to be a formidable instrument for quickly spreading ideologies, doctrines and thoughts, to limit the influence of official media (controlled by government), and to explain the philosophy and reasons behind protests. Moreover, they consider social media particularly effective for fast planning and deployment of rebel forces. Techno-realists are sceptical regarding the use of social media to spread revolutionary ideologies, to sustain effective uprisings, and to mobilize parts of the population (specifically peasants, retired people, the working class) that are not accustomed to or competent in the use of social media. (2) Training and tactics Digital evangelists believe that specific social media (especially YouTube) are effective instruments in rebel training, with special regard to coping with security forces using specific tactics and showing how repression squads operate and perform, especially in urban guerrilla warfare. Techno-realists define this aspect as a Western, romantic, nave vision of social media; they assert that it is unrealistic to expect to learn via the Internet how to deal with the military, capable repression forces (such as Arab security bodies), or ruthless paramilitary units (often part of the coercion system acting in the neopatrimonial states). Protestors risk arrest, injury or death and must be strongly committed to street actions; protesters who decide to leave domestic safety and to challenge a menacing repression force cannot be compared with acts of keyboard activism based on a flow of complaints on social media. (3) Communications For digital evangelists, the movements leadership can use social media to rapidly and safely communicate with other cells or allied groups in the country; in this way the core of the rebellions can avoid being dangerously exposed during transfers or meetings, all occasions to be retaliated against or ambushed by security squads. Techno-realists consider this condition as a negligible advantage because of the low level of diffusion of the web and the low access rate to digital technologies in Arab populations. This situation limits communication through social media between a movements leadership and distant cadres and cells, especially with militants who are far from urban areas or located in remote, inaccessible districts. (4) Deployment and rapid response Digital evangelists judge social media as a valuable tool for organizing mass mobilizations without advance notice and showy preparation, and arranging swift deployment of protesters in areas that are not covered or protected by security forces. Other rebels can deceive police with fake announcements of mobilization. Techno-realists support a completely different view; they maintain that, if the movements leadership uses social media to mobilize protesters, the risk of providing a great advantage for repression forces is significantly high. By monitoring social media, security squads can swiftly react to sudden mobilization and can be deployed in specific locations.

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464 F. Comunello and G. Anzera (5) Costs Social media, in the digital evangelist view, can reduce the costs of mobilization for the rebels (e.g. shrinking expenses for communications and propaganda); this can lower the dependence of the protesters on foreign sponsors and enhance the perception (and legitimacy) of rebels as autochthonous and local actors not linked to foreign interests. Techno-realists also talk about lower costs and social media, but as an advantage for government agencies. In their view, social media are tools with low security levels for the people using these technologies; monitoring social media (and obtaining specific data from Internet service providers) could allow a small, skilled group of officers to control the rebellions progresses. (6) Flexibility Digital evangelists note that the use of social media to organize protests is highly flexible; if a government tries to limit access to these technologies or to shut the Internet down (a controversial step that can be considered a defeat for the regime, showing that the government is not capable of controlling the protesters without draconian measures), the rebels can rapidly revert to the traditional tools to keep the protest alive, using leaflets, fax-machines and telephones, which can be profitably used to complement social media. Techno-realists support a different conception of flexibility; indeed, by using social media, security forces (notably those skilled in the control of civil society, as in neopatrimonial states) can adapt their monitoring activities, e.g. checking specific subjects suspected of being linked to the rebels, or avoiding mass arrests by capturing key figures and decimating the rebel movements. (7) Resilience Digital evangelists maintain that the use of social media raises the robustness of rebel movements by adopting technological tricks such as secret IPs, devices able to avoid the effects of an Internet shutdown, or virtual and private networks. Techno-realists consider the dependence on social media to be full of risks for the rebels if the government chooses to shut down the Internet or other services (such as the SMS service). Even if this decision may be questioned, if the regime feels that it can inflict a decisive blow on the rebels due to their dependence on social media, it may opt for this strategy. (8) Propaganda/media diplomacy Digital evangelists are convinced that the use of social media is an important tool for protesters to establish a channel between rebels and international public opinion; the movements leadership can explain the reasons for the uprising, by either using social media or obtaining access to global media. Techno-realists note the possibility that intelligent and ruthless security forces can use social media to spread false information, frighten people, ambush rebel forces, manage the public debate on the reasons behind protests, or damage the reputation of rebels by false accusations. This list of the key points of debate between digital evangelists and techno-realists highlights three main issues. First, the analysis of the connections between social media and the Arab uprisings touches the same issues, even if the two blocs reach opposite conclusions. Second, it appears evident that each approach only enables us to grasp particular aspects of the phenomenon. Third, and most notably, both digital evangelists and techno-realists can identify specific traits of the process, but without dismantling the arguments of their opponents, as Papic and Noonan explain (2011). For example, it may be true (as digital evangelists claim) that rebels use social media for fast deployment, to keep secret their target and the identity of the places where they will mobilize a mass of people, but, at the same time the techno-realist evaluation is also valid, stating that social media (especially in the context of the

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Islam and ChristianMuslim Relations 465 neopatrimonial states) are valuable tools for skilful repression forces to monitor the movement of protesters or identify and control the leaders of rebellions. Conclusion: lessons learned (so far) For a better understanding of the role of social media in the Arab uprising, we should abandon any technological deterministic framework: instead of focusing on the consequences of technology for society, we should consider the complex interactions between society, technology and political systems. The Internet and especially social media does not determine the shift from communities to networks: rather it enables it, and makes the networked structure of society more visible, while empowering networked individuals (Rainie and Wellman 2012). Moreover, the availability of technology and its effective use are still critical issues in large parts of the Arab societies. Furthermore, we are not dealing with a zero-sum game: social media can be effective tools both for the rebels and for the repressive machine. In fact, the principal outcomes of research and reflections on the connections between social media and the Arab Spring can be summarized in a decalogue. First, we must note that social media are not strong enough to cause revolutions, even if they may become, if used properly, effective tools for training, recruitment and organization (Papic and Noonan 2011). Second, the role of social media must be related to fair accessibility for the populations; if access is denied or limited, the effects of social media will be weaker (Anderson 2011). Third, in the setting of neopatrimonial states, even if social media can be effective in organizing movements, when it comes to people acting in the street and confronting a frighteningly repressive machine, as in the Middle Eastern sultanistic dictatorships (Gladwell 2010), the inspiration cannot be provided through Facebook or Twitter. Fourth, as Gladwell (2010) remarks, a strong and sturdy movements leadership cannot be easily adapted to the horizontal, rather than hierarchical architecture proposed by social media. Fifth, as Morozov has pointed out, cyber-enthusiasts (whom he defines as the internets cheerleaders) too often forget that security forces can also use social media to monitor populations and to thwart protesters (Morozov 2011). Sixth, as Hassanpour (2011) has demonstrated, an Internet shutdown is not an advisable card for the sultan to play; when Mubarak tried to stop the dissenters by shutting down the Internet and blocking cell phone coverage (28 January 2011), his action caused an eruption of protests and not a stalemate in the demonstrations. These findings may suggest that social media are judged by the sultans as an important and troublesome tool, but that stopping the Internet is not enough to stop the revolutionaries. Furthermore, disrupting communication channels between people (especially cell phone communications) pushed even apolitical people to take action, making it sound as if the regime was coming to an end. Seventh, as Etling, Faris and Palfrey have noted, even if it is right to avoid shallow enthusiasms for social media, it is important that scholars put continuous research effort into how new technologies and social media can be proficiently used to struggle against dictatorships and authoritarian governments (Etling, Faris and Palfrey 2010). Eighth, as demonstrated in valuable research (Zweiri and Wootton 2008; Etling et al. 2009), the impact of social media on political and social organization will be relevant in the coming crucial years, as societies shift from the revolutionary phase to a post-neopatrimonial phase, producing new forms of governance and different political actors. Ninth, as Shirky (2011) points out, social media are reshaping the public sphere; what he calls the conservative dilemma is plaguing dictatorships: because it is difficult to limit the diffusion of the Internet and, as the usual responses, censorship and propaganda, are highly ineffective, means to thwart the progressive effects of these technologies will represent a constant challenge for contemporary regimes. Tenth, and finally, when analysing insurrectionary processes it is important to

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466 F. Comunello and G. Anzera evaluate the influence of social media on specific components of the revolutionary arc; as Howard et al. (2011) discovered, social media during the Arab Spring played a key role for three reasons: these technologies helped to shape the political and social debates during the pre-revolutionary phase; helped to mobilize people as the rise of anti-government online discussions heralded street actions; and helped to globally spread voices against regimes. Social media allowed the social groups that triggered street actions to be connected and organized. These scholars have deduced that, even if social media cannot be defined as the engine of revolutions, they played an important role in affecting the actions of small groups of skilful activists who promoted the mass demonstrations. As we have shown, empirical research on this topic has hitherto produced controversial results: there is no evidence that clearly supports either techno-realist or digital evangelist perspectives. For a better understanding of the role of social media in the Arab uprisings, we should in fact abandon such dichotomous visions. We should also focus more on the specific context where the uprisings are taking place, concentrating on the peculiarities of the different areas involved. Moreover, as Internet researchers have pointed out, social media should not be considered as isolated from other media, nor online mediated activity as isolated from offline activism. For now, we can surely conclude that a more empirical research is needed. For a better understanding of our subject, moreover, we need to better integrate multiple disciplinary perspectives, and to build a conceptual framework that rejects oversimplifying, dichotomous perspectives. We are dealing with a complex subject that requires complex analytical frameworks and hope that our article will make a contribution.

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Notes
1. Official data provided by Facebook: http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx?NewsAreaId=22 (accessed 17 April 2012). 2. For instance, Twitter only supports short messages (the limit is 140 characters, hence its definition as a microblogging site); links and photographs can also be shared. While friendship on Facebook is a symmetrical relationship (both parts need to accept the friends request), on Twitter the relationship is asymmetrical (follower /following): there is no need to follow back someone who is following us, and only a small minority of users have a private profile, while others do not have to authorize/ approve people willing to follow them. As the majority of profiles are open, users can both read tweets by users they follow and have access to general discussions, mainly through a keyword search (# hashtags); the most popular themes discussed at a specific moment, worldwide or in single countries, become trending topics, thereby gaining further popularity. Users also have the opportunity to retweet a message to their followers, thus contributing to its (viral) spread, or to address tweets to specific users (@mention). 3. The two authors confront their opposing views in Gladwell and Shirky (2011). 4. Some of the authors we are referring to in the present paragraph may not recognize themselves under the label Internet scholar ; however, we have decided to include them on the basis of their analytical consideration of the relationships between the technological and the social factors that are related to Internet use, consistent with the multidisciplinary tradition of Internet Studies. 5. As we cannot summarize the whole special section, we have decided to give a brief account of the papers that will be useful for further development of this article. Nevertheless, we strongly recommend reading the whole special section, as all articles provide inspiring perspectives, from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view.

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