In the Court of 5th Judicial Magistrate at Bankura, Dist. Bankura. PRESENT: Mr. Sk. Md.

. Arif Hasan, 5th J.M., Bankura. Misc Case No. 59/10 Misc case No. 135/10
Smt. Saraswati Bauri vs. Dhiren Bauri & ors. JUDGEMENT DELIVERED ON: January 20, 2014 Author: Mr. Sk. Md. Arif Hasan, 5th J.M., Bankura
Claim: Protection Order, residential order and Damages under Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 [herein after called as DV Act] against the respondents. Respondents: 1) Dhiren Bauri; 2) Lakshman Bauri; 3) Dukkhiram Bauri; 4) Sukhen Bauri; 5) Kumkum Bauri; 6) Sandhya Bauri; 7) Latika Bauri, 8) Uttala Bauri.

JUDGEMENT
Fact behind this action: 1. This is the case of an unfortunate widow who lost her husband at a very young age. Smt. Saraswati Bauri, the aggrieved, is now 34. Late Lalu Bauri was her husband. He expired some six years. Dhiren, Lakshman, Dukhiram and Sukhen are Lalus brothers respectively. Kumkum, Latika, Sandhya and Uttala are their wives. 2. Since the death of Lalu, according to Smt. Saraswati Bauri, she was tortured a lot at her matrimonial house. Dhiren, Lakshman, Dukhiram, Sukhen and their wives tortured her. They quarreled with her off and when. They even assaulted her quite a few times. They created a compelling situation for Saraswati to leave her matrimonial house. Finally, on one fine morning she was driven out from there. They denied all her rights in the matrimonial house. In such situation Smt. Saraswati Bauri, the aggrieved, sought assistance of Mrs. Aparna Dutta (Roy), the protection officer, Bankura. So, Mrs. Dutta brought this action against Dhiren and his brothers and their wives, the respondents, for Smt. Bauri. She brought this action through filing a Domestic incident report. Three reliefs were sought for in this case for Smt. Bauri. They are a) protection order, b) residential order and c) compensation order respectively. Defence: 3. Dhiren, Lakshman, Dukhiram, Kumkum, Latika and Sandhya contested this case. They in their joint W/O took the defence that the facts alleged by Saraswati are all false. They did neither subject her to any domestic violence; nor, they had ever created any disturbance in Saraswatis possession or occupation in her residence in the matrimonial home. They did not drive her out from there. Saraswati voluntarily left her matrimonial home. They live in separate mess. Sukhen and Uttala did not contest this case. Trial: 4. During the trial of this case, Saraswati had examined two witnesses. She examined herself as PW-1 and tendered Jagat Jiban Bauri, her uncle, as PW-2. Dhiren and other respondents
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examined one witness only. They tendered Dhiren as witness for them. He was examined as OPW-1. No documentary evidence was produced by either of the parties. POINTS FOR DETERMINATION 5. With reference to factual matrix, I would frame the following points for deciding the case: (i) Is Saraswatis matrimonial house a shared house ? (ii)Was she subjected to any sort of domestic violence there at the instance of respondents? (iii)Is she required to be awarded with protection order, residence order and compensation order or any of them? (iv) Is this action maintainable against Kumkum, Latika, Sandhya and Uttala?

DECISION WITH REASONS 6. For convenience I would take all points together.
7. This case is of some interest because it is the first I have had under the relatively new Domestic Violence Act, 2005. I would first decide the maintainability issue of this case i.e. point nos. (i) & (iv), before turning to the enquiry about the alleged domestic violence upon Smt. Saraswati Devi. The maintainability of this case depends upon two facts. 1 st is if Saraswatis matrimonial house is or is not a shared house? The second is if Kumkum, Latika, Sandhya and Uttala could be made party respondents in this case or not? So far as the maintainability of this case against Dhiren, Lakshman, Dukhiram and Sukhen are concerned, I am sure that there is no ambiguity about its maintainability. I have no doubt that they were in a domestic relationship with Saraswati Devi. They are her deceased husbands brothers; or in other words they are her brothers-in-law. [See, S. 2(f) of D.V. Act; S.4 of New Zealands Domestic Violence Act, 1995, a statute in pari materia]. They also admit this. But, the trouble is about its maintainability against Kumkum, Latika, Sandhya and Uttala. I have no doubt that they were in a domestic relationship with Saraswati and till now they are as such. [See, S. 2(f) of D.V. Act]. They are the wives of her husbands brother. Saraswati said this in her evidence. The contesting respondents also did not dispute it. I must say that they in their W/O, had impliedly admitted this. So far as the nature of Saraswatis matrimonial house is concerned, I am quite sure that it is a shared house. I would give reasons for it. Two conditions are necessary for a house to be shared house. 1st the aggrieved and respondents or any of them either jointly or singly have an interest either in law or in equity in the house together with its appurtenances or it belongs to a Joint family. Having read the statement of objects and reasons of the DV Act, I believe this joint family does not have the same meaning as that of a HUF, but it means joint-ness of the family qua the property. I would see the appurtenances of a dwelling house to be part of it; otherwise it would be impossible to live in a dwelling house without privy, bathroom etc. which generally exist on appurtenant. [See, Kalipada v. Tulsidas AIR 1960 Cal 467; Neelkamal v. Kamakhya AIR 1928 Cal 539; Maniklal v. Gouri Shankar AIR 1968 Cal 245]. The second is that the aggrieved person must live or have lived at any stage of her life in the house with the respondents either jointly or singly but in a domestic relationship. [See, S.2(s) of DV Act]. Now apply that section to this case. Dhiren and all other respondents in this case were related to Lalu either by blood or by marriage. Deceased Lalu was Saraswatis husband. So, Saraswati lived in a domestic relationship with Dhiren and all other respondents by the reason of her marriage with Lalu. Dhiren and other respondents admit that the matrimonial house is their paternal property and they including Lalu got it by Typed & Printed by me: 5th J.M., Bankura. Page 2 of 10

inheritance. [See, 8th and 9th line in the 2nd paragraph of the W/O]. Dhiren in his evidence said that their paternal properties have yet not been partitioned. After Lalus death Saraswati certainly inherited his estate. So, Saraswatis matrimonial house and its appurtenant are still the joint property of Saraswati and the respondents. Admittedly Saraswati lived in the matrimonial house till one year next after her husbands death i.e. till a few months before this case. I would, therefore, hold Saraswatis matrimonial house to be a shared household. 8. On the question of maintainability of this case against Kumkum, Latika, Sandhya and Uttala, I do find no difficulty. The answer is in S. 2(q) proviso and S. 19(1) proviso of DV Act. I will read both the provisos: S. 2(q) Provided that an aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of marriage may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the male partner. S. 19(1).. Provided that no order under clause (b) shall be passed against any person who is a woman. 9. Having read these two, I believe, the intention of legislators was to cover the female relatives of husbands also under the phrase respondent but to exclude any other females who may be in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved viz. step mother, sister, aunty, grandmother, brothers wife, husbands kept or girlfriend etc. So far as the word wife in the proviso of S. 2(q) is concerned, I do not believe that a widow who had not remarried but spent a considerable part of her life in her deceased husbands house yet after his death like Saraswati in this case, would be deprived of the benefit of the DV Act simply for the reason of her husbands death. If I were to decide this case with the eyes of hyper technical Judges, they would, I believe, have seen the word wife technically to mean a lady whose marriage has not been terminated either by divorce or by death. But, I do not believe in any such doctrine which says that simply because a brides husband had died, she would be excluded from the benefits of a beneficial legislation. I believe that the word wife in DV Act has a much extended meaning. According to my understanding it includes a widow also who once was wife of her deceased husband, but never thereafter became wife of any other. I believe, she would enjoy the same status and benefits under the DV Act as that of a wife. She, as I believe, is to be seen as wife of the deceased husband till she remarry any other; otherwise the very object of the DV Act would be frustrated and it would become dead letters of the statute book. I believe, the object of enacting this new statute was to suppress the vagrancy of certain women who have since long been subjected to different sorts of injustices and abuses at the hand of their relatives and family members especially from the matrimonial house or the house of male partners in a marriage like relations. Under the old Hindu law as it existed until 60 years ago, she had no rights at all apart from those of her husband. She was treated by the law more like a piece of his furniture than anything else. If anything was in her favour it was only that the husband could not sue her in trespass, but neither could he sue a piece of furniture. He could bundle his furniture out into the street, and so he could his wife. The law did not say him nay. If the husband turn her out, she has to go and find her lodging elsewhere. She had to find someone else who would take her in and provide some food out of pity or charity. She then had to approach before a civil court for declaring charge upon her husband's property and for an order of maintenance after paying adveloram court fees on her 12 months claim. For this she had to find someone
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philanthropic out who would give her the credit for purchasing adveloram court fees. And in the course of doing all this, the husband would divorce her so as to extinguish her cause of action. She then had to either beg on the street or had to beg before her paternal relatives for food and residence. The other option that would be left for her was to sell her dignity which, I believe, no lady would prefer to choose. Nevertheless, she could not be sure, if her paternal relatives would take her in or would decline her. So, if they decline, her ultimate address would be some dirty pavement of any lonely street. Thus, if she could find anyone to trust, it was this earth and open sky who would at least not decline her to bear. But, neither could she spend night on such layby without serious risk to her feminine dignity. Even if her husband, by the grace of luck, did not turn her out, nevertheless, if the husband dies his brother or father could also turn her out just as they could his old furniture. But the law is not standing still. The equity also stepped into in the meantime. I believe, the DV Act was a step in such progress. All that has changed now is that a wife is no longer her husbands chattel. The husband can no longer turn her out of the matrimonial home, even though he or his father may have, in point of law, the absolute title to the property as owner. She now has as much right as he to stay there even though the house does not stand in her name. [See, S. 17 of DV Act]. In short she now has a right of her own, derived no doubt from her husband, but still a right of her own, to assert the residence-right on the premises, no matter what her husband may say or do about it. I do not believe that this right would also die with her husbands death. I am quite sure that this DV Act, 2005 was enacted for giving few rays of justice to these ladies who were deplorably oppressed for long. Nothing would be more unjust than closing the doors of justice for such a woman simply for the reason of her husbands death which was beyond her control. I believe, if there is a wrong, the law must give a remedy. A judge, so far I believe, should not go by the black and white letters of statute ignoring the social condition for which it came into the statute book and should not deny justice on technical issues. Ubi jus ibi remedium. I would, therefore, hold this case to be quite maintainable against Kumkum, Latika, Sandhya and Uttala also. The decision to which I particularly desire to refer in support of my above interpretation is Seaford Court Estates Ltd. vs. Asher (1949) 2 All ER 155. I am fortified a lot by this decision. Lord Denning, J. said there: The English language is not an instrument of mathematical precision. Our literature would be much poorer if it were. This is where the draftsmen of Acts of Parliament have often been unfairly criticized. A Judge, believing himself to be fettered by the supposed rule that he must look to the language and nothing else, laments that the draftsmen have not provided for this or that, or have been guilty of some or other ambiguity. It would certainly save the judges trouble if the Acts of Parliament were drafted with divine pre-science and perfect clarity. In the absence of it, when a defect appears, a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament, and he must do this not only from the language of the statute, but also from a consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to it and of the mischief which it was passed to remedy, and then he must supplement the written word so as to give force and life to the intention of legislature. A judge should ask himself the question how, if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, they would have straightened it out? He must then do so as they would have done. A judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases.

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10. So far as the alleged domestic violence upon Saraswati is concerned, there is a couple of evidence on record. One is her own oral evidence. The other is Jagat Jibons oral evidence. The gist of Saraswatis evidence is that 15 years back she got married with Lalu. But, her husband died a few years back. Within one year of her husbands death she was driven out of her matrimonial home. After the demise of her husband they started picking quarrels with her on flimsy grounds and they used to assault her. Once she had sold one goat of her husband. She sold it because of her poverty and for arranging money for her subsistence. But, Dhiren and other respondents assaulted her over that issue. She told them why she sold it out. But, they did not listen. They even tried to kill her throttling neck. Finally they drove her out of the matrimonial home after physical assault. Similar is the evidence of Jagat Jibon. According to his evidence Saraswati was tortured a lot since her husbands death. The respondents denied her rights at matrimonial house and in her husbands property. Finally she was driven out. According to him Saraswati has been passing her days in utmost misery. Let me say at once, evidence in this case does not require to pass proof beyond reasonable doubt. I believe the standard of proof in this case would be preponderance of probabilities. I have no doubt that this case is more like a civil proceeding than a criminal case. 11. It is important to notice a few of Saraswatis cross examination. She said, I am not ready to reside at my matrimonial home. Then continued : It is impossible for me to reside there because the OPs quarrel with me and they are trying to kill me. Mr. Pranab Kumar Pal, Ld. Defence counsel, asked Saraswati as to the span of time she spent in the matrimonial house after her husbands death. How long you stayed at matrimonial home after your husbands death? She answered: After the death of my husband I stayed at my matrimonial home for about a year. After that I was driven out. A little later she was asked whether her residential room is not laying abandoned. She answered: It is a fact that my residence is laying in abandoned condition. The OPs are not letting me to stay at such residence. So, Smt. Bauri stayed at the shared house for about one year after her husbands death. But during this period she was abused both emotionally as well as physically. For this her life in matrimonial home became hell. On one hand her husbands memory pursuing her. Torture of the respondents was an addition to her grief. I have no doubt that Saraswati had loved her husband a lot. He left this earth when Saraswati was just 29. [See, PW-1s age on deposition sheet dated July 29, 2011]. She could have quite easily got married for the second time. But she preferred to remain a widow of Lalu only. So, she decided to spend her rest life at her matrimonial home with the memories of her husband. But, Dhiren and other respondents were not letting her to live there. It was impossible for her to stay there enduring the tortures of her brothers in law and their wives. Finally they turn her out. Evidence of Jagat Jibon also especially his cross examination suggests the same fact. Nevertheless, he said in his cross examination that Saraswati does help her brothers during the cultivation season. They are Bargadars. He also said that Saraswati does work under the Govt. project 100days work as well. I do not find any wrong in doing such works. After all Saraswati has to survive. Her husband is no more in this world. I believe that there would hardly be a philanthropic person, who would contribute to Saraswatis minimum livelihood requirements for the rest of her life gratuitously. So, she has to do some job for survival. I
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do not believe that doing such works would extinguish her rights in her husbands property or in her matrimonial house. 12. So far as the legal position is concerned, I believe simple quarrel may also amount to domestic violence if it picked up repeatedly and purposely. Let me say at once that any act or omission which endanger the health, safety or wellbeing of aggrieved person either physically or mentally would amount to domestic violence and would also include physical, sexual, economic, verbal and emotional abuses. [See, S. 3 DV Act and Explanation I of it]. What may be normal behaviour in one case could amount to domestic violence in another case depending on the fact and circumstances. [See, Explanation II of S.3, DV Act]. One statute in pari materia to which I particularly desire to refer here is The Domestic Violence Act, 1995 of New Zealand. After England, New Zealand was the 1st country in the history of the world, which 1st gave effect to Vienna Accord, 1994, Beijing Declaration and the Platform of Action, 1995 and General Recommendation No. XII, 1989 of The United Nations Committee on Convention on Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). I do admit that Englands D.V. & Matrimonial Proceeding Act, 1976 was enacted long ago, but, so far I believe, New Zealands DV Act is more comprehensive and similar to our DV Act. I would, therefore, chose the New Zealand Act. 13. It is important to notice the similarity of the provisions of New Zealand Domestic Violence Act and the languages used therein with our Domestic Violence Act, 2005. Both covers the same field and was enacted with the same object. I believe that this New Zealand Act could be used as an aid for interpreting our DV Act. I will read a few portions of both the statutes relevant to this case:
S.3, Indian DV Act, 2005: For the purposes of this Act, any act, omission or commission or conduct of the respondent shall constitute domestic violence in case it (a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb or well-being, whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved person or tends to do so and includes causing physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and economic abuse; or (b) . (c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any person related to her by any conduct mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b); or (d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental, to the aggrieved person. Explanation I.- For the purposes of this section,(i) "physical abuse" means any act or conduct which is of such a nature as to cause bodily pain, harm, or danger to life, limb, or health or impair the health or development of the aggrieved person and includes assault, criminal intimidation and criminal force; (ii) (iii)"verbal and emotional abuse" includes(a) insults, ridicule, humiliation, name calling and insults or ridicule specially with regard to not having a child or a male child; and (b) repeated threats to cause physical pain to any person in whom the aggrieved person is interested. (iv) "economic abuse" includes.. (c) prohibition or restriction to continued access to resources or facilities which the aggrieved person is entitled to use or enjoy by virtue of the domestic relationship including access to the shared household. Explanation II.- For the purpose of determining whether any act, omission, commission or conduct of the respondent constitutes "domestic violence" under this section, the overall facts and circumstances of the case shall be taken into consideration. Typed & Printed by me: 5th J.M., Bankura. Page 6 of 10

S. 3, New Zealand DV Act, 1995: (1) In this Act, domestic violence, in relation to any person, means violence against that person by any other person with whom that person is, or has been, in a domestic relationship. (2) In this section, violence means (a) physical abuse; (b) sexual abuse; (c) psychological abuse, including, but not limited to, (i) intimidation; (ii) harassment; (iii) damage to property; (iv) threats of physical abuse, sexual abuse, or psychological abuse; .. (4) Without limiting subsection (2), (a) a single act may amount to abuse for the purposes of that subsection; (b) a number of acts that form part of a pattern of behaviour may amount to abuse for that purpose, even though some or all of those acts, when viewed in isolation, may appear to be minor or trivial. (5) Behaviour may be psychological abuse for the purposes of subsection (2) (c) which does not involve actual or threatened physical or sexual abuse.

14. Having read these two, I am sure that repeatedly picking up quarrels with a sad widow who just has lost her husband would certainly amount to domestic violence. In my opinion, time has now come for recognising this sort of emotional violations as domestic violence. The definitions of Domestic Violence, verbal and emotional abuse and economic abuse in our DV Act are not exclusive but inclusive. The abuse may be physical as well as mental. A perfectly innocent expression, coupled with acts or conduct of the persons in the matrimonial house together with the surrounding situation or circumstances may amount to a psychological violence, torture, abuse, pressure etc. [See, Explanation II of S.3, DV Act; S v. Miranda 384 US 436, of US Supreme Court]. I would, therefore, hold that any act or omission which cause any emotional or psychological crisis or distress or pain in any womans mind would also be a domestic violence. I do believe the evidence of Saraswati regarding the respondents repeated picking up of quarrels with her. Applying the above interpretation and position of Law, I am sure that Saraswati was subjected to domestic violence, at least to the extent of emotional abuse. 15. I have been referred to the evidence of Dhiren. There he said that they have no objection if Saraswati again start residing in her husbands house. I am astonished what objection they could have? A bride without having any share or title even have the right of residence in her matrimonial house. [See, S.17 of DV Act]. So also a widow. I believe that the wife does not live at her matrimonial house under leave or licence of her husband or parents in law; but she remains there with her own right and because of the institution of marriage. It is her right as well as duty, though she cannot assign it to any other. It is her special equity, a right independent from her right u/s 17 DV Act which existed all along with all the wives and widows in this country since prior to 2005 even. [See, Janet Eves v. Stuart Eves (1975) 1 WLR 1338]. Mere four walls and a roof, as I believe, does not make the building a home. It is both the husband and wife who, by their joint effort, make it a house or in other words it remains a house for their joint effort. They both intend it for their joint use. They both, if not the bride alone, does a great deal of work to the house e.g. clean the dirt, keep the house pretty etc. They both improve or maintain or take care of it by their joint effort intending it to be a continuing provision for both of them and for their joint benefit, no matter in whose
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name it was purchased or who got it, in point of law, by inheritance or otherwise. In any case a couple gets married with no thought of what is to happen to their family assets should the marriage broke down. The spouse marries on the assumption, if not in law yet in equity at least, that the marriage will not break down but will continue until parted by death. Yet the family assets, as I believe, is not a res nullius. The improvements to the family assets by the bride or her loss of physical energy in resisting its depreciation cannot go without a legal consequence. The parents of the groom bring the bride into the matrimonial house intending it to be used by the bride also with others in the family and for their joint benefit as if it is her also, at least by conduct they led her to believe this. In short, the spouse as well as the husbands parents and relatives through the institution called marriage, as I could understand, create something very closed to resulting or implied or constructive trust. Or in other words I do find an equitable right for the bride to assert a residence right in the matrimonial house, though the superior courts in India, so far I know, might not have got the opportunity as yet to expressly say this. If the husband fails to remain there with her or deserts her or dies, her right, as I already said, remains unaffected. This right was perceived under old Hindu law even, though not in clear words. [See, Narada XIII, 25 &26; Golap Chunder Sarkars Translation p.153, 173 & 174; Manu, 3:55, 3:58, 8:28-29; Bai Devkore v Sanmukhram (1889) ILR 13 Bom 101]. The Indian DV Act, so far I believe, has only made a concise statutory codification of this right in section 17 of it. But, in this case Saraswati not only have a mere right of residence in her matrimonial home, but she has title i.e. co-ownership, a superior right, to it. Assuming, however, that Dhirens wife, Dhiren, his brothers and their wives have no objection if Saraswati again start residing in her matrimonial home, there still remains the question why she was compelled to leave the house, if I assume for a moment that they did not drove her out? I do not believe that she voluntarily left the house without any external compulsion or influence. She lost her husband in her full youth. She could have got married for the 2 nd time. But she preferred to remain a widow of her deceased husband. She had been staying at her matrimonial home till one year next after her husbands death. She had decided to spend her rest life with her husbands memory. I have no doubt that she had emotionally broken after her husbands death. She was mourning for her dead husband. I can understand her grief and sorrow. Why would such a lady leave her husbands house for nothing, in every corner of which her husbands memories were alive? Why would she leave the house after one long year of her husbands death? I have no doubt that some torture or domestic violence had been perpetrated upon her. The quarrels which Dhiren and other respondents quite often used to pick up with Saraswati, as I already said, is of course a domestic violence of the category called psychological violence or emotional abuse. I would, therefore, hold that Saraswati was domestically violated or in other words Dhiren and other respondents have perpetrated domestic violence upon her. For the reasons already discussed, I feel it necessary, as a court of law and equity as well, to awards protection and residence order for Saraswati. It is true, of course, Dhiren and his brothers are also joint owners and by virtue thereof, they also have a right to have access to every portion of the matrimonial home of Saraswati, a joint property of all of them. I know, by granting residence order, I am going to restrict this right of these co-owners to some extent. But that is a right which the courts, for the protection of the wife or widow, can restrict. Such a power to restrict arises out of her personal right, as I already said, to occupy the house. If respondents conduct is so outrageous as to make it impossible for her to live in the matrimonial home, the court can restrain them even from using the house even though they are joint owners. At least our D.V. Act gives such
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authority. [See, Devis v. Johnson (1978) 1 All E.R. 841; Gurasz v. Gurasz (1969) 3 WLR 482; S. 19 of our DV Act]. One speech of the father of Nation (Mahatma Gandhi) that I particularly desire to refer here is the more helpless a creature, the more it entitled to protection by men, from the cruelty of men. 16. Nevertheless, I do not think any compensation order is necessary in this case. So far as the mental torture or her emotional distress is concerned, I do not think she had suffered any permanent injury which necessitated a compensation order. Section 22 of DV Act, as I believe, has not created any new right of damages; but it had only recognised the common law reliefs under tort and gave authority to a magistrate exercising criminal jurisdiction for awarding such common law reliefs. I believe that the phrase for injuries, including mental torture and emotional distress in the section means all sorts of physical trespass e.g. assault, battery etc. of law of torts including nervous shock. Compensation for mental distress and mental torture could, as I understand, only be awarded if it amount to nervous shock or if it directly cause any injury or illness to the aggrieved. Somehow or other the court i.e. the magistrate has to draw a line between sorrow and grief for which damages are not recoverable, and nervous shock and psychiatric illness for which damages are recoverable. [See, Hinz v. Berry (1970) 2 QB 40; Hambrook v. Stokes (1925) 1 KB 141]. The evidences in this case of course suggest that Saraswati felt huge grief and sorrow for the acts of Dhiren and other respondents, but it does not suggest that Saraswati has been arrested with psychic illness or she suffered any permanent injury or suffered any nervous shock for such conduct. The other situation where I could award damages is for the conversion of Saraswatis property or chattels at her matrimonial home. It is important to notice the cross examination of Saraswati to which I already have referred to previously. She admits there that her residential room in the matrimonial home is still remained vacant in an abandoned condition. Though she said the reason for it. It is in an abandoned condition because the respondents are not letting her to live there. Nevertheless, this evidence suggests that neither Dhiren, nor any other respondent has used or is using her room at her matrimonial house. I can, therefore, not hold them guilty of the tort of conversion at least, though they are guilty of perpetrating domestic violence upon Saraswati. I would, therefore, dismiss Saraswatis claim for compensation. I will, as I already said, award her with protection and residence order only. 17. Hence, I do hereby ORDER that, this case U/s 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and the same is allowed in part and on contest. I do hereby restrain Dhiren Bauri, Lakshman Bauri, Dukhiram Bauri, Sukhen Bauri, Kumkum Bauri, Latika Bauri, Sandhya Bauri and Uttala Bauri respectively, the respondents, u/s 18 of the above Act from either committing or abetting or aiding any sort of domestic violence upon Saraswati Bauri and from picking any undue quarrel with her. I do restrain them further from making any unnecessary and undue or hurting or harsh or unpleasant interaction with Saraswati which may cause any pain, either mental or physical. They could, however, make normal interactions, if they wish. I do hereby restrain them further u/s 19 of the above Act from causing any obstruction or disturbance to Saraswatis peaceful possession in her matrimonial house situated at Borjora
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(Boltala) within PS- Barjora, Dist.- Bankura, or other properties of her husband which she inherited from him. They are further restrained from obstructing Saraswatis access to the matrimonial house in any manner whatsoever. They shall not, without permission of Saraswati Bauri, enter into the portion of the matrimonial house in which she used to reside during lifetime of her husband. They are further restrained u/s 19(1) & (2) of the said Act from encumbering those properties to the extent of her share in any manner whatsoever without sanction of this court. I do hereby direct the I/C, Borjora PS, u/s 19(5) of the above Act, to render necessary assistance for implementation of this order. In case of failure to comply with the above orders, Saraswati Bauri is at liberty to file necessary complaint before this court through appropriate proceeding u/s 31 of the Act. The parties are, however, at liberty for praying modification of this order, if in future the matrimonial house and other properties are equitably partitioned by metes and bounds by any regd. deed or decree of a competent court. Let a copy of this Judgement be supplied to Smt. Saraswati Bauri free of cost in terms of S. 24 of the aforesaid Act. Let another copy of this Judgement be forwarded to Mrs. Aparna Dutta (Roy), the Protection Officer, Bankura, for necessary information and for providing requisite assistance to Smt. Bauri. I do hereby direct Mrs. Aparna Dutta(Roy), u/s 9(2) read with S. 28 of the Act, to keep watch if this order is being complied with or not and to report. Let another copy of this Judgement be forwarded to the I/C, Borjora PS for necessary information and action. I do hereby dismiss, for the present, Smt. Saraswati Bauris claim for Compensation. The case is thus disposed of on contest. Note in concern registers.

(Sk. Md. Arif Hasan) Judicial Magistrate of 1st Class, 5th Court, Bankura. Dated: 20-01-14.

Typed & Printed by me:

5th J.M., Bankura.

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